A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Warwick, Centre for Social History

November 2002
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ABSTRACT

This is a history of the development of the manager in English football from 1880 until the mid-1960s. It is predicated on two main arguments. First, that football management in England has largely reflected the practical tradition of British management where managers are employed more for their experience than any qualifications that they might hold. Second, that the management of players during this period mirrored prevailing attitudes within society towards the handling of young, working-class men and because they lacked any management training, managers imposed their personality and authority on them. The thesis has a chronological structure. The first chapter provides a broad overview of British management up to 1970. Its aim is to provide an overall context for the rest of the thesis by analysing the history of British management, its culture, and also the role of education. Chapter 2 charts the early development of football management in the years up to 1914. The following chapter examines the emergence of early football managers during the same period. It examines, first, the relationship between a manager and his directors and how this has developed in light of football’s commercialisation process; second, how the training and background of managers has reflected trends within British management; and third, the manager’s relationship with his workers, the players. This framework will be used throughout the thesis. Chapter 4 is a case study of Herbert Chapman. Chapter 5 deals with the inter-War period and Chapter 6 looks at the emergence of modern football management from 1945 up to the Sixties. Chapter 7 assesses the socio-economic impact of a manager
on a team's performance during this period. The conclusion will briefly draw together the main themes and arguments of the thesis.
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<td>Annual General Meeting</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>Emergency General Meeting</td>
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<td>Professional Footballers’ Association</td>
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<td>SGM</td>
<td>Special General Meeting</td>
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<td>UEFA</td>
<td>Union des Associations Europeennes de Football</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Personality must be the key factor in managerial success. It is not a question of being a nice man or a nasty one, of being likeable or aloof, of being imaginative or cautious, hard or indulgent in discipline. All of these things are subordinate to the essential quality that, it seems, all the most successful managers have: the capacity to dominate. This is not just an overbearing manner, a thrusting of two fists at the world; it is not just arrogance. It is a steeliness in a man's make-up, the will to make his methods tell. He is the kind of man who will not permit interference by the amateurs, and the kind who will never be invited to work for a board not prepared to be overshadowed. The successful manager may have all kinds of talents, from charm to low cunning, but to stay successful he needs to be very close to indomitable.


[T]here's a contradiction in football terms ... a great football man is not necessarily a great man.


I'm sure he didn't like me - and I certainly didn't like him. I'll tell you one thing, though. I respected him. I sat scores of times in the dressing-rooms while tough, fit professionals players waited nervously. And above the tramp, tramp of his steps ... I could hear the flat Cullis voice chanting: 'I... will... not... have... a... coward... in... my... team.'

Former Wolverhampton Wanderers' player, Eddie Clamp on former manager Stan Cullis quoted in J. Holden, *Stan Cullis: The Iron Manager* (Derby, 2000), pp. 78-79

Today, football managers are celebrities. Through the media-driven hyperbole that has engulfed the game, they have been portrayed as figureheads: men who embody the clubs that they manage. Not only are their salaries commensurate with this new celebrity status, some have perceived managers as possessing mystical powers. Yet the job of the football manager is a highly volatile one, and while they take the plaudits for any success, they are more likely to receive brickbats and ultimately the sack for failure. How have football managers become, apparently, so important? This study aims to answer this question by charting the shifts within the football manager's role, placing it in the context of football's history whilst also exploring how these changes have been reflected not only in the wider world of British management but also in society as a whole.
Although it is a history up to 1966, some material has been included in later chapters that is outside the timeframe of the thesis. Its purpose is to highlight not only how earlier developments had an impact on the role of more recent managers but also how the present has provided continuities with football management’s past. The 1880-1966 period has been chosen because it marks, both at the start and the end, important changes within football and society in general. The late Victorian era ushered in the commercialisation of leisure. The 1880s signalled the beginning of modern football with the legalisation of professionalism and the birth of the Football League in 1888. By the Sixties, the modernisation of Britain had gathered momentum, and football was part of that process. More liberal attitudes (‘Sexual intercourse was invented in 1963’!) and policies were adopted, characterising a change from a previously rigidly stratified society to one in which there was a decline in deference. In addition, the country’s education system was beginning to expand as the first generation of working class students who had enjoyed a secondary education now graduated from universities in increasing numbers. At the same time as National Service was ending, football’s antiquated labour regulations, the maximum wage and the retain and transfer system, were being overhauled, laying the foundations for the game’s more rapid commercialisation during the decades that followed.

With the current interest shown in them, it is perhaps surprising that football managers have been largely absent from English football’s historiography. Tony Mason, for example, has commented on how the history of football has been written largely ‘in terms of ... institutions, players and matches’. There have been no

studies which have tried to make a link between the history of football management and other mainstream academic disciplines such as management studies or to compare the jobs of football managers with those of managers in other industries. Social histories of football have tended to analyse the importance of the game’s rising popularity and its commercial growth in a national social and economic context. In their excellent studies, Tony Mason, Nicholas Fishwick and Dave Russell have each emphasised the development of club management but without focusing on the evolving and changing nature of the manager’s role. Stephen Tischler, in his study of football before 1914, virtually ignores the day-to-day administration of clubs. Instead, he is more concerned with capital-labour relations that are analysed within a rigid Marxist framework.

One of the few academic studies that has dealt with the manager’s developing role in some depth is The Football World by the sociologist, Stephen Wagg. As its subtitle, A Contemporary Social History, suggests, it is only partly a work of history as it mainly concentrates on the period after the Second World War. Wagg attempted to blend a history, sociology and politics of football by focusing on the relationship between the media and the game’s continuing commercialisation together with an account of controversies over the value of coaching. He argues that from the inter-war period ‘a mystique began to be woven around the figure of the team manager’, and that this was desirable for directors, players and press alike.

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2 T. Mason, Association Football and English Society 1863-1915 (Brighton, 1980); N. Fishwick, English Football and Society 1910-50 (Manchester, 1989); D. Russell, Football and the English (Preston, 1997). Note: all works cited are published in London unless otherwise indicated.


Other academic work based on regional case studies or examinations of particular clubs, have also paid some attention to the manager’s role. In his study of West Ham, Charles Korr has shown how it employed fewer managers than any other club and how the motives of the directors were a determining factor in their relationship with the manager. Korr has also emphasised the importance of a manager’s link with the supporters and the impact that this had on club identity. Tony Arnold’s business history of professional football in Bradford mainly concentrates on the actions of the directors of the city’s two clubs, City and Park Avenue. It clearly shows how, before 1930, directors were really the managers of the club, and that the manager had a subordinate role. Amongst the recent economic literature on football, there has been a growing interest on the impact of the manager. Stefan Szymansi and Tim Kuypers, for example, have analysed the sport from both an economic and business perspective. Managers are looked upon as ‘competitive advantages’ who can make a difference to a team’s performance but this must be seen in the light of a contemporary economic climate for football in which the gap between the rich and poor clubs has been rapidly increasing.

The importance of the manager’s role has been recognised recently by a number of significant biographies. A pioneering study was Stephen Studd’s account of the career of Herbert Chapman who is perhaps the most emblematic managerial figure in the game’s history, in terms of the impact he is thought to have had on the

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evolution of the manager's role.\textsuperscript{7} Studd could have perhaps been more critical of Chapman, although his interpretation may have been influenced by the fact that Chapman left behind little contemporary material. Two other notable biographies are Stephen F. Kelly's book on Bill Shankly and Eamon Dunphy's life of Matt Busby.\textsuperscript{8} Unlike many books on sporting celebrities, these cannot be accused of hagiography. Both are written in a broadly historical context and their research benefits from their relative insider status; Dunphy as a former player and Kelly as Liverpool's official historian.

The management of football clubs had begun to take on greater significance during the late nineteenth century when players started to be paid and the game became a commercial proposition. But how were clubs run in the age of limited liability? Did they model themselves on any particular form of management and what influenced the thinking and actions of committees and boards of directors? It will be one of the major themes of this thesis that football management emerged out of the English practical tradition in which knowledge was gathered and passed on through the generations by 'doing it' rather than by learning how to 'do it': managers went through the mill rather than having read John Stuart Mill! Early football clubs had been set-up for social and sporting reasons and were part of the British liberal voluntary tradition. Once footballing competition intensified however, money began to play a greater part in the running of clubs. There was no clear model available for clubs to use and at first they were run by elected committees with a quasi-democratic

ethos. Later, as commercialisation developed, a more business-like approach was needed and following the conversion to limited liability, directors began to 'manage' clubs. In a sense, they made it up as they went along but at the same time they drew upon their own business and professional experiences. From the mid-nineteenth century, cricket, horse-racing and professional athletics had also become commercialised sporting spectacles, and in one way, they provided examples of how to run a sports business. But despite the new commercial imperative, the Football Association's early administrators never considered football to be an industry, and the traditions of voluntarism, the values of amateurism, and later those of mutuality through the Football League, pervaded the management of clubs until well into the twentieth century.

In conjunction with these voluntary and amateur traditions, of paramount importance to our understanding of the development of football management is the fact that football clubs were (and, in general, still are) very small companies. Unlike large organisations with their layers of management and extensive bureaucracies, football clubs by comparison, have traditionally employed only a handful of administrative staff. It meant that there was greater potential for individuals to shape significantly a club's direction through their own personality and charisma. Because of their small size, a greater emphasis was placed on the success of personal relationships, particularly that between chairman and manager. A certain chemistry between these two has been crucial to the successful operation of football clubs. If it

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9 Sports grounds, for example, at the Aston Lower Grounds and Lillie Bridge, had also been built as commercial propositions.
has not been there, and the relationship breaks down, the manager has usually been sacked.

Following the legalisation of professionalism in 1885 and the subsequent escalation in costs, clubs recruited men from the local business community who had experience of management and the raising of money to run them. Because of their size, many clubs were, and continued to be, dominated by powerful directors. As the demands of running a club increased however, the club secretary, at first, and later the manager would be given more responsibilities. Eventually, through gradual changes in the management of clubs, managers gained more powers, and consequently, more opportunities arose for them to bring their own personalities to bear on a club. Change however, was uneven and, in this thesis, any changes will be examined in a historical context in which there was much continuity.

In addition to the importance of more careful financial management after 1885, clubs also had the problem of how to manage the professional footballers themselves. Early football club directors usually had no experience of handling this new type of labour and the way that they managed them was, again, often based on their own social and professional background. The main feeling amongst them was that young men needed discipline and that an eye needed to be kept on them during training. Football was unlike other jobs however. Players only trained in the mornings and then spent much of their free time in the pub. Initially, clubs had employed trainers to look after the players but they lacked any real authority, often had little knowledge of football and their man-management skills were poor. By the
early 1900s, a growing number of secretary-managers had been appointed in an attempt to improve the day-to-day running of clubs.

In what terms however, can we understand the nature of the relationship between management and players? It will be an underlying tenet of this thesis that the management of footballers largely mirrored attitudes towards the handling of young, working-class men in general. As Arthur Hopcraft suggests in the opening quotation, by the 1960s, football managers essentially imposed their personalities and authority on players. There was not a particular model that managers regimentally followed though as the role of managers developed unevenly and also differed from club-to-club. Instead, there were a number of different styles that emerged and echoed managers’ own life experiences. However, it can be argued that, in a number of ways, the management of footballers was not dissimilar to life in the army. Johnny Rogan, for example, has argued that the ‘hierarchical structure of football clubs most closely resembles that of a military-style organisation’; it is the directors who represent the officer class, managers and trainers are the NCOs with the players forming the other ranks.\textsuperscript{10} The military model is essentially authoritarian, based on respect for hierarchy and traditional notions of masculinity in which orders have to be obeyed usually without question, at all times. Of course, this is not a perfect mirror image of football management; rather it represents more of an analogy. This model aims to provide a context to show how the management of footballers has reflected prevailing trends and developments in industry and wider society as well as football. Because football managers have received little or no training for

\textsuperscript{10}J. Rogan, \textit{The Football Managers} (1989), p. xii
management, they have adopted methods and a style of management, in addition to any military persona, which has echoed their own experience.

But, in some respects, being a footballer can be compared to being in the army. Football, as a game, is comparable to warfare in that it is mostly tedious, punctuated by moments of intense excitement. The military historian, Richard Holmes, has suggested that sport is akin to serious fighting as it requires aggressive motivation and has several useful military functions. In particular, as a fast-moving team game, football requires the capacity to make quick decisions under pressure, and because of the level of physical contact, demands a certain capital of physical courage. Moreover, managers and players are publicly judged by results on a weekly basis, and experience intense, short-term pressures. As a result, players have been closely monitored both at training and even during their leisure time. It has been expected that they toe the line and if they do not, they have been shouted at, humiliated and disciplined.

The basis for the worker-management relationship within football clubs initially reflected the strict hierarchy of Victorian class society, and stemmed from the belief that, even if people did not like it, everyone knew their place. The education system, for example, mirrored, and has continued to reinforce, crude class hierarchies from this period where the upper-classes went to public schools, grammar schools educated an expanding middle-class while the working classes went to elementary and eventually secondary modern schools. The introduction of mass education in the late Victorian period was also accompanied by harsh measures for

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the disciplining of children, such as the cane. By the late 1880s, military drill had become established as part of the curriculum in both voluntary and board schools and was regarded as the linchpin in teaching social discipline to the children of the poor.  

During the second half of the nineteenth century, some of the ideas and attitudes concerned with the handling of workers had also been founded on military principles. In a number of industries and organisations, particularly those with uniformed workforces, a class based authoritarianism was prominent. Railway companies, for example, were the first organisations, apart from the army and navy, to have control over a substantial body of workers, and they ran their uniformed labour force with discipline and through a hierarchical structure. Due to the nature of the work, underpinned by the 'tyranny of the clock', strict discipline was deemed essential to avoid accidents. This thinking partly emanated from the background and expectations of many of the early managers who came from the army and were recruited for their experience in controlling large groups of men. Railway uniforms further emphasised the military connection; guards, for example, would wear the company's own uniform which became the equivalent of army regimental colours. The language employed in the industry also had militaristic overtones. On joining the railway, men entered the 'service'; company officials were called 'officers' and 'superior officers'; and workers went on 'duty' rather than to work. This

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15 McKenna, 'Victorian', p. 27
16 *ibid.*
disciplined world trained railwaymen early on to accept fines or even dismissal for a range of misdemeanours. The development of English provincial police forces during the mid-nineteenth century was also based on military and hierarchical principles. All early chief constables, for example, had had military experience, and police officers, like railwaymen, were also recruited from the lower classes. The largest group was drawn from farm workers who were accustomed to working in an environment which demanded obedience and a conscious identification with their masters. By comparison, footballers were mainly young, cheeky, urban workers which created different problems for football clubs.

These prevailing attitudes about the man-management of industrial workers were further complemented by Britain's wartime experience during the twentieth century. By 1900, 22 per cent of men aged between 17 and 40 had been subjected to military life and discipline. This increased throughout the century, notably during the world wars. In 1914 alone 1 million men volunteered for the army. Later, the National Service Act of 1948 demanded that men aged over 18 served in the armed forces, initially for eighteen months but from 1950, for two years. Between 1945 and 1960, 2.3 million men were called up. Many men therefore, including many players and future managers, had a taste of life in the armed forces and experienced its tough methods of handling men. Moreover, these experiences had a cultural impact. Some

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people not only recognised that management on military principles was a way of ‘doing things’, but they also believed in it.

Within the framework of a military model of management, many football managers would perform a role similar to that of a Sergeant-Major. The Regimental Sergeant-Major has overall responsibility for the lower ranks, and links up with the Commanding Officer. Similarly, the football manager coaches his lower ranks, the players, and is accountable to the board of directors. Many managers have shared similar characteristics to those of Sergeant-Majors. Both tend to be charismatic, autocratic and powerful figures who like to impose their personalities on others, and like to get their own way. Usually from working-class backgrounds, both have made their way ‘through the ranks’, Sergeant-Majors as privates and NCOs, and managers as players. Both have employed ‘verbal authoritarianism’, a mixture of violent and abusive language, direct personal castigation and scornful humour, as key disciplinary techniques in order to reinforce soldier/player subordination. This ‘management by fear’ quickly became institutionalised throughout British professional football. The image of a manager throwing tea cups around the dressing room has almost become a cliché but in times of stress, managers, as a last resort, have continued to verbally abuse players, the abuse laced with industrial language. It should be noted that this is part temper and part performance as most managers are attempting to inspire

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20 A. Parker, ‘Chasing the ‘Big-Time’: Football Apprenticeship in the 1990s’ (PhD Thesis, University of Warwick, 1996), pp. 72-74. For the 2000-01 season the Guardian produced an irreverent survey, but one which contained more than a hint of truth, of the ‘fear factor’ of Premiership managers. George Graham, for example, was given 10/10. It was claimed that his fear factor was ‘enormous. Has a capacity for volcanic rage and random shouting almost unparalleled in the modern game’. Alex Ferguson, also known for his ‘hairdryer’ technique, was allocated 13/10 which also referred to his fear factor over referees as his ‘purple face and apoplectic puffing out of cheeks give him a huge advantage over rival managers in the intimidation stakes’. Guardian: The Season: A Supporter’s Guide to the 2000-01 Football Season.
players to greater efforts.\textsuperscript{21} The Sergeant-Major image is further underlined by the fact that football managers are more likely to develop nodules on their vocal chords than most other working people due to constantly using their voice at full volume.\textsuperscript{22} However, instead of the aloofness of the RSM, the relationship between manager and players has perhaps been more similar to that of a Sergeant and his platoon or a corporal and his section during wartime. Teamwork is essential to both situations, everyone ‘mucks in’ together, engendering group loyalty and there is a kind of intimacy and solidarity.

But football is mostly not like the army. The similarities that have existed need to be tempered with an awareness of fundamental differences. For instance, once soldiers enter the army they are unable to leave of their own volition, and in their barracks they are subjected to military law. Footballers themselves were once subjected to the retain and transfer system which restricted their mobility but, in theory at least, they could leave at any time they wanted, and after games and training they could go home to their wives.

A military model of management, therefore, represents more of an analogy than a systematic comparison with football. Football managers have adapted to their environment, and have been influenced by other male role-models. One of the most influential, for example, was probably that of the father-figure, especially given Britain’s patriarchal society. Domineering as well as kindly fathers, or even grandfathers, have provided important role-models for generations of younger men

\textsuperscript{21}For examples of managers ‘performing’ during half-time see the Sunderland manager, Peter Reid in the series Premier Passions, BBC TV (1998). Even more explicit was Leyton Orient’s John Sitton in a Channel 4 documentary about his club in 1995.

\textsuperscript{22}Guardian, 24 February 1998, p. 4
during their formative years. Like managers, fathers have tended to demand respect for their seniority and authority. In addition, because of the near universal experience of school, some managers may have seen their role like that of the schoolmaster. A teacher-pupil relationship is still an authoritarian one but its main purpose has been to impart knowledge and requires sensitivity, sympathy, understanding but also discipline which can be harsh. The vissicitudes of the relationship between footballer and manager needs to be seen in its historical context. No one model explains this developing new role. Managers comprised a myriad of different personalities who learned through personal and practical experience but the style tended to be authoritarian.

In effect therefore, it seems not too far fetched to argue that the changes in the job from George Ramsay in the 1880s to Alf Ramsey in the 1960s, have been grafted on to the basic elements of the military model with its adherence to hierarchy and the need for obedience, plus the nineteenth century social model of rank and order. Some early managerial figures like George Ramsay at Aston Villa (see chapters 2 and 3) had been clerks drawn from the lower-middle-classes. Their authority was class-based. They kept their distance from the players and identified more with the directors. Others such as Tom Watson (see Chapter 3) and Bob Kyle at Sunderland were more like workplace intermediaries, such as foremen or overlookers, reflecting nineteenth century labour management methods. By the Twenties and Thirties, managers were increasingly former players who had had no preparation for management apart from their own life-forming experiences. Their methods were somewhat crude and perpetuated a culture of authoritarianism and hierarchy which
was passed from one generation to the next. Not only was this reinforced by the restrictions placed on players by the maximum wage and the retain and transfer system but also by the game’s increasing competitiveness. A number of managers subsequently gained reputations as autocrats. Major Frank Buckley (see Chapter 5) unsurprisingly typified the RSM figure and others such as Harry Storer and Charles Hewitt at Millwall were also noted for their autocratic styles. Other celebrated exponents however, like Fred Everiss at West Bromwich Albion, Sam Allen at Swindon and Charles Foweraker of Bolton Wanderers had clerical backgrounds and concentrated mainly on the administrative side, leaving the club trainer to handle the players. They, and others such as George Kay, were perhaps more schoolmasterly in their approach, and more sympathetic to some of the needs of players. At Arsenal, Herbert Chapman (see Chapter 4) broke the mould and was the game’s first ‘modern’ manager. He realised that results on the field could improve if he developed a closer relationship with the players. Yet Chapman was also a disciplinarian who demanded loyalty from them, and could be ruthless if they disobeyed his orders.

Some managers, like Sergeants in charge of platoons, came to regard players as ‘their boys’. In such circumstances, their management style was complemented by elements of both patriarchy and matriarchy. Not only did they think of themselves as father-figures but they also acted as mother-figures because, like mothers, they were always there to look after their players. Some post-Second World War managers, such as Matt Busby, Bill Shankly and Jock Stein, also took on this role of the patriarch, and often talked about their football club as a ‘family’. It is an idea that is still prevalent within football. What they really meant however, and this was
probably reinforced by their own military experience, was that if a football club was a family, it was they, the manager, who was at its head. Because managers are older then the players, most feel that they are also wiser than them, and that this has to be reflected by strict obedience. It has often meant that managers want to influence all aspects the personal conduct of players, preferring them to be married and settled, for example, rather than single and able to 'play the field'. Although they may have seen their relationship with players in terms of loyalty, it was mostly one way as managers were in a position, not only to recruit players, but to leave them out of the team and transfer them to another club if necessary.

Even if some managers adopted a more considered approach, they were still firmly based on ideas of who should wield power and who should not. Alan Brown, for example, had the reputation of a hardliner, perhaps reflecting his previous job as a policeman. At Wolverhampton Wanderers, Stan Cullis (see Chapter 6) had been a player under Frank Buckley. He had also been a Sergeant-Major in the War, and as manager he followed his mentor's ways. As the third of the opening quotations suggests, he could strike fear into his players, although, unlike Buckley, Cullis would develop closer relations with them. By the 1960s the role of the manager was becoming more narrowly defined. Increasingly, through the media, they became public figures and tried to cultivate a more professional, technocratic image. This was true of many, none more so than Alf Ramsey (see Chapter 6), whose close relationship with his players was symbolised by him wearing a tracksuit during the

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24 Hopcraft, *Football Man*, p. 96
World Cup Final of 1966. In turn they displayed fierce loyalty towards him. As we have seen, managers had had to combine secretarial duties with the playing side but now their responsibilities lay often much more with the players. Yet, like his managerial forebears, Ramsey, through his experience in football and life generally, rather than through any specialist management training, insisted on discipline and that he was in charge, and believed strongly that these were essential requirements for successful football management.

The influence of the military on football management has also been complemented and reinforced by the game's occupational culture which is deeply rooted in the past. Ross McKibbin has argued that it 'lacks an organised intellectuality' due to an insufficient emphasis on education within the game.25 Like British management, football has been pervaded by anti-intellectualism. Instead, British football culture has generated authoritarian tendencies through an adherence to the values of hierarchy and traditional notions of masculinity. And as most managers were former players, they have been immersed in it, and players themselves do seem to respect 'experience', passed on from one generation to the next.

As we have seen, class also provided a framework for management, creating a rigid hierarchy within clubs which cemented the structure of player-management relations and which has endured throughout the history of modern football.26 Early Football League administrators and football club directors were predominantly from middle-class backgrounds whereas professional footballers came largely from the

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25 London Review of Books, 6 January 2000, p. 32
working-class. During the late Victorian era a growing intermediate social stratum sought to distinguish itself socially from manual workers. The main component of this increasing social division was an intense white collar status consciousness amongst the lower middle-classes.\textsuperscript{27} Within football clubs, directors increasingly regarded professional players as socially inferior and this was reinforced by the cult of nineteenth century amateurism. Professionalism was regarded as a necessary evil which had to be kept in its place. Increasingly, directors preferred the secretary to deal with the players. In addition to a recognition of the need for better man-management, they found it socially unacceptable to haggle with players over something as vulgar as money. Football managers have subsequently imposed their own hierarchy of power by traditionally insisting that players address them as ‘Boss’ or ‘Gaffer’.\textsuperscript{28} Addressing the manager by a title has not been restricted to Britain. Since the 1930s all Italian professional footballers have called their manager by the term ‘Mister’ in recognition of that country’s first professional manager, the Englishman, William Garbutt.\textsuperscript{29}

Clubs have also developed their own sub-cultures and hierarchies. In particular, a group mentality has developed because footballers have increasingly lived in a cocooned, insular world in which outsiders are distrusted and where players are expected to conform to a certain male type. Only one British footballer,

\textsuperscript{26}Wagg, Football World, pp. 105-06
\textsuperscript{27}G. Crossick, ‘The Emergence of the Lower Middle Class in Britain: A Discussion’ in G. Crossick (ed.), The Lower Middle Class in Britain 1870-1914 (1977), p. 49
\textsuperscript{28}For example, in March 1953 Tim Ward was appointed manager of Barnsley. He had previously been a player at the club. On his appointment, Ward said that those who knew him as ‘Tim’ would now have to call him ‘Boss’. A. Ward and I. Allister, Barnsley: A Study in Football 1953-59 (Crowberry, 1981), pp. 9-11.
Justin Fashanu, has openly admitted that he was gay, for example, mainly because homosexuality is one of football’s great taboos. Stan Collymore felt that he was persecuted by his manager, John Gregory, at Aston Villa for suffering from depression because it was felt that it was not ‘normal’ for a top footballer to be depressed.

These attitudes have been reinforced by the unusual nature of the football industry itself, as unlike most other businesses, football clubs have short-term objectives, thus creating a highly pressurised environment. Unsurprisingly, as Eamon Dunphy has argued, rather than taking pride in one’s performance, the prime motivating factor in football has been fear. As a result, older players, fearful of losing their place to younger ones, made sure that they conformed to certain standards, thus perpetuating a certain group ethos. When first taken on as a professional at Middlesbrough in 1937, future England captain, George Hardwick, had to address senior professionals as ‘Mister’. The senior players also kept the juniors in their place by the lavatorial and vulgar stunts they pulled on them. It is a hierarchy still prevalent in the modern game, and has been extended to the trainees in today’s clubs. As a reminder of their youth and subordinate position, not only do they have to refer to the first team manager as ‘Boss’ but they must also politely

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31 Guardian (G2), 16 April 2001, pp. 2-4. Collymore somehow never fitted in at the clubs he played for and had the image of an outsider and a trouble-maker.
32 E. Dunphy, Only a Game?: The Diary of a Professional Footballer (1976), p. 113
33 G. Hardwick, Gentleman George (Liverpool, 1998), pp. 32-33
acknowledge professional players, coaches and directors.\textsuperscript{34} Alex Ferguson continues to demand a certain deference from his players. On one occasion at Manchester United, a young player called him ‘Alex’. Ferguson replied, ‘Were you at school with me?’ The player replied, ‘No.’ ‘Well call me Mr Ferguson or Boss’, came the order.\textsuperscript{35}

It is a common saying that ‘football is a man’s game’, and it emphasises the game’s all-male exclusivity. John Tosh has defined masculinity as both a psychic and a social identity that can be found in three separate spheres; the home, at work, and through association. He has claimed that all-male associations such as sports clubs and public houses have the greatest appeal among young unmarried men and are integral to a notion of patriarchy beyond the household. These all-male arenas have sustained the myth that ‘masculinity is about the exclusive company of men’.\textsuperscript{36} Richard Holt has argued that amongst footballers the dominant masculine code in the early professional game was ‘maleness’ as opposed to ‘manliness’. Instead of adopting middle-class and Christian manly ideals, the working-classes, imbued football with a masculine value-system of their own.\textsuperscript{37} Furthermore, football, as a form of work experience, has reflected a shop-floor culture in which ‘manual labour is suffused with masculine qualities’ of strength and pride due to the need for mental

\textsuperscript{34}Parker, ‘Big-Time’, p. 55

\textsuperscript{35}A. Ferguson, \textit{Managing My Life: My Autobiography} (1999), p. 186. Football trainees had traditionally been assigned menial tasks such as cleaning the dressing rooms and the senior professionals’ boots which further underlined their subordinate status. For example, see \textit{True Stories}, ITV (1996), a documentary which focused on the players assigned to Chelsea’s YTS scheme. By 1998 however, through the introduction of the ‘Football Scholarship’, they no longer undertook menial tasks. D. Monk and D. Russell, ‘Training Apprentices: Tradition versus Modernity in the Football Industry’, \textit{Soccer and Society}, Vol. 1, 2 (Summer 2000), p. 66


and physical bravery. Playing through the pain, or when injured, is a central part of the professional footballer’s culture. Players regularly carry or conceal injuries, and mask pain both to avoid losing their place in the side and to conform to the ethos of the group. Managers have characterised good professionals as those players who have been prepared to play while injured.

In addition, football’s attitudes to women have sometimes bordered on the misogynistic because, like the armed forces and the culture of the shop-floor, it exhibits a strict male chauvinism. At an official level it was seen as an all-male domain, and from 1921 clubs registered with the FA were not allowed to stage matches on their own grounds between female teams. It was felt that ‘the game of football [was] quite unsuitable for females and ought not to be encouraged’. In the 1980s, during contract talks with Brian Clough at Nottingham Forest, Neil Webb’s wife Shelley, tried to contribute but was met with the response, ‘I wasn’t talking to you, little Miss Busy’.

During the 1990s the influx of foreign players into the British game has exposed cultural differences between them and their home-grown team-mates. At Coventry City, the Norwegian, Trond Soltvedt, also from a middle-class background, recollected how his former team-mates at Rosenborg encouraged him on the pitch. In

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38 P. Willis, ‘Shop Floor Culture, Masculinity and the Wage Form’ in J. Clarke, C. Critcher and R. Johnson (eds), Working Class Culture (1979), pp. 185-98
40 Parker, ‘Big-Time’, p. 224
41 Albion News, 10 December 1921, p. 104; Green, Football Association, pp. 533-34. Again, in 1946, the FA felt it necessary to send a reminder to County Associations to make them, ‘see that clubs and officials do not loan their grounds or provide facilities for irregular football by woman participants’.
England however, they, and in particular club captain, Gary McAllister, yelled and swore at him all the time. McAllister replied that he took worse when he was fifteen. But, as he said, ‘I got over it. It doesn’t do you any harm. Toughens you up’. The captain also plays an important role within a club’s hierarchy. Dennis Bergkamp has observed that, in terms of motivation before games, in England there is music in the dressing room and everyone is shouting. The captain is ‘very much the focal point and he will shout even more at everyone to get them motivated’. Bergkamp believed that, by contrast, the quieter nature of Dutch dressing rooms was attributable to the more democratic spirit which existed there. Another major element of football’s masculine shop-floor culture has been its language and its intimidatory sense of humour which has revolved around the practical joke. McAllister believed that, ‘[t]easing and being teased shows you are one of the lads, that you can take it, and dish it out’.

Attitudes towards the game in Britain from schoolboy to professional level have also reflected a general feeling within working-class shop-floor culture that ‘practice is more important than theory’. As a result, British football can perhaps be best summed up in three words, ‘Get Stuck In’. The British game has placed greater emphasis on the physical rather than the technical side, and has enshrined older forms of toughness and rudeness instead of notions of fair play and

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44 *Guardian* (Sport), 21 June 2000, p. 7. For an example of the role of the captain, see Kevin Ball, captain of Sunderland at the time of the making of the fly-on-the-wall programme, *Premier Passions*, BBC Television (1998).
45 Gekoski, *Staying Up*, p. 176, 140
46 Willis, ‘Shop Floor’, p. 194
A football team also came to symbolise the virtues of the men who supported it, mostly from the working-class. As a result, attributes such as hardness, stamina, courage and loyalty came to be regarded as more important than skill. In comparison to European football, British soccer has been derided as 'kick and rush', unable to develop enough players capable of understanding tactics, constructive and intelligent movement and sophisticated ball control. As we shall see, the role of the football manager has not only developed within a deeply embedded culture dominated by the qualities of hierarchy, discipline and masculinity but one which places an emphasis on brawn over brain.

In studying the evolution of the football manager, problems have arisen over the lack of primary sources available. None seem to have left diaries or many letters and this has made it difficult to construct profiles of them. Furthermore, unlike doctors, for example, football managers are not served by a professional organisation like the British Medical Association. A League Managers' Association does exist and has its headquarters in Leamington Spa but it has been more concerned in representing the interests of managers in the football industry rather than establishing their professional credentials. Football managers have not been required to undertake training courses or to have their knowledge examined, and the LMA has traditionally acted more as a friendly society. Attempts were made to trace some of the earlier minute books of the LMA but this proved unsuccessful.

47 Holt, Sport, p. 173
48 ibid.
In fact, the main sources for this study have been the archives of professional football clubs. The author wrote to approximately twenty-five clubs for permission to consult their records and received a variety of replies. As we noted earlier, within football there is a distrust of the ‘outsider’ and some clubs denied that they had any records (even though there was evidence to suggest otherwise). Others just refused access. One club allowed the author access but it was to no avail as the records had been thrown away following stadium re-development! Furthermore, one club’s records, the now defunct Leeds City, are still held by a firm of Leeds solicitors.

Four clubs however, Arsenal, Charlton Athletic, Middlesbrough and Wolverhampton Wanderers, were willing to allow varying degrees of access, all of which required a certain amount of negotiation. At one club almost complete access was given, at the others it was dependent on certain people employed by or attached to the club. One club only allowed access for two days in which the year of the records had to be carefully selected in case anything ‘controversial’ arose. The records, mainly the minutes of directors’ meetings, also varied in terms of their longevity and detail. In general, the recording of these meetings has become increasingly less detailed over time. However, this was also a reflection of how a club’s management was changing, especially with regard to the players. In addition, to their own records, Arsenal hold the cuttings and books of the journalist James Catton which includes folders of newspaper clippings, and a small amount of correspondence. Outside the clubs, local record offices have provided another source, again with varying degrees of usefulness. In addition to its library and the minutes of various committees, the Football Association hold a range of significant materials.
The usefulness of the sources changed as work on the thesis progressed. Initially, at least up to 1939, contemporary newspapers were very informative, reflecting the close relationship between football and the press. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century the annual general meetings of clubs were reported in great detail, and clubs often provided the main source of information for journalists. Furthermore, some football administrators, such as William McGregor, were journalists themselves and their writings provided inside knowledge. Another chairman of the Football League, John Bentley was editor of the Athletic News which became a mouthpiece for the Football League. By the 1930s however, one can detect a change as football clubs became increasingly aware of their position and status, and information began to be more restricted. After 1945 this process increased, and was reinforced at a local level where the need for the local paper to establish a good relationship with the local club often over-rode the desire to print anything controversial. Because of this, more autobiographical and oral evidence has been used for the post-War period. A number of interviews were conducted, although only one with a former manager, George Hardwick. The others were attempts to build up a picture of a manager's professional and family background.

The study itself is based on a relatively straightforward chronological structure, beginning in the 1880s and ending in the 1960s. The thesis aims to incorporate elements, not just of social history but also of business and economic history. The first chapter provides a broad overview of British management in general up to 1914. Its aim is to provide an overall context for the rest of the thesis by analysing the history of British management and the culture in which it emerged.
Chapter 2 charts the emergence of football management in the years up to 1914. Rather than looking at individual managers, it will focus on how and by whom clubs were managed in the early years of the game, first when they were amateur and recreational, and then after professionalism was legalised. The chapter's main emphasis is to show how football clubs grew out of voluntary organisations and how their management continued to be part of that more democratic tradition. Its aim is to provide a picture of the environment from which the early football manager emerged - men like Tom Watson whose work will be examined in the following chapter. Chapter 3 attempts to place the development of the manager within a wider context by looking at three main areas: first, the relationship between a manager and his directors and how this developed in the light of football's commercialisation process; second, how the training and background of managers has reflected trends within British management in general, and third, the manager's relationship with his workers, the players. This framework will be used throughout the thesis.

Chapter 4 is devoted to one manager, Herbert Chapman, whose career bridges the First World War and the 1930s when he helped to establish Arsenal as the biggest and most successful club in the country. Essentially, it is an attempt to emphasise the role of the individual in history because, it will be argued, Chapman was the most important figure in the development of modern football management. He was the first to realise that managers might 'organise victory', and marked the starting point for football management's move towards a more professional era. The fifth chapter deals with the inter-War period more generally. The purpose here is to show how, despite the increase in the number of managers, directors continued to run
clubs very much in the mould of their Victorian predecessors. But there were increasing exceptions, such as the scope Wolverhampton Wanderers allowed Frank Buckley and also the freedom given to Jimmy Seed at Charlton Athletic. Their roles are analysed in the light of the particular context in which they operated.

Chapter 6 looks at the emergence of modern football management from 1945 up to the mid-Sixties. It takes account of the changes within a society which was slowly shedding its deferential attitudes, and also the landmark decision in football to abolish the maximum wage in 1961. During this period, managers also developed closer relations with their players, and as the game began to move closer to business, directors gradually delegated more powers to their managers. Yet even by the Sixties, football management was still not a profession. Managers had usually been players and it was that form of practical experience which was thought to be the best preparation for the job. This remained a strong tradition within British management more widely which was reluctant to support any form of vocational training. Finally, Chapter 7 will explore the impact which a manager had on a team's performance during this period. Though there will be an analysis of some economic interpretations of this complex subject, it will be argued that it is the context in which the manager works which is the key to understanding both failure and success.
CHAPTER 1

THE MAKING OF BRITISH MANAGEMENT

[Man]agement is an arena for human behaviour at its most naked - under stress, but freed from many restraints of civilisation.

The conclusion that many British managers are uneducated in business and management terms is inescapable. It must also be true that management training in Britain is too little, too late, for too few. It is finally probably true that most management development is left to chance in a Darwinian belief that the fittest will survive. They probably will but it is a wasteful process.

Nothing illustrates more precisely the peculiar weaknesses of football than the recent history of club management. Indeed, the history of management in this one small and rather unimportant industry is a telling insight into the broader story of British attitudes towards business management in general.
J. Walvin, Football and the Decline of Britain (1986), p. 27

In the Introduction it was noted how British management has been characterised by a practical tradition where knowledge has been gained through experience rather than, as Charles Handy has indicated above, because of any management education or training. Handy’s views on management in general have been echoed by those of James Walvin’s on football management, and it is intended that this chapter will provide the historical background of how the management of football clubs developed. By charting the development of British management from the mid-nineteenth century up to about 1970, we will be able to see how the management culture of British industry has evolved, and explore its consequences for the actual management of firms. This will also allow us to examine the social and educational backgrounds of managers themselves.

The culture of British management has generally been resistant to change but from the late nineteenth century a few large businesses adopted more sophisticated
management practices. However, despite a steady decline in the number of owner-manager businesses throughout the period, most British firms have remained small in size, and included in this number were football clubs. It is not intended to argue that developments in management were instantly reflected in smaller companies. In fact, the effects of any changes within the management of major companies filtered down very slowly. Furthermore, as we noted in the Introduction, without the chain of command of big corporations, the management of small firms was more easily influenced by personalities and the actions of a few individuals. The changes and continuities within the management of football clubs therefore, were similar to those within the vast majority of British firms, although these changes need to be considered in the context of football’s history.

Before looking more closely at the history of management, it would be beneficial to offer a definition of the terms, ‘management’ and ‘manager’ to understand how they have been applied in everyday language. Both, for example, can be expressed as economic and social relationships. On one level, management is a process which involves the relationship between employers and workers. It can also be defined as persons managing an organisation such as the governing body, board of directors, or the administration of business concerns or public undertakings. A manager is a person conducting a business or one who controls activities or a team in sports or an entertainment. Management is also a cognitive process in which people make arbitrary decisions based on their own judgement. Robert Heller claims that management is unquantifiable, as ‘there are only actions - intelligent, not so bright

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1 R. Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (1983), pp. 189-92
and stupid'; and that 'management is not a scientific and objective activity, but a subjective historical process full of ifs and buts'. In his more academic study, Tony Watson defines management as, 'simply a matter of running an organisation so that the variety of people who want something out of it will go on supporting it in such a way that it is able to continue its existence into the future'. Whether it is a science or merely a subjective process, the work of a manager may also involve human and social dimensions. The modern day manager has been described as 'a fallible human being, trying with the help of others, who are equally fallible, to cope with circumstances that are constantly changing'. Managers of the modern work organisation have also been described as 'creators and manipulators of mini human societies' who 'devise social structures and cultures within which people relate to each other'.

The concept of a manager has never been very clear and during the past it has had no fixed meaning. The actual origins of the words, 'management' and 'manager', stem from the sixteenth century. An early English definition of the word 'manage' referred to the handling of horses and then from the early sixteenth century it came to mean taking control and directing in general. 'Manage' later overlapped with the French word 'menage', which meant household, and a 'menager' was defined as a housekeeper. In 1861, for example, Isabella Beeton wrote the Book of Household Management. In the eighteenth century, a manager had been used to describe

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2 Heller, Naked Manager, p. 16, 19, 22  
3 T. Watson, In Search of Management: Culture, Chaos and Control in Managerial Work (1994), p. 10  
4 Heller, Naked Manager, p. 15  
5 Watson, Management, p. 32
someone in charge of public institutions such as schools. In the sixteenth century
the word ‘manage’, had been extended to the operations of war. Military
management techniques entailed the control of large numbers of men by enforcing
discipline through several layers of authority. Management, in terms of a body of
men directing an institution, first entered the language in the 1700s, and referred to
the running of a theatre as opposed to industrial enterprises. The competition
within London’s theatrieland produced a number of entrepreneurs. The finest actor of
his day, David Garrick (1717-1779) also managed the Drury Lane theatre from 1747
to 1776. In the nineteenth century, Henry Irving (1838-1905) also became an actor-
manager, taking over the Lyceum Theatre in 1879 and making it the most popular in
London.

Modern management, as a function and an occupation within a business
organisation, can be divided into three specialisms: strategic, functional and
operational. At the strategic stage, managers are executives who plan for long-term
goals, whereas at the functional and operational levels, lesser lights co-ordinate and
implement the plans of the strategists. A football manager therefore, belongs among
the ‘lesser lights’; a middle manager. Henry Mintzberg has allocated the business
manager a number of roles. They act as figureheads for their company and have a
leader role which involves the hiring and firing, training and motivating of their staff.

7 Williams, Keywords, pp. 189-92
8 Ibid.
9 P. Hartnoll, A Concise History of the Theatre (1968), pp. 121-25; G. Wickham, A History of the
Theatre (Oxford, 1985), pp. 170-71
10 Hartnoll, Theatre, pp. 202-203; Wickham, Theatre, pp. 204-06. Irving was the first actor to be
knighted in 1895.
As the nerve centre for the unit, managers have an informational role due to the interpersonal contact with their employees and a network of contacts outside the organisation. The manager also plays a major role in the decision-making process of his unit which may include negotiations over contracts and salaries. Decision-making requires judgement and it is this quality that is perhaps more eagerly sought than any other. Yet this also creates a paradox, because to assess someone’s ability to judge is itself, largely a process of intuition.

Since the Industrial Revolution there has been a progressive differentiation in the role and tasks of management and managers. This process has been underpinned by a ‘divorce of ownership from control’ where the management of organisations has evolved from one-man businesses to those under the control of specialised professionals, and as businesses have grown the degree to which the individual or small group has been responsible for its control and ownership has decreased. This development can be divided into three stages. First, during the personal form of management, which is associated with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a single individual performed most of the functions. The entrepreneur/owner-manager undertook most of the management jobs, and controlled much of his business personally. Entrepreneurial management, the dominant form in Britain until the 1940s, saw owners begin to delegate responsibility to professional managers, bringing in capital from sources unconnected with family or religious groups. There

was a growing divorce between ownership and control which emphasised the increasing importance of functional management and the role of outside agencies such as the stock exchange. The dividing line between entrepreneur and manager however, was not very clear until the mid-nineteenth century, especially in small firms. Pollard’s general rule has been that ‘the broader, strategic decisions about a firm belong to the “entrepreneur” ... while the tactical decisions in carrying out the strategy are the tasks of management’.\textsuperscript{15} The nature of the entrepreneur-manager relationship changed as the structure of industry itself changed. It is the evolution of this relationship which, in terms of the allocation of tasks, shares similarities with that between the directors and a manager of a football club.

Entrepreneurial management was the bridging point in the evolution of the final stage, managerial capitalism. In theory, there is a total divorce between ownership and control with all management tasks undertaken entirely by professionals with the bulk of the company’s equity held by investors who have no role in the day-to-day running of the business.\textsuperscript{16} In reality however, shareholders often interfere. In the nineteenth century, the railways had laid the basis for large-scale industry in Britain by adopting joint stock status which led to an inevitable divorce between ownership and control. From the 1840s the expansion of the railway companies created an emergent class of professional salaried managers who were Britain’s first group of corporation executives. As has already been mentioned, the new managers were often retired army officers as the unprecedented scale of


\textsuperscript{16}Wilson, \textit{Business History}, pp. 12-13
operations entailed the handling of large groups of men, and the only real model for railway companies was the army. During the twentieth century, managers became increasingly set apart from other employees through the establishment of organisational hierarchies. The trend towards the development of an increasingly distinct managerial social stratum therefore, is associated with an increase in organisational size and administrative complexity. Modern football has also seen the emergence of a distinct managerial class. This process however, has taken place in light of the changes that football clubs have undergone, as small businesses, rather than in line with those in major corporations.

British industrial management emerged from the First Industrial Revolution between 1780 and 1830. Some of the earliest enterprises had been agricultural estates owned by eighteenth-century landowners who employed agents and stewards to manage their properties. However, there was little evidence of management in the burgeoning manufacturing sector. Early firms' ideas of management had been limited. With few models to emulate or principles to follow, it was a process of trial and error, and firms adapted to changing circumstances as they saw fit. Britain's prosperity during this period was due in no small measure to 'practical tinkerers'; men who used a pragmatic approach to solve problems. Few, if any, establishments existed which were capable of producing a scientific training in any subject.

17 Sampson, Company Man, pp. 22-26; Kirby, 'Big Business', pp. 128-29
18 Child, Management Thought, p. 14
19 Pollard, Modern Management, pp. 6-7
20 Pollard, Modern Management, pp. 27-29; Williams, Keywords, pp. 189-92
21 C. Horn, and P. Horn, 'English Management at the Onset of the Scientific Age', Management Services (May 1981), p. 6
Despite later developments within management, this practical legacy persisted well into the twentieth century.

Initially, a manufacturing entrepreneur undertook most of the managerial functions and kept close control of the firm’s direction. But as competition intensified, the organisational structure of firms began to change with the partnership becoming a common feature of British industry. Partnerships, a firm in which all the partners shared the risks and profits of business were often family firms. The family firm itself became the predominant business model during the nineteenth century and influenced business organisations well beyond that time. As the liability of partners was unlimited, a ‘network of trust’ had to be established between them and it gradually provided an internal market for skilled and managerial labour. Once established, the family firm tradition of personal capitalism, with its consequences for management, proved very resilient.

Developments within management were precipitated by changes in manufacturing processes which were responding to improvements in technology and increases in competition. During the eighteenth century, most manufacturing production had been carried out using the putting-out form of organisation. Sub-contracting was also adopted at this time when some industries began to grow and is a system which continues today in many sectors, such as civil engineering.

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22 Wilson, Business History, p. 21
24 Here, the actual production of textile goods for merchants was undertaken in cottage workshops by domestic artisans.
business grew in size and complexity from the end of the eighteenth century, there began a growing, if modest, demand for professional managers. Coal-viewers probably emerged during this period and by the late nineteenth century the coal mines later saw the creation of the first true professional class of skilled managers.26 Most managers within the manufacturing industry however, were typically trained through the practical work of their firms. Managers were slow to make an appearance in industries where there was an absence of complex technology as the accumulated practical experience of workers was deemed sufficient. Furthermore, in the textile industry there were few large industrial units and this prevented managers establishing a professional identity as owners continued to be their own managers, usually assisted by an overseer-foreman.27 Formal education had a limited role during the Industrial Revolution and ‘[p]ractical skill rather than academic aptitude was ... deemed to be the basis of business in many spheres’.28

By the early nineteenth century, industry had moved towards the factory system of production as it was able to accommodate more powerful technology and cut labour costs.29 Mills had initially been located in rural areas where there was access to a water supply but by the 1850s they had begun the move into the towns. The previous harshness of factory life was beginning to be ameliorated through the

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26 Pollard, Modern Management, pp. 126-28
27 Ibid., pp. 128-33
use by some employers of a form of industrial paternalism.\textsuperscript{30} Industrialists wished to generate greater co-operation between themselves and the workers. Because nineteenth century businesses were small, some industrialists, like Stanley Baldwin at his family’s ironworks in Bewdley, knew the names of all the workers.\textsuperscript{31} Instead of conflict and coercion, the owners and workers both had a shared interest, as goods needed to be made and without them there would be neither profits nor wages.\textsuperscript{32} As the world’s first and most completely developed example of a mechanised factory system, the Lancashire textile industry represented the clearest example of this change in employer-worker relations. Mills helped form distinct communities, not unlike pubs and churches, and were the basis for clubs and societies. From the 1850s, some large employers provided reading rooms or a library at the mill. Others paid for an annual works day to the seaside.\textsuperscript{33} During the second half of the nineteenth century, firms like Cadburys’ would provide sporting facilities for their workers.\textsuperscript{34}

Industrial paternalism was still based on traditional forms of authority with the employers in charge. Mill owners treated the new industrial towns as squires treated their country estates. They formed themselves into local elites and ran for political office. Not only were the factories managed as family firms but the owners looked upon them as ‘miniature kingdoms’. Within the Lancashire cotton area a ‘dynastic industrialism’ emerged which inextricably linked civic and economic life. It was preserved by a high trust culture which consisted of a social network of marriage

\textsuperscript{30}Wilson, \textit{Business History}, p. 33
\textsuperscript{31}Cannadine, \textit{Class}, pp. 114-15
\textsuperscript{32}ibid., pp. 91-92
\textsuperscript{33}Thompson, \textit{Respectable Society}, pp. 205-14
and business links. Employers also intended to pass the family business on to future generations. Family networks acted as the source for recruitment of future managers who were immersed in the practicalities of life at the mill by serving an apprenticeship. Interestingly, the bosses of football, particularly its managers, liked to use the language of the family, and many clubs were run like family firms. The Football League itself was based largely on the idea of mutuality (see Chapter 2).

However, there was little overall evidence of any significant divorce of ownership from control before the twentieth century. Despite a growth in the size of the average firm, there was little dilution of proprietorial power. One general consequence for the management of smaller firms was that, without the checks of the managerial hierarchies of big companies, there was more potential for individuals to influence the direction of the business. Dominant personalities therefore, found it easier to impose their opinions and actions on company management. In this sense, football clubs were prime examples of this process. As well as directors, this situation, paradoxically, offered more opportunities for managers to have an influence on a club's development.

There had been a move by organisations, started by the Companies Acts of 1856 and 1862, towards limited liability but this further reinforced the prevailing management culture. In theory, the adoption of joint stock status should have created an extensive divorce of ownership from control because company equity could be

36 Joyce, *Work*, pp. 24-33
sold to shareholders who had little interest in managing the enterprise. In Britain however, unlike in America, family firms were unwilling to relinquish control over any part of the company’s management. Instead of becoming public companies, a form of private company evolved which was only legalised by the 1907 Companies Act. These companies kept the number of members small with the controlling ordinary share capital usually retained by the participating partners and their families. Between 1880 and 1914, about 132,000 companies were registered, the bulk being ‘private’. In 1914, 77 per cent of the 63,000 registered companies were still of this type.

The culture of British management, with its deeply embedded resistance to change, has been criticised for its inefficiency and its role in retarding the growth of the economy. The period between 1860-1914 has been identified as a crucial one in Britain’s economic development. Its position as the premier industrial nation was challenged by Germany and especially the United States. British industry however, found difficulty in responding. There was little capital investment in management and instead, its practical tradition persisted, so much so that in 1911, managers, administrators and higher professionals, made up only 4.4 per cent of Britain’s occupied population, totalling 813,000. Coleman has identified how British businessmen were split into two categories: the ‘gentleman’ who was the educated amateur and the ‘player’, the practical man. Both had long-term implications for

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37 Payne, *British Entrepreneurship*, p. 21  
38 Wilson, *Business History*, p. 120  
industry. ‘Gentlemen’ were usually the sons of owners and educated at public schools which offered a classical education rather than a practical one of direct usefulness to businessmen. Britain’s business elite was represented by upper- and upper-middle-class families and this was reflected in their education. Graduates of this system went into business as amateurs with little or no management training. The same was also true of the ‘players’, the uneducated, self-made owners of family firms, who had gained their fortunes as practical tinkerers and this contributed to a ‘mystique of practical experience’.41 They then bought land and their sons, the next generation, became gentlemen.

Because of the upsurge in foreign competition much attention was focused on the perceived deficiencies within the British education system. The education which graduates received at university, for example, was hardly relevant to a career in industry. By the end of the Edwardian years, both Oxford and Cambridge produced a similar output of future businessmen, 10-15 per cent. However, both were more concerned with developing leadership qualities for an elite. Graduates from Oxbridge had attended institutions which had little understanding or liking of business and instead, created an environment that valued success in the professions or government service. Education was based on the humanities which had little bearing on a business career.42 It was this sort of education which generally shaped the types and levels of expertise brought by industrialists to their businesses, and also their own notions of

what was adequate and appropriate for their needs. Furthermore, business had a preference for social values at the expense of expertise which was compounded by businessmen sending their sons to Oxbridge to gain social experience and status. This was a weakness in the formation of British industrial leadership and consequently comparatively few graduates became managers.

Universities however, did provide some preparation for management. Even if future managers did not study a particular subject such as engineering, the skills acquired at university in analysis, critical thinking and self-appraisal, and in developing interpersonal relationships, would at least provide a basis for a managerial career. Moreover, one criteria for measuring how efficiently a society is preparing for its future is the extent to which a college education is available to its population. When compared to countries such as the United States, France and Germany however, Britain lagged until the 1960s. In 1885, England, with a population of 26 million, supported only 5500 university students; Germany’s population numbered 45 million and had a student population of 24,187. Even by 1900 a much higher proportion of business leaders from foreign countries had attended university. In 1900 in Britain, the percentage was 21 whereas in Germany it was 49.

In response to the increase in foreign competition there had been a rapid rate of growth in the British educational sector from 1890 to 1914. This development

44 *ibid.*, pp. 50-54
45Jeremy, *Business History*, p. 398
however, was on a local level mainly due to regional industrial demand rather than as a result of central co-ordination from the government. Engineering professorships were established in some of the older universities such as Newcastle and the new civic, ‘red brick’ universities in Leeds, Sheffield and Manchester were essentially technical universities. Imperial College, London was founded in 1907.\(^{47}\) In addition, Britain had an extensive network of local technical colleges and Polytechnics which provided evening classes. There was also the highly developed City and Guilds examination system which began in London in 1879.\(^{48}\) At all levels however, scientific and technical education was patchy. The civic universities performed no better than Oxbridge in producing science and technology graduates, turning out only 378 by 1900.\(^{49}\) Moreover, the changes within British education were likely to be prior to any economic development, and therefore, a lag developed.

Other countries made greater educational provision for the new economic conditions and exploited the increased demands in emerging industries like chemicals, precision tools, and metallurgy. Management education in France was supported by the *grandes écoles*, a series of colleges specialising in engineering, which were founded in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In Germany, the state helped to provide an expanded education system which met the needs of industry. A string of business schools, *Handelshochschulen*, were set up around the turn of the century, the first in Leipzig in 1898.\(^{50}\) By 1900 Germany had eleven engineering schools plus three mining schools and by 1913 it had ten times as many engineering students in its

\(^{47}\)Pollard, ‘Entrepreneurship’, pp. 76-77
\(^{48}\)Pollard, ‘Entrepreneurship’, pp. 76-77; Sanderson, *Education*, see Chapter 3
\(^{49}\)Jeremy, *Business History*, p. 400
technical schools, *Technische Hochschulen*, as in England and Wales.\(^5\) In 1881 America's first university-level business education, the Wharton School, was established at the University of Pennsylvania. After the American merger mania between companies of the 1890s, higher education responded to a growing demand for better trained managers. The Harvard Business School opened in 1908 with thirty more established by 1914. By 1915 there were 10,000 students majoring in the commercial curricula of colleges and universities.\(^5\) Japan's economic growth from the late nineteenth century was attributed to the 'Zaibatsu', very large and centrally controlled holding companies. They soon turned to education which was regarded as the servant of industry, to help them acquire skilled employees. In 1875 a business school was established in Japan and in 1877 a modern engineering college was opened. New graduates to a Zaibatsu were subjected to in-house training which involved work in all aspects of the company.\(^5\)

At the turn of the century a collection of novel ideas about managing the business emerged which pushed the analysis of management itself in the direction of a science. F.W. Taylor advocated the scientific selection and training of men for management plus the replacement of 'rule of thumb' working methods with a more systematic approach.\(^5\) Other new thinkers included Frank Bunker Gilbreth who pioneered time and motion studies.\(^5\) Yet in Britain, time and motion studies were

\(^5\)ibid., pp. 406-07
\(^5\)Locke, ‘Education’, pp. 58-59
\(^5\)Keeble, *Ability to Manage*, pp. 25-26
\(^5\)ibid., pp. 29-32
\(^5\)Urwick and Brech, *Scientific Management*, pp. 126-47
even more neglected than scientific management. Innovations in industries like engineering and shipbuilding, were restricted to the introduction of new machine tools. Work practices within the workshop organisation remained structurally unchanged. Scientific management was largely rejected by British industry due to the persistence of traditional modes of production and the preference for a more personal style of management.56

Even with the limited numbers of science, technology and commercial graduates, British industry had little interest in a closer relationship with education. Trade unionists did not want the apprenticeship undermined as it reinforced their status and bargaining power. Employers, who were often not highly educated themselves, took little interest in the training and education of apprentices and preferred that they learned their skills through ‘rule of thumb’ methods. The typical university graduate was seen as inappropriate for British firms. They were regarded as too old when they left university as the right habits were understood to be formed during the early years in industry. Employers also suspected that graduates were too theoretical and had little knowledge of how industry worked. A degree therefore, was seen as a positive disadvantage for managerial employment in many industries with apprenticeships remaining the most popular form of training for work on the shopfloor and for aspiring managers.57 Graduates themselves found industry unattractive as general levels of pay were low, and industry had a reputation for retaining poor quality managers and ageing directors which was a drawback for

56 Wilson, *Business History*, pp. 162-63
ambitious young men. Businessmen, the ‘players’ as opposed to the ‘gentlemen’. had low social status. Even engineers were not fully accepted as professional men in Britain because of a ‘fundamental snobbery running through the whole social system’. All these factors made a career elsewhere, like the Civil Service for example, more attractive.

The craft apprenticeship system therefore, continued to provide a major source for future managers until the 1960s. Instituted during the Middle Ages, apprentices received practical training controlled by craftsmen, foremen or overlookers within the firm as opposed to learning any theoretical analyses at academic institutions. Some business leaders, including car manufacturers William Rootes and Herbert Austin, started out as apprentices but subsequently it caused problems in the running of the industry. William Morris began in a small bicycle shop as a mechanic before making cars on his own account at Cowley. Austin and Morris retained ultimate power over their companies, and continued to run them as private fiefdoms well into the twentieth century, although Austin’s power was slightly diluted. Both were professional in the sense that they participated in top-level decision-making but they lacked any professional managerial training. Roy Church has argued that because of his lack of managerial skills, Morris’s direction of his company was to have deleterious effects on the whole of the British car industry.

As his company expanded through amalgamations, Morris was unwilling to delegate

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58 Keeble, *Ability to Manage*, pp. 78-80
to the professional managers he employed and persistently interfered in the running of the company.\textsuperscript{61}

The growth in foreign competition in the final quarter of the nineteenth century had hastened an increase in industrial concentration. Yet, it did not result in any major shift in management culture. Between 1890 and 1905 British textiles, brewing and tobacco firms had experimented with amalgamations and mergers.\textsuperscript{62} Unlike mergers in America however, they were defensive in nature. There was rarely any intention of integrating production, distribution or management. These new organisations were holding companies which adopted a federal structure allowing former owners to continue running their own businesses without too much interference from headquarters.\textsuperscript{63} In America there was a more rapid transition from the personal to the entrepreneurial form of organisation by 1914, while in Britain, a 'corporate lag' developed. Many American firms were still controlled by families who dominated the decision-making process but they were more willing to delegate responsibility to professional managers, unlike their British counterparts.\textsuperscript{64}

During the inter-War years the family firm remained an important characteristic of British industry. In 1930, 23 out of the 50 largest UK manufacturing companies were still owner-dominated. Even by 1950, a sample of 92 large manufacturers revealed that 50 were controlled by families.\textsuperscript{65} British corporate development during these years was characterised by 'rationalisation' in terms of the

\textsuperscript{62}Payne, \textit{British Entrepreneurship}, p. 21
\textsuperscript{63}Wilson, \textit{Business History}, pp. 102-03
\textsuperscript{64}\textit{ibid.}, p. 70
organisation of work, and also a merger boom. A number of new business entities emerged such as ICI in 1926 and Unilever in 1929, and in 1923 the government sponsored the merger of the railways into four large regional enterprises. ICI and Unilever established multi-divisional (‘M-form’) management structures, a decentralised form of management marking a shift from the old functional organisation. It was only the larger firms such as these which offered any in-house training.66 The ‘M-form’ had been pioneered in America and represented a move towards managerial capitalism. Conservative management practices still persisted however, as relatively few British firms moved towards the multi-divisional form. Instead, the holding company (‘H-form’) continued to be popular with British industrialists.67 Many company boardrooms also had a ‘club’ atmosphere which influenced attitudes to organisational change and there was a continuing ambivalence towards management training within the manufacturing sector. In 1950 there were still only 12 British multi-divisional companies as families maintained control of most firms.68

By 1931 managers, administrators and higher professionals still accounted for only 4.8 per cent (1.01 million) of the total occupied population.69 The inter-War years however, witnessed a gradual if slow growth in the number of managers employed in British industry. With the continuing strength of the family firm, a prime recruitment method for potential managers remained patronage. This

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65 Keeble, *Ability to Manage*, p. 45
67 Foreman-Peck, ‘Industry’, p. 397
represented a strong continuity with practices from the 1890s. Patronage was actually widespread in all types of firms, at all levels, and continued well into the 1950s. Until the 1960s the family influence was a major factor in promotion in most firms, except the largest companies.\textsuperscript{70} Nepotism was another characteristic of British management during this period and in 1942, it was cited by the Institute of Industrial Administration as one of the three curses of industry along with secretiveness and traditionalism.\textsuperscript{71}

British management education continued to lag behind other leading industrial nations during this period and this created the perception of a lack of quality in its business leaders. In 1930 the percentage of Britain’s business leaders who were university graduates had risen to only 23 per cent; in Germany, it was now 62 per cent while in France, it was 96 per cent.\textsuperscript{72} Industry, in general, remained either hostile or apathetic to what education could offer. In 1918 the Manchester Municipal School of Technology set up a Department of Industrial Administration. Its aim was to provide training in all aspects of industrial management from foreman to director but it suffered from a lack of funding and widespread apathy on the part of local business. The LSE established a Department of Business Administration in 1930 and instituted a diploma course aimed at students with two years’ business experience, but numbers were fewer than expected, forcing the department to close between 1939 and 1945.\textsuperscript{73} In comparison, there was a great expansion of business

\textsuperscript{69}Keeble, \textit{Ability to Manage}, p. 44
\textsuperscript{70}\textit{ibid.}, p. 46
\textsuperscript{71}\textit{ibid.}, p. 47 n27
\textsuperscript{72}Jeremy, \textit{Business History}, pp. 393-95
\textsuperscript{73}Keeble, \textit{Ability to Manage}, see Chapter 5
education in the United States between the Wars. In 1932, 400 colleges and universities had business courses, enrolling over 90,000 students a year. During the 1920s, the Harvard Business School began to specialise in corporate administration. By the early 1930s, it was graduating 400 MBAs a year and just after the War employed 32 full-time professors.\textsuperscript{74}

The inter-War years however, did see the emergence of a professionalised core of top management. But it was accountants, rather than engineers or scientists, who began to predominate. The proportion of companies with qualified accountants among their directorates rose from 7.6 per cent in 1911 to 19.1 per cent in 1931. By 1951 this had increased to 39.1 per cent.\textsuperscript{75} There were (and still are) more managers in Britain with an accounting background than in other advanced countries. One of the reasons for this was that the accountancy sector creamed off some of the brightest recruits from public and grammar schools. As there had been such poor provision of training by business and British universities, a vacuum had been created which was partly filled by accountants. Accountancy was the most relevant and broadest management training available despite criticisms of its untheoretical approach and unsuitability as a preparation for general management. It did however, provide an element of meritocracy due to the stringent qualificatory standards which forced down pass rates.\textsuperscript{76} In this sense, they were trying to emulate other professions, like medicine, by controlling access.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{ibid.}, p. 26, 114
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{ibid.}, Table 4, pp. 422-26
Britain's overall investment in human capital before 1939 compared unfavourably with both the United States and Germany, and this had ramifications for the economy. Rose has argued that the productivity gap between British and American manufacturing industry was partly caused by skill deficiencies. Furthermore, the low numbers of scientifically and managerially trained graduates provided a relatively small pool of specialist expertise. As a consequence, Britain was unable to fulfil its potential for a shift from the old staple industries towards more skill-intensive sectors.\(^77\)

Following the Second World War Britain underwent something of a managerial revolution. In 1951, 1.96 million people were categorised as managers, administrators or higher professionals. By 1971 this figure had increased by 70 per cent to 3.36 million, more than one in five of the male population in employment.\(^78\) There were further structural and organisational changes within British industry due to another surge of industrial concentration through mergers. By 1957, the share in production of the largest 200 manufacturing firms was 73 per cent which by 1969 had risen to 86 per cent. The numbers of traditional owner-managers were also declining and being replaced by career managers. By 1963, 29 per cent of the largest 116 companies were controlled by family business men; 32 per cent by professional career managers; and 39 per cent by representatives of financial institutions.\(^79\) Moreover, by 1970, 72 out of the 100 largest industrial enterprises had adopted a multi-divisional management structure. Nationalisation also generated a need for

\(^{77}\) Rose, 'Investment', p. 357
\(^{79}\) *ibid.*, p. 437, 442
professional management of state industries as did the creation of the welfare state. In 1947 the British Institute of Management was founded as management increasingly displayed the traits of a profession. There were also initiatives in the field of management education. In 1965 the Manchester Business School commenced teaching, with its London equivalent starting the following year. Both offered Harvard-style MBAs. 80

Despite these developments British managers continued to lag behind the international competition in terms of educational qualifications and technical expertise. Post-War practices in many sectors were shaped by deeply entrenched work traditions and the scepticism of managers concerning the value of training and education for their specific firms. In addition, the general apprenticeship was deeply embedded in the psyche of unions and employers alike. 81 In the mid-1950s only one third of executives and a fifth of general managers of large British companies held degrees. Countries like Germany, the United States and Japan had surpassed these figures in the 1920s. The overall ratio of graduates in management who actually held degrees was only 10 per cent. In 1959 it was found that about fifty per cent of general managers had no qualifications of any kind, and over half of the directors in charge of production were without engineering or scientific qualifications. This situation did not change drastically during the next two decades. 82

81 Rose, 'Investment', p. 357
82 Aldcroft, 'Missing Dimension', pp. 97-98
Many smaller and medium-sized companies still relied upon the characteristics of the practical man solving problems on a pragmatic, rule-of-thumb basis. There was little expertise in smaller companies. In a survey carried out in 1976, it was found that managers, in both large and small firms, were only marginally better qualified than the population as a whole. Over half the managers had no qualifications at all, with only 3 per cent holding a degree. Many of the degree holders were from large firms so the incidence of graduates in small firms was very low indeed. The increase in government expenditure on education following the War did not close the skills gap between the British worker and his foreign counterpart. Although a third of the chief executives of the UK’s largest firms by the 1970s were a product of state education, the 1944 Education Act did little to prepare the majority for work. It was a workforce ill-fitted to confront the rapidly industrialised world of the Fifties and Sixties. Universities neglected both technology and management training in the post-War period, and as a result, British managers were less well equipped than their American counterparts to cope with the challenges of big business.

British managers still saw experience rather than a managerial education as the key to business success, a legacy of generations of industrial practice. Only a few large firms, like ICI, valued expertise through their in-house, systematic training schemes. Rose has argued that Britain’s twentieth century productivity gap was mainly due to a combination of a lack of technical expertise and the poor quality

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83 This figure rose to only 11 per cent amongst general managers.
84 Aldcroft, 'Missing Dimension', pp. 99-100
85 Jeremy, Business History, p. 387; Rose, 'Investment', pp. 358-59
training that managers received. The probable root cause of the training lag has been the reluctance of directors to prioritise manpower issues at all levels, including the professionalisation of management. This is perhaps unsurprising as most of the men at the top were still basically amateurs. As they themselves had little or no training in the methods of management, the traditions of the practical man and of the gentleman were perpetuated within the boardrooms of British industry.

Since the late nineteenth century, management has been a weak link within British industry. Neither systematic nor meritocratic enough in its selection, nor scientific enough in the application of its training, British management has lagged behind its foreign competitors in terms of quality. This is not to say that Britain did not produce high-quality managers but that it did not produce enough of them. Throughout most of the twentieth century, personal capitalism was a persistent feature of British industry. As a result, many firms continued to prefer their future managers to be grounded in their own methods as opposed to undertaking any training or possessing formal academic qualifications. Overall, the typical British manager in industry before 1970 was not part of a profession in the true sense of the word. If professions were created through the restriction of access by means of selective training, education and qualification then British management failed this criterion.

Similar criticisms have been expressed about the culture of football management. Writing about the ‘decline’ of football in 1986, James Walvin remarked

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86 Rose, 'Investment', pp. 359-62
87 ibid.
88 Aldcroft, ‘Missing Dimension,’; p. 109; Keeble, Ability to Manage, p. 162
that 'football simply reflected the experience of wide areas of British management which specifically eschewed the concept of professional managerial training and vocational education.' Football managers were, and are, generally ex-professional players whose knowledge of management was limited to the practical experience they gained when they were players. Like many of their counterparts in industry, the training they received as a manager was on-the-job. This was little preparation for their new role which demanded different qualities and abilities from those which enabled them to become players, such as financial acumen, skilled man-management, sensitivity to the media and fans, and a managerial flair. The following chapter will attempt to chart the origins of these developments by outlining how football became an industry and how clubs were managed between 1880 and the Great War.

89 Perkin, *Professional Society*, p. 439
90 Walvin, *Football*, p. 28
91 *ibid.*, p. 27
CHAPTER 2

RUNNING A FOOTBALL CLUB, 1880-1914

In all our large towns, and most of the small ones, north of Birmingham to the Tweed, from September to April, Saturday is consecrated to football. Saturday evenings are devoted to football symposia, and newspapers issue special editions one after the other, with from three to four columns of reports and gossip about the results of the day’s games and the players.


“I do not like your up-to-date football - it is now like a business.”


Between 1880 and the Great War, football underwent radical changes. By 1914, from being purely a sporting activity, it had begun to display the characteristics of an industry, initially through the adoption of professionalism by elite clubs. Football however, developed into a very peculiar business. It was still a sport but it was also partly entertainment due to the game’s increasing mass appeal. While money was important however, the pursuit of mammon did not characterise the game. This chapter will examine the transformation that football underwent during this period, its governance and the effect it had on the general management of clubs by looking at who ran them and their motives for doing so. Before embarking on an analysis of football management’s historical development, the idea of football as an industry and what type of business it was by 1914, will be examined.

Football had become a mass spectator sport by the turn of the century. The FA Cup Final had rapidly established itself as a national institution and in 1914 it was attended by a reigning monarch, George V, for the first time, giving the game the

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1 The first FA Cup Final in 1872 attracted two thousand people to the Kennington Oval; from 1895 to 1914 the Cup Final was played at Crystal Palace where in 1901 the attendance exceeded 100,000 for the first time.
establishment's stamp of approval. The game's growing popularity was also a reflection of the boom that took place in the service industries between 1870 and 1914. In the second half of the nineteenth century, services had accounted for half the growth in national income.\(^2\) In the leisure sector there was a rise in the consumption of alcohol, and music halls were increasingly placed in the hands of entrepreneurs. With the expansion of the rail network, the railway excursion became a popular day-out for workers and cheaper newspapers were also published to cater for a wider market.\(^3\) A burgeoning sports industry emerged as football and other sports such as boxing, cricket and horse-racing were increasingly commercialised.

Changes in the nation's social and economic make-up were significant factors in this development. Modern football had regional origins in Scotland and in the English North and Midlands. East Lancashire, in particular, the cradle of the industrial revolution, was at the forefront of the commercialisation of leisure. As a result of increases in working-class spending power and leisure opportunities, commercialised spectator sports for the mass market, particularly football, became one of the economic success stories of late Victorian Britain.\(^4\) During this period the nation's standard of living steadily increased. Food prices in particular had begun to fall from the 1880s onwards and this gave the working-class greater spending power.\(^5\) From 1847 working men had increasingly gained the Saturday half-holiday

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\(^4\) *ibid.*, p. 52
\(^5\) Vamplew, *Pay Up*, p. 53 In 1900 the service industries accounted for 21.2% of consumer spending, although only _ of this was attributed to the working-classes. Lee, 'Service Industries', p. 126
at different times depending on job, employer and geographical location. Increased life expectancy further widened, and deepened the potential market for spectator sport. By 1901 Britain’s population was over 45 million while the death rate had fallen to under 17 per 1000. British society was also very youthful with around 30 per cent of the population under 15 years of age throughout the nineteenth century. Between 1871 and 1901 levels of urban density rose from 61.6 per cent to 77 per cent, producing further potential concentrated markets for recreational entrepreneurs. By 1915 the majority of spectators at professional football matches were from the working classes of major towns that had populations in excess of 50,000. One result of these social and economic changes was that aggregate attendances in professional football rose from approximately 602,000 during the first Football League season in 1888-89 to nearly 9 million by 1913-14.

Early football clubs however, particularly those formed during the 1870s, were purely amateur sporting bodies not businesses. They reflected the nineteenth century, middle-class voluntary tradition. Morris has stated that ‘subscriber democracy’ characterised voluntary societies where the members of the club paid an annual subscription entitling them to one vote in the election of a committee and officers at the annual general meeting. By the 1870s sports clubs were being organised with the same traditions of chairman, agendas, rules, subscriptions and

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6 Mason, Association Football, pp. 2-3; Russell, Football, p. 13
7 G. Williams, The Code War (Harefield, 1994), p. 50
8 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 53
9 Mason, Association Football, p. 150
10 Vamplew, Pay Up, Table 6.2, p. 63
members.\textsuperscript{11} It is the persistence of some of these traditions, in particular amateurism, that have had a lasting impact on the development of football management.

Football clubs owed their origins to various types of institutions already in existence. As a consequence, the reasons for establishing a football club ranged from the missionary, to the philanthropic, to the simple desire to spend leisure time playing football with friends. A number of clubs like Bolton Wanderers and Everton, had connections with local churches.\textsuperscript{12} Some came from schools. Sunderland, for example, was born at a meeting of Sunderland school teachers in October 1879.\textsuperscript{13} Places of work was another point of origin. Newton Heath (later Manchester United) originated from the depot and carriage works of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway in 1878.\textsuperscript{14} West Ham was first known as Thames Ironworks after London’s largest surviving shipbuilding firm. The owner, Arnold F. Hills, formed a football club in 1895 as part of his strategy to develop better industrial relations with his workforce.\textsuperscript{15}

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\textsuperscript{12} Bolton Wanderers, formed in 1874, were originally known as Christ Church FC. One of the church regulars was Thomas Ogden, master of the school attached to the church. On the instruction of the Reverent Wright, who was concerned with the welfare of his parishioners, Ogden collected together a band of young men to form a club. He also collected sixpence from each of them, in order to purchase a ball that cost five shillings. The name was changed in 1877 to Bolton Wanderers after the vicar refused the members permission to hold meetings at the church if he was not present. P.M. Young, \textit{Bolton Wanderers} (1965), pp. 18-19. Everton was formed in 1878. It was originally known as St. Domingo’s Church which was sited in Everton, Liverpool and had formed a football club to supplement its cricket section. The following year the football club’s name was changed to Everton. P.M. Young, \textit{Football on Merseyside} (1963), pp. 13-15
\textsuperscript{13} A. Appleton, \textit{Hotbed of Soccer} (1961), p. 164. The club was originally called Sunderland and District Teachers’ Association Football Club. James Allan, a Scot from Thomas Street Boys’ School, called the meeting. He was made vice-captain. \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{14} Williams, \textit{Code War}, p. 71. By 1880 a team was run by the depot’s dining room committee. \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{15} Korr, \textit{West Ham}, pp. 1-3; Mason, \textit{Association Football}, pp. 29-30. The name of West Ham Football Club was established in 1900.
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\end{flushright}
than others, although clerks, and their skills, were prominent in the formation of many clubs. Blackburn Rovers’ membership had originally consisted of the sons of local business and professional families who had attended grammar and public schools. However, the roots of another local club, Blackburn Olympic, were more working-class. In 1883 ‘Olympic’ became the first northern club to lift the FA Cup defeating Old Etonians 2-1 with a group of players who were mainly skilled workers. They included three weavers, two cotton spinners, a picture framer, an iron moulder, a dentist’s assistant, a master plumber and a workman.

A closer look at the early history of Aston Villa illustrates how football clubs from this period emerged, the difficulties they encountered and who ran them. Up to 1914 Villa was largely run on a collective basis, with responsibilities being shared amongst the members and later the directors. Some of the club’s early committee members and players belonged to the middle classes. The club also had a strong Scottish connection and this proved important in its struggle to survive and prosper. This connection marked the club during its early years and was represented by the choice of the Scottish lion as the club’s emblem. One long-serving member, Charles Johnstone, was a teacher who came from Scotland and was later headmaster at three

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18 Mason, *Association Football*, p. 30  
19 *ibid.*, p. 40. The club was originally founded by John Lewis and Arthur Constantine in December 1874. Lewis had attended Market Drayton Grammar School but returned to his hometown to form a club and invited any other players to join who had also returned home from school. Catton, *Leaguers*, p. 24.  
20 J. Catton, *The Real Football* (1900), pp. 123-126. The club had originally been formed by the amalgamation of two minor clubs, Black Star and James Street in January 1878. *ibid.*  
21 Catton Folders, A-B, p. 33
Aston Villa had its origins in the Aston Villa Wesleyan Chapel. In 1872 its bible class members had formed a cricket club with the leader of the class, H.H. Hartshorne, as its first President. W. Scattergood was elected the club captain and W.H. Price its first secretary. It was not until two years later that the club decided to form a football section after some members saw a club mate, W.B. Mason, play for Grasshoppers against Handsworth. Those who took up football subscribed a shilling a head after the first practice game in Aston Park. Their first game was at Wilson Road, against a rugby club, Aston St. Mary’s. The first half was played under rugby rules and the second under the association code.\textsuperscript{16}

Along with Villa and Everton, Sheffield Wednesday was another club that had a connection with a cricket club. A football section had been established in 1866 to keep the members together during the winter months.\textsuperscript{17} This had certain advantages for clubs trying to establish themselves. First, clubs had a pool of members who wanted to play football, and there was already a mechanism in place where they could procure membership fees. Less visible but importantly, the name of the club as a sporting institution would have been established and would have built up a network of contacts within the local area.

Mason has pointed out that there is insufficient evidence to say whether any particular industries or occupational groups were more likely to form football clubs

\textsuperscript{16}The scorer of the only goal of that game was a historian, Johannes (or Jack) Hughes who later detailed Aston Villa’s origins in a book. (I have been unable to trace the book). \textit{Birmingham Sporting Mail}, 20 March 1915, p. 1. Another account of a club called Aston Villa but with no connection with its more famous predecessor was given by J.W. Brigham. He claimed that he became the first secretary of the club in 1868 and that HH Hartshorne was its first President. Hartshorne had proposed to members of his Sunday afternoon bible class that they form a cricket and football club. The cost of membership was initially a halfpenny per week that Brigham collected. Their first playing ground was a piece of waste land at the corner of Church Street and St. Silas’s square before moving to St. Peter’s Road, Hutton Road and then to Perry Barr. Catton Folders, A-B, p. 33.
local schools. Another prominent member was W. Margoschis, a local tobacconist who had the latest scores of away games relayed to his shop by pigeon. The main influence on Villa’s early development however, was George Ramsey. He was the club secretary from 1884 to 1926 but before then he had been a player, captain, committeeman, and chairman. Ramsay, a native of Glasgow, was a commercially trained clerk who came to Birmingham in the early 1870s and took up a position with the iron merchants, Izon, in Stafford Road. His migration was a familiar tale: an example of the attraction that Birmingham held for people seeking employment as a result of the city’s rapid economic growth into a major manufacturing centre during this period. Even in 1851 Birmingham’s population comprised of over 50% of migrants from most parts of the British Isles.

Ramsay’s connection with Villa began when he saw them playing in a public park in Aston in the mid-1870s. Ramsay had previously played at a high standard in Glasgow with the ‘Oxford’ Football Club. Almost immediately he was elected captain and then began to coach the players who undertook exercises such as running, throwing the hammer and gymnastics. Ramsey also coached them in the nuances of passing and dribbling, a standard part of the game in Scotland, and under

22 Birmingham Post, 1 October 1941, p. 4, ‘Obituary’. He was also connected with Birmingham Volunteers.
23 Birmingham Central Library, LF25.1, George H. Osbourne Newscuttings, Notes on Aston Villa Football Club, 1874-1907 (hereafter to be referred to as ‘Osbourne Newscuttings’), p. 56, Birmingham Mail, 13 February 1886; p. 65, Dart, 4 February 1887
24 Aston Villa News and Record (AVNR), Vol. 2, No. 66, December 25-26 1907, p. 11. Even when he retired his services were retained by Villa in the capacity of a consultant. ibid., Vol. 17, No. 668, August 28-30 1926, p. 12-13
27 Birmingham Daily Post, 8 October 1935, p. 16, ‘Obituary’
his guidance Villa’s play and results improved. From 1876 until 1880 Ramsay was club captain, and he also began to take control of the club’s direction off the field. Villa’s first games were played at the public park in Aston but on Ramsay’s initiative they moved to their first ground at Wellington Road in Perry Barr in 1876.

Ramsay was also keen to secure people who would assist Villa in any way and in 1877 he quickly persuaded William McGregor, another Scot, from Braco in Perthshire who had been previously connected with the Calthorpe club, to join. He was immediately elected vice-president. McGregor was an early football entrepreneur and he later founded the Football League in 1888. He came to Birmingham in 1870 where he and his brother, Peter, opened a linen draper’s shop in Summer Lane, Newtown. A tee-totaler, McGregor was also a member of the local Liberal Association during the period when Joseph Chamberlain was its President. Although he did occasionally play in goal during practice games, and was an umpire for the club, it was his talents as an organiser that Ramsay wanted to utilise. McGregor later exploited his involvement in football by putting his name to products such as the ‘McGregor football’ and the ‘McGregor lace-to-toe football

29 AVNR, Vol. 2, No. 66, December 25-26 1907, p. 11
30 S. Inglis, Villa Park - 100 Years (Warley, 1997), p. 15. Ramsey had persuaded a farmer to sublet the club a field that bordered Birchfield and Perry Barr. It was a mile from Aston Park and Ramsay himself took on the lease for three years at a commencing rental of £5 per year. The club also rented a room at a coffee house in Aston High Street for the purpose of meetings and social gatherings. It later moved the clubroom to Lozells and then to Six Ways where it held music evenings. AVNR, December 25-26 1907, p. 11; Osbourne Newscuttings, p.40, Birmingham Mail, 24 October 1883, ‘The Rise and Progress of the Aston Villa Club’.
31 Catton, Real Football, p. 71
32 Dictionary of National Biography (forthcoming)
Booth’, and his shop sold football shirts and shorts. He also wrote regular columns for Birmingham newspapers like the *Sports Argus*.35

Another early football entrepreneur was William Sudell of Preston North End who, in contrast to the collective efforts at Aston Villa, had been the driving force behind Preston’s emergence as the top team in the country during the 1880s. He was the chairman of Preston North End between 1874 and 1893 and has been described as ‘football’s first great professional manager’ due to the direction he gave the club and the responsibilities he undertook.36 Sudell was already a management figure before he got involved in football as he was manager of a Preston cotton mill, John Goodair & Co. He was employed by the firm for over 25 years, and after the owner’s death he ran the factory himself until 1893.37 Born around 1850, Sudell was a freeman of the town and claimed that an ancestor had been a Guild Mayor of Preston two hundred years previously. Sudell first joined Preston North End as a member in 1867 and was elected chairman in 1874. He had been a keen sportsman in his younger days, playing cricket and rugby for the club, and on occasions he later played in goal when the team took up football.38 He was one of the first people to recognise the game’s commercial potential, and in this sense, Sudell, along with

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34 *Sports Argus*, 23 December 1911, ‘Obituary’, p. 3; *Dictionary of National Biography* (forthcoming)
35 *Birmingham Daily Mail*, 23 December 1911; *Dictionary of National Biography* (forthcoming)
36 E. Grayson, *Corinthians and Cricketers* (1957), p. 25. In 1888-89 Preston were the first team to win the ‘double’, the Football League and the FA Cup in the same season. They also won the League the following year.
37 *Preston Herald*, 13 April 1895, p. 6. The factory was considered one of the largest in Preston. At one time it was worth £70,000 and had 64,000 spindles and 1300 looms. *Preston Guardian*, 13 April 1895, p. 2
38 *Preston Herald*, 24 March 1888, p. 5. When he was twelve he once skated 30 miles on the frozen Preston to Lancaster canal.
McGregor, were part of the entrepreneurial spirit that existed within other areas of the service and leisure industries in the 1880s.

In the retail sector, for example, the late nineteenth century witnessed the rise of the department store. Many of its pioneers were non-conformist liberals who personified the ‘Triumph of the Entrepreneurial Ideal’. Household names of the twentieth century, such as D.H. Evans, Owen Owen, Bainbridges’ of Newcastle and the Binns family, emerged from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. Harrod’s, which began as a butcher’s shop in Cable Street, Stepney, only experienced real growth and success when the Harrod family had left the business and Richard Burbidge took over as general manager.39 Burbidge, a committed Anglican, was appointed in 1891 and aimed to attract a larger and better clientele in order to support the store’s growth. He introduced new departments and services and by 1894 the store had its own theatre ticket agency, restaurant, hairdressing salon and also operated one of London’s first 24-hour telephone services. Burbidge also borrowed more aggressive American marketing techniques and was convinced of the value of good advertising. By 1913 Harrods’ had been awarded its first Royal Warrant, assuming an exclusiveness that contrasted sharply with its previous co-operative image.40

The music hall was another institution that prospered under Victorian entrepreneurial verve. They had their origins in public house entertainment but by 1870 London had 31 large music halls, although many smaller ones had been closed due to the strict implementation of fire precautions. Halls became larger and more

opulent as a result. By the end of the century, the music hall had become a mass entertainment as well as big business. In 1899, for example, the Moss Empires of Edward Moss had a capital of £1 million.41

Cricket too underwent its own commercial revolution. In 1846 William Clarke had established the All England Eleven (AEE), the first example in England of a peripatetic team comprising professional sportsmen. Clarke capitalised on the growing interest in the game and the AEE played wherever there was a demand. Clarke, as manager, received a cut of the gate and paid his team on the strength of their performance in each game but he would always pocket the majority.42 Other cricketers like George Parr, Alfred Shaw and Arthur Shrewsbury followed Clarke’s entrepreneurial lead. They all made handsome profits from arranging overseas tours that ultimately acted as forerunners for international cricket.43 Some, like the Lillywhites and William Gunn, later developed thriving businesses in the sale and manufacture of sporting goods.44

Across the Atlantic, baseball had emerged as a professional sport during the 1870s. The National League had been established in 1876 and the game had its own entrepreneur in Albert G. Spalding. He had been a pitcher with the National League’s first winners, the Chicago White Stockings, and had actually drafted the League’s

42 In 1852 however, a schism emerged within the AEE and a rival team, the United Eleven of England, was set up. In 1865 the United South of England XI was formed after the southern professionals withdrew from both the AEE and UEE. C. Brookes, English Cricket: The Game and its Players through the Ages (Newton Abbot, 1978), p. 112
43 The first tour to Canada and the USA took place in 1859 with the first visit to Australia in 1861. The latter was underwritten and managed by a firm of tea importers, Messrs. Spiers and Pond, who made a profit of £11,000. Brookes, English Cricket, pp. 101-19
constitution. On retirement he set up the Spalding Sporting Goods Company that supplied clubs with balls and other equipment making him wealthy enough to buy and own the White Stockings.45

Sudell and McGregor were behind the formation of Britain's National Baseball League in 1890. Preston North End was one of the original four members along with Aston Villa, Stoke City and Derby County. Sudell and McGregor sat on the League's council, while George Ramsey was its honorary secretary. Deepdale was used as Preston's home and some of the footballers also played the game.46 The League only lasted a few seasons but in 1906 it was reincarnated in the form of the British Baseball Association, with John Cameron, the secretary-manager of Tottenham Hotspur, as its honorary secretary.47

During the 1880s a football club's administration had been a relatively simple affair. For example, Bolton Wanderers' committee consisted of the club's officers: president and vice-presidents, captains and vice-captains, treasurer and secretaries plus eight non-playing members. All were elected at the annual meeting. Their duties included the arrangement of each season's fixtures, the selection of players for all matches and the transaction of business on the club's behalf. The secretary, who by 1882 had an assistant, arranged the dates for the fixtures and was responsible for

46 Football Field, 3 May 1890, p. 3; 21 June 1890, p. 5. Sunderland and Middlesbrough had been originally included. but dropped out before the season started, probably for financial reasons. ibid. Derby's ground was actually called the Baseball Ground.
47 Spurs Monthly, January 1995. I am grateful to Andy Porter for supplying me with this information.
collecting money owed to the club. His assistant took sole charge of collecting gate receipts.\(^48\)

**Table 2.1: Blackburn Rovers Balance Sheet, 1875-76**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receipts</th>
<th>£ s d</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>£ s d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T. Greenwood</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td>Football</td>
<td>0 15 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Baguley</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td>Haworth Bros. for Book</td>
<td>0 1 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Waugh</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td>Cloth for Flags</td>
<td>0 2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Dean</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td>Receipt Book</td>
<td>0 0 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Thomas</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td>Thornbers for Rules</td>
<td>0 8 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Lewis</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td>Paid Man, Allowance</td>
<td>0 0 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Baguley</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td>Goal Posts</td>
<td>0 0 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Greenwood</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td>Umpire’s Expenses to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Duckworth</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td>Darwen</td>
<td>0 0 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Constantine</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td>Expenses to Church</td>
<td>0 2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Cottam</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td>Expenses to Cob Wall</td>
<td>0 1 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Birtwistle</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td>Post Cards and Stamps</td>
<td>0 5 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Birtwistle</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td>Paid for Sundry Ex.’s</td>
<td>0 3 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Baldwin</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jas. Thompson</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Brothers</td>
<td>0 3 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\[\text{2 8 0} \quad \text{2 8 0}\]


During these early years a football club’s finances reflected its humble origins. In 1875-76 the balance sheet of Blackburn Rovers (Table 2.1) showed that the club had an income of £2 8s 0d, entirely made up of members’ subscriptions; they received no gate receipts and, unsurprisingly, paid out no wages to players.\(^49\) In 1882, and in addition to their subscriptions, the players of Bolton Wanderers had to pay for the cost of their equipment and railway fares. The club also operated a fines system. For example, anyone using bad language on the field would be fined two pence. Failure to notify the secretary of the inability to play was a sixpence

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48 Young, *Bolton Wanderers*, p. 169

49 In fact, their major expense was a football that cost 15s - and that had to last the whole season or they would have been in debt. *AVNR*, 29 January 1910, p. 380
penalty.\textsuperscript{50} As the number of clubs grew, more teams travelled further away from their home towns. In East Lancashire this was easier than in most places because of the close proximity of a large number of football-playing towns. The increase in travelling however, forced Bolton to subsidise the railway fares of their players as many were unable to afford them.\textsuperscript{51} When clubs acquired a ground, and because of football’s growing appeal, they began to charge spectators for entry. Aston Villa’s landlord took note of their popularity and hiked up the rent to £8 after the first season.\textsuperscript{52} The rise in crowds forced the club into improving and enclosing the ground. A hedge originally encircled the field but gaps in it had allowed fans a free view. In 1878 the hedge was cut down and replaced by boardings, and to keep spectators back from the pitch, ropes were fastened around trees bordering it.\textsuperscript{53}

Clubs’ incomes began to rise as did the array of their expenses. In 1879 Villa’s gate receipts amounted to £42 17s 10d.\textsuperscript{54} For the 1879-80 season Villa’s income totalled £235 11s 9d.\textsuperscript{55} By 1883 gross receipts had increased to £1720 1s 6d. From this, £443 was deducted for the away team’s share. Costs included those for entertainment, £104; travelling expenses to Scotland, Wales and Lancashire, £186; and sundries such as printing and advertising amounted to £142. It was said, with perhaps more than a hint of irony, that ‘so large are the sums of money involved ...

\textsuperscript{50} Young, Bolton Wanderers, pp. 19-20
\textsuperscript{51} ibid., p. 20
\textsuperscript{52} Inglis, Villa Park, p. 15. The first gate versus Wednesbury had amounted to 5s 3d but on occasions receipts exceeded £10. Aston Villa News and Record, October 12 1935, p. 81; AVNR, December 25-26 1907, p. 12
\textsuperscript{53} Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 178, Saturday Night, ‘The Early Days of Aston Villa’, 24 June 1893. Games were played on a sloping meadow that was dotted with trees. Later, the trees were cut down, and the remaining stumps were blown up with dynamite in the middle of the night by Ramsay and an accomplice. ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} ibid., p. 178, Saturday Night, ‘The Early Days of Aston Villa’, 24 June 1893. See Appendix 1
that the club has assumed the proportions of a large business affair'. 56 Some clubs also found patrons from the local community. Peter Parkinson, a manager of a Bolton mill, sponsored the ‘Wanderers’ from 1878. During this period Villa also acquired one of its first patrons. George Kynoch, again a native from north of the border, owned a local munitions factory, the Lion works at Witton that, at one time, employed 2000 people. 57

Yet, the most important ingredient in a club’s success and, at this stage, survival, was its players. Archie Hunter was Aston Villa’s most famous player during the 1880s and another example of Villa’s young, male, Scottish connection. Hunter was not actually recruited through any inducement of remuneration as was often the case, but instead by accident. He had met the Calthorpe club when they were touring Scotland, and when he came to Birmingham in 1878 as an apprentice in the hardware trade, he tried to locate them but was unable to find their ground. 58

55 ibid., p. 180, Saturday Night, ‘The Early Days of Aston Villa’, 8 July 1893. See Appendix 2
56 ibid., p. 39, Midland Echo, 25 May 1883
57 Birmingham Daily Gazette, 2 March 1891, ‘Obituary’. In 1886 Kynoch became Conservative M.P for Aston Manor. His involvement with Villa initially began when he donated some wooden railings to erect barriers at the Perry Barr ground. Kynoch was also an early visitor to Villa games where he and his wife would ride around the ground on horseback while the match was in progress. Following a game against the Edinburgh team, Heart of Midlothian, he held a dinner for the club and 120 guests at his factory’s dining room. Later, the ‘Kynoch Wagon’ was a regular fixture at Perry Barr where he entertained his guests. Kynoch was also one of the three guarantors of the ground’s rent from 1880 to 1887, along with McGregor and J. Clements. He was the club President between 1886 and 1887 where he succeeded W.M. Ellis and was later succeeded himself by James Hinks. Kynoch however, proved unpopular with McGregor and other committee members because of the autocratic way he wanted to run the club. In 1887 Kynoch disposed of his interest in the munitions factory. He left for South Africa the following year, remaining there until he died, although he was still an MP at the time. Osbourne Newsclippings, p. 178, Saturday Night, ‘The Early Days of Aston Villa’, 24 June 1893, p. 68 Birmingham Gazette, 16 June 1887; Birmingham Daily Gazette, 2 March 1891, ‘Obituary’; Birmingham Sporting Mail, 23 December 1911, p. 1
58 Birmingham Daily Gazette, 30 November 1894, p. 3
colleague at work who was a Villa enthusiast then suggested that he contact George Ramsay.\textsuperscript{59}

The lifespan of many fledgling clubs however, was short-lived. A club’s survival depended on a number of factors. These included money to finance itself as well as the historical accident of location because rapid urbanisation during the nineteenth century was swallowing up the potential space for clubs to play. Birmingham’s first association football club, Calthorpe, was formed in 1873 by two Scots, J. Campbell Orr and John Carson who were previously linked with Queen’s Park.\textsuperscript{60} Originally called Birmingham Clerks, they renamed themselves after their ground at Calthorpe Park.\textsuperscript{61} Calthorpe later left the park bearing its name and rented a private ground owned by Lord Calthorpe on the Bristol Road. However, the club could not charge gate money for their matches due to the terms of their tenancy. As their income diminished, so their natural growth declined due to the competition of other clubs that were emerging in Birmingham and its surrounding area.\textsuperscript{62} By the 1886-87 season, when Aston Villa won the FA Cup for the first time, Calthorpe had scratched from the main local competition, the Birmingham County FA Challenge Cup.\textsuperscript{63}

Football was fast becoming a mania, and by 1884 some of Villa’s crowds had reached 15,000. They also took some of their fans to away games. In 1883 Villa had

\textsuperscript{59} A. Gibson and W. Pickford, \textit{Association Football and the Men Who Made It}, Vol. 2 (1906), p. 54
\textsuperscript{62} Morris, \textit{Aston Villa}, p. 7
\textsuperscript{63} Birmingham City Archives, MS519/1, p. 288
played Queen's Park in Glasgow and such was the interest generated in the game the
London and North Western Railway Company ran two trains and the Midland
Railway one special train from Birmingham. In addition to the struggle to keep
pace with the rise in football’s popularity, clubs began to compete with each other
for the attentions of football enthusiasts by advertising themselves to a wider
audience. At first, Aston Villa used large wall posters but from 1886 all the club’s
games were advertised in the Friday edition of the Birmingham Mail and local
sporting papers. Newspapers however, had been used early on by the club for
important games. In 1881, for a game against Blackburn Rovers, an advert had been
placed in the Birmingham Mail which announced that ‘[t]he committee of the Villa
club has deemed it necessary to provide tickets for admission, in order to avoid
excessive crushing at the gate’. Tickets were sold in the establishments of some club
members including McGregor’s drapery. Another outlet for tickets was the Crown
and Cushion public house which was adjacent to the ground in Perry Barr. Ticket
prices ranged from 3d for general admission to 6d for the reserved section. Admission to football games then was not just restricted to standing or seats. When
Villa played Aston Unity in a cup-tie at the Aston Lower Grounds in 1883, general
admission was 6d and the reserved grounds or stands cost 6d extra. But if you were
in possession of a two-wheel carriage admission that would cost 1s 6d while the cost

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64 Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 48, Birmingham Gazette, 25 October 1884
65 ibid., Saturday Night, p. 56, 23 January 1886
66 ibid., p. 36, Birmingham Mail, 28 January 1881
67 ibid., p. 36, Birmingham Mail, 18 February 1881
of a four-wheeler was 2s 6d, a kind of corporate hospitality of its day for the richer supporters.\textsuperscript{68}

As crowds increased, they became more socially stratified. The majority of the spectators, who were working-class, paid the minimum admission price and stood to watch the game. Clubs however, began to recognise that they also had to cater for wealthier patrons. In 1887 Villa built a new pavilion and new stand with a seating capacity for 700. A refreshment stand was also erected and an unreserved portion was set aside for more carriages to enter the Perry Barr ground. Similar to county cricket clubs, the club’s pavilion was designated a reserved area for members.\textsuperscript{69} Another stand was built in 1892 that accommodated an extra 1000 spectators.\textsuperscript{70} The increase in working-class spectators changed the nature of the crowd. In 1889 there had been complaints about gambling and the use of foul language at Perry Barr and the club brought in extra police to try and curb it.\textsuperscript{71}

Accompanying the rise in the game’s popularity was its increased competitiveness. Established in 1871, by the game’s governing body, the Football Association, it was the FA Cup that did most to stimulate competition. The national competition was also supplemented by local cup competitions: both the Sheffield and Birmingham FA’s challenge cup competitions began in 1876-77 and the first final of the Lancashire Cup was played in 1880.\textsuperscript{72}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{68} Albion News, 2 December 1922, p. 112. Persons on horseback however, were prohibited. \textit{ibid.} See Appendix 6
\item \textsuperscript{69} Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 68, Birmingham Times, 20 August 1887. The new stand and pavilion was designed by an architect, Daniel Arkell.
\item \textsuperscript{70} \textit{ibid.}, p. 85, Birmingham Mail, 23 January 1892
\item \textsuperscript{71} \textit{ibid.}, p. 76, Birmingham Mail, 22 November 1889; Birmingham Mail, 6 December 1889
\item \textsuperscript{72} Mason, \textit{Association Football}, p. 78, n. 8; Russell, \textit{Football}, p. 12
\end{itemize}
became known as ‘pot-hunting’ and generated interest through a combination of their competitive edge allied to the expression of local pride and hostility towards rival local communities.\(^{73}\) Walvin has commented how later Victorian local rivalries were becoming less physical and aggressive. Instead,

- brass band contests, football games, choral festivities - these and others absorbed and re-channelled the old traditions of local pride and imposed on them a peaceable style more in keeping with the social tone of late Victorian life.\(^{74}\)

As a result, association football, rather than rugby football, began to emerge as the dominant code by the 1880s. Up to this period many football clubs had played by different sets of rules.\(^{75}\) In areas such as Lancashire and the North East, rugby had initially been the more popular sport before 1880.\(^{76}\) As the Lancashire Rugby Union refused to sanction a county cup competition, rugby’s popularity in that county was superseded by the association code. In Yorkshire however, where a rugby cup competition was established in 1876, soccer, particularly in the West Riding, remained a poor relation until the twentieth century.\(^{77}\) The diffusion of association football also spread to other major cities such as Newcastle, Liverpool and Manchester by 1890.\(^{78}\) Consequently, there had been a rapid growth in the numbers of football clubs from the 1880s, especially in the Midlands and the North. The Lancashire Football Association was formed in 1878 by 30 clubs: by 1886 it had

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\(^{73}\) Russell, *Football*, p. 19


\(^{75}\) Williams, *Code War*, p. 51


114. In 1882 the Birmingham FA had 52 clubs. By 1912 it was estimated that there were 13,000 amateur football clubs and three-quarters of a million amateur players.

The growth of the game, particularly in the North, and the increase in competition had caused clubs to look outside the local area for better players, some of whom had been enticed by the promise of work and better wages. This was in direct contravention of the southern-dominated FA’s amateur ethos that forbade any form of professionalism. In the 1870s the FA had been dominated by either leisured gentlemen or by professionally or commercially employed products of public and grammar schools. They regarded football as fun, not work and therefore, were hostile to the idea of players being paid. By the 1880s however, the payment of players amongst northern clubs was widespread, particularly for the services of Scottish players. Scottish players attained the title of ‘professors’ because the game north of the border was technically more advanced than in England in the skills of dribbling and, in particular, passing.

In line with this entrepreneurial tendency, William Sudell was a prime advocate of professionalism, convinced as he was that the public wanted to watch the best players. In 1887 he argued that,

> Professionalism has, in my opinion, benefited football. I consider football is played more scientifically now then ever it was and that is solely due to the fact that in a professional team the men are under the control of the management and are

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79 Mason, *Association Football*, p. 31  
80 Bentley, ‘Is Football a Business?’, p. 383  
81 Mason, *Association Football*, p. 69  
82 Scottish footballers continued to make-up a considerable element of English club’s playing staffs. See Appendix 7. In 1910 and 1925 the percentage of English players playing in the Football League was, in both cases, approximately 77 per cent. In the same two years the percentage of Scottish
constantly playing together. Professionalism must improve football because men who devote their entire attention to the game are more likely to become good players than the amateur who is worried by business cares. No; purely amateur clubs will never be able to hold their own against a professional team.\(^{83}\)

He considered that, ‘[football] will be played more scientifically and with less roughness and dash in the future. In short, professionalism will make such strides that football will become a science’.\(^{84}\) The emphasis on science was used to show that football could be seen as a respectable activity, and not the rough and uncouth spectacle it was proclaimed in some quarters.

Sudell, unsurprisingly, had been the main instigator behind the FA’s legalisation of professionalism, thus igniting football’s commercialisation process. Preston North End had been one of a number of Lancashire clubs that had made payments to players since the early 1880s. But in 1884 Preston’s opponents in an FA Cup tie, Upton Park, lodged a complaint with the FA claiming that they had been playing against a team of professionals. Though the charge was upheld and Preston were expelled from the competition, it opened up the debate over professionalism, plus the transferring of players. In October 1884 thirty-six northern and Birmingham clubs had threatened to resign from the governing body and form their own British Football Association but this was averted. Following protracted arguments, professionalism was finally legalised by the FA at a special general

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\(^{83}\) Glasgow Evening News and Star, 22 January 1887, p. 4

\(^{84}\) Ibid.
meeting in July 1885.\textsuperscript{85} Certain rules and restrictions however, were initially imposed on the freedom of professionals similar to those in cricket.\textsuperscript{86}

Professionalism was never accepted by some members of the FA and there was a long period of struggle between the amateur and professional ethos that persisted well into the twentieth century, affecting the administration of the game, and ultimately the management of clubs. In 1894 the FA Amateur Cup was established due to the dominance of professional clubs in the FA Cup. In 1907 a group of die-hard clubs, mainly from the South, broke away to form the Amateur Football Association, complaining that the FA was only interested in the business of football and that the professionalism had infected the game. They returned to the fold in 1914.\textsuperscript{87}

Three years after professionalism was legalised, on the initiative of William McGregor, the Football League was formed by twelve clubs, six from the Midlands and six from Lancashire.\textsuperscript{88} From 1888 onwards, the sport operated on a more organised, commercial footing. Initially, the League’s objectives were limited: ‘its creation was essentially a practical response to a number of difficulties in the

\textsuperscript{85}Football Association Minutes, 26 January 1884, 28 February 1884, 23 March 1885, General Meeting, 20 July 1885; Williams, \textit{Code War}, Chapter 10; Mason, \textit{Association Football}, p. 74; Russell, \textit{Football}, p. 25

\textsuperscript{86}Williams, \textit{Code War}, p. 93. For example, they could only play for one club per season but for cup matches they needed to have a two year residence qualification within six miles of the club; and they could not serve on FA Committees.

\textsuperscript{87}T. Mason, ‘Football’ in T. Mason (ed.), \textit{Sport in Britain: A Social History} (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 147-48. Despite professionalism being brought out into the open, professional players continued to encounter a certain hostility from some quarters. On one occasion, Sudell threatened not to allow any of Preston’s professionals to play internationals again unless they were accorded the same treatment that amateurs received. \textit{Football Field}, 14 April 1888, p. 6

\textsuperscript{88}McGregor had originally written a letter to Bolton Wanderers, Blackburn Rovers, Preston North End, West Bromwich Albion and Aston Villa suggesting that they arrange home and away fixtures. An initial meeting took place at Anderton’s Hotel in Fleet Street, London, 22 March 1888 and then a second one at the Royal Hotel, Manchester on 17 April. Twelve clubs were formally invited: six from Lancashire were; Accrington, Blackburn, Bolton, Burnley, Everton, Preston, and six from the
management of clubs that had arisen following the legalisation of professionalism'.

These difficulties revolved around the erratic and unreliable nature of clubs' seasonal fixture lists that mainly consisted of friendlies. Some games would be one-sided, drawing small crowds. On other occasions the opposition failed to turn up, and if a club was knocked out of the cup competitions in the early rounds it could have had serious financial implications. In essence, competitive football was the aim: leagues were supposed to decrease the number of one-sided fixtures as well as providing a regular product. Thus, the Football League would provide a pre-arranged and permanent schedule of games that could attract large crowds and subsequently, provide a more reliable source of income. The institution of the Football League and other leagues, such as the Football Alliance, in 1889, and the Southern League in 1894, established the principle of annual, pre-arranged fixtures as the most reliable method to generate revenue. By 1912 the number of professional clubs had risen to 400, and there were also 7000 professional players.

Professionalism increased the rivalry between clubs from the same town or city, both on and off the pitch. With no regulation, a process of economic 'cannibalisation' took place as clubs competed for the same market of fans, reflecting contemporary laissez-faire economics. As costs from paying players rose, it was


Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 18

An earlier attempt to rationalise fixture lists was made in June 1886 when a conference of football secretaries in Blackburn was called by T. Hindle of Darwen. Here, fixtures were arranged for the forthcoming season using an exchange method. *Football Field*, 29 May 1886, p. 6; 26 June 1886, p. 9

Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 18

*ibid.*, p. 26. Professionalism in Scotland was not legalised until 1893, two years after the Scottish League was established. Mason, 'Football', p. 147
only one or two clubs in each town or city that survived and prospered. For example, Blackburn Olympic, FA Cup winners in 1883, had folded by the end of the decade, as Blackburn Rovers emerged as the town’s dominant team.94 During the 1880s Preston North End had been England’s premier team, and in seven seasons between 1883-84 to 1889-90 they dominated English football.95 Initially however, North End had had to compete for the town’s loyalties with another local team, Preston Zingari.96 In the 1880s, the two main rivals on Merseyside were Everton and Bootle. Everton was one of the founding members of the Football League in 1888 but Bootle’s application for the following year was rejected. It was accepted in 1892 but by then Liverpool Football Club had been established. Liverpool joined the Football League the following year whilst at the same time Bootle resigned from the League as Merseyside could only sustain two major clubs.97 One of the more interesting examples was the situation at Middlesbrough. In 1889, it was an amateur club but some members wanted it to turn professional. The majority refused but a minority of Middlesbrough members broke away to form a professional club, Middlesbrough Ironopolis. Middlesbrough responded by turning professional itself. In 1892 both clubs agreed to amalgamate if their application to join the Football League was successful. It was rejected however, and the amalgamation was cancelled with the

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93 Bentley, ‘Is Football a Business?’, p. 383
94 Catton, Real Football, p. 128
95 Preston North End played 466 games, winning 394, drawing 37 and losing only 35. In that period Preston scored 1502 goals and conceded 385. Athletic News, 1 May 1922, p. 4
96 In 1884 Zingari won the Preston challenge cup and claimed to have the finest ground in Lancashire. In that year Zingari also imported four players from Scotland in an attempt to compete with North End. Scottish Umpire, 21 August 1884, p. 5; H. Berry and G. Allman, One Hundred Years at Deepdale 1881-1981 (Preston, 1982), p. 28
two clubs again going their separate ways. Ironopolis eventually joined the League in 1893 but the following year, unable to sustain itself financially, it was voluntarily wound up. Two competing teams in the same town had not helped Middlesbrough either, and they reverted back to amateurism that same year.98 The impact of competition within football reflected more general patterns within industry as a whole. During the 1890s, in the face of competition from the United States and Germany, there was an increase in business amalgamations and consolidations. In one way, the institution of the Football League in 1888 mirrored this development as it provided ‘a framework for [the] greater rationalisation and centralisation of professional football’.99

Table 2.2: Professional Football Clubs’ Total Income, Wage Payments and Dividends, 1908

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division One FCs</th>
<th>Gross Income (£)</th>
<th>Payment to Players (£)</th>
<th>Dividends and Payments (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division Two FCs</td>
<td>224,906</td>
<td>107,107</td>
<td>1,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern League</td>
<td>147,602</td>
<td>77,511</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCs</td>
<td>98,524</td>
<td>64,411</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>471,032</td>
<td>249,029</td>
<td>1,869</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sports Argus, 16 October 1909, p. 1

98 Appleton, Hotbed of Soccer, pp. 81-84; http://members.aol.com/ironopolis/mihistory.htm. Middlesbrough eventually joined the Football League in 1899.
99 Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, p. 62
Table 2.3: Summary of Aston Villa's Balance Sheets, 1879-1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Position in Football League*</th>
<th>Revenue (£) 2000 Prices</th>
<th>Wages (£)</th>
<th>Pre-tax Profits (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td></td>
<td>235</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>93,500</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>116,000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,739</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,935</td>
<td>722,000</td>
<td>3,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13,797</td>
<td>846,000</td>
<td>6,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11,457</td>
<td>685,000</td>
<td>5,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,141</td>
<td>947,000</td>
<td>4,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12,946</td>
<td>757,000</td>
<td>5,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20,408</td>
<td>1,146,000</td>
<td>7,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20,167</td>
<td>1,122,000</td>
<td>6,726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 39, Birmingham Gazette, 22 May 1883; Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 53, Birmingham Mail, 4 July 1885; Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 178, Saturday Night, Birmingham Gazette, 1 June 1888, p. 3; Aston Villa News and Record; Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, pp. 340-78; Butler, Football League; R. Roberts, Schroders: Merchants and Bankers (1992), Appendix V

* Aston Villa only played in Division One during this period.

By 1914 the finances of English league clubs had been transformed and the professional game had developed into a not insignificant industry. Table 2.2 shows how that in 1908 the gross income of all professional clubs in the Football League and the Southern League was nearly £_ million (£28 million at 2000 prices) and just under £_ million was spent by clubs on players’ wages. Increases in turnover grew significantly throughout the period as illustrated by Aston Villa’s finances in Table 2.3. As early as 1885 the club had generated a revenue of £1913. But by the end of the period its income was the modern day equivalent of £1 million. Spectator sports in general were thriving and during this period Scottish football clubs and county cricket clubs also generated similar amounts of revenue, yet as in English football, some did better than others. For example, the average income of Glasgow

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100 Roberts’s book has been used for all monetary conversions throughout the thesis.
Rangers before 1914 was £14,164 and for Hearts the figure was £7361. St. Johnstone’s average income however was only £818. There were similar differences of revenue in cricket’s county championship. Between 1890 and 1914 Surrey generated an average income of over £14,000 per year whereas for Derbyshire it was £2348.102

Table 2.4: Professional Football Clubs’ Average Income and Wages, 1908

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division One FCs</th>
<th>Average Income (£)</th>
<th>Income (£) 2000 Prices</th>
<th>Average Wages (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Income (£)</td>
<td>Income (£) 2000 Prices</td>
<td>Average Wages (£)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Two FCs</td>
<td>11,245</td>
<td>673,000</td>
<td>5,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern League FCs</td>
<td>7,380</td>
<td>441,000</td>
<td>3,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Sports Argus, 16 October 1909, p. 1; Roberts, Schroders, Appendix V</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.5: Sample of Professional Football Clubs’ Wages and Revenue, 1905-06

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Gates (£)</th>
<th>Gates (£) 2000 Prices</th>
<th>Wages (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle United</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18,522</td>
<td>1,133,000</td>
<td>4,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston Villa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18,384</td>
<td>1,124,000</td>
<td>6,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15,476</td>
<td>946,000</td>
<td>5,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12,486</td>
<td>764,000</td>
<td>4,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tottenham</td>
<td>*SL</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,075</td>
<td>738,000</td>
<td>5,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotspur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulham</td>
<td>SL</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,615</td>
<td>710,000</td>
<td>4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10,747</td>
<td>657,000</td>
<td>5,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolwich Arsenal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10,682</td>
<td>653,000</td>
<td>3,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9,426</td>
<td>576,000</td>
<td>4,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8,828</td>
<td>540,000</td>
<td>4,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield United</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8,696</td>
<td>532,000</td>
<td>4,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,220</td>
<td>503,000</td>
<td>4,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn Rovers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>489,000</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derby County</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6,772</td>
<td>414,000</td>
<td>3,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preston North End</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7,894</td>
<td>483,000</td>
<td>4,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notts. County</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5,169</td>
<td>316,000</td>
<td>3,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bury</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5,529</td>
<td>338,000</td>
<td>3,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwich City</td>
<td>SL</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,930</td>
<td>301,000</td>
<td>2,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4,283</td>
<td>262,000</td>
<td>3,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol Rovers</td>
<td>SL</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,142</td>
<td>253,000</td>
<td>3,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Ham</td>
<td>SL</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,646</td>
<td>162,000</td>
<td>2,125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aston Villa News and Record, Vol. 1, (1), September 1st 1906, p. 5; Butler, Football League; Roberts, Schroders, Appendix V

* SL - Southern League

101 At 2000 prices this equated to over £100,000.
102 Vamplew, Pay Up, Table 8.1, p. 83; Table 8.5, p. 94
The turnover of the average Football League club in 1908, shown in Table 2.4, was perhaps similar to a small local firm. By 1914 some of the leading clubs had annual turnovers of over £20,000. In terms of generating income, an elite group of clubs emerged from the major urban areas, reflecting the advantages of a metropolitan location with its large pool of potential supporters and a modern transport network. It was these clubs that made up the majority of clubs in Division One and also included London teams from the Southern League such as Tottenham Hotspur (Table 2.5). In general, these clubs also paid the most wages (Table 2.4). Table 2.5 shows how in 1906 Villa, along with Newcastle United, had generated revenue through the gate, at the equivalent of over £1 million at 2000 prices.

The increase in football's competition after 1885 revolved around the players. Players' wages, as shown in Table 2.4, took up most of a club's costs, approximately 50 per cent. They were a club's main assets and players quickly began to realise their market place potential by selling their labour to the highest bidder. During the 1880s, a free market existed where some players were able to command a comparatively high weekly wage and move freely to other clubs.

103 A department store, Broadbents, of middle-class Southport, had a turnover of £27,570 by 1901. J.H. Porter, 'The Development of a Provincial Department Store 1870-1939', Business History, Vol. 13, 1 (1971), pp. 65-71. However, the business included more than one store. By 1910 there were between 150 and 200 department stores in Britain. One third of these were public companies with an aggregate turnover of £20 million.

104 Bentley, 'Is Football a Business?', p. 393. Today, this equates to £1.1 million.

105 It should be acknowledged that there appears to be a large discrepancy between the gate money Aston Villa received in 1905-06 (Table 2.4) to what it received in subsequent years (Table 2.2). Using the balance sheets of Aston Villa between 1878-79 and 1913-14 as an example, Appendices 1-5 show however, the growing complexity of a football club's finances during this period.

106 This proportion remained relatively steady up to the 1960s.
Sunderland, for example, allegedly paid a player £5 a week in 1889.\textsuperscript{107} By 1893, it was claimed that the average weekly wage of professional footballers was £3 during the season and £2 in the summer.\textsuperscript{108} Wages plus transfer fees continued to rise as the footballing competition intensified. In 1898, Everton bought Johnnie Holt from Rangers for £300 and paid him wages of £6 10s per week all the year round.\textsuperscript{109} Alf Common became the first player to be transferred for £1000 when he moved from Sunderland to Middlesbrough in 1905.\textsuperscript{110}

In order to regulate football's labour market, the game's governing bodies introduced two highly restrictive acts of football legislation. Both had the aim of preventing the poaching of players between clubs as this had created undue competition.\textsuperscript{111} From the late Victorian period, industrial labour markets had been increasingly bureaucratised and regulated, and during this period football became part of this trend.\textsuperscript{112} At the same time, these measures had the effect of curtailing a player's freedom of movement and his earning capacity. First, the retain and transfer system was adopted as Rule 18 of the Football League's constitution in 1890.\textsuperscript{113} Under the transfer system, once a player registered with a Football League club he could be retained by that club for the entirety of his career unless the club decided when, or if, to transfer him. The length of the contract between club and player was for one year only with the club deciding whether or not to sign him on for the

\textsuperscript{107} Tischler, \textit{Footballers and Businessmen}, p. 61 n52. At 2000 prices this was £312.
\textsuperscript{108} Mason, \textit{Association Football}, p. 97
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Liverpool Review}, 27 August 1898, p. 9
\textsuperscript{110} At 2000 prices it equates to £61,155.
\textsuperscript{111} Vamplew, \textit{Pay Up}, p. 112
\textsuperscript{112} Savage and Miles, \textit{British Working Class}, pp. 48-56
following year, and if a player was offered the maximum wage he could not ask for a transfer. Accordingly, the transfer of a player from one club to another was only possible through the purchase of a player's contract. A player, or the buying club, required the permission of the player's club for an approach to be made. Furthermore, clubs could place a transfer fee on a player who had not been offered a contract for the following season as they still retained his registration. The second piece of legislation was the maximum wage which was Rule 32 of the FA’s constitution and came into effect in 1901. Initially, a limit was imposed on players of £4 per week that also included bonuses. Similar to soldiers accepting the King’s or Queen’s Shilling when they enlisted in order to gain their loyalty, players were also entitled to a £10 signing-on fee when they joined a new club. The purpose of the transfer system was to prevent the rich clubs from buying up the best talent because if a small club could afford to pay a player the maximum, there was little incentive for that player to move. In 1901 players were allowed benefit matches at the end of their career or after five years' continuous service that guaranteed them a certain

112. Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 61
114. Mason, Association Football, p. 104. Relations between clubs and players were placed on a more formal basis with the introduction of contracts. Players were also required to register with both the Football League and the Football Association before being allowed to play competitively. From 1912 it was technically the League rather than the club who owned players' registrations. Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 169
115. Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 61
116. Mason, Association Football, p. 105. The Southern League, established in 1894, did not recognise the contracts of players from the Football League until 1909. They were then able to switch leagues without the fear of being penalised. Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 136
117. ibid., pp. 98-99
118. The £10 signing-on fee was set by the Football League in 1891 and the amount was not changed until 1958. S. Inglis, Soccer in the Dock (1985), p. 11
Players later received extra benefits together with periodic rises in the level of the maximum wage.

The imposition of a maximum wage however, did not prevent clubs from breaching it. Between 1901 and 1911, the FA and the League investigated and punished at least seven clubs for financial irregularities. The most notorious cases were Middlesbrough and Manchester City. After an inspection of Middlesbrough’s books in 1905, the FA found the club guilty of making irregular payments to players. A £250 fine was imposed and eleven of the club’s twelve directors were suspended for two years. Billy Meredith, Manchester City’s star player, was to admit that the club had paid him £6 per week from 1902, and that when City won the FA Cup in 1904 he had received an extra £53 in bonuses. Later, in 1905, Meredith was found guilty by the footballing authorities of offering a bribe to an Aston Villa player and was suspended for one season. In May 1906, the FA launched a further investigation into the club’s affairs when Meredith admitted his guilt on all charges, thus implicating the club. The FA reacted by fining seventeen past and present City players who were forbidden from playing for the club again. Two directors were also suspended and the manager, Tom Maley, was banned from football for life.

The pressure to meet rising wage demands, either by fair means or foul, had caused professional clubs to look for other means of raising finance. One of the most

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119 Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, Chapter 5
120 Initially, in 1901 clubs such as Aston Villa and Liverpool had attempted to rescind the rule but the maximum wage was increasingly accepted as a necessity. In 1908 an attempt by the FA Council to abolish it was defeated. Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 129
121 Inglis, Soccer, p. 10. The clubs were Queen’s Park Rangers, Sunderland, Manchester City, Glossop, Coventry City, Manchester United and Middlesbrough.
122 Appleton, Hotbed of Soccer, p. 90
popular methods was the adoption of limited liability status. During the 1890s a rash of clubs formed themselves into limited companies. The fact that football clubs were increasingly becoming financial concerns was shown by the *Athletic News* urging all clubs with an annual turnover of over £1000 to take advantage of the legislation. By converting themselves into limited liability companies, football clubs could sue and be sued, the individual responsibility of directors would also be limited, and a club’s new status would reassure its creditors.\(^{124}\) As a members’ club, the committee could have been made responsible for a club’s debts. Nearly all professional football clubs became private limited liability companies with Small Heath being the first in 1888.\(^{125}\) By 1912 the leading clubs were capitalised at over £2 million.\(^{126}\) Members of some clubs were resistant to change and did not want to cede their influence through incorporation. Aston Villa had earlier tried to register the club under the Friendly Societies Act but this was found to be impracticable.\(^{127}\) At a special meeting in 1889 William McGregor submitted details of a scheme to convert Villa into a limited liability company but his motion was thwarted by 71 votes to 67.\(^{128}\) The club was eventually incorporated in 1896.

Aston Villa’s initial capital was £10,000 and was offered in the form of 2000 £5 shares. The club used this money to fund the move to its new ground at the

\(^{123}\) Inglis, *Soccer*, pp. 12-18

\(^{124}\) Mason, *Association Football*, p. 37

\(^{125}\) A. Fabian and G. Green (eds), *Association Football*, Vol. 3 (1960), p. 242. The last club to convert to limited liability status was Nottingham Forest in 1997. Up to then, the club’s directors were elected from its 200 paid-up members. *When Saturday Comes*, June 2001, p. 17


\(^{127}\) Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 74, *Birmingham Mail*, 30 January 1889

\(^{128}\) *Athletic News*, 4 February 1889, p. 1
Aston Lower Grounds in 1897. The decision to wind-up the old club and form a limited liability company had been deemed essential if the club was to move because it quickly generated enough capital to guarantee the project. From the 1890s onwards, football’s popularity was expanding and clubs were looking to relocate to grounds with larger capacities that would then generate more income. To find a favourable location, one factor clubs had to take into consideration was the local transport network, and subsequently, many grounds were situated near to a railway station and tram lines to give supporters better access to grounds. Villa Park, for example, was serviced by stations at Witton and Aston. The first purpose-built football stadium was Goodison Park, the home of Everton. It was opened in August 1892 and cost £3000. Many clubs moved from ground to ground before finding a suitable long-term site: Sunderland moved from their ground at Newcastle Road before settling at Roker Park in 1898; and before moving to Old Trafford in 1910, Manchester United played at Bank Street, Clayton. The capacity at Old Trafford was projected to be 100,000. Some grounds in Scotland also had large capacities. Hampden Park, home of Queen’s Park and the venue of Scotland’s home games totalled nearly 120,000 in 1909, and the ground of Third Lanark could hold over 110,000 spectators.

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129 Morris, Aston Villa, p. 58. Villa’s move to its new ground was almost a homecoming as it was situated adjacent to the park where the club first played. It was not until 1911 that Villa actually owned the freehold of Villa Park. Until then, it had been leased to the club by Edgar Flowers of the brewery, Flowers and Sons. See Inglis, Villa Park, pp. 64-95
130 Young, Football on Merseyside, pp. 173-76. At 2000 prices this converts to £188,000.
131 Sunderland Daily Echo, 10 Sept. 1898, p. 3
133 Vamplew, Pay Up, Table 6.4, p. 65
In 1914 Aston Villa had plans to increase Villa Park’s capacity to 104,000. It was hoped to more than double the club’s earning capacity from £1650 per match to £4000. Standing spectators formed the vast majority of the crowd and paid a minimum admission fee of 6d that had been set by the Football League in 1890. Only 11,000 seats were to be provided with the vast majority of spectators found on the uncovered terraces. The club had wanted to provide better covered facilities to cater for supporters who, via the expanding railway network, came from nearby Coventry, Worcester, Walsall, Kidderminster and different parts of the Black Country. These spectators were probably attracted by Villa’s success and also by watching first division football. A local railway company had estimated that a Villa home game brought in approximately 1000 spectators from Coventry alone.

Table 2.6: Finances of a Sample of Clubs, 1908-14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Revenue (£)</th>
<th>Wages (£)</th>
<th>Pre-tax Profits (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barnsley</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10,320</td>
<td>2,792</td>
<td>4,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford City</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10,680</td>
<td>6,985</td>
<td>-580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford Park Avenue</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9,505</td>
<td>4,485</td>
<td>2,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol City</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6,964</td>
<td>4,067</td>
<td>-78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bury</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8,669</td>
<td>4,135</td>
<td>1,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derby County</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9,740</td>
<td>3,982</td>
<td>-2,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12,038</td>
<td>6,098</td>
<td>-1,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preston North End</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7,546</td>
<td>4,581</td>
<td>-1,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield United</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8,606</td>
<td>5,806</td>
<td>-1,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield Wednesday</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17,035</td>
<td>5,414</td>
<td>3,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tottenham Hotspur</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20,551</td>
<td>5,906</td>
<td>5,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bromwich Alb.</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5,976</td>
<td>4,995</td>
<td>-1,381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Szymanski and Kuypers, *Winners and Losers*, pp. 340-78

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134 *AVNR*, 8 August 1914, pp. 668-69. Re-development of the ground took place but due to the First World War and other reasons the ground’s capacity did not reach 104,000. See Inglis, *Villa Park*.

135 Tischler, *Footballers and Businessmen*, p. 133

136 *AVNR*, 8 August 1914, pp. 668-69
To what extent were football clubs like 'normal' businesses, and did they seek to capitalise on the increase in revenue? As Table 2.6 illustrates, some clubs did make profits. Moreover, Everton made a profit in every year, between 1890 and 1915, except 1907, and the club nearly always paid a dividend. 137 But others also made losses. Before entering receivership in 1902, Newton Heath had been kept solvent only by loans and had never paid a dividend. 138 A football club's commercial potential was in fact constrained by the Football Association. In order to maintain a degree of equality within the professional game between clubs, its constitution effectively restricted a club's capital base from which it could expand as a business. 139 Rule 45 of the Football Association dealt with football club companies. Initially, all affiliated clubs' articles of association had to contain certain measures. 140 One of these, from 1896, limited the payment of dividends to shareholders to 5 per cent, rising to 7⁷ per cent after 1918. 141 Furthermore, and importantly, directors could not be paid. 142 In effect, they were still, and continued to be up until the 1980s, a part of the voluntary, amateur tradition. The main aim of football clubs was to win football matches. As a consequence, there is a strong school of thought that states that many clubs did not obey strict economic rules; and could be classified as

138 Mason, Association Football, p. 46
139 See Chapter 7 of this thesis for a wider discussion on the economics of English professional football.
141 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 86; Mason, Association Football, p. 56 n108. The maximum dividend on preference shares was also set at 7⁷ per cent, and a company was not allowed to issue more preference shares than subscribed shares. A company was unable to make a mortgage or charge upon its assets at a rate no higher than 7⁷ per cent and was also unable to borrow at a rate higher than 7⁷ per cent - not unless these measures received the FA Council's written consent. Keeton, Football Revolution, p. 52, 55
'utility-maximisers' as opposed to 'profit-maximisers', willing to sacrifice profits for the sake of winning games and championships.¹⁴³ Losses, at least before the introduction of the maximum wage in 1901, were probably the result of bad management as clubs paid more than they could afford. Profits on the other hand, were mostly ploughed back into the club for buying new players or investing in the ground.

To what extent then were commercial considerations a motive for shareholders and directors to get involved in football? Shareholders in English football clubs before 1914 were predominantly drawn from the local population, the majority being middle-class, although the largest occupational group that held a stake in their clubs was skilled labour, consisting of 28.6 per cent.¹⁴⁴ To a certain extent, shareholders in football clubs reflected the local economy and its socio-occupational structure. When Middlesbrough Ironopolis was formed in 1889 its first chairman, James H. Boolds, was the manager of a local shipyard, Cleveland Dock. A large number of shareholders were rivetters and platers who probably worked at the shipyard.¹⁴⁵ Most working-class shareholders only held one or two shares, as their reason for purchasing them can be attributed to identification with their team.¹⁴⁶ In this respect, football was one of the few, if not the only industry that had working-class shareholders.

¹⁴²Mason, *Association Football*, p. 162
¹⁴³Vamplew, *Pay Up*, p. 13
¹⁴⁵Teesside Archives U/S 1489, The Middlesbrough Ironopolis Football Company Ltd., Register of Members, c. 1894; http://members.aol.com/ironopolis/mihistory.htm
¹⁴⁶Mason, *Association Football*, p. 38
Football club directorates however, mirrored shareholdings rather than the make-up of its shareholders.\textsuperscript{147} The next highest group of shareholders, in socio-occupational terms, were proprietors and employers with 26 per cent, including 6.9 per cent associated with the drink trade, but in terms of shareholdings, they accounted for 46 per cent compared to 13.7 per cent for skilled labour.\textsuperscript{148} Before 1915 approximately 50 per cent of football club directors belonged to the proprietor and employer category, and the proportion of professionals and managers on club boards considerably exceeded that of skilled workers.\textsuperscript{149} Tischler has shown how the make-up of Middlesbrough's directorate changed between 1892 from being predominately working-class to one during the 1901-1914 period that was dominated by industrialists and proprietors from the alcohol and tobacco trades.\textsuperscript{150}

Collins and Vamplew have argued that the drinks trade used football to market its product, and was an important stage in the commercialisation of sport. Players, past and present were given houses to increase custom, products were advertised at grounds and financial support was given to teams to boost awareness and sales of beer.\textsuperscript{151} Manchester City, for example, was known as a 'brewers' club during the Edwardian period. Its chairman, John Chapman, owned half a dozen public houses and the club secretary, Joshua Parlby was a publican. The club's chief benefactor was Stephen Chester Thompson who was the managing director of Chester's Brewery. It was one of Manchester's biggest brewers and controlled many

\textsuperscript{147}Vamplew, \textit{Pay Up}, p. 166
\textsuperscript{148} \textit{ibid.}, p. 160, Table 10.2
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{ibid.}, p. 168, Table 10.6
\textsuperscript{150}Tischler, \textit{Footballers and Businessmen}, pp. 75-76
pubs in the Ardwick and Gorton areas of the city. Furthermore, the club’s headquarters was the Hyde Road Hotel in Ardwick.\textsuperscript{152} In 1899 however, Middlesbrough was in more need of the drinks trade than it was of the club as it had to raise the necessary capital to finance their entry into the Football League. The club decided to assign volunteers to various parts of the town to canvass tradesmen and licensed victuallers to buy the required 1000 £1 shares. Alf Mattison of the Zetland Hotel took up 20 shares which gained him a directorship.\textsuperscript{153}

With an increasing proportion of businessmen and professional people becoming directors, it can be assumed their motives were different to working-class shareholders; but what were these? A survey of the literature on the subject reveals a great variety. Robert Lewis, in his study of the early development of football in Lancashire, has argued that ‘football as a leisure industry although organised as a business to cater for a mass audience, seldom created any profits and can hardly be viewed as a normal commercial enterprise’.\textsuperscript{154} On the other hand, Tischler proffers the view that ‘directorial participation in football was in most cases characterised by the implementation of many of the same income-producing methods outside of sports’.\textsuperscript{155} However, he is unable to substantiate his claim that, despite the limit of a

\textsuperscript{152} J. Harding, \textit{Football Wizard: The Story of Billy Meredith} (Derby, 1985), p. 29, 34
\textsuperscript{153} Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 20, 27 February; 6, 13 March 1899. The club also lobbied some of the town’s dignitaries for support, including Sir Joseph Pease, the local MP, and chairman of the North Eastern Railway Company. \textit{ibid.} The number of shares that had been promised by March was 850. \textit{ibid.}, 17 March 1899
\textsuperscript{155} Tischler, \textit{Footballers and Businessmen}, p. 86
5 per cent dividend, directors were able to get round this and conceal extra income due to their familiarity with business techniques.\textsuperscript{156}

One notable opportunist though, was John Houlding. As president of Everton, he was also landlord of their Anfield ground. In 1891 he increased the rent and following a complex dispute, the club’s members were outraged enough to leave Anfield and make a new home for the club at Goodison Park in 1892. With a stadium and no team, Houlding decided instead to form his own football club, Liverpool. The outcome was that Houlding’s Sandon Hotel next to Anfield was still frequented by football spectators for every home game and being chairman of the football club, complemented his position as a leading local Conservative.\textsuperscript{157}

The formation of a small number of clubs also differed from those that had evolved from amateur roots, and showed that money could be made out of football. Sheffield United’s formation, for example, also owed something to financial opportunism. They played at Bramall Lane, home of Sheffield United Cricket Club which was formed in 1854. In 1889 it had been decided to form a football section following the financial success of an FA Cup semi-final played there earlier that year.\textsuperscript{158} The club had a share issue in 1899 the same year they won the FA Cup. The cost of an ordinary share however, was £20 and out of the financial reach of working people.\textsuperscript{159} Chelsea, formed in 1905, was established by Henry Mears as a commercial concern. In 1896 he became owner of Stamford Bridge, the home of the London Athletic Club. Mears, a large contractor from South West London,

\textsuperscript{156}ibid., p. 70
\textsuperscript{157}Mason, Association Football, p. 38, 45
\textsuperscript{158}Catton, Rise of the Leaguers, pp. 114-115; Catton, Real Football, pp. 168-169
redeveloped it as a football ground using his own company. Mears owned the catering company that supplied the large crowds of Stamford Bridge between 1905 and 1915. Mears was also the landlord and charged the football club an annual rental of £2000.160

In 1903 Bradford City was formed after originally being a rugby club, Manningham. The club’s committee had decided that the association code was more profitable after the club’s failings on the rugby field. Manningham had joined the Second Division of the Northern Union League in 1902 but it failed to obtain promotion despite spending heavily on players’ wages, and, as a result, liabilities exceeded assets. A campaign was then started by some club members, the Football League, the Bradford FA and local schools to establish a first-class team in the local area that culminated in Bradford City’s formation. By 1906 the gate receipts of the new club were five times higher than in the last three seasons of rugby combined.161

Some directors therefore, did benefit from the game financially, from secondary profits and modest share dividends. Others used their position on the board to award them and their companies contracts to undertake the club’s catering and to build new stands. But as Table 2.6 shows there was also money to be lost. Many directors also acted as guarantors. In 1900 Middlesbrough’s directors had to place a personal security of £40 with the bank if the club was to receive an overdraft.162 The chairman of Manchester United, the brewer, J.H. Davies, spent

159 Mason, *Association Football*, p. 38
161 Arnold, *Game*, pp. 23-49
162 Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 23 April 1900
£20,000 on financing the club without receiving any reward.\textsuperscript{163} In general, the reasons for becoming a football club director were multifarious but generally not of a profit-orientated nature. Russell has introduced the notion that serving on a club board was akin to a civic duty and has argued that, ‘profit-maximisation ... was not a major consideration for the football club directors of Victorian and Edwardian England’.\textsuperscript{164} Mason has suggested that a professional football club can be looked upon as ‘a family firm with both shares and directorships passed down [the] generations’ rather than a profit-making concern.\textsuperscript{165}

The analogy with family firms requires closer examination as the management of a football club shared similarities with small nineteenth century businesses.\textsuperscript{166} A football club however, was a peculiar type of business. Former President of the Football League, J.J. Bentley argued that for a club to be successful it had to work on business lines, and because of the large amounts of money involved business principles were required, but not commercialism.\textsuperscript{167} In one sense, football management reflected the prevailing business culture of personal capitalism, despite the general absence of a profit-motive in football. In Chapter 1 it was shown how management in British industry was built on a practical tradition that largely eschewed the hiring of professional management, and although directors delegated some of their authority to others, there was still a close relationship between the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Bentley, ‘Is Football a Business?’, p. 389
\item Russell, Football, pp. 42-44
\item Mason, Association Football, p. 49
\item There have been examples of families sitting on the boards of football clubs for generations such as the Cearns family at West Ham and at Chelsea, the Mears.
\item Bentley, Is Football a Business?’, p. 393
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
control of a firm and its ownership. Football directors, many of whom were small businessmen, based their ideas of managing football clubs on their own social and business experiences. As a result, clubs were mainly run by directors who also wanted to enjoy the privileges of ownership, and regarded selecting the team as a perk of the job. Yet, they were also part of the voluntary tradition and spent much of their time working on behalf of the club travelling many miles up and down the country. Furthermore, they were unwilling to hand more responsibilities over to salaried officials. Directors regarded them as socially inferior and tainted by earning a wage, attitudes rooted in the cult of amateurism.

There were notable differences however, between clubs and local firms that stemmed from the markets that they operated in. For their income, football clubs relied on supporters for whom ‘the supreme appeal of football lay almost certainly in its expression of a sense of civic pride and identity’, and this was very unlikely to change. Clubs also represented an institution within a local community whereas the people who owned family firms were responsible only to themselves. Attempts to amalgamate Bradford City and Bradford Park Avenue in 1907, for example, failed as members were more interested in maintaining control over their club’s direction and identity. Directors of local firms also shared similar motivations with football club administrators. Jonathan Boswell has argued that from 1880 to 1939 informal social control was exercised over local businessmen in general, and this diverted firms from a simple pursuit of maximum short-term profit. Their motivations were instead

168 Wilson, Business History, p. 22
169 Holt, Sport, p. 166
170 Arnold, Game, p. 48
influenced by various socio-institutional factors such as ethical convictions, sentiments of patriotism and local pride, and ambitions for public approval and status. These attitudes were compounded as many directors of football clubs came from the local business community. In his study of West Ham United, Charles Korr states that the directors’ \textit{prima facie} freedom was an illusion, ‘[t]he club had become almost a captive of the community in which it existed and which the directors purported to serve’, and where one of their hallmarks was a belief in their role of public service to the club. Moreover, football clubs were also part of the Victorian philanthropic tradition, and this continued into the twentieth century. During this period, ‘[c]haritable activity became a characteristic feature of propertied life: to be broadcast aloud, emblazoned in the press, and chiselled onto the side of public places and monuments’. Football League clubs made donations to a number of causes that cemented their standing in the local community.

Despite converting to limited liability status, the management of many clubs continued to be rooted in the voluntary tradition. Many football club directors were former members of clubs whose main interest was in the welfare of that club. Initially, Aston Villa had been run by just one general committee. In 1887 this numbered nine plus the officers of the club, the President, vice-Presidents, treasurer

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172 Korr, \textit{West Ham}, p. 27, 43
173 Walvin, \textit{Victorian Values}, p. 96
174 Aston Villa, for example, in 1899 donated £100 to Birmingham University’s Endowment Fund. The fund’s secretary was Joseph Chamberlain who wrote back to the club saying that ‘the evidences which have been given that the cultivation of athletics does not destroy interest in intellectual pursuits’. Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 142, \textit{Birmingham Mail}, 5 July 1899. Following the 1902 Ibrox Disaster where 66 spectators died, Football League clubs raised £24,000. For pre-season friendlies, clubs distributed the proceeds amongst local charities and causes. Football also donated to
and the secretary.\textsuperscript{175} Efforts by William McGregor to rationalise the club’s management structure had floundered on the resistance of other committee members who did not want their authority undermined. Eventually in 1893, there was a restructuring of the committee after it resigned \textit{en bloc}. The running of the club had been criticised by members for its mis-management and it was alleged that this had affected the team’s performance.\textsuperscript{176} When Villa did become a company in 1896 it was run by a five man board of directors. Despite the adoption of limited liability status, most clubs continued to be run by committees. As the business of football increased however, so did the work of committees. For the 1892-93 season, Wolverhampton Wanderers’ board of directors numbered 12, with a players’ and a finance committee.\textsuperscript{177} Before embarking on their first season in the Football League, Middlesbrough had three committees: finance and emergency, players’ and ground. The players’ committee had five elected members, the other two committees had three while the chairman and the vice-chairman were appointed to all three as ex-officio members.\textsuperscript{178} For the following season the player’s committee was reduced to three.\textsuperscript{179} The workload and enthusiasm of the directors was reflected in their attendance at directors’ meetings. In 1906-07 for example, Aston Villa’s directors held 41 meetings.\textsuperscript{180} When Middlesbrough decided to turn professional and join the national tragedies. For the Bolton Colliery Disaster Fund £1200 was raised and £700 went to the Titanic Fund. Bentley, \textit{Is Football a Business?}, p. 390
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{175} \textit{Birmingham Daily Gazette}, 9 June 1887, p. 7
\item \textsuperscript{176} \textit{Birmingham Daily Gazette}, 25 February 1893, p. 5
\item \textsuperscript{177} See Appendix 8
\item \textsuperscript{178} Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 27 June 1899
\item \textsuperscript{179} Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 19 April 1900
\item \textsuperscript{180} AVNR, 3 August 1907, p. 8. Fred Rinder attended all 41 meetings. Other directors and the number of meetings they attended were Howard Toney, 40; John Devey, 39; P.W.M. Bate, 36; and Councillor Jack Jones, 40.
\end{itemize}
Football League in 1899, the increase in financial responsibilities brought with it an escalation in management duties. The workload of the club’s directors increased dramatically and during the summer before the new professional season began, meetings were held two or three times a week.\footnote{Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 1899, \textit{passim.}}

Management however, differed from club to club. At Preston North End there was a reverse in style where William Sudell, once the dominant figure in the club, lost overall control when it became a limited liability company in 1893. North End had initially been run by a general committee but in 1886 the number of committee members was reduced from 12 to 4 with Sudell as chairman.\footnote{Preston Herald, 24 March 1888, p. 5} Sudell probably wanted the executive to be streamlined so that he could run the club the way he managed the cotton mill. And because of the success of the team, his style did not elicit any criticism from the members.\footnote{Football Field, 23 January 1886, p. 4; Berry and Allman, \textit{One Hundred Years}, p. 72} It is not inconceivable however, that vanity began to cloud his judgement because after the 1889 AGM there was not to be another one for four years. As the 1880s came to a close, the club was experiencing greater financial pressures, and suffered a steady decline in the 1890s. Between 1889 to 1893 it ran up a deficit of £752. This precipitated Sudell’s request at the 1893 AGM that the club become a limited liability company.\footnote{Football Field, 22 July 1893, p. 8. Its initial capital was 5000 £1 shares but by 1894 only 1947 had been taken up. Lewis, ‘Football in Lancashire’, pp. 326-27}

The direction of clubs however, could still be heavily influenced by individuals. Football clubs like other firms, are ‘organic institutions’ in the way that they evolve. Roy Church has argued that the success or failure of a firm is dependent
on the ability of individuals as ‘owners, managers and individuals [have] the potential for affecting corporate structure and strategy in important, yet indeterminate ways’. Moreover, football clubs were, and continue to be, relatively small firms where the potential for an individual to influence its direction is much greater than in larger companies. Fred Rinder, for example, was the dominant personality on Aston Villa’s executive for over 30 years. He was known for his austere manner and had a reputation for being brusque with people. Yet, he probably found being a football club director more interesting than his other line of work (see below). Football also represented a chance to climb and mix in higher social circles, including royalty. It perhaps had a touch of glamour as well as improving the perception of a director’s own status. Together with his work for the Villa, Rinder also held senior positions on FA committees such as the International Selection Committee and was also on the Football League Management Committee. Only a few months before he died he had travelled 1000 miles in a week on football matters. Like other football administrators such as Arthur Oakley at Wolverhampton Wanderers, Charles Sutcliffe from Burnley and John Bentley, but, admittedly, unlike most other directors, football became a way of life for Rinder, ‘almost a surrogate profession in itself’.

It was noted earlier that some directors had had a long connection with their club from a time when members paid subscriptions. Rinder, for example, was elected

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185 Church, ‘Deconstructing Nuffield’, p. 565
186 Football club directors usually met members of the Royal Family at the FA Cup Final. The opening of Villa Park’s new Trinity Road Stand in January 1924 was also attended by the Duke of York, the future George VI. Inglis, Villa Park, pp. 116-17
187 Birmingham Mail, 27 December 1938, p. 7, ‘Obituary’
a member of Aston Villa in 1881. He became a member of its committee in 1893 and eventually chairman of the board in 1899. Rinder, who succeeded another long-serving member, J.E. Margoschis, was a surveyor with Birmingham corporation. Coming from a non-conformist background, it was ironic that as a teetotaller, he was a technical adviser to the Licensing Justices and in 1912 he was appointed surveyor of licensed premises. Rinder gave the club free advice on the building of the grandstand at Perry Barr in 1887, and laid out the designs for Villa Park when the club moved there. Unusually, Villa had two former players, John Devey and Howard Spencer, who sat on the board. Both had required special dispensation from the FA to become directors as professional players had previously been barred from serving on club executives. After finishing his playing career, Devey entered the cinematography industry with another former Villa player, Harry Hampton, forming the Winson Green Picture House Company. Spencer entered the coal trade and was managing director for a Birmingham coal and coke manufacturer.

The make-up of many club boards reflected a unitary civic culture. William Sudell represented the traditions of both civic duty and pride within Preston that were well-established within the town during the Victorian and Edwardian periods. In Lancashire the scope of local government grew during the nineteenth century and councils became increasingly dominated by new industrial elites that replaced the

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188 Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, p. 49
189 *AVNR*, 23 April 1913, pp. 545-547; 31 December 1938, pp. 221-222
190 *ibid.*, 3 September 1910, p. 6; *Birmingham Mail*, 27 December 1938, p. 7, ‘Obituary’
191 Inglis, *Villa Park*, p. 24
192 Mason, *Association Football*, p. 120
193 *Birmingham Gazette*, 15 January 1940, p. 3, ‘Obituary’
landed gentry. Moreover, ‘many among the industrial bourgeoisie were to hold firmly to a vision of themselves as the custodians of a unique industrial civilisation’. Lancashire towns also became pioneers of a kind of municipal socialism that involved local government controlling local gas and water supplies. In the late nineteenth century Preston was characterised by the active presence of a central urban elite. Whereas a suburban elite would have had no interest in the town, residents of Preston still relied on the town itself as a place of recreation and of day-to-day living. This meant that powerful families showed an active concern for their neighbourhood. By contrast, those in the urban middle ranks involved themselves at less prestigious levels of local government such as members of health boards and Poor Law administrators. In a sense, Sudell’s role with Preston North End reflected one of these lesser lights as the football club grew in importance as a local social institution. As football’s popularity increased however, so did his popularity, elevating Sudell to the status of local celebrity.

Sudell had also joined his local Volunteer Force in 1874, rising to the rank of Major by 1895. The Volunteers had a reputation for primarily being an excuse for its members to enjoy social and recreational activities, and some regiments, most


195 Joyce, *Work, Society*, p. 1

196 Walton, *Lancashire*, pp. 228-29


198 Walton, *Lancashire*, p. 230

famously the Third Lanark Rifle Volunteers, had established football clubs. One of
Liverpool's original directors John McKenna, also joined the Volunteers and became
a Sergeant-Major in the South Lancashire Artillery Volunteers. In 1883 a rugby club,
connected to the battery, was formed and McKenna acted as its chairman. Frank
Watt, later secretary at Newcastle United, had helped form a football club with the
3rd Edinburgh Rifle Volunteers in 1874. Because of his connection with the
football club, Sudell also held positions with other sporting institutions which
included being vice-president of the Preston Bicycle Club and the Preston Swimming
Club plus an array of cricket and football clubs.

Many directors were also involved in local public life as town councillors or
magistrates. For example, two prominent Villa directors, James Lees and Jack Jones
were members of local councils. Lees, a Conservative, was a member of Aston Urban
District Council for three years. Some football club directors also tried to exploit
their connections to gain election to public office. At Manchester City, John
Chapman and John Allison attempted to become Conservative councillors by using
the alleged support of the club's players. Another Manchester City director,
Chester Thompson was a local politician. He was also agent for A.J. Balfour, the
Conservative Prime Minister between 1902-05, whom Thompson persuaded to
become patron of the club. The most notorious connection between football and
politics occurred in 1910 and concerned the Middlesbrough chairman, Lieutenant-

200 Liverpool Daily Post, 23 March 1936, p. 5
201 Catton Folders V-W, p.1897, Athletic News 28 November 1927
202 Preston Herald, 24 March 1888, p. 5
203 Birmingham Daily Post, 16 December 1905, p. 10, 'Obituary'
204 Harding, Football Wizard, p. 94. Meredith himself was a Liberal supporter.
Colonel T. Gibson Poole. He was found guilty of offering a bribe to Sunderland before a game because he felt if Middlesbrough won that particular game it would be crucial to his chances of becoming the Conservative and Unionist MP for the town. Middlesbrough won the game but the Liberals won the election. Poole was later banned from football for life. 206

By 1914 therefore, professional football had emerged as a form of mass entertainment. Football entrepreneurs had exploited widespread socio-economic changes, although football was unlike conventional industries. Not only did clubs set out to defeat each other but part of the game’s popularity relied on a contest between equally-matched teams. By 1914 football clubs were still small organisations despite the game’s increasing commercialisation and competitiveness, and this was reflected by how clubs were run and by whom. Football clubs came to be regarded as local social institutions and as such they were to be managed for the benefit of the local community. Directors were part of the British voluntary tradition and regarded their positions as one of the perks of civic life. The management of a club was reflected by the professional, commercial and social experience of its directors. In general, they preferred to manage the club themselves rather than delegate. Club bureaucracies usually consisted of a secretary and perhaps an assistant who handled the day-to-day running of the club. Secretaries however, generally had minimal influence and were subservient to the directors’ whims. The next chapter will examine football management in more detail during this period, including the

205 *ibid.*, p. 29
206 Appleton, *Hotbed of Soccer*, pp. 95-97
developments that took place, how they took root in the game's management culture, and, in particular, the emergence of early football managers.
CHAPTER 3

THE PIONEERS, 1880-1914

Uncommon qualities are ... distinctly needful in the average secretary to the modern professional football team. He must be a strategist like Von Moltke, and he must be a practised logician, to prove to his victim how paltry are the silken fetters of domesticity compared to that self-advancement which it is the chief aim and object of every proper man to seek, and especially a young Scotchman.

Edwardes, ‘New Football Mania’, p. 627

Whereas the previous chapter considered the more general aspects of running a football club, this chapter will examine more closely the process of football management. In particular, it will focus on the relationship between directors and the game’s emerging managers, and how it reflected those in business and in society as a whole. Football managers mirrored the increasing role of intermediaries within British industry during the late nineteenth century, mainly due to developments in the organisation of authority within industrial enterprises. In essence, industry’s problem had been how to control the human element, its workforce, and as a result, certain forms of ‘delegated authority’ emerged during this period.¹ Changes in workplace relations were reflected by late Victorian England society. This period had witnessed growing class conflict and class prejudice as an increase in living standards created greater competition for status between the divided middle-classes. One hallmark of the middle-class was that at every level there was segregation both within occupations and pastimes. The lower middle classes consequently sought to remove themselves from the working-class in terms of income, status, geography, education and physical appearance, in order to aspire to a higher social standing.²

²Perkin, Professional Society, p. 78, 94, 100
Football club directors also regarded professional, working-class players as their social inferiors, and became increasingly reluctant to deal directly with them on a day-to-day basis. Instead, it became preferable for an intermediary to be used in this capacity and this role was usually split between the trainer and club secretary. Relationships within the workplace changed gradually during the nineteenth century. In 1875 the Employers and Workmen Act began the slow process of changing the law of Master and Servants to that of employers and workmen. In theory, future contractual relationships were now based on the market place where the employer paid the workman according to the worth of his labour. Previously, status was the basis of workplace relations in the form of the master's authority and servants' subordination but this was now replaced by a free and equal contractual agreement. The historical process of these changes however, was much more complex and uneven as the language and notion of master and servants pervaded workplace culture well into the twentieth century.

4 Master and Servant statutes, designed to regulate contracts between employers and workers, had dated back to the 14th century, denying the labourer the right to withhold his service or to bargain his wages. The 1823 Masters and Servant Act had made it a criminal offence for a worker to break his contract, and was punishable by a fine or a maximum sentence of three months hard labour. Any breach by an employer however, was deemed only a civil offence.
6 Changes in workplace relationships during this period can be placed in the wider debate over the idea of free labour and the extent of people's freedom to sell it. Robert Steinfeld, for example, has suggested that the notion of free labour was invented in the USA during the nineteenth-century. Stanley Engerman however, has argued that employers have, from the days of slavery, believed that labour can never be given freely, and that it has to be coerced in some form or another. R.J. Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labour: The Employment Relation in English and American Law and Culture 1350-1870 (1991); S.L. Engerman (ed.) Terms of Labour: Slavery, Serfdom and Freedom Labour (Stanford, California, 1999)
Intermediaries and their role therefore, were subject to the prevailing social and cultural environment. One such development was foreman supervision. From the late nineteenth century, for example, the foreman began to take over many of the functions once held by sub-contractors, occupying an important position between capital and labour, particularly in the staple industries. He controlled production functions as well as being responsible for labour management, making him a master of the shopfloor. His responsibilities often included the planning of production, the hiring and firing of workers, allocation of work, labour discipline and the fixing of wages. Such was the importance of some shipyard foremen that ships were named after them.

The manufacturing sector also employed intermediaries. At George Kynoch’s munitions factory in Witton, for example, a form of internal contract operated that allowed foremen to hire their own labour. In Preston’s weaving industry overlookers held similar responsibilities. Employers relied on them to police the labour market due to the problem of retaining mobile, skilled, low paid workers. Overlookers were usually male weavers in their late twenties when they were promoted by their employers. To achieve promotion from the low-paid weaving sector they spent time involving themselves in church or chapel activities that brought them to the attention of their employers. A Preston Overlookers Union had been formed in 1875 that both reflected and encouraged notions of craft autonomy.

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8 Joyce, ‘Work’, pp. 157-8
9 Garside and Gospel, ‘Employers and Managers’ p. 102,
By 1900 it had successfully campaigned to replace the employer’s hold over promotion with a structured career path for overlookers determined through their own self-regulation.\(^\text{11}\)

After 1918 the role and status of the foreman began to wane. The impact of an intense period of technological change had increased the necessity for mechanisation plus turbulent trade union activity leading up to and beyond the First World War, such as the emergence of shop stewards, had had a deleterious effect on the foreman’s powers.\(^\text{12}\) Moreover, as the operations of some firms increased, specialist personnel departments were established for such functions as selection and dismissal, further reducing the foreman’s independent initiative.\(^\text{13}\)

Managers, who were employed in industry, worked according to the traditions of their firm rather than to the rules of any association or profession. Between the years 1860 and 1900 many traditional professions had established new protective organisations, and there was also a concomitant rise in educational and training initiatives. In 1880 the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales had been established with a set of rules for admission that included compulsory examinations and a code of conduct.\(^\text{14}\) Many firms employed managers as they saw fit rather than as a professional who had acquired qualifications. Managers generally had their autonomy restricted and were given little training and

\(^{10}\) Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 3., p. 631

\(^{11}\) Savage and Miles, Working-Class, pp. 79-82

\(^{12}\) Coopey, ‘Supervision’, p. 8

\(^{13}\) Coopey, ‘Supervision’, p. 9; Garside and Gospel, ‘Employers and Managers’, p. 102

this was one reason that prevented them from establishing themselves as a profession.

Despite these general constraints, there were still some innovative, professional managers from the nineteenth century who were able to improvise within their industry.\textsuperscript{15} In Chapter 1 it was demonstrated how the railways had led the way during the nineteenth century. One such innovator had been Captain Mark Huish, general manager of the London and North Western Railway from 1846 to 1858. There had been a rapid growth in the size and scope of certain railways in the 1840s due to the speculative ‘mania’ in 1845-46 that created innate difficulties for large-scale operations. Huish, in addition to using his military experience in handling men, prepared the railways for modern management by emphasising a more scientific approach, particularly through the use of accounting methods and statistical analysis.\textsuperscript{16}

Another example illustrates not only developments within management but also differences in approach between American managers and their British counterparts. James C. Stewart was an American who, early in the twentieth century, worked as a supervising engineer and general manager on a number of large construction undertakings in Britain that had been financed by American capital. Stewart, for example, implemented time-and-motion studies to improve the output of bricklayers. He also used a more ‘hands-on’ style of management that compared

\textsuperscript{15}Wilson, \textit{Business History}, p. 22, 27
favourably with British contractors and architects who were criticised for being too aloof and too reliant on their foremen. An article in *World's Work* asked,

> Is it not again the old trouble that labour is a disgrace to a gentleman in England, whereas it is an honour in America? Or, to go further still, is there not a crying need in British construction generally for a strenuous middle man, a manager, between the architect and the labourer, to see that the one properly and promptly carries out the plans of the other?¹⁷

The actual term, managers, has been used very generally to describe those responsible for the running of an organisation or operation. In football, manager, and its function, have held a number of different meanings. It is difficult therefore, to define what or who constituted a football manager up to 1914. Early references to football management were usually in the context of the financial affairs of a club, and managers were regarded as committee members or directors. Former Football League President, John J. Bentley commented that, ‘'[i]n the early eighties ... club managers realised the fact that it was necessary to have a “star”'.¹⁸ Football managers were still associated with a club’s finances later in this period. In 1906, for example, Aston Villa’s programme reported that, ‘'[f]ootball managers have found it exceedingly difficult to persuade any player of average merit that he is not worth the maximum of £4 per week ...’.¹⁹ Yet the other side of football management concerned a club’s most valuable assets, its players, and clubs began to realise that they needed some form of supervision. On away trips, Bentley remarked that, ‘'[t]he manager takes full charge of him from leaving home until he returns ... That is part of the business of

¹⁸ Bentley, ‘Is Football a Business?’, p. 383
¹⁹ *AVNR*, 1 September 1906, p. 5
football’. Like many clubs, the directors of Aston Villa and Middlesbrough carried out this task, and perhaps they were the managers.

Moreover, many of football’s paid officials carried the title of secretary or secretary-manager. However, perhaps it can be claimed that George Ramsey, generally regarded as a secretary of Aston Villa, was football’s first manager. In 1886 the club placed an advertisement in the *Birmingham Daily Gazette*,

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WANTED, MANAGER FOR ASTON VILLA FOOTBALL CLUB who will be required to devote his whole time under direction of Committee. Salary £100 per annum. Applications with reference must be made not later than June 23 to Chairman of Committee, Aston Villa Club House, 6 Witton Road, Aston.

Canvassing members disqualifies
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Any definition of the early football manager is difficult therefore, as titles did not necessarily fit the job, and they became interchangeable. It also illustrates how the job of football management had changed. Tom Watson, for example, on his will, was given the title of secretary. One of his memorialists remarked however, that, ‘Tom Watson had been given many titles and in his football wares was the title of secretary. This was not strictly correct. Tom was a manager pure and simple’. Furthermore, Jimmy Catton claimed that Watson had been asked by the Sunderland committee to become its manager. Because someone did not carry the title of football manager it did not disqualify them from carrying out management functions, and on the other hand someone who held the title of manager perhaps might have had

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20 Bentley, ‘Is Football a Business?’, p. 393
21 *Birmingham Daily Gazette*, 21 June 1886, p. 2 Ramsey was chosen from 155 applications. *Athletic News*, 29 June 1886
22 A survey of other managers in an index of wills from Watson’s period failed to reveal anyone else’s occupation.
23 *Liverpool Football Echo*, 15 May 1915, p. 3
fewer responsibilities than some secretaries. It will be argued then that the early football manager and his role needs to be placed in a wider context and that the job developed in a piece-meal fashion that differed from club to club. There was no set job description for a football manager and any managerial powers were, and continued to be, limited by the management culture of the club that employed them.

**Table 3.1: Sample of Occupations of North East Football Club Secretaries, 1881-1891**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher Professions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Professions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers and Proprietors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators and Managers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical Workers</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foremen, Supervisors, Inspectors</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual Workers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled Manual Workers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Manual Workers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on occupational categories in G. Routh, *Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906-60* (1965), pp. 155-57

Sources: *Newcastle Daily Journal*, 22 August 1885, p. 4, 23 September 1886, p. 3; *Ward's Directory of Newcastle* (1883-88); Bulmer, *History and Directory of Newcastle-upon-Tyne* (1887); Censuses 1881 and 1891

Who were football's early managerial figures and what was their background?

Clubs were initially looking for someone who had experience of being involved in football, and as a result, secretaries and managers came from diverse backgrounds. It was only after the first generation of footballers had retired that there was a more recognised path into management. The results of a small survey of secretaries of amateur clubs in the North East during the 1880s is shown in Table 3.1. It reveals a relatively even mix in terms of occupational categories, although unsurprisingly perhaps, clerks, with their organisational and administrative skills, formed the largest

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24 Catton, *Real Football*, p. 178
group with skilled workers next (see Chapter 2). Three of the four secretaries from the category of unskilled workers were miners, reflecting the importance of the industry in the local economy. Ironically, workplace intermediaries such as foremen who undertook managerial functions did not figure in the survey. Most secretaries also shared similar backgrounds and occupations with their fathers (see below).

Men who emerged as managerial figures in the professional game before the First World War had shared similar backgrounds to those in the North East. Experience of clerical work was an important qualification however. For example, John Nicholson, Sheffield United’s secretary-manager from 1899 to 1932, originally worked as a clerk in the local deputy coroner’s office, and Sam Allen who held a similar position with Swindon Town between 1902 and 1933, had been a clerical worker at the local Great Western Railway works.26 Another pre-1914 manager, Sam Hollis, had worked in a probate office and also the Post Office.27 A number of managers and secretaries were qualified as accountants. In Chapter 1 we saw how accountancy was one of the few professions that offered some management training. Derby’s secretary-manager from 1900 to 1906, Harry Newbould, was actually a qualified accountant.28 Similarly, Spurs’s secretary from 1906 to his death in 1949, Arthur Turner, was an accountant who had a wide range of tax and rating law expertise.29 Glasgow Celtic’s long-serving manager, Willie Maley, initially trained to be a chartered accountant with a city firm but continued to play as a professional

25 The sample was taken from two years, 1885 in which there were 43 clubs and also 1886 which had 50.
27 ibid., p. 153
28 ibid., p. 198
with Celtic, and later abandoned accountancy to work full-time at the club. Before taking up his duties with Wolverhampton Wanderers, Jack Addenbrooke was a teacher in a local school, and later became a tobacconist. Frank Brettell, manager of Portsmouth, Plymouth and Tottenham Hotspur, relinquished his position as a schoolmaster when he was appointed secretary of Bolton Wanderers in 1896. Will Settle belonged to the merchant class, selling coal. He had first been a director of Bolton Wanderers but became their manager in 1910 for five years.

Tom Watson came from a working-class background. He was born on 8 April 1859 in the Byker district of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. His father, Ralph, was an iron moulder and before taking up a permanent position with Sunderland in 1888, Tom had followed him into the trade. Unlike Watson, John Cameron was a professional footballer. He was one of the first, if not the first, professional player to combine playing with the duties of club management when he became the player-secretary-manager of Tottenham Hotspur in 1899. Cameron had initially joined just as a player in the autumn of 1898. A Scottish international, Cameron came to Everton from Queens Park of Glasgow in September 1895. Initially, he was an amateur and worked for the shipping firm Cunard but it was said that his amateur status caused friction

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29 J. Holland, Spurs: A History of Tottenham Hotspur Football Club (1956), p. 70
31 Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 73. Included in Wolves’s fixture list for 1892-93 was an advertisement that states that Addenbrooke was a ‘Wholesale and Retail Tobacconist’ at 7 High Street, Wolverhampton. Source: Wolverhampton Wanderers FC.
32 Liverpool Review, 1 August 1896, p. 12; Young, Bolton Wanderers, p. 68. He had been a founder member of Everton then the club’s assistant secretary and secretary.
33 Young, Bolton Wanderers, p. 69
34 Certified Copy of an Entry of Birth, CK 762194, 20.4.98
35 1881 Census; Ward’s Directory of Newcastle, 1887-8. Dr Neal Garnham of Sunderland University has claimed that Watson was actually a money lender but I have been unable to verify this.
amongst Everton's professionals. They thought that being an amateur gave him some social advantage over them and his team mates refused to pass to him. This, apparently, forced him to turn professional. 37

What other qualities did clubs look for in their managers apart from their knowledge of running a football club? It has already been mentioned that one of the major themes of this thesis is that in football management, like industry, training and knowledge has been acquired on-the-job. In Chapter 1 however, it was stated that the education received by managers is one indicator that can be used to gauge their quality. What education did managers undergo therefore, and how did it effect the quality of football management? Education sharply reflected Victorian class society as for the bulk of the population it was a means to consolidate the rank, the sex role and social position of those receiving it. 38 In terms of basic education however, all managers were probably literate as total literacy had been achieved in Britain by 1913. A mass market for the printed word had also developed as the general population now had the time and money to spend and read newspapers and novels. 39 Behind this phenomenon had been a gradual extension of compulsory education. In 1870 the Forster Education Act created local School Boards dedicated to running elementary schools. Attendance was initially optional but in 1880 it was made compulsory for all 5-10 year olds. In 1894 the school leaving age was raised to

37 Catton Folders, B-C, p. 218. It is possible however, that other factors may have forced the change, for example, being made redundant at Cunard. C.B. Fry's Magazine, Vol. 2 (8), November 1904, p. 180
38 Walvin, Victorian Values, pp. 86-87
39 Sanderson, Education, p. 3; Walvin, Victorian Values, p. 83
11, and to 12 in 1899. The Fisher Act of 1918 raised it to 14 across the board. The substance of a child’s education at an inner-city board school however, was largely based on that of the public schools. Teachers and pupils by 1900 were subject to a system of learning, a syllabus and to ideals, inherited from elitist institutions.

Nevertheless, the improvements in literacy rates and elementary education had important social and economic consequences. Literacy, acquired through schooling, could enhance job prospects and performance, and have direct relevance to tasks such as keeping accounts, reading and writing instructions. It also promoted an orderly mind, inculcated social discipline and facilitated urban living with its signs, advertisements for jobs and housing, not to mention enabling intelligent engagement in leisure activities. Literacy also became linked to earnings as Lady Florence Bell discovered when investigating her husband’s iron works in Middlesbrough during the early 1900s. Linked with the prospect for greater earnings for the literate was an increased probability of upward social mobility which suggested that literacy was increasingly valued in job requirements.

In terms of secondary education however, working-class children were not so well catered for. At first, an ad hoc system of higher grade schools existed that gave children some post-elementary work. Not until the early twentieth century were more, if hardly equal, opportunities created for working-class pupils. Under the 1902 Education Act higher grade schools were abolished and grammar schools were created

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40 Sanderson, Education, pp. 3-4. Until 1891 however, and if they did not receive some form of charity, parents had to pay weekly schools fees, ranging from 1d. to 4d. per week, and many refused to send their children to school for financial reasons. Thompson, Respectable Society, p. 136
41 Walvin, Victorian Values, p. 88
42 Sanderson, Education, pp. 7-8. Reference to Lady F. Bell, At the Works (1907)
by new Local Education Authorities. Children from elementary schools could win a scholarship if they passed an examination at 11. Later, LEA scholarships were extended to the universities. In one sense, the system was more fluid as the number of sons of skilled artisans and unskilled workers who made up grammar school pupils increased from 9 per cent in 1897 to 20.6 per cent by 1913. On the other hand, however, it perpetuated Edwardian England's highly stratified social structure as working-class pupils were denied the opportunities given to their middle-class counterparts. Furthermore, grammar schools reflected the liberal education and values of a public school and Oxbridge. At the expense of more relevant and modern scientific subjects, a classical education was promoted in which Latin had to be studied. It was felt that this type of education was a gateway for working-class scholarship pupils to enter university, including Oxbridge.\textsuperscript{43}

It is reasonable to assume that the general educational levels of football managers, even up to 1939, were relatively poor, reflecting the experience of the majority of working-class men who did not receive a secondary education. In terms of education, it could be argued that levels even decreased once players started to become managers compared to the early pioneers. Some prominent managers however, did receive a more superior education than their contemporaries and this was perhaps reflected in the stature of the clubs they managed. At the top end of the educational scale, William Sudell received a private education at a Cheshire boarding school where he was probably given a classical liberal education in the public school

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{ibid.}, pp. 9-13
tradition. Ernest Mangnall was a pupil at Bolton Grammar School. He became secretary-manager of Manchester United in 1903, and later managed Manchester City. On his appointment as Tottenham’s new secretary, it was noted that John Cameron ‘has splendid business experience and his educational credentials are far in advance of most of the other candidates’. Tom Watson, born in 1859, may have been too late to benefit from the 1870 Education Act but he did attend school. His father, a skilled worker, was probably part of the independent educational tradition that sent its children to church, chapel or voluntary schools. Within respectable working-class households, learning was sought as a means of advancement and the schooling of their children was seen as normal before it became compulsory. After attending a local school, Tom attended a school in York where, in 1873 aged 14, he first played football.

How did the role of the nascent football manager and his relationship with directors evolve during this period, and to what extent was it affected by the game’s commercialisation? It would perhaps be beneficial to look at management relations within other sports first, and how these were influenced by commercialism. American baseball, for example, provides not only a contrast in management style but also national business cultures. Baseball in America became a professional sport earlier than football and, unlike English football, American Major League Baseball

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44 Preston Herald, 24 March 1888, p. 5
45 Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 186. When he was at United, the club won the Football League in 1908 and 1911 and the FA Cup in 1909.
46 Tottenham Herald, 24 October 1899, p. 3
47 1871 Census. Watson’s occupation is listed as ‘Scholar’.
48 Thompson, Respectable Society, p. 137; Walvin, Victorian Values, p. 86
49 Athletic News, 10 May 1915
clubs had few commercial restrictions placed upon them as the game was organised for profit from the outset. Dividends in baseball could reach 75 per cent whereas in England the maximum was 7 per cent. As early as the 1860s, teams from large cities had been funded by joint-stock companies and groups of wealthy capitalists.50

The first all-professional baseball team was the Cincinnati Red Stockings. Formed in 1869, Harry Wright was appointed manager to conduct its business affairs and in the process became baseball’s first modern manager.51 The first part of his job entailed dealing with the club’s business affairs, particularly the organisation of tours. He also had to ensure that the club made a profit. It was the management of the team however, that brought Wright most recognition. During the 1860s and 1870s a team captain acted as the team manager, with responsibility for making tactical decisions on the field of play. The manager of the club was its business manager, similar to a football club’s secretary, who handled the day-to-day business. Wright was the first club official to take the management of the team upon himself, acting as manager on and off the field. He directed and supervised practices, decided who played where and when, maintained morale and kept an eye on the players’ eating, drinking and sleeping habits. Wright, given the authority of the club’s directors, established the principle of a manager’s authority over the players in every aspect of the game.52

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51 H. Seymour, Baseball: The Early Years (Oxford, 1960), p. 71; Goldstein, Playing for Keeps, p. 11. Wright was actually born in Sheffield in 1835 and like his father, Sam, was engaged in America as a professional cricketer. In 1867 he switched to baseball, a decision, which, Goldstein argues, had far-reaching consequences for the future of both sports in America. ibid.
52 Goldstein, Playing for Keeps, pp. 112-13
Scottish football provides a different, if not a straightforward, contrast as there were no restrictions on the dividends paid to Scottish clubs. Celtic, for example, paid up to 25 per cent. Between 1888 to 1940, Willie Maley was Celtic’s secretary and then manager. In 1896-97 the club became a limited liability company but was run like a family firm. Maley was appointed secretary-manager in 1897 and built a reputation as a martinet but he was never fully responsible for selecting the team during his entire career. Some of the directors had been former players and they even dispensed practical advice at training sessions. British football clubs however, were generally non-profit making organisations. Commercialisation was not as advanced as in America and directors, like those at Celtic, maintained a tighter grip on the club’s management and were unwilling to relinquish much control.

Changes in the management of English football clubs and the relationship between managers and directors were gradual and uneven. Football clubs were small companies with small bureaucracies and so a club’s management culture was partly shaped by the personality of individual directors. The process of football management however, was also partly framed by commercial pressures (see Chapter 2) and as these increased so did the demands on the time of directors who were unpaid and had their own professions or businesses to run. More time therefore, had to be devoted to the administration of business on a day-to-day basis and this was increasingly left in the hands of the secretary, and later secretary-managers. This process was evident by the 1890s as clubs began to gradually outgrow their amateur

53 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 86
roots, accompanied by the steep rise in football’s popularity. George Ramsay had been appointed secretary of Aston Villa as early as 1886. Following their conversion back to the professional game in 1899, Middlesbrough’s directors found that they could not handle the increased workload. For the next season they decided to appoint a paid secretary, and John Robson was upgraded from his honorary position to secretary-manager. Some clubs elected a match secretary plus a financial secretary to cope with the increased responsibilities. A match secretary’s duties included the fixing and organising of games. Before, and during the early years of the Football League, secretaries advertised for games when there was a blank in the fixture list. Applications for match tickets and general ticketing arrangements were also dealt with by the secretary. All club correspondence was the secretary’s responsibility, bringing this to the attention of the committee at their meetings, at which he would also take the minutes. George Ramsay also informed the players by telegram whether they were playing or not and about the forthcoming travel arrangements for an away game. Some club officials, including secretaries, later became responsible for the recruitment of players. This required travelling to games to watch certain players, usually accompanied by a committee member or director. Some clubs even vested powers in their players. At Newcastle United in the early 1900s, following a series of poor results, the chairman, James Telford asked the club captain, Colin Veitch and two other players, Andy Aitken and Jack Carr, to pick the team, overlooking the

55 Mason, Association Football, p. 34
56 Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 3 May 1900. Robson had initially been appointed assistant secretary at Middlesbrough to J. Borrie in 1893. ibid., 28 August 1893
57 P. Morris, Aston Villa: The First 100 Years, (Birmingham, 1974), p. 8
club's secretary, Frank Watt. In 1903 the newly formed Bradford City's board of directors consisted entirely of former members of Manningham rugby club. They realised they lacked any substantial knowledge of soccer, and allowed the players to elect their own captain.

John Cameron was appointed secretary-manager of Tottenham Hotspur in 1899 because he was a football specialist. He was not a specialist in the true sense of the word but someone who had the experience and knowledge of playing at the highest level. His appointment was at a time when the financial risks within football were becoming greater. Professional football had come late to London but its potential to draw big crowds was obvious. London's population provided a massive potential pool of spectators that was served by a transport network with the ability to move people rapidly around the capital. Woolwich Arsenal had been the first professional London club and they had joined the Football League in 1893. Spurs became professional in December 1895 and created the need to generate extra money. Under the direction of Charles D. Roberts, Spurs converted from a members' club to limited liability status in March 1898. Roberts became chairman in 1899 and initiated the club's move to a new ground, White Hart Lane, in

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58 Sunday Sun, 7 June 1931, p. 32
59 Williams, Code War, p. 162
60 His appointment to this joint position was from February 1899 to March 1907 during which the club won the Southern League in 1900, and in 1901 they became the first professional London club to win the FA Cup. Soar, Tottenham, p. 24
61 R. Finn, Tottenham Hotspur FC: The official history (1972), p. 28
62 ibid., p. 31. Roberts was known for his fund raising activities such as military tattoos in the northern home counties. He had also been, apparently, a baseball pitcher for the Brooklyn Dodgers. Soar, Tottenham, p. 21. At the end of the 1898-99 season only 1558 of the 8000 £1 shares had been taken up. Finn, Tottenham, p. 32; Soar, Tottenham, p. 22
September of that year. The club leased a plot of ground called Beckwith’s Nursery from the brewers, Charringtons, and eventually purchased the freehold in 1901 at a cost of £8900. Cameron’s relationship with the Spurs’ directors was based on deference. In an article he wrote that, ‘[t]he manager is not the sole governing authority. As regards his status, he is indubitably the servant of the club directors.’ Cameron also acknowledged the managerial work undertaken by directors. By 1906 the Spurs’ directors had decided that the growing demands on Cameron in connection with team building and management made it impossible for him to give the required amount of time to his secretarial duties. So his position was divided in two: Cameron was appointed team manager and Arthur Turner secretary. The following year however, Cameron resigned citing various differences with the board.

Notwithstanding the claims of George Ramsey, Tom Watson was probably the game’s first prototype football manager and his career spanned both the amateur and professional eras, fulfilling the role as a football club intermediary between the players and directors. Initially a keen amateur player, he had also been a prominent figure in the rapid growth of football in the Newcastle area during the 1880s. In 1881 Watson had founded Rosehill Football Club in the mid-Tyne district and by 1885 he

63 Finn, Tottenham, p. 32
64 Soar, Tottenham, p. 23-4. The ground was adjacent to Charrington’s White Hart pub on the High Road, and part of the lease agreement was that Tottenham only served Charrington beers. Something they have done ever since. ibid.
65 J. Cameron, ‘How to Run a Football Team’, Gibson and Pickford, Association Football, Vol. 4, p. 128-133
66 G. Wagstaffe Simmons, History of Tottenham Hotspur Football Club 1882-1946 (1947); Holland, Spurs, p. 70
67 Tottenham Weekly Herald, 20 March 1907, p. 4
was representing the club on the Northumberland FA Challenge Cup committee.\(^{68}\)

The following year he was the representative of Newcastle West End after being elected the club’s honorary secretary at its 1886 AGM.\(^{69}\) During his time at ‘West End’ he had helped to secure the lease of a ground that was to become St. James’ Park.\(^{70}\) In December 1887 however, he resigned his position. This seems to have followed an FA Cup tie between the Newcastle team, Shankhouse, who had been loaned St. James’ Park, and Aston Villa, a few days earlier. At the game a crush developed and the arrangements for the admission of the public, which were presumably Watson’s responsibility, were criticised.\(^{71}\) For the start of the 1888-89 season, Watson was the honorary secretary at Newcastle East End.\(^{72}\) His time at West End and East End coincided with an infusion of capital into both of them. Watson was responsible for introducing several Scottish professionals into their ranks and offering them £5 for signing on plus a factory job on Tyneside.\(^{73}\) In 1887 West End played a game in Edinburgh and it was the first time a local club had met all the players’ expenses; previously they had paid them themselves.\(^{74}\)

In 1889 Watson was hired by Sunderland as their match secretary. Sunderland had needed someone with experience and he was one of the few

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\(^{68}\) *Athletic News*, 10 May 1915, ‘Obituary’. It was later re-named Willington Athletic. Tyne and Wear Archives Service, S/NFA/13

\(^{69}\) *Newcastle Daily Journal*, 10 May 1886, p. 3

\(^{70}\) Catton Folders, W. Correspondence between Watson and Catton. He had been appointed by the club to wait upon the Lord Mayor of Newcastle, Sir BC Browne. It was the influence of the local MP, Sir CF Hammond, and the financial assistance of Messrs Stanger and Robinson however, which obtained the lease and permission for the ground to be enclosed.

\(^{71}\) *Newcastle Daily Journal*, 21 December 1887; *Newcastle Daily Chronicle*, 24 December 1887

\(^{72}\) *Athletic News*, 10 May 1915, ‘Obituary’

\(^{73}\) *Newcastle Daily Journal*, 7 May 1915, ‘Obituary’, p. 11

\(^{74}\) *Newcastle Daily Chronicle*, 13 September 1887, p. 7
candidates who had a background in what was a fledgling industry.\textsuperscript{75} Even the year before, it had been felt that Sunderland needed to appoint someone who could devote all his time to the club as ‘the work of a football club secretary absorbed 16 to 17 hours of his time weekly’ and ‘[t]here was no reason why such work should be done voluntarily’.\textsuperscript{76} At the 1889 AGM, one member claimed that ‘the [secretarial] duties had so greatly increased that a match secretary was imperatively required’.\textsuperscript{77} It was perhaps no coincidence that Watson’s appointments at Sunderland, and then Liverpool in 1896 (see Chapter 2), were times when both clubs were facing competition within their own areas. On his arrival on Wearside the club was engaged in a spiteful local battle with Sunderland Albion for football supremacy in the town.\textsuperscript{78} For example, the two clubs had been drawn together in cup competitions on two occasions with ‘Albion’ having home advantage. Sunderland though withdrew from both, preferring to concede defeat rather than ensure large gate receipts for Albion.\textsuperscript{79} Furthermore, to obtain a more lucrative fixture list than Albion, Sunderland increased the expenses paid to opposing teams. Sunderland even withheld the

\textsuperscript{75}Sunderland’s secretary, John Grayston, had been instructed by his committee to find a full-time employee. He knew of Watson’s reputation and, after finding him in a Newcastle pub, Grayston had been given £10 to fit him out with a suit and instructed to present Watson in front of the committee for an interview that same night. \textit{Sunderland Weekly News}, 2 October 1931, p. 7

\textsuperscript{76}\textit{Sunderland Daily Echo}, 4 April 1888, p. 4

\textsuperscript{77}\textit{ibid.}, 4 June 1889, p. 3

\textsuperscript{78}The original founder of Sunderland, James Allen, had left and formed Sunderland Albion on 13 March 1888 in a dispute over professionalism. Sunderland had been found guilty by the FA of playing three professionals in an FA Cup tie against Middlesbrough. Before being eligible to play in the competition, the players had not fulfilled the competition’s residential qualifications of living two years near to the club’s HQ. Middlesbrough, who had lost the tie, then protested to the FA. Albion had the financial support of James Hartley Jnr., a glassworks owner and joined the Football Alliance in 1889. Appleton, \textit{Hotbed of Soccer}, p. 170-71; A. Rippon, \textit{Great Soccer Clubs of the North East} (Derby, 1981), pp. 46-47

\textsuperscript{79}\textit{The Journal}, (100 Years of Sunderland AFC: A Journal Football Special), 23 October 1979, p. xii
publication of the following season’s fixture list so as not to give any advantage to their rivals.\textsuperscript{80}

During Watson’s time at Sunderland the club was patronised by a local shipbuilder, Robert Thompson JP. Together with his brother Joseph Lowes Jnr., they owned Sunderland’s most famous shipyard, J.L. Thompson and Sons, at North Sands, Southwick.\textsuperscript{81} Thompson later claimed that as an employer he had benefited from football as it kept working men out of mischief on a Saturday because of their attendance at the matches.\textsuperscript{82} By 1887 Robert was President of Sunderland, and had been joined on the club committee by his brother.\textsuperscript{83} James Marr and a Mr McLintock were shipyard managers at Thompson who also joined the committee. Marr later became chairman of the club’s committee.\textsuperscript{84} A future committee chairman, Jim McMillan, and an early member, was a monumental sculptor and master stonemason.\textsuperscript{85} Another important committee member and benefactor was the treasurer Samuel Tyzack, an Australian, who had inherited a local firm of iron-

\textsuperscript{80}Sunderland Daily Echo, 4 June 1889, p. 3
\textsuperscript{81}Rippon, Great Soccer Clubs, p. 46; Sunderland Daily Echo, 27 May 1893, p. 3. The Sunderland goalkeeper, Ted Doig was a timekeeper and the club’s trainer, Joe Bell, was a shipyard foreman. Sunderland Weekly News, 2 October 1931, p. 7. For Doig and his family history see http://wkweb.cableinet.co.uk/haggis.whisky/inthe1.htm
\textsuperscript{82}Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 10 July 1896, p. 4. In 1894 Robert Thompson resigned from the committee, although he did not completely sever his ties with the club. Thompson cited the growing demands on his time due to the shipyard’s new status as a limited liability company. Sunderland Daily Echo, 13 July 1894, p. 2; Sunderland Herald and Daily Post, 4 August 1894, p. 3
\textsuperscript{83}Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 5, Robert Thompson, pp. 504-06; Sunderland Daily Echo, 6 May 1887, p. 3; Robert Thompson was succeeded by John Potts Henderson, a wine and spirits merchant. Sunderland Daily Echo, 4 August 1894, p. 3; 28 February 1927, p. 7, ‘Obituary’
\textsuperscript{84}Sunderland Weekly News, 2 October 1931, p. 7 Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 4, James Marr, pp. 151-53. Marr later entered into a partnership with other members of the shipyard to establish the Sunderland Forge and Engineering Co. in 1887. By 1901 he was the managing director and chairman of the directors of the shipyard. During the First World War, Marr was a member of the Advisory Committee to the Ministry of Shipping and in 1919 was made a Baronet. Sunderland Echo, 24 November 1932, p. 1, ‘Obituary’
\textsuperscript{85}Sunderland Daily Echo, 27 May 1893, p. 3
Despite the financial input of its committee, Sunderland had been forced to adapt continually to the game’s changing climate. Before limited liability status, guarantee funds of £1000 and £1100 had been raised in 1892 and 1894 respectively. Watson claimed that only in becoming a limited liability company would the club be able to compete with the wages paid to players by other clubs.

Liverpool Football Club, as we have seen in the previous chapter, was run by John Houlding. In an attempt to avoid what happened at Everton, he wanted to control the club as his own fiefdom. The club adopted limited liability status in 1892 and its constitution allowed Houlding to nominate four committee members. Rule 3 had stated that ‘the Executive Committee shall have sole power to engage players, arrange fixtures, and have full control of all matters, including the election of members during its year of office’. Directors of the club were also allowed to make a profit from providing it with ancillary services. In 1902 Houlding died and three years later his son, William, sold the family shareholding. The Liverpool directorate however, was later characterised by the continuity of its personnel, and thus created a stable environment. None were from wealthy backgrounds like Houlding but

86 ibid., 4 August 1894, p. 3; 16 June 1915, p. 4, 'Obituary'. Tyzack resigned from the committee in 1894. ibid., 13 July 1894, p. 2; Sunderland Herald and Daily Post, 4 August 1894, p. 3
87 ibid., 2 June 1892, p. 2; 4 August 1894, p. 3. In 1892 each guarantor was entitled to 2 three year season tickets to the vice-president’s stand. He or she was required to pay £5 on entering into the guarantee with the balance to be made up during the three year period. ibid.
88 Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 10 July 1896, p. 4. The North Sands shipbuilding yard had been converted to a limited liability company in 1894 with a capital value of £125,000 made up of £100 shares. Marr was appointed to the board of directors along with Robert and J.L. Thompson Jnr. In comparison, when the football club was converted to a limited liability company in 1896, its capital value was £5000. Sunderland Daily Echo, 13 July 1894, p. 2; Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 10 July 1896, p. 4; B. Graham, The History of Sunderland AFC 1879-1995 (Tyne and Wear, 1995), p. 17.
89 Day, 'Football Club Directors', p. 65
instead were solid citizen types who got things done and believed in the value of experience.90

The extent of Watson’s role and powers developed over his career. He was originally appointed Sunderland’s match secretary in 1889 but later became the general secretary.91 Because of the increase in the club’s business, secretarial duties were divided with the financial side left in the hands of the previous secretary, W.T. Wallace whilst Watson concentrated on running the club’s administration and business, namely the team. It was Watson, in alliance with Tyzack, who went to Scotland to recruit the players that turned Sunderland into the ‘Team of all the Talents’.92 This job had previously been undertaken by Tyzack alone.93 Although Watson accompanied the team on their away trips, the first and second teams were selected by a teams committee that included Tyzack. From 1892 the second team was under the charge of Robert Campbell who succeeded Watson as secretary.94 Much of Watson’s time was taken up travelling by train and indicates that the committee members either did not have the time or were not willing to devote theirs to the club’s business anymore. In contrast, Middlesbrough’s directors supervised the players on trips to away games.95 At Aston Villa James Lees undertook this task for a number of years, and during the 1904-05 season he travelled approximately

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90 Mason, ‘Blues’, pp. 5-6
91 Sunderland Daily Echo, 4 June 1889, p. 3; Sunderland Herald and Post, 28 August 1895, p. 3
92 Sunderland won the Football League championship in 1891-92, 1892-93 and 1894-95, and were runners-up in 1893-94. Appleton, Hothead of Soccer, pp. 176-77.
93 Sunderland Daily Echo, 4 June 1889, p. 3
94 Graham, Sunderland, p. 17; Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 5 September 1896, p. 3
95 Middlesbrough FC Minutes, c.1899-1900, passim
3000 miles with the team.\textsuperscript{96} Watson, between September 1891 and May 1892 covered over 14,000 miles, both travelling with the team, and also to Football League and FA meetings in his capacity as the club’s representative.\textsuperscript{97}

One of Watson’s first administrative tasks had been to draw up a fixture list containing the best teams but it was to be on easier terms than the previous season when they had paid £1100 to the visitors.\textsuperscript{98} Watson was also in charge of organising the club’s sports days which he had had experience of at Newcastle. For one game at Bolton he arranged an excursion party, although this was dependent on getting a guarantee of 200 people. Watson also tried to arrange a tour to America in 1895. He corresponded with American clubs on Sunderland’s behalf and was to make all the necessary arrangements. The tour seems to have fallen through, probably because financial terms could not be agreed.\textsuperscript{99}

Watson had been recruited by Liverpool because of the successful job he had done at Sunderland, and he continued to do well at Liverpool where he won the Football League on two occasions, in 1900-01 and 1905-06. This made him the first manager to win the championship with two different clubs. Watson’s role at Liverpool seems to have become more influential as time went on. On taking up his new position it was suggested by a local paper that he should be given greater

\textsuperscript{96}Birmingham Post 16 December 1905, p. 10 ‘Obituary’; Birmingham Mail, 23 December 1905, p. 3. As a token of the players’ appreciation of his services on their behalf, the players had earlier presented him with a gold medal. Sports Argus, 16 December 1905, p. 4, ‘Obituary’

\textsuperscript{97} In 1891 Watson was elected to the FA Council as the representative of its number one division that covered the north east of England and North Yorkshire. For the 1892-93 season it was estimated he had travelled 13,000 miles. Sunderland Daily Echo, 19 May 1892, 27 May 1893, p. 3

\textsuperscript{98}Sunderland Daily Echo, 4 June 1889, p. 3

\textsuperscript{99} Correspondence between Watson and Colonel John I. Rogers, the President of the Philadelphia Association Football Club were published in the local press. Sunderland Daily Echo 10 July 1894, p. 3
autonomy, 'that the new secretary ought to be allowed as free a hand as possible and not be hampered in his work so long as he goes all right. It should be remembered that too many cooks spoil the broth.'100 This did not extend to the selection of the team however, which was undertaken by a committee. When Liverpool was first established, the recruitment of the team had been undertaken by a sub-committee that included John McKenna.101 As a director, McKenna also acted as honorary secretary and seems to have run the club along with Houlding’s son William, who was the club’s chairman with his father as President. It was William and McKenna who had recruited Watson.102 He developed a close friendship with McKenna who was a witness to Watson’s probate but their relationship did not effect the overall management model. The directors were still in charge. They ultimately decided on the players they wanted, they chose the team and disciplined the players if necessary. In January 1897, for example, three players, Wilkie, Allan and Niell, had been found guilty of drunkenness by the committee and it was the committee that delivered their week’s suspension.103

100 Liverpool Echo, 29 August 1896, p. 3
101 Catton, Leaguers, p. 79. McKenna was a vaccination officer with the West Derby Union and a Liverpool director until 1922. Born in Ireland in County Monaghan in 1855, he came to Liverpool aged 17, and his first job was a grocer’s boy. Initially, he played rugby and at one time was a member of the West Lancashire Rugby Union before supporting Everton. However, he joined Liverpool following Houlding’s rift with Everton. It was McKenna who tendered Liverpool’s application to join the Football League in 1893. He later served on the League’s management committee between 1902 and 1908, was elected vice-president in 1908 for two years before his election in 1910 as League President, a post he held until his death in 1936. In 1923 he became a life member of the Football League. In 1905 he also became a member of the FA Council and in 1928 a vice-president of the Football Association. Liverpool Daily Post, 23 March 1936, p. 5, ‘Obituary’; Mason, ‘Blues, p. 5; Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, Appendix 1, p. 370. Young, Football on Merseyside, pp. 43-44

102 Liverpool Football Echo, 1 August 1896, p. 2. Initially, the permanent secretary had been W.E. Barclay until 1895 but up to the time of Watson’s appointment McKenna stood in on a part-time basis. Catton, Leaguers, p. 79, 84. Barclay had previously been Everton’s secretary but supported Houlding during his dispute with the club. Young, Football on Merseyside, p. 43

103 Liverpool Football Echo, 23 January 1897, p. 4
As the club was a commercial entity, Watson’s main role was to ensure the smooth running of the club on a financial level, and between 1900 and 1915 Liverpool made a profit every year.\(^{104}\) It was also Watson who oversaw the outright purchase of the Anfield ground in 1907.\(^{105}\) Yet his responsibilities also extended to supervising the players, particularly to away games and when the players undertook special training.\(^{106}\) Watson was a charismatic figure and tried various means to maintain control over the players as well as keeping them happy and relaxed. Once, on the eve of a big cup match, he feared that the team would spend the night out on the town. He enlisted the assistance of one of the players, Billy Dunlop, to play a few tunes that apparently captured the players’ attention for the remainder of the evening. Another time, he asked a journalist to give him and his players ‘some music’. This then turned into a concert with Watson himself acting as the MC, demanding and giving songs.\(^{107}\)

Watson however, had a contempt for the secretary who was just a ‘postcard writer’ who wrote to their various contacts nationwide asking if they could recommend any players. Instead, he believed that the art of management ‘entailed the task of moulding men into one complete harmonious body’. It was one of his strengths, claimed Jimmy Catton, that ‘he had the gift of assimilating varying natures into one set of men animated with a common purpose’.\(^{108}\) His influence however,

\(^{104}\) Mason, ‘Blues’, p. 7
\(^{105}\) *Athletic News*, 3 June 1907, p. 3
\(^{106}\) *Liverpool Football Echo*, 14 October 1899, p. 4
\(^{107}\) *Liverpool Echo*, 7 May 1915, p. 4
\(^{108}\) *Athletic News*, 10 May 1915, ‘Obituary’
could only stretch so far. In April 1915 a match between Manchester United and Liverpool was fixed in return for bribes to some of the players.\textsuperscript{109}

One of football management's main functions, probably its most important, has been to build a winning team. Although managers are important, it is the quality of a team's players that is the main basis for its success. Managers therefore, have needed a good judgement of players, together with a slice of luck. Clubs explored various avenues in order to recruit players during the 1880s. One method was to place advertisements in newspapers.\textsuperscript{110} The content of the adverts were mainly directed at footballers who held a trade and as a consequence many professional players came from working-class backgrounds.\textsuperscript{111} The other main method was for club committeemen to be informed of promising players through personal contacts and networks. They would then approach the player themselves.\textsuperscript{112} Early managers were known as 'postcard writers' because of their willingness to sign players they had not seen on the recommendation of a friend or contact. Some clubs used agents. Middlesbrough used a Mr Ferguson who was paid a £5 commission for every player who he had recommended and who then went on to play for the club.\textsuperscript{113} In 1893 Aston Villa had used an agent to recruit some players without the committee seeing them beforehand and who were not very good.\textsuperscript{114}

Before the First World War, Scotland was a major source for footballers. Why was this so? Why were they in such demand and apparently more skilful than

\textsuperscript{109}Inglis, \textit{Soccer}, Chapter 3
\textsuperscript{110}Mason, \textit{Association Football}, p. 91
\textsuperscript{111}Mason, \textit{Association Football}, p. 91; Tischler, \textit{Footballers and Businessmen}, p. 93
\textsuperscript{112}Mason, \textit{Association Football}, p. 92
\textsuperscript{113}Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 4 July 1899
English footballers? By the early 1880s Scottish 'professors' had become renowned for their combination play and their ability to keep possession of the ball by passing it amongst themselves. Up until then the game in England was dominated by an emphasis on individual players dribbling the ball, resulting in possession being frequently lost.\textsuperscript{115} Perhaps one of the reasons can be found in underlying national cultural characteristics. In particular, Scottish education has had a reputation, if a romanticised one, for being more democratic than the English system. Scottish rural areas, through the wide diffusion of education by parish schools, had high literacy rates. Talented local boys, the 'lad of pairts', were also trained for a university education that was cheaper and attracted students from a wider and lower social strata than English aristocratic undergraduates.\textsuperscript{116}

The way the game was played therefore, was perhaps transmitted through notions of self-improvement in Scotland as opposed to English aristocratic and public school ideas of 'natural' superiority. In England more emphasis had been placed on playing the game for the sake of it rather than learning how to play it, and this may have engendered a more individualistic style. However, it should be noted that the Royal Engineers, one of the most successful teams during the 1870s, were noted for their 'combination'.\textsuperscript{117} English football also perhaps owed something to a lingering connection with rugby which was less popular in Scotland. Physical contact was important and a certain robustness was evident, although this was not absent

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{114} \textit{Birmingham Daily Mail}, 25 February 1893, p. 3
\item \textsuperscript{115} Mason, \textit{Association Football}, p. 207-08
\item \textsuperscript{116} R. Anderson, 'In Search of the “Lad of Parts”: the Mythical History of Scottish Education', \textit{History Workshop Journal}, 19 (Spring 1985), pp. 82-104; Sanderson, \textit{Education}, p. 13
\item \textsuperscript{117} Catton, \textit{Real Football}, p.111
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
north of the border. Rushes of players downfield chasing the ball was another feature of English football and was perhaps a legacy of the public schools game, British Bulldog. For whatever reason, Scotland dominated the annual fixture with England during the 1870s and ‘80s through superior teamwork and passing.\textsuperscript{118} In October 1882, the FA’s assistant secretary, N.L. Jackson responded by forming the Corinthians which was made up of players who had attended public school and university and provided the bulk of the England team. Jackson believed that this would give them more opportunities to practice together and eventually overcome the Scots.\textsuperscript{119} Despite the club’s amateur ethos it could not hide the competitive sentiment behind its formation.\textsuperscript{120}

During the 1880s Preston North End, largely made up of Scots, was known as the ‘Invincibles’ whilst ‘Team of the Macs’ was the sobriquet given to Liverpool’s original side. Furthermore, professionalism had quickly dissolved the idea that teams should comprise local players. Under John Cameron, Tottenham Hotspur in 1900-01 did not include one player from London.\textsuperscript{121} From the summer of 1883 Preston’s recruitment policy of Scottish players centred on Edinburgh, unlike other Lancashire clubs which had focused on Glasgow.\textsuperscript{122} Sudell had acted on the advice of Tom McNeill, a native of Edinburgh, who was a foreman at the Preston

\begin{footnotes}
\item [118] The first game was played in 1872 and out of the first 20, Scotland won 11, England 4 and there were 5 draws.
\item [120] For a study in Victorian hypocrisy in amateur sport read Rae, \textit{Grace}.
\item [121] Holland, \textit{Spurs}, Chapter 6
\item [122] In 1883 Edinburgh had 40 football clubs. Berry and Allman, \textit{One Hundred Years}, p. 19
\end{footnotes}
Herald's composing room. By 1884 there were 58 Scottish players in England and of these, eleven represented Preston North End. Players however, had to be induced to come over the border, and at North End they were found fictitious employment by club members. For example, its most famous player Nick Ross, joined the club from Heart of Midlothian on 17 July 1883, and took up a position as a slater in Preston with a Mr Bradshaw. Players’ wages were then refunded to their employers by the club treasurer and deducted from the gates before they were entered in the club’s books.

Tom Watson, together with Sunderland’s treasurer, Samuel Tyzack, went to Scotland to find players and negotiate terms with them. The result was the ‘Team of all the Talents’. In addition to wages, Sunderland also offered the players jobs at the J.L. Thompson shipyard. Watson claimed that the players were paid on average a wage of 30s per week and to no player did he give a retainer of more than £10. However, the case of John R. Auld, a Scottish international, suggests that the Sunderland players received more than this as well as other benefits. On signing for

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123 Catton, Wickets, p. 138; Lewis, ‘Football in Lancashire’, p. 139; Athletic News, 4 September 1911, p. 4, ‘Obituary’
124 The geographical origins of Preston North End’s Scottish players were: Edinburgh - 6 (Hearts - 3; St. Bernard’s - 3); Glasgow - 3 (South Western; Lugar Boswell; Port Glasgow Athletic); Ayrshire - 2 (Stewarton Cunninghame and Annbank). Scottish Umpire, 10 December 1884, p. 11; Berry and Allman, One Hundred Years, p. 28. In December 1884 the Scottish Football Association banned them and the other 47 from returning to Scotland as players because they were perceived to be professionals. Ibid. It was not until 1893 that the Scottish FA legalised professionalism, although the Scottish League had been established two years earlier. Mason, ‘Football’, p. 147
125 Catton, Leaguers, 1897, p. 96; Preston Herald, 11 August 1894, p. 5. Local players were not excluded however. Fred Dewhurst who played on the left wing, was a master at the local Catholic Grammar School and was also the club secretary, and full back Bob Holmes was a lawyer’s clerk for a Preston firm. Preston Herald, 24 March 1888, p. 5; Athletic News, 1 May 1922, p. 4
126 Lewis, ‘Football in Lancashire’, p. 139
127 The origin of this sobriquet is attributed to William McGregor, although its actual meaning may be more ironical than literal as talent can also mean money. Athletic News, 26 February 1917, p. 1 It won 3 Football League championships in four years from 1892 to 1895.
128 Football Field, 10 June 1893
the club in 1889, he received a cheque for £300 that was to be his wages paid two years in advance. He then received £150 for the actual signing and even £20 for just signing a professional form. Auld then requested that he wanted a place of business. This turned out to be a boot and shoe shop in Sunderland for which the club paid the first year’s rental of £50 and it also put in the fixtures. After his second year with the club he received a £200 loyalty bonus. In addition to this, he also received playing bonuses of 10s for an away win, 7s 6d for a home win, and 5s for a draw.¹²⁹

When clubs began to pay players it brought with it unique labour management problems. Footballers were young men, many of whom liked a drink, and, from the club’s perspective, needed discipline. Yet, this was complicated by the fact that the players were the club’s main assets. Thus, in terms of any managerial strategy directors and managers needed to feed players some carrot as well as brandish the stick. As we have seen, management-worker relations within football clubs were cemented by the prevailing class system (see Introduction). Virtually all professional footballers were from the working-classes whilst the majority of directors had middle-class backgrounds. On one occasion, the Aston Villa club programme reporting on a banquet, commented on how well one of the players, Joseph Bache spoke for a footballer!¹³⁰ In 1909 the players threatened to strike over the maximum wage and the repeal of the retain and transfer system. In response, one member of the Football League Management Committee, Charles Sutcliffe, wrote an article entitled, ‘Who Shall Be the Masters - Players or Clubs?’ By implication

¹²⁹ Auld had claimed that after his club in Scotland, Third Lanark, elected him on to their committee he decided to stay with them, and returned the cheque. Further meetings with Sunderland then followed before he moved to Wearside. *Athletic News*, 26 February 1917, p. 1. Auld opened his boot and shoe shop in August 1889. He still had it in 1917 in addition to another branch he opened.
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players were still regarded as servants to their clubs despite the fact that they had signed a contract with their employers. The restrictions imposed by the transfer system however, added to the players’ sense of obsequiousness. Furthermore, in 1909 footballers were declared as workmen under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1906. As a result, players were now entitled to compensation if they sustained any injuries ‘while following their employment’.131 A certain tension existed therefore, between the two parties, and directors were to increasingly use their secretaries in matters between the club and players.

The most obvious way to discipline players was through their pockets. As early as 1885 Villa’s committee had wanted to reward or punish players through their wage packets. The club’s poor performance was being blamed on the poor condition of their players. The committee was forced to resign and it was proposed that players should be fined for not attending practice. A graduated scale of pay was suggested where professionals received a match fee, a bonus for a win and bonuses for every goal scored. It was also proposed however, that any player who played whilst out of condition should not be paid at all.132

Clubs though still had the problem of controlling and discipling the players. The most important role was perhaps fulfilled by the trainer, a quasi NCO figure, who was the person most in contact with the players. In addition to maintaining the players’ fitness, his main function was to keep an eye on them and make sure they kept out of mischief. The Middlesbrough trainer regularly reported to the board and

130 AVNR, 3 September 1910, p. 7
was questioned on the condition of the players. A trainer’s authority however, was limited. Most were former players and they shared a similar status. Clubs also used more covert methods to monitor and control the players. Aston Villa resorted to spying on their players and some were spotted in pubs when they should have been training. Rules were also introduced for players to abide by with reference to training and playing. Any player of Wolverhampton Wanderers, for example, who did not undertake his weekly training would forfeit a day’s wages, his daily meals and would be liable to suspension. Clubs also insisted that any players who claimed that they were too ill to play or train had to provide a doctor’s certificate. Middlesbrough also made players sign their names in a book on training nights.

Rules also reflected temperance and non-conformist attitudes within a club’s management. Middlesbrough, for example, adopted the rules of Aston Villa, and supplemented this with a ban on players betting on matches. William McGregor had wanted Aston Villa to make a rule banning professional players serving in public

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132 Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 55, Birmingham Mail, 12 December 1885
133 Middlesbrough FC Minutes, passim.
134 Villa’s trainer, Joe Grierson, apparently wore a flat cap. Information supplied by Don Bilton.
135 Inglis, Villa Park, p. 16; Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, pp. 208-09
136 See Appendix 9
137 For example, Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 27 November 1899
138 Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 31 July 1899. One unusual transgression of club rules was committed by Villa player, James Cowan. In 1896 he absented himself from training to compete in the Powder hall Handicap Sprint in Edinburgh. He won the race and the prize money of £80 but he along with three other team mates, Charlie Athersmith, Albert Evans and Chatt, pulled off a betting coup. It was rumoured that Cowan’s winnings totalled £1300. Unsurprisingly enough the club suspended Cowan for a week and fined him four weeks wages. Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 123, Birmingham Mail, 2, 4, 10 January 1896, Birmingham Post, 11 January 1896
139 Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 31 July 1899
houses. At the same time the welfare of the club’s players sometimes conflicted with the interests of directors who worked in the drinks trade. It is reasonable to assume that, in keeping with his working-class background, frequenting pubs was one of a footballer’s main leisure activities during this period. All too often for a club’s liking this interfered with football, and in conjunction with any prevailing non-conformist attitudes inside the club, management aimed to stamp down on the players. In 1893, during a poor season for Villa, Fred Rinder claimed that, ‘[d]rink was the curse of the team’, and that players had been drunk when training. He also complained that some members of the committee used ‘filthy, obscene and profane’ language to the players, and that some of them had been seen drinking with the players. By looking through the minutes of Middlesbrough it is clear that drink was a major problem for them and no doubt other clubs. Following the imposition of the maximum wage in 1901, many players had had their wages reduced. Some, like Derby County’s famous inside-forward, Steve Bloomer, resorted to turning up drunk at training on a number of occasions as a submerged form of protest. It was also claimed that Bloomer prepared for important matches with a few pints of beer at a local hostelry.

A number of clubs adopted paternalism as an attempt to gain both control and the loyalty of the players. Many nineteenth century employers used this method to stabilise their workforce, prevent the loss of workers and also as an

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140 Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 80, Birmingham Mail, 17 June 1890
141 Birmingham Mail, 25 February 1893, p. 3
142 Birmingham Mail, 25 February 1893, p. 3
143 Middlesbrough FC Minutes, passim
attempt to secure worker loyalty. In 1879 the brewers, Flowers and Sons, had built a club house for its workers, containing a billiard table, a bagatelle board and a library. Musical evenings were also regularly staged and team sports were introduced. In his capacity as Harrods’ general manager, Richard Burbidge appreciated that good conditions were a pre-requisite for an efficient workforce. He abolished lateness fines, introduced early closing, cost price meals and a provident fund for the lower grades. In 1905 Burbidge opened an athletics club at Barnes. This was paternalism as a two-way process however: benevolence was part of an employer’s duties but it was for the purpose of gaining control over the workforce and to engender a degree of deference and respect amongst them. Breweries, for example, attempted to improve their dealings with their workers through the introduction of numerous bonuses like beer allowances, seaside holidays in the summer and allocating beef to workers at Christmas. Nenadic has argued however, that despite its success as a response to the issue of labour control and workforce loyalty, paternalism is potentially inflexible ‘because it is tied to a social institution whose virtues include reciprocal loyalty and the maintenance of traditions’. As the business environment changed therefore, a paternalist style of management would tend to change at a

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148 Reinarz, ‘Flowers’, see Chapters 5 and 6 on paternalism

During the 1892-93 season, in an attempt to keep an eye on their players, Villa built a club house at their Perry Barr ground that provided amenities such as a billiards table with card and writing rooms plus the availability of non-alcoholic refreshments, although there could be little doubt as to its main purpose. In welcoming the initiative, the \textit{Birmingham Mail} commented that the sooner it was open the better ‘for several of the team require to be under pretty constant supervision’.\footnote{\textit{Birmingham Mail}, 7 November 1892, p. 3} When the club moved to Villa Park more recreational facilities were also provided. A large room under the grandstand was fitted up as a gymnasium and the then current players’ recreation room was connected to another room that was to be utilised as a reading room and library.\footnote{\textit{Aston Villa News and Record}, 8 August 1914, p. 668} When Fred Rinder proposed the redevelopment of Villa Park in 1914, he announced that the players’ dressing rooms were to be moved to the other side of the ground and situated in the corner of the new stand nearest to the offices, gymnasium and recreation rooms. Training was to take place on a piece of land on the other side of the offices, and as a result all the players’ facilities were to be situated in one corner of the ground. Rinder then added, ‘[t]he training quarters and recreation rooms would then be under the easy control and supervision of the trainer [Grierson] without him having to walk to the opposite side of the ground to see how things are going on’.\footnote{\textit{Aston Villa News and Record}, 1 September 1906, p. 3}
In 1892 Sunderland shipbuilders opened a Workmen’s Rest Home that provided a reading room, a library and games facilities. In the same year Sunderland Football Club purchased a house adjoining the club that was then fitted up as a billiard room. The club aimed to give the players somewhere to spend their leisure time whilst hoping (probably optimistically) it would keep them out of trouble. Tottenham Hotspur also opened a social club for the players in 1899. The club provided billiards tables and card tables plus facilities for reading and writing. There the players were under the control of a club steward, Troop-Sergeant-Major Sinton, who had served twenty-one years in the 1st Royal Dragoons and who in his own person embodied the notion of the military model of management.

Other forms of paternalism included financial compensation. For example, Preston North End’s first Scottish import, J. Belger, broke his leg in November 1884 and was forced to retire from football. At the club’s AGM in January 1886, a sum of £50 was voted to be paid to him as a final settlement; previous to that he had been receiving £2 per week from the club since his injury. Belger had already received a cheque for £200 on leaving hospital in January 1885 which had been donated by the club’s followers. This was probably common among football clubs as Aston Villa had dispensed gratuities to injured players as far back as 1879-80.
By 1914 football's industrial relations were moving away from a paternalistic model to one drawn on capital and labour lines that reflected the unrest throughout industry as a whole. In March 1902, for example, Stockport County's players had bypassed the club's committee and picked the team themselves, after their wages had not been paid for over a week. During the 1890s footballing competition had intensified. In 1896 Manchester City prohibited its players from working at any other job other than football, in order to increase their fitness levels. Players also became more militant regarding their working conditions. An early players' union, the Association Footballers' Union, had been established in 1897 with John Cameron as secretary, something that he continued when manager at Tottenham Hotspur. It enjoyed the support of the Athletic News but was wound up in 1901. The union was revived in 1907-08 and by 1909 the players threatened to go on strike if their demands for the repeal of the retain and transfer system and the maximum wage were not met. As a result, more time needed to be devoted to the welfare of the players. In addition, directors were increasingly unwilling to deal with working-class players. It demanded therefore, a different approach to management and an increasing number of clubs used their secretaries or employed secretary-managers to handle the players.

With football's growing competitiveness, what methods did clubs use to improve the team's performance? As we have seen, early trainers were employed to keep an eye on the players to make sure they stayed out of mischief. In addition to their supervisory role, trainers also prepared the players for games, and could have

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160 Williams, Code War, p. 159
161 Harding, Football Wizard, p. 40
an impact on the team’s results. Villa recruited Joe Grierson, for example, as their trainer in 1893 when he was lured from Middlesbrough Ironopolis.\textsuperscript{163} Grierson was noted for specialist goalkeeping and weight-training routines.\textsuperscript{164} The preparation and training of sportsmen for events was not new. In the late eighteenth century, for example, the pugilist, Tom Cribb, used the pedestrian champion, Captain Robert Barclay-Allardice as his trainer for some fights.\textsuperscript{165} During the 1880s Preston North End hired Jack Concannon, a well-known distance runner from Widnes. He put the players through a physical preparation similar to that of professional boxers, runners and oarsmen.\textsuperscript{166} Preston also employed a shoemaker who once travelled with the team to Scotland for a game against Renton to adapt the players’ boots according to the state of the pitch.\textsuperscript{167} Tottenham’s trainer under John Cameron was Sam Mountford who had also been a professional athlete, winning Sheffield sprint handicaps. The training that the Tottenham players underwent was fairly representative of the period. During the season it was thought that walking and some practice at kicking with the occasional sprint was enough to maintain a player’s fitness.\textsuperscript{168} For important games teams retreated to hotels for a week to prepare

\textsuperscript{162} Harding, \textit{Good of the Game}, pp. 5-32. Harding’s book provides a history of the player’s union. See also Mason, \textit{Association Football}, Chapter 4
\textsuperscript{163} He left in 1915 and during that period Villa won the League six times and the FA Cup on four occasions.
\textsuperscript{164} Information supplied by Don Bilton
\textsuperscript{165} National Portrait Gallery, British Sporting Heroes Exhibition, 16 October 1998 to 24 January 1999.
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Preston Herald}, 4 January 1888, p. 3; Gibson and Pickford \textit{Association Football}, Vol. 2, p. 160
\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Football Field}, 22 January 1887, p. 2
\textsuperscript{168} J. Cameron, \textit{Association Football and How to Play it} (1909), p. 33
themselves where they were under the supervision of the trainer and secretary.\textsuperscript{169}

The first team to do this was probably Blackburn Olympic who undertook a pre-match preparation before their 1883 Cup Final victory.\textsuperscript{170}

When Preston won the cup in 1889, their preparation and training included ball practice, combined with some walking and running exercises, although it ceased on the Thursday before the game. In an attempt to engender team spirit the players drove twelve miles in an open wagonette to Lytham on the Friday before the semi-final where they had tea at 'The Ship'.\textsuperscript{171} Travelling to other games however, was usually a rushed affair with teams getting to the ground just before kick-off and then leaving soon after the game finished in order to catch the last train. On the saloon before Preston's final league game in 1888-89 at Aston Villa, the players chatted and smoked around a card table. After the train passed Wolverhampton they then changed into their kit. Following a four hour journey, they were then driven in an open conveyance to the ground, arriving just in time for the 3.15 p.m. start. The following week at Grimsby the train journey began at 8 a.m. To make sure the players got to the station on time cabs were sent round to their homes. Grimsby was

\textsuperscript{169} During Preston's run to the FA Cup Final in 1887-88 it used the Palace Hotel in Birkdale Park, Southport as its training headquarters. \textit{Preston Herald}, 4 January 1888, p. 3

\textsuperscript{170} This consisted of spending a week at a health hydro a week before the Final where they then followed a set-routine. At 6 am they drank a glass of port wine plus two raw eggs followed by a walk along the sands. Next, there was breakfast that consisted of porridge and haddock. Lunch was made up of two legs of mutton, one for each end of the table. At tea-time there was more porridge plus a pint of milk each. Their final meal at supper consisted of half-a-dozen oysters. The Final itself went to extra-time, and, it is claimed, it was Olympic's superior fitness over their rivals, the former public school boys, Old Etonians, which was the telling factor. The club was patronised by Sydney Yates of W. and J. Yates, a firm of iron founders. \textit{Kicking and Screaming}, BBC Television (1995); Mason, \textit{Association Football}, p. 33

\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Football Field}, 23 March 1889, p. 5; 30 March 1889, p. 3
reached at 2 p.m. leaving enough time to eat a bowl of soup and to change. After the game there was only 30 minutes to catch the 5.30 p.m. train home.\textsuperscript{172}

Around the turn of the century, books on the training and conditioning of footballers began to be published that reflected a growing awareness of the need for a more scientific approach to the training and coaching of sportsmen and women in general.\textsuperscript{173} In 1901, for example, \textit{The Training of the Body}, written by F.A. Schmidt and Eustace H. Miles, attempted to analyse the mechanical movements in humans in activities as diverse as bowling and climbing. Another pioneer in this field was Sam Mussabini, one of the first British athletics’ coaches. He also coached cyclists and in 1913 his first book on athletics, \textit{The Complete Trainer}, was published. Later, Mussabini used a cine-camera to study the techniques of runners and used cinematography to aid his lectures.\textsuperscript{174} An early lecturer on football had been Robert Campbell, Tom Watson’s successor at Sunderland. Campbell made many speeches in support of the game and also wrote a short series of pamphlets on various aspects of football such as \textit{Football: Physical, Social and Moral Aspects}, published in 1897.\textsuperscript{175}

One consequence of these new ideas was that more consideration was given to the player’s physical well-being. Billy Meredith actually took this upon himself. He followed a strict match-day diet of a glass of port before and a boiled chicken

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Ibid.}, 16 February 1889, p. 2; 23 February 1889, p. 2

\textsuperscript{173} For example, J. Goodall, \textit{Association Football} (1898)

\textsuperscript{174} D. Terry, ‘An Athletic Coach Ahead of his Time’, \textit{British Society of Sports History Newsletter}, 11 (Spring 2000), pp. 34-38. Mussabini coached the winners of the men’s 100m at both the 1908 and 1924 Olympic Games, Reggie Walker of South Africa and Britain’s Harold Abrahams. He also coached the early female athlete Vera Searle. Mussabini was a leading figure in the sport of billiards as both a journalist and referee. He died on 25 March 1927. \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{175} I am grateful to Neal Garnham for providing me with this information. Campbell was the brother of Sunderland’s centre-forward, John, and had worked at the J.L. Thompson shipyard. Appleton, \textit{Hotbed of Soccer}, p. 182; Graham, \textit{Sunderland}, p. 17
after the game and this helped to prolong a career that lasted over 30 years. Meredith also took advantage of the revolutionary heat treatment of sporting injuries offered at the Matlock House Hydro near the Manchester City ground in Hyde. A book written by John Cameron put forward theories about the training and preparation of players and it also indicated how clubs had become concerned with the effect of vices on the well-being of their players. Robert Campbell, for example, advocated that players should be tee-tottlers and Cameron advised players not to consume excessive quantities of alcohol, probably with little effect. Smoking was 'a matter which is left to the men’s common sense'. Cameron also regarded diet as important. He recommended that ‘a substantial meal should be taken at least two hours before a match’. This was to include a well-cooked beef steak, stale bread and vegetables with no potatoes. It was argued that this would enable the players to ‘play right through the game without ... feeling fatigued’. Players also had to be kept together, have regular hours for meals and go to bed early. Clubs have always wanted players to get an early night, although attitudes towards diet have changed markedly, particularly in the last ten years.

Some early coaching of players had been undertaken by team captains such as Archie Hunter at Aston Villa and Jimmy Ross at Liverpool. The main role of the

176 Harding, Football Wizard, p. 52-53. The Hydro’s proprietor was a club director, John Allison. ibid.
177 R. Campbell, Football: Physical, Social and Moral Aspects (1897); Hughes, ‘The “Spurs” in Mufti’, p. 178. Cameron claimed that plenty of internationals, including Vivian Woodward, were total abstainers. Cameron, Association Football, pp. 34-35
178 ibid., p. 35; Catton Folders, B-C, p. 218
179 Cameron, Association Football, p. 34
180 ibid., p. 40
181 Catton, Leaguers, p. 21, 83. Jimmy Ross had originally played for Preston North End and was the brother of Nick.
captain however, was that of leadership and to make tactical changes on the pitch. At Everton, Nick Ross was in disagreement with the committee over his role as captain. He felt that as captain and a professional that he should pick the team and their positions on the field but instead the Everton committee undertook these tasks.\textsuperscript{182} Despite the emergence of new ideas on the coaching of players, any improvements generally took place on an \textit{ad hoc} basis. In 1908 one newspaper columnist bemoaned the repetition of players’ mistakes, and was convinced that ‘the first club who can secure the right man to give the team lectures with a blackboard on points of play and then take them on to the field to practice one point after another, will speedily rise to the top of the tree’\textsuperscript{183} Preston North End however, had already done this. Nick Ross, along with Sudell, has been credited with introducing the blackboard into the dressing room, and of being a clever tactician.\textsuperscript{184} Furthermore, a Doctor Gledhill used chessmen set out on a billiard table to illustrate tactical plans.\textsuperscript{185} On another occasion, Sudell hired a bus and four horses and, along with other members of the committee, drove the team to Blackburn to watch them play Everton. The reason for this, it was reported, was to enable the North End players to identify the finer aspects of each teams’ play which would serve them well when they met them later.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{182}Liverpool Review, 16 March 1889, p. 18
\textsuperscript{183}Birmingham Sporting Mail, 5 December 1908, p. 1. The columnist was Charles Johnstone of Aston Villa.
\textsuperscript{184}Athletic News, 4 September 1911, p. 4, ‘Obituary’; Berry and Allman, \textit{One Hundred Years}, p. 20; Inglis, \textit{League Football}, p. 28
\textsuperscript{185}Catton, \textit{Wickets}, p. 144. In Catton’s \textit{The Real Football}, p. 152, he claims that it was Sudell who used both diagrams on a blackboard and chessmen on a billiard table to illustrate tactics.
\textsuperscript{186}Football Field, 25 January 1890, p. 3
Sudell’s advocacy of scientific football was supported by Preston’s style. The team cultivated a short passing game partly as a consequence of employing Scottish players. It had been Queen’s Park of Glasgow during the 1870s who had introduced passing and the combination of forwards using the full width of the pitch. Their formation had consisted of two backs, two half-backs and six forwards although by 1884 English teams had learnt to counter it. Preston was the first team to consistently play with three half-backs and only five forwards; the extra half-back had previously been a centre forward. It became known as the attacking centre-half formation and lasted until 1925 when the offside law was changed. The new formation allowed greater balance between defence and attack. It was also characterised by a marking system in which the wing-halves marked the wingers and the full-backs blocked the middle. The centre-half was then allowed to ‘rove’. The five forward players would try to advance in a line and make the best use of the space in front of them and between the defenders. Importantly, through its passing, this formation brought a greater cohesion and emphasis on teamwork.

Preston’s style contrasted with the majority of their opponents. In a game against Bolton in 1885, North End was ‘machine like ... in working the ball along the ground’, whereas their opponents did ‘their work in rushes’. Before their 1888 cup tie, Aston Villa was advised to harry and bustle North End to prevent them

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189 Mason, *Association Football*, p. 209
dominating the game through their measured passing. It did not work. Preston’s final goal in their 3-1 victory was described as their best; ‘they passed the ball through the Aston Villa ranks with the utmost cleverness and appeared to be as fresh almost as at the beginning’.190 The 1889 FA Cup Final brought a comparison between the two sets of forwards: ‘[w]hile the Wolverhampton men went in for hard - very hard - and determined play, North End plodded away with a distinct system’. John Goodall as the centre-forward was the epitome of the team’s play. The stress he placed on ball control earned him a reputation as the pioneer of scientific play.191 It was claimed that the early style of Aston Villa was based around the short, forward oblique pass in which the whole forward line, backed up by its half-backs would participate. This was varied by using alternate wing attacks who would centre the ball with, it was planned, three forwards coming in to meet it.192 Players were also developing their own tactical plans at other clubs. At the turn of the century, full backs began to play an ‘offside game’, probably invented by Morley and Montgomery of Notts. County, and perfected by Newcastle United’s Billy McCracken.193

Football was still a very vigorous game at this time. Heavy shoulder charges were very much part of the play and goalkeepers, unlike today, received no protection.194 On occasions, teams were prepared to use underhand tactics to stop Preston North End playing, although the Preston players were not averse to retaliation. In one game, Everton was accused of ‘inaugurat[ing] a series of

190 Preston Herald, 7 January 1888, p. 2; 11 January 1888, p. 3
191 Williams, Code War, p. 106
192 Birmingham Sporting Mail, 12 September 1908, p. 1
193 Joy, Soccer Tactics, p. 48
194 Mason, Association Football, p. 209
malpractices from the start of the game'. This met with retaliation from the Preston players, bringing the comment that 'such disgraceful exhibitions ... tends to lower the respectability of the game and disgust the better class of onlookers'.\textsuperscript{195} During a third round FA Cup in October 1886 at Hampden Park match a foul by a Preston player, Jimmy Ross, against a Queen's Park player, Harrower, so incensed the Scottish fans that they invaded the pitch to attack Ross, ironically, a fellow Scot.\textsuperscript{196}

Football's popularity had coincided with, and was reinforced by, the expansion of the newspaper industry during the late nineteenth century. Mason has stated that, 'there is an important symbiotic relationship between the expansion of the game [football], both amateur and professional, and both the growth of a specialised press and the spread of football coverage in the general newspapers'.\textsuperscript{197} The press became part of the sporting sub-culture and through reporting on matches it gave football a cultural legitimacy. Following the success of the Bolton-based Football Field, football specials became common in towns with a professional football club after 1884. Sports coverage as a whole became more widespread in the national and, especially, the Sunday papers during the 1890s. It was during this decade that the Northcliffe Revolution took place. Newspapers began to be run more like businesses. As much advertising as possible was sought and this became linked to the size and nature of the readership. By the turn of the century no paper aiming

\textsuperscript{195}Football Field, 3 December 1887
\textsuperscript{196}This incident was to have consequences for Scottish identity and also Scottish nationalism. On 10 May 1887 the Scottish FA announced that Scottish clubs could not be members of any other FA's and this forced them to withdraw from the FA Cup. This speeded up the development of Scottish and English football on national lines, not British ones. In the process, it helped to reinforce Scottish consciousness. G. Jarvie and I.A. Reid, 'Sport, Nationalism and Culture in Scotland', The Sports Historian, Vol. 19, 1 (May 1999), pp. 113-14
\textsuperscript{197}Mason, Association Football, p. 187
for a popular readership could neglect sport.\textsuperscript{198} It was the manager who became the link between the press and the football club, and thus the fount of stories. Yet it was a two way process as information was sometimes passed on to promote the club. It was important that the club kept its local audience informed of any on-going news such as the transfer of players or ticket arrangements for important games.

Publicity therefore, was important for football clubs. Tom Watson had recognised its value from early on, and that the best way to convey it was through the press. At the 1887 AGM of Newcastle West End, one member, J.A. Mather, took exception to reporters being present and moved that they leave. Watson strongly objected. He insisted that the club was a public body and that instead, the press should be made welcome and be able to publish and criticise the club's proceedings.\textsuperscript{199} When he was involved with Rosehill it was announced in 1885 that, as a publicity stunt, the club intended to engage a Highlander in costume to play the team on to the ground.\textsuperscript{200} On other occasions, because the club did not have enough money to pay a printer's bill, Watson, under the cover of darkness, advertised a forthcoming game by painting details on a wall.\textsuperscript{201} Later, in September 1887 Newcastle West End was accompanied by the columnist, 'Captain' on its trip to Edinburgh. His favourable report undoubtedly reflected the club's wishes as it embarked on a more professional approach.\textsuperscript{202}

\textsuperscript{198} T. Mason, 'All the Winners and the Half Times ... or England lose by one goal and 326 runs', in \textit{Warwick Centre of the Study of Sport in Society Working Papers}, Vol. 3 (1994), pp. 75-87
\textsuperscript{199} \textit{Newcastle Daily Chronicle}, 6 June 1887, p. 7
\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Newcastle Daily Journal}, 2 October 1885, p. 4
\textsuperscript{201} Catton Folders, W
\textsuperscript{202} \textit{Newcastle Daily Chronicle}, 13 September 1887, p. 7
Watson enjoyed a long and fruitful relationship with reporters and he used it to cultivate his own reputation.

No secretary contrived to be mentioned in print so often as Tom Watson of Liverpool. He loved to see his name in good type. It was a little weakness of his - and quite pardonable, for most people have their spice of vanity, although they take pains to conceal it.203

When he left Sunderland the local reporters presented him with an inscribed, carbuncle gold pin and a silver match box.204 Watson’s particular relationship with the press has to be placed against the nature of football reporting of the period. The *Athletic News*, for example, was a strong supporter of professional football and exhibited a preference for northern teams. This is not surprising since it was published in Manchester, and John James Bentley was, between 1893 and 1900, its editor as well as the President of the Football League from 1894 to 1910.205 Bentley’s successor, James Catton, corresponded with Watson and other managers. This would usually entail a request by him for details of their careers which he could then use for an article.206

At this early stage football clubs were usually reported in terms of their directors. Newspapers would announce that the directors had selected the team for Saturday for example. Yet some managers, such as Sudell, were already associated with their team. When Preston North End won the FA Cup in 1889, it was reported...

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203 *All Sports Weekly*, 11 October 1924, p. 5
204 *Newcastle Evening Chronicle*, 19 August 1896, p. 3
205 Mason, *Association Football*, p. 191; Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, p. 370. He was also a committee member of the Football League Management Committee between 1888-93 and again from 1910-12. *ibid.*
206 Catton Folders, W
as Sudell's 'great victory'. Sudell was also recognised as the club's dominant figure, and before the following season, the *Athletic News* predicted that 'Mr Sudell will keep the team up to its present high standards'. It seems that Tom Watson had also established an early reputation with the press. In 1892 it was reported that a prominent FA Councillor J.C. Clegg had asked Watson who he was. The reporter commented, '[f]ancy the great Tom Watson of Sunderland not being known'. Liverpool were also referred to as 'Tom Watson's men', and this image was also transmitted to the public. When the club won the League in 1901 the rejoicing crowds at Lime Street station in Liverpool attempted to shoulder him. Furthermore, Watson was immortalised in a painting by Thomas Hemy, in a scene of a match between Sunderland and Aston Villa in January 1895.

Even if directors and committees ran clubs, it was still believed by some that a manager could make a difference to the team. When Aston Villa had problems with its committee in 1893 it was argued that the club lacked someone like Major Sudell or Mr Tom Watson who could improve its fortunes. At Burnley's AGM in 1894 it was remarked that some of the players were guilty of disobedience and misconduct and that it required a manager to look after the team. It was then claimed that,

> Mr Sudell ... was in the main responsible for the decision of the meeting. The argument was that while Mr Sudell was the manager, the North End were the

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207 *Athletic News*, 1 April 1889, p. 5  
208 *Athletic News*, 1 September 1889, p. 5  
209 *Liverpool Football Echo*, 24 January 1891, p. 3  
210 *Birmingham Sporting Mail*, 24 March 1906, p. 1; *Liverpool Daily Post*, 30 April 1901, p. 6. The crowd's attempt was unsuccessful due to size of his girth and his weight.  
211 *The Times*, 16 October 1999, p. 37. Legend has it that after seeing the original, Watson was disappointed at not being depicted and Hemy then painted him on the line as the linesman. Information supplied by Eric Doig.
champions. Therefore, if Burnley have a manager, Burnley will become the
champions. 213

In the majority of clubs though, directors and committees were unwilling to loosen
the reins of power. However, the growth in newspaper readership also correlated
with a rise in scapegoating, as fans wanted someone to blame when their team was
not doing so well. Wagg has argued that club directors began to look for another
figure to represent the public face of the club so that they instead, became the focus
of the fans’ ire. 214 This was to help to project a public perception of the manager as
a powerful figure within the club despite the fact that the main source of power was
still located in the boardroom.

What kind of lifestyle did the early football manager cultivate? First, how
much were they paid and to what and to whom can this compared? It has been
calculated that the mean average income of the male population in 1913-14,
expressed as a percentage, was 116. 215 For a manager this rose to 247, for clerks it
was 122 while for foremen it was 152. It was also calculated that of 574,000
managerial figures in 1913-14, nearly half earned over £200 per year. At the top end
of the scale, 4140 (0.7 per cent) business managers earned on average £4321. William
Sudell’s annual salary in 1881 as a cotton mill manager was £500. 216 This placed him
within the middle incomes bracket of the upper and middle classes who accounted

212 Birmingham Daily Mail, 30 January 1893, p. 4
213 Athletic News, 13 August 1894, p. 1; Lancashire Daily Post, 28 May 1894, p. 4; 11 August
1894, p. 3. Bradshaw was the late honorary secretary and was also the previous year’s chairman of the
committee. Burnley’s guarantors had originally wanted a Mr O. Pickles to take the job. He was the
groundsman. Lancashire Daily Post, 16 June 1894, p. 2
214 Wagg, ‘Organising Victory’, p. 22
215 Savage and Miles, Working Class, Table 2.3, p. 26. The figure 100 is used to represent the
average mean income for the entire population.
216 £26,865 at 2000 prices.
for 1.4 per cent of the occupied population.\textsuperscript{217} He enjoyed a ‘comfortable’ middle-class lifestyle, as well as belonging to the ‘servant-keeping class’: in 1881 he also employed a live-in female, domestic servant.\textsuperscript{218}

Throughout this period, the growing importance of football managers was reflected by an increase in their salaries. Tom Watson originally earned 35s. a week (£89 per year) at Sunderland, later rising to £150.\textsuperscript{219} He also took over a tobacconist’s shop in the town and it was in this shop’s office that football business was conducted.\textsuperscript{220} On moving to Liverpool, Watson lived in terraced houses.\textsuperscript{221} His annual salary was £300 which at the time was considered the most anyone in football had ever earned, and this figure had probably increased by the time he died in 1915.\textsuperscript{222} At 2000 prices £300 in 1896 converts to £20,310, equivalent to the salary of someone in the lower professional class such as teaching or academia. The effects of his probate amounted to £966 15s. 7d.\textsuperscript{223} He may also have taken his holidays abroad, although this might have included club tours.\textsuperscript{224} George Ramsey was also earning £300 by 1900 but by 1914 this may have increased to over £500. Ramsey’s


\textsuperscript{218} Perkin, Professional Society, p. 78; Census 1881. He lived at 3 St. George’s Terrace, Preston with his wife, Ellen, and four children. They later had another five so it is not surprising that they employed a servant.

\textsuperscript{219} Sunderland Daily Echo, 4 June 1889, p. 3. The club’s financial secretary was awarded a salary of £20 per annum, probably in the form of an honorarium. \textit{ibid.}; Sunderland Weekly News, 2 October 1931, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{220} Sunderland Echo, 7 May 1915, p. 2, ‘Obituary’

\textsuperscript{221} He occupied a terraced house at 106 St. Domingo Vale, and later 246 Anfield Road and house in Priory Road which were all close to the Anfield ground and John Houlding’s establishment, the Sandon Hotel. I am grateful to Eric Doig for supplying me with this information, and for showing me Watson’s home.

\textsuperscript{222} Liverpool Review, 1 August 1896, p. 6; Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 5 September 1896, (Football Edition), p. 3

\textsuperscript{223} In 2000 this converted to nearly £45,000.
assistant may also have earned a £150 annual salary.\textsuperscript{225} When John J Bentley became secretary of Manchester United in 1912 his salary was £300.\textsuperscript{226} These managers however, were at the top end of the scale and were employed by the bigger and more successful clubs. Lower down the scale, John Robson of Middlesbrough, earned a salary of £156 that was more in keeping with the status of a clerk.\textsuperscript{227} In 1895 Frank Watt was offered the position of secretary at Newcastle United with an annual salary of £140 plus a house owned by the club chairman, James Telford, that was rented to the club. Watson had earlier turned the position down because he earned more at Sunderland.\textsuperscript{228} Willie Maley’s salary in 1897 was £150, although he also received £40 as an honorarium for past services rendered.\textsuperscript{229}

How did a manager’s salary compare to other occupations as well as managers in other businesses? Male teachers, for example, in England and Scotland initially earned comparable salaries with salaried football officials but their incomes only increased gradually over a similar period. In 1880 the mean annual salary for a certificated teacher in England was £121 and in Scotland £138. By 1914 these figures had increased to £147 and £163 respectively.\textsuperscript{230} During the Victorian and Edwardian periods, the salaries of public figures reflected their status. For example, in 1913 the

\textsuperscript{224}Liverpool Echo, 6 May 1915, p. 5, 'Obituary'
\textsuperscript{225} See Appendix 5. On the balance sheet it states: Secretary’s and Assistant Secretary’s salaries - £615 15s. 8d. £500 in 1914 equates to £28,087 at 2000 prices.
\textsuperscript{226} Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 74. £17,536 at 2000 prices.
\textsuperscript{227} Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 3 May 1900. This figure converts to £9677.
\textsuperscript{229} Campbell and Woods, Glory, p. 53
Chancellor of the Exchequer’s salary was £5000.231 Earlier, in 1859-60, the Town Clerk of Manchester, Sir Joseph Heron, had been at the centre of a debate over whether to pay him an annual salary of £1500 or £2000.232

Managerial salaries in industry were dependent on factors such as locality, the type of industry and the job itself. The Stratford-upon-Avon brewery, Flowers and Sons, paid their clerks on average £10-£15 per month during the 1880s. Other salaried staff included department heads who earned £25 per month whilst the annual salary of a head brewer was between £300-£600. The wages of a malt house foreman were between 21s to 26s per week whilst the foreman of the brewery’s cooperage earned £4 per week.233 In the early years of the Birmingham motor car industry, FW Lanchester was appointed general manager of Lanchester Engine Company in 1899. He was awarded a salary of £350 per annum that rose to £450 after two years.234 A works manager was appointed in 1901 but interestingly it proved impossible to get a properly qualified man because the salary offered, £150 a year, was too low.235

It seems that, in terms of income, football managers had become part of the lower middle-class despite the lack of mobility from the working-classes to the middle-classes before 1914. It has been estimated that the odds against someone from a working-class home becoming a member of the middle class were ‘monumental’.

230 H. Corr, ‘Dominies and Domination: Schoolteachers, Masculinity and Women in Nineteenth Century Scotland’, History Workshop Journal, No. 40 (Autumn 1995), Table One, p. 155. The current conversion rates for these are for 1881, £6390 and £7288; for 1914, £8257 and £9066.
232 A. Briggs, Victorian Cities (1963), p. 207. £1000 in 1859 is the equivalent today of £50,301.
233 Reinarz, ‘Flowers’, pp. 219-21
234 Lanchester had though also invested some his own savings into the company.
For a skilled worker's son it was 200 to 1 against and for an unskilled worker's son this increased to 2000 to 1.236 The idea of class however, is not merely defined by economic indicators such as income, nor by occupation or education. Instead, as E.P. Thompson has argued, class needs to be seen as a social and cultural formation, that it is defined by men and women as they live their own history.237 Melling argues that foremen were able to differentiate themselves from the ordinary worker through social aspirations and styles of life. This might also be reflected in a superior education and status. Foremen identified themselves more with the lower middle-class than with artisans or workers, and they were often owners of small properties and frugal savers. Some also became freemasons.238 Football managers probably held similar aspirations. It was claimed, with more than a hint of irony, that, ‘[s]ome secretaries sport big watch-chains, glittering rings and cigars the size of a policemen’s truncheon’.239

Managers' aspirations were also reflected in the local societies and institutions that they joined. Freemasonry, for example, was an important part of a unitary civic culture (see Chapter 2). A number of football directors, like Fred Rinder, had joined its fraternity, and it is probable that with their assistance a number of managers were invited to join.240 Tom Watson, for example, was a freemason who was probably introduced to the ‘brotherhood’ by the Liverpool

236 Savage and Miles, *Working Class*, p. 34
237 Thompson, *English Working Class*, pp. 10-11
238 Melling, ‘‘Non-Commissioned Officer’’, p. 191
239 *All Sports Weekly*, 11 October 1924, p. 5
240 *Aston Villa News and Record*, 31 December 1938, p. 222
director, John McKenna. McKenna, himself, was probably invited to join a lodge himself by John Houlding, another freemason. The founder of Sunderland, James Allen, had also been an active freemason. During the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries there were regular reports of freemason meetings and who attended them. Football’s link with freemasonry had begun as far back as the formation of the FA which used to hold its early meetings at the Freemason’s Tavern in London. It continues to the present as the President of the Football Association, the Duke of Kent, is also the Grand Master of all freemasons.

Watson also attended church regularly and was a keen bowler. He had been chairman of the Liverpool Parks and Garden League, and a former President of Liverpool and District Bowling Association. For his long service as a manager he was awarded the Football League’s Long Service Medal in 1910 for twenty-one years in football management. Ernest Mangnall was also awarded one in 1921. Furthermore, Watson’s funeral was an occasion not just for the local community but for football as well. As a manager, Watson had become part of the football establishment. The Football League, local FA’s and the major clubs were represented, as were members of the press. The number of wreaths numbered over

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241 *Liverpool Courier*, 11 May 1915. At Watson’s funeral it was reported that there was a large attendance of masons. *Liverpool Daily Post*, 23 March 1936, p. 5, ‘Obituary’. McKenna was a ‘well-known freemason, being past master of several lodges and gaining high honours in the craft’. *ibid.*

242 *Day*, ‘Football Club Directors’, p. 55

243 *Sunderland Daily Echo*, 18 October 1911, p. 8, ‘Obituary’

244 *The Times*, 27 October 1863, p. 3f, 2 September 1882, p. 10d, 29 August 1883, p. 8


246 *Liverpool Echo*, 7 May 1915, p. 4; *Liverpool Evening Express*, 6 May 1915, p. 5, ‘Obituary’

247 *Liverpool Evening Express*, 6 May 1915, p. 5, ‘Obituary’

248 Information supplied by Eric Doig, 10 June 1999

249 Turner and White, *Football Managers*, p. 186
one hundred (and this at a time of war). Seven former Liverpool players including Alex Raisbeck, Ted Doig, and the club trainer William Connell, acted as pall bearers. 250

With its growing profile and the game’s peculiar business that demanded weekly results, football management developed pressures all of its own. And these manifested themselves in various ways almost from the start. For William Sudell it ended with him being sent to prison for three years in April 1895. He had been found guilty of embezzling money from his mill and falsifying the accounts over a four year period from 1889 to 1893. Both the prosecution and defence agreed that Sudell did not gain personally from his felony. Instead, he diverted the money into the coffers of the club and used it for entertaining football officials and visiting teams. 251 The management of Preston had started to overwhelm him. Football’s increasing competition meant that he was forced to find other sources of income if Preston was to maintain its standing.

The nature of the business could also fray the nerves. During the 1889 FA Cup semi-final against West Bromwich Albion, it was reported that Sudell and the club trainer, Tom Livesey, ‘kicked about like a pair of restive ponies’ due to the pressure from Albion. 252 On another occasion Preston were losing 2-0 to Notts. County and Sudell encouraged or perhaps berated the players from the touchline. 253 Similarly, Tom Watson was also nervous about the result of any match, and ‘for a

250 *Liverpool Courier*, 11 May 1915. When Doig died four years later he was buried 20 feet away in Anfield Cemetery, General section 4, plot 1477. Both graves are unmarked by a stone. Information supplied by Eric Doig
251 *Preston Herald*, 13 April 1895, p. 6; *Preston Guardian*, 13 April 1895, p. 2; Public Record Office HO140/161, A58929. See Appendix 10
252 *Athletic News*, 18 March 1889, p. 4
long period could not bear to look at a game in which his team was engaged until assured that a good lead had been obtained. He was highly strung and it was common for him to leave the ground or walk around the grandstand because he could not stand the strain. This stress, combined with a weight that was between 18 and 20 stones, perhaps resulted in pleurisy which caused his death. By contrast, John Cameron took a more relaxed attitude, and was still imbued with the amateur spirit. Before the 1901 Cup Final, he was the last of the Spurs team on to the field, walking casually with his hands in his pockets and with an air of indifference about him to the biggest game of the year.

By 1914 the role of a football managerial figure, in line with similar developments throughout industry as a whole, had gradually gained more importance. The business of football clubs had increased, and directors, with their own businesses to run, were unable to meet the rising demands of managing a club. Furthermore, as competition increased, more clubs realised that a sort of specialist was required to run the club on a day-to-day basis. Clubs had originally sought men with financial and clerical experience but would later turn to players who had had professional experience of the game. Directors however, were still in control, and made all the important decisions, including team selection. Furthermore, managers were hardly specialists but rather a product of British management's practical tradition. The job did not require any formal training nor qualifications, or even much

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253 Catton, Wickets, p. 146. They recovered to win 3-2.
254 Sunderland Echo, 7 May 1915, p. 2, 'Obituary'
255 Athletic News, 10 May 1915, 'Obituary'
256 Catton Folders, W; Liverpool Evening Express, 6 May 1915, p. 5, 'Obituary'
257 Kicking and Screaming, BBC Television (1995)
in the way of basic education. It was not ‘professionalised’ therefore, like some professions had been but managers did begin to try and forge a professional, and as a result a middle-class, identity using the expanding press coverage of football to help achieve it. In 1907, for example, a secretaries’ and managers’ association was established although it was more characteristic of a friendly society, than a professional body and it did not last long. The gradual importance of the manager’s job however, was being recognised not just by the press but also by clubs through the increase in their salaries. Although clubs tried to control players’ wages, a manager’s income remained subject to individual negotiations in a largely free market.

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258 Information supplied by League Managers’ Association
CHAPTER 4

HERBERT CHAPMAN: A MODEL OF FOOTBALL MANAGEMENT, 1907-1934

That Herbert Chapman was the first and probably the greatest, in a line of great football managers is of crucial importance in the development of the game as we know it today.


Men of stature really have their own effect on football by doing something different when something different is needed. The sheep follow, until some other man of stature leads them along a different path his adventurous, probing mind has charted. Such an adventurer was Herbert Chapman who in transforming Arsenal transformed the game of football.

Busby, *Soccer*, p. 135

Herbert Chapman not only put Arsenal on top of the soccer world. He did more for professional football than any man since William McGregor, the founder of the Football League. The C.B. Cochran of football, he swept it from the committee and roped-off enclosure stage to be a leading entertainment industry and he showed that teams run by amateur directors could not match those run by expert managers. He looked beyond the cloth-capped supporters and made big soccer games as fashionable as Wimbledon or a Test Match.


He dreamed while he worked, a dream ever glowing of the glory of Greece in an English game.


Herbert Chapman provides a benchmark in the development of the football manager. He died suddenly and relatively young in 1934 at the age of 55 and it could be argued that this inspired the beatification process that the eulogies above suggest. Yet he was undoubtedly the model on which modern football managers have been shaped in terms of the influence they have held within football clubs and because of Chapman, the perceived importance of the football manager to his club has taken on a new dimension. He enjoyed unprecedented success with his clubs and demonstrated how essential skilled management was to the modern football club. As small organisations, football clubs have left much potential for individuals to influence their management through the strength of their personality. Traditionally, the directors had kept a tight
grip on the reins of power, and this continued through the inter-War period. Chapman as a manager therefore, was exceptional; an example of the impact that human agency can have on the process of social change.¹ His career is also a study in micropolitics but it needs to be located within its wider context.

Chapman had grasped the idea that football should, and could be modernised into something more akin to the entertainment business. Particularly when he was manager at Arsenal during the 1930s, he tried to attract and then cater for a wider audience that was less stratified and more heterogeneous. Chapman later claimed that

[i]the old idea that a club may sit back and wait for the crowds to come should have died long ago. In these days you have to fetch them by making an irresistible appeal and in this respect, at least, we do not differ greatly from other entertainment promoters.²

Throughout Chapman’s career in football, one of the most famous entertainment promoters was C.B. (Charles Blake) Cochran. Cochran was a theatrical entrepreneur and a showman who had an eye for the spectacular. He began by staging boxing and wrestling matches before making his name promoting Harry Houdini. He later staged a rodeo at Wembley’s Empire Exhibition in 1924. Many theatrical productions followed, including a long collaboration with Noel Coward on ‘On With the Dance’. Cochran was not a businessman, but his visual sense and good ear for music provided the basis for his success as an entertainer.³ In other service industries, entrepreneurs were also placing an increasing importance on the dramatic in order to attract customers. An early pioneer in the field of retail, for example, was Gordon H.

¹ P. Burke, History and Social Theory (Oxford, 1992), pp. 38-43
Selfridge. An American, Selfridge had a flair for publicity and in 1906 he moved to London. He had been impressed by London style but neither its department stores nor their marketing and selling techniques. In 1909 Selfridge’s opened on Oxford Street to a great fanfare of publicity and became an example of American retailing methods on this side of the Atlantic. Selfridge himself was a showman who loved display, although he paid careful attention to conditions of work for his staff. He also prided himself on knowing their psychology and that of his customers.4

In addition to his awareness of the need to promote the game, Chapman brought a more systematic approach to football management. The journalist Jimmy Catton claimed that Chapman studied the styles and tactics of his opponents and that many matches were won before a game had begun.5 His emergence was also a reflection of the rise of dynamic managers in other areas of business, and a growing scientific approach to management in general. By the early twentieth century new ideas had emerged such as the scientific management associated with the writing of Frederick Taylor (see Chapter 1). Henri Fayol, a mining engineer from France, also argued that administration was a specialised function, and that the higher the position in a company’s management hierarchy, the more administrative knowledge and skills became important.6 Fayol believed that every manager’s objective was ‘to get the optimum return from all employees of his unit in the interest of the whole concern’. He also argued that to manage was ‘to forecast and plan, to organize, to command, to co-ordinate and to control’. Managing by command, for example, rested on certain

4 *ibid.*, Vol. 5, p. 109-13
5 *All Sports Weekly*, 13 March 1926, p. 6
personal qualities and an awareness of the general principles of management such as having a thorough knowledge of his/her personnel and the setting of a good example. \(^7\)

1 By 1939 however, top British management whether owners or salaried managers, was still dominated by traditional attitudes. There was little evidence of a radical divorce of ownership from control and the business culture of personal capitalism persisted. Manufacturing industry was diffident towards management training not only in comparison to its American counterpart but also the British railway industry. The education and training of managers remained separate activities, and even large companies retained a cosy ‘amateurishness’. \(^8\) Whereas in Japan, Germany and the USA there was a propensity to employ professional managers, in Britain there was still the widely-held belief that ‘managers were born and not made’. \(^9\)

2 One company not part of this overall corporate lag was Imperial Chemical Industries (see Chapter 1). In its early years it was dominated by Harry McGowan who was at the cutting edge of the emergence of professional managers. A Glaswegian by birth, he rose from being a 5s a week office boy at Nobels’ Explosives in 1894 to chairman and managing director of ICI by 1930. He possessed a shrewd judgement of character and excellent bargaining skills that facilitated his rise through the managerial ranks of Nobel Industries. In October 1926 McGowan, along with

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\(^7\) H. Fayol, *General and Industrial Management* (1949), p. 6, 43, 97

\(^8\) Gourvish, ‘British Business’, p. 34

\(^9\) Wilson, *Business History*, p. 177
Alfred Mond, formed Imperial Chemicals Industries Ltd.\textsuperscript{10} He was an expert in commercial matters rather than technical ones but he was strong-minded and full of self-confidence, with a flair for negotiation and finance. McGowan however, was also an autocrat who was ruthless, purposive and resolute; and it was anathema for him to delegate authority to divisional managers.\textsuperscript{11}

Chapman was born on 19 January 1878 in the small Yorkshire mining community of Kiveton Park half-way between Sheffield and Worksop. His father, John, was a miner, possibly illiterate as he was unable to write his own name, who had five other sons and one daughter.\textsuperscript{12} Herbert attended the local colliery school which played football and cricket, and he became captain and secretary of the football team by the age of 12.\textsuperscript{13} He later played for Kiveton as did all his brothers.\textsuperscript{14} One of his brothers, Harry, later played for Sheffield Wednesday winning Football League honours in 1903 and 1904, and an FA Cup winner’s medal in 1907. He was also manager of Hull City between 1913 and 1914.\textsuperscript{15} Of his other brothers, two lived in Grimsby; Thomas was a chief stevedore and Matthew a sanitary inspector. The other two stayed in Kiveton; Jack became a county councillor and a magistrate whilst Ernest was an official at the colliery. His sister married and also stayed in the village.

\textsuperscript{10}This involved an amalgamation of Nobel Industries, Brunner Mond, United Alkali and the British Dyestuffs Corporation.
\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Dictionary of Business Biography}, Vol. 4, pp. 21-27
\textsuperscript{13}Catton Folders B-C, p. 263, 'The New Manager', May 6 1912; 'A Chat with Mr Herbert Chapman', November 11 1908; \textit{Daily Independent} (Sheffield), 8 January 1934, p. 1, 'Obituary'
\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Daily Independent} (Sheffield), 8 January 1934, p. 1, 'Obituary'
\textsuperscript{15}Harry later died from tuberculosis, 29 April 1916. Turner and White, \textit{Football Managers}, p. 105
Along with the rest of his family, Chapman regularly attended the local Methodist Chapel, and he also went to the Methodist Sunday school.\(^{16}\)

On leaving school he initially worked at Kiveton Colliery with his father. When he was 17 he left Kiveton to work for a firm of ticket printers in Ashton-under-Lyne. He earned 10s. a week but his income had to be supplemented by his mother as his weekly rent was 11s. Chapman also played for a local team, Ashton North End, but he soon found another job and played for Stalybridge Celtic which paid him 7s 6d a week. Chapman went on to play for several clubs, although he enjoyed only a moderate career as a footballer. His first club as a professional was Grimsby Town whom he joined in May 1898.\(^ {17}\) He actually signed amateur forms but during the week he worked in a local solicitor’s office for 5_ days and played football on Saturday afternoon with the club paying four-fifths of his salary.\(^ {18}\) He also had spells at Swindon Town, Sheppey United in Kent, Worksop, Northampton Town, Sheffield United, and finally, Tottenham Hotspur when John Cameron was manager. During his playing days he showed an early knack for the spectacular by wearing light yellow boots.\(^ {19}\)

It has been widely reported that Chapman later qualified as a mining engineer but the evidence for this is vague and there is no record of him ever graduating. It maybe that he started a course at University College, Sheffield but never completed it because he moved around so much. He may have later claimed that he qualified in

\(^{16}\) *Daily Independent* (Sheffield), 8 January 1934, p. 1, 'Obituary'. His mother, Emma, died in 1908 and his father became ill shortly afterwards. Chapman cared for him in Northampton when he was manager. *Northampton Daily Reporter and Echo*, 25 August 1908, p. 4

\(^{17}\) Studd, *Herbert Chapman*, p. 24

an attempt to embellish his profile. Whatever his qualifications, Chapman brought a more considered and humane approach to football management that was to be the basis for his later success. In 1905 Chapman married Annie Poxon while he was playing for Spurs. They had met earlier at Kiveton Park where she was a teacher. She had wanted to continue her teaching career in North London at Silver Street school but because of married workers regulation, i.e. the 'marriage bar', this proved difficult. However, she did retain her position. Edmonton Education Committee had initially proposed that her job be advertised but the motion was defeated by a single vote after the headmistress had praised her efficiency and discipline as a teacher.

His first managerial position was with Northampton Town, which he took up in April 1907 at a time when clubs were beginning to employ managers at an increasing rate. The background to his arrival at Northampton Town reflected local as well as national issues within football. The club had been formed in 1897 and was in immediate competition with the town’s older rugby club, the Saints. Northampton Town joined the Southern League in 1901 but struggled to make an impact and after the 1905-06 season had to seek re-election to the League. In 1906 a joint board of guarantors and members of the old committee had been appointed to manage the club due to its parlous financial situation. Northampton was then the only club in the

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19 L. Knighton, *Behind the Scenes in Big Football* (1948), p. 62
20 I am grateful for the research undertaken by Lawrence Aspden, the Curator of Special Collections and Library Archives, University of Sheffield, and Mark Shipway at the Leeds University Archive, in helping me trying to trace Chapman’s mining qualifications.
21 Studd, *Herbert Chapman*, pp. 31-32
22 *Northampton Daily Echo*, 4 May 1912, p. 4
24 *Northampton Daily Reporter and Echo*, 2 May 1906, p. 4
Southern League that relied on gate receipts and three or four patrons for its income. The other clubs relied on shareholders and directors. The guarantors included the officers of the club who controlled the club’s financial affairs while the overall responsibility for the team fell to a selection committee and the club secretary, A. Jones. The club had also engaged a new trainer, Dick Murrell.

Northampton Town however, was really run by A.J. ‘Pat’ Darnell who was one of the club’s guarantors. He was a charismatic figure both on a local and national scale. A prominent Northampton Conservative and a local solicitor, Darnell was appointed the Borough Coroner in 1911, a position that he held for 40 years. He had an interest in all the town’s sporting clubs and was the honorary secretary of Northamptonshire County Cricket Club from 1891 to 1921. He also served on the MCC’s Board of Control. Initially a rugby player, Darnell was elected acting President of Northampton Town when it was formed in 1897 and was responsible for managing the club’s successive re-elections to the Southern League.

Fishwick has argued that only clubs that lacked strong traditions of directors’ involvement or in which a crisis occurred, would experiment with new ideas. Northampton Town fitted these criteria on both accounts. Chapman’s appointment in April 1907, initially as a player-manager, was set against a further deterioration in the club’s financial and football position as it again sought re-election. The

25 *ibid.*, 28 August 1906, p. 3. Studd claims that Northampton Town became a limited liability company in 1901. Studd, *Herbert Chapman*, p. 35
26 *Northampton Daily Reporter and Echo*, 21 August 1906, p. 3; 28 August 1906, p. 3
27 *ibid.*, 28 August 1906, p. 3
28 *Northampton Chronicle and Echo*, 23 March 1955, p. 5, ‘Obituary’
30 *Northampton Independent*, 4 May 1907, p. 10
guarantors demanded more control of the club's management in return for a further sum of money that would allow the club to apply for re-election. Consequently, 'it was made a condition that a Playing-Manager should be secured'. Chapman was their selection 'and it was the intention of the guarantors to give him a free hand' in terms of his management of the team. This meant that the selection committee (which had both selected and dropped Chapman when he was a player at Northampton Town) was dispensed with, although not the services of the old officials. It was evident to the club's guarantors that for the club to advance both on and off the pitch, it had to follow 'the lead of most other clubs' and appoint a manager with a knowledge of professional football as opposed to relying on the amateurs on the committee.

To what extent Chapman had a 'free hand' is not clear. At the end of his first season, it was commented on during the AGM that,

it was impossible to pass without also thanking Herbert Chapman for his selection and dealing with the players. The standard of play and the good fellowship among the men were tributes to his skill in the selection and handling of players.

Chapman later claimed that he had had the responsibility of choosing the team at all the clubs he had managed. It is unlikely however, that Darnell acceded complete control on team matters. For example, when Northampton were looking for a suitable right-winger, it was reported that '[t]hey had no one who could fill that role to the

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31 As the new incumbent would be doing two jobs, the appointment of a player-manager instead of a manager was probably for economic reasons.
32 Northampton Daily Reporter and Echo, 24 August 1907, p. 3
33 ibid.
34 ibid., 14 July 1908, p. 3
35 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p. 7
satisfaction of the committee’. As Chapman was initially a player-manager his status would have been lower than if he had been the manager. Moreover, he had not been first choice for the job. That had been England international, Walter Bull, his team mate at Tottenham, and it was he who actually recommended Chapman for the job when they were players together at Tottenham. The fact that Chapman was promoted in status on two occasions also gives an indication of the level of his subservience. In 1909 he stopped playing and was given the revised title of secretary-manager with a three year extension to his contract. His salary was also increased in 1908 as a reward for the club’s success. Before Chapman left to join Leeds City in 1912, the club had wanted to promote him again to the position of company secretary, at the time considered a more prestigious post than that of manager.

A letter from Darnell to the editor of the Athletic News, Jimmy Catton, is suggestive of Chapman’s position within the club might have been. In 1911 Northampton Town drew at Newcastle United in the FA Cup but decided to forgo home advantage in the replay and switched the game to Newcastle in the expectation of a larger gate. This was Darnell’s decision. He claimed that he consulted the players about the switch, not Chapman, although the players probably had little option but to go along with the suggestion. Darnell also refers to his manager by using his

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37 He continued to play for a local Thursday team. Catton Folders B-C, p. 263, ‘The New Manager’, 6 May 1912
38 Northampton Independent, 19 December 1908, p. 40
39 Northampton Daily Echo, 30 July 1912, p. 3
40 Catton Folders M-O, p. 1238, 9 July 1911
surname only. He admits however, that he did not attend the replay which suggests that Chapman was in charge of the team.

Chapman still operated within a framework where managers were not only subordinate but also socially inferior to their directors. To improve his social and professional standing however, he later became a member of a local freemasons’ lodge. Dominated by the Protestant bourgeoisie, in addition to being elitist, men were only invited to join the craft, further narrowing the social field. His aspirations however, had only begun to be realised when Northampton Town was successful and his social mobility therefore, reflected his growing status within the club. At Northampton Town his appointment had an immediate effect on the team’s fortunes. It finished sixth in his first season and won the Southern League championship in the following season, 1908-09. In the next three seasons Northampton finished in the top four. The club’s finances also improved markedly. Its income for the season prior to Chapman’s arrival was £1855. In his final season it had increased to £5309.

The scope of his responsibilities embraced activities both on and off the field. But it was Chapman’s influence as a manager in developing a tactical plan ‘to organise victory’ that was one of the most notable landmarks in the history of football management. As a player, he could only remember an occasional chat

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41 He was a member of the Kingsley Lodge of Freemasons. *Northampton Mercury and Herald*, 12 January 1934, p. 15, ‘Obituary’. On moving to Sydney to take up a position as the secretary of an estate agency, Don Bradman became a freemason after being invited to join by the captain of his club side, St. George, in the early 1930s. Thus, reflecting both his rising professional and sporting status. C. Williams, *Bradman* (1996), pp. 26-29
42 Catton Foldes B-C, p. 263, ‘The New Manager’, 6 May 1912
43 *ibid.*
44 Chapman, *Herbert Chapman*, p. 13
between two men playing on the wing about tactics. Chapman was to make match preparation the main responsibility of the manager. This probably evolved out of Chapman’s time as both player and manager which would have created opportunities to influence pre-match discussions about how to play. He later extended this by developing more long-term tactical ideas. Tony Say has claimed that his tactical acumen gave something extra to all the clubs he managed. At Northampton Town he sowed the seeds of his future strategies. Chapman believed that a team could attack for too long. He wanted to develop a more organic style of play where the team played together as a unit. At Northampton, for example, the two inside-forwards would drop back in to defence at times to draw out the opposing defenders. This would then create more space behind the opposition’s defence that could be exploited by swift counter-attacks. These counter-attacks were to be built on accurate long-passes and the element of surprise. But just as important as his plan was Chapman’s ability to get it across to the players so that they understood it and believed in it. He achieved this through an ability to convey his arguments in an articulate manner but one in which the soft tones of his Yorkshire accent betrayed a certain steeliness. It also emphasises the importance of human capital and the need for intelligence in the field of management in general.

In addition to his tactical acumen, Chapman was also a good judge of a player. Northampton did not have the financial resources of other Southern League

46 Chapman, *Herbert Chapman*, p. 65
48 Chapman speaks briefly on *Kicking and Screaming*, Part 2, BBC Television.
clubs like Tottenham and Fulham, and this restricted the quality of the players Chapman could buy.\textsuperscript{49} Yet he was able to find the right players to suit the system he had developed. One of them was Edward Lloyd Davies, a Welsh international full back, whom he persuaded Darnell to make the first ever player for which Northampton paid a fee when he moved from Swindon in November 1907. He also discovered Fred Walden, an outside-right, at nearby Wellingborough in 1909 who was later to represent England.\textsuperscript{50}

Chapman also has some claim to being the first ‘track-suit’ manager. It was reported after his death that, ‘[i]n his more active days he dressed for the part and went out to practice with a player whose deficiencies he wanted to remedy’.\textsuperscript{51} One of these players was Walden himself who improved his crossing of the ball through Chapman’s tutoring.\textsuperscript{52} Chapman’s successor at Northampton Town was, ironically, Walter Bull, and he can also claim to be a ‘track suit’ manager. At pre-season training it was reported that the players were practising their ball skills and ‘among them was the new manager, Walter Bull, who donned training kit’. This is not surprising as for the previous 14 months he had been coaching the Gimnasia y Esgrima club in Buenos Aires.\textsuperscript{53}

In terms of his overall man-management of the team, Chapman’s experience as a player had taught him that they should be treated with more consideration and that this could have a beneficial effect on the team. When he played for Grimsby the

\textsuperscript{49}See Table 2.5
\textsuperscript{50}Studd, \textit{Herbert Chapman}, p. 38, 45-46
\textsuperscript{51}\textit{Yorkshire Evening Post}, 6 January 1934, p. 10, ‘Obituary’
\textsuperscript{52}Catton Folders, V-W, p. 1870, ‘Ideas’, 27 February 1914
team had been run by a committee and its relations with the players had become so bad that training sessions had been riddled with indiscipline.\textsuperscript{54} Chapman's background contrasted with the men previously responsible for the Northampton team, the financial secretaries, Benbow and Foyle and the secretary, ‘Dado’ Jones, who had been old officers of the club but with little real experience of professional football.\textsuperscript{55} After Northampton Town won the Southern League in 1909, the impact of Chapman’s contribution was recognised at the club’s AGM, and he was praised ‘for the able way in which he has kept the team together and promoted that good feeling which brought about success’.\textsuperscript{56}

Chapman felt that managers had to share the problems of players to get the best out of them. He later used as an example the relationship between the French boxer Georges Carpentier and his manager Descamps, who had formed an understanding of human nature by psychological methods. Similarly, he felt that footballers and managers had to work together with confidence in each other to achieve the same goal.\textsuperscript{57} Chapman also adopted a paternal approach. For example, players with serious injuries were sent to a specialist in Sheffield and the trainer, Dick Murrell, would rapidly provide treatment for other injuries. Chapman also arranged for the dressing rooms to be improved.\textsuperscript{58} On his departure it was said that, ‘[t]here has been an improvement in the morale as well as the football ability of the

\textsuperscript{53} Northampton Daily Echo, 1 July 1912, p. 4; 7 August 1912, p. 2; Albion News, 29 April 1911, p. 5
\textsuperscript{54} Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 24
\textsuperscript{55} Northampton Daily Reporter and Echo, 24 August 1907, p. 3
\textsuperscript{56} Northampton Daily Echo, 20 July 1909, p. 3
\textsuperscript{57} Chapman, Herbert Chapman, pp. 9-10
\textsuperscript{58} Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 41
players. The relations between manager and players have been of the best and
between the players and public no less'.

As well as his responsibility for the players, Chapman, as secretary-manager
had administrative duties. As Northampton Town was in local competition with the
rugby club it needed to generate more support. Graham Williams has claimed that
‘how to overcome the Rugby game and win away its followers was one of the major
issues confronting the early football clubs’. Chapman never managed a club from a
traditional football area. Both Leeds City and Huddersfield were located in rugby
strongholds and although Arsenal did not face competition from the oval ball game, it
was not regarded as London’s major club when he became its manager. The county of
Northamptonshire as a whole preferred the association code. Yet the town of
Northampton itself favoured rugby. Northampton Town needed success to entice
people from nearby small towns like Rushden, Kettering and Wellingborough who
usually supported their local teams.

Chapman was aware of the value of publicity in stimulating interest in
football and he used newspapers to promote the club. On taking up his position it
was reported that, ‘[h]e wants to do everything possible to maintain interest in the
club’s doings while the 1st XI is out of town’. The reserve team was to be
strengthened and a scoreboard was erected on the ground that gave the results of
other clubs’ matches. The following season Chapman reported a large increase in

59 Northampton Daily Echo, 4 May 1912, p. 4
60 Williams, Code War, p. 4
61 Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 52
62 Ibid., p. 42
63 Northampton Daily Reporter and Echo, 19 August 1907, p. 3
season ticket sales and the grandstand's central accommodation had to be increased.\textsuperscript{64}

He later reached an agreement with Northampton Rugby Club whereby the fixtures of the two clubs did not clash.\textsuperscript{65}

Chapman left Northampton Town in May 1912 to become the secretary-manager of Leeds City, possibly for more money or perhaps because he saw greater potential at Leeds.\textsuperscript{66} It had been reported a month before that Leeds was going to appoint 'the well-known secretary of a Southern League club in the Eastern Midlands'.\textsuperscript{67} Despite this rumour, Chapman later signed a new contract at Northampton, and when he moved Darnell made it a condition that he did not take any Northampton players with him.\textsuperscript{68} He agreed to this but in November 1912 tried to buy Fred Walden. He was thwarted when the Northampton supporters set up a shilling fund that enabled the club to keep him.\textsuperscript{69} However, in an early example of managers bringing their own assistants with them, trainer, Dick Murrell did accompany Chapman to Leeds but only after he made it clear that he wanted to leave Northampton and not just go to Leeds.\textsuperscript{70}

It is a cliché that football managers never go to a club when it is doing well but one that has an element of truth. Consequently, one of Chapman's first tasks was to lobby (successfully) for votes for the re-election of Leeds to the Football

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Northampton Daily Echo}, 1 August 1911, p. 1
\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Athletic News}, 6 May 1912, p. 1
\textsuperscript{67} \textit{ibid.}, 25 March 1912, p. 1
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Athletic News}, 6 May 1912, p. 1; \textit{Northampton Daily Echo}, 30 July 1912, p. 3
\textsuperscript{69} Studd, \textit{Herbert Chapman}, p. 54
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Northampton Daily Echo}, 30 July 1912, p. 3
League after the club had finished bottom of the Second Division. \(^7\) Leeds, also like Northampton, underwent a financial reconstruction soon after Chapman's arrival. In a predominantly rugby area, Leeds City, which had only been formed in 1904, struggled to survive. Chapman's predecessor Frank Scott-Walford left the club due to ill-health apparently caused by the anxieties brought on by the club's poor financial situation. He had earlier written to the directors complaining that he had personally been called upon to meet the club's liabilities. Total losses since 1905 amounted to £11,320 with a deficiency between assets and liabilities of £8365. \(^8\)

Following an EGM in August 1912, Leeds went into voluntary liquidation. A new company was formed which had a nominal capital of £7000. The claims of the club's previous guarantors, Sam and Reginald Kirk, were settled when they received £1000 in cash and £9000 in debentures. Norris Hepworth, the eldest son of the tailor, Joseph Hepworth, replaced them as the club's main benefactor and guarantor. In 1891 Joseph Hepworth & Son became a private company with a capitalisation of £360,000 and Norris as its chairman. \(^9\) Tom Coombes was appointed the club's liquidator, a position he held until August 1915 that emphasised the club's precarious financial situation. \(^10\) The club's underlying weakness was its share issue which only raised £5500, and when the bank pressed for the return of its £7000 overdraft, Norris Hepworth paid up. The financial situation eased following

\(^7\) Chapman, *Herbert Chapman*, p. 2
\(^8\) Arnold, *Game*, p. 61
\(^10\) *Athletic News*, 26 August 1912, p. 6; Arnold, *Game*, p. 61
Chapman’s appointment but it was again threatened by the death of Norris Hepworth in 1914 whose estate was owed £16,000 by the club.\textsuperscript{75}

Initially, Chapman needed to recruit players. An advertisement in the \textit{Athletic News} simply stated, ‘Leeds City FC Ltd; Require First Class Players; All Positions’.\textsuperscript{76} As the paper was virtually a trade journal, advertising for players plus managers and trainers, it was used by every club in England and even some abroad.

By the end of his first season, Chapman had persuaded the financially prudent Leeds directors to part with £3000. This was to pay a dividend, literally, as the club finished sixth and attendances increased to the extent that there was a profit of £400.\textsuperscript{77} In October 1912 however, his team building led to the first in a series of skirmishes that Chapman had with the football authorities. As we have seen in Chapter 2, during this period football had been hit by a number of scandals usually involving illegal payments to players as clubs tried to circumnavigate the restrictions of the maximum wage. During the summer of 1912 Chapman had signed three new players and agreed to pay each of them a full year’s salary of £208 to the end of the following April. The problem was that two months had already elapsed since the end of their previous contracts. This meant that, in effect, the players were receiving more than the maximum wage of £4 per week. Chapman, apparently, realised the illegality of this and persuaded the board to ask the Football League to instigate an enquiry. Chapman was admonished but also praised for his honesty.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{75} Arnold, \textit{Game}, p. 62; \textit{Yorkshire Evening Post}, 20 February 1914, 'Obituary'
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Athletic News}, 20 May 1912, p. 4
\textsuperscript{77} Studd, \textit{Herbert Chapman}, p. 56
\textsuperscript{78} \textit{ibid.}, pp. 56-57;
Chapman introduced two significant innovations to his management style at Leeds. First, in 1913 he began to use a round of golf as part of the training routine to help relax the players.\(^79\) Next, he inaugurated the team talk at Leeds. Chapman had decided that players should give as much thought to football as they did to playing billiards and gambling at cards.\(^80\) Before every home game the Leeds players would assemble on a Saturday morning at a city centre hotel to talk amongst themselves. Chapman presided but he encouraged every player to express his views on the previous week’s game. At Leeds he also had a diagram of the field painted on a table top in his office where he would discuss the game with individual players. He recognised that the majority of northern and Scottish working-class players were shy and reticent about speaking in group situations, and that private interviews were a way of gaining their confidence.\(^81\) In comparison, his predecessor Frank Scott-Walford had been a referee in the Southern League.\(^82\) He was perhaps more autocratic in his dealings with the players compared to Chapman’s more paternalistic manner.

Following the outbreak of war, first-class football was brought to a belated halt in 1915. A wartime regional competition replaced the traditional leagues and in 1916 Leeds City won the northern group of the Midland League and the following year the Midland League itself.\(^83\) Chapman had established a managerial reputation for himself by 1914 and during the War he took a position at the Barnbow munitions

\(^79\) *ibid.*, p. 61

\(^80\) It was claimed that during the Euro 2000 football championships the England squad had been divided by those that had joined a card school and those that had not. It was also reported that sums of up to £6000 were gambled during card games causing friction amongst the players and undermining team spirit.

\(^81\) Chapman, *Herbert Chapman*, pp. 10-13

\(^82\) Turner and White, *Football Managers*, p. 219
factory, the Number One National Shell Filling Factory just outside Leeds. He was chief storekeeper, in effect a sub-manager, with responsibility for the stores, the box factory plus the farm. As head of his department, Chapman was empowered to place orders on behalf of the factory but the practical management of the stores and labour was under the direction of the works manager or managing director. Before the national filling factories opened, managers and foremen underwent training at the Woolwich Arsenal, although it is not known if Chapman attended. On the face of it, a football manager taking a managerial post, albeit a junior one, in a civilian workplace may seem unusual. In wartime however, anyone with managerial experience was probably sought out by the Ministry of Munitions. It also highlights again that British management in general was underdeveloped. Its practical tradition meant the Ministry was unable to recruit qualified managers and looked to people from various backgrounds like Chapman who had experience of handling people.

83 In 1918 Leeds again won the Midland League and also a play-off with the winners of the Lancashire League. Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 69
84 PRO MUN4/4297, Report of J. Gibson, 7 November 1917; R.H. Gummer, The Story of Barnbow, 1919, ‘Staff Lists of Nos. 1 and 1A Filling Factories. Some accounts claim that he became its manager in chief with thirty sub-managers under him. However, there seems to be no evidence to substantiate this. See Huddersfield Examiner, 13 June 1925, p. 11 and Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 68. The box factory was built in the spring of 1916 for the manufacture and repair of gun ammunition boxes. Up to 17,000 workers were engaged at Barnbow at its peak of which 93 per cent were women and girls. PRO MUN5/365/1122/4, National Filling Factory No. 1. Leeds; Gummer, Barnbow, p. 9
85 PRO MUN4/4297, Report of J. Gibson, 7 November 1917; PRO MUN5/102/400/14, Ministry of Munitions: National Filling Factories, Memo on System of Accounting. A sub-manager such as Chapman was subordinate to his managing director. In terms of salaries, foremen and sub-managers received annual salaries of about £250. The managing directors actually worked for nothing. The Ministry of Munitions had decided that could not afford to pay any managing directors because it would require an annual salary of between £2-5000. PRO MUN5/154/1122/3/24, Copy of minute to Mr Nash CM, concerning the training of managers etc. for the National Filling Factories, 27 November 1915; PRO MUN5/153/1122.3/8, Meeting to discuss the administration of National Filling Factories and the appointment of managers, 17 August 1915
86 PRO MUN5/154/1122.3/23, Outline of course of Instruction to be taken as Woolwich Arsenal by Managers and Foremen for National Filling Factories, November 1915
Working at the munitions factory may have influenced his later football management career. Seebohm Rowntree was placed in charge of the Ministry’s Industrial Welfare Department and introduced measures similar to those in place at his York Cocoa Works. By the end of the War, ‘modern welfare was firmly established in the public mind as an essential function of progressive industrial management’. What Chapman would have noticed was an emphasis on high health standards where workers were given regular medical examinations, backed up by surgeries and a dental department. A Comfort Fund was instituted following a General Voluntary Agreement and a weekly deduction from the workers’ wages. This also helped to pay for a two year lease on a convalescent home.

Chapman’s managing director at Barnbow was Joseph Watson. He was a soap manufacturer who had inherited the family firm, Joseph Watson and Sons. As managing director, Watson built up the firm and emerged as William Lever’s main rival in the North. Watson had been impressed by Chapman’s work at Barnbow and offered him a position as superintendent of labour at Europe’s largest seed crushing mills, the Olympia Oil and Cake Works in Selby. Throughout this period Chapman had still been advising Leeds but in December 1918 he resigned to take up his position at Selby which was probably a better paid job. In 1920 however, Watson

87 Urwick and Brech, Scientific Management, Vol. 1, p. 60
88 Gummer, Barnbow, pp. 43-44
89 ibid., pp. 44-45. An important factor behind these developments may have been an explosion that killed 35 women workers on 5 December 1916. ibid., p. 50; PRO MUN5/365/1122/4, National Filling Factory No. 1. Leeds. Gummer’s account of the explosion’s aftermath reads as government propaganda. Five other lives were lost due to accidents in two other incidents in 1917 and 1918.
90 PRO MUN5/365/1122/4, National Filling Factory No. 1. Leeds
92 Yorkshire Evening News, 16 December 1918; Huddersfield Examiner 13 June 1925, p. 2
sold the oil mills to a Dutch margarine company, and Chapman found himself out of a job.\textsuperscript{93}

On announcing that Chapman was leaving Leeds City to work for Joseph Watson, the report in the \textit{Yorkshire Evening News} had read like an epitaph regarding his career in football. This was nearly prophetic. On 6 October 1919 Leeds City was suspended by the FA and later that month it was expelled from the Football League. A joint FA and Football League commission had been set up to inspect the club’s books following allegations by a former player, Charles Copeland, of improper payments to players during the War.\textsuperscript{94} In July 1915 the FA had suspended all player agreements and ruled that players could not be paid and, in October 1916, the Football League Management Committee drew up stringent rules for players’ expenses.\textsuperscript{95} Leeds City was asked to produce their accounts for inspection but the directors had given them to a Leeds solicitor who refused to hand them over, without a legal subpoena.\textsuperscript{96} Chapman was implicated and then suspended \textit{sine die} together with four members of the Leeds directorate and another official, George Cripps.\textsuperscript{97} As he was at Barnbow during the time of the alleged payments, it was difficult to gauge the extent to which Chapman knew about them.

\textsuperscript{93} Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 5, pp. 690-92
\textsuperscript{94} Athletic News, 1 September 1919, p. 1
\textsuperscript{95} A.J. Arnold, ‘‘Not Playing the Game?’: Leeds City in the Great War’, \textit{IJHS}, Vol. 7, 1 (May 1990), p. 113
\textsuperscript{96} Athletic News, 29 September 1919, p. 1, 6 October 1919, p. 1
\textsuperscript{97} Arnold, ‘‘Not Playing the Game?’’, p. 115, 117-18, n2. Tony Arnold has since traced the missing documents and has discovered that Leeds did break the FA ban on paying players and tried to mask the amount of expenses paid out. He does not specify however, the extent of Chapman’s role in the affair. \textit{ibid.}, p. 118, n38. My own research, which followed protracted correspondence with a firm of Leeds’ solicitors, Blacks, failed to unearth the missing records.
Chapman's ban was overturned in October 1920 by the same commission, although he was now out of work, and whereas the Leeds directors were unaffected materially by their ban, Chapman relied on football for a living. His career in football management restarted at Huddersfield Town where he was to win his first major honours; the FA Cup in 1922 and in 1924 and 1925 the Football League championship.

Like Leeds City, Huddersfield had run into financial problems. By 1919 total accumulated losses were £6650, and despite spending over £21,000 on ground improvements, attendances only averaged 4000. Furthermore, two of the club's directors, David and Hilton Crowther, were owed over £25,000. They ran a large woollen textile mill in Milnsbridge and did not want to patronise a loss-making club. Instead, they wanted to move Huddersfield Town to Leeds City's old ground at Elland Road after that club had been disbanded in 1919, which they believed offered better commercial opportunities. The move to Leeds fell through however. Supporters of Huddersfield Town were mobilised by its chairman, W.L. Hardcastle, and another director, Amos Brook Hirst. The Football League Management Committee had ordered that the club pay the Crowthers £25,000 by the end of 1919

99 Huddersfield also won it the following season when Chapman left for Arsenal, the first club to win the Football League championship three years in succession.
100 Arnold, Game, p. 82
101 Brook Hirst was a prominent Huddersfield lawyer, and had originally preferred rugby. He was one of the club's original directors in 1908 but resigned in 1911 before returning to assist with raising the funds to ensure the club's survival. He later served on the Football League Management Committee from 1931 to 1939, and between 1939 and 1941 was President of the League itself. He resigned his post that year to become chairman of the FA Council. Inglis, League Football, p. 394
if it wanted to stay in Huddersfield. A fund was set-up and the target reached and an upturn in results that season resulted in a profit of £368.102

Huddersfield Town were also in competition with the older local rugby league club, Huddersfield, which played in the Fartown district. Huddersfield dated from 1868 whereas ‘Town’ were comparative late-comers, being formed only in 1908.103 Huddersfield Town had been floated by 170 people who took up 600 £1 shares out of a nominal capital of £2000. It originally applied for membership of a proposed Third Division of the Football League. This scheme failed but it joined the Second Division in 1910.104 Along with the two Bradford clubs (see Chapter 2), a number of West Yorkshire clubs had adopted the association code during the early 1900s, including Leeds City in 1904 and Halifax Town which formed itself into a company in 1911. As a result, all of rugby’s northern strongholds had become vulnerable to the lure of the Football League.105

In the face of this competition, the Northern Rugby Union went through a phase of reconstruction. To make itself more attractive to potential spectators, for example, the number of players was reduced from 15 to 13 in 1906.106

102 Catton Folders H-K, p. 836, Sunday Dispatch, 25 January 1931; Huddersfield Examiner, 18 June 1921, p. 2. David Crowther continued to serve on the ‘Town’s’ board while his brother, became the first chairman of Leeds United AFC Ltd in October 1920. It was he who carried the club’s financial burden of £35,000, and it was not until 1924 when Leeds were promoted to Division One that he was repaid through a debenture scheme. Hilton Crowther was a Leeds board member for over 30 years. Arnold, Game, p. 83; Huddersfield Examiner, 18 June 1921, p. 2

103 Williams, Code War, p. 33. By 1895 the rugby club was known as Huddersfield Northern Union Club following the breakaway by some northern clubs. This was later changed in 1922 to Huddersfield Rugby League Football Club following the adoption of the title Rugby League for the new code.

104 Arnold, Game, pp. 61-62; Catton Folders H, p. 74, All Sports Weekly, 10 March 1928; Catton Folders H-K, p. 836, Sunday Dispatch, 25 January 1931

105 Williams, Code War, p. 172

First World War, Huddersfield had a winning team, led by the charismatic Harold Wagstaff, and support for it far outstripped that of its association rivals. In face of this competition the football club went into voluntary liquidation in 1912 and had to be reconstructed as a new company. One visible consequence of this was that the local press gave preference to the rugby club in its coverage. By 1921 however, gates at Huddersfield Town were outstripping those of the rugby club and by 1923 it was the football club that enjoyed preferential treatment.

Chapman became manager of Huddersfield Town shortly after his predecessor, Ambrose Langley, resigned on 24 April 1921. Chapman had probably arrived at the club in February of that year but it is unclear under what role, although it may have been as assistant manager. A few days before Langley’s resignation, Chapman had signed Clem Stephenson from Aston Villa and Langley may have resigned on the principle that he was not informed of the transfer. He may also have felt that the directors had already decided to replace him with Chapman.

It was at Huddersfield Town that Chapman came to national prominence and the club’s success made his name as a manager. Initially though, his position was relatively marginal as the directors took an active part in the club’s management.

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107 Williams, *Code War*, p. 178
108 *Huddersfield Examiner*, 10 September 1921, p. 14. Huddersfield Town had had a gate of 19,000 whereas the rugby club’s last two crowds were 10,359 and 10,499.
109 *Huddersfield Daily Examiner*, 24 March 1921, p. 1, 1 April, p. 3; *Athletic News*, 28 March 1921, p. 3
110 *Huddersfield Examiner*, 13 June 1925, p. 2. The circumstances behind his move to Huddersfield are uncertain as it is not actually known how long or in what capacity he had served before he became manager.
111 *Huddersfield Daily Examiner*, 16 March 1921, p. 4
112 Even on the day of his appointment, that story in the local paper was published below the appointment of the club’s new trainer, Jack Chaplin (who had been at Leeds City with Chapman). *ibid.*, 1 April 1921, p. 3
This is perhaps understandable considering the money that had been invested in the club. Clem Stephenson’s transfer, for example, cost £4000 at a time when the record fee was £4600.\textsuperscript{113} In addition to buying players, further improvements were made to the ground at Leeds Road in 1921. The capacity of a terrace side had been increased from 22,000 to 24,000 together with the construction of a new press box.\textsuperscript{114} Moreover, team building and its selection was reported through the actions of the directors. In 1922, for example, it was said that the ‘Town Directors are following a very progressive policy in building up the team, and further signatures may be expected at any time’.\textsuperscript{115} By the end of his tenure however, the directors had been sufficiently impressed by Chapman’s management skills to give him the responsibility of selecting the team.\textsuperscript{116}

The background to Chapman’s promotion may have been dependent on a number of factors. First, the club was faced with a precarious financial situation. In 1922, for example, Huddersfield Town won the FA Cup but still made a loss on the season of £1707.\textsuperscript{117} The town economy was dominated by the textile industry but following a short post-War boom a depression, through a fall in exports, had set in and this seriously affected the club’s attendances.\textsuperscript{118} By August 1923 there were 6000 unemployed in Huddersfield and its outlying districts, with no indications of

\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Athletic News}, 22 August 1921, p. 5
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Huddersfield Examiner}, 13 May 1922, p. 2
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Huddersfield Daily Examiner}, 6 January 1934, p. 3, ‘Obituary’
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{ibid.}, 28 June 1922, p. 3
Improvement. On one occasion Chapman met a deputation of the local unemployed who had asked for a reduction in admission. But he could only repeat the rules of the Football League Management Committee that did not allow any concessions.

In addition, in 1921 the club’s directors had come under pressure from the shareholders’ and supporters’ committee which wanted the number of directors reduced from ten to eight and three of their own nominees to remain on the board. The directors were also not above criticism, and this was widely published through readers’ letters in local newspapers. Furthermore, the Huddersfield players had shown signs of militancy. In 1922 the Football League Management Committee had decided to reduce the maximum wage from £10 to £8. There was little sign of a national strike but at Huddersfield Town the players had discussed the possibility of taking some form of industrial action. This perhaps indicated to the directors that they needed to improve their relations with the players, and that by giving the manager more responsibility he could foster them. Or it may have simply been that they did not want the stress of dealing with players face-to-face.

Huddersfield Town’s directors may have found that the business of running a club with its increasing commercial pressures and the intensifying football

119 Huddersfield Examiner, 25 August 1923, p. 13
120 Huddersfield Daily Examiner, 18 October 1921, p. 3, 19
121 Huddersfield Examiner, 18 June 1921, p. 2. The club’s articles of association allowed no fewer than three directors and no more than 10. Ibid. Huddersfield Daily Examiner, 21 June 1921, p. 3
122 Huddersfield Examiner, 15 April 1922, p. 2; Harding, Good of the Game, p. 148. The FLMC later claimed that under Rule 7 of its constitution it had the right to alter players’ contracts. This was declared illegal by the courts however, following what became known as the Leddy Case in 1923. See Harding, Good of the Game, Chapter 15.
competition had begun to overwhelm them. They may have reasoned that the situation demanded someone with specialist football knowledge to take a bigger role in running the club.\textsuperscript{124} What was Chapman's role as manager? Initially, it was more of an administrative one: he distributed tickets for games and arranged special trains for away matches.\textsuperscript{125} He was also the public face of the club, acting as bridge between the club and the press. Chapman had also shown his flair for promoting the club following the transfer of Clem Stephenson by arranging a scoop for the journalist, Ivan Sharpe, to announce the player as 'A Harold Wagstaff for Huddersfield Town'.\textsuperscript{126} He also organised club tours including one to Paris in 1921.\textsuperscript{127}

It was Chapman's management of the team however, that bolstered his reputation and the signing of Clem Stephenson in 1921 turned out to be crucial to that success. He became the first in a line of Chapman's purchases whom he essentially built the team and its system around. Stephenson, at inside-forward, was given a roving role, and at Arsenal, Charlie Buchan and Alex James were similarly important. The impact of both Chapman's and Stephenson's arrival was immediate.

\textsuperscript{123}Militant tendencies could also be found amongst rugby league players in general who, led by their union chairman, Harold Wagstaff, had threatened to strike at the same time. \textit{Huddersfield Examiner}, 15 April 1922, p. 14

\textsuperscript{124}On this point, speculation is only possible as I was unable to gain access to the minutes of directors' meetings at Huddersfield Town.

\textsuperscript{125}For example, \textit{Huddersfield Daily Examiner}, 13 January 1922, p. 3. In April 1921 the Triple Alliance of the miners, railway men and transport unions had threatened to strike. As Huddersfield Town had a game at Chelsea on the Saturday, Chapman had made contingency plans to take the team home by charabanc. \textit{Huddersfield Daily Examiner}, 15 April 1921, p. 3. Eventually, only the miners went on strike in what became known as 'Black Friday' for the union movement.

\textsuperscript{126}I. Sharpe, \textit{40 Years in Football} (1952), p. 41

\textsuperscript{127}\textit{Huddersfield Daily Examiner}, 8 April, p. 3, 15 April 1921, p. 3; \textit{Huddersfield Examiner}, 1 April 1922, p. 2
as the team finished the season strongly. Like at Leeds, his office had a table with a football field marked out on it and here he conducted pre-match talks.

Chapman created a more relaxed environment for the players and improved their relations with the directors. Yet he was also a disciplinarian. He wanted his players to behave themselves both on and off the pitch. He warned them away from women and told them to quit smoking, although he did allow the players a glass of sherry the night before a game. It is unlikely however, that the players, young working-class men, totally adhered to this relatively spartan regime. Before a game, Chapman also gave each player a glycerine tablet, probably more for the placebo effect then any chemical assistance it might produce. With control over the team’s selection, Chapman employed psychological methods together with some gentle persuasion in an attempt to improve performance. If a player had had a good game, for example, Chapman would later ask them if they were not feeling well, and tell them that they had better have a rest. Conversely, after a poor game, he would praise a player for his efforts.

It was at Huddersfield Town that Chapman developed his management skills and brought them to bear on a national stage. He had started out as subservient to the club’s directors but when he left in May 1925 for Arsenal, he had established himself as a manager who, given autonomy over team affairs, could markedly improve its performance. The impact of Chapman’s management was recognised by both press

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128 Athletic News, 22 August 1921, p. 5
129 Catton, Wickets, p. 144. Catton had been taken to the secretary’s office by the then incumbent Arthur Fairclough who remarked, ‘this is where the directors play’. ibid.
130 Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, p. 27
and public alike. One supporter wrote to the local paper stating that ‘everyone must admit that, with all due respect to our players, if any man has played an individual part in bringing Huddersfield Town to its present heights that man is Herbert Chapman’.132

If Chapman achieved national recognition at Huddersfield Town then Arsenal was his tour de force. In eight years he had turned a mid-table team into the greatest footballing power in the land, and the most famous club in the world. It was at Arsenal that the full range of his managerial skills were brought to the fore and this probably could have only happened in London. Ever since he had played for Tottenham Hotspur, Chapman had seen the possibilities of managing a team in the capital with its access to a large supporter base, supported by London’s transport network. Moreover, London had not suffered from the depression like some areas in the North and Wales which had relied on export industries. During the inter-War period the level of employment in London increased as it was able to attract a range of new industries which depended on domestic consumers rather than on exporting goods.133 In London therefore, there was the potential to make something bigger than anywhere else. Chapman was to build two teams at Arsenal. The first was basically the one he inherited, and the second, marked its arrival by winning the FA Cup in 1930, and later two Football League championships in 1931 and 1933. When he became manager in 1925 Arsenal had finished twentieth in the First Division. The following season they were second. Jimmy Catton, commenting on the

131 *Sunday Dispatch*, 7 January 1934, p. 13. This article involved an interview with former Huddersfield Town player, Alex Jackson but Studd (p. 89) claims that Chapman never managed him because he signed in May 1925 just before Chapman left for Arsenal.
132 *Huddersfield Examiner*, 13 June 1925, p. 2
transformation, declared that, ‘[t]he power behind a good team is the power of Herbert Chapman’.  

Before Chapman joined in 1925, Arsenal had had a peripatetic existence. Originally formed by a group of workmen at the Woolwich Arsenal in 1886, it later played at the Manor Ground in Plumstead. Henry Norris took over the club in 1910 when it was suffering a financial crisis. At that time he was the chairman of Fulham and wanted to amalgamate the two clubs but the Football League had refused. Norris, a solicitor by profession, was a very rich property developer having built 2000 houses in the Fulham and Wimbledon areas. He was also Mayor of Fulham between 1909 and 1919 and later the MP for Fulham East from 1918 to 1922, and his political skills proved vital to Arsenal’s short-term future. In 1913 he moved the club to Highbury and by 1915 he had poured £125,000 into the club. Arsenal’s move to Highbury is the most significant example of an English football club removing itself completely from its roots to a new area. Norris’s boldest manoeuvre however, came after the War when Arsenal found themselves in the First Division on the resumption of the Football League in 1919. Despite finishing sixth in the Second Division in the season before football was stopped, Arsenal beat

133 Baines, ‘Onset of Depression’, pp. 175-76
134 *All Sports Weekly*, 13 March 1926, p. 6
135 Mason, *Association Football*, p. 26; Joy, *Forward Arsenal*, p. 9. The club’s original name was Dial Square, after part of the factory The club had five names in total: Dial Square; second, Royal Arsenal FC; third, Woolwich Arsenal FC; fourth, The Arsenal FC; and finally, Arsenal FC.
136 Norris was assisted his football business by William Hall who acted as his eyes and ears. Hall, a metal merchant from Putney, was first a director at Fulham but when Norris became Arsenal chairman, Hall took over at Fulham to look after Norris’s interests. In 1913 Hall was elected to the Football League Management Committee and served until 1917. Inglis, *League Football*, pp. 392-93
Tottenham, who had finished runners-up in 1915, in a vote for a place in the top division. Norris had lobbied the Football League Management Committee intensely, and he also found an ally in the editor of the *Athletic News*, Jimmy Catton, to whom Norris wrote a series of letters seeking his support.139

Chapman’s predecessor at Arsenal had been Leslie Knighton who was a very different type of manager. Knighton had little playing experience but enjoyed a long career in management and administration. He arrived at Arsenal in June 1919 when the club was £60,000 in the red but when he left in 1925 the club was free of debt.140 Knighton took little interest in team affairs however.141 Commenting on the different temperaments of players, he once described football stars with a temperament as ‘just hell’.142 In May 1925 he ‘left’ the club following a disagreement with Norris who had persistently bullied him and generally interfered with his management of the club.143 ‘I never met his equal for logic, invective, ruthlessness against all who opposed him’, Knighton said of him. He later admitted that he was not articulate enough or of strong enough character to stand up to Norris.144 One of Norris’s quirks had been that he disliked players under five feet eight inches. He also forbade Knighton to spend more than £1200 on a player when at the time transfer fees for

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138 This is likely to be superseded if Wimbledon FC move to Milton Keynes in 2002-03.
139 Joy, *Forward Arsenal*, pp. 27-28; Catton Folders O-P
141 Turner and White, *Football Managers*, p. 165
142 Knighton, *Big Football*, p. 37
143 *Athletic News*, 11 May 1925, p. 1
144 Knighton, *Big Football*, p. 52
good players were about £5000. Instead, Norris preferred the team to be made up of local players yet he also prevented Knighton from employing a talent scout.

Before Chapman was appointed manager, the advertisement for the job in the *Athletic News* specified that ‘Gentlemen whose sole ability to build up a good side depends on the heavy and exorbitant [sic] transfer fees need not apply’. Yet Chapman was to break Norris’s embargo and this had two far reaching consequences for football management. First, it marked an important albeit small shift in the power relations within football clubs as Chapman was able to demonstrate the influence a professional football manager could bring to bear on a big club’s fortunes, even if directors held ultimate responsibility. Chapman was also recognised as ‘the man who introduced big business into football’ as the combination of Arsenal’s financial muscle and his freedom to direct the club’s affairs underlined the importance of money in football’s production process.

How did Chapman persuade Norris to part with more money? Knighton himself claimed that Chapman was ‘exceptionally clever with finances and could ... charm off a donkey’s hind leg’. Unlike Knighton, Chapman had a record of achievement, especially at Huddersfield Town and Studd argues that because of this, Norris accepted the limits of his own authority on a professional level, and that he too was also ‘won over by the manager’s charm, powerful persuasiveness and

145 *ibid.*, p. 51. At the Football League’s AGM in 1922, Norris had tried, unsuccessfully, to impose a universal transfer fee of £1650 per player. Joy, *Forward Arsenal*, p. 31
146 Knighton, *Big Football*, pp. 51-52
147 *Athletic News*, 11 May 1925, p. 4
148 *Birmingham Gazette*, 8 January 1934, p. 6, ‘Obituary’
149 Knighton, *Big Football*, p. 62
Confirmation of Chapman's determination to manage his way came in the form of Charlie Buchan's transfer from Sunderland. Knighton claimed that he had originally bid for Buchan but Norris had refused to sanction the move. Chapman initially visited Buchan at his shop in the town and asked him to move to London. Sunderland valued Buchan, who was 34, at £4000, yet this time Norris agreed to the transfer.

By 1927 however, Norris's association with Arsenal was at an end as he, and fellow director William Hall, were suspended sine die by the FA for paying their chauffeurs' wages from club funds. Following Norris's departure, it seems that Chapman's powers were extended. At a board meeting in 1928 the new chairman, Sir Samuel Hill-Wood, and the manager were delegated full powers by the board concerning the transfer of players. Later, it was recorded that the acquisition of new players was to be left with the manager. He was however, 'to communicate his suggestions and recommendations to the chairman, vice-chairman and George Allison, for approval'. Yet, there is no suggestion that any of Chapman's recommendations were ever rejected. Neither is there any mention in the minutes

150 Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 92
151 Knighton, Big Football, p. 86
152 C. Buchan, A Lifetime in Football (1955), pp. 84-86. Norris later came to a peculiar arrangement with the Sunderland manager, Bob Kyle. There was to be an initial down payment of £2000 and then £100 for every goal Buchan scored. The total cost was £3900. See Appendix 11
153 Football Association Minutes, The Arsenal Football Club, Limited, Report of Commission, August 1927; Decisions of the Council, 29 August 1927. Two of the Arsenal directors G.W. Peachey and J.W. Humble were found to have failed in their duty to discover the irregularities, and were removed from the club's board. They were replaced by John Edwards and George Allison. ibid. Norris later brought an unsuccessful libel case against the club. The Times, 6, p. 5d, 7 February 1929, p. 5a.
154 Arsenal FC Minutes, 30 October 1928
155 Arsenal FC Minutes, 23 April 1929
156 This seems to be the case on the evidence of the minutes from 11.10.27 to 26.9.29.
of team selection which indicates that the manager was picking it. Chapman’s relationship with George Allison however, was relatively cool. On one occasion he rebuked Chapman for not forwarding, in time, his application for a seat on the Football League Management Committee.\(^1\) It is also interesting that in his autobiography, Allison rarely mentions Chapman and certainly not in the glowing terms that others have used.\(^2\)

Some of the other directors who succeeded Norris could be described as gentlemen and were probably happy to allow Chapman to run the club with minimal interference. These included Lord Lonsdale, Colonel Sir John Norton-Griffiths and Colonel Sir Matthew Wilson.\(^3\) Perhaps their overall attitude was best summed up when they debated whether or not to allow their chauffeurs into the boardroom for tea after a game. It was eventually decided that Chapman would arrange for them to take tea in the gymnasium.\(^4\) Another new director, John Edwards, was more proactive and had some responsibility for the re-development of the ground.\(^5\) Overall, the Arsenal directors still held ultimate responsibility for the club and also acted as financial guarantors. A hierarchy did exist and, as at his other clubs, the directors could dismiss Chapman because he was a paid officer. During the season, the directors held fortnightly board meetings where Chapman would give a manager’s

\(^{1}\) Arsenal FC Minutes, c. 1927-33

\(^{2}\) G. Allison, *Allison Calling* (1948), *passim*

\(^{3}\) Arsenal FC Minutes, 30 August 1928; 20 November 1928

\(^{4}\) Arsenal FC Minutes, 4 October 1928

\(^{5}\) For example, he represented the club in negotiations with St. John’s College of Divinity over the purchase of land from the college because Arsenal wanted to extend the southern part of the ground. Arsenal FC Minutes, 4 July 1928. Edwards was a solicitor in London’s Piccadilly and when Norris left he became the club’s vice-chairman and largest shareholder. He was elected to the FLMC in 1936 but resigned in 1940 following his suspension by the Law Society for alleged professional misconduct. Inglis, *League Football*, 1988, p. 394
report and the language used during these meetings, such as ‘the manager was empowered’ and ‘the manager was instructed to’, suggests that Chapman was a subordinate.

But he had full control over team matters and would not brook any interference by directors, on match days barring them and members of the press from the players’ dressing room. Furthermore, he believed that it was vital that the manager should be with the team and so he did his scouting during the week. Chapman felt that if he was not present on match days then the team’s match policy might break down. It was this control over team affairs combined with Arsenal’s financial resources that enabled him to demonstrate the full range of his skills and the fundamentals of modern football management. These were the ability to judge a footballer; an astute tactical acumen; and the personality to be able to motivate players generally. Chapman was considered a fine judge of a player and was convinced that a footballer’s all-round intelligence was just as important as his footballing ability. Before signing a player however, Chapman would ask, ‘How does he behave?’ and ‘What sort of life does he lead?’ He wanted his players to reflect his own sober lifestyle and would drop his interest if the answers were not satisfactory. On first meeting Eddie Hapgood, a future Arsenal and England captain, Chapman asked, ‘Well, young man, do you smoke or drink?’

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162 Islington Central Library, Arsenal Collection, YH779ARS, Islington Gazette, 29 July 1960
163 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p. 9
164 ibid., p. 25
165 ibid., p. 51
166 E. Hapgood, Football Ambassador (1945), p. 12
Players had to be blended into a tactical system and, Bernard Joy and Tony Say have argued that Chapman’s tactical ability in exploiting the new offside rule from 1925 was a major reason for Arsenal’s success. In 1924-25 they had finished twentieth, the following season they were second. In addition, Catton attributed much of Arsenal’s success to Chapman’s ability to switch players’ positions. Bob John, for example, was converted from a half-back to a full-back. The change in the offside law had produced a sudden increase in goals being scored. Arsenal countered this by turning the centre-half, Jack Butler, from an attacking player into a purely defensive one, renamed a ‘stopper’ or a ‘policeman’. This changed a team’s whole system, producing the so-called W/M formation. The ‘W’ represented the five forwards with the ‘M’ as the defensive system with the wing-halves marking the opposing the inside-forwards, and the full-backs, the wingers. The centre-half would occupy a central defensive role as Chapman believed that it was in this area where 90 per cent of goals were scored. In the 1930s Butler was replaced by Herbie Roberts whom Chapman converted from wing half, and who was more a defensive player than Butler. Who actually invented the defensive centre-half is open to debate. Charlie Buchan, for example, claimed that he suggested it to Chapman at the start of the 1925-26 season but that Chapman had initially rejected the idea. It was perhaps an indication of his willingness to listen that led Chapman to later reconsider. Buchan claimed that this was one of Chapman’s greatest strengths, ‘[h]e

167 Say, ‘Herbert Chapman’, p. 84; Joy, Soccer Tactics, p. 50
169 A player was now offside if at the moment the ball was played towards him, he did not have at least two opponents behind him. Under the previous law the number was three.
170 Say, ‘Herbert Chapman’, pp. 81-98; Joy, Soccer Tactics, pp. 50-64
would always listen to other people and take advantage of their ideas if he thought they would improve the team in any way. 172 As we have seen, Chapman also believed that teams could attack for too long; the essence of his overall plan was to create space in which to launch rapid counter-attacks. This style was more direct and Arsenal therefore, eschewed the short-passing game that had previously been the fashion. Wingers were also encouraged to cut inside and shoot for goal rather than cross from the by-line. 173 Arsenal’s style not only had its imitators but it ushered in a new era as football became faster and more physical, and the players got bigger. 174

Chapman did not confine his tactical input to team discussions. During a cup-tie against Aston Villa in 1931 played in foggy conditions, the two captains had agreed with the referee to forgo half-time and turn straight round. With Aston Villa leading 2-0 however, Chapman rushed to the touchline and ordered his players to the dressing room for a rest. Arsenal went on to draw the game and eventually won the replay. It was because of Chapman’s actions that the FA made a rule that no official was allowed to walk to the touchline or on the field without the referee’s permission. 175

Notwithstanding his tactics, Chapman still needed the best players to carry out his plans and this was where Arsenal’s financial muscle played an important role. Chapman had seen that a linkman, a roving inside-forward, between defence and attack was the vital ingredient. Buchan had initially volunteered for the role but

171 Buchan, *Lifetime in Football*, p. 91
174 Joy, *Soccer Tactics*, p. 59
175 Whittaker, *Tom Whittaker’s*, pp. 182-83
Chapman wanted to retain his goal scoring potential.\textsuperscript{176} Chapman later found his ideal linkman in Scottish international, Alex James. His transfer from Preston North End in the close season of 1929 for £8750, along with David Jack's some months earlier from Bolton for a record, £10,647 10s 0d, represented Chapman's determination to buy the best players.\textsuperscript{177} Chapman however, only secured James's signature with the assistance of Bradford City's chairman, Tom Paton. Paton had close contacts with Selfridges, and to satisfy his wage demands, James became a sports demonstrator at the store for a £250 annual salary.\textsuperscript{178} It was also an example of Chapman's ability to persuade the Arsenal directors to speculate and they later signed a £10,000 guarantee with Barclays to meet the fees.\textsuperscript{179}

Chapman did not just buy established stars for large fees. Herbie Roberts, for example, was bought in December 1926 from Oswestry Town for £200.\textsuperscript{180} Eddie Hapgood cost Arsenal £250 from Kettering plus a friendly against them.\textsuperscript{181} Cliff Bastin, aged 17, joined at the same time as Alex James from Exeter City. The fee of £2000 represented a risk but so keen was Chapman to buy him that it was decided to pay the fee up front and 'complete the matter immediately, therefore, eliminating all contingent happenings'.\textsuperscript{182} It was a risk handsomely rewarded as Bastin had won every honour in the game by the age of 21 and became the club's record goalscorer.

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\textsuperscript{176} Buchan, \textit{Lifetime in Football}, p. 92
\textsuperscript{177} Jack's fee converts to about £400,000.
\textsuperscript{178} Arsenal FC Minutes, 3 May 1929; 13 May 1929; J. Harding, \textit{Alex James: Life of a Football Legend} (1988), pp. 99-100. James's job at Selfridges circumnavigated Football League restrictions on illegal payments because there were no rules to prevent professional footballers from having more than one job.
\textsuperscript{179} Arsenal FC Minutes, 8 January 1929; 23 July 1929; Harding, \textit{Alex James}, pp. 98-101
\textsuperscript{180} Joy, \textit{Forward Arsenal}, p. 45
\textsuperscript{181} Arsenal FC Minutes, 18 January 1928
\end{flushright}
Joe Hulme played on the right wing and was renowned for his speed. In 1930 the forward line was completed by Jack Lambert at centre-forward. His eventual selection for that position had been more problematic for Chapman, and perhaps owed something to luck. He was originally bought as an inside-forward from Doncaster for £2000 but at first, he spent most of his time in the reserves. Chapman did not think Lambert was the ideal centre-forward and spent £20,000 on three other players. None proved as effective as Lambert who, although not as skilful, complemented the team's overall pattern with his robust style.183

Chapman’s search for players was extensive. Taylor has identified the development of a highly regulated transfer market within British football during the inter-War period. The role of advertising and agents declined and was replaced by the circulation of transfer lists and an increase in clubs' scouting networks. Informal contacts and networks however, probably remained the most fertile source for locating new talent.184 In 1928 Chapman arranged with W. Connell to be the club’s ‘advisor’ in Scotland at a rate of 10/- per week plus expenses. Chapman would watch recommended players himself before signing them.185 Several clubs, Arsenal, among them, adopted nurseries such as Dartford, who nurtured players before they moved to the parent club. Moreover, Chapman tried to make arrangements with other league clubs including Northampton Town, Charlton Athletic and Clapton Orient.186

182 Arsenal FC Minutes, 13 May 1929
183 Joy, Soccer Tactics, pp. 60-61
184 Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, pp. 159-69
185 Arsenal FC Minutes, 5 January 1928; 10 January 1928. Connell may have been the former Liverpool trainer.
186 Chapman visited the Northampton Town chairman with a view to a proposed agreement between the two clubs. Arsenal later ‘arrived at an understanding’ with Charlton Athletic in which each club would assist the other in finding and developing players. An agreement was later signed and sealed
As we have seen earlier, Chapman became skilled in his man-management of footballers, and at Arsenal he developed a close relationship with the players. Eddie Hapgood for instance, continually refers to Chapman as the ‘Old Boss’ throughout his autobiography. He was essentially an authoritarian figure however, who used his personality to demand discipline from players, and he was also as ruthless as a successful football manager had to be. No doubt Chapman preferred ‘gentle persuasion’ to wielding the big stick but he was not afraid to use it if he thought it necessary. His trainer, Tom Whittaker, recalled how Chapman ‘never allowed sentiment of any sort to sway his judgement’. In 1929 Arsenal had been invited to tour Argentina, and it is interesting that Chapman actually consulted the players to ascertain their feelings on the matter and then reported back to the board. The question of the tour was left with Chapman and the invitation was eventually declined. This perhaps had less to do with the players’ opinions however, than the effects of six weeks at sea and the extra games would have had on them the following season. The style with which Chapman dealt with players however, interestingly reflected emerging trends within wider management theory. During the 1920s the American political scientist, Mary Parker Follett, had pioneered work on the value of human relations within industrial organisations. She argued that a manager’s overall objective was to create a ‘functional unity’ within his/her organisation. To achieve this required a different philosophy of leadership that was less autocratic but...
without managers abdicating their responsibilities. Instead, managers now needed to persuade workers to work with them rather than adhere to old ideas of leadership in which managers merely impressed their views on others. Managers needed to be co-ordinators and organisers of their workers' skills. It was these qualities that would give them their authority. 189

One aspect of Chapman's team discussions had been to create a sense of togetherness between the players, although there were also benefits on the tactical side. Chapman was convinced that because of the discussions the players were quickly able to sense a weakness in the opposition. 190 He also went to great lengths to eliminate any triumphalism or complacency within the team when it had won. A 7-1 victory over Wolverhampton Wanderers was followed by a two-hour meeting that concentrated solely on the build-up to the goal Arsenal had conceded. 191 On a personal level, Chapman's approach was different according to the individual's make-up. George Male was a wing-half who became a right-back and later played for England. In getting Male to overcome his doubts about the switch, Chapman called him to his office. Male later confessed, 'By the time I came out of that room, I was not only convinced I was a full blown right-back, I knew, without doubt, that I was the best right-back in the country'. 192 On Chapman's style Male said, 'he was the boss, and you knew it, even though his voice was so quiet. When he talked to you

188 Arsenal FC Minutes, 8 January 1929; 15 January 1929; 12 March 1929
189 H. Metcalf, and L. Urwick (eds.), Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett (1941), pp. 247-70. See also Urwick and Brech, Scientific Management, Vol. 1, Chapter 5
190 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, pp. 12-13
191 Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 137
there was no bullying. He could persuade you in the quiet way he’d talk to you'.

On another occasion however, Chapman had pulled Male aside before a train journey and was told to ‘pull his socks up’ because he was ‘playing for his place’.

Chapman did have problems however, with players who would not conform to his ideas, in particular Alex James. At the root of his disagreement with Chapman were the restrictions placed on James to exploit his commercial potential. In 1931, for example, his contract with Selfridges had expired and he had refused to re-sign for Arsenal unless Chapman offered him more money. James continually challenged Chapman’s authority and made their disagreements public in the newspapers, something that infuriated Chapman. James was a special player however, and because football was a peculiar business it was highly unlikely that Chapman would transfer him. He was less forgiving of those who were expendable. For instance, his first trainer at Arsenal, George Hardy, shouted out a tactical instruction to the players during a game in February 1927. On the Monday Chapman sacked him.

After Arsenal had been famously defeated by Walsall in the FA Cup in 1933, one player, Tommy Black, was transferred within a week to Plymouth. Chapman had brought up the player’s future at the next board meeting because Black had committed the crude foul that gave Walsall a match clinching penalty. Chapman also

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193 Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, p. 29
194 Harding, Alex James, p. 154
195 James was already on the maximum wage of £8 per week and therefore, Chapman could not offer him anymore. However, James was later re-employed by Selfridges, which included a raise to £300, and so re-signed for the club. Harding, Alex James, pp. 135-39
196 ibid., Chapter 16
197 Joy, Forward Arsenal, p. 48. Chapman later found Hardy a job as trainer at Tottenham Hotspur. Islington Central Library, Arsenal Collection, YH779ARS, Islington Gazette, 29 July 1960
transferred Charlie Walsh that month and another from that team, Billy Warnes left at the end of the season.198

But in general, in order to claim a player's loyalties, the club invoked a more paternalistic approach. On one level players were dealt with personally. Jack Butler, for instance, received an award for his loyal service when he left the club.199 In 1928 Chapman signed Raymond Parkin who was given the option of completing his apprenticeship as an electrical engineer in London whilst remaining an Arsenal player.200 Chapman was also concerned that the players had their horizons broadened and in 1928 enrolled them on a course of twelve lessons in Physical Culture.201 Arsenal operated a house purchase scheme whereby Chapman bought houses he thought suitable for players on the club's behalf. This was another example of how he wanted to mould the players in his own image. Many properties were located in the newly developed suburban areas of North London like Hendon, where Chapman himself lived.202 Chapman also launched a financial savings scheme where £1 of the players' weekly wage was deposited with the club at an interest rate of 6 per cent.203 A similar scheme had earlier been instituted by Lord Hawke at Yorkshire County Cricket Club, and mirrored the prevailing notion that employers knew what was best for their workers.

198 Arsenal FC Minutes, c. January 1933; Joy, *Forward Arsenal*, pp. 78-79
199 Arsenal FC Minutes, 3 May 1929
200 Arsenal FC Minutes, 14 February 1928
201 Arsenal FC Minutes, 20 November 1928
202 Arsenal FC Minutes, 4 July 1928; 23 July 1929; 23 October 1928; 14 December 1928; 12 February 1929. The scheme had been subject to the approval of the Football League Management Committee. The club also paid for the house's decorations at a cost of £45 before James took possession. Today, £800 converts to about £30,000. Charlie Buchan also lived in Hendon and a house in New Southgate was bought for Alex James for £800.
203 Studd, *Herbert Chapman*, p. 129
As the club’s assets, a player’s welfare was paramount and Chapman improved dressing room and training facilities under Hardy’s successor, Tom Whittaker. Whittaker’s legacy as a trainer was as important as Chapman’s was as manager. His work was recognised by the FA and he became England’s regular trainer. Whittaker’s football career had been ended by an injury but he was persuaded by Chapman to embark on a one-year study of anatomy, massage and electrical treatment at Arsenal. Modern medical electrical apparatus such as sun ray equipment was installed, and players were sent on appropriate courses. Innovations were also introduced to the Arsenal players’ training as they played head tennis and a shooting box was installed in the 1920s. Both aimed to improve ball control and these exercises were supplemented by the normal fitness work, particularly lapping. Charlie Buchan however, claimed that he felt fitter at Sunderland where he trained twice a day whereas at Arsenal it was only the once.

As Chapman held the title of secretary-manager, he also ran the club on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, his control over his staff, which admittedly probably only numbered a handful, was as firm as that over the players. No member of staff was permitted to leave until they had phoned his office at six o’clock and asked for permission to go. He held wide responsibilities that entailed a variety of administrative tasks, ranging from sorting out the arrangements for the opening of the

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204 Whittaker, *Tom Whittaker’s*, p. 44
205 Joy, *Forward Arsenal*, p. 48; Arsenal FC Minutes, 4 December 1928; 18 December 1928; 8 January 1929
207 Buchan, *Lifetime in Football*, pp. 100-01
208 Studd, *Herbert Chapman*, p. 108
new tea room to dealing with pirate chocolate sellers.\(^{209}\) His first job every morning was to open the post which included answering complaints from the public. Some of this was very trivial work. One correspondent claimed for a damaged umbrella and another claimed for a pair of glasses after they were broken by the ball during a game.\(^{210}\) Chapman was the public face of the club and on one occasion visited a local resident after his fence had been damaged following a game, to ‘point out in a friendly manner [that] we [Arsenal] can not be held responsible for damage at such a distance from the ground’.\(^{211}\) Chapman’s duties also embraced financial responsibilities such as communicating with the Legal and General Insurance Society who handled the club’s insurance and made a survey of the ground following Chapman’s recommendations to the board. One result was that Legal and General arranged a guarantee policy regarding the club’s payment of entertainment tax.\(^{212}\) The stadium’s physical upkeep also came under the secretary-manager’s remit and included drawing up a schedule of repairs and maintenance jobs such as the installation of additional female lavatories.\(^{213}\) Accidents on the club’s premises were also dealt with by Chapman. When a casual labourer sustained a poisoned hand it was reported to the insurance company, as was a fire in the kitchen.\(^{214}\) Chapman was also responsible for the stadium’s commercial income.\(^{215}\) For instance, the rights to sell chocolate and

\(^{209}\) Arsenal FC Minutes, 27 October 1927; 14 February 1928.

\(^{210}\) Arsenal FC Minutes, 5 January 1928; 13 November 1928. He was reimbursed for the glasses to the sum of £2 10s 0d.

\(^{211}\) Arsenal FC Minutes, 21 February 1928

\(^{212}\) Arsenal FC Minutes, 20 October 1927; 3 November 1927; 25 November 1927; 6 December 1927

\(^{213}\) Arsenal FC Minutes, 10 January 1928, 2 May 1928, 25 November 1927

\(^{214}\) Arsenal FC Minutes, 31 January 1928; 24 January 1928

\(^{215}\) Arsenal also sought to exploit any outside commercial opportunities that arose. On the back of the Speedway craze of the late 1920s, the club seriously considered putting a track in at Highbury on two
cigarettes within the ground were acquired by the Elliot Bros. for £100 a season.\textsuperscript{216} Refreshment stalls were also erected at the Gillespie Road entrance under Chapman’s direction.\textsuperscript{217}

The legacy of Herbert Chapman however, was not just restricted to the management of his teams. He embraced football modernity and was full of ideas about the future development of the football business.\textsuperscript{218} Chapman claimed that ‘[w]e have not got to the bottom of football yet. There are still possibilities to be explored ... Insufficient regard is paid to the demands of the public. Give them what they want and you will get their support’.\textsuperscript{219} He saw the press as an extension for advertising and in 1929 Arsenal had hired a publicity agent, F.J. Coles, for £100. He also doubled as the club’s programme editor. Coles was expected to attend the majority of home matches and ensure a report of the game was published in London’s morning and evening papers. He had to telephone Chapman every day for any information on the club that could be published in order to keep Arsenal’s name occasions. First, in 1928, it was approached by Seymour and Graham Ltd., and Messrs Randolph and Dean and later the club met their representative, A.J. Hunting of the Speedway Motor Cycling Co. of Australia. After consulting the stadium builder, Archibald Leitch, about the possibility of ground alterations, Arsenal felt that too many costly difficulties would be involved. The following year however, Hunting was again interviewed by the club. ‘Dirt Track Racing’ at Highbury was conditional on financial guarantees being provided, and more importantly, that the pitch and terraces could be restored to a condition fit for football. Following a report by an architect, Mr Binnie, and a grass expert, Mr McDonald, it was decided not to proceed. Arsenal FC Minutes, 31 January 1928; 9 February 1928; 21 February 1928; 15 March 1928. Leitch was paid £39 11s 2d for his services. Arsenal FC Minutes, 22 March 1928. Arsenal FC Minutes, 26 March 1929; 9 April 1929

\textsuperscript{216} Arsenal FC Minutes, 30 August 1928
\textsuperscript{217} Arsenal FC Minutes, 9 May 1928. Any application to sell newspapers and advertisements in or near the club’s premises however, was not allowed under any circumstances. Arsenal FC Minutes, 30 August 1928.
\textsuperscript{218} Dictionary of National Biography (forthcoming)
\textsuperscript{219} Chapman, \textit{Herbert Chapman}, p. 152
in the news. Chapman was a stickler for accuracy and if any reporter got his facts wrong, he would be on the receiving end of a few choice words.

The birth of the BBC in the 1920s provided another medium for Chapman to publicise his own views on football. Inevitably almost, Arsenal’s home game against Sheffield United in 1927 was the first to be broadcast on radio by the BBC. The BBC applied directly to clubs for broadcasting rights and Arsenal willingly granted permission for certain games. The club had a strong interest in broadcasting. While Chapman was a personal friend of the BBC’s Outside Broadcasts Director (OBD), Gerald Cock, George Allison was an early football commentator. There appears to have been some tension however, between Chapman and Allison over the BBC on a personal level. For example, Allison had been invited by S.J. de Lotbiniere, Cock’s successor as BBC OBD, to arrange football talks for the radio, but for the ones on football management Chapman was never recommended by Allison. Furthermore, on one occasion de Lotbiniere had inadvertently phoned Chapman when wanting to speak to Tom Whittaker

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220 Arsenal FC Minutes, 31 July 1929. For the 1929-30 season a new programme editor, William Johnstone, was appointed in a honorary capacity and to maximise sales, a programme sales manager, Rowland Beatty was also hired. Arsenal FC Minutes, 23 July 1929; 31 July 1929; 18 September 1929
221 Whittaker, Tom Whittaker’s, p. 56
222 In 1926 he gave a talk on the BBC about some of his ideas. He was also interviewed by Peter Batten on ‘My Greatest Hour’. Yorkshire Evening Post, 6 January 1934, p. 10, ‘Obituary’. Northampton Independent, 13 January 1934, p. 9
223 Arsenal FC Minutes, 20 October 1927, 23 October 1928. The BBC encountered opposition however, from smaller clubs who felt it would affect attendances and at the Football League AGM in 1931, the broadcasting of its games was prohibited. Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, pp. 347-50
224 BBC WAC, R30/1262/1, Gerald Cock, Internal Memo, 22 February 1928; OB Department letter, 23 February 1928
225 BBC WAC, George Allison File 1, 1927-32, Letter from George Allison to S.J. de Lotbiniere, 22 June 1932; George Allison File 2, 1933-34, Letter from George Allison to S.J. de Lotbiniere, 13 October 1933. Allison had suggested Peter Hodges of Leicester City and Percy Smith of Tottenham Hotspur.
concerning a football talk. De Lotbiniere had said that Chapman was 'obviously anxious to have a finger in the pie but I think all will go well'.

Perhaps Chapman's shrewdest move was to persuade the London Electric Railway to change the name of their Piccadilly Line station adjacent to the Arsenal ground from Gillespie Road to Arsenal in 1932. The change in name was not just for the consumption of Londoners as it was claimed that a fairly large section of the Arsenal crowd came from outside of the capital, and many from as far as Scotland came just to see Alex James. Through his broadcasts and journalism, Chapman also advocated the use of a white ball that would be easier for the crowd to see at the end of dark winter afternoons and that players' shirts should be numbered. On the suggestion of the Daily Mail's cartoonist, Tom Webster, Chapman changed Arsenal's shirts from all red to red with white sleeves to make them more distinctive and modern. Floodlights were installed at Highbury after he saw them used on the continent in 1930, and the benefits that they could bring to the English game. For those chilly nights he even proposed that the stands should be heated. It would be over twenty years before most of these measures were adopted in England.

He also believed in the value of coaching and had been impressed with the coaching scheme of the Corinthians and the FA that was inaugurated at Highbury in 1930. It was initially for public school boys and Chapman wanted it to be extended

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226 BBC WAC, George Allison File 1, 1927-32, Letter from S.J. de Lotbiniere to George Allison, 12 December 1932
227 Islington Gazette, 28 October 1932, p. 6
228 Sharpe, 40 Years, p. 52; Daily Herald, 8 January 1934, p. 15, 'Obituary'. Clubs were forbidden to use numbers in Football League matches so Chapman used them in practice games.
229 Whittaker, Tom Whittaker's, p. 95
230 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p. 156; Whittaker, Tom Whittaker's, p. 283
to the whole country including elementary schools. He also wanted the FA to
distribute a film on coaching. Chapman suggested that the England selectors
choose twenty of the most promising players and bring them together for coaching
once a week. However, he had no faith that this idea would be accepted. Chapman
was also impressed with the progress of football on the continent and envisioned a
West European Cup. He himself has a claim to have been England’s first manager,
if only on an unofficial basis. England visited Italy in 1933 whose team, with the
patronage of Mussolini’s Fascists, had been making rapid progress, something that
had even been noted by the Foreign Office. The FA member in charge of the
England team was Arthur Kingscott who Ivan Sharpe claims had invited Chapman to
Turin to act as team manager, although without the FA’s blessing. It was
Chapman who gave the players a team talk before the game, and also at half-time.

What can we say about Chapman’s lifestyle as Arsenal manager? In
appearance he sometimes resembled a country gent with his plus fours
complementing a portly figure and round face. His aspirations were partly reflected
by an increase in salary. His initial wage at Arsenal was £83 6s. 8d. per month plus

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231 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p. 157
232 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, pp. 173-74; Buchan, Lifetime in Football, p. 123
233 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p. 119, 165
234 ibid., p. 170. The competition would consist of the champion teams of England, Scotland,
France, Belgium and Spain. In fact, the first European Champions competition, was played in 1930.
Called the ‘Coupe des Nations’ it was played solely in Switzerland, and the first final in Geneva, was
between Ujpest of Hungary who beat Slavia Prague of Czechoslovakia 3-0. The referee was Stanley
Thesis, De Montfort University, date unknown), pp. 63-64
236 Sharpe, 40 Years, p. 156
237 Joy, Forward Arsenal, p. 86; Chapman, along with the rest of the England party, is later pictured
with Mussolini at his residence. Hapgood, Football Ambassador, op. p. 33
expenses and equated to an annual salary of approximately £1000.\textsuperscript{238} In 1933 he was awarded a new salary of £2000 per year, then the highest in football, and in today's terms the equivalent of £86,000. This was the salary of a high-flying business executive, and a reflection of Chapman's importance to the club. In addition, there was a possible £500 bonus if Arsenal won the cup and £250 for the league.\textsuperscript{239} The nature of the manager's job, both in terms of its precariousness and importance, was illustrated when it was reported in April 1929 that he had resigned at Arsenal and gone back to Huddersfield.\textsuperscript{240} This may have been a story that was deliberately planted by Chapman because in June he was offered, and accepted, a new contract with the club.\textsuperscript{241} He also had aspirations for his family. He had two daughters and two sons who both played rugby union which suggests that they attended private schools. The eldest, Ken, born in 1908, played for the East Midlands and later became President of the Rugby Football Union. Bruce meanwhile represented Middlesex. Herbert regarded Bruce's qualification as a solicitor as his proudest moment.\textsuperscript{242} He can have had little time for a family life however, as he was a workaholic. It was this commitment that probably led to his early death when he contracted pneumonia and died without warning on 6 January 1934.

The reaction to Chapman's untimely passing shared similarities with the those of assassinated American Presidents. His reputation soared. Supporters and,
especially the players, were visibly upset at his death, and the fans paid their respects by turning up to Highbury in record numbers.\textsuperscript{243} In October 1936 a bust of Chapman by Jacob Epstein was unveiled and placed in the foyer of Arsenal’s East Stand. It had been commissioned by twelve friends who formed the Herbert Chapman Club and met on the anniversary of his death to place a wreath on his grave.\textsuperscript{244} In this sense, Chapman had been immortalised, and a mythology grew up around him. In writing about Denis Compton, Jeff Hill has argued that he was famous in his playing days and remembered long afterwards in part because of the stories and images that made up the ‘legend’. It was this language of the legend, based on accounts of his triumphs and perceptions of his personality, that gave people their ideas about Compton. Thus, he became a ‘text’ and like all texts, open to interpretation.\textsuperscript{245} It is the role of the historian, to interrogate these texts in order to separate the myth from the reality. And, in order to unveil the reality of Chapman’s career the availability of sources needs to be taken into account. Chapman was not a literary man. He left neither diaries or letters, so the ‘truth’ needs to be teased out from a range of usually indirect sources. This work suggests that certain previous ‘truths’, concerning Chapman can no longer be supported with as much conviction as once was the case.

Chapman therefore, was not a myth but perhaps his reputation was. How then can we place him in the wider history of football management? In one sense, his

\textsuperscript{243} For example, the second home game after his death, against Spurs drew 68,828. It was played on a Wednesday, in January, in daylight, and, at the time, was a record for mid-week League game. Joy, \textit{Forward Arsenal}, p. 83

\textsuperscript{244} Whittaker, \textit{Tom Whittaker’s}, p. 131. Other famous figures who sat for Epstein included David Lloyd George and T.S. Eliot.
success with Arsenal was an historical accident, a product of circumstances. Things just fell into place for him that was not the case for managers at other clubs. Arsenal was a unique club. It was prepared to spend a lot of money in procuring success and was aided by its London location. Once Henry Norris had left, Chapman enjoyed unprecedented powers and influence. Yet he also had to prove he could manage, and in this respect he was uniquely successful, not only at Arsenal but also at his other clubs, especially Huddersfield Town. Chapman himself was unlike other football managers. In addition to his experience as a player, he was better educated, more articulate and had had a broader experience of life than most, including working for 5 years in industrial middle-management. Arsenal may have had more resources than other clubs, but this in itself was not a guarantee of success. It was Chapman’s management that was the key ingredient to Arsenal’s emergence as the exemplar of football modernity and, to a large extent, it was this which justified his mythical status.

Chapman’s greatest legacy was to modernise the role of the manager and become its model for the future. His hands-on style and increased powers meant that the manager became more important to the players, and certainly more important than the directors. Managers would have more power over team selection, and over which players to buy and, more importantly, to sell. Some managers would show greater concern for the welfare of players, and some would even be seen as father-figures. In the fullness of time, it would not be the players who would take responsibility for team tactics but the manager. Moreover, his role as motivator

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reinforced his increasingly powerful position. Players would come to rely on ‘the Boss’, and like the press and the fans, they would identify them as the most important person in the club. Largely because of Chapman’s success, directors would come to regard a manager as someone who could change the fortunes of their club. They would seen them as ‘experts’ and professionals. Paradoxically, it would mean that a manager’s job would become less secure as directors would search ever more frantically for the ‘right man’. Chapman also defined and extended the boundaries of the manager’s job, making it all-consuming. In terms of how a club was run, football managers would want to be in charge of everything, from the tea-lady to the first team. It became a job for obsessives and carried great pressures that left little time to self or family.

Yet, Chapman’s legacy was more than this. He realised that football could become a branch of the entertainment business, that it could be promoted. Because of the lack of leisure alternatives, other clubs were complacent on this matter but under Chapman, Arsenal was at the forefront of the game’s modernisation. In promoting football, Chapman cultivated his own personality and used Arsenal, with its capital location and proximity to the national newspapers, as his vehicle. It enhanced his public and professional status and at the same contributed to his mythology. After Chapman, managers would seek to increase their own status by promoting themselves through their day-to-day contact with newspapers, weekly columns, serials and, later, books. In time they would become media personalities. Eventually, the manager would become a football club’s focal point as Chapman had at Arsenal. A perception would emerge that they were all-powerful figures able to control and
shape the fortunes of clubs. The press began to link team performance with the work of its manager, and as a direct result, supporters would make the same association. Chapman may not have been the sole pioneer of these developments but he was certainly in its vanguard, the manager who set the standard by which other managers would be judged. However, as we shall see, this process would take time. Both Chapman and Arsenal were far ahead of the game. In the next chapter, an attempt will be made to examine Chapman’s influence on his managerial contemporaries.
CHAPTER 5

THE EMERGENCE OF THE FOOTBALL MANAGER, 1918-1939

... it is not always possible for one man to be a football expert, an accountant, and
to deal with the correspondence of a big club. Hence of late years the manager, as
distinct from the secretary has become a growing fashion ... it is clear that there is a
growing conviction that the secretary has separate duties, and the directors
appreciate that an experienced manager is needed.

Jimmy Catton in *All Sports Weekly*, 22 January 1927

When is a football manager a real manager? Answer: When he's allowed to manage.
*Topical Times*, 27 April 1935, p. 579

In the previous chapter we saw how Herbert Chapman represented the manager of
the future and how his career was a landmark in the change of football management
from its essentially voluntary tradition to a more professional approach. As Figure
5.1 demonstrates, during the inter-War period, and in the succeeding years, there was
an increase in the number of football managers.¹ In terms of management however, it
was much the same as before, as the idea of a manager may have become more
popular but directors still held firm ideas on how clubs should be run. In general,
they resisted any ‘Chapmanisation’ process. Instead, they preferred to retain the
privileges of ownership and run the club as they saw fit, or until they felt the
manager could be given more powers. A small number of Chapman ‘disciples’ did
emerge who had their own ideas regarding the running of a football club but any
change was slow overall, and with the outbreak of war any modernisation was frozen
for its duration at least. Chapman therefore, was relatively unique because his role at

¹ It should be noted that Figure 5.1 refers to the number of people who became managers of Football
League clubs during each five year period. It is not a calculation of the number of managers that have
been employed by clubs i.e. managerial turnover (see Figure 6.1). These figures also need to be
qualified. The data is at its most equivocal for period before the First World War as there is the
probability that there may have been more managers appointed during those years. The periods during
the World Wars have been included because football was played then, if only on a regional basis. The
rise in new appointments after the wars can be partly attributed to clubs wanting a fresh start and to
Arsenal was so wide-ranging. To a large degree, the management of football clubs continued to reflect patterns within British industrial management as whole. Keeble has argued that, '[m]aking managers the British way ... produced for the country an industrial leadership less well educated and less widely experienced than their counterparts abroad ... The British way was inefficient and wasteful.' Similarly, football managers were increasingly former players but it was largely a matter of luck if they had any skills in man-management for example.

The inter-War period as a whole was characterised by severe regional fluctuations in the economy. A short boom followed the First World War until 1921, but then Britain experienced the fastest economic collapse in its history. From 1921 until 1938, unemployment remained above one million, reaching a peak of 2.8 million in 1932, and between 1929 and 1932 Britain was hit by a second international depression. During the Twenties there had also been a shift away from staple industries reliant on exports, towards high productivity industries such as motor vehicles, consumer durables and electric power that depended on the home market. These industries however, were mainly located in the South and the Midlands, so some regions such as the North East, that relied heavily on staple industries, continued to struggle to come to terms with the changing economic circumstances.

Yet despite the worst years of the Depression between 1929 and 1932, the 1930s was a decade of continual growth with the real incomes of consumers rising.

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1 Keeble, Ability to Manage, p. 61
2 Baines, 'Onset of Depression', pp. 169-76; D. Baines, 'Recovery from Depression', in Johnson, Twentieth Century Britain, pp. 188-91; B. Harris, 'Unemployment and the Dole in Interwar Britain', in Johnson, Twentieth Century Britain, pp. 203-06
Demand for leisure commodities during these years was buoyant and there was a 15 per cent increase in consumer spending on the theatre, cinemas and sporting events. Football attendances also increased considerably, closely mirroring the fortunes of the national economy. In 1927, 23.4 million watched Football League games; for the 1937-38 season, it was 31.43 million. Stephen Jones has suggested that the level of disposable income of the workers was the main determinant of consumer demand. As a football club’s main source of income was gate receipts, its level of support was partially dependent on local economic circumstances such as levels of trade, employment and wages.

Gareth Williams has argued that the fortunes of Welsh rugby were reflected by the economic slump of the inter-War period. In South Wales, with unemployment endemic in mining areas, the Depression had a devastating impact on crowds at rugby internationals and at club level. Welsh football was similarly affected. In the early 1920s there were six Welsh clubs in the Football League but by 1930 Aberdare Athletic and Merthyr Town had been forced to drop out. Russell contends however, that there were only modest changes in the overall geographical balance of footballing power across the inter-War period. The rise of southern football, for

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6 Dobson and Goddard, 'Performance', p. 767; Jones, 'Economic Aspects', p. 289

7 Jones, 'Economic Aspects', p. 288

8 Furthermore, half a million people moved out of South Wales, a fifth of the nation’s population, affecting the numbers who played. Merthyr had an unemployment rate of 66 per cent, and more turned up to watch the team train than play because they were unable to afford the 9d admission charge. G. Williams, ‘From Grand Slam to Great Slump: Economy, Society and Rugby Football in Wales During the Depression’, *Welsh History Review*, Vol. 11, 1982-83, pp. 338-57.
example, can be largely attributed to the success of Arsenal.\textsuperscript{9} Despite this, a club’s fortunes partly reflected the state of the local economy. Tottenham Hotspur’s revenue, for example, increased from £37,087 in 1927 to £52,144 by 1934, during which time Spurs were mainly in the Second Division.\textsuperscript{10} Middlesbrough however, was deeply affected by the depression, and between 1927-28 and 1932-33, when unemployment in the town was 46 per cent, the football club’s attendances fell by 44 per cent.\textsuperscript{11} Revenue also dropped from £36,792 in 1930 to £24,611 in 1934.\textsuperscript{12} Yet throughout the thirties’, Middlesbrough, along with Sunderland and Newcastle, maintained their First Division status. This perhaps partly stemmed from cultural variables such as the North East’s reputation as a ‘hotbed’ of football.\textsuperscript{13}

The main reason for football’s relative resilience was the protection offered to clubs by the Football League in its role as a cartel and its equalisation policies.\textsuperscript{14} As well as maintaining a competitive edge, promotion and relegation provided clubs with opportunities to increase their incomes by playing at a higher level. Moreover, not only did the retain-and-transfer system and the maximum wage regulate football’s labour market, it limited, to a certain extent, the concentration of football talent in the richer clubs. During the First World War the principle of pooled resources had been established and in 1924 this was extended. League President, John McKenna,

\textsuperscript{9}Russell, Football, p. 77. In 1919 both the First and Second Divisions of the Football League were increased from 20 to 22. In 1920 a Third Division of 22 clubs drawn from the Southern League was added, and in 1921 the Third Division North comprising 22 clubs was established.
\textsuperscript{10}Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, p. 375
\textsuperscript{11}Russell, Football, p. 82
\textsuperscript{12}Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, p. 363
\textsuperscript{13}Russell, Football, p. 83. In 1932 Newcastle won the FA Cup. In 1936 Sunderland won the League and the Cup a year later.
\textsuperscript{14}Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, pp. 248-77
devised a scheme whereby 20 per cent of the home club’s net gate was to be paid to the visitors.\textsuperscript{15} In addition, the gate receipts for FA Cup ties were shared. Within this framework however, football clubs were still ‘dynamic business enterprises’, and Russell has identified the management of resources and the team as more significant factors in the clubs achieving success than the prevailing socio-economic forces.\textsuperscript{16}

Britain’s economic vicissitudes had a modernising impact on business. The government had encouraged a policy of ‘rationalization’, leading to some ailing plants in the staple industries being closed down. The intention was to make industry more profitable and efficient, and so production was concentrated in just a few works.\textsuperscript{17} Rationalization was accompanied by a wave of mergers within industry as a whole between 1918 and 1933, changing the structure of British business. Between 1921 and 1951 the number of employers fell from 692,000 to 457,000 due to industrial amalgamations, with small businesses being gradually eliminated from their markets.\textsuperscript{18} The industries most affected included food, chemicals and shipbuilding. In addition, the government facilitated the merger of the 120 railway companies into just four geographically separate and gigantic businesses in 1923.\textsuperscript{19} The scale of these companies’ operations increased and the day-to-day control over capital was gradually, if unevenly, transferred from its owners to career managers in bureaucratic

\textsuperscript{16}Jones, ‘Economic Aspects’, p. 296; Russell, Football, p. 84
\textsuperscript{17}Baines, ‘Onset of Depression’, p. 177
\textsuperscript{19}Jeremy, Business History, p. 206
hierarchies. Consequently, the divorce between ownership and control widened and this signalled the start of ‘the professionalization of management’.20

One of the new breed of modern business managers was Josiah Stamp. He originally worked for the Inland Revenue and also studied for an economics degree at the LSE. By 1914 he was on the Board of Inland Revenue where he created the Excess Profits Duty that raised nearly one-third of the total tax revenue collected during the War. In 1919 he was recruited by Harry McGowan to work for Nobels as company secretary. His expertise in accounting was unusual among businessmen, and he later became Britain’s best-known expert economist. His professional reputation was such that in 1924 he was appointed as one of Britain’s representatives on the Dawes committee, formed to examine the problem of German reparations. Stamp emerged as the committee’s most effective member. He felt his new found status was not commensurate with his position at Nobels however, and in 1926 he accepted the position of president of the executive of Britain’s biggest company, the London, Midland and Scottish Railway. Under Stamp the LMS was to be run as a modern business.21

In conjunction with the rise of career managers like Stamp, the inter-War period, particularly the 1930s, marked the emergence of a managerial middle-class. There was an increase in the membership of technical and scientific professions together with a rise of salaried employees. This was reflected by a gradual change in the structure of the labour force when the number of managers and administrators

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20 Perkin, Professional Society, pp. 294-96
nearly doubled from 704,000 to 1.25 million between 1921 and 1951.\textsuperscript{22} Yet despite these changes and the merger activity in the large businesses, 'conservative management practices persisted'.\textsuperscript{23} The mergers were mainly horizontal, and were characterised by consolidation as they brought together firms in the same industry. The merger wave was defensive, aimed at stabilising competition and prices and also emulative, as British firms responded to the threat of intervention by foreign companies.\textsuperscript{24}

The increase in industrial mergers and concentration however, had created a demand for senior managers with a higher level of ability. It was a demand that the education system was not yet able to fill. Access to education in general remained restricted during this period. The Fisher Act of 1918 had raised the elementary school leaving age to 14 and it had also made provision for continuation schools. These were designed to give part-time education to children up to the age of 16 already in work, and provide a link between industry and schooling but only a few were built. The local education authorities, not central government, were the major contributors to the finance of education between the wars. The economic depression however, severely diminished the capacity of some areas to fund education. In addition, much of a decreasing rate income, through the collapse of local businesses, was taken up by the payment of unemployment benefit. As a result, fewer grammar schools or junior technical schools (which were started before 1914) and technical colleges could be built in these areas. Overall, there was only a modest increase in the

\textsuperscript{22}McKibbin, \textit{Classes and Cultures}, pp. 44-49

\textsuperscript{23}Gourvish, 'British Business', p. 27

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{ibid.}, pp. 27-34
number of secondary schools and even by 1938 there was only 14 per cent of former elementary school children attending secondary schools. The access of working-class children to grammar schools remained low, rising from 4 per cent for those born between 1910 and 1919, to only 7 per cent in the period 1920-29. Grammar schools themselves were characterised by inequality and waste. On the one hand, 73 per cent of children of high intelligence still attended elementary or central schools by 1935; on the other, 49 per cent of fee-paying children in grammar schools were not of the intelligence to benefit from such education. The lack of mobility in the education system was even more acute at university level where in 1938-39 only 2.5 per cent of boys came from working-class backgrounds.25

British managers therefore, were characterised by low levels of educational achievement and qualifications due to a lack of support from the education system. Keeble has argued that the gap between industry and education could have been narrower if industry had wanted it.26 In 1933 thirty-one leading industrialists and public figures such as Gordon Selfridge, Seebohm Rowntree and John Reith put their names to a manifesto that recognised ‘the importance of efficient management to industry’. The manifesto suggested that, ‘[s]ystematic education for management is ... one of the chief steps required to assure Britain’s industrial future’. It also recognised that Britain provided competent technical and scientific training but not in the ‘administrative application of ... specialised knowledge’.27 Employers however, were disinclined to recognise the virtues of training and as a result there was little

25Sanderson, Education, Chapter 5. University numbers did rise from 40,000 to 50,000 during the inter-War period but this only accounted for 1.7 per cent of all eighteen year olds in 1938-39.
26Keeble, Ability to Manage, p. 65
Background of Football Managers, 1885-1993

Figure 5.2:
investment in future managers. They had failed to support the junior technical schools and also preferred employees to undertake vocational courses in their own time rather than the company's.\textsuperscript{28} Employers also found it difficult to understand that this form of education could benefit them. Perhaps this is understandable as many employers had also emerged from this management culture (see Chapter 1). Some businessmen also believed that higher education was perceived as a positive disadvantage to a business career and that it was the early years in industry that were critical for forming the right habits and ideas.\textsuperscript{29}

In terms of the social make-up of managers employed, Ross McKibbin has argued that management was dominated by the middle-class due to the importance of the possession of the correct social manners. Consequently, social confidence was put ahead of technical expertise as a quality most sought in managers, particularly in small firms. Successful management was seen as being able to get on with people and having a good sense of humour. British managers were generalists who needed leadership qualities and personality; it was men who had learned to lead their team to victory on the rugby field who were regarded as the ideal candidates to lead their workers to greater effort in the workplace. It was also a representation of British society where relationships within the workplace reflected its hierarchical class system. Furthermore, technically qualified men were rarely appointed to company boards because it was thought that their social skills were too narrow and disabled

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{27}Evening Gazette (Middlesbrough), 2 January 1933, p. 3
  \item \textsuperscript{28}Keeble, \textit{Ability to Manage}, p. 70; Sanderson, \textit{Education}, p. 64
  \item \textsuperscript{29}Keeble, \textit{Ability to Manage}, p. 85
\end{itemize}
Figure 5.3:
Playing Experience of Football Managers, 1885-1993

Source: Turner and White, *Football Managers*
them for management.\(^{30}\) Overall, this situation compared unfavourably to Germany which placed priority on a high level of general and vocational education and also Japan which emphasised high academic abilities combined with a professional attitude to business. British industry instead ensured that the belief in the 'cult of the amateur' survived well into the twentieth century.\(^{31}\)

It was not surprising therefore, that football managers had no training or little education. Figure 5.2 shows that following the First World War, and particularly after 1930, managers increasingly represented the first generation of professional footballers. One simple equation directors worked on, was that the better the player, the better qualified he was for the job. For example, a number of players from the famous Newcastle team of the Edwardian period had become managers by the Twenties.\(^{32}\) Figure 5.3 shows that of the players who became managers there has been a relatively high percentage who have been former internationals footballers.\(^{33}\) Interestingly, as shown in Figure 5.4, it seems that no particular type, defender, midfielder or forward, was favoured. The exception to this was goalkeepers who perhaps suffered from the prejudice that they were not 'real' footballers.\(^{34}\) It was

\(^{30}\) McKibbin, *Classes and Cultures*, p. 97; Keeble, *Ability to Manage*, p. 59

\(^{31}\) Keeble, *Ability to Manage*, p. 59; Wilson, *Business History*, p. 177

\(^{32}\) These were Peter McWilliam, Billy McCracken, James Lawrence, Jack Carr, James Howie, Robert Hewison, George Jobey, Alec Gosnell and Colin Veitch. *Huddersfield Examiner*, 22 December 1923, p. 16

\(^{33}\) For example, in 1997 there were approximately 2000 players of whom about 200 were current or former British Isles internationals. The ratio of internationals to players who became managers is about 1 in 3 to 1 in 4. *News of the World, Football Annual 1997-98*

\(^{34}\) For this graph, not only has the number of goalkeepers, defenders, midfielders and forwards been taken into account, but also their formation on the field. Up to 1960 therefore, the overall percentage figure has been divided by 1 for goalkeepers, 2.5 for defenders and midfielders, and 5 for forwards. After 1961 the ratio changes to 1-4-4-2 to take into consideration changing formations within the game. In a survey conducted in Desmond Morris, *The Soccer Tribe* (1981), p. 228, it was found that in 1980 out of the 92 managers in the Football League, 88 were former professionals with the remaining four ex-amateurs. Of the 88 ex-professionals 27 had been forwards, 32 midfielders, 28 defenders and one had been a goalkeeper.
Figure 5.4: Football Managers' Positions on Field as Players, 1885-1993

Source: Turner and White, 'Football Managers'
their knowledge of the professional game that attracted football club directors. It was believed that former professionals would ‘know the ropes’ and understand all about players from the ‘practical side’ such as detecting ‘malingering’.\(^{35}\)

Of course, directors did look for other attributes notably, experience, leadership qualities and evidence of a better education but as most players came from working class backgrounds, it meant that few potential managers had had a secondary education, the great majority having left school at 13, or 14 after 1918. A few did have a secondary education behind them, and this was probably a higher proportion compared with footballers in general. Before becoming a professional footballer, Colin Veitch, for example, had trained as a pupil teacher at Rutherford College in Newcastle in the late 1890s.\(^{36}\) A superior education and a successful playing career however, were no guarantees for success and at his only club as manager, Bradford City, he left after eighteen unsuccessful months.\(^{37}\) Andy Ducat was similarly unsuccessful as manager of Fulham between 1924 and 1926. Like Veitch, he received a secondary education, at Compton House School in Southend. He also won two caps for England and captained Aston Villa when they won the FA Cup in 1920.\(^{38}\)

Of course, it was not compulsory for managers to have been players (and it never has been). Some were hired for their knowledge of local football or were

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\(^{35}\) *Huddersfield Examiner*, 22 December 1923, p. 16

\(^{36}\) *Sunday Sun*, 3 May, p. 32; 10 May 1931, p. 32. Veitch, Newcastle’s captain and an England international, was very atypical of a professional footballer. A committed socialist, he was also a talented actor, musician, a chorus member of the Newcastle Amateur Operatic Society and member of the Newcastle People’s Theatre. Between 1911 and 1918 he was also chairman of the Players’ Union. Harding, *Good of the Game*, p. 91, 377. In Chapter 9 of his *English Journey*, J.B. Priestley visited the Newcastle People’s Theatre.

\(^{37}\) *Sunday Sun*, 16 August 1931, p. 21

\(^{38}\) He also played cricket for England and later became cricket coach at Eton college. Ducat was one of only 17 men to represent England at both football and cricket during the twentieth century. He died whilst batting at Lords. Morris, *Aston Villa*, p. 112; Turner and White, *Football Managers*, p. 122
promoted after having previously served the club in some other capacity either as player, trainer or secretary. Charles Foweraker was the most successful manager in Bolton Wanderers’ history, winning the FA Cup in 1923, 1926 and 1929. He had originally been a gateman for the club whilst working for the London and North Western Railway. He later became assistant secretary before he was appointed secretary-manager in 1919. In 1930 Bristol Rovers appointed Captain Albert Prince-Cox as their manager. He had been a referee and therefore, had some understanding of controlling players. Prince-Cox also held a professional qualification as a meteorologist. Fred Everiss had not been a player either, and had left school at 13 in 1895 after passing the Labour Examination, allowing him to enter employment. He first worked as decorator and then as a printer’s errand boy before joining West Bromwich Albion as an office boy at 4s per week in 1896, and was only 20 when he became the club secretary. Similar to Herbert Chapman, Fred Everiss later worked in a local munitions factory during the First World War. He interrupted his tenure with West Bromwich Albion in 1915 and was placed in charge of the production of shells at the John Spencer factory in Wednesbury. During the inter-War period therefore, managers still came from a diversity of backgrounds, although it is open to question whether William Beer, before managing Birmingham City, had received the ideal preparation for football management after spending ten years as a sheep farmer

39 Young, Bolton Wanderers, p. 69
40 Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 208
42 Midland Chronicle, 1 October 1915, p. 4; Sunday Mercury, ‘The Fred Everiss Story’, 29 May 1949, p. 17
Training was on the job. Billy Walker believed that he only required two fundamental qualifications for football management. First, that he had twenty years experience as a player and that he had familiarised himself with the ‘3Rs’ of football management; the FA and Football League’s rules and regulations.

Life experience therefore, was the main form of training for former players who became managers. Their experience of professional football was a form of preparation but in general it only perpetuated and consolidated the dominant thinking on how players should be handled. As we have seen, this had been built on a rigid hierarchical structure where everyone knew their place and strict notions of authority. In addition, following the First World War many footballers had served in the army. As we have seen in the Introduction, life in the forces shared some similarities with that in football clubs where management also largely consisted of the need to control and discipline young men. It is likely that some managers with military experience used this in their handling of footballers. Frank Buckley, for example, was awarded a commission in the 17th Footballers’ Battalion and was later promoted to Major and acted as second-in-command. On his first managerial appointment at Norwich City, Buckley actually advertised for players from the Footballers’ Battalions. Previous to that he had served as a Sergeant-Instructor in the 2nd Kings Liverpool Regiment during the Boer War. In addition to his army background, Buckley had owned a farm in partnership with his brother Chris. He also dressed like a farmer, wearing a tweed suit with plus fours. Throughout his

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43 Turmer and White, Football Managers, p. 86
44 B. Walker, Soccer in the Blood (1960), pp. 30-33
career he was always addressed as the ‘Major’, even by his wife!\textsuperscript{47} Three other members of the Footballers’ Battalions also became managers; Jack Tresarden, Angus Seed and Charlie Bell who, like Buckley, was given a commission.\textsuperscript{48} Seed’s brother, Jimmy also joined the Cyclists’ Corps at Sunderland during the War.\textsuperscript{49} Without prior training it inhibited the ability of managers to approach the job with a more reflective and considered attitude.

As the demand for more managers with a football playing background increased so their geographical diffusion closely mirrored the spatial pattern of origin amongst professional footballers, with ‘northerness’ a continuing characteristic in their production.\textsuperscript{50} As a result, the geographical location of soccer ‘hotbeds’ reflected the sport’s early development and consequently the distribution of the production of players and managers.\textsuperscript{51} John Bale argues however, that the geographical diffusion of footballers, and thus managers, reflected the shifting economic performance of the North and the South.\textsuperscript{52} Despite the dominant flows of migrant footballers going from the North to the South, there was a definite, if slow, ‘nationalisation’ process.

\textsuperscript{46} *Athletic News*, 17 March 1919, p. 6
\textsuperscript{47} Catton Folders B-C, p. 195
\textsuperscript{48} ‘Footballer’s Battalion’ by Frank Buckley. Information supplied by Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club.
\textsuperscript{49} Seed, *Jimmy Seed*, p. 67. Other footballers who joined the same regiment included Tommy Thompson and Tom Wilson. Wilson, who later captained Huddersfield Town when Herbert Chapman was manager, also captained his battalion’s team. *ibid.*
\textsuperscript{50} J. Bale, *Sport and Place: A Geography of Sport in England, Scotland and Wales* (1982), Tables 4.1 and 4.2, pp. 32-38. See Appendix 15-16 for a spatial breakdown of the production of football managers born in Great Britain. One of its most notable aspects is the disproportionately large Scottish percentage and its long-term decline. This decline is reflected in the largely commensurate rise in English managers and closely resembles the pattern for professional footballers. See Chapter 2, n82 of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{51} Up to 1920, teams that were later elected to the League were invariably from the North. The one notable early exception being Woolwich Arsenal which was the first southern team to join the Football League in 1893.
\textsuperscript{52} Bale, *Sport and Place*, p. 29. See part II, Chapter 4
Managers begin to hail from an increasing number of different locations including London and South Wales.

Demand for managers was not confined to England of course. In Chapter 3 it was noted how Willie Maley was the first manager of Glasgow Celtic, helping them enjoy much success. In 1920 their Old Firm rivals, Glasgow Rangers, appointed Bill Struth, a stonemason by trade and the club’s trainer, as their manager. He retired in 1954 and under him Rangers surpassed the Maley years at Celtic.\footnote{Murray, Old Firm, pp. 204-07} Moreover, it was not just Britain where football managers were increasing. Through its trading links, football was exported by the British to all corners of the globe. Interest and competition in the game grew in these new footballing countries and so did the need for expertise to aid their development. Pierre Lanfranchi has argued that European football was a ‘manifestation of technical progress’ as many clubs were established by the growing number of engineers on the continent.\footnote{P. Lanfranchi, ‘Exporting football: notes on the development of football in Europe’, R. Giulianotti and J. Williams (eds.), Game Without Frontiers: Football, Identity and Modernity (Aldershot, 1994), pp. 23-46} It was partly through this tradition that European football later developed a more technocratic attitude towards management and coaching compared to Britain’s practical tradition. In addition, the game in Europe was a ‘white collar’ game whereas in Britain it had strong working-class roots. Nevertheless, because they were the pioneers of football, British coaches were at the forefront of turning football into the world game.\footnote{J. Walvin, The People’s Game (Newton Abbot, 1975), Chapter 5. For a history of South American football see T. Mason, Passion of the People? (1995)} One of the early pioneers was William Garbutt. He had been a player with Woolwich Arsenal and Blackburn Rovers in the early 1900s before moving to Italy to coach Genoa between
1910 and 1915. He later managed Naples from 1929 and 1935 having helped to prepare the Italian team for the 1924 Olympics.\textsuperscript{56} Fred Pentland became famous as manager of the Spanish Basque team, Athletic Bilbao, winning two titles in 1930 and 1931. In 1920 he had coached the French Olympic team before managing Racing Santander. Pentland has been credited with introducing the short-passing game to Spanish football.\textsuperscript{57}

Jimmy Hogan was probably the most famous of the British coaches who worked abroad. He began in 1910 coaching a club in Holland before taking charge of the Dutch national team. He moved to Austria in 1912 where he began a long association with Hugo Meisl who was described as the Herbert Chapman of European football. Hogan was peripatetic and also coached in Germany, Switzerland and Hungary. In 1936 he coached the Austrian side that reached the 1936 Olympics Final.\textsuperscript{58} European managers also began to emerge between the wars. Hugo Meisl has already been mentioned as a pioneer in Austria and he was later assisted by his nephew, Willy Meisl. Vittorio Pozzo was the leading coach in Italy. As a young man he had worked in Bradford but preferred to watch Manchester United, especially Charlie Roberts. Back in Italy he first worked at Torino before managing the national team that won the World Cup in 1934 and 1938 and also the Olympics in 1936.\textsuperscript{59}

Both European and South American countries concentrated more on the training and preparation of players than the British. Furthermore, greater emphasis

\begin{footnotes}
\item[57] When Saturday Comes, March 2000, p. 20. He had also played for Blackburn Rovers like Garbutt and had been interned by the Germans during the War. \textit{ibid.}
\item[58] D. Turner, ‘A Coach’s Trip to Europe’, \textit{The Footballer}, Vol. 1, 6 (March/April 1989), pp. 28-29
\end{footnotes}
was placed on the national team rather than the club game. In Italy, admittedly assisted by a Fascist regime that used football for political purposes, the national team under Pozzo assembled three weeks before a game for practice and tactical preparations. In Holland all potential internationals were card indexed and then underwent a thorough preparation consisting of blackboard demonstrations and ball practice. English coaches returning from the continent to management positions, like Tom Bromilow at Burnley, faced cultural resistance from players to the methods they had used on the continent. Similarly, Jimmy Hogan had returned to England in 1934 to manage Fulham but was dismissed after only one season. The players did not respond to his methods and the directors agreed with them that experienced players did not need coaching.

English football was at a more mature stage of development than in Europe. Its management culture therefore, was more deeply embedded and despite the increase in the number of football managers, it would be wrong to assume that a change in their relationship with club directors was inevitable. Burke has argued that to understand why social change takes place historians need to examine how it takes place, i.e. the mechanics of change. During the inter-War period, the management of English football clubs was essentially about power, and this continued to be exercised by the directors. Despite the impact of Herbert Chapman, the amateur,

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60 Sharpe, *Forty Years*, Chapter 12
62 *Topical Times*, 12 January 1935, p. 43
63 Turner, 'A Coach's Trip to Europe', pp. 28-29
64 Burke, *History*, p. 139
voluntary tradition of English football management persisted as directors were unwilling to concede the perks of their position. In one sense, this is not surprising. Many directors were successful businessmen who had a lot of self-esteem and thought they knew a lot about football, and some did, having played it at a reasonable level. Harold Hardman, for example, a director of Manchester United, had been an England amateur international. In comparison to footballers, directors were also better educated and more experienced in life in general. Any claims therefore, of interference from directors is perhaps a case of history with hindsight because directors had always taken the responsibility of running the club and expected to continue to do so.

Some directors therefore, like James Taylor at Preston North End, dominated their clubs during this period. At nearby Blackburn Rovers, former England captain, Bob Crompton was honorary manager between 1926 and 1931 as well as being a director of the club at the same time. Newcastle United’s tradition of directors being in charge of the team was continued by Stan Seymour, another former player, until the 1950s. George Allison of course, had been a director before relinquishing this position to become Arsenal’s full-time manager. Other directors just liked to interfere. At Glasgow Rangers however, Bill Struth as manager also held the largest individual shareholding and in 1947 he was able to oust the club chairman, James Bowie. As Fishwick has similarly argued about football (see Chapter 4), Gourvish has identified the role of crisis as one of the necessary ingredients in the

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65 Russell, Football, p. 90
66 Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 114
67 Appleton, Hotbed of Soccer, pp. 151-61; Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 222
transition within British industry from an owner-dominated to a manager-dominated enterprise in large-scale businesses during the Twenties and Thirties but he also argues that this transition was marked by a determination of families to maintain control of a company. 69

Because they were small and peculiar businesses, any management changes were specific to each football club. For example, Frank Buckley initially had to defer to the directors of Wolverhampton Wanderers when he became manager in 1927. It was not until 1933-34 when the team was having a poor run of results, together with changes in the boardroom, that he was accorded full powers to select the team. 70 Peter McWilliam also became Middlesbrough's manager in 1927. It was claimed that he was to be given total control of team selection without any interference from the board. It was actually stipulated in his contract that he was to have full powers to select both the first and second teams. The reality however, was rather different. When Herbert Bamlett, his predecessor, had been manager, the directors had selected the team, and when they disagreed on this together with the recruitment of players they took a vote. McWilliam was also faced with the problem of directors questioning his selection and having to change the team at their behest. 71 Similarly, on taking up the post of secretary-manager at Sheffield Wednesday in 1933, Billy Walker felt that his position was one of full power and full responsibility. When the

68 Murray, Old Firm, p. 206
69 Gourvish, 'British Business', p. 28
70 Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Minutes, 23 August 1933; 29 August 1933; 3 October 1933
71 Middlesbrough FC Minutes, passim
club was later relegated to the Second Division in 1937 however, the directors began to interfere with Walker's handling of the team.72

In contrast, Jimmy Seed, who was appointed manager of Charlton Athletic in May 1933, virtually ran the club himself. This can be concluded from the actual number of directors' meetings Charlton held between 1935 and 1939: only one every two months. Middlesbrough's directors on the other hand met once a week during the playing season and their interference probably stemmed from the voluntary tradition, and the need to be involved. In 1932 Charlton had been taken over by two brothers, Albert and Stanley Gliksten who were millionaire timber merchants from London's East End. They were probably too busy running their business to manage the football club and so left it in the hands of Seed.73 In 1932 Charlie Paynter had been appointed West Ham's team manager and he also continued with his duties as club trainer. The recruitment of players however, was now the responsibility of two directors, Messrs. Liddell and Leafe. This division of labour represented a dilution of the responsibilities of the previous secretary-manager, Syd King.74

How did a manager's relationship with his directors effect his role? According to Jones, football management, in strict economic terms, has to satisfy a demand for 'productivity gains in the form of a quality team' and that during this period this was increasingly translated into techniques such as coaching and tactics.75 Before this however, a team had to be assembled. With the growth of the transfer market in this

72 Walker, Soccer, pp. 36-37
74 West Ham FC Minutes, 7-22 November 1932. I am grateful to Matt Taylor for this information. Korr, West Ham, pp. 88-90
75 Jones, 'Economic Aspects', p. 293
period, due to an increase in the number of transfers and actual fees, it further underlined the importance of selecting the right player. In effect, the main job of the manager had become that of a personnel manager: someone who built the team by looking for players but whose power was conditional on the club’s overall strategy and financial situation.

When the post for manager of Wolverhampton Wanderers was advertised in the Athletic News in 1927, it was unequivocally stated in capital letters, that ‘A SPENDTHRIFT IS NOT NEEDED’. And during Frank Buckley’s tenure this set the tone for the club’s long term policy. When he took office the club owed the bank £14,000, and had made a loss for the 1926-27 season of £1500 with first team receipts totalling £15,000. By 1935-36 the club had made a profit of £17,000, were in credit with the bank to £4000 and gate receipts had increased to £32,000. Buckley had built himself a reputation for ‘wheeling and dealing’ in players, and, importantly, finding talent. Between 1935 and 1938 the club’s income from transferred players was £110,658; an overall profit of £68,000. At the centre of this turnaround was Wolves’s scouting system and Buckley’s ability to sell on players for large profits. In 1938, for example, Wolves sold Bryn Jones to Arsenal for a record £14,000. On his appointment as Charlton manager, Seed was told by

\[\text{\textsuperscript{76}}\text{Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, pp. 165-67}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{77}}\text{Athletic News, 2 May 1927, p. 19}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{78}}\text{Guide and Ideas, ‘Football is My Life Story’ by Major Frank Buckley, 1 May 1937, p. 3}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{79}}\text{P.M. Young, Centenary Wolves, Wolverhampton (1976), p. 109; Cullis, All for the Wolves (1960), p. 94}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{80}}\text{Express and Star, 22 December 1964, p. 24, ‘Obituary’. Buckley also needed some luck. Billy Wright won a then record 105 caps for England and played only for Wolves during his career. Yet Buckley thought that he was too small to be a footballer and was prepared to transfer him but was prevented from doing so because the groundsman argued that he was the hardest working member of his staff. Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999}\]
the Glikstens of their ambitious plans to make Charlton's ground, the Valley, the best in the country but their motivations later changed.\textsuperscript{81} When they first assumed control at Charlton they had taken an active role in all the club's affairs. This stemmed from their financial investment that later totalled £105,000, made up of two debentures.\textsuperscript{82} Later, it became the aim of the Glikstens to reclaim the loan rather than make further investment. Seed claimed that, as a result, the club had 'a policy against big spending'.\textsuperscript{83} In his 23 years as manager of Charlton, Seed spent £55,000 on players but sold others worth £170,000.\textsuperscript{84}

It was noted in previous chapters how the labour market underwent a process of bureaucratisation, and during the inter-War period it continued to be formalised. This meant its organisation was increasingly placed in the hands of managers and officials. The national insurance scheme, introduced in 1911, was extended to most industrial workers by 1920, including footballers with Football League clubs. Bureaucratic employers, particularly the railways, also took greater steps to monitor and control their workers by imposing fines, placing workers under surveillance and subjecting them to medical tests and examinations of competence.\textsuperscript{85} Football clubs also adopted more systematic methods regarding the recruitment of players. For example, many began to develop sophisticated scouting networks that

\textsuperscript{81} R. Redden, \textit{The History of Charlton Athletic: Valley of Tears, Valley of Joy} (1993), p. 32

\textsuperscript{82} A debenture is defined as a sealed bond issued by a company acknowledging that it is indebted to the holder of the bond for a specified sum of money, bearing interest until repayment of the principal sum. The first, worth £65,000, was a debt the club owed to Messrs Humphreys Ltd, a firm of engineers. The Glikstens took this on and took out a second debenture of £40,000 in April 1937 when the club accrued further debts from transfer fees and wages. Charlton Athletic FC Minutes, 21 April 1937; Seed, \textit{Jimmy Seed}, p. 25

\textsuperscript{83} Seed, \textit{Jimmy Seed}, pp. 30-31. For example see Charlton Athletic FC Minutes, 22 January 1935

\textsuperscript{84} Redden, \textit{Charlton Athletic}, p. 32

\textsuperscript{85} Savage and Miles, \textit{British Working Class}, pp. 53-54; Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 231
extended across the British Isles, and the richer the club the more sophisticated the network. 86 Jimmy Seed arranged for scouts to cover most of Britain on behalf of Charlton. He was particularly keen to cultivate the North East that was generally regarded as a breeding ground for professional footballers. 87 Seed appointed his brother, Anthony, as the chief to the other five scouts there. 88 Sam Bartram, for example, Charlton’s longest serving player, was recommended to Seed whilst playing for Boldon Villa in county Durham. 89 Professional clubs also began to develop links with local junior clubs and adopted them as nursery clubs. Young professionals played for these junior clubs who would then cultivate their talent before playing in the Football League. Charlton’s nursery club was Bexleyheath and Welling. 90 Scarborough approached Middlesbrough with the view of becoming their nursery club but Middlesbrough rejected it. Instead an arrangement was reached where Middlesbrough gained first refusal on Scarborough’s players. 91

In addition to the reports from scouts, Jimmy Seed kept a record of every Charlton first team game in which he gave brief comments on each player from both

86 Fishwick, *English Football*, p. 41. Reports on players were dispatched to clubs where they were usually discussed between the directors and manager who would then decide whether someone should watch the player before signing him.

87 Over 15 per cent of Football League players born in England and Wales between 1919 and 1939 and who signed with clubs after 1945, came from the North East. At the time, the North East’s population accounted for less than 6 per cent of the population of England and Wales. The overall total was 756 out of a grand total of 5016. Of this total, 53 per cent came from the three major urban conurbations: Tyneside - 213 (28 per cent); Teesside - 120 (16 per cent); and Wearside - 69 (9 per cent). P. Hutchins, ‘Sport and Regional Pride: Association Football and the North East of England 1919-1961’ (PhD Thesis, University of Sussex, 1990), pp. 59-60

88 Seed, *Jimmy Seed*, p. 31. One of whom was a Mr Fake of Annfield Plain who was employed in 1935 on a trial basis for a season at 30 shillings per week plus expenses. Charlton Athletic FC Minutes, 28 May 1935


90 Charlton Athletic FC Minutes, 22 January; 26 February; 23 April; 11 July; 19 July 1935. They had had a previous agreement with Romford that was cancelled.

91 Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 24 April 1927; 18 January; 25 January 1928
sides. For example, Seed signed Don Welsh from Torquay in February 1935 for £3250.92 Earlier that season when Charlton met Torquay United, Seed remarked that Welsh was the best player on the pitch, a ‘brilliant player in defence and attack’.93 Other players were judged more harshly. Manchester City and England goalkeeper, Frank Swift’s performance in October 1936 apparently ‘did not inspire confidence’.94 Reports on players at Middlesbrough were made by directors, the manager and scouts. Their comments placed great emphasis on a player’s social and physical characteristics as well as his technical ability, reflecting the traditional masculine qualities managers sought in players. In 1927, for example, McWilliam reported that the Wolves’ full back, Shaw, had two good feet ‘but is very weak at close quarters’.95 On reporting on Boyd of Newcastle United, one director, Rand, observed that ‘the player struck him as lacking in pluck, otherwise a good player’. McWilliam made his own enquiries and came to the conclusion that ‘he was a very good footballer but a bit timid’.96 Armstrong of Jarrow was reported as having satisfactory ability but of being of poor physique as he was only 5 feet 6 inches tall and weighed 9 stones and 10 pounds.97 A report by a Middlesbrough scout on Ballantine of Partick Thistle detailed some of his personal habits. He was a married man who was strictly temperate and a non-smoker but was inclined to be moody.

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92 Charlton Athletic FC Minutes, 26 February 1935
93 Charlton Athletic FC Team Book, 27 August 1934
94 Charlton Athletic FC Team Book, 10 October 1936
95 Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 14 December 1927
96 Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 12 September 1928
97 Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 18 December 1929
Follow-up reports confirmed his footballing ability but also a hasty temper that led him to committing too many petty fouls.\(^98\)

Age was another significant factor when Middlesbrough decided to sign a player. It was common for players to mislead clubs regarding their actual age for fear that they might not be taken on. Jack Curnow was 25 when he joined Wolves in 1935 but he had told the club’s scout that he was 23. The scout then said that this would be too old, and told Curnow to tell Buckley that he was in fact 21. Buckley believed him.\(^99\) In 1930 the Middlesbrough chairman, Phil Bach, wanted to see the birth certificate of any player they were interested in who was around 30 years old.\(^100\) In 1933 the club cancelled the contract of E.P. Taylor on the grounds that he had wilfully misled the club over his age.\(^101\) In the following year, Middlesbrough finally decided to obtain all the players’ birth certificates.\(^102\)

To what extent did the relationship between players and managers change during the inter-War years? Were there any advances in the management of labour at football clubs? In terms of managerial styles employed by football managers, Wagg has argued that managers in this period could be divided between a ‘players’ manager’ and the more authoritarian NCO types.\(^103\) This distinction however, is simplistic, as any man-management methods needs to be placed in the context of football’s wider employer-employee relations.

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\(^{98}\) Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 9 April; 16 April 1930
\(^{100}\) Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 11 April 1930
\(^{101}\) Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 8 June 1933
\(^{102}\) Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 11 April 1934
As we have seen, the relationship between club and player was increasingly formalised, reflecting changes within British industry. During the twentieth century industry gradually shifted from old-style paternalism towards a more rational system of welfarism. The overall aim however, was still to maximise worker productivity. At the level of employment relations, few UK employers had a broad strategy beyond nineteenth century paternalism. By the 1930s however, the concepts of human relations had emerged. Before 1914 Quaker firms such as Cadbury and Rowntree had already conducted experiments in this field and these contributed towards advances in employment relations. Their work contributed to some acceptance of the new American ideas of personnel management. These were associated with the Hawthorne experiments in industrial psychology that were undertaken by Elton Mayo, a Harvard Business School professor. Moreover, Lyndall Urwick, who had worked at Rowntrees, became a pioneer of UK management consultancy.

Between 1900 and 1939 the Football League evolved into a central regulatory body, gaining formal control over player conditions relating to employment, pay, discipline, movement and welfare. In terms of the players' general welfare, Charlton were more progressive than many other clubs. In 1936 it was one of only two London clubs that took advantage of the FA's arrangement with the Board of

103 Wagg, *Football World*, pp. 50-51
104 Jeremy, *Business History*, p. 450
105 *ibid.*, pp. 452-53
106 Taylor, 'Proud Preston' p. 159; p. 198. See Chapters 5 and 6
Average Age of New Football Managers, 1885-1993

Source: Tuner and White, Football Managers
Education and London County Council to provide educational classes for London’s professional footballers. Taylor however, argues that

the extension of welfare schemes [between 1900 and 1939] to cover accidents, pensions, sickness or death was not the work of idealistic paternalists but of hard-headed employers intent on maximising the efficiency and ensuring the dependence of their workforces at the lowest possible cost.

Some clubs however, continued to play a paternal role. Players of Wolves, for example, were encouraged by Buckley to save their wages and also to send some money to their parents.

However, a club’s labour management methods were still fairly rudimentary. Most managers had little daily contact with the players and were regarded as ‘ivory tower’ figures who remained in their offices whilst trainers continued to supervise the players on a day-to-day basis. In addition to this distant relationship, a generation gap existed between managers and players. With former professionals becoming managers, the average age of new managers increased to around forty, as shown in Figure 5.5. As a young player at Charlton after the Second World War, Malcolm Allison questioned the value of the club’s training. He was told to see Jimmy Seed the following day who informed him that he was being transferred to West Ham. His response was to ask Seed if he could shake his hand. Allison said, ‘I

107 Football Association Instructional Classes for Boys in Association Football, Committee Report 1936-7, May 1937. The other club was Clapton Orient. Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, p. 244. Several Charlton players enrolled at Woolwich Polytechnic for courses on technical subjects, and in cooperation with the Woolwich Commercial Institute, it also held special courses at their ground, the Valley

108 Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, p. 246

109 Guide and Ideas, ‘Football is My Life Story’ by Major Frank Buckley, 8 May 1937, p. 5

110 From the 1960s onwards however, the average has levelled out to about 37 years of age.
want to thank you for teaching me the art of communication, because you’ve just spoken to me for the third time in seven years!\textsuperscript{111}

Industry also continued to display an aversion to the benefits of scientific management. Taylorism, it was popularly believed, would result in a de-skilling of the workforce, and thus proved unpopular with British workers. In addition, few large firms paid much attention to scientific management until the 1930s. One exception was the Bedaux system designed by the Frenchman, Charles E. Bedaux.\textsuperscript{112} It was based on a universal measurement of work, and spread to England in the late Twenties. By 1939 about 250 firms had adopted it including Rover at Coventry, and a number of firms made savings.\textsuperscript{113} These were emerging ideas however, and the reality for many workers was a continuation of past practices. In a paper given to the psychology section of the British Association in 1923, Alice Ikin listed 32 qualities that were felt to be desirable in a foreman. These included an ability to swear, to teach, organise and inspire confidence, as well as qualities such as character, personality and self-control.\textsuperscript{114}

In terms of man-management techniques, a manager’s personality was his most important tool, and as we have seen in the Introduction, some managers employed verbal authoritarianism, in dealing with players. At Rangers, for example, it was claimed that Bill Struth was a charismatic personality who would not accept

\textsuperscript{111}Observer (Sport), 2 January 2000, p. 4
\textsuperscript{112}Bedaux committed suicide in 1944 before he faced a trial in Florida for treason as a Nazi sympathiser in Vichy France. His home, the 16th century, Chateau de Cande, hosted the wedding of two other well-known Nazi sympathisers, the Duke and Duchess of Windsor. Express and Star, 19 February 1944, p. 8
\textsuperscript{113}In 1934 however, glasscutters employed by Pilkington Brothers in St. Helens, Lancs. refused to work under the Bedaux system. Daily Herald, 9 January 1934, p. 11
\textsuperscript{114}Blackpool Times, 21 September 1923, p. 4
neither criticism nor advice, and ruled by fear. He also ruled the team through a 
hierarchy of older players who were given petty privileges. The word ‘martinet’ was never far away when 
describing Buckley’s managerial style. Don Bilton, who joined Wolves just before 
the outbreak of the Second World War, said he ruled by fear and that ‘If you had a 
rotten game you’d hardly dare go in at half-time, you were going to get the biggest 
bawling at ... cursed and swore at you. So from that point of view he was a terrible 
chap’. Jackie Sewell described him as ‘a very frightening man’, when he was his 
manager at Notts. County, who could ‘make grown men have tears in their eyes’. Conversely, Bilton also recognised acts of kindness when Buckley, on occasions, 
supplied young players from poor backgrounds with new clothes. These actions 
were perhaps part of Buckley’s methods, albeit rudimentary, for motivating players, 
and, as well as striking fear into them, to also engender an ‘I’ll show him attitude’ 
amongst them. When he was at Blackpool, the supporters’ club had complained 
about Buckley’s style of management. They suggested that the players had lost their 
enjoyment of the game and that this was the reason for the team’s lack of success. 

Other managers however, were more sympathetic. Matt Busby, for example, was 
greatly influenced by George Kay, his manager at Liverpool during the Thirties who 
displayed much loyalty towards his players and treated them with consideration.

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115 Murray, Old Firm, pp. 205-06
116 Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999
117 Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, p. 34
Kay's approach contrasted sharply with the malicious atmosphere Busby had experienced at Manchester City.\textsuperscript{119}

Football clubs also continued to issue players with rules by which they had to abide. At Hull City, for example, players were not allowed to enter public houses after Mondays nor attend dances after Tuesday.\textsuperscript{120} For Wolves's players, dancing after Wednesday night was 'strictly forbidden'.\textsuperscript{121} In addition, Buckley had a network of spies throughout Wolverhampton's pubs and clubs to observe whether the players were behaving themselves and not breaking any curfews.\textsuperscript{122} Because of the club's recruitment policy, young players predominated and at one point, in 1937, Wolves did not have one married man amongst the forty players on their books.\textsuperscript{123} It was further claimed that Buckley wanted to know when and who a player was going to marry. Buckley was almost obsessed by having control and his office was situated in the foyer of the main stand so everyone who went in had to go past it.\textsuperscript{124} In 1938 he created a hostel for the clubs young players complete with recreational facilities, in order to keep them under the one roof and make supervision easier.\textsuperscript{125}

Buckley was the sole authority at Wolves when it came to player supervision. The club trainers were directly under his command and they feared him

\textsuperscript{119}Dunphy, \textit{Strange Kind of Glory}, pp. 56-72  
\textsuperscript{120}See Appendix 13  
\textsuperscript{121}See Appendix 14  
\textsuperscript{122}Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999  
\textsuperscript{124}Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999  
\textsuperscript{125}\textit{Express and Star}, 23 December 1964, p. 8
as much as the players did.\textsuperscript{126} The role of the trainer, as seen at Arsenal with Tom Whittaker, took on increasing importance. Jimmy Seed delegated many supervisory duties to his trainer, Jimmy Trotter, and on a day-to-day basis it was Trotter who was in charge of the players. At most clubs trainers were still regarded as important figures in terms of the daily supervision of players. Many were also former footballers who, like managers, brought with them a practical experience of the professional game. In 1922 however, West Bromwich Albion appointed Bill Gopsill as trainer, a man who had been an NCO in the Army.\textsuperscript{127} A trainer’s overall authority though was limited, and at some clubs senior players would take advantage of this fact. Charlie Cole was Middlesbrough’s trainer throughout the inter-War years. George Hardwick said later that, ‘[h]e had little or no authority. The players ruled him rather than him ruling the players. Poor Charlie, he had a hell of a time because everyone was taking the piss out of him’.\textsuperscript{128}

The club captain was still regarded as an important position in the club throughout the period, often acting as intermediary between the manager and players. Stan Cullis was made Wolves captain at the age of 19 by Buckley who told him that he was to be the ‘boss’ on the field, and make any necessary tactical changes. Once, at a reserve game, Cullis overturned a director’s tactical decision, and received Buckley’s backing for it afterwards.\textsuperscript{129} When Jimmy Seed was captain of Sheffield Wednesday between 1927 to 1931, he admits to being given ‘unlimited licence’ to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[127] \textit{Albion News}, 26 August 1922, p. 2. He had been a Corporal in the Boer War and a Sergeant in the Royal Army Medical Corps during World War One
\item[128] Interview with George Hardwick, 25 February 1999
\end{footnotes}
introduce his own methods and ideas. The manager at the time was Bob Brown who was more of an administrator, and he never interfered in any of Seed’s onfield decisions. Once a week they would have a chat and Seed would then convey Brown’s views to the players. Seed believed that a captain, including his at Charlton, should be a manager on the pitch. ¹³⁰ Like Arsenal, Charlton introduced pre-match tactical discussions on Friday mornings where players and the trainer were given the opportunity to state their opinion. ¹³¹ At other clubs such as West Bromwich Albion it was the players and not the manager who devised the tactics. ¹³² Bill Struth also left tactics to the Rangers’ players on the field. ¹³³

Football’s industrial relations were characterised by a lack of player militancy during this period. Union membership was generally low and there were also fluctuations between clubs. Some, such as the Manchester clubs, United and City, were almost always unionised whereas the opposite was the case at Everton and Liverpool. It has been suggested, although there is little evidence, that powerful individuals had an influence over the make-up of a club’s union membership. Everton, for example, was run by its dictatorial chairman, Will Cuff, who was a prominent member of the Football League Management Committee. Similarly, the lack of union activity at Wolves may have been due to Buckley’s influence. ¹³⁴ Arsenal players were also absent but instead of Chapman’s influence, the more obvious answer however, may have rested with the fact that Arsenal were successful

¹²⁹ Cullis, Wolves, pp. 12-14
¹³⁰ J. Seed, Soccer From The Inside (1947), pp. 108-10
¹³¹ ibid., pp. 67-68
¹³² I am grateful to Ian Atkins for this information.
¹³³ Murray, Old Firm, p. 205
and that the players were doing all right.\textsuperscript{135} If there was a lack of militancy amongst players, it did not stop their disgruntlement over the transfer system and the maximum wage. In 1938, for example, Tranmere Rovers won the Third Division North but on the eve of the new season the players went on strike until they had received an extra £2 per week.\textsuperscript{136}

One problem that managers had not previously encountered was the wishes of players' wives. As a result of their political emancipation in 1918, and then having their franchise extended in 1928, women were becoming more assertive in other areas of society. Football clubs also recognised that a player's family life might influence his performance on the pitch. Tom Bromilow had agreed with two players to their transfer to Burnley but in both cases they had just been fixed up in new houses and the wives were not willing to move having just got settled in. In what he described as 'quite a ticklish little job', Bromilow had to persuade them that the transfer was to everyone's advantage.\textsuperscript{137} Billy Walker also had problems with getting players' wives to settle in a new town. On one occasion, a wife had complained because there was no electric fire in the house.\textsuperscript{138}

As was mentioned earlier, the actual training of players at most English clubs was still relatively basic. It mainly consisted of lapping, i.e. running around the ground, and was notable for the absence of any work with a football. This was partly due to the widely-held belief that by not seeing a ball during the week players would

\textsuperscript{134} Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 217  
\textsuperscript{135} Harding, \textit{Good of the Game}, pp. 170-74  
\textsuperscript{136} Interview with Jack Curnow, 5 June 1990  
\textsuperscript{137} Topical Times, 12 January 1935, p. 43  
\textsuperscript{138} Walker, \textit{Soccer}, p. 112
be hungry for it on a Saturday, and also that very few trainers had actually had any qualifications themselves. Occasionally, some players would indulge in a game of head tennis. 139 Nat Lofthouse, the former Bolton centre-forward, has remarked that when Saturday arrived they did not know what to do with the ball. 140 The debate over the merits of coaching had been in progress for a number of years, yet according to Stephen Wagg, it met considerable resistance throughout the professional game from both management and players. 141 Nevertheless, on the initiative of its secretary, Stanley Rous, the Football Association began coaching courses in schools in 1934-35. 142

Frank Buckley, like Herbert Chapman, was one of the few managers who had recognised the benefits of coaching much earlier. He gained a reputation as a pioneer of modern training methods and had an obsession with physical and mental fitness. 143 Soon after his appointment at Blackpool in 1923, it was reported that a 'pleasing feature of the training ... is that the manager dons the jersey and joins the boys giving them advice and practical demonstration of what to do and how to do it'. Buckley also held practice games on Friday afternoons aimed at developing a better understanding between the players. 144 Later, at Wolves, he introduced mechanical innovations to supplement training sessions. A rowing machine was an early

139 Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, pp. 42-43; Interview with George Hardwick, 25 February 1999
140 Kicking and Screaming, Part 2, BBC Television
141 Wagg, Football World, pp. 31-32. For example, Birmingham Sporting Mail, 5 December 1908; Athletic News, 24 November 1919
142 One of the first was taken by former West Bromwich Albion captain, Jesse Pennington, at King Edward VI School in Stourbridge. Albion News, 26 January 1935, p. 223
144 Blackpool Times, 31 July, p.12; 7 August 1923, p. 5
example. Buckley also had a machine purpose-built that fired out footballs at
different angles for players to control. A room under a stand was fitted with rubber
walls at which players kicked a ball that would then return at unpredictable angles
again with the aim of improving their ball control.\footnote{Express and Star, 3 August 1927; Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999} One of Buckley’s most peculiar
practices was to encourage players to go ballroom dancing. This, he believed, would
improve their balance and movement. On occasions, he would insist on players
dancing with each other in training.\footnote{Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999; Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, p. 34-35} Buckley was very keen that all players,
including goalkeepers, should be able to kick proficiently with both feet. In practice
matches, for example, right wingers would play on the left wing for this purpose. He
wanted his players to be versatile and would play them in a number of different
positions.\footnote{Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999; Cullis, Wolves, p. 13}

Buckley’s most infamous innovation or, some may argue, stunt, was to inject
his players with monkey gland extracts. It was later sensationalised by the popular
accusations of using chemical assistance to improve the team’s performance and
claimed its purpose was to increase a player’s resistance to colds and other minor
illnesses.\footnote{Young, Centenary Wolves, p. 115; Express and Star, 29 March 1939, p. 12; Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, p. 32; Cullis, Wolves, pp. 15-16} Buckley’s wife later claimed that he had the injections himself and that
they worked wonders for him!\textsuperscript{150} The use of medicinal substances was not uncommon in football, although there is no evidence that they helped to improve performance.\textsuperscript{151} At Blackpool, Buckley had handed out pep pills to players before a cup-tie in the mid-1920s.\textsuperscript{152} Leslie Knighton also gave pep pills to Arsenal players before a cup-tie with West Ham in 1925.\textsuperscript{153}

Other aspects of pre-match preparation that gained more importance included the treatment of injuries. In Chapter 4 it was seen how Tom Whittaker became an early expert in this field. Jimmy Trotter at Charlton was also a leader, qualifying as a masseur and physiotherapist. West Bromwich Albion players who required cartilage operations were sent to Mr Stewart, a knee specialist from Newcastle who also treated players from other clubs.\textsuperscript{154} Psychology was also tried by clubs in the 1930s. The Reverend M. Caldwell, a chaplain to two large London mental hospitals, was described as an expert in practical psychology who gave lectures on what he termed ‘psychotactics’. Some of the clubs who employed him included Arsenal, Brentford

\textsuperscript{150}Express and Star, 12 September 1964, p. 37. After Wolves defeated Leicester City in the 1939 FA Cup the MP for East Leicester, Montague Lyons, asked the Minister of Health to order an investigation into the treatment of football players with gland extracts from animals. \textit{Ibid.} In 1938 the Football Association held an enquiry and stated that gland treatment was not compulsory for players, and anyone who refused could not be subjected to any disciplinary action. Stan Cullis claimed that only one player, Dickie Dorsett, refused the injections whilst others discontinued the treatment. Don Bilton, as a seventeen year old, also refused them at the start of pre-season training for the 1939-40 season. B. Ferrier, \textit{Soccer Partnership: Billy Wright and Walter Winterbottom} (1960), pp. 88-89; Young, \textit{Centenary Wolves}, p. 115; Cullis, \textit{Wolves}, pp. 15-16; Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999

\textsuperscript{151}It was not uncommon in other sports either. The use of drugs by athletes can be traced back to ancient Greeks where Olympians ate rams' testicles to give them extra strength. Dorando Pietri who was disqualified after winning the 1908 Olympic marathon in London after getting assistance from officials, had entered the stadium and was near to collapse probably from the effects of some form of strychnine. Many other competitors had also taken it. Due to the exertions imposed on cyclists by the Tour de France, drug-taking was common before 1914. In 1924 the previous year's winner, Henri Pelissier showed a journalist his medical bag that contained cocaine, chloroform and various pills. \textit{Guardian} (Sport), 20 July 1998, p. 6; R. Holt, \textit{Sport and Society in Modern France} (1981), p. 98; \textit{Guardian}, 1 August 1998, p. 13

\textsuperscript{152}R. Daniels, \textit{Blackpool Football: The Official Club History}, 1972, p. 36

\textsuperscript{153}Joy, \textit{Forward Arsenal}, pp. 32-3
and Sheffield Wednesday. At one time Wolves players also attended regular sessions at a local psychologist in an attempt to build up their confidence.

Amateur psychology, combined with newspaper hyperbole, became a feature of the run-up to the 1939 FA Cup Final between Wolves and Portsmouth that Wolves surprisingly lost 4-1. The Portsmouth manager, Jack Tinn was better known for his ability to attract publicity rather than for any tactical acumen he possessed, and before the Final, Portsmouth’s players were photographed allegedly ‘drinking’ monkey gland extracts. A player was also photographed clipping on Tinn’s famous spats as part of a pre-cup-tie ritual. On the day of the Final, it was noted that of the two teams Portsmouth were the more relaxed perhaps because Tinn had employed a comedian, Albert Burden, to ease the players’ pre-match tension. In comparison, and perhaps due to Buckley’s stricter regime, the Wolves players looked nervous. It was claimed that he himself knew little about the need for personal relaxation. Jimmy Guthrie also claimed that evidence of Wolves’ nervousness came in the form of the official Wembley book that all the players signed. The Wolves players signed first and on receiving it, Tinn pointed out that their scrawling signatures indicated their nerves, thus boosting Portsmouth’s confidence.

Herbert Chapman had been at the forefront of the game’s tactical developments, and other managers tried to emulate his methods albeit with varying

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154 Seed, Jimmy Seed, pp. 89-90; Albion News, 11 December 1937, p. 139
155 Albion News, 16 January 1937, p. 195
156 Cullis, Wolves, p. 16; Morris, Team Makers, p. 39; Pawson, Football Managers, p. 34
157 J. Guthrie, Soccer Rebel (Newton Abbot, 1976), pp. 16-17
158 Guthrie, Soccer Rebel, pp. 16-17; Cullis, Wolves, pp. 16-17
degrees of success. Many other clubs however, still developed tactics on a match-to-match basis without any long-term plan. Following the change in the offside law in 1925, a greater emphasis was placed on speed and athleticism, and the need to stop conceding goals. The need for tactics became greater. As a result, the immediate goal explosion that accompanied the law change subsided, and by 1937-38 the number of goals scored per game fell back to less than three for the first time since 1924-25.\textsuperscript{159}

After 1925 many teams attempted to copy Chapman’s W/M formation. They tended to place the emphasis on its defensive aspects as opposed to its attacking potential. The main reason behind this was that other clubs did not have the financial resources of Arsenal and were unable to purchase forwards of the quality of Alex James and David Jack. Under Jimmy Seed, Charlton Athletic were criticised for playing negative football. When he was captain of Sheffield Wednesday, Seed had developed a tactical plan that was to be used at Charlton in which an inside-forward would drop back into defence. Its chief aim was getting men behind the ball when the other side had it.\textsuperscript{160} Seed, like Chapman, regarded the centre-half as an essentially defensive player.\textsuperscript{161} Other managers, such as Brentford’s Harry Curtis, still saw the centre-half as the team’s pivot, at the heart of the team’s defence and attack.\textsuperscript{162} This was a fading belief however, during the inter-War years as centre-halves increasingly came to be seen as a third back or stopper with the job of close marking the opposing centre-forward and preventing goals.

\textsuperscript{159}Russell, \textit{Football}, p. 85
\textsuperscript{160}Seed, \textit{Jimmy Seed}, pp. 35-36
\textsuperscript{161}Seed, \textit{Soccer}, p.67
\textsuperscript{162}Seed, \textit{Soccer}, p. 26; \textit{Albion News}, ‘Football Programme Supplement’, Volume 22, 1930-31
Frank Buckley’s tactics reflected his personality - direct. There was little close inter-passing as the accent was on attacking, high-speed football. Others termed it ‘long ball’ or ‘kick and rush’. Attacks were launched by the full-backs whilst the centre-half, Stan Cullis, would support the forwards. Like Arsenal, the wingers would also cut in from the wing and make for goal diagonally. Because of Buckley’s training methods, his teams were also renowned for their high levels of fitness. To take advantage of their stamina, Buckley regularly flooded the pitch before every home game. He claimed later that a softer pitch would lead to fewer injuries. Another major characteristic of the Wolves style under Buckley was its emphasis on the physical. Football during the inter-War years could be violent and certain players, like Frank Barson, gained reputations as ‘killers’. The football authorities however, wanted to stamp out these tendencies, partly in an ‘attempt to establish football as a sophisticated commercial sport’ that would be attractive to a wider audience. This conflicted with an acceptance by many players of the legitimacy of football’s physical approach: they still saw it as a ‘man’s game’. Wolves came under particular scrutiny. In 1936-37 seventeen cautions, more than any other club, were recorded against them and because of this the club’s proposed continental tour that year was vetoed by the FA Council.

163 Taylor and Ward, *Kicking and Screaming*, pp. 31-32; Morris, *Team Makers*, p. 33
164 Young, *Centenary Wolves*, p. 112; Guthrie, *Soccer Rebel*, p. 17
165 Taylor and Ward, *Kicking and Screaming*, p. 33; Young, *Centenary Wolves*, p. 115
167 Russell, *Football*, pp. 87-88. For example, see Guthrie, *Soccer Rebel*, pp. 17-18
168 Football Association Council Minutes, 30 April 1937; Football Association Disciplinary Committee Minutes 18 January-26 June 1937. Buckley did not help Wolves’s cause by a curt letter he sent on the matter to Stanley Rous, the FA secretary.
How did football's relationship with the media during the inter-War period change and how did it affect the position of the manager? The game's increasing commercialisation during the inter-War years was aided by developments in the media that Fishwick argues became an agent in football’s nationalisation process.\(^\text{169}\)

It also created an increase in hyperbole. In addition to the press, the broadcasting of games on radio widened football's potential audience.\(^\text{170}\) The inter-War period was marked by a continuation of the expansion in newspaper readership that had begun before 1914.\(^\text{171}\) Football was particularly important to Sunday papers such as the *News of the World* and the *People* as they carried Saturday's results and reports that were most important to football fans. Reporting centred around gossip and this also applied to football. Before 1914 the front page of the *Athletic News* had also been dominated by tittle-tattle. Any criticism it offered however, was relatively benign.\(^\text{172}\)

During the inter-War period, and partly due to a developing circulation war between the popular press, the language used in the reports became more aggressive and sharper. It was now full of violent words and jargon-ridden due to the American influence of ‘Sportuguese’.\(^\text{173}\)

Moreover, there was a proliferation of specialist local sports papers such as Saturday evening ‘Greens’ and ‘Pinks’. These were also vehicles for fans offering

\(^{169}\) Fishwick, *English Football*, p. 94

\(^{170}\) The game's broader appeal was also reinforced through the football pools that in 1936 had an annual turnover of £30 million; twenty times the annual income of all Football League clubs. *The Economist*, 17 April 1937, p. 132

\(^{171}\) In 1920 the national morning newspapers had a combined circulation of 5.4 million; by 1937 this had risen to 9.9 million. There was also an expansion in the circulation of Sunday papers from 13 million to 15.7 million during these years. At the same time there was a decline in the number of papers and also a fall in the readership of provincial newspapers. R. Williams, *The Long Revolution* (1961), pp. 204-07

\(^{172}\) By 1931 the *Athletic News* had been discontinued.
their opinions on the team’s situation, and thus provided a framework for discussion. Football clubs however, were (and still are) very sensitive to criticism, and on occasions this affected their relations with the local press. Many supporters’ clubs had also sprung up in the Twenties and Thirties but they were non-threatening organisations. When the National Federation of Football Supporters’ Clubs was formed in 1926 it adopted the motto, ‘To Help and Not to Hinder’.

Nevertheless, the game’s image was changing and public relations became an increasingly important aspect of a manager’s job. Directors preferred to stay in the background and it was the manager who gradually became a club’s public face as well as the first point of contact with the press. In addition to the increase in football coverage, reporters needed a regular source for their stories and the manager was the obvious choice. Directors were too remote and also resented any press intrusion and the players were usually forbidden by clubs to make any comment in public. The press therefore, had an interest in managers having sole charge of the team as the more autonomy managers enjoyed the more inside stories reporters were likely to get. Wagg has contended that by the 1930s the football manager, through the press, was becoming more closely associated with the team’s performance, and that manager-reporter relations had become institutionalised. Russell has also

173 Fishwick, *English Football*, pp. 100-13
174 *Ibid.*, pp. 94-100
175 In 1930 the Middlesbrough board received a letter from a player R. Bruce who asked for a transfer due to the continual barracking from the crowd and the criticisms in the local *Evening Gazette*. The directors decided to forward a copy of Bruce’s letter to the paper’s local competitor, the *Northern Echo*. Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 9 April 1930
176 R. Taylor, *Football and its Fans* (Leicester, 1992), see Chapters 3 and 4
177 Players did put their names to ghosted articles however.
178 Wagg, *Football World*, p. 44, pp. 54-57
recognised how the press began to report on a club's performance in terms of its 'managerial activity'. Russell however, is also aware that the press constructed reality, as well as reflecting it and that the powers that managers actually held did not always reflect the media's perception of these powers.\(^{179}\)

The impact of the BBC on football was not as great as the press but its influence grew steadily throughout the period.\(^{180}\) In 1924 licences were held by 10 per cent of British households but by 1939 it had increased to 71 per cent.\(^{181}\) Under John Reith, the BBC was driven by a strong sense of moral purpose that included the raising of cultural and educational standards. Broadcasting was also intended to bring different classes together, promote social unity and enhance a sense of national identity through the coverage of major national events such as the FA Cup Final, first broadcast in 1927.\(^{182}\) The radio provided managers with limited opportunities of exposure to a national audience. We saw in the last chapter how George Allison, one of the game's first commentators, organised a series of football talks throughout the season.\(^{183}\) In 1932, for example, Allison suggested to the BBC that the Leicester City manager, Peter Hodges give a talk on 'Team Building and General Managerial Worries or Practices'. The OBD, S.J. de Lotbiniere, actually preferred Fred Everiss.\(^{184}\) In 1944 Frank Buckley was interviewed by Dennis Moore on the radio programme,

\(^{179}\) Russell, Football, p. 88; see also Fishwick, English Football, pp. 35-36

\(^{180}\) The British Broadcasting Company was established in 1922 and became a corporation in 1927.

\(^{181}\) In 1930 it was 30 per cent and by 1933 48 per cent. The middle-classes made up a disproportionate percentage of listeners as many poorer sections of the working-class were unavailable to afford a wireless. Davies, 'Cinema and Broadcasting', pp. 265-69

\(^{182}\) ibid.

\(^{183}\) BBC Written Archives Centre, George Allison File 1, 1927-32, Amount paid during the financial year ended 5 April 1931. In 1931 Allison himself was paid £339 6s. for his services to the BBC.

\(^{184}\) BBC WAC, George Allison File 1, 1927-32, Letter from George Allison to S.J. De Lotbiniere, 22 June 1932
‘Strike a Home Note’, where he expounded his views on the development of football at home and abroad. Buckley was able to broadcast his idea of a British League that included clubs from Scotland and Ireland in addition to those in England and Wales, and he also predicted a European tournament with clubs travelling by aeroplane.\footnote{BBC WAC, R30/915/1, 1 March 1944; \textit{Express and Star}, 3 March 1944, p. 7}

In 1946 a banquet was held to celebrate Fred Everiss’s association of fifty years with West Bromwich Albion, and this was featured on a local radio programme, ‘Midland Region’\footnote{West Bromwich Public Libraries, Scrapbook No. 10, p. 29, \textit{Midland Chronicle and Free Press}, 18 October 1946; \textit{Albion News}, 26 October 1946. It was also featured on the \textit{Pathe News} reel in cinemas.}. How did the lifestyle and status of the football manager change? During this period, there was an increasing gap in salary between managers of top clubs and those in the lower divisions. This reflected not only a club’s size, status and economic fortunes but also a manager’s importance to the club. On accepting the position of secretary-manager at Bolton Wanderers, Charles Foweraker’s salary was £400 in 1919. His contract was for five years and he received annual increases of £25.\footnote{Young, \textit{Bolton Wanderers}, p. 69 n1. At 2000 prices this converts to £11,070. This relatively low conversion rate was due to the economic effects of the First World War.}

In contrast, George Allison, on succeeding Herbert Chapman at Arsenal in 1934, was awarded a five year contract worth £3000 per annum, reputedly the highest in the game.\footnote{Arsenal FC Minutes, 15 June 1934; Catton Folders A-B, p. 6, \textit{Daily Mail}, 31 May 1934. This was nearly £130,000 at 2000 prices.} During the Thirties, a player’s maximum basic weekly wage was £8 during the playing season. Managers with lower division clubs however, were not paid much more than the players they managed. In 1934 Walsall’s new manager-coach, Andy Wilson, was paid £5 per week whereas the club’s star player, Gilbert
Alsop was offered £6 per week a year later. Similarly, George Collins at Darlington was paid £4 per week and only £2 10s. in the summer. The club's secretary received £2 per week while its trainer's wage was £3 10s. and 30s in the summer. In 1935 one player R. Strang's weekly income was £5 in the playing season. Later, Jackie Carr was engaged as manager-coach at £5 per week plus bonuses.

Some clubs from the Third Division however, were ambitious and were able to offer substantial salaries. Ipswich Town, backed by the brewers, Cobbolds, entered the Football League in 1938 and the year before they had offered the position of manager to Frank Buckley. He eventually refused and so the club then turned its attention to the Manchester United manager, Scott Duncan. He was given a seven year contract at £1500 per annum plus a 5 per cent commission on the sale of all players, together with bonuses if Ipswich gained entry to the Football League and any subsequent promotions. In 1936 Jimmy Seed's annual salary was increased to £1040 following Charlton's successive promotions to Division One. Frank Buckley was re-engaged by Wolverhampton Wanderers in 1933 for five years on a

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189 Walsall FC Minutes, 25 September 1934; 23 April 1935. Alsop was awarded £4 per week during the close season, £5 per week if he was playing and £6 per week in the first team. At 2000 prices £1 in 1934 was worth £43.27.
190 Darlington FC Minutes, 8 May 1935; 14 May 1936
191 Darlington FC Minutes, 19 October 1938. The board later cancelled his contract due to the club's financial position but Carr offered to work only for his travelling expenses. A new manager was later engaged with Carr as coach on a wage of £5 per week plus first team bonuses. Darlington FC Minutes, 21 December 1938; 22 May 1939
192 Ipswich Town FC Minutes, 4 October; 1 November 1937. I am grateful to Matt Taylor for this information. Duncan's bonuses were £100 on election to the Third Division of the Football League; £250 on promotion to the Second Division; and £500 on promotion to the First Division. Duncan later requested that the term relating to 5 per cent commission on all transfer of players be deleted from his contract. *Ibid.*, 29 November 1937. At 2000 prices £1500 converts to £60,000.
193 Charlton Athletic FC Minutes, 8 April 1936
yearly salary of £800 plus £200 expenses.\(^{194}\) In 1938 he stated that he would be happy to stay at Wolves for the entirety of his career but later left in 1944 for Notts County that was offering him an annual salary of £4500, then the highest salary paid to a football manager.\(^ {195}\) This compared to the Chancellor of the Exchequer who during the inter-War period, as in 1913, had a salary of £5000.\(^ {196}\)

How do these figures compare with the salaries of other managers during the inter-War years? In 1922-24 the mean average income of the male population, expressed as a percentage was 114; for a manager it was 307. By 1935-36 the figures were 115 and 272 respectively.\(^ {197}\) The average salary of a manager in 1922-23 was £534 and the median salary was £483.\(^ {198}\) By 1938-39 these figures had declined to £490 and £444 respectively.\(^ {199}\) At the top end of the scale, it was calculated that 4240 managers received an average salary of £8290.\(^ {200}\) Some of the top company executives however, earned substantially more. In 1926 Josiah Stamp, for example, was offered a salary of £17,500 on taking up the position of president of the executive of the London, Midland and Scottish Railway.\(^ {201}\) At ICI Harry

\(^{194}\) Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Minutes, 24 October 1933
\(^{196}\) Routh, Occupation and Pay, pp. 70-74. It should be noted that the salary of the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not changed since 1913 and was still £5000 in 1960. ibid. At 2000 prices £5000 in 1944 converts to £120,000.
\(^{197}\) Savage and Miles, British Working Class, Table 2.3, p. 26
\(^{198}\) £18,382 and £16,627 respectively at 2000 prices.
\(^{199}\) At 2000 prices these actually increased to £19,593 and £17,754 respectively.
\(^{200}\) Routh, Occupation and Pay, pp. 72-74. At 2000 prices this converts to £331,150.
McGowan’s annual salary as chairman and managing director averaged £57,000 between 1931 and 1937, and in 1937 he received £64,410.  

In terms of income criteria, most football managers belonged to the middle-classes as it was (crudely) calculated that the middle-class began and the working class ended at £250 per year. The extent to what constituted ‘middle-classness’ however, was complex and social indicators such as education (especially in a grammar school), fertility, lifestyle, manners and social aspirations were considered just as important to people who did not fit the financial indicator. For example, what mattered to clerks about being middle-class was the status of their occupation, social aspirations and manners and, importantly, a very strong sense of not being working class.

Jimmy Seed, for example, sent his daughter, Gladys, to Brooklands Prep School and from there to Bromley County School for Girls. Seed and his family lived in a detached house on an estate opposite a golf course in Bromley, Kent, and their neighbours included an anaesthetist and a doctor. His house was fitted with consumer durables such as a washing machine and telephone, and they later owned a television. Seed also owned a car that he first bought in the 1920s when he was a player. Private car ownership stood at 100,000 in 1919 and had reached 2 million by...
1939, although the majority of working-class families were unable to afford one. Unsurprisingly, Seed’s homelife took a back seat to his job and its demands. Even during the summer he was away from home on club tours to Sweden and the USA. Gladys and her mother usually stayed with relatives in the North East. On other occasions the family went to Jersey and once on a cruise. Christmas was also a difficult period for family gatherings as matches were played both on Christmas Day and Boxing Day. Furthermore, Seed hardly ever sat down with his family for meals or helped his wife with the housework. He never discussed football at home although Gladys did attend every Charlton home game. Seed’s interests outside of football seem to have been golf, gardening, bridge, sketching and he could also play the piano.

Another aspect of middle-class life during the inter-War period was a propensity for joining clubs. Membership became synonymous with friendship and in middle-class communities, membership of these mainly masculine associations was regarded as obligatory. After the failure of the previous organisation, football managers and secretaries re-formed the Football League Secretaries’ and Managers’ Association in 1919. Membership required five years service in club management and in 1935 this comprised 90 per cent of all secretaries and managers in the League. It lacked any pretensions however, to further its members’ professional credentials. In essence, the FLSMA was a friendly society. Fred Everiss was elected

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205 Davies, ‘Cinema and Broadcasting’, p. 264
206 Information supplied by Gladys Dutton, 20 April 1999
207 McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, pp. 87-88
209 Albion News, 5 October 1935, p. 67
chairman in 1935. He declared that, 'it is not a trade union. We have nothing to do with agreements, salaries or quarrels with employers which we consider a domestic matter'. Football management therefore, was not regarded as a profession by its own members.

Despite the increase in their material well-being, managers were ultimately judged by results, notwithstanding the limit of their powers, and the intensification of competition brought with it a steady increase in managerial insecurity. There was also a decline in the number of men who gave a lifetime of service to one club. The stability of some clubs contrasted with others who employed several managers over the period. For instance, Walsall hired nine managers between 1921 and 1937 and during the 1930s Manchester United had four. As we have seen in previous chapters, football management was a stressful job. Matt Busby recollected George Kay sitting on the trainer’s bench ‘shouting, beseeching, wringing his hands, holding his head in apparent anguish, and making an excellent attempt to head and kick every ball in the match’. The pressures of the job could also take their toll on a

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211 Albion News, 5 October 1935, p. 67
212 See Figure 6.1
213 In 1937 it was commented on that only eight managers had been managers of one club for ten years or more. Albion News, 25 December 1937, p. 155. The eight, including club and date started were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Manager</th>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fred Everiss</td>
<td>West Bromwich Albion</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Robert Jack</td>
<td>Plymouth Argyle</td>
<td>1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Charles Webb</td>
<td>Brighton and Hove Albion</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Charles Foweraker</td>
<td>Bolton Wanderers</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>George Jobey</td>
<td>Derby County</td>
<td>1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Harry Curtis</td>
<td>Brentford</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Frank Buckley</td>
<td>Wolverhampton Wanderers</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Jack Tinn</td>
<td>Portsmouth</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

214 Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 66; Wagg, Football World, p. 47
215 Dunphy, Strange Kind of Glory, p. 103; Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 161
manager’s health, Kay himself was forced to retire in 1951 on medical advice. The case of Syd King at West Ham however, was extreme. King, secretary-manager since 1901, was suddenly sacked in November 1932 following a board meeting where he was drunk and insulted the directors. King, a regular at many local pubs, took the news badly, and less than a month after his dismissal he committed suicide. An inquest was held and he was found to be of ‘unsound mind’ and that he had been suffering from persecution delusions. These had begun in the previous season when West Ham had been relegated.\(^\text{216}\)

By 1939 most football clubs employed a manager. It was becoming more widely recognised that there needed to be some buffer between directors and players. Yet few followed Arsenal’s lead and allowed managers the range of powers accorded to Herbert Chapman. The management of clubs was characterised by a struggle between the amateur, voluntary tradition and an emerging, fledgling professionalism. Directors were generally resistant to change. Between the wars football was slowly modernising itself into a commercial leisure activity and they believed that they were more capable than managers in dealing with this and the game’s rising financial problems brought on by increased competition. Managers received no training for the job and were unlikely to have had a secondary education. Experience of playing professional football, possibly at international level, became the main qualification for being a football manager. Although administration and secretarial duties were still a major part of the job, more managers were becoming responsible for the players. Yet their technical input remained limited as coaching was not part of their remit and

\(^{216}\)Korr, West Ham, pp. 84-85. He died by drinking a corrosive liquid mixed with alcohol.
only a few recognised its benefits. The growing media interest in football though made the manager a more visible figure, and in its eyes, he was more accountable for the team's performance. The job was a demanding one that could bring material rewards but more stress. In 1934 the growing importance of a manager was recognised when Dick Ray, then manager of Leeds United, was chosen to manage the Football League team against the Scottish League. More importantly, and on a larger, national scale, managers were leading out their teams in the FA Cup Final by 1939. In the next chapter, we shall see how, after the Second World War, football management modernised itself, albeit this took place on a gradual basis rather than through any acceleration of the process.

217 *Albion News*, 10 February 1934, p. 245
CHAPTER 6

FOOTBALL MANAGEMENT AND MODERNITY, 1945-1966

[When questioned closely, many [British] managers clung tenaciously to the idea that management could never be taught because it was more about instinct than expertise. The British, it seemed, were largely happy to remain devotees of ... 'folk management' regardless of the advice that was so avidly proffered from across the Atlantic.


If [Alf] Ramsey is now to hold the overall responsibility ... then at last the English system will have moved closer to the pattern for long employed in many countries overseas.

1 The Times, 4 December 1962, p. 4a

From 1945 up to the 1960s, football management underwent a process of modernisation. When the Football League re-started after the Second World War, football management had changed very little since 1939. The directors were in charge and to a large extent managers were employed on the basis of ‘Front Man and Office Boy’. 1 By the mid-1960s however, there had been a change in the perception of football managers that was symbolised by the knighthood accorded to Alf Ramsey in 1967. It was widely believed that the new professionalism that he had brought to the management of the England team was a crucial factor in its World Cup victory the previous year. It will be argued however, that despite a gradual shift in the role of the manager, football management was slow to modernise. It struggled to uproot itself from its Victorian roots, echoing a reluctance to embrace reform throughout the game.

This chapter will examine the context, both management and football, plus pressures from society in general, in which the role of the manager developed. By looking at the changes in management in industry we can see how they related to those in football.

1 Wagg, Football World, p. 157
management. Finally, the chapter will chart the effect 'modernisation' had on the manager's job and also his lifestyle.

Conekin et al have identified modernisation as a period in which 'extraordinarily contradictory impulses towards the modern ... were expressed within British society'. Modernity in post-War Britain was shaped to a certain extent by foreign influences, although modern American culture and ideas did not penetrate as deeply as has previously believed. Instead of a 'linear history of progressive advance ... British modernity was always a balancing act between innovation and tradition' and can be placed 'within the broader traditions of English ad hocery and the orchestration of change under the guise of continuity'.

British society was also marked by fundamental economic and social changes throughout this period. Following war and peace-time austerity, and the imposition of rationing, the 1950s saw the beginning of a more affluent society in which living standards doubled between 1946 and 1973. Greater prosperity amongst the working-classes also brought a decline in deference. This was assisted by the creation of the welfare state with its cradle-to-the-grave provisions and a more egalitarian ethos that permeated the public consciousness. Libertarian measures such as wider access to contraception, and a burgeoning youth culture added to a growing permissiveness within the country. People did what they wanted more often than ever before.

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2 Conekin et al, Moments of Modernity, pp. 2-3
3 ibid., pp. 18-19
4 ibid., p. 19, 20
5 Perkin, Professional Society, p. 419
How was British management in general affected by these changes, and to what extent did it undergo a process of modernisation? A demand for managers arose due to the changes to the British economy that saw an increase in production and mechanisation. In addition, with the nationalisation of certain industries, the 1945 Labour Government promoted a new ‘managerial class’ that was later continued by Conservative administrations. In an example of the ‘Butskellite’ political consensus of that era, Alfred Robens, a former official in the shop workers’ union and a Labour MP, was appointed chairman of the National Coal Board in 1960 by Harold Macmillan. The nation’s industrial structure continued to change as the number of small owner-managers declined (see Chapter 5). A corresponding rise in the salaried class was supplemented by the welfare state that became a haven for professional administrators (see Chapter 5). In 1955 one survey estimated that there were between 400,000 to 450,000 managers, demanding an annual replacement of 12,000 per year. Perkin has argued that British society now displayed the attributes of a meritocracy as it accepted ‘the principle that ability and expertise were the only respectable justification for recruitment to positions of authority and responsibility’. In Britain however, a purely professional society, one structured around career hierarchies rather than classes, did not emerge. Instead, professional interests became entangled with the class system.

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8 Perkin, *Professional Society*, p. 418
10 Perkin, *Professional Society*, p. 405, 359
The question of managerial efficiency had been raised during the production crisis of the Second World War and continued throughout the post-War years. Steven Fielding has stated that, '[m]ore enlightened managers came to appreciate that workers could be encouraged to greater efforts if treated like human beings'. The 1945 Labour government advocated more efficient working practices, arguing that treating workers better would eventually create higher productivity. The private sector however, deemed this as 'illegitimate interference' and the government was reluctant to compel them to change. Moreover, trade unionists were more interested in their families and leisure activities then in raising productivity.

Overall, efforts to maximise industrial output failed and the deficiencies within British management were partly blamed. After the War attempts were made to utilise American management ideas through technical assistance programmes. As part of the Marshall Plan, they aimed to improve the efficiency of the economies of Western European countries because the Americans were afraid if these economies failed, it left Europe open to the challenge of Communism. Many Americans felt that many British firms were run on autocratic and unscientific lines, and to improve efficiency, it was felt that they should embrace American techniques, such as personnel management. This required teamwork and consultation at all levels of the firm with complex problems being solved rationally by different specialists within

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11 During World War Two attempts had been made to improve factory efficiency by setting up joint manager-worker production committees but these ultimately failed. S. Fielding, 'The Good War: 1939-1945' in N. Tiratsoo (ed.), From Blitz to Blair: A New History of Britain since 1939 (1997), p. 37
12 ibid.
13 J. Tomlinson, 'Reconstructing Britain: Labour in Power 1945-1951', in Tiratsoo, From Blitz to Blair, p. 98. The private sector still accounted for 80 per cent of the economy in this period. ibid., p. 97
the company’s management. Instead, American advisors felt that too many British executives acted on the spur of the moment. These initiatives were accepted by a number of firms but they were ignored by the majority. Nick Tiratsoo has argued that ‘[t]he problem was ... that American prescriptions conflicted with long-standing indigenous methods and traditions within British industry’. The British believed that management was about leadership of people in the same way that the army was led by generals. Many British companies were dominated by charismatic chief executives who were all-powerful personalities. It was felt that British managers had to inspire their subordinates with any procrastination seen as a sign of weakness. Furthermore, the effects of the class system continued to penetrate British management. Middle managers were organised into ranks, for example, with differentiation based on privileges and badges of position as opposed to expertise, and there was also a move away from an emphasis on specialist skills.

Attempts to persuade British business of the benefits of management education had limited success. Higher education institutions in Britain were unenthusiastic and academics regarded management studies as intellectually inferior. The courses offered were also of a poor quality. Larger firms did begin to take the training of managers more seriously but it was not until the mid-1960s that the

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14 Tiratsoo, ‘Americanisation’, pp. 104-105
16 Tiratsoo, ‘Americanisation’, p. 97
17 ibid., pp. 105-10
London and Manchester Business Schools were launched.\textsuperscript{18} During the 1950s the preferred method was still to put a future manager 'through the mill' on a job rotation basis within that particular firm. Businessmen continued to believe that graduates cost too much and had to be told to forget a lot of what they had learned.\textsuperscript{19} In large firms 55 per cent of managers had started from the bottom and a fifth of them had only a primary education; seventy per cent of top executives had no professional qualifications whilst only a third had attended university.\textsuperscript{20}

The nature of the developments in industrial management were largely reflected by those in football management. Between 1945 and 1966, the overall management of an English football club by its directors remained relatively unchanged. With the Football Association still limiting share dividends to 7.5 per cent gross, few organisational changes were made and, as a result, clubs were not run for private profit. Boardrooms were also largely characterised by staleness and immobility. A survey in 1964 found that a director's average age was 58 with 38 per cent aged over 60. Furthermore, the majority of shares tended to be passed on to relatives and friends.\textsuperscript{21} Directors' motives had also changed very little from the turn of the century. Many were local businessmen with money and time to spare. They benefited from their association with the club as it raised their standing in the

\textsuperscript{18}ibid., pp. 101-02. In 1955 five universities offered postgraduate courses in business administration; Birmingham and Glasgow offered one on production engineering whilst the London School of Economics, the Manchester College of Technology and the Dundee School of Economics offered one similar to that at Harvard. The teaching consisted of lectures, the case study method for seminars, study-visits to factories were linked with problems under discussion in the classroom and businessmen were brought in to have their brains picked on their own specialities. \textit{The Economist}, 17 December 1955, 'What Makes a Manager?' Supplement, pp. 1-8

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{The Economist}, 17 December 1955, 'What Makes a Manager?' Supplement, p. 3

\textsuperscript{20}ibid., pp. 3-4

\textsuperscript{21}'English Professional Football', \textit{Planning}, Vol. XXXII, 496 (June 1966), p. 120; Butler, \textit{Football League}, p. 223
business community and local social circles. In general, a director’s contact with the club stopped at the manager. A PEP report criticised this development as the director became ‘completely detached from any dealings with the player, and the resulting gulf between the two is a poor basis for communications when ex-players become members of a club’s organisational or administrative staff’. Boardrooms were riddled with complacency, and frequent power struggles that undermined a club’s prospects. Little attempt was made to embrace new management ideas as the directors wanted to remain in control. In 1965, a survey of 76 clubs found that in 73, one manager was responsible for all spheres of the club’s activities - playing, administrative and financial. Only three clubs had a general manager as well as a manager.

Attitudes to management were also partly formed by the prevailing insular and parochial nature of English football that held little regard for the rapid progress of European football. As League Champions in 1955, Chelsea had been invited to be England’s representatives in the inaugural European Cup but the Football League would not sanction their participation. Before competitions were instituted, some English clubs did play foreign opposition in friendlies under floodlights, an innovation that was at an embryonic stage. Wolverhampton Wanderers’s victory over Honved in 1954 created great interest, particularly as the second half was televised live. Wolves played a number of friendlies against top continental

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22 'English Professional Football', *Planning*, pp. 120-21
23 *ibid.*, p. 121
24 *ibid.*, p. 124
opposition and other clubs recognised that European football was an important source of revenue. It also demanded improved playing standards but the widespread acceptance of this was a slow process.26

English insularity had been represented by the management of the England team. In 1945 it was taken for granted by many people, both inside and outside the game, that England was still the premier footballing nation. This view suffered a setback when the USA defeated England 1-0 in the 1950 World Cup but it was written off at the time as a one-off. English football however, received a major jolt when Hungary’s 6-3 victory at Wembley in 1953 made them the first European team to defeat England on home soil.27 Before the game, the press had disregarded the Hungarians but defeat created a demand from the same newspapers that English players should be subjected to the same modern, pre-match preparation of their opponents.

Walter Winterbottom, appointed in 1946, was England team manager as well as Director of Coaching. He was responsible to an FA International Selection Committee and in his early days as manager, the team was picked by 'committee' with members nominating and then voting on players for particular positions.28 Winterbottom’s role was advisory, and although he gradually gained more influence over selection, it was never total. In 1954, for example, a conference of club managers

25Manchester United, under Matt Busby, were England’s pioneers the following year. The Inter-City Fairs’ Cup was inaugurated in 1955 (later renamed the UEFA Cup in 1971-72) with the first Final played in 1958. In 1960-61 the Cup-Winners’ Cup was first played.
26‘English Professional Football’, Planning, p. 152
27The following year Hungary defeated England 7-1 in Budapest.
28Kicking and Screaming, BBC Television; D. Bowler, Winning Isn’t Everything ... : A Biography of Sir Alf Ramsey (1998), pp. 64-65
was called by the FA with the purpose to assist the England team. Shortly after, an Assistant Director of Coaching was appointed to allow Winterbottom more time to concentrate on preparing the international teams. He was still instructed however, to keep reports of players that members of the committee had brought to his attention. Winterbottom's successor was Alf Ramsey. His appointment followed meetings in 1962 between the FA and prominent club managers that were intended to assist England's preparation for the 1966 World Cup. Apart from recommendations concerning the co-operation between clubs and the England manager in the training and preparation of players for 1966, it was the unanimous feeling among all the managers canvassed that the England manager should have full responsibility for selecting the team.

The FA had actually been aware of the rise in playing standards in Europe and that also by the early 1960s, European clubs and national teams only employed qualified coaches. Resistance had been centred within the Football League and its clubs who feared fixture congestion. To improve the quality of football management, the FA endeavoured to establish courses for managers but it was

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29 Whittaker, *Tom Whittaker's*, Plate op. p. 159. The managers included Matt Busby, Arthur Rowe, Ted Drake and Vic Buckingham
30 Football Association International Senior Selection Committee and Technical Committee Minutes, 22 July 1954. This was held at the Great Western Royal Hotel. The same place as the managers' conference.
31 Football Association Minutes, Regional Meetings of Managers of 1st and 2nd Division Clubs, Plans for England XI-World Cup 1966, October 1962. These included Matt Busby, Bill Shankly, Stan Cullis and Don Revie but interestingly, not Ramsey.
32 Football Association Technical Committee Minutes, 11 August 1961. In Italy, for example, the first football management course was introduced in 1946. Two years later a diploma course was initiated. I am grateful to Pierre Lanfranchi for this information.
33 Rous, *Football Worlds*, p. 153
frustrated in its efforts.\textsuperscript{34} In 1969 an \textit{F.A. News} editorial commented on how it had been nearly ten years since the FA had first investigated the possibility of a course for training club managers.\textsuperscript{35} In the intervening years there had been a number of false starts. The first initiative, for example, involved a course for senior managers to be undertaken at Loughborough College of Education.\textsuperscript{36} It reached an advanced stage of planning but had to be deferred, apparently because of England's qualification for the 1962 World Cup.\textsuperscript{37}

The FA's concern for improvements in the quality of managers was linked to the high degree of wastage in managerial turnover where many new appointees proved unsuitable for the job. Figure 6.1, based on Turner and White's on calculations, shows that the number of managerial changes between 1946 and 1965 figure was 480.\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Planning} estimated that throughout a similar period over 600 managers had parted from their clubs. The annual turnover of football managers was

\textsuperscript{34}Football Association Technical Committee Minutes, 11 August 1961
\textsuperscript{35}\textit{F.A. News}, February 1969, p. 247
\textsuperscript{36}In 1961 the Technical Committee had circulated a report to member clubs, including recommendations for the breakdown of duties between manager, trainer and coach. A manager's responsibilities included: the scouting system; signing players approved by the Board; dealing with players' salaries; overall control of all staff; planning of tactics and coaching with coaches; and, selection of the team. Coaches were to have responsibility for the day-to-day coaching; development of tactics; reports on players; and supervision of apprentices. Football Association Technical Committee Minutes, 11 August 1961
\textsuperscript{37}\textit{F.A. News}, February 1969, p. 247. In 1963 and 1964 the FA did organise conferences for managers, and one lecture was given by John Marsh, the director of the British Institute of Management. A view that courses for managers should be established, appeared to have had considerable support, but nothing came of it. Again, in 1966, proposals concerning a course of training for management were made by the FA to the Football League and the Football League Secretaries' and Managers' Association. The FA negotiated with a University of Technology (possibly the University of Manchester Institute for Science and Technology) to set up a course of study. This was to comprise of either three consecutive annual periods of four weeks or two consecutive annual periods of six weeks during the close season. The proposals seem to have been rejected. \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{38}Turner and White, \textit{Football Managers}, p. 9. It also demonstrates how a manager's average tenure at one club (in terms of years), has fallen, in line with the rise in the number of new managers employed.
Source: Turner and White, "Football Managers"

**Figure 6.1:**

Average Tenure of Football Managers, 1921-1990

**Text:**

- New Managers
- Tenure

**Legend:**

- New Managers
- Tenure

**X-axis:**
- 1926 TO 1930
- 1931 TO 1935
- 1936 TO 1940
- 1941 TO 1945
- 1946 TO 1950
- 1951 TO 1955
- 1956 TO 1960
- 1961 TO 1965
- 1966 TO 1970
- 1971 TO 1975
- 1976 TO 1980
- 1981 TO 1985
- 1986 TO 1990
a quarter, probably by far and away the highest turnover in industry.\textsuperscript{39} The overall aim of the FA was to establish a formal appointments procedure, similar to other professions, for those entering football management. This was perhaps the reason for the rejection of their proposals. Directors of Football League clubs, for instance, would have been loath to forgo their prerogative of employing who they wanted as manager. Some managers though were in favour of the FA’s initiatives. Stan Cullis, commenting on the high turnover, believed that it could be alleviated if the League instituted a training course for prospective managers. This would include, he suggested, a study of ‘tactics, business administration, laws and regulations of the Football Association and Football League, the art of handling men’.\textsuperscript{40} Others however, without qualifications would not have been in favour of a system that decreased their chances of finding work. It would have also decreased the pool from which clubs picked managers.

Like their counterparts in industry therefore, football managers continued to learn their job ‘on the job’ and had few qualifications. This next section will consider what qualities they brought to the management of clubs and also their backgrounds. There was a significant increase in the number of new football managers appointed between 1945 and 1970 (see Figure 5.1). After 1945 managers were nearly always former professionals, a high proportion being internationals. In 1998 a poll was conducted to find the top one hundred players to have played in English football since 1888. Despite the subjective nature of the poll it does indicate that good players do not necessarily make good managers. From the list, forty nine became

\textsuperscript{39} ‘English Professional Football’, \textit{Planning}, p. 123
managers, the most successful being Alf Ramsey and Kenny Dalglish. Some, like Danny Blanchflower, Bobby Moore and Bobby Charlton, had very brief management careers. Directors also looked for leadership qualities and, to a certain extent, captains fitted this criteria. For example, of the nineteen captains who lifted the ‘Cup’ between 1946 and 1966, thirteen went on to become managers. In addition, Stan Cullis, Eddie Hapgood, George Hardwick and Billy Wright were captains of England who became managers during this period but of this group only Cullis enjoyed managerial success.

No doubt some directors did look for evidence of qualifications, and an increasing number of managers, like Bill Nicholson, had acquired FA coaching badges. Although this was never (and still is not) a prerequisite for taking a position as a football manager, it undoubtedly helped managers in gaining employment. Interestingly, future Liverpool managers Bill Shankly and Bob Paisley both held qualifications in physiotherapy. The coaching schemes initiated by the FA during the 1930s were expanded after the War, and supervised by Walter Winterbottom. Russell has identified these trends as attempts by the Football Association ‘to meet contemporary challenges and to shed off at least some of its conservative traditions’. Wagg has argued that football was moving towards a technocracy

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40 Cullis, *Wolves*, p. 102
41 *Guardian*, 5 August 1998, p. 20; Turner and White, *Football Managers, passim*
42 Turner and White, *Football Managers; News of the World Football Annual, 1997-98*, pp. 74-75. For the period 1923 to 1939 only three out of sixteen FA Cup winning captains became managers.
43 Kelly, *Bill Shankly*, p. 50, p. 199. Paisley was in fact a qualified physiotherapist.
44 Russell, *Football*, p. 127
45 *ibid.*, p. 130
although its members thought of themselves as professionals rather than being part of a profession.\(^{46}\)

As a result, there was still much resistance to the idea of coaching that emanated from the tradition of anti-intellectualism within the working classes. A stigma was attached to coaching as it challenged firmly held beliefs that English football was based on individual skill and masculine toughness. Walter Winterbottom's early team meetings as England manager were met with scepticism by senior players like Tommy Lawton and Raich Carter.\(^{47}\) Stan Cullis was never impressed by coaching. He regarded it as too theoretical and academic, and worried when some of his players came back from England games with new ideas. On one occasion, in exasperation, he said to his England half-back Bill Slater, 'Bill, Bill, you're playing ... like an England player!'\(^{48}\) Billy Walker, a manager who spanned the inter- and post-War periods, was convinced players were becoming 'vastly overcoached from the beginning', and should be allowed to adapt their own natural skills to any given situation.\(^{49}\)

As in the inter-War period, most managers had left school by the time they were 14 and had only received a basic education. Raich Carter, for example, attended Hendon Board School near Sunderland.\(^{50}\) Others however, did enjoy a better education. Alan Brown, for example, attended Hexham Grammar School whilst Bill

\(^{46}\)Wagg, *Football World*, p. 73

\(^{47}\)Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998; *Kicking and Screaming*, BBC Television

\(^{48}\)Anon., *Talking With Wolves* (Derby, 1998), p. 15

\(^{49}\)Walker, *Soccer*, pp. 88-89

\(^{50}\)Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998
Nicholson won a scholarship to the prestigious Scarborough Boys’ High School.\(^{51}\) Stan Cullis won a scholarship to Chester Grammar School but his father refused to let him go. He later attended a few evening classes and spoke French plus Esperanto and had a knowledge of shorthand and book-keeping, a particularly valuable skill for management.\(^{52}\) Matt Busby’s headmaster had initially advised him to train as a school teacher.\(^{53}\) Walter Winterbottom had been a PE lecturer at Carnegie College in Leeds before he was appointed England manager.

Before 1960 there was no formalised apprenticeship scheme for footballers and many managers had worked, usually in typical working-class occupations.\(^{54}\) Some, like Bill Shankly, Matt Busby and Jimmy Adamson, had worked down coal mines.\(^{55}\) Before joining Sunderland, Raich Carter was an apprentice artificer in a forge but never served his time.\(^{56}\) Don Revie left school at 14 and served his time as an apprentice bricklayer.\(^{57}\) George Hardwick gained an apprenticeship as a draughtsman at Dorman Long (courtesy of a Middlesbrough director).\(^{58}\) After failing to get a job at the newly-built Ford plant in his home town of Dagenham, Alf Ramsey decided to become a grocer and was apprenticed to the local Co-op store.\(^{59}\)

\(^{51}\) Hopcraft, *Football Man*, p. 112; Rogan, *Football Managers*, pp. 24-25

\(^{52}\) *Express and Star*, Newspaper Library, ‘Stan Cullis’ file; Hapgood, *Football Ambassador*, p. 130; Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999

\(^{53}\) Busby, *Soccer*, pp. 13-14

\(^{54}\) Parker, ‘Big-Time’, p. 16


\(^{56}\) Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998

\(^{57}\) Rogan, *Football Managers*, p. 93

\(^{58}\) Interview with George Hardwick, 25 February 1999

\(^{59}\) Bowler, *Winning*, pp. 25-26
One notable social characteristic of the post-War period was a downward trend in religious observance. In 1910 12 per cent of the population attended Anglican church services falling to 7 per cent by the 1960s.\textsuperscript{60} Despite this a number of prominent managers retained strong religious beliefs. Raich Carter was a Primitive Methodist who as a child went to Sunday school three times a day and went to church three times on a Sunday as an adult. When he was at Hull City, Raich Carter read the lessons for Sportsmen’s services in local churches.\textsuperscript{61} During his spell at Sunderland (1957-64), Alan Brown joined ‘Moral Rearmament’, a Christian evangelical movement based in Switzerland. It underlined not only his views in general but his commitment, so he claimed, to protecting the integrity of football.\textsuperscript{62} Matt Busby was a devout Catholic. In addition to his knighthood from the Queen, he received a papal knighthood in 1968. He was known to ‘kneel quite unselfconsciously inside his own boardroom to kiss the hand of a visiting bishop’.\textsuperscript{63} Bill Shankly was brought up in a Protestant family. However, this did not prevent him watching Rangers one week and Celtic the other, despite the sectarianism that characterised the Glasgow clubs’ rivalry.\textsuperscript{64}

Stan Cullis was a regular church-goer, and his son Andrew, later became a vicar.\textsuperscript{65} Moreover, Cullis never swore. The nearest he got was to splice any

\textsuperscript{60} P. Clarke, *Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-1939* (1996), pp. 160-61
\textsuperscript{61} Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998
\textsuperscript{62} Hopcraft, *Football Man*, p. 112; *Independent on Sunday* (Review), 30 June 1996, pp. 11-12
\textsuperscript{63} *Observer* (Sport), 23 January 1994, p. 20
\textsuperscript{64} Kelly, *Bill Shankly*, pp. 15-16
\textsuperscript{65} Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999
outbursts with the word ‘flopping’. In this respect, Cullis was undoubtedly one of the few exceptions to a general rule. Before becoming a manager, Alf Ramsey decided to take elocution lessons to rid himself of his Dagenham accent. It was the early Fifties and Britain was still a class-conscious society in which accent was a significant indicator of one’s class. Ramsey wanted to gain self-confidence by learning how to speak like the bosses.

One of the most important influences on how managers managed was probably still the experience they gained of military life in the armed forces during the War as physical training instructors, or through National Service until it was abolished in 1963. It gave a number of future managers a feel for handling men, albeit in a less intense environment than actual warfare. It was this experience that perhaps persuaded some directors to recruit a certain manager following the War. Matt Busby had initially served in the 9th Battalion of the King’s Liverpool Regiment but was later transferred to the Army Physical Training Corps. He also managed the Army football team that included internationals like Bert Sprotson and Frank Swift, and claimed that he quickly learned the importance of delegation by assigning men to various tasks. Arthur Rowe was attached to various units and was

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66 Anon., *Talking With Wolves*, p. 75
67 Bowler, *Winning*, pp. 95-96
68 In the first few weeks of the War, a number of coaches and players who had signed onto the FA’s army national service Register, went to Aldershot. This scheme had been planned before the War. By February 1940 over seventy well-known players had successfully completed their training in the army, becoming Sergeant-Instructors of Recreative Physical Training. The FA had also prepared a list before the War containing the names of men to be selected for enlistment and training as NCOs in the RAF Physical Training School. Green, *Football Association*, pp. 362-3; Jack Curnow collection, Letter from Football Association, 14 February 1940, RE: Recreative Physical Training (Army Side); Football Association War Emergency Committee Minutes, 30 October 1939; 22 January; 4 March 1940
69 Tyrell and Meek, *Manchester United*, pp. 8-9; Busby, *Soccer*, pp. 14-15
also put in charge of service sides. Stan Cullis actually joined the South Staffordshire Territorials in May 1939. He was called up when war broke out and became a Company Sergeant Major Instructor in an anti-tank regiment. In July 1944 he took charge of sport at an Eighth Army military rest camp in Italy. Moreover, military experience perhaps created, or even reinforced, a collective sense of ‘British is best’, and that ‘we’ have little to learn from foreigners, thus, perpetuating resistance to European-led innovations. On the other hand, others may have benefited from the experience of different cultures. Neither did military experience produce a uniformed style of management. Instead, managers developed their own styles although it was underpinned by notions of authority, something that life in the forces highlighted.

The next question to address is how changes within the football industry affected the aims of management and subsequently the role of the manager. As we have seen, the years from 1945 to 1966 created better living standards. This had important consequences for football, and marked a shift by clubs towards a more business-oriented approach. Changes to the population’s leisure pursuits were reflected by a gradual shift in the audience habits of football fans. In the immediate post-War period, attendances at Football League clubs reached a peak of 41.3 million in 1948-49 but by 1964-65 they had fallen to 27.6 million. This decline was partly explained by the growth in real incomes which gave people the choice to diversify

70 Morris, Team Makers, p. 70
their leisure pursuits. During the Fifties there was also an increase in owner-occupation, accompanied by a rise in car ownership and spending on consumer durables. The home was to become the chief leisure centre for all the family with gardening and DIY becoming weekend alternatives to watching a game on a Saturday afternoon.

Fans were also becoming more discerning. In 1962 a Football League survey revealed that the poor condition of many stadiums was a contributory factor to their staying away. In 1964 seats made up only 12 per cent of a League club’s total accommodation whereas in Portugal the figure was 80 per cent. With the rise in personal incomes, people experienced higher standards of comfort. In response, Spurs increased their seating capacity from 15 per cent in 1960 to 28 per cent in 1964 and although crowds fell by 27 per cent, the revenue through the gate remained largely unchanged, thus proving that there was a market for more seats.

Furthermore, Gavin Mellor has suggested that post-War crowds in the North West were not the typical homogenous, working-class mass as increased car ownership and better communications had given fans a greater choice of games to watch. Television also provided an alternative to watching a game on Saturdays. In 1945 the BBC’s television service had only 15,000 licence holders but this had increased to 5 million by 1956. In 1954 the Independent Television Authority was established and

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72 Between 1950 and 1966 there was approximately a 1 per cent fall in attendances for every 1 per cent increase in consumer spending. ‘English Professional Football’, Planning, p. 110
by 1969, 90 per cent of households held a licence. By then television occupied nearly a quarter of the leisure time of both men and women in England and Wales.76

The most important changes to the management of clubs however, were the abolition of the maximum wage in 1961 and the modification of the retain and transfer system two years later. They not only changed the club-player relationship but it also signalled the decline of mutuality amongst Football League clubs. Until the 1960s clubs had strongly resisted any changes despite a growing militancy amongst the players after 1945. Footballers increasingly thought that they were part of the entertainment industry, and regarded themselves as professionals rather than workers. There had also been a feeling amongst both press and public after the War that footballers should be paid more, particularly as they were playing in front of record crowds.77 Despite this, between the mid-1950s and 1960, the average earnings of skilled manual workers had risen marginally faster than those of footballers.78 In 1950 Stoke City and England centre-half, Neil Franklyn, along with other players like Charlie Mitten of Manchester United, had briefly been enticed to Bogota, Columbia to play for a local club. At home Franklyn had been paid the maximum wage of £12 per week, and Stoke had turned down his transfer request. He received a £1500 signing-on fee in Columbia, this compared to the mandatory £10 at home.79 In

76 Clarke, Hope and Glory, pp. 250-53
78 Following the abolition of the maximum however, the average earnings of players rose 148 per cent between 1955 and 1964 from £711 to £1559; the average worker’s earnings rose from £572 to £936 over the same period, a 61 per cent increase. At 2000 prices these figures represented an increase from £10,808 to £18,963 for footballers; and £8695 to £11,385 for workers. Mason, ‘Football’, p. 162; ‘English Professional Football’, Planning, p. 131; Clarke, Hope and Glory, p. 255.
1956 Wolves had been forced to cancel a televised floodlit friendly against Spanish champions, Bilbao, that would have earned them £10,000. The Players’ Union however, had wanted its members to be paid for playing in these games and, following a vote, the Wolves players went on strike.\(^{80}\)

Clubs may have been unwilling to scrap the restrictions on a footballer’s freedom of movement and their earning potential but that did not prevent them from luring players with under-the-counter payments. In 1957 Sunderland were heavily fined with several directors banned for life after it was found that they had made illegal payments to players that stretched back many years.\(^{81}\) The fall-out from this affair and a steady flow of top League players to Italy, like Denis Law, John Charles and Jimmy Greaves, for bigger pay packets, provided the background for the Professional Footballer’s Association’s threat to strike over the removal of the ‘maximum’ in 1961. The Football League acquiesced to their demands. Two years later, in the High Court, following the ‘Eastham Case’, the retain and transfer system was found to be in restraint of trade, although it was modified as opposed to being abolished.\(^{82}\)

*The Times* caught this new mood amongst the players who, it said, were ‘no longer content to let the big money go to boxers, tennis stars and other highly

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\(^{80}\) The Players’ Union had set a deadline for 13 March for the FA and the League to come to the negotiating table on this issue. The Wolves-Bilbao game was to be played on the following night but if no payment scheme was in place, the Union would ban all of its 2500 members from participating in floodlit games. The Wolves players narrowly voted, 15-12, in favour of strike action. However, this was not a vote against the club as the Wolves directors had favoured the payment of fees to players for these games. The Wolves players proposed a motion of ‘no confidence’ in the Union’s executive although it was later withdrawn *Daily Herald*, 5 March, p. 10; 6 March, p. 10; 8 March 1956, p. 9; *Express and Star*, 12 March, p. 22; 13 March, p. 24; 14 March 1956, p. 26

\(^{81}\) Russell, *Football*, p. 146. For a full account of this affair see Inglis, *Soccer*, Chapter 8

\(^{82}\) For a detailed account of the background and aftermath of these events see Harding, *Good of the Game*, Chapters 20-26
publicised darlings of the crowds. A new generation of professional footballers has arisen which knows that its life is a short one and is determined to make it lucrative'.\(^{83}\) Arthur Marwick has argued that the removal of these restrictions symbolised the period's prevailing mood that resulted in an 'End of Victorianism', where 'British society seemed to have broken out of the straitjacket of dullness and conformity which had pinioned it since Victorian times'.\(^{84}\) This was also reflected in cricket when the Gentlemen versus the Players fixture was abolished in 1963.\(^ {85}\)

The changes in football's industrial relations, together with the fall in demand for professional football and the changing habits of fans, saw the emergence of a process of economic rationalisation. This had begun in the mid-Fifties and accelerated during the Sixties. First Division clubs were less affected by the fall in crowds than teams in the lower divisions, and in terms of income, First Division clubs steadily increased their share. By 1964-65 First Division clubs accounted for 50.4 per cent of the game's gross receipts. In 1950-51 this figure had been 44.4 per cent. The other divisions experienced a concomitant decrease in their gate receipts.\(^{86}\) The income of Bury in 1951, for example, a club that yo-yoed between Divisions Two and Three, totalled £51,885, in 1960 it was £71,774; and in 1970, £90,616. At nearby Manchester United however, the figures were: 1951, £89,636; 1960, £183,218; 1970, 

\(^{83}\) *The Times*, 5 May 1962, p. 9
\(^{84}\) A. Marwick, *British Society since 1945* (1990), p. 152
\(^{85}\) The professional-amateur distinction was not abolished in football until 1974.
\(^{86}\) 'English Professional Football', *Planning*, pp. 108-10
£527,118.\(^{87}\) Not only were fans supporting the bigger teams but consequently the best playing talent became concentrated in fewer clubs.\(^{88}\)

Pressures therefore, were building up within clubs to confront the changing circumstances. To what extent did they affect the relationship between a manager and his directors? In essence, the growing tensions between them redefined their relationship without changing its basic structure. The directors were still the bosses who traditionally disliked delegating, did not like spending money and therefore, were reluctant to cede power to managers. Managers, on the other hand, wanted to manage their own way, mirroring their experience as players and, for some, in the armed forces which had been, ‘Do as you are told, not as you like.’ Yet any demarcation between a manager’s duties and the directors’ prerogative to wield their power was still hazy. A 1962 documentary, for example, about West Bromwich Albion, *The Saturday Men*, showed how at a board meeting, the manager, Archie Macaulay, could only recommend that the directors select the team he wanted.\(^{89}\)

As we have seen, managers had few qualifications and it may have been the case that some directors did not want well qualified managers as they could not manipulate them. In 1955 Coventry City engaged Jesse Carver as their manager. He had been a successful coach in Italy, winning their League in 1950 with Juventus. However, he left after six months and returned to Italy, accused by Coventry’s directors of not knowing the transfer market. His successor, George Raynor had been his assistant. He also had experience of managing abroad, winning the 1948 Olympic

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87 Szymanski and Kuypers, *Winners and Losers*, pp. 340-78
88 *The Economist*, 25 December 1965, pp. 1419-422
Games football championships with Sweden and he was later in charge when they reached the World Cup Final in 1958. Raynor also resigned complaining of interference from the directors. One source of this problem perhaps stemmed from the terms of a manager's actual contract. The terms of Raich Carter's contract with Leeds United in 1955 left his role open to the interpretation of the directors for example. It was stated, that the 'manager shall [sic] subject to any orders or directions given to him by the Board of Directors during his employment hereunder be responsible for and have the control of the training and management of all the football players'. In other words, directors reserved the right to interfere in team matters.

How some managers gained autonomy in team matters was a complex and gradual, almost imperceptible process, and much depended on an individual club's management culture. Moreover, because they were small organisations football clubs could be dominated by powerful personalities, and during this period an increasing number were managers. At Manchester United Matt Busby used the force of his personality and argument to gain greater control over team affairs. On one occasion, early in his stewardship he was sitting in the directors' box during one game when a director, Harold Hardman, 'leaned forward and said in a voice that people around him could hear: 'Why didn't you do so-and-so?' Busby rebuked him in private and insisted that directorial interference was put on the agenda at the next board

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90 Coventry Evening Telegraph, 23 March 1955, p. 6; F.A. News, December 1959, p. 163
91 See Appendix 17
meeting. On another occasion in 1947-48, club chairman, Jimmy Gibson insisted that Busby should sign a player but Busby refused and stood his ground. He claimed from then on his autonomy as manager was never questioned and this continued under future chairmen, Hardman and Louis Edwards. One reason for United’s decline from 1968 however, was Busby’s continued presence at the club. On retirement he became the club’s general manager and this seems to have intimidated his successor Wilf McGuinness. Busby, unable to relinquish the reins of power, was also implicated in the sacking of Frank O’Farrell who succeeded McGuinness.

When Bill Shankly was recruited by Liverpool, then in the Second Division, in 1959 it was because of his reputation for running small clubs on a shoestring budget, not because the directors thought he was going to play a prominent role in the club’s later success. Attendances were falling throughout football and Liverpool’s average gates were under 30,000. Shankly subsequently encountered directorial interference similar to that which he had experienced at his other clubs, Carlisle United, Grimsby Town, Workington Town and Huddersfield Town. When he was manager at Workington the board had selected the team and signed new players. It

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92 Busby, Soccer, pp. 16-17; Dunphy, Strange Kind of Glory, pp. 111-12. It was not possible to verify this claim as Manchester United would not allow me access to their archives. Hardman, as a former England amateur player, probably thought he was qualified, as well as entitled to question Busby’s judgement. Dunphy, Strange Kind of Glory, p. 112
93 Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 99. He also had short period as caretaker manager between December 1970 and July 1971 and was a director from June 1971 until August 1982. The club made him its President in March 1980
94 Tyrell and Meek, Manchester United, pp. 126-27; Dunphy, Strange Kind of Glory, pp. 344-60, pp. 363-68; Pawson, Football Managers, p. 73
95 Kelly, Bill Shankly, pp. 135-37 Shankly begun his managerial career at Carlisle United between March 1949 and July 1951. He then moved to Grimsby Town and was manager from July 1951 to January 1954. Next was Workington between January 1954 and November 1955. After that he became assistant manager at Huddersfield Town to a former Preston North End team-mate, Andy Beattie, from December 1955 until November 1956 when he became the manager. He held that position until November 1959 when he became manager of Liverpool the next month.
had a large number of directors who were continually involved in power struggles and at one chaotic meeting some nearly came to blows.\footnote{i} Initially, the Liverpool directors also wanted to tell Shankly what to do.

With his past record and Liverpool’s economic situation, the directors were unwilling to provide him with any money to buy players. However, help was literally round the corner in the form of near neighbours Everton. In 1960 John Moores, owner of the Littlewoods football pools company, became chairman of Everton after holding a controlling interest for a number of years. He had now decided to exercise his authority and immediately offered Everton a £56,000 interest free loan to buy players.\footnote{Young, Football on Merseyside, p. 152} Moores was also the major shareholder in Liverpool and a bridge-playing friend of its chairman, Tom Williams. He decided to place his own nominee on the Liverpool board, Eric Sawyer, an accountant. Sawyer was in charge of finance at Littlewoods and was made financial director at Liverpool. He realised that if Liverpool was to make progress it needed to invest in new players.\footnote{Kelly, Bill Shankly, pp. 136-41} In 1961 Sawyer persuaded his fellow directors to release the money for Shankly to buy Ron Yeats and Ian St. John, two players who were pivotal to Liverpool’s promotion to Division One in 1962.\footnote{Pawson, Football Managers, pp. 66-67; Guardian, 17 March 2000, p. 36}

Before John Moores, Everton themselves had had a tradition of directors running the team stretching back to William Cuff who had dominated the club for...
many years.\textsuperscript{101} The club's first manager, Theo Kelly, was not appointed until 1939. Kelly had been the secretary and the directors continued to run team affairs. He was replaced in 1948 by Cliff Britton, a former player, with Kelly resuming his secretarial duties.\textsuperscript{102} In 1956 Britton resigned citing directorial interference but rather than appoint a successor, team matters were delegated to a sub-committee with Ian Buchan as chief coach.\textsuperscript{103} In 1961 Moores however, installed his own choice, Harry Catterick, as manager.\textsuperscript{104}

It was Liverpool however, who eventually became Merseyside's top club. In one way Shankly was lucky because he was at Liverpool at the right time. They were a 'fallen giant' but had great potential to exploit the changing economic circumstances, post-maximum wage. The club's success was in no small way due to Shankly but only because he had been given more freedom to manage. As a result, his influence over the running of the club grew, and this included the negotiation of players' salaries.\textsuperscript{105} Yet, Shankly's relationship with the directors remained strained right up until his mysterious departure in 1974. He perhaps began to alienate the directors as he may have felt that the club could not do without him. Shankly had threatened to resign on a number of occasions as a way of getting the directors to accept his views on a specific issue. Perhaps Liverpool's directors felt that the club

\textsuperscript{101} Cuff was club secretary from 1901 to 1918, and then chairman for seventeen years between 1921 and 1938. He then became President of the Football League until his death in 1949 Young, \textit{Football on Merseyside}, p. 76; p. 105 n3; pp. 146-47
\textsuperscript{102} Turner and White, \textit{Football Managers}, p. 162
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Daily Herald}, 10 March 1956, p. 10
\textsuperscript{105} Prior to his retirement, Shankly had improved the salaries of all the playing staff with Kevin Keegan's being doubled. M. Dononvan, 'Football as a Life and Death Struggle: A Critical Analysis of the Management Style of Bill Shankly' (MA Thesis, University of Warwick, 1992), p. 54
was in such a healthy financial position that Shankly was now dispensable or that the increase in the game's commercial growth meant that they had to have control of the club's finances.\textsuperscript{106}

At smaller clubs, directors probably had a greater say in the running of the club, particularly as money was tighter than for Division One clubs. Darlington were a perennial lowly club during the Fifties, and none of its managers had money to buy new players.\textsuperscript{107} At the end of the 1951-52 only twelve players were offered contracts for the following season.\textsuperscript{108} During the 1950s the club's management changed very little compared to the 1930s. In March 1952, following criticism of the team's performance in the local press, the club appointed Bob Gurney, a centre-forward for Sunderland when they won the League in 1936 and the Cup the following year.\textsuperscript{109} Despite his playing reputation, the directors continually questioned Gurney's team selections and the players he wanted to sign. On one occasion, it was recorded that, '[t]he manager submitted his team ... Certain suggestions were made by us as to the constitution of the team and it was agreed that the manager would consider them in the light of playing conditions'.\textsuperscript{110} Gurney was replaced in 1957 by Dick Duckworth, the chief scout at Sheffield United. One of the terms of his contract was that as manager he would have full control of the playing and training staff, and scouts, and to be responsible for all team selections. However,

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Evening Gazette} (Middlesbrough), 5 October 1957, p. 15
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Northern Echo}, 6 May 1952, p. 6
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Northern Echo}, 28 February 1952, p. 6
\textsuperscript{110} Durham County Record Office, D/XD 97/4, Darlington FC Minutes, 16 December 1952. See also Minutes 13 October 1953
a few months later it was recorded that the manager had put forward his ‘suggested’
teams for Saturday’s game.\textsuperscript{111}

Despite any changes in their relationship with the board, the recruitment and
buying and selling of players was still the most important aspect of the manager’s
job. Following the abolition of the maximum wage however, clubs had to concentrate
their resources. Before its abolition many clubs had been able to employ a large
number of players. In 1953 Barnsley had 42 professionals and 40 amateurs on its
books which created a lot of competition just to reach its fourth team.\textsuperscript{112} Manchester
United had five teams with the youngest players, aged 15, in the fifth.\textsuperscript{113} During the
Sixties however, wages and transfer fees began to escalate and forced clubs to reduce
their staffs. Yet even in the era of the maximum wage, the bigger clubs could still
afford the best players. Richer clubs were also able to pay the maximum wage to as
many players as possible, not to mention illegal payments. Matt Busby was never
afraid to pay out large transfer fees, and in eighteen seasons between 1950 and 1967,
United made a loss on transfers on eleven occasions.\textsuperscript{114} Managers also had to satisfy
directors who had an eye on the balance sheet. Even after the Liverpool directors
allowed Shankly to spend money on building up the team, he still had to sell other
players. By 1964 he had invested just over £150,000 in new players but had
recouped just under the same figure.\textsuperscript{115} Stan Cullis, continuing the policy of Frank
Buckley, was even more successful. Between 1948 to 1956, he made a total of

\textsuperscript{111} Durham County Record Office, D/XD 97/4, Darlington FC Minutes, 25 November 1957; 2
October 1958
\textsuperscript{112} Ward and Alister, Barnsley, p. 11, 24
\textsuperscript{113} Dunphy, Strange Kind of Glory, p. 189
\textsuperscript{114} Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, p. 360
£170,150 profit in transfer dealings.\textsuperscript{116} Wolves made an overall profit of £186,222 in the period 1948 to 1959.\textsuperscript{117}

During the 1950s Wolves’ success, both on and off the field, had been based on the production of home-grown talent, enabling the club to save on transfer fees.\textsuperscript{118} One of their nursery teams was based at Wath-on-Dearne in South Yorkshire. Run by a former Wolves player Mark Crook, it had been instituted by Frank Buckley before the War. After 1945 it supplied the club with a number of players such Ron Flowers and Roy Swinbourne. Matt Busby also developed home-grown talent at Manchester United. The ‘Busby Babes’, his most famous team, was virtually wiped out after the Munich air disaster in February 1958. It had been a product of United’s youth system, and the team’s average age when United won the league in 1955-56 was 22.\textsuperscript{119} United’s youth scheme had initially been set up in the form of Manchester United Junior Athletic Club by James Gibson when he first became chairman in 1931. The chief scout had been Louis Rocca who had many contacts all over Britain and Ireland. Rocca died in 1950 and was replaced by Joe Armstrong.\textsuperscript{120} His main asset was the ability to charm parents into letting their sons sign for United.\textsuperscript{121}

Dunphy has claimed that originally, Busby would not agree to under-the-counter payments for schoolboy footballers but he later relented in the face of the

\textsuperscript{115}Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 159
\textsuperscript{116}Express and Star, 17 March 1956, p. 15
\textsuperscript{117}Express and Star Newspaper Library, ‘Stan Cullis’ File, Sporting Star, 7 May 1960
\textsuperscript{118}Wolverhampton Wanderers won the Football League in 1954, 1958 and 1959. They also won the FA Cup in 1949 and 1960.
\textsuperscript{119}Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 99
\textsuperscript{120}Dunphy, Strange Kind of Glory, pp. 147-48
competition from other clubs. The poaching of talented schoolboy footballers was a common, if shady practice during this period. In 1959 Wolves were found to have contravened the FA’s Rule 32(d). It stated that ‘[n]o approach of any description shall be made either directly or indirectly to a boy on the roll of a recognised school either to sign registration forms or to play for a Club affiliated to a County Football Association’. A Wolves scout, Mr G. Cotterell, denied trying to induce a young player but he admitted that he went to the player’s house to help the father find employment when his son left school. Wolves were fined £250 with the commission taking previous offences into consideration.

As the business of football clubs increased, managers delegated more responsibilities to a growing number of assistants. Furthermore, backroom staff provided some clubs with continuity when a new manager was appointed. At Manchester United, Matt Busby came to rely on Jimmy Murphy and Bert Whalley who supervised the reserve and youth teams. Bill Nicholson and Eddie Baily played under Arthur Rowe when Spurs won the League in 1951. Baily later became Nicholson’s assistant when Tottenham won the ‘Double’ ten years later. Stan Cullis was manager of Wolverhampton Wanderers from 1948 to 1964, following a playing career with the club that had begun in 1934 and lasted until 1947. He then had a short spell as assistant manager. The club’s link with Frank Buckley had been interrupted by the appointment of Ted Vizard in 1944 but even then continuity was

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121 Rogan, Football Managers, p. 6
122 Dunphy, Strange Kind of Glory, pp. 124-25, 254
123 Football Association Handbook: Rule of the Association and Laws of the Game (1960-61)
124 Football Association Consultative Committee Minutes, 6 April 1959
125 Dunphy, Strange Kind of Glory, p. 104
maintained by secretary, Jack Howley who had joined the club as a player in 1923. Joe Gardiner, who as trainer acted as a foil to Stan Cullis, was another player under Buckley. Later, Wolves player Bill Shorthouse retired in 1957 and then became the club’s coach.¹²⁷

When he took over at Liverpool, Shankly’s first task was to ensure the jobs of the club’s coaching staff; Bob Paisley, Joe Fagan, Reuben Bennett and Albert Shelly. They were later joined in the Sixties by Ronnie Moran and this group formed what was to be known as the ‘Boot Room’. This was a room under the stand where the group would meet up and discuss tactics and the form of players. It was to eventually create a body of knowledge and experience unmatched in the history of English football. Each brought their own brand of knowledge. Shankly was the leader who motivated the players and Paisley was the tactical brains while Fagan was more of a psychologist.¹²⁸ When Shelly retired in 1970, Paisley became Shankly’s assistant. Paisley came to be regarded as his ‘hatchet man’, keeping the manager informed of any dissension amongst the players.¹²⁹

How was the relationship between the manager and his players, affected by the changes in post-War football and society? Overall, there was no radical transformation and with no training for managers any changes were mainly through trial and error. Overwhelmingly, managers still felt that young men needed discipline from an authoritarian figure. What style that took depended much on the manager’s own personality, and some, for example, continued to maintain a Sergeant-Major

¹²⁶Rogan, Football Managers, pp. 24-48
¹²⁷T. Matthews, The Wolves (Warley, 1989), passim
¹²⁸Kelly, Bill Shankly, pp. 120-22
persona. Nevertheless, subtle changes in the style of management did emerge, one that involved a closer relationship between manager and players, and that owed something to the decline in deference throughout the country. Some managers talked about a so-called ‘family-like’ atmosphere in their clubs. This revolved around the notion of the manager as the father-figure demanding obedience without question from the players. In football clubs however, as in any family, it did not prevent dysfunctional behaviour by some of the members, and these methods did not fit an increasingly permissive society.

Younger managers though were able to develop a better understanding of modern players. Stan Cullis was forced to retire early from football at 32 in 1947. When he became manager in 1948 he regularly trained with the players. He also initiated team talks on a Friday morning, similar to those of Herbert Chapman. Wolves won the Cup in his first season, something Cullis put down to co-operation with the players as a result of his weekly team talks. In addition to helping form tactics, the talks that involved all the players, built up confidence and established trust between manager and players.\textsuperscript{130} Other managers however, found the transition from player to manager difficult to overcome. Former England international, Raich Carter had problems coming to terms with the fact that some of his players did not show the same dedication towards the game as he had done.\textsuperscript{131}

Conditioned by his experience as a player, Matt Busby wanted to bring a more humane approach to management, similarly to his manager at Liverpool, George

\begin{enumerate}
\item[129] Rogan, \textit{Football Managers}, p. 212
\item[130] \textit{Express and Star}, 9 May 1949, p. 11
\item[131] Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998
\end{enumerate}
Kay. He first tried to fill any gulf between the manager and his charges by training with the players. Busby was also prepared to listen to a player’s personal problems, although he was more concerned with the impact that these may have had on players’ performances. He also had his players’ vetted for any vices and domestic problems. Busby’s style of management brought him into conflict with a number of players and highlighted a streak of authoritarianism. Johnny Morris found Busby’s paternalism, his attempt to create a ‘family’ at Old Trafford, condescending and would not submit to Busby’s ways. Following an argument with Busby on the training pitch, Morris walked off and was promptly placed on the transfer list.

Furthermore, when Charlie Mitten came back to United after the ‘Bogota’ incident, he was also transferred listed. However, when George Best started to dispute Busby’s authority during the Sixties, the manager was criticised for being too lenient towards him.

With the decline in social barriers as a whole, footballers grew in confidence regarding their own status and also became more independently minded, a process that accelerated once the maximum wage was abolished. In the Fifties, a group of West Ham players including Malcolm Allison became part of an ‘Academy’ that met in a local cafe, discussed tactics, and would then try and impose them on their manager, Ted Fenton. From early in his career Danny Blanchflower had also challenged convention and had his own ideas on the way to play and prepare for

133 Dunphy, Strange Kind of Glory, p. 105
134 ibid., p. 129; pp. 144-46
135 ibid., p. 161
136 Russell, Football, p. 130
matches that ran contrary to that of the management at Barnsley and Aston Villa.\textsuperscript{137}
The problem for his managers was how to deal with his rebelliousness. He moved to Spurs in 1954 but the manager Jimmy Anderson, did not take kindly to Blanchflower changing team formations during matches. He stripped Blanchflower of the captaincy and dropped him for a while.\textsuperscript{138} When Bill Nicholson became manager in 1958 he decided to harness Blanchflower’s footballing talents as opposed to regarding them as a threat to his own authority. He let Blanchflower run the team during games and to make any positional changes.\textsuperscript{139} By giving a senior player more responsibility, he could act as a buffer between the manager and players. In return for his extra responsibility he would maintain discipline. At the same time, this reinforced the masculine hierarchy within clubs with captains of the team taking on the role similar to that of a Lance Corporal.

A manager’s motivational methods however, still resonated with the past. Cullis was captain under Frank Buckley, and in many ways adopted a similar persona, that of a hard, authoritarian figure. His son described him as a ‘hard man’.\textsuperscript{140} Former player Dennis Wilshaw believed that the team spirit ‘stemmed from the fact we all hated his guts’.\textsuperscript{141} Another former player, Bill Slater, however, described him as a ‘very demanding manager’ but one who the players liked. Slater said that they might ‘complain a bit that he was never satisfied but I think they respected him, and

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Guardian}, 10 December 1993, p. 4, ‘Obituary’
\textsuperscript{138} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{139} Bowler, Danny Blanchflower, passim
\textsuperscript{140} Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999
\textsuperscript{141} Anon., \textit{Talking With Wolves}, p. 13
liked him'. Cullis methods of motivation were also more subtle than those of Buckley. After a victory he would pick up on some of their faults but after a defeat he would say very little. On one occasion in 1953 he asked Roy Swinbourne, the club’s leading goalscorer at the time, his age. Swinbourne said, ‘Twenty-six.’ ‘Oh. I shall have to be looking for a replacement,’ Cullis replied, much to Swinbourne’s astonishment.

Sometimes the demands of management however, resulted in an abuse of players. One player, Ted Farmer, discovered during half-time at one game that after being elbowed in the stomach he was urinating blood. Despite an examination by the doctor, Cullis forced Farmer to play on. He told the doctor, ‘Wait till it comes through his backside before you take him off.’ His injury was later diagnosed as damage to the wall of his bladder, necessitating five days in hospital where no Wolves official visited him.

The abolition of the maximum wage affected Wolves more than the big city clubs, and also created problems for Cullis as manager. Until then the club had prospered by a mixture of careful husbandry and nurturing home-grown players. Other clubs however, were able to offer markedly better wages. At Fulham, England captain, Johnny Haynes, became the country’s first footballer to be paid £100 per

142 Interview with Bill Slater, 9 December 1999
143 ibid.
144 Anon., Talking With Wolves, p. 15
145 T. Farmer, The Heartbreak Game (West Bromwich, 1987), pp. 53-54. In 1969 a Roma player, Giuliano Taccola, died after being forced to train in cold conditions by his manager, Helenio Herrera, who had earlier been warned by the club doctors that Taccola had a heart murmur. Guardian, 11 November 1997, p. 18, 'Obituary'
Everton, with John Moores as chairman, offered a potentially lucrative bonus system. On top of their basic wages and bonuses, players would earn £2 per thousand on home gates over 35,000 if the club was in the top two of the First Division at the time. It was calculated that for certain weeks players could earn over £100 per week. Everton won the League that season and there was a 50 per cent increase in their wage bill. In comparison, Wolves’s wage structure was not radically altered after 1961. Initially, to maintain an equality amongst the players, they were all paid the same. However, Cullis had problems coming to terms with the fact that players put money over their loyalty to the club. In 1961 and 1962, club captain Ron Flowers held out for more money before re-signing. Previously, the imposition of the maximum wage had made moving not so attractive, making it easier for him to motivate the players.

Bill Shankly motivated players with an eccentric brand of authoritarianism mixed with an enthusiasm and sense of humour which meant that no-one was ever quite sure if he was being serious or not. Despite his autocratic tendencies he seems to have transcended any generation gap and at Huddersfield Town the players preferred Shankly’s more open style to his more stuffy predecessor, Andy

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146 At 2000 prices £100 converts to £1300.
147 The Times, 27 July 1962, p. 12f
148 Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, p. 354. Manchester United had a similar bonus scheme, and in the mid-Sixties George Best claimed that sometimes he was earning nearly £1000 a week. At the height of his popularity in 1969, his income, not just from football, was £5000 per week. He also claims that in the late Sixties his basic weekly wage was £700 whereas Denis Law and Bobby Charlton earned twice as much. At 2000 prices £1000 in 1967 was worth £10,935. £5000 in 1969 was worth nearly £50,000. G. Best, The Good, the Bad and the Bubbly (1990), p. 30, 64, 166.
149 Interview with Bill Slater, 9 December 1999
If ever a player was injured however, Shankly would ignore him. Ray Clemence described how ‘if you were injured, you almost went round with a little bell’. Ian St. John claimed that Shankly was ‘capable of exaggerating any situation to get the best out of his players’. During team talks Shankly would be completely dismissive of the opposition. The players of course knew that it was all nonsense; an act, a regular performance. But it worked. It had the effect of relaxing them by banishing negative thoughts and filling them with confidence.

Increasingly, there was a greater awareness by managers of the need to prepare players better before games due to the increase in footballing competition. More attention was paid to training for example. Wolves gained a reputation for being a very fit team that won many games when other teams tired during the final minutes. The club acquired a training ground at Castlecroft where the coaching and practice took place. The players had to meet at the football stadium, Molineux, to catch a bus. They also had to sign a book so that the manager was aware of any late arrivals. Cullis would attend but training was usually supervised by the coaches and trainers. A Monday morning would sometimes be taken over by an inquest on Saturday’s game. On other days practice games and coaching took place with time being allotted to practising certain moves like throw-ins. Ideas were interchanged between coaches and players alike and not forced upon them. All this was designed to make training more interesting and prevent it becoming too repetitive. For two days a week training was under the direction of Frank Morris, an international

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151 Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 92  
152 Sunday Correspondent, 11 March 1990, p. 58  
153 Sunday Times, 4 October 1981, p. 31
athlete, who concentrated on the players' physical conditioning. Training also included weight-lifting and circuit training. On a Friday, after picking up their pay cheques, the players would do some light work at Molineux, including a spell in the shooting-pen, a legacy of Frank Buckley.155

For over thirty years, Liverpool's training was conducted under 'Shankly's Rules' even after he retired. He had instituted them when he arrived in 1959 and they continued until the early 1990s. Training took place at Melwood over 90 minutes on a pitch the exact size as Anfield. The day would begin with a long-warming up session, followed by ball exercises. (Surprisingly, Liverpool never practised any set-pieces like corners or free-kicks.) Stamina training was always done on grass, not on roads. To finish with there was a five-a-side game which Shankly would insist on being competitive. It was during these games that the basis of Liverpool's style of play, control, pass and move, was founded.156 Routine was everything, particularly the 'cooling down' period after training. This served two purposes. First, the players changed at Anfield as a psychological ploy designed to make the players familiar with their home ground. The most important aspect of the coach trip was that it allowed the players' bodies to cool down, closing the pores and helping to avoid injuries. Shankly and Paisley, with their background in physiotherapy, earnestly

154 Rogan, Football Managers, pp. 88-89
155 Flowers, Wolves, pp. 57-63
156 Kelly, Bill Shankly, pp. 194-98; Sunday Correspondent, 11 March 1990, p. 58. To spice things up he would sometimes divide teams up on the basis of England versus Scotland or bachelors versus married men. Shankly made sure he was on the best team and he always took the penalties. If he missed it had to be re-taken as the keeper was deemed to have moved, a scene reminiscent of the film, Kes where Brian Glover's PE teacher insisted on re-taking a penalty after it was saved by one of the boys. Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 194-98
believed in its advantages. It resulted in very few injuries and Liverpool would regularly field fewer players in a season than any other club.\textsuperscript{157}

Throughout the period a demand grew for better training and coaching. After 1961 there was a gradual shift in the occupational culture of footballers where they attained a greater sense of their own professional identity.\textsuperscript{158} Some players, probably a minority, also began to look upon coaching as something that was necessary to the extension and development of their careers. Busby had initially made the ball available during training together with physical conditioning. By the Sixties however, this was not enough for some players. Noel Cantwell, who came from West Ham’s ‘Academy’, criticised Busby’s pre-match preparations and the lack of coaching at the club.\textsuperscript{159} When he left Manchester United for Leeds under Don Revie in 1963, Johnny Giles noticed a difference in attitude. Without the quality of players that United had at Old Trafford, Revie concentrated on paying attention to detail.\textsuperscript{160}

More people consciously thought about the game, would plan set-pieces and in general, try not leave things to chance. Revie himself became famous for his dossiers on the opposition that would highlight their faults and strengths. It was something he had picked up when he played as a junior for Middlesbrough Swifts from its

\textsuperscript{157}Kelly, \textit{Bill Shankly}, p. 50, p. 199. In Italy, where some clubs were owned by multi-millionaries like the Agnellis at Juventus, the owners of Fiat, there was greater pressure placed on managers and more emphasis was placed on preparing the players. At Inter Milan, owned by the oil merchant, Angelo Moratti, Helenio Herrera invented the \textit{ritiro}, the training camp, where players would be sent on the eve of games, allowing Herrera to keep an eye on them. It also enabled him to impose some of his eccentric methods on the players such as making them hug each other before a game. S. Kuper, \textit{Football Against the Enemy} (1994), pp. 78-79; \textit{Guardian}, 11 November 1997, p. 18, "Obituary"

\textsuperscript{158}M. Polley, \textit{Moving the Goalposts: A History of Sport and Society since 1945} (1998), pp. 114-17

\textsuperscript{159}Dunphy, \textit{Strange Kind of Glory}, p. 257. Cantwell later became manager of Coventry City.

\textsuperscript{160}\textit{ibid.,} p. 295
manager, Bill Sanderson. Revie realised that managers, as well as inspiring players, needed to exploit the flaws of the opposition.¹⁶¹

Managers increasingly made themselves responsible for the team’s tactics and new ideas on playing strategy also emerged after the War. There had been a fear that coaching would produce a uniformity of play but instead a variety of styles emerged. Just after the War Burnley, under Cliff Britton, employed the ‘clockwork’ method. It aimed at getting all the players behind the ball when Burnley lost possession of it, so when they regained possession it was done by the short pass.¹⁶² To a large extent style depended on the players a manager had at his disposal. Arthur Rowe instituted a ‘Push and Run’ method in his Spurs’ team that won the League in 1951 but by the mid-Fifties he was unable to find replacements of a similar quality.

Under Cullis, Wolves were characterised as a typically British ‘Kick and Rush’ team during the Fifties. However, it was more sophisticated than this. Cullis basically wanted to play the game in his opponent’s half. They employed a pressing game, harrying the opposition into mistakes, and a smothering defence so as not to let the other team enjoy easy possession. Wolves would then look to play long passes to their wingers, Johnny Hancocks and Jimmy Mullen. They would ‘work the touchline’ and be available for the ball out of defence. It was also important that they were very good and they helped to create many chances for themselves and the other Wolves forwards. In every season between 1957-58 to 1960-61, Wolves scored over one hundred League goals.¹⁶³ Although successful in England, Wolves were

¹⁶¹ Rogan, Football Managers, 1989, p. 93
¹⁶² A. Ledbrooke and E. Turner, Soccer From the Press Box (1955), p. 86
¹⁶³ Interview with Bill Slater, 9 December 1999
unable to reproduce this form in European competition. In the 1960 European Cup, they were beaten 9-2 on aggregate by Barcelona. One of the major innovations from Europe was the defensive system *catenaccio*, where, basically another defender, the ‘sweeper’ played behind the back four. A Swiss coach of the 1950s, Karl Rappan, was probably the first to use it, but *catenaccio* was perfected by Helenio Herrera’s teams in Italy, producing a negative and sterile, albeit successful form of football.\(^{164}\)

In 1962 Ipswich surprised the football world by winning the Football League. Ramsey played a flexible 4-3-3 formation to suit the players he had. In particular, the left winger, Jimmy Leadbetter, was played in a withdrawn role on the left that created an element of surprise, allowing him to make runs into the penalty area without being marked. When England won the World Cup it was said it was achieved by a team of ‘wingless wonders’ but Ramsey was more interested in how the team as a whole would function within a certain pattern, and found that none of the specialist wingers he tried conformed to his ideas. Alan Ball and Martin Peters were used during the competition, partly for their ability on the wing but also because they could ‘tuck inside’ and reinforce the midfield. The England team overall was built on a strong defence and an emphasis was placed on efficiency with the team working as a unit. Ramsey’s methods were later copied by clubs with lesser players bringing perhaps a more bland form of football. He was later criticised for this, as Herbert Chapman had been in the Thirties for the W/M formation.\(^{165}\)

During the Sixties some managers had become well-known media personalities. This process was to be accentuated by the arrival of television,

\(^{164}\)Kuper, *Football*, p. 78; *Guardian*, 11 November 1997, p. 18, 'Obituary'
although football’s relationship with it was still at a early stage. Until the mid-1960s there was little football shown on television apart from the Cup Final and internationals. Yet its potential to directly affect football was shown by the estimated audience of 10 million that watched the 1953 ‘Matthews’ Final.\textsuperscript{166} It also demonstrated how television could appeal to wider audience who were not supporters and enhance the game’s status. Images of managers however, were still formed by the press. Wagg argues that ‘the assumption that the managerial hand alone guided team performance, became more deeply woven into the popular football consciousness, gaining acceptance not only on the terraces and in the stands, but among directors and managers themselves’.\textsuperscript{167} Not only did managers come to be regarded as witchdoctors but also as figureheads for their clubs, and by the mid-Sixties, a flair for public relations was a growing requisite for the job. The overall purpose of advertising is to stimulate a demand for the consumption of goods, and with falling attendances during this period, football clubs became aware of the need to ‘sell’ themselves and to promote the right image.\textsuperscript{168} The advertising of the club therefore, became a function of the manager, and he came to be seen as ‘the club’. Not only were they promoting the club but managers were also enhancing their own image. During the 1960s Bill Shankly’s quotability endeared him to reporters and he also used this to promote the club, its players, and importantly, the fans.

\textsuperscript{165}Mason, \textit{Kick and Rush}

\textsuperscript{166}As a result of the drop in attendances at the League games played on the same day, the following year’s Final was switched to the last day of the season when no other matches were played. Russell, \textit{Football}, p. 139

\textsuperscript{167}Wagg, \textit{Football World}, p. 159

A manager’s relationship with the media was also a two-way process. After the War, for example, local football personalities were sought by BBC radio for post-match summaries. In August 1946 these included Blackpool’s manager, Joe Smith. Prophetically, with regard to the high media profile of today’s managers, the BBC OBD S.J. de Lotbiniere remarked that, ‘[p]eople’s vanity can so easily be tickled by microphone appearances’. Some managers also developed their own post-match soundbites. Asked a question by Eamon Andrews on the BBC’s Sports Report, Stan Cullis would invariably reply, ‘I haven’t got a crystal ball here to know the future Eamon’; an early equivalent of the ‘We’ll take one match at a time’ cliché that modern managers so often use. During the 1950s Cullis also appeared on a weekly local radio show, Talking Football, with Danny Blanchflower. Cullis was also aware of the importance of newspapers. He took many calls from journalists through the day on his office phone and he also took calls at home in the evening and on Sundays. He claimed that ‘the services of the newspapers are vital to the prosperity of football which could scarcely continue in its present position if the papers ignored it’. However, this did not prevent him from banning David Jack from the Molineux press box for a report that ‘went beyond what might be expected from a Sportswriter of repute’.

169 BBC WAC, R30/915/1, Letter from OBD, S.J. de Lotbiniere to Victor Smythe, Manchester, 27 August 1946; Memo from OBD, S.J. de Lotbiniere to Victor Smythe, Manchester, 4 September 1946
170 Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999
171 Bowler, Danny Blanchflower, p. 83. Blanchflower was then at Aston Villa.
172 Cullis, Wolves, p. 205
173 Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Minutes, 7 February 1957
Some managers however, were still uncomfortable with dealing with the press. Alf Ramsey always treated them with suspicion. The day after England won the World Cup, Ken Jones, a journalist who had supported Ramsey, requested an interview. Ramsey replied, ‘Sorry, its my day off.’ When congratulated by reporters who had been less appreciative, his response was to ask, ‘Are you taking the piss?’ A year later on a tour to Canada, Ramsey was approached by a TV reporter who said: ‘Sir Alf, we’re going to give you five minutes of CBC time.’ ‘Oh no you’re not,’ he responded and continued to walk on.

To what extent had the football manager’s job changed during this period? In general, managers were obsessives and workaholics, in line with some of their autocratic tendencies. A 1967 study of the work of 160 managers in business calculated that they worked, on average, 42 hours per week. It can be safely assumed that by 1967 the lot of the football manager was much greater, and more stressful. One reason for this increase since 1945 was that managers, like Tim Ward at Barnsley, were spending more time coaching players and had to fit it in with the club’s administration. At Workington, Bill Shankly had to answer the phone himself and also make up the players’ wage packets. Some managers however, had administrative duties written out of their contracts.

Managers also spent a lot of time travelling up and down the country watching games. Wagg argues that they were not only used for scouting purposes to

174 Bowler, Winning, p. 223
175 ibid., p. 228
176 R. Stewart, Managers and their Jobs (1988, 2nd edn.), p. 15
177 Ward and Alister, Barnsley, p. 36
178 Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 71
improve their team’s performance but gossiping with other managers would also reaffirm their professional identity. Stan Cullis spent a lot of time travelling, looking for players, sometimes accompanied by his son, Andrew. It was probably one of the few opportunities he had to spend some time with him. Andrew recounted how they rarely saw him. He was there at Christmas but because Cullis came from a large family, he would forget birthdays. Following one scouting trip to Blackburn Rovers, Cullis was driving home until he realised that he had left Andrew in the Blackburn boardroom. Andrew also often accompanied his father to the Wolves’ ground, Molineux on Sundays where Cullis would check up on injured players.

There was no doubt managing a football club was a stressful occupation, and probably became more stressful over this period. Tom Whittaker became ill with nervous exhaustion when secretary-manager at Arsenal and died in office in October 1956. Arthur Rowe suffered a nervous breakdown when manager of Spurs in 1954. After six months recuperation he had a relapse and he had to step down in 1956. Bill Shankly’s predecessor at Liverpool, Phil Taylor, retired on grounds of ill-health. He was only 42. Liverpool’s success during the mid-Sixties with its attendant increase in the club’s administrative workload, was perhaps the reason for

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179 Ward and Alister, *Barnsley*, p. 135
180 Wagg, *Football World*, p. 187
181 Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999. Cullis came from a family of ten.
182 Turner and White, *Football Managers*, p. 249
183 *ibid.*, p. 216
184 Kelly, *Bill Shankly*, p. 115
the suicide of the club’s secretary, Jimmy McInnes, in May 1965. Yet perhaps football management is also addictive. It has been speculated that Shankly died of a broken heart because his sudden retirement in 1974 left him ‘in the tormented frame of mind of one who had forfeited the power and responsibility of decision-making’ in which he was centre-stage.

Even when he was ill and confined to bed on doctor’s orders, Stan Cullis would still conduct club business over the phone such as negotiating transfers and picking the team. He was sacked by Wolves in September 1964 two days after he came back from a week’s recuperation in Eastbourne which his doctor had ordered. The directors later blamed Cullis’s treatment of the players for their subsequent complaints and transfer requests. He had lost their confidence and respect. His son, Andrew, confirmed that he had not been well for a few months and that this may have been due to a mini-stroke. As a result, he became increasingly short-tempered with the players. Following a game during the club’s 1964 tour to North American, he was seen chasing the referee around the ground.

Despite their responsibilities, managers had little control over games and referees were often the target of their frustrations. In one of his match reports, following a game at Cardiff that ended in a draw, Cullis described the performance of

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185 Kelly, *Bill Shankly*, pp. 179-80. McInnes, a former player who became secretary in 1955, was found hanging in a turnstile attendant’s box the day after Liverpool had played Inter Milan in the first leg of a European Cup semi-final.
186 *Sunday Times*, 4 October 1981, p. 31
187 *Express and Star*, 15 March, p. 28; 17 March 1956, p. 15
188 *ibid.*, 9 September 1964, p. 36; 19 September 1964, p. 1
189 *ibid.*, 18 September 1964, p. 1
190 Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999
191 Farmer, *Heartbreak Game*, p. 82
H.J. Husband as ‘poor, a definite “homer”’. His appearance was described as unsatisfactory; his control of the game, poor; and regarding his fitness, he was insufficiently mobile. Another referee, K.A. Collinge was blamed for inciting the misconduct of some Wolves’ supporters against Burnley. He was described as ‘bad, incompetent, gave bad decision after bad decision ... if he has one or two games like this he will be responsible for Grounds being closed’. Cullis concluded that, ‘there is no doubt that the trouble was caused by the incompetence of the referee’. It may also have had something to do with the fact that they lost.

The most tense part of the job was the game itself, again highlighting the limit to a manager’s powers that tormented them week after week. This even applied to the more successful managers like Stan Cullis. He said that because ‘the margin between success and failure is so small that every match in which Wolves play is something of an ordeal for me. Sitting in the directors’ box or on the touchline, I make every pass, go into every tackle with every Wolves’ players’. Anyone sitting next to him would be kicked and elbowed throughout the game. Cullis wondered how other managers like Matt Busby could be so phlegmatic.

Undoubtedly the perceived importance of football managers was growing. The increase in their salaries not only reflected this but also the game’s increasing commercialisation and the need for better management. When Matt Busby first became Manchester United manager in 1945 his salary was £750 but this increased

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192 Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Minutes, 27 February 1957
193 ibid., 4 April 1957
194 Cullis, Wolves, pp. 98-99; Anon., Talking With Wolves, p. 75
It had increased to approximately £6000 while his players earned £25 per week. Following a 1958 study of a sample of managers in industry, it was calculated that their average salary was £1794. This varied amongst different groups however. Managers in the top bracket earned on average, £3193. At the other end of the scale, managers who had worked their way up from the bottom and had left school early, averaged £1422. Based on census categories, it was calculated that managers earned on average £1480 in 1955/6 and £1850 in 1960.

On taking up his position with Ipswich Town, then in the Third Division South in 1955, Alf Ramsey’s salary was £1500. He was also given £150 for car expenses and moved into a house owned by the club worth £2850. The salary of his secretary, Scott Duncan, was £1000 plus £150 for expenses. On becoming England manager in 1962, Ramsey’s salary increased to £4500. After 1966 it was increased to £6000 plus £20 per week living expenses. In 1974 it was believed that Ramsey was still earning less than a third of First Division managers.

Managers’ salaries also reflected the status of their clubs. When Shankly moved from Huddersfield Town to Liverpool in 1959, for example, his salary

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195 Busby, Soccer, p. 16. At 2000 prices £750 equates to nearly £18,000. Dunphy, Strange Kind of Glory, p. 147. (In Chapter 5 it was stated that Frank Buckley’s salary at Notts. County was £4500). In contrast, the maximum wage for players in 1945 was £9, and in 1961 it was £20.
196 Observer, 9 May 1999, p. 11. £6000 in 1963 was the equivalent in 2000 of £76,500.
199 Ipswich Record Office, GC 426/2/2/2, Ipswich Town FC Minute Book, 8 August; 5 December 1955; 9 April 1956. £1500 converts to £22,800 at 2000 prices.
200 Bowler, Winning, p. 153. This converts to £58,380.
increased by £500 to £2500. In 1952 lowly Darlington offered Bob Gurney £15 per week. He also received five per cent on the profits made on transfers. It highlighted, if only in a limited way, how managers, unlike players, were free to negotiate the terms of their own contracts. In 1957 Gurney’s salary was upgraded to £1000. His successor, Dick Duckworth, was later offered a three year contract at £1200 per year and the same bonuses as the first team. He also received a car allowance when on club business but had to keep a record of his mileage.

Raich Carter’s contract, signed in June 1955, reflected the different aspirations of Leeds United compared to Darlington. He received a fixed salary of £1850 plus ‘reasonable’ expenses incurred on behalf of the club. Carter was also entitled to 21 days annual holiday on full pay but this had to be taken during the close season. Furthermore, the contract included potential bonus payments for 1958. This was dependent on the club’s position in the First Division and progress in the FA Cup. If Leeds reached the Cup Final and became champions, for example, Carter stood to earn a £1000 bonus for each achievement.

Stan Cullis also had bonuses written in to his contract. In 1956 he received £1000 and the following year, £912-10-0. Cullis was also offered five year contracts in 1955 and again in 1960. In 1959 he formed himself into a private

201 Observer (Sport), 2 May 1999, p. 5. The conversion rates at 2000 prices are: £10,000, £112,050; £6000, £67,230.
202 Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 117. At 2000 prices these convert to £7013 and £35,066 respectively.
203 Durham Record Office, D/XD 97/4, Darlington FC Minutes, 1 April 1952; 31 January 1957
204 Ibid., 9 May 1958
205 See Appendix 17. At 2000 prices £1850 converts to £28,122.
206 Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Minutes, 28 May 1956; 23 July 1957. £1000 in 1956 converts to nearly £15,000.
207 Express and Star, 2 March 1961, p. 32
company, 'Stanwin Limited', with a capital of £100 in £1 shares. It was reported that he was following the recent example of several leading figures in entertainment and sport. The advantages of this move included the protection of his private assets and it centralised all his various sources of income. At the time these included broadcasting, newspaper articles and authorship. When Cullis was sacked by Wolves in 1964 he was paid £14,000 by a national newspaper for 'his story'. It was probably at least twice his salary at Wolverhampton Wanderers. It also highlighted the importance that tabloid newspapers had begun to attach to managers. They had now become personalities who could sell papers, reinforcing their relationship with the media. This figure was a record until 1974 when Alf Ramsey was paid £21,000 by the same paper for three signed articles following his dismissal as England manager. Following England's World Cup triumph, Ramsey was offered £10,000 by a Sunday paper for a few quotes but had refused. However, the salaries of even the top British managers paled in comparison with that of Inter Milan's Helenio Herrera who in 1966 was awarded a contract of £90,000, the equivalent in 2000 of £1 million.

What of their homelife? In general, a football manager was rarely at home. Their wives had to be selfless and understanding of the fickle nature of their husband's job. However, it usually meant a better, more middle-class lifestyle due to the job's financial rewards and the opportunity to enjoy a higher standard of living.

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208 Ibid., 28 December 1959, p. 8
209 It was either the Sunday People or Sunday Mirror.
210 Observer (Sport), 2 May 1999, p. 1, 5. The conversion rates for £14,000 in 1964 and £21,000 in 1974 are £170,289 and £124,173, respectively.
The climb of managers up the earnings ladder also enabled some to send their children to private schools. Stan Cullis’s son, Andrew, went to a prep school and then went to Repton public school where he boarded. His parents chose a boarding school because they felt that he should not be exposed to the pressures of living in a ‘football home’. Stan Cullis’s choice of Repton was determined by the fact that they played football and not rugby! His daughter was also sent to boarding school at the age of seven.\textsuperscript{212} Raich Carter also sent his two children to private school. His daughter, Jane, initially went to a private school in Mansfield but later attended state schools. His son, also called Raich, went to a prep school and then passed the entrance exam for Hymers College, the top school in Hull. Raich senior had been indifferent to putting his children through a private education, ‘If they’ve got brains they’ll get there anyway,’ he had said. But his wife, Pat, was most insistent. She said, ‘With you and me as parents they might not have brains. I can’t take that risk.’\textsuperscript{213}

Houses were another indication of social mobility. Many managers during this period mainly stayed in club houses. The semi-detached Bob Gurney was provided with, for example, was next door to the club’s honorary secretary.\textsuperscript{214} In Wolverhampton, Stan Cullis moved from a small house in Stafford Road when he was a player to Tettenhall, a middle-class area. He bought two houses in that area. The second one was a ‘good size family house’ and was on the same road as club

\textsuperscript{211}Guardian, 11 November 1997, p. 18, ‘Obituary’. It is not known if the figure was an annual salary.
\textsuperscript{212}Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999 When Andrew was born Cullis chose not to travel with the Wolves to Blackpool the day before the game but instead went the following day. \textit{Express and Star}, 10 September 1948, p. 7
\textsuperscript{213}Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998
chairman, John Ireland, who later sacked Cullis.\textsuperscript{215} Raich Carter always lived in houses that the club owned but they were in keeping with an aspiring middle-class lifestyle. When he went to Leeds his wife, Pat, commented that ‘it was a fabulous house, very beautiful house. We had a car. The standard of living was wonderful.’ When he was manager at Middlesbrough, they were able to choose their own house and which the club would buy. Pat Carter recalls that, ‘They let you choose it and they would buy it. They would pay for your choice in wallpaper. They’d pay for the decorating and your removal expenses. It was quite exciting because it meant we could have a new carpet.’ The house Middlesbrough bought in Redcar cost £2500 and later fetched £6000. They then put their savings to a house in Hull worth £7000.\textsuperscript{216} Managers also moved in different social circles from those of their working-class origins. In addition to mixing with showbusiness personalities, they were invited to sportsmen’s dinners and to various societies. Some like Jackie Milburn and Jock Stein became freemasons.\textsuperscript{217} Stan Cullis, on one occasion, was invited to speak at a meeting of the South Staffordshire branch of the Institute of Marketing and Sales Management in Wolverhampton where he pontificated on the challenge to football from changing social habits.\textsuperscript{218}

What did managers do away from football? How did they relax? In the case of Bill Shankly this proved near impossible. He liked to listen to records of hymns and

\textsuperscript{214} Kelly’s Directory of Darlington and Neighbourhood (1957)
\textsuperscript{215} Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999
\textsuperscript{216} Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998. £2500 in 1963 converts to £31,860 at 2000 prices.
\textsuperscript{217} Webb, Freemasonry, pp. 29-30.
\textsuperscript{218} Express and Star, Newspaper Library, ‘Stan Cullis’ File, Express and Star, 23 November 1962
drink lots of tea but mostly he liked to talk about football. On Sunday afternoons at Huddersfield he regularly met a bunch of sons and their dads for a kick-about. His one concession to his wife was that he cleaned the oven before he went out. Stan Cullis liked to play a bit of golf but he particularly liked to tend to his garden. He would also take his family to church on a Sunday. Cullis was unable to spend much time on holiday with his family due to his football commitments. In the summer Wolves would often tour so the rest of the family went to places like the Channel Islands and Tenby without him.

By the mid-Sixties, the role of the football manager had undergone a process of modernisation. The abolition of the maximum wage had marked the beginning of the gradual change from football management's amateur tradition to a more professional approach. Where previously directors had been reluctant to spend money, they now found that the new commercial pressures demanded a specialist to run the club. Directors were still the bosses but the powers of the manager had increased, probably reaching a peak in the Seventies and Eighties. The rise in the status of football managers also mirrored the shift towards a more meritocratic society and the rising managerial class, reflected by their rising salaries. Managers were eager to establish their professional identity, and in this they were assisted by changes in the media; a process that would later intensify, turning them into celebrities. With the rise in their profiles, they were increasingly identified by directors, fans and especially the media as the scapegoat for a poor run of results.

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{219} \textit{Sunday Times}, 4 October 1981, p. 31
  \item \textsuperscript{220} Kelly, \textit{Bill Shankly}, pp. 87-88
  \item \textsuperscript{221} Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999
\end{itemize}
Despite the job becoming more stressful and demanding, they were unwilling to give up many of their duties, particularly the financial side. This highlighted the 'contradictions' of British modernity where innovation was checked by tradition. The role of the football manager had developed but it did so within the framework of traditional management practices as attempts to modernise failed. Football managers continued to be employed more for their practical knowledge of the game than any qualifications that they held. Despite the rise in the standards of European football, English clubs continued to be managed 'the British way'. 
CHAPTER 7

‘WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?’: MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY IN FOOTBALL’S PRODUCTION PROCESS

Another of football’s eternal mysteries is the question what a manager actually does. My theory is that his function is the same as that of a fuse in an electrical circuit. Its sole purpose is to be changed when the lights blow up.

Simon Barnes in *The Times*, 13 January 1997, p. 27

A coach may be 60 per cent responsible for a team’s performance in the build-up to a match but once the game has begun he is less than 10 per cent accountable for what happens on the field.

Cesar Luis Menotti, Argentina’s World Cup coach of 1978, quoted in *Guardian* (Sport), 2 July 1998, p. 1

... players are as fallible and vulnerable as the rest of us. And it is the players and only the players, and how they play on match day, who make or break managers.

Busby, *Soccer*, p. 20

Napoleon used to ask of a man: ‘Has he Luck?’ Ability, experience, integrity were important; without luck they were useless.


In the previous chapter we have seen how by the mid-Sixties football managers had begun to emerge as important figures within the game. Increasingly, a perception arose that the performance of a team was closely associated with the actions of its manager. Newspapers reinforced this idea as they relied heavily on managers for their daily stories. Ultimately, the perception that the football manager was a powerful, mystical figure began to be disseminated amongst fans, players and, importantly, directors, and this was to signal an increase in the powers of this new breed of managers. This process begs important questions, most centrally, what difference did managers actually make in football’s production process during this period and to what extent were they able to influence a club’s performance? With reference to the modern era, Wagg has argued that, ‘[i]n plain terms it is simply wrong to equate the performance of a football team with the performance of its manager. It makes no
more sense, in principle, to ... blame the head teacher of an inner city secondary modern school for regularly poor exam results'. Yet just as there are undoubtedly competent and incompetent head teachers, there are efficient and inefficient football managers. Russell has stressed how the ability of individual managers and coaching staffs in getting the best out of players remains the crucial ingredient; 'As any fan is aware, managers can literally make, re-make or break a club.'

It will be argued in this chapter that managers did make a difference. Yet, with particular reference to the time span of this thesis, it is necessary to take into account the changing socio-economic and cultural environment within which football management was carried out. In particular, during this period, we have seen how football management was beginning to throw off the shackles of its 'amateur' past and how the abolition of the maximum wage in 1961 expedited more professional attitudes. Yet, the culture of management within some clubs meant that this process was slow and uneven. Directors, for example, liked to interfere in some clubs more than others, thereby reducing the influence of the manager. Because of this culture, we have to beware of copper bottomed generalisations concerning the manager's influence, and therefore, it is important to take into consideration the wider context.

Historically, coaching in sport in general has had a long tradition. Boxing was an early example and this has continued into the modern era. Muhammad Ali, for example, built up a close partnership with Angelo Dundee. Through the Marylebone Cricket Club, cricket was one of the first sports to produce a coaching manual. Track

2Russell, Football, p. 171
and field athletes have also been noted for their close relationships with their coaches. In Chapter 2, the influence of Sam Mussabini was mentioned and in more recent times, Sebastian Coe was coached by his father, Peter, whilst his rival during the early 1980s, Steve Ovett, was similarly successful under long-time coach, Harry Wilson. Other individual sports, like golf, have begun to place a premium on the value of coaching. From the mid-1980s, for example, Nick Faldo teamed up with David Leadbetter who helped him win six major titles.3 Because of the pressures of top level sport, it is increasingly difficult for individuals to succeed by themselves. Instead, like team sports, they need the support of experts such as agents, managers, coaches, dieticians and fitness trainers. Tiger Woods’s entourage, for example, is known as ‘Team Tiger’, and includes his coach Butch Harmon.4 Yet, judging the value of coaches is still problematic.

American team sports have traditionally placed a greater emphasis on the role of coaches and managers than those in Britain. Even in the supposedly amateur environment of college sports, coaches have earned salaries of over $1 million because of the intense competition within the collegiate system. Tom Landry was the head coach of the professional American football team the Dallas Cowboys for 29 years. Through their success under him, they became known as ‘America’s Team’ and it was Landry who popularised their image by introducing cheerleaders. As a coach Landry was a tactical innovator and a master strategist. He also developed a revolutionary computerised scouting system that became the basis for Dallas’s success. Yet, in 1989 he suffered the same fate as most managers when he was

sacked by the new owner.\(^5\) American sport not only reflected that country's business culture but also how commercialisation and increased competition can have an impact on the management process. In America generally, compared to Britain, there has been greater investment in management resources.

Unsurprisingly, the most extensive work on the question of managerial contribution to the success of sports clubs has been on American Major League Baseball. A brief survey of the literature, reveals that most studies conclude that managers can make a difference.\(^6\) Porter and Scully, for example, estimate managerial efficiency by manager and by firm. They are positive regarding a manager's contribution, stating that 'managerial skill in baseball contributes very substantially to the production process'.\(^7\) Furthermore, for those managers who remain with one team for any length time there is a systematic improvement in efficiency, similar to a learning curve.\(^8\) A high-quality manager contributed as much to a team's revenues as a superstar player; in effect, increasing the 'marginal revenue product' as, it was claimed, managers did not earn as much as superstar baseball players.\(^9\)

In order to establish the background to football managerial efficiency before 1966, it has been necessary to use research that highlights aspects of modern football

\(^4\) Observer (Sports Monthly), July 2000, pp. 29-35
\(^5\) Guardian, 17 February 2000, p. 24, Obituary
\(^8\) ibid., p. 646
management but may be imaginatively used to compare with the past. Measurements of the worth of football managers have been traditionally difficult to calculate. Conventional observers tend to make judgements on managers based on the number of trophies they win, taking no account of the socio-economic environment in which they work. King and Kelly (1997), for example, have devised a graded scoring system predicated on a number of variables: teams finishing in first or second place in the League plus cup wins including European trophies even though this was not applicable to some managers such as Herbert Chapman. There has been an increasing number of British academic investigations on the subject. Looking mainly at the period after 1980, the management scientist, Stefan Szymanski, has brought a statistical approach to the question of managerial efficiency and his findings concur with Wagg’s earlier supposition. Szymanski has stated that managers ‘have little impact on the performance of the clubs they manage’. Instead, it has been the extent of a club’s financial investment that has been the main factor behind its success (or failure).

Szymanski has calculated, by means of regression analysis, that between 1982 and 1997 the wage expenditure of football clubs accounted for 80-90 per cent of a club’s performance whereas the manager’s contribution was estimated at about 2 per cent. By further use of regression analysis, Szymanski and Kuypers worked

9 ibid., p. 649
11 S. Szymanski, ‘Suits in a league of their own’, Observer, (Business, Work), 1 November 1998, p. 7; Szymanski, ‘Suits’. The top ten in order were: Kenny Dalglish; Joe Kinnear; Lawrie McMenemy; Howard Kendall; Alex Ferguson; Keith Burkinshaw; Dave Bassett; Trevor Francis; Bruce Rioch; Kevin Keegan.
out that between 1978 and 1997 the relationship, i.e. the regression, between wage expenditure and league performance was very efficient. The money that a club spent on players’ wages accounted for 92 per cent of its league position during this period. In layman’s terms, clubs got what they paid for: the best players cost the highest wages. This ‘goodness of fit’ can be traced back to 1978 when footballers gained freedom of contract. There is however, a greater variability when looking at just one particular year. For the 1996-97 season, for example, the correlation between wage expenditure and league position was 78 per cent, admittedly still a high figure.13

Despite this concentration on wage expenditure, Szymanski has produced a list ranking managers based also on regression analysis. It highlights how managers can make a difference, although he continues to argue that it was relatively slight. In this list, which covered the 1982-1997 period, Kenny Dalglish was ranked first. It was argued that in winning championships with Liverpool and Blackburn Rovers, ‘he achieved more at those clubs he managed than would have been expected given his spending on wages’. Other top ten entrants, like Joe Kinnear, Lawrie McMenemy and Dave Bassett, appear due to their ability to extract the best from limited resources. Alex Ferguson is ranked only fifth and George Graham does not make the top ten despite their successes at Manchester United and Arsenal respectively.14 In addition, Dawson et al, by measuring coaching performance against available playing talent, have also concluded that the most successful coaches are not necessarily the most efficient ones; that ‘coaching efficiency is only partially correlated with team performance’. Using match outcomes rather than league rankings as a variable,

13Szymanski and Kuypers, *Winners and Losers*, pp. 162-66
playing talent has then been measured by a combination of the ‘Opta Index’ that evaluates player performance based on a series of categories (ex post) against a player’s start of season transfer value (ex ante) to predict coaching efficiency.\textsuperscript{15}

Looking at the impact of pre-1966 managers, the historical context in which they worked clearly needs to be taken into account. In our period, for example, the financial context was very different. Before the maximum wage was abolished the years 1950 to 1960 show a regression of only 50 per cent. Szymanski and Kuypers have claimed that wage expenditure did matter in the 1950s but that the market was relatively inefficient. Because of the constraints of the maximum, wage expenditure was less important in terms of its relationship to league performance compared to the modern era.\textsuperscript{16} Before 1961, a player’s power was restricted and the potential for management to influence performance was perhaps greater as playing talent was distributed more evenly. Despite the relatively greater potential for managers to make an impact, compared to the 1990s, changes in the management of clubs were slow and gradual. The skills and powers of managers before 1966 were less extensive than their modern counterparts and change usually stemmed from an increase in the game’s competitiveness and the subsequent rising financial costs.

Any change in the role of the manager took place within the framework of a club’s overall aims and objectives, and these varied little throughout the period as they were not run for profit. These objectives, and their ultimate effect on the

\textsuperscript{14}Szymanski, ‘Suits’


\textsuperscript{16}ibid., pp. 167-70
management of clubs, had developed out of the historical governance of the game. As we have seen, early in its history, the FA had been determined to limit commercialisation by requiring that certain restrictions be placed on clubs in their articles of association. In 1896, under rule 45(a), it imposed a 7\% per cent maximum on shareholders’ dividends.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, until 1981, the Football Association prohibited the payment of fees to directors and also excluded paid managers from sitting on the board.\textsuperscript{18} Arnold has argued that the price of the Football Association’s protection of football against financial greed ‘was to deny the incentives that might have widened the supply of managerial talents and investment’.\textsuperscript{19} Other businesses would ‘either adopt a cooperative structure utilising the enormous fund of available local goodwill and commitment or raise equity capital’. In return, the business would have to give effective voting rights and an increase in monetary returns to shareholders. Football however, ‘allowed power to concentrate into the hands of directors’ and as shares rarely offered a monetary return, they only became useful as a means of control.\textsuperscript{20}

Moreover, in its capacity as a cartel, the Football League had tried to equalise competition through the imposition of the maximum wage and the retain and transfer system.\textsuperscript{21} These measures enabled clubs to control their players and prevent the

\textsuperscript{17}Szymanski and Kuypers, \textit{Winners and Losers}, p. 16. There were further periodic rises; in 1920 7.5 per cent, 1974 10 per cent, 1983 15 per cent.
\textsuperscript{18}Arnold, \textit{Game}, p. 127; Sloane, ‘Economics of Professional Football’, p. 131
\textsuperscript{19}Arnold, \textit{Game}, p. 20
\textsuperscript{20}\textit{ibid.}, pp. 124-25
\textsuperscript{21}Vamplew states that there are four interrelated features that characterise a profit-maximising sports cartel. First, there has to be a central, decision-making organisation to act as a rule-making body. This will then try to influence profits through cost-minimising regulations, usually labour market intervention. Cartels can also attempt to maximise revenue by improving the quality of the product
richer clubs buying up the best ones. 22 The League's retain and transfer system, that evolved in the 1890s, allowed clubs to hold 'monopsony' power over players. This meant that clubs had a firm grip over their players and that a player's club was the only buyer in the market for that player's services, unless it chose to sell him. If a player wanted a move his club could refuse and no player could leave if they were offered the maximum wage. As a result, there was little incentive for players to want to move as they would, in theory, only receive the maximum at another club, curbing competition for playing talent in the process. 23 The League also adopted cross-subsidisation mechanisms to try and further equalise competition. It regulated the quality of the competition by controlling entry into it through a re-election process and by promotion and relegation so as to avoid unattractive one-sided contests. 24 In 1890 the League had set a minimum admission fee of 6d, and there were few increases until the 1960s when football admission costs began to outpace inflation. 25 Furthermore, in 1924 it had also approved a 20 per cent allocation of gate receipts to visiting teams. 26 In 1891, to prevent competition for spectators, the League decided not to admit any club whose ground was within three miles of another member. 27

Between 1889 and 1915 the professional game had been 'reasonably competitive', with ten different clubs winning the championship over the 27 years. 28

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22 Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 258
23 Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, p. 170; Mason, Association Football, pp. 104-05
24 Arnold, Game, p. 124
25 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 81, p. 328 n28; Dobson and Goddard, 'Performance', p. 769
26 Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 269
27 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 137
28 Russell, Football, p. 53
Although looking at the period 1900 to 1939, Taylor has argued that there is little evidence to show that the League’s equalisation measures ‘substantially assisted the attainment of equality’ of competition, with the possible exception of the promotion system.\(^\text{29}\) Taylor points out that the Football League’s early policy makers were not economists but administrators, unpaid volunteers, and had a different perspective on how the game should be run. Arnold and Benveniste have also argued, that ‘individual sporting leagues reflect differences in the cultures in which they are grounded, in the aspirations of those who influence their activities, and in the historical development of their practices and rules’.\(^\text{30}\) Economic considerations therefore, like increasing profits, were important but the League was just as interested in the notions of friendship and mutuality, and it was this that permeated much of the League’s early policy and which continued up until at least 1961.\(^\text{31}\)

Nevertheless, these Football League regulations, in combination with those of the FA, had important consequences for a club’s organisation and its management. Sloane has argued that football clubs were ‘utility maximisers’ where directors, with an urge for power, and shareholders, who had a desire for group identification, invested emotionally, not financially. Instead, a club’s main goal was ‘to provide entertainment in the form of a football match. The objective was not to maximise profits, but to achieve playing success whilst remaining solvent’. Utility maximisation suggests therefore, that clubs would always strive to maximise their

\(^{29}\)Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, p. 256
\(^{31}\)Taylor, ‘Proud Preston’, p. 277
playing success, and any profits were usually ploughed back into the club.\textsuperscript{32} Arnold, like Sloane, has also argued that English football clubs developed unusual business objectives: they were motivated by playing success not by maximising profits.\textsuperscript{33}

Despite the commercial restrictions, the pre-1960s football club was not a moribund entity. Instead of being concerned with the finances of others, clubs naturally had their own ambitions. A football club therefore, was a dynamic and organic organisation with its direction continually shaped by human agency. But what direction did individual clubs want to take? Arnold and Sloane have agreed that clubs sought playing success but what did clubs consider as ‘success’? And how was football ‘consumed’? Adam Smith argued that the ‘sole end and purpose of all production’ is consumption, defined as ‘the process in which goods and services are bought and used to satisfy people’s needs’.\textsuperscript{34} The relationship between demand, supply and consumption however, is difficult to disentangle as supply does not necessarily create its own demand.\textsuperscript{35} John Benson has argued that ‘people’s interest in sport could be, and often was, an important determinant of their behaviour as consumers’.\textsuperscript{36}

Football’s production process is perhaps more difficult to disentangle than other industries. What has it meant to individual clubs for example? Football’s consumption is illogical, and as a commodity it does not conform to the forces of economic rationalism. Clubs, the ones who supply the ‘product’, have been subject

to different motivations, conditioned by factors such as their fan base. Notwithstanding the measures to restrict commercialisation and competition, some clubs from major conurbations, were inherently bigger and more ambitious than others due to the size of their potential spectator base. ‘Success’ for a club therefore, was (and still is) an ambiguous term. For a First Division club success could have meant winning the League or FA Cup, while others may have been satisfied by a mid-table position or avoiding relegation. It was only from the late Fifties that European competition became important to a few clubs. In the lower divisions, some clubs aimed for promotion whilst others wanted to maintain their League status. Some clubs may have just been happy with maintaining financial solvency.

Similarly, fans have ‘consumed’ the game for different reasons. Furthermore, when fans ‘chose’ a team they usually stay with that team for life. It has been said, and with more than a grain of truth, that the average male football fan will change his wife more often than his football team. Even if a team has not been successful, some fans will continue to support it. In terms of the nature of consumption this is irrational. If, for example, someone had bought an iron it would be replaced as soon as it stopped working. Football however, is different. Up to the 1960s the vast majority of fans identified with their local team. Post-war crowds were becoming more heterogeneous but only gradually, and there was little football on television to divert attention away from the local team (see Chapter 6). Attendances still fluctuated however. Every club had a hardcore of supporters who would attend most home games but many others were more discerning. Success was usually the main

36 ibid., p. 117
attraction. A club’s latent support, for example, could be stirred by a winning run. The FA Cup, in particular, generated much excitement because of its sudden death nature and the attraction of the Final, the biggest game of the year, held in London. Others perhaps would only go to certain games, like those over the Christmas period, a local ‘derby’ or when the local team was playing against one of the big clubs. Some fans watched football more for its overall excitement and entertainment value rather than using it as an exercise in partisanship. For the majority though, games became occasions wracked with tension and anxiety where winning overrode the enjoyment factor. One crucial element that dictated attendances during our period was the weather. A cold, wet winter’s day held little appeal, especially if it meant standing on the open terraces that were a common feature of the majority of grounds.

Football management therefore, like the game itself, has been a peculiar business. Initially, as we have seen, unpaid directors ran nascent football clubs rather than salaried managers as football management reflected the English traditions of amateurism and voluntarism. Not only had the absence of a profit motive tempered the need for greater investment in managerial resources, but club directors also devoted a lot of their spare time to running their clubs. They were generally local business or professional men who had more interest in the indirect benefits that being a director of a local club could bring rather than for any financial remuneration. Initially, the manager was usually the secretary who dealt with the club’s administration with the directors looking after team affairs. This situation gradually changed as football’s competition intensified and directors had to look after their own businesses. As a result, secretaries and managers gradually gained more
responsibility for team affairs. This has not been a linear process however, with most clubs having different ideas on how they should be run. For example, following the split in 1892 of Everton Football Club’s membership, and the subsequent formation of Liverpool, a different management culture emerged within each club (see also Chapters 2 and 3). John Houlding, the chairman, had wanted the club to be run more commercially, with him as the controlling figure, whereas the main bulk of the membership felt strongly that Everton should remain a members’ club, and hence more democratic in nature. When Liverpool was formed after the split, it was run more for profit as well as being centrally controlled by Houlding. In 1896 Tom Watson was appointed secretary-manager, in line with Liverpool’s more commercially-driven policy. Despite becoming a limited liability company, Everton’s management, on the other hand, continued to be run on more voluntaristic lines. This tradition persisted, and the club did not appoint a manager until the 1930s, with Will Cuff, an early member, remaining its dominant figure up to the 1940s. 37

Before 1914, cricket shared some similarities with football but also offered a contrasting management structure. Like most football clubs, their county cricket counterparts had not been run for profit, and this had implications for their management culture. Cricket was never viewed as a business in any form however. Competition was not as intense as football and there was very little commercial activity. Instead, the game’s supporters were more concerned with notions of local pride and county allegiance as by the late nineteenth century the game was seen as an

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integral part English culture. Unlike football clubs that turned themselves into limited liability companies during the 1890s, a country cricket club maintained its status as a members’ club. Their management therefore, was based on traditional committee lines, with its members democratically elected by the club membership. Committees picked the team and also looked after the club’s finances. On the field, instead of a manager, it was the playing captain who was responsible for the team. This situation still basically exists today.

By comparison, American baseball clubs of the nineteenth century had few commercial restrictions placed upon them and mirrored how American society itself was more business orientated. Baseball was organised for profit and it allowed owners to move their club, or ‘franchise’, to different cities to exploit more favourable commercial opportunities such as access to large populations, most notoriously exemplified by the move of the Brooklyn Dodgers to Los Angeles in 1958. In terms of a baseball club’s organisation, there was a more decisive divorce between ownership and control than in either football or cricket. Early in baseball history, commercial forces had led to a manager replacing the captain as the progenitor of on-the-field tactics. The managerial hierarchy generally associated with major league baseball franchises hardly changed over the entire twentieth century. It

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39 One exception was the London County Cricket Club. It was formed in 1898 by the directors of the board of the Crystal Palace Company who had decided to establish a first class cricket club (although it was not a member of the County Championship) at the Crystal Palace site in Sydenham. W.G. Grace was appointed secretary and manager. Rae, Grace, pp. 432-33. In 2000-01 Hampshire became the first county cricket club to form itself into a limited liability company due to the rising salaries of players and the cost of a new stadium that increased the members’ liabilities. Observer (Sport), 22 April 2001, p. 13
consisted of the owner who provided the capital and took the risks; the general
manager who had responsibility for acquiring and trading players and negotiating
salaries; and then the manager who was responsible for the team.41

How then has the manager fitted into football's peculiar pattern of
consumption? On the face of it, his main function is to win football matches. Like
their counterparts in industry, football managers take a set of inputs (resources) and
turn them into something of greater value than anyone else. Most managers fail to
win but, as we have seen, measuring success has been relative, and managers
therefore, have still made an impact. And at football clubs, which were smaller than
most businesses throughout this period, the potential has been greater for the
manager to influence a club's direction and fortunes. The traditional management
model of English football clubs has rested on a manager who has been responsible to
a board of directors. The impact of this relationship can be seen when placed
alongside Chandler's model of managerial capitalism that entails a complete divorce
between control and ownership, and allows for all forms of management to be
undertaken by professionals.42 There seems little difference, for example, between
football's management hierarchy and that of American baseball's three-tiered
structure. The divorce between ownership and control however, is still wider in
baseball and therefore, there has been more scope for professional management to
undertake particular managerial tasks. In England, on the other hand, the potential for
directorial interference has been greater because the organisational structure of

40 The only comparable example of this type of move in England was when Woolwich Arsenal
moved across London from Plumstead to Highbury in 1913. Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and
Losers, p. 309
41 Horowitz, 'Manager', p. 415
football clubs has caused power to be concentrated in the hands of directors. Yet, conversely, this organisational culture has meant that managers themselves have had greater potential to increase their influence within clubs through mini power struggles. The manager’s role has also been a reflection of football’s management culture. There has never been a job description for football management, no formal qualification have been required and a manager’s range of duties has varied from club to club. This has highlighted British *laissez faire* attitudes towards football management compared to those on the continent. In Britain there has been a strong tradition of anti-coaching throughout the game, and, unlike some European countries who have invoked a licensing policy, it has allowed clubs to choose anyone they like as manager.\(^43\)

Notwithstanding this culture, and the reality or potential for directorial interference, directors expected managers to improve a team’s performance. In what context did they achieve this? As we have seen, Szymanski and Kuypers have argued that in the modern era, a team’s performance in the long run has been more reflective of that club’s finances rather than any managerial expertise. Before 1966 however, money played less of a role in football management; and there was more potential for managers to make a difference. Furthermore, it can be argued that over a shorter period, like one game, a manager can have an important influence. Over time their influence perhaps waned. Yet it does not take into account the importance of the

\(^{42}\)Wilson, *Business History*, p. 13

\(^{43}\)One manifestation of this has been that by 2000 there were 1000 UEFA qualified coaches in England whereas in France there were 17,000 and in Germany, 53,000. The Football Association has proposed that by 2003 managers in England will need a coaching qualification in order to work. Tony Banks MP quoted on *BBC News*, 12 October 2000. *Guardian*, 28 March 2000, p. 34
‘then and now’. Fans are more interested in the present and unconcerned with the long-term. In general, they want instant success.

By what means then has a manager been able to improve a team’s performance? Basically, a football manager has needed three key qualities: an ability to judge a player, tactical acumen and motivational skills. Good judgement when purchasing a player (within a club’s budget), together with recruiting young players and bringing them through, has probably been the manager’s most important attribute as it is essentially players who win or lose matches. However, as we have seen throughout this thesis, the extent to which managers have been able to exercise their ability in this area has been usually dependent on their directors who have had the ultimate sanction on any transfer. Paradoxically, clubs have been transformed due to the talents of certain players, making them more indispensable than the manager. During this period, players such as Derby’s Steve Bloomer and Dixie Dean at Everton were deemed irreplaceable. Similarly, Tom Finney and Stanley Matthews were crucial to their clubs. Across the Atlantic, not only did Babe Ruth transform the New York Yankees but also baseball itself during the Twenties. Before the Sixties however, it had been easier for football clubs to prevent players moving due to the game’s labour regulations.

In addition to recruiting skilful players, they need to be able to blend in with the manager’s overall tactical plan. And that, during this period, was contingent on them actually having one. Initially, it had been the players who devised team tactics but gradually managers took it upon themselves to make tactics their responsibility and the importance of tactics increased as competition intensified. Defences became
better organised and the need to find an edge became more urgent. The process of imparting knowledge or instructions to players in general has become an important development of football management. The idea of team talks before games was introduced by Herbert Chapman and then used by other managers such as Jimmy Seed and Stan Cullis. However, the regulations of this period restricted the extent to which managers could influence games after they had started. It was not until 1965-66, for example, that substitutes were first used in the Football League. There had been a principled ideological opposition to their introduction amongst the rulers of English football. They felt that substitutions were somehow unfair and would be open to abuse. It was also felt that they would increase the use of ‘tactics’ in the English game, just as it had done in Europe and was something that was sneered at by English officials and players alike.\(^{44}\) By contrast, American sports have featured a constant turnover of players during games, reflecting their acceptance of increased specialisation.

The extent of a manager’s influence has also been restricted by the rules of the game. Compared to American sports, a manager in association football has limited opportunities to make changes during play. A game of soccer is played over two 45 minute periods and is a non-stop, 360 degree game where players frequently change positions. Furthermore, association football has steadily moved away from

\(^{44}\)One substitute was allowed at first but only for an injured player. The following season substitutes were permitted for any reason. Jimmy Mullen of Wolverhampton Wanderers was the first substitute used by England in 1950 but they had been used in Europe before the War. By 1960 substitutes were being permitted but only with the approval of the National Association or International Association. The number of substitutes in the Football League was later increased to two in 1987-88, then three in 1995-96. Five can now be selected from but only a maximum of three can be used. In international games whole squads can be placed on the bench, although, again, only three can be used. News of the World Football Annual, 1997-98, pp. 327-30; Butler, Football League, p. 225; Matthews, The Wolves, p. 280; Football Association Handbook: Rules of the Association and Laws of the Game for Season 1960-61, p. 179
relatively static formations as the game's pace has increased. Increasingly, footballers have needed to display all-round skills such as tackling, running, passing, heading, shooting. By contrast, a game of baseball is, in theory, timeless and revolves around the pitcher-hitter confrontation. As a stop-start game it lends itself to frequent opportunities for coaching, if not by the manager then by other specialist coaches. In basketball and American football time-outs have been available to coaches to devise 'plays' in response to situations teams find themselves in during games. In comparison, half-time has traditionally been the only time when a football manager can make a significant intervention.  

In soccer, in fact, coaching from the touchline was initially banned. It was regarded as a form of cheating, highlighting again the conflict between football's amateur tradition and its burgeoning professionalism. In 1939 a law was introduced that stated '[w]hile the game is in progress ... trainers or club officials must not coach players along the boundary lines'.  

In 1955 Stan Cullis had been asked by the referee to refrain from coaching during a game Wolverhampton Wanderers played at Grimsby Town. Cullis later said that it was essential for him to be able to shout instructions to a player during the game. He also claimed that most managers or trainers did the same, and, in exasperation, he asked, 'How else could they [managers] affect team positional changes if necessary?'.  

Tactical changes therefore, were not regarded as so important before 1966 as they have been in recent years. It now seems to many fans that making tactical changes is the litmus test of

45 At first it was 5 minutes but has since increased to 10 and now 15 minutes.
managerial competence, and in this sense they are akin to witchdoctors with mystical powers because they apparently have the ability to change the direction of a game.

Instead, successful managers, like Busby, Shankly and Cullis, from the immediate post-War period, gained reputations as leaders of men. They were charismatic personalities who had the capacity to dominate players, something that Arthur Hopcraft has identified as the key factor in managerial success. To achieve this they have imposed an authority over players that echoes not only workplace relationships but those in wider society generally. As we have seen, in order to maintain discipline amongst these young men, the methods adopted by some managers were not dissimilar to those used in the military. A manager’s personality therefore, together with an element of social psychology, can be added to their powers of motivation to inspire players to greater efforts. This is not just to get the best out of players but also to keep them in a relaxed frame of mind in the days between games so that they do not use up nervous energy.

Perhaps the main requirement of a manager however, has been that which Napoleon asked for when discussing the quality of his generals: luck. And in football luck plays a bigger part than in most other sports. American football and rugby, for example, have placed a greater emphasis on physical power that tends to confirm the old saying that ‘a good big ‘un will always beat a good little ‘un’. This is mostly not the case in football which is more technically oriented and where footballers usually reflect average heights and weights. Moreover, many factors can influence a game of football. First, games of soccer are generally low scoring and that usually maintains

47 *Express and Star*, 10 January 1955, p. 20
an uncertainty throughout the contest. One team therefore, can dominate the game in terms of possession without scoring and then concede a late goal. Furthermore, there are a variety of ways to score a goal including own goals from lucky deflections that can not be planned for. The referee can also influence a game’s outcome by his decisions, most notably when mistakenly awarding a penalty kick or allowing or disallowing goals. Of course, over the course of a season luck may balance itself out but sometimes it may not and a team’s bad luck may persist for longer. For instance, a club may have been afflicted by a bad run of injuries to key players, unsettling team formation and morale. The fate of a manager therefore, is subject to a variety of factors, over most of which he has little or no control.

The position of a football manager though, has meant more than merely someone who was just responsible for the team’s results. Managers have become emblematic figures for their clubs. From the time of William Sudell and Tom Watson, a kind of footballing menage a trois emerged between managers, the press and the fans; each one needed the other. To feed the rising interest in the game, newspapers required quotations and it was the manager who increasingly provided them. With more intense competition, the media spotlight on the game increased. Directors, unwilling to take responsibility for poor runs, increasingly replaced their managers. At the same time, a fan’s perception of a manager’s powers increased through this heightened media interest. Whether real or imaginary, the stature of the manager was raised. It was Herbert Chapman who had been the first to command such status and after the War, this process developed further with Matt Busby. In particular,

48 Hopcraft, Football Man, p. 97
following the Munich Air Disaster, and with the growth of television, Busby’s stature became almost iconic.

How then have managers made a difference to the teams they have managed? This part of the chapter will analyse a number of case studies but rather than try to establish who were the most successful managers, the aim is not only to underline how they did it but also to draw attention to the historical context in which their success took place. Such a framework could be applied to other managers, like Matt Busby, who have been looked at in previous chapters but have not been included here.

One aspect of football management that seems to have made a difference, in addition to the individual impact of a manager, is that of continuity. Here perhaps a parallel can be drawn with that of teaching. School children, for example, find it difficult to handle constant changes in teachers and respond better to a familiar face. Not only does familiarity breed contempt but it can also breed a certain amount of affection, or at least stability. Similarly, the relationship between manager and player is easier to build if it has a long-term basis. In the era before the maximum wage was abolished these relationships were easier to maintain as player mobility was relatively low. Moreover, when a club changed a manager some directors felt that it made sense to promote from within. A long period of continuity would mean fewer distractions and more stability in the running of a club. With less time and mental energy being expended in thinking about these changes, manager and players alike could focus more on the playing side. One negative aspect of managerial continuity
however, may be the development of a generation gap where older managers may be
unable to relate anymore to their younger players.

The most successful modern example of managerial continuity has been
Liverpool. From Shankly through to Dalglish, successive managers all had a previous
connection with the club. Paisley and Fagan had been members of the backroom staff
whereas Dalglish was a player when appointed manager. It can be argued however,
that a similarly successful form of continuity had been pioneered by Arsenal, starting
when Herbert Chapman became manager in 1925. Like Liverpool however, the
transition from one manager to another was never an entirely smooth one. As we
have seen, Chapman was the first manager to bring the full range of his managerial
skills to bear on a club’s fortunes, first at Huddersfield Town and then at Arsenal.
Yet Arsenal’s later success following Chapman’s death in 1934 was based on
promoting from within. Chapman’s successor was George Allison, a club director.
He was followed in 1947 by Tom Whittaker, the club trainer since 1927, who was
manager until his death in office in 1956. During this period, Arsenal’s management
tradition had also been analogous with a small family firm. Since 1927 the position of
chairman had been ‘kept in the family’ when Samuel Hill-Wood became chairman. He
was later succeeded by his son, Denis, who in turn was followed on to the board by
his son, Peter.49 In addition to managerial continuity, there was the quality and
longevity of Arsenal’s backroom staff. Joe Shaw, for example, was assistant manager
to both Chapman and Allison. Bob Wall joined the club in 1928 as assistant

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49 Peter Hill-Wood is still the current Arsenal chairman.
secretary, a role in which he continued until 1956 when he was made secretary and provided a link between each manager.\textsuperscript{50}

Arsenal, during the Thirties, was the first club to dominate English football for a long period; this in an era of relatively equal competition.\textsuperscript{51} Furthermore, as we suggested earlier, the relationship between wage expenditure and league position was not as great in the 1930s as it has been the in 1990s with more clubs able to satisfy the demands of players due to the maximum wage. Arsenal’s success created a certain aura and even a mythology that surrounded the club. No team until then produced such polarised opinions. Even Arsenal’s style of play and tactical plans engendered a belief that they were ‘lucky’ as they would win many games by soaking up pressure and then score goals on the counter-attack.

Throughout this period Arsenal had been the biggest spenders in football, with the resources to maintain their success by purchasing quality players like David Jack and Alex James. In 1938 Allison paid a world record fee of £14,000 for Bryn Jones of Wolverhampton Wanderers.\textsuperscript{52} Yet, because of its achievements, the club still made large profits.\textsuperscript{53} Wealth however, was not a guarantee of success; it was the management of resources that was the crucial factor. Arsenal’s policy of ‘speculate to accumulate’ compared with the performance of some of London’s other relatively

\textsuperscript{50} Studd, \textit{Herbert Chapman}, p. 108; Joy, \textit{Forward Arsenal}, p. 193. During the War Joe Shaw was assistant manager at Chelsea but returned to Arsenal in 1947.

\textsuperscript{51} In seventeen playing seasons, between 1930 and 1953, Arsenal won the Football League on seven occasions and the FA Cup three times. It was not until 1970, when they won the Fairs Cup, that the club lifted another trophy.

\textsuperscript{52} During Chapman’s tenure Arsenal spent £101,400 on transfers reclaiming £40,000. Between 1934 and 1939 Allison paid out £81,000 for players, although £51,000 was claimed back. Allison, \textit{Allison Calling}, p. 101

\textsuperscript{53} Under Chapman, Arsenal made a yearly average profit of £10,000 in his eight years, and between 1934 and 1939 this figure rose to £22,000 per year. Allison, \textit{Allison Calling}, p. 217.
prosperous clubs at the time. Tottenham Hotspur, for example, was thought to be as wealthy as Arsenal. It had assets worth £80,000 but the Spurs directors ran a very tight ship. They were unwilling to pay the same transfer fees as their North London rivals, and consequently, the club made a profit on transfers nearly every year during the inter-War period. Moreover, wage levels were only a third of the club’s income. But in 1935 Spurs were relegated to the Second Division and its manager, Percy Smith, resigned, claiming that, because he had been unable to emulate Arsenal’s success, he, instead of the directors had been made the scapegoat. 54 West Ham’s board was similarly parsimonious. Up to 1961 the club had only ever employed three managers: Syd King, Charlie Paynter and Ted Fenton. Despite this managerial continuity, the board imposed strict financial constraints on them all, and for much of that period West Ham was a Second Division team. 55 Chelsea, on the other hand, as one of the best-supported teams in the Football League during the inter-War period, was much more ambitious. Unlike Spurs, Chelsea’s wages swallored up over half of its income. Chelsea wanted to emulate Arsenal and in 1930 they paid Newcastle £10,000 for the Scottish centre-forward, Hughie Gallacher. Later, in 1933, they lured former Arsenal manager, Leslie Knighton away from Birmingham City. Success was elusive however, and Chelsea averaged only thirteenth place during the fifteen seasons it spent in the First Division between the wars. 56

55 Korr, *West Ham*, Chapter 6
However, Arsenal's policy of promoting from within did not guarantee permanent success, and the playing fortunes of the club declined during the Fifties and Sixties. When Whittaker died, his assistant, Jack Crayston, another former player, became the next manager. He had two ineffective years before he was replaced by the club's former goalkeeper, George Swindin who was equally unsuccessful. It was not a matter of money either. Throughout the post-war period, Arsenal was consistently one of the richest clubs in the League. Arsenal's decline can perhaps be traced back to the War when the club practically lost a full team of internationals through retirement or injury, breaking the link with the Thirties. Furthermore, Arsenal perhaps failed to adapt to football's changing circumstances. In 1956 Whittaker was still a secretary-manager with responsibility for team and administration. It was this tradition that perhaps checked the club's progress as the management of football clubs was increasingly devolved with the manager concentrating his efforts on the players on the pitch.

In an attempt to reverse its fortunes the club broke with tradition and appointed an outsider as the next manager in 1962. Billy Wright had no previous connection with the club nor any management experience. But as a former England captain, and in line with the prevailing thinking of the time, it was thought that this gave him the right qualities for the job. Arsenal was no more successful however, and he was sacked in 1966, the same year that Arsenal experienced their lowest ever League crowd. Arsenal then reverted back to their policy of appointing from within

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57 Joy, *Forward Arsenal*, p. 133
58 Joy, *Forward Arsenal*, p. 140; Whittaker, *Tom Whittaker's*, p. 30
59 The crowd was 4554 for a game against Leeds in May.
as the next manager, like Tom Whittaker, was the club physiotherapist, Bertie Mee. He had had a brief playing career with Derby and Mansfield before turning to physiotherapy, going to Arsenal in 1960. Mee’s greatest management asset was his ability to delegate. He left the playing side to Don Howe and their partnership helped Arsenal win the ‘Double’ in 1971.\(^{60}\) Continuity therefore, may have long-term benefits but clubs still needed to pick the right man; someone who knew how to manage footballers.

Unlike the majority of clubs, Arsenal’s perennial ambition, since Chapman had been to win trophies. Others however, aspired to more modest targets. Lower division clubs, for example, had their ambitions stymied by the Football League’s promotion and relegation system for a large part of this period. Despite the expansion of the Football League in the Twenties, promotion from the Third Divisions, North and South, was restricted to only one team per division.\(^{61}\) A ‘closed shop’ emerged as there was little mobility within the league structure. Third Division clubs therefore, were forced into setting different targets. With promotion for the majority difficult to attain, financial stability became perhaps a more realistic aim; something that was aided by the League’s rules on players’ wages and mobility.

Yet there was still some pressure to succeed, and lower division managers continued to lose their jobs. One who kept his was Bob Jack, manager of Plymouth Argyle from 1910 to 1938.\(^{62}\) ‘Argyle’ was a founder member of the Third Division

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\(^{60}\) *Guardian*, 23 October 2001, p. 22, Obituary; p. 30

\(^{61}\) In 1958 the Third Divisions, North and South, were replaced by Third and Fourth Divisions. Between the Second and Third Divisions there was a 2-up, 2-down promotion and relegation system whereas between the Third and the Fourth, it was 4-up, 4-down.

\(^{62}\) He had previously joined Plymouth as a player in 1903, and became manager for one season, 1905-06. He then joined Southend as player-manager in 1906 before re-joining Plymouth.
South in 1920, after previously winning the Southern League in 1913. Amazingly, in six consecutive seasons between 1922 and 1927 they finished second. Pressure mounted from the fans who believed it was a deliberate policy on the part of the board who did not want promotion.\textsuperscript{63} Despite this ‘failure’ however, Jack continued as manager. In 1930 Plymouth finally won promotion, and maintained their Second Division status until 1938. Another manager who gave long service to a club was Sam Allen at Swindon Town. Between 1902 and 1933, he was secretary-manager, when Swindon, who joined the Football League in 1920, was mainly a middling Third Division South team.\textsuperscript{64} In comparison to their modern counterparts, it is difficult to believe that Allen or Jack would have kept their jobs for as long as they did. It highlights the different context in which football management operated and how pressures, if not absent, were not as intense as they are now. Not only did the Football League’s policies cushion any inequalities but the media spotlight on the game was not as intensive. Directors therefore, probably felt less pressure to take some action when results were poor. In later years, because of football’s rising media profile, they perhaps believed that they ought to be seen to be doing something, and this invariably meant sacking the manager.

Following the Second World War football underwent a process of modernisation, albeit a sluggish one. There was a greater turnover of managers, although for many, the extent of their powers and role was ambiguous. By the Sixties however, more managers had greater autonomy and they began to think more deeply

\textsuperscript{63}Turner and White, \textit{Football Managers}, p. 157
\textsuperscript{64}Swindon had earlier won the Southern League in 1911 and 1914. Turner and White, \textit{Football Managers}, p. 74
about the game. Perhaps chief amongst these was Don Revie. His major achievement was to establish Leeds United as a force within English football. Despite its large population, Leeds was located in a rugby area and the football club had traditionally competed with Leeds Rugby League Club for the city’s patronage. Because of the lack of interest in soccer, Leeds was generally a mid-table Second Division team before Revie’s arrival. He brought a new professionalism to football management, completely transforming the club’s standing. Between 1965 and 1974 Leeds was consistently the best team in the country, although they ultimately gained a reputation as perennial runners-up.\textsuperscript{65} Importantly, from when he became manager Revie had the support of his chairman, Harry Reynolds, a millionaire businessman. He continued to support Revie especially in the transfer market. Revie was also ably assisted by Les Cocker, who was regarded as the top trainer in the country at the time.

Revie had been fortunate to inherit an outstanding group of young players at Leeds including Billy Bremner, Norman Hunter and Paul Reaney. However, he was also astute in the transfer market in the signings of Bobby Collins, Johnny Giles in particular, and also Alan Clarke who cost a then record fee of £165,000 from Leicester, proof that Leeds’s success under Revie had put them among the country’s most wealthy clubs. By inheriting a mostly young team, he was able to gain an

\textsuperscript{65} They won the League twice in 1969 and 1974 and were second on five other occasions, 1965, 1966, 1970, 1971 and 1972. The FA Cup was won once in 1972 and they were runners-up three times, 1965, 1970 and 1973. On four occasions they narrowly failed to win the ‘Double’ and only once won a trophy in these seasons. Leeds had won their first trophy, the League Cup, in 1968, and later that year won its first European trophy, the Fairs Cup which it won again in 1971. It had previously been runners-up in the same competition in 1967 and also lost the Cup Winners’ Cup Final to AC Milan in 1973. In 1975, after Revie had left to manage England, but what was basically his team, Leeds, now managed by Jimmy Armfield, unluckily lost in the Final of the European Cup to Bayern Munich, having earlier in 1970 lost in the semi-final to Celtic.
intense loyalty from his players, and saw Leeds in terms of a family club with him at
the head. In recognition of changes within society and football during the Sixties,
Revie placed great importance on the welfare of his players. This included sending
birthday cards and chocolates to the players' wives and children. In return, the
players had to accept his strict code of discipline. No one could grow their hair long
or wear jeans, and the night before games the players would play carpet bowls and
bingo to prevent them from going out.

Revie had wanted Leeds to emulate the achievements of Real Madrid, and in
1963 he changed their colours to all-white in honour of the Spanish club. Revie was
also very particular in his pre-match preparations and had dossiers compiled on
opponents to draw attention to their weaknesses (see Chapter 6). In 1964, Leeds
won promotion to the First Division with a ruthless style of football, combined with
a cynical professionalism. Leeds players would put pressure on referees by
questioning decisions, overreacting and feigning injury. Initially, their style of play
had concentrated on efficiency but they later developed into one of the greatest
footballing sides of the modern era. Surprisingly, despite Revie's professionalism, he
was incredibly superstitious, betraying a realisation that he was unable to control
events. Many players had their lucky charms and would follow particular rituals.
Revie himself continuously wore a 'lucky' blue mohair suit and raincoat for games.
Despite their success, Revie's team had grown old together and his successors were
unable to replicate its achievements. It was another fifteen years before Leeds would approach anything like the success they enjoyed under Revie.66

To understand how managers have made a difference therefore, it is important to realise not only that their impact changed over our period but that it has to be assessed in a variety of contexts. Making an accurate quantitative judgement therefore, on a manager’s contribution is difficult, and suggests a need for the detailed case study. The evidence used by Szymanski and Kuypers, for example, is only part of the equation. In addition to examining managerial efficiency on a long-term basis, account must be taken of the short-term. It is a club’s fans’ expectations and the week-to-week experience that have determined the game as a product, something the projection of long-term economic forecasts cannot begin to explain. Questions on managerial efficiency therefore, are contingent on a definition of ‘efficiency’. Yet managers have made an impact, and it has been all the more evident because football clubs, instead of resembling monolithic corporations, are really small organisations. And as such the human factor becomes more important. The potential to influence has been much greater but this potential was often constrained by football’s management culture which, through the interference of directors, inhibited the role of the manager. Yet the perception of the manager as a powerful figure continued to

66Pawson, Football Managers, pp. 68-70; Rogan, Football Managers, pp. 92-122; Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, pp. 188-202. Revie was to also acquire a reputation for astute financial management not just for the club but also himself, gaining him the unfortunate nickname of Don ‘Readies’. In 1977 he dramatically resigned as England manager. Thinking that he would be sacked anyway he thought it would be best to jump before he was pushed and he secretly negotiated a coaching job in the United Arab Emirates. He announced his resignation in a daily tabloid, his letter of resignation followed the same morning. He was heavily criticised by the FA who banned him from football for 10 years, although this was later overturned in the High Court. Allegations over match-fixing were later unproven. Rogan, Football Managers, pp. 92-122
grow, and his success, or failure, became increasingly public. Whatever their impact, managers, it was deemed by directors, players and fans alike, mattered.
CONCLUSION

The lingering belief that outstanding deeds on the field automatically confer on a retired player the gifts of motivation, inspiration and a deep understanding of the human psyche gets less credible as the financial side of the game becomes increasingly tied up with big business.

David Lacey, Guardian (Sport), 12 February 2000, p. 2

In many quarters (including sport itself) there has been a widespread belief that football, and sport in general, are somehow autonomous from the rest of society, and, as a result, not a serious subject for academic study. One of the major objectives of this thesis has been to confront these attitudes and demonstrate how a history of the football manager has reflected both social changes and continuities. No study of a particular occupation can ever provide a complete history of its development and the broader social and economic environment within which it operates. Nevertheless, by filling a gap in football’s historiography this thesis provides a number of insights. It not only charts the development of management within British industry in general from the 1880s up to the 1960s but it also locates the history of football within the wider debates of social, economic and cultural history. As well as summarise the findings of this thesis, the conclusion will also include a short postscript that will try and outline how football management and the role of the manager have developed since the 1960s.

One of the two main ideas that has emerged has been that football management has largely reflected the practical tradition of British industrial management as a whole. Football clubs, like most British firms have been small organisations, and managers have been employed more for their experience rather
than any training they have undertaken or theoretical qualifications gained. During the twentieth century, management in general became increasingly professionalised as emerging corporations demanded a more sophisticated approach to administrative affairs. However, it has been within a society divided by class, and the consciousness of its distinctions that a tradition of British management has emerged in which the ideas of gentlemen amateurs and practical men have persisted. A minority of managers did have middle-class backgrounds and attended public or grammar schools but most of them came through the apprenticeship system or via promotion from the shopfloor. These managers were trained in the gathering of knowledge by learning on the job rather than through any formal training or academic study. This was supplemented by the attitudes of employers who mainly ran small firms and were reluctant to employ professional managers.

Despite a gradual growth in professionalism, management has been at the centre of debates concerning British economic performance up to the Sixties, and it can be argued that football management has not escaped these criticisms. Britain's supposed economic 'decline' has provided a rich polemical source for economic historians. Barry Supple, for example, has argued that any decline has been relative rather than absolute as the British economy from the mid-nineteenth century has maintained a steady growth rate of about 2 per cent. Notions of decline therefore, owe more to perception than reality. One of the most famous 'declinist' theses was put forward by Martin Wiener who argued that Britain had suffered from a loss of

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'industrial spirit' since the 1850s due to the ambiguous attitudes which the social elite held towards industrialism and hence, management. These attitudes were formed from the elite's prevailing cultural values that permeated down through the rest of society. One result was that the boardrooms of companies were filled by educated young men who held anti-business values, what Wiener refers to as the gentrification of the industrialist.\(^3\) Harold Perkin however, has responded that the old aristocracy was not anti-industrial and was gradually replaced by a professional class in which company directors formed the new aristocracy.\(^4\) English culture, argues David Coates, has been a social product linked to class power. As a result, this has created English 'peculiarities', such as the persistence of the values of paternalism, within the modern United Kingdom through the continuity of a sensitivity to class and status that stems from its pre-industrial hierarchical society.\(^5\) Rather than being influenced by cultural values or being anti-business, employers preferred to retain control over the firm's direction. And when they did employ professional managers, they eschewed managerial training for them, preferring to mould them in the ways of the company. Football managers have evolved from this same practical tradition. They have mainly been former players working-class, men who had little, if any, secondary education, and whose playing ability, rather than potential management qualities, was the main criteria for their selection.

Football management shared similarities with the traditions of management generally but it was also shaped by its own peculiar context, and this had

\(^4\) Perkin, *Professional Society*, pp. 374-75
implications for the development of the manager’s role. During the late nineteenth
century, football had been part of the commercialisation of leisure. Other sports such
as boxing, cricket and horse racing were also part of this process that had been made
possible partly by the increase in the spending power of the working-classes and the
expansion of the railway network. In one sense, football has changed little. It was,
and continues to be, an unusual business where the game revolves around two
opposing sets of players who have the same objectives: scoring goals at one end
while keeping them out at the other. And although the aim is to win, in order to
equalise competition and attract supporters, the outcome of games must retain an
element of uncertainty. By the 1890s football had established itself as the most
popular sport; filling the demands of working class men for escapism and glamour on
a Saturday afternoon. Early football clubs had resembled voluntary organisations and
had conducted their management through elected committees. Later, as their financial
responsibilities increased, clubs formed themselves into limited liability companies,
run by boards of directors but as football clubs remained small organisations
throughout this period, they were usually dominated by powerful personalities,
unwilling to relinquish the reins of power. In addition, there were also other external
factors that framed their management. The maximum wage and retain and transfer
system, for example, maintained a certain equality amongst clubs and inhibited the
need for investing in managerial talent. Long-running tensions in the governance of
the game between its amateur ethos and a fledgling professionalism also created a
resistance to managerial developments as there were no payments for directorates
and only limited share dividends.
Changes in football management therefore, were slow and it inherited much from its Victorian origins. Yet as the period wore on, the role of managers became increasingly prominent. This was partly contingent on the environment in which football developed, particularly due to the nature and intensity of its competition, the growing media interest and the increased financial costs. Of equal importance were the personal relationships that forged an individual club’s management culture. During the nineteenth century the workload of directors increased and they devolved more duties to secretaries who took on more responsibility including that for team affairs. Managers and secretary-managers would become increasingly accountable for the performance of the team, although real power remained very much in the hands of the board. Even during the inter-War period, change was slow with only Herbert Chapman and a few others really having an idea of what football management entailed.

Up until the 1960s, football had had few leisure rivals to challenge its position. But in the Fifties other leisure alternatives had emerged, with much of these centred around the home either through DIY or watching television. Attendances fell and football clubs were placed under greater financial pressure, although smaller clubs suffered most. They now had to improve their product, possibly by having a winning team or one that played attractive football, to attract fans whereas before their audience had been a relatively captive one. The role of the manager increased in importance as directors began to realise, albeit slowly, that their own knowledge of the game was limited and management required greater expertise. And with the increasingly cut-throat competition, they wanted someone to blame for failure. By
the Sixties, football management had undergone a process of rationalisation, albeit a gradual and uneven one, with tasks, such as selecting the team and deciding the tactics, increasingly placed in the hands of the manager.

Despite the increase in expertise, football management offers insights into seemingly contradictory aspects of British management. On the one hand, football management quickly established itself as a meritocracy. In this sense, it has been in the vanguard of managerial capitalism, driven by a combination of commercialisation and increasing competitiveness, resulting in the best managers being recruited by the biggest clubs. Whereas the boardrooms of major companies had been dominated by family members well into the 1960s, there has been little nepotism in football as ability has usually been the over-riding factor in club appointments. On the other, these meritocratic tendencies were still accompanied by the lack of any tradition of preparation for the job, and the absence of a screening process. To talk in terms of football management as a profession, similar to that of lawyers or GPs, would be incorrect. However, in the wider world, football managers have represented an example of late twentieth century social mobility. To a certain extent they have always been engaged in a struggle for social status, and have wanted to move away from their working-class roots. They have reflected a growing meritocratic society as more and more people have occupied what were thought of as traditional middle-class jobs and where income has come to define status. Football managers therefore, acted like professionals, shared a similar status and lifestyle but, in theory, were not formally qualified to deserve the distinction.
The second main idea of the thesis, and from the point of view of the social historian, one of the most important insights to be gained from a study of football management, is how it has mirrored attitudes and methods of handling groups of young working-class men in general. Football managers, for example, have imposed their authority over players in a manner not dissimilar to Army NCOs and other male authority figures. In other sports, social relationships have also provided the background for labour management methods. Horse-racing, for example, still exhibits strict feudal and 'squirearchy' overtones where racecourse officials are deferentially addressed as 'sir' by jockeys. Cricket's model of management has revolved around the team captain. Through the nature of their position, captains have been aloof figures, and for many decades at Test level, England captains had to be amateurs which meant appointment from the middle-classes. It was not until 1952 that a working-class professional, Len Hutton, was appointed as captain of the England team. The cricket captain's job was similar to that of a player-manager with responsibility for team discipline and tactics. Former England captain Mike Brearley has stated that part of the job's make-up is epitomised by 'the image of a traditional Sergeant-Major' where at 'some point, consultation, delicacy of feeling, weighing-up of pros and cons need to give way to orders, bluntness, decisiveness'.

During this period, football management typified the division of workplace relations on class and hierarchical lines, and owed much to its Victorian legacy. Yet changes did take place, noticeably that of a closer relationship between management and players as the role of the manager evolved. Despite this development, the

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6 M. Brearley, *The Art of Captaincy* (1985), pp. 263-64. Recent studies of successful managers in
relationship remained an essentially authoritarian one where managers demanded obedience from players, some in a manner not dissimilar to a Sergeant-Major, others via more subtle methods but nonetheless all relying on traditional ideas of masculinity to enforce their authority. Initially, the directors, as well as picking the team, dealt with the players on disciplinary matters, leaving the trainer to keep an eye on them on a day-to-day basis with the secretary looking after administrative matters. As more secretary-managers and managers were appointed, they became more responsible for the players' supervision and welfare but kept their distance from them and identified more with the directors. It was Herbert Chapman, long before others, who realised that a closer relationship between manager and players could be beneficial. After 1945 there was a decline in deference and a few more managers began to realise that it was important to foster good relations with the players. Because of their lack of training however, ideas for handling footballers owed much to their life experience (many had been in the armed forces) and were grafted on to a quasi-military model. Managers needed to be strong, charismatic personalities to keep the players, young working-class men, in check. This culture has perpetuated itself, and passed down through the generations as players who have gone on to become managers have known little else about the job save what they experienced as a player.

We shall now briefly look at how the role of the manager has developed since the Sixties. There have been signs that the manager has gradually moved up from the ranks of the NCO to the Officer class as some successful managers like Matt Busby, business have also suggested that 'macho' qualities are a necessary part of the job. *Independent*, 6 January 1999, p. 4
Alex Ferguson and Bobby Robson, have been awarded Knighthoods. At the same time, recent football managers share many similarities with their predecessors. During the last twenty years, much of the amateurism that has pervaded football management has been replaced by a commercially driven professionalism. In the process, the role of the manager has become more narrowly defined. During the 1990s the game experienced unprecedented commercialisation. A number of football clubs adopted PLC status, while directors are now paid for their services. The establishment of the Premier League in 1992 heralded an age of television sponsorship, particularly by BSkyB. Following the Taylor Report, post-Hillsborough, all-seater stadiums replaced those from the early twentieth century in order to attract newly affluent fans as the game increasingly, with much hyperbole, has presented itself as a branch of the entertainment industry.

With this new affluence, the wages of players have escalated dramatically and this has placed a greater emphasis on management skills. It was probably during the Seventies and Eighties that managers reached the height of their powers, running the club from top to bottom. Since then however, there has been a move towards greater specialisation with tasks being split up and devolved to experts in various fields. Football clubs have gradually delegated their financial affairs, public relations and marketing, for example, to experts, leaving only the preparation of the team to the manager. Clubs now also employ a variety of assistants who help with players’ fitness, diet and mental attitude. Specialist coaches and psychologists are commonplace at the bigger clubs and managers have been compelled to delegate
more. During his long managerial career Jim Smith has noted how his job has changed,

I used to be completely ‘hands on’ but that’s not really possible in the Premiership.
I’ve got a good coach and then there are your masseurs and your fitness coaches. At one time, your players just ran round a pitch, had a pie and chips and played. But because of the money involved in staying in the Premiership, we have to do everything possible to prepare players properly.

Because they have become expensive assets and are no longer tied to a club under the retain and transfer system, greater tolerance has been required of wayward players (and their agents). Thus, different approaches to man-management have emerged due to a growing shift in the balance of power towards the players. Any developments however, have merged with older notions and models of who is in charge. Moreover, whereas some managers have adopted subtler and more scientific methods to the management of footballers, others have continued to act like quasi NCOs using their personalities to dominate players.

In addition to developments in the technical role of managers, there has been a corresponding rise in their media profile, and, as a result, their perceived importance and status. Moreover, since the 1960s football has gradually overtaken cricket as the English sport that carries the most cultural significance and meaning. Saturation television coverage has been supplemented by an expansion in newspaper reporting as well as the internet, where there is a constant demand for news and gossip. Radio phone-ins also give fans the opportunity to vent their frustrations, much of it

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7 Under Sven-Goran Eriksson, England have employed the Norwegian, Professor Willi Railo, regarded as the most eminent sports psychologist in Europe. *Guardian* (Sport), 21 May 2001, p. 14.
8 *Independent on Sunday* (Section 2), 22 November 1998, p. 7
directed towards the managers, all adding to the media frenzy. The institutionalised nature of the relationship between the manager and the media has been one of the recurring themes of this thesis, and through the medium of television this relationship has become closer still.

The 'tabloidisation' or 'dumbing down' of the British media has created a need for instantaneous news and gossip, something that the press conferences of managers can deliver, no matter how inanely. It has created a cult of personality around managers where the ability to deliver sharp one-liners, give 'good interviews' and play 'verbal tennis' with journalists is seen as important as their tactical acumen. This has been further enhanced by their own charismatic, masculine personalities which appeals to many male working-class fans, as it is they who most identify with managers. And because of their own background, they are more likely to demand 'passion' from managers rather than acknowledge the importance of training or qualifications for the job. A mystique, and a mystery, has continued to grow around them as no-one really knows what they do. Consequently, managers have become emblematic figureheads for their clubs and, as the media's first point of contact, it is unsurprising that they are identified with performances on the field. Frequent media appearances, therefore, either through interviews or as pundits, seemingly give them, as celebrities, an air of authority. The position of the manager however, has become increasingly paradoxical. On one hand, they are lauded by the media and fans alike as
saviours, or in some cases ‘Messiahs’, who can turn round the fortunes of their clubs; on the other, football managers have never been sacked more frequently.\textsuperscript{10}

As the demands of the job have increased so has their fear of failure and stress levels. Not only are they under more pressure to succeed but managers are usually workaholics, addicted to the job. They have little time for a family life and any holidays can only be taken during the close season. Crewe’s manager, Dario Gradi, claims that during the season he works between 70 and 80 hours, 7 days a week, and that in 2001 he did not take a day off.\textsuperscript{11} It is this type of lifestyle that can affect their health. In 2001, for example, Liverpool manager Gerard Houllier was rushed to hospital during half-time in a game against Leeds where he had a major heart operation and took five months to recuperate.\textsuperscript{12}

The job however, does have its compensations. As they have become part of the professional classes, top football managers have come to be paid salaries that compare with those of top executives. Alex Ferguson, for example, signed a contract for an annual salary worth £1.5 million in 1999. Other Premiership managers can also expect to earn in excess of £500,000 per year. In the lower divisions however, and reflecting football’s meritocracy, salaries are considerably less, averaging between £40,000 and £100,000. In 1998 the highest paid manager in the Third Division earned

\textsuperscript{10}In 2001-02 there were a total of 57 managers sacked out of the 92 League clubs. Observer Sports Magazine, 6 October 2002

\textsuperscript{11}Observer Sports Magazine, 6 October 2002. Managers in general today have succumbed to a ‘long hours’ culture with 77 per cent exceeding their contracted hours, 54 per cent working in the evenings and 34 per cent working at weekends. Many also believe that their relationships plus their health have been put under strain as a result. Observer (Business), 4 October 1998, p. VIII

\textsuperscript{12}Observer Sports Magazine, 6 October 2002. For a game in the 2001-02 season, two managers, Sam Allardyce of Bolton and Dave Bassett of Leicester had their hearts monitored. During the match, Allardyce’s heart rate increased from 46 per minute to 160 while Bassett’s heart muscles at one stage contracted ominously. \textit{ibid.}
£40,000 but still comparable with other professionals such as university professors.\textsuperscript{13}

In order to meet greater competition and rising demands, clubs have cast their nets further to find the manager who will improve their fortunes. The Bosman ruling not only brought an influx of foreign players but now foreign managers and coaches are a feature of English football. This recent influx of foreign coaches has suggested a number of other ways in which the football manager’s job and position has changed.\textsuperscript{14} First, it has reflected the emergence of a knowledge-based economy and the subsequent increase in the global migration of human capital. As a result, it has highlighted the shortcomings of the culture of British football management. It is not

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Guardian}, 8 October 1998, p. 21, 5 May 1999, p. 32. Football managers salaries also compare favourably with senior politicians. The Prime Minister, for example, draws a salary of £163,418 while other members of the cabinet are paid between £99,793 to £117,979. \textit{Guardian}, 12 June 2001, p. 1. In 2000 over 110 business executives received salaries in excess of £1 million, earning around 24 times more than the average manufacturing employee, although in football it is often the managers who are trying to maintain parity with the workers. \textit{Guardian}, 22, p. 26, 23 August 2000, p. 27

\textsuperscript{14}Scottish football has also seen the rise of the foreign born manager. The question of who the first foreign manager was depends on the definition of a manager and what is meant by being foreign. For example, it can be argued that the Sunderland treasurer in the 1880s and 1890s, Samuel Tyzack was the first. He was born and brought up in Australia, although like other parts of the world it was under British colonial rule at the time. Using material from the \textit{Breedon Book of Football Managers} there were, up to 1993, 16 managers born outside the British Isles. Note that managers from the Republic of Ireland have been excluded from this brief survey (not to mention those from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) due to the complex historical relationship between Britain and Ireland. Furthermore, some English managers were born outside these shores such as Jack Butler (Sri Lanka), Leslie McDowall (India), Charlie Mitten (Burma), Dario Gradi (Milan), Terry Butcher (Singapore) and Percy MacKrill, Frank Osbourne and Ed Stein (South Africa). (Stein was also the first black manager of a Football League club, although the first manager to come from the ethnic minorities seems to have been Frank Soo who managed Scunthorpe between 1959 and 1960). Others were also products of the Empire, particular South Africa such as Eddie Firmani, Gordon Hodgson and Peter Hauser. Firmani was connected as a player and manager with Charlton either side of South Africa’s conversion to a republic in 1961. Earlier, Hodgson had won caps playing for England. The first manager from outside the British Isles and with no Imperial connection was Bert Trautmann whose circumstances admittedly, were very exceptional as he had been a German POW who went on to play for Manchester City. He was briefly manager of Stockport County from 1965 to 1966. Trautmann had been ‘assimilated’ into English football just as the next one was, the Uruguayan, Danny Bergera. Other managers that had been assimilated up to 1993 include Ossie Ardilles and Ivan Golic. The first foreign manager with no previous connection with English football therefore, was the Czech, Josef Venglos at Aston Villa in 1990. Later, foreign managers such as Gianluca Vialli, Ruud Guillit and Jan Molby have been assimilated as they played for English clubs. Some managers however, such as Arsene Wenger, Gerard Houllier, Jean Tigana, Claudio Ranieri and Christian Gross, have come into the English game with no previous experience. In Scotland, Celtic and Rangers have also hired ‘non-assimilated’ foreign coaches in Wim Jansen and Dick Advocaat respectively whilst in 2002 the German, Bertie Vogts was appointed manager of the national team.
that England does not produce good, intelligent football managers, it is just that, as with its counterpart in business, the British way has been inefficient, and the number of competent managers is fewer. By contrast, modern foreign coaches have undergone an educational and screening process through the acquisition of professional qualifications. These have represented a licence, and have prevented clubs in Germany and Italy, for example, from employing who they liked as managers. In Britain it is the clubs who are allowed to decide who they want as manager. As a result, there seems to be a high level of wastage in terms of managers being hired and fired.

This volatility of employment is not solely a characteristic of football managers as pressures on managers have increased across society and the economy. In addition to politicians, leading figures in the management of public institutions like the National Theatre, not to mention the Millennium Dome, have been placed under great scrutiny. Moreover, during the 1980s Thatcherite neo-liberal policies, in their quest to create competition, extended meritocratic ideals and the growing cult of managerialism to the public sector as the performances of hospitals and schools were subjected to football-style league tables.

Assessing the quality of English football management however, is problematic. It would be difficult to construct an argument that English football is in decline because of the failings of its management in the context of the current popularity and profitability of the Premier League. Even for the underachieving England team it is hard to blame previous managers without taking into account other mitigating factors such as how the priorities of the clubs have historically taken
precedence over those of the national team. It can be argued however, that there are deep-rooted factors behind the apparent failure of the national team, and that the lack of training and sub-standard education that English managers have received is one of the most important. In one sense therefore, the appointment of the Swede, Sven-Goran Eriksson, as England manager echoes Malcolm X’s notorious comment on the assassination of John F. Kennedy that ‘the chickens have come home to roost’. Moreover, in contrast to the likes of Jimmy Hogan who exported British ideas on how to play football to Europe, Britain now exports few managers abroad. The traditions of football management are also a reflection on the English education system that has traditionally been based on class lines. The education of the working-classes has been of a lower quality than that of other classes, and with football management becoming more demanding, it has required a greater level of human capital.

English football has started to try and make up the gap between itself and its European competitors in terms of the training and quality of its managers and new managers will require an FA approved formal qualification by 2003. In this sense, football managers will be joining the ranks of other professions such as doctors, lawyers and teachers where qualifications are obtained and standards can be measured, guaranteeing a certain level of competence and a feeling of commitment to

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15 It may be more than a coincidence that Eriksson’s appointment was secured by the then FA’s chief executive, Adam Crozier, who is Scottish by birth and had a background outside football, with the advertising company Saatchi and Saatchi. Thus, perhaps bringing a different perspective to English football.

16 Two of the most recent exceptions have been Bobby Robson and Terry Venables (see Chapters 5 and 6 for earlier examples). Others include John Toshack and Roy Hodgson. One ex-pat, Clive Charles who coaches in the USA, attributes his success to not beginning his coaching career in England. Perhaps the stunted development of US soccer can be partly attributed to their over-reliance on English coaches during the 1970s. *When Saturday Comes*, March 2000, pp. 22-23
the job. Furthermore, it can be argued that there have been improvements in the quality of managers since 1945. On a national level, for example, the Butler Education Act of 1944 provided a secondary education for every child. Yet, it is still claimed that UK managers are the worst educated and trained in the developed world. In 1997 only 24 per cent of managers and employers held degrees with nearly one fifth holding just GCSE grades D-G or no qualifications at all. In comparison, two-thirds of all professionals hold university degrees. However, there has been an increasing awareness of the need to provide better training for football managers together with a growing input from academics not only on management but also about the governance of football, and especially in the area of sports science. This development has been echoed in other areas of public life. Even the government has established a Centre for Management and Policy Studies to train senior ministers and civil servants.

Nor is it just football where foreign managers and coaches have been employed that implies a certain deficiency in home-grown methods. In 2000, for example, there was not one British coach in Rugby League’s Super League: all were either from Australia or New Zealand. The Rugby Football League also wanted to recruit an Australian as national coach. In addition, the RFL’s executive director, Greg McCallum is an Australian. Similarly, in Rugby Union the British Lions

17 Guardian, 28 March 2000, p. 34
18 Guardian (Jobs and Money), 20 May 2000, p. 33
19 Observer (Business), 12 July 1998, p. 1
20 There are at least three English football managers with degrees: Howard Wilkinson (PE), Steve Coppell (Economics), Lawrie Sanchez (Business Management).
21 Guardian (Jobs and Money), 6 May 2000, p. 29
22 Guardian, 14 July, p. 31; 16 August 2000, p. 28
appointed the New Zealander, Graham Henry, already in charge of Wales, as coach for the tour to Australia in 2001. Interestingly, the new breed of professional rugby union clubs have followed soccer by appointing famous players as coaches. Leicester appointed former player Dean Richards and at Newcastle, the former England fly-half, Rob Andrew was initially the club’s player-coach. But some clubs promoted foreign players as coaches such as the South African, Francois Pienaar at Saracens and Phillipe Saint-Andre of France at Gloucester. Again, rugby does not have any licensing system for its coaches and clubs are able to select who they want.

This has also applied to cricket whose counties have also begun to employ foreign coaches. The New Zealander John Bracewell, for example, has enjoyed success at Gloucestershire. Furthermore, the former Glamorgan coach Duncan Fletcher of Zimbabwe was appointed England coach in 2000. Other sports have also looked abroad for greater expertise. Swimming, for example, has recruited the Australian Bill Sweetenham as its National Performance Director; Chris McSorley, the national team coach of the British ice hockey team is a Canadian; the national rowing coach Jurgen Grobler is a former product of the East German coaching structure; the Hungarian, Laszlo Nemeth coaches the English basketball team; and even the most socially exclusive of English sports, tennis, has hired a Frenchman, Patrice Hagelauer, as its Performance Director.

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23 Observer (Sport), 22 February 1998, p. 2
24 One of his first tasks has been to throw out the sport’s existing qualifications, impose new ones and make every coach re-sit the exams for these every four years. The Times (Sport), 19 June 2001, p. 5
25 Guardian, 1 November 2000, p. 34
Some of the antediluvian attitudes of British sport have their source at an administrative level. British sports have traditionally been run by men from upper- and middle-class backgrounds who, because Britain invented most modern sports, have tried to uphold their traditional voluntarist amateur ideals. Furthermore, the labyrinthine structure of many sporting bodies built on the committee system has meant that any change was slow. This has engendered a feeling that even if British was not best anymore on the field then it knew best off it. The persistence of this attitude has been exposed on an international level where British sports administrators have had little idea of the global changes in their sports and their impact on the domestic scene.\(^{26}\) Within FIFA, for example, British football officials are seen as arrogant and out of touch. This is partly a result of the home nations’ permanent representation on the rules committee and also of an agreement in 1946 that automatically gave them a vice-President.\(^ {27}\) Because cricket was a game exported to the Empire, English administrators have been regarded by the International Cricket Council as embittered former masters with a ‘chip on their shoulder’. Consequently, many sports have moved their international headquarters from Britain to other countries.\(^ {28}\)

Arguments over the quality of management can be extended to the coaching culture within English football and its impact on the development of young players. The question of who coaches young players is an important one for the future of the

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\(^{26}\) Much of this next section is based on *On The Line*, BBC Radio 5 Live, 20 November 2000

\(^{27}\) Until 1946 British football had had a on-off relationship with FIFA. In 1928 all four nations withdrew over the issue of broken time payments to amateurs. As a result, it was not until 1950 that teams from Britain first entered the World Cup.

\(^{28}\) For example, Track and Field Athletics has moved to Monaco; Fencing to Switzerland; Shooting to the USA; Motor Racing to Paris; and International Rugby to Ireland.
game. At the professional level, as we have seen, coaches tend to be former players who, even if qualified, do not have much of an educational background themselves.English football therefore, has created a reproductive coaching culture that has stymied the progress of young footballers with its mistrust of intelligence and its commitment to the macho attitudes of 'getting stuck in'. Many managers and other figures in the game have pointed to the lack of 'natural talent' coming through as the main reason behind the falling standards of British footballers. It has been suggested that one reason for this decline was the disappearance of street football. This is a fatuous and romanticised notion, mainly because even when street football remained feasible and popular, England teams have underperformed. Questions need to be directed at the footballing authorities asking why playing and coaching standards in Europe and other foreign countries have risen without a corresponding rise in Britain, rather than the harking back to supposedly better times. France had cited the same problem of a lack of street football as being responsible for a decline in its fortunes. Unlike England, once identified, the French Football Federation established a scheme for selecting and educating talented young players who were then based at a chateau in Clairefontaine. This apparent failure to raise standards in England has been supplemented by an historical resistance within the professional game itself that, partly due to the working-class background of its players and managers, has

29See Parker, 'Big Time'. One exception to this rule is Steve Heighway, now in charge of Liverpool's successful youth development programme, who gained a degree from the University of Warwick.
30For example, The Times, 3 February 1997, p. 33; Independent on Sunday (Sport), 21 January 2001
31Guardian (Jobs and Money) 26 August 2000, p. 17; Guardian (Sport), 2 September 2000, p. 2. The English FA has recently announced plans to begin a similar scheme on a site near Burton-on-Trent, Staffs.
displayed an anti-intellectualism together with a prejudice against working on
technique and skills.32

So what of the future for football management? How will the role of the
manager change? Because of the game’s present rampant commercialisation, it is
likely that in terms of the structure of a club’s organisation, the role of the manager
will become increasingly specialised, and comparable to a head coach in European
football clubs and American sports franchises. With clubs employing expert coaches,
his actual tasks will probably be reduced to not much more than picking the team,
co-ordinating the staff attached to the players and using his powers of motivation to
inspire them. In England, managers will probably be better trained and qualified as
clubs, especially those that are PLCs, will demand candidates with the evidence of
proven ability. How many will actually be English remains to be seen. With a more
narrowly defined role, clubs may feel that in an ever more frenetic search for the vital
ingredient that makes for either success in Europe or survival in the Premier League,
managers are more expendable. Yet they will probably remain authoritarian, at least
in their outlook. Football clubs are still small businesses and the potential will still
remain for a manager to bring success or failure through the force of his own
personality.

32L. Allison, ‘Why are we so Crap?’, paper given at University of Leicester CRSS/Warwick Centre
for the Study of Sport in Society Seminar, 5 December 2000
## Appendix 1
Aston Villa Balance Sheet, 1878-79

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Credit</th>
<th>Debit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Members' Subscriptions</td>
<td>20-08-00 Loss on summer season (including sports) 11-12-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Season Tickets</td>
<td>0-12-06 Rent of Field 11-15-00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donation (HH Hartshorne esq.)</td>
<td>1-01-00 Printing 9-06-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate Takings</td>
<td>42-17-10 Bill Posting 2-03-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans from members</td>
<td>8-10-00 Advertising 1-05-06</td>
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<td>Sale of Fixture Cards</td>
<td>0-2-00 Loans returned 8-10-00</td>
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<td>Umpire’s expenses 1-06-02</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stationery 5-03-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Footballs and repairs 2-06-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sundries 1-07-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loan to Cricket Club 5-00-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cash in hand of Secretary 1-06-02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

73-11-10 Audited and found correct, July 15 1879
WG Sothers, Wm. Jones, Auditors

Appendix 2
Aston Villa Balance Sheet, 1879-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credit</th>
<th>Debit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash in hand, season 1878-79</td>
<td>6-11-11 Loss on contest 13 Sep. 1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members' Subscriptions</td>
<td>38-15-00 Loss on contest 17 May 1880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>2-11-06 Rent of Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Season Tickets</td>
<td>4-15-00 Ground Improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate Takings</td>
<td>173-01-04 Gate Keeper and Policemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Bagnall</td>
<td>0-10-00 Hire of Tent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Brockwell</td>
<td>0-10-06 Brass Checks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Hinks</td>
<td>1-00-00 Entertainment of opposing teams and annual dinner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC. Holder</td>
<td>2-02-00 Gate Money divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Johnstone</td>
<td>0-10-00 Cricket and Football Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. McGregor</td>
<td>1-01-00 Expenses of Professional Cricketer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Margoschis</td>
<td>1-01-00 Gratuiites to disabled players</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TW. Peart</td>
<td>1-01-00 Expenses of Team at out matches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Quinsey</td>
<td>1-01-00 Expenses of Training for Cup ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Salt</td>
<td>0-10-06 Bill Posting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Taylor</td>
<td>0-10-06 Advertising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6-17-06 Stationery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8-13-06 Postages and Telegrams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-06-06 Subscriptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-17-00 Hire of Committee Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expenses arranging matches and attending Staff Association Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-05-04 Sundries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-06-06 Cash in hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19-03-02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Audited and found correct June 26 1880
F. Johnstone, W. McGregor, Auditors

### Appendix 3
Aston Villa Balance Sheet 1897

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cr.</th>
<th>£-s-d</th>
<th>Dr</th>
<th>£-s-d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gate Money</td>
<td>10001-08-07</td>
<td>Wages, Transfers and Commission paid to</td>
<td>3999-10-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and for players</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members’ Subscriptions</td>
<td>268-16-06</td>
<td>Players’ Bonuses for winning matches</td>
<td>621-07-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Season Tickets</td>
<td>191-02-00</td>
<td>Match Expenses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rents</td>
<td>349-05-03</td>
<td>inc. travelling, training and hotel</td>
<td>1215-04-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>expenses gatekeepers and Groundsmen</td>
<td>218-02-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gate money paid away</td>
<td>1215-04-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Printing and similar expenses</td>
<td>1659-09-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General Expenses</td>
<td>219-07-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rent, Rates and taxes of ground</td>
<td>472-15-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ground Maintenance</td>
<td>65-02-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cost of Club house</td>
<td>148-08-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary and Assistant’s Salaries</td>
<td>258-11-08</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: *Sport Argus* (Birmingham), 19 June 1897, p. 3
### Appendix 4
Aston Villa Balance Sheet and Statement of Accounts, 1907

#### Income and Expenditure Account

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dr.</th>
<th>£-s-d</th>
<th>Cr.</th>
<th>£-s-d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Players’ Wages and Transfers</td>
<td>6782-05-11</td>
<td>Gate Money</td>
<td>15692-08-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Match Expenses, viz -</td>
<td></td>
<td>Less paid away</td>
<td>3328-18-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travelling, Training and Hotel Expenses</td>
<td>1709-19-10</td>
<td>Rents (Sub-lets)</td>
<td>401-19-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate Keepers and Police</td>
<td>695-08-08</td>
<td>Season Tickets and Members’ Subscriptions</td>
<td>839-09-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainers’ Wages</td>
<td>273-00-00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referees and Linesman</td>
<td>133-05-05</td>
<td>Share Transfer Fees</td>
<td>3-19-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors’ Fees</td>
<td>151-10-03</td>
<td>and Sundry Receipts</td>
<td>40-05-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footballs, Jerseys, Boots, and Sundries</td>
<td>84-03-00</td>
<td>Interest allowed by Bank</td>
<td>148-00-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Expenses viz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postings, Advertising and Printing</td>
<td>1010-09-09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incurred cost of Villa News</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less of Villa News and Advertisements</td>
<td>550-04-01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rents, Rates, Taxes, Inc.</td>
<td>736-02-01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Light, Coal, Water and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Maintenance</td>
<td>624-17-02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary’s and Assistant’s Salaries</td>
<td>474-18-08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>205-11-05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postages and Telegrams</td>
<td>44-18-05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medals for Players, and Cups and</td>
<td>73-12-00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medals for Junior Organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Fee</td>
<td>26-05-00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association and League Fees</td>
<td>16-01-00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundry Expenses and Petty Payments</td>
<td>30-09-05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance, being excess of Income over</td>
<td>2232-15-02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td>1274-10-00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£13797-03-11</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£13797-03-11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Balance Sheet, 1907**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liabilities</th>
<th>Assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered Capital called up viz.</td>
<td>Sundry Debtors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£5 per share on 1953 Share of £5</td>
<td>Cash at London City and Midland Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>each Capital</td>
<td>Ground Fixtures, Fittings etc. Total cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundry Creditors</td>
<td>inc. additions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>Less Sales (L197) and Depreciation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Account</td>
<td>Investment viz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance brought forward from last account</td>
<td>Birmingham Corporation 3 per cent Stock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(£1000) cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Midland Railway 2½ per cent. Perpetual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preference Stock (£1000) cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>London &amp; North Western Railway 4 per cent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pref. Stock (£800) cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great Northern Railway 4 per cent. Pref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stock (£820) cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway 3 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debentures (1300) cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000-00-00</td>
<td>Sport and Play Ltd 10 shares of £1 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>488-5-0</td>
<td>10-00-00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4466-07-00                                       | Source: *Aston Villa News and Record*, 3 August 1907, p. 9
## Appendix 5
### Aston Villa Balance Sheet and Statement of Accounts, 1914

Income and Expenditure Account for the year ended 31 May 1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dr.</th>
<th>£-s-d</th>
<th>Cr.</th>
<th>£-s-d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Player's Wages and Transfers</td>
<td>6726-18-03</td>
<td>Gate Money received</td>
<td>21478-00-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Match Expenses viz:- Travelling, Training, and Hotel Expenses</td>
<td></td>
<td>Less paid away</td>
<td>3278-12-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1863-07-00</td>
<td></td>
<td>18199-08-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footballs, Jerseys, Boots and Sundries</td>
<td>81-08-03</td>
<td>Rent (sub-lets)</td>
<td>272-09-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainers' Wages</td>
<td>273-00-00</td>
<td>Season tickets and members' subscriptions</td>
<td>1360-03-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatekeepers and Police</td>
<td>673-18-11</td>
<td>Share transfer fees</td>
<td>3-16-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referees and Linesmen</td>
<td>132-18-11</td>
<td>Interest on Investments, less charged by Bank</td>
<td>143-13-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors' Fees and Medicine</td>
<td>89-14-04</td>
<td>Sales of Villa News and Advertisement</td>
<td>819-19-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3114-07-05</td>
<td>Less cost of production</td>
<td>632-04-06</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>187-14-09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Printing, Advertising and Printing</td>
<td>484-05-04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Expenses viz:- Rates and Taxes (including Light, Coal, Water, and Insurance)</td>
<td>716-15-09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground Maintenance</td>
<td>948-13-04</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Postages and Telegrams</td>
<td>78-16-10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association and League Fees</td>
<td>18-14-00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundry Expenses and Petty Payments</td>
<td>40-13-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary's and Assistant's Salaries</td>
<td>611-15-08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Accountants' Charges</td>
<td>27-16-06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations (including £100 to Duke of Westminster's Olympic Fund)</td>
<td>228-13-00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cups, Shields, Medals, etc. presented to players and sundry associations, and souvenirs to honorary officials, directors, and secretary in commemoration of winning the English Cup</td>
<td>391-19-03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance being excess of Income over Expenditure for the Year</td>
<td>6777-16-03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20167-05-05</td>
<td></td>
<td>20167-05-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liabilities</td>
<td>£-s-d</td>
<td>Assets</td>
<td>£-s-d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Capital</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sundry debtors</td>
<td>16326-14-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000-00-00</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cash at London City and Midland Bank Ltd</td>
<td>5011-02-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital called up viz:-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ground Fixtures, Fittings, Materials, Tools, Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£5 per share on 1953 shares of £5</td>
<td>9765-00-00</td>
<td>Total cost, including additions</td>
<td>27166-19-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>each</td>
<td>333-11-03</td>
<td>Less Sales and Depreciation</td>
<td>16326-14-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundry creditors</td>
<td>4978-02-00</td>
<td>Freehold Land Investments viz:-</td>
<td>10840-04-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td>Birmingham Corporation - £1000</td>
<td>11669-12-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Account:-</td>
<td></td>
<td>3% stock cost</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance brought forward from last</td>
<td>14617-09-05</td>
<td>3% stock cost</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>account</td>
<td></td>
<td>Midland Railway - 2% % Perpetual Preference Stock</td>
<td>987-11-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dividend paid 19 June 1913</td>
<td>488-05-00</td>
<td>(£1000) cost</td>
<td>778-00-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation written off ground</td>
<td>2488-05-00</td>
<td>London and North-Western Railway - 4% Pref. Stock (£800) cost</td>
<td>999-02-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-00-00</td>
<td>12129-04-05</td>
<td>Great Northern Railway - 4% Pref. Stock (£820) cost</td>
<td>989-19-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add excess of income over</td>
<td>67716-03</td>
<td>Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway - 3% Debenture Stock (£1300) cost</td>
<td>4978-02-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expenditure for the year</td>
<td>18907-00-08</td>
<td></td>
<td>33983-13-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33983-13-11</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Aston Villa News and Record*, 8 August 1914, pp. 662-63
Appendix 6
Handbill Advertisement for Football Match

BIRMINGHAM AND DISTRICT
FOOTBALL
ASSOCIATION
SILVER CHALLENGE CUP

ASTON UNITY

v

ASTON VILLA

Lower Grounds, Feb. 10 (3-15 p.m.) 1883

This will be probably one of the most keenly contested matches of the series. The “Villa” met and defeated in the prior rounds Sutton Coldfield (5 to 0), Derby Midland (4 to 1), and Small Heath Swifts (21 to 0). “Unity” beat Wellington (4 to 0) and All Saints, Darlaston (6 to 0), having the “bye” in the third round.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASTON UNITY</th>
<th>ASTON VILLA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Matthews Goal</td>
<td>T. Mason Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.R. Benson, Capt.</td>
<td>J. Simmonds {Backs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Rogers }Backs</td>
<td>A. Harvey {Backs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Pallett } }Half-Backs</td>
<td>C. Apperley }Half-Backs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Upton } }Right</td>
<td>D. Anderson }Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Lloyd }Centre,Forwards</td>
<td>E. Davis }Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Green }Forwards</td>
<td>H. Vaughton Forwards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Dyer }Centre,Forwards</td>
<td>Archie Hunter, Capt. Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Heilborn }Forwards</td>
<td>A. Brown Forwards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Wilson } }Left</td>
<td>O. Whateley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Coley } }Right</td>
<td>Andy Hunter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Umpire, Mr J. Ford
Referee - Mr. C. Crump, President B and D.F. Association

Umpire, Mr. W.B. Mason

ADMISSION SIXPENCE
Reserved Ground or Stands, 6d. extra. Carriages - 2 wheel. 1s. 6d.; 4-wheel, 2s. 6d.

Persons on Horseback not Admitted.

Source: Albion News, Vol. 14 (18), December 2nd 1922, p. 112

(It will be noted that Aston Unity played three half-backs and five forwards, whereas Aston Villa had only two half-backs with six forwards.)
Appendix 7
‘Scottish Element in English Association Football’

Estimate - Division 1 - 16 Clubs

176 Players
97 of them English

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLUB</th>
<th>NUMBER OF ENGLISH PLAYERS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aston Villa</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Liverpool</td>
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<td>Blackburn Rovers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sheffield United</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield Wednesday</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Sunderland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wolverhampton Wanderers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notts. County</td>
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<td>Nottingham Forest</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Derby County</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Bury</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preston North End</td>
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<td>Stoke</td>
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</table>

Source: Liverpool Review, 23 October 1897, p. 6
Appendix 8
Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club

Season 1892-3

PRESIDENT
Sir Alfred Hickman, M.P.

VICE PRESIDENT
Sir William Plowden, K.C.S.I.

DIRECTORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TB Adams</th>
<th>W. Allt</th>
<th>W. Blakemore</th>
<th>J.J. Tate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M. Bray</td>
<td>S. Craddock</td>
<td>C. Crump</td>
<td>G.W. Walker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Forder</td>
<td>L. Johnson</td>
<td>B.B. Nook</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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PLAYERS' COMMITTEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>W. Allt</th>
<th>S. Craddock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L. Johnson, Chairman</td>
<td>C. Forder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J.J. Tate</td>
</tr>
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</table>

FINANCE COMMITTEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>G.W. Walker, Chairman</td>
<td>M. Bray</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B.B. Nock</td>
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SECRETARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>J.H. Addenbrooke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7, High Street, Wolverhampton</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Registered Office:-
Molineux House, Wolverhampton

Source: Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club
Appendix 9
Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club
Rules for Players

Name: Mr C.P. Shinton, 18 Wanderers Avenue, Wolverhampton

Rules

Framed by the Directors for the guidance of Players and issued subject to the Rules, Regulations and Bye-laws of the Football Association.

Season 1914-1915

1. Each player will be provided with the necessary Football outfit for which he must account to the Secretary on May 1st 1915 or at any other period as may be desired. Each player is required to take due care of his outfit and will be required to see that the stops on his boots are according to the regulations of the Football Association, and any player being sent off the field by the referee for any infringement of these regulations will be suspended for one week.

2. Instructions for Training for each week during the Season will be posted in the Dressing Room on the Thursday previous to the Monday, on which day in each week the Training will commence.

3. No player will be exempt from any of these instructions, except through inability (to substantiate which he must produce a certificate from the Club’s Medical Adviser), or by special permission of the Team Committee, which will only be granted when the player follows bona fide weekly employment, in which case he must attend at Molineux Grounds at 7 p.m. on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday in each week, and train as instructed by the Trainer. It must be understood that the latter part of this rule will not apply when the Team is required to go into strict Training for any period fixed by the Directors, in which event every player named in the list, which will be posted in the Dressing Room, must be present for each day at the time detailed in the rota for the week or weeks fixed for such strict Training.

4. Every player must start promptly and complete the work set for him to do each day which is specified on the weekly Training List. Any player not complying with this rule will not be allowed meals (when provided), will forfeit a day’s wages, and be liable to suspension, as the Team Committee or Directors may determine.

5. On each Training Day after the completion of the allotted work, every player must sign his name in the Training Book kept for the purpose in the Dressing Room.

6. Any player who is chosen to play in any Match or elected on reserve, can only be excused from playing by producing on the day preceding, or morning of the Match, a certificate from Dr J.A. Wolvevers, 6 Tettenhall Road, the appointed Medical Adviser to the Club. N.B.: When the Match is played away from home the certificate must be produced on the morning of the day preceding the Match.

7. The players, while playing in all Matches, must obey all orders and instructions given to them by the Captain of the Team, and the Captain shall report any refusal to obey such orders or instructions, and any player offending will be dealt with as the Team Committee may determine.

8. Players must respect the decisions of referees. All appeals against the decision of a referee must come through the Captain. This rule does not prevent players individually claiming for fouls, etc.

9. The superintendence of the Reserve Team has been placed in the hands of Mr. Dallard, and all players in Reserve Team Matches must strictly obey his orders in all respects, both before and after the Matches. In case Mr. Dallard shall report any disobedience, the player offending will be dealt with as the Team Committee or Directors may determine.

10. Except under special circumstances, players will not be written to either as Training, Playing in Matches, Times of Kick-off, Trains, etc. Each player must take notice from the List of Instructions as posted in the Dressing Room every Thursday afternoon, and if any player should fail to play in any Match for which he is selected as one of the team, he shall forfeit one week’s wages and be further dealt with as the Directors may determine.
11. Wages will be paid after each Saturday's match.

12. No one will be allowed in the Dressing Room excepting players and officials of the Club, either before or after Matches.

J.H. ADDENBROOKE
Secretary

Source: Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club
## Appendix 10
Details of the Court Case against William Sudell

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>TRADE</th>
<th>Degree of Instruction</th>
<th>Name and Address of Committing Magistrate</th>
<th>Date of Warrant</th>
<th>When received into Custody</th>
<th>Verdict of the Jury</th>
<th>Sentence or Order of the Court</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>William Sudell</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Mill Manager</td>
<td>Well</td>
<td>J. Toulim Esq., Preston</td>
<td>1895 27th March</td>
<td>1895 27th March</td>
<td>Pleaded guilty of embezzlement</td>
<td>3 years penal service</td>
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</table>

### Offence as charged in the Indictment

Embezzling and stealing a banker’s cheque and order for the payment of the sum of £400, the property of John Phelps Goodair, his master, at Preston, 22nd April 1892.

Second charge

Embezzling and stealing a banker’s cheque and order for the payment of the sum of £125 19s. 9d., at Preston, 21st May 1890, and on the 29th May 1890, a banker’s cheque and order for the payment of the further sum of £135 12s. and on the 25th June 1890 a banker’s cheque and order for the payment of the further sum of £201 10s. 5d., respectively the property of John Phelps Goodair, his said master.

Third charge

Unlawfully, wilfully, and with intent to defraud, omitting to enter in a certain book, to wit, a ledger, an order for the payment of £125 19s. 9d., for and on account of his said master at Preston, 21st May 1890.

Source: PRO HO140/161
Appendix 11
Financial Breakdown of Charlie Buchan’s Transfer from Sunderland to Arsenal, 1925

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>July 11, 1925</td>
<td>Cash: Transfer Fee re: Buchan Sunderland</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 23</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 12</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 20</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 27</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 10</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 29</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 18, 1926</td>
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<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 11</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 16</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>March 23</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 12</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
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3,900

Source: Arsenal Ledger, Arsenal FC
Appendix 12
The W/M Formation

Source: Joy, Soccer Tactics, p. 54
Appendix 13
HULL CITY A.F.C.

SEASON 1939-40

PLAYER'S TICKET

Admit J. Curnow

Official Entrance

E. BLACKBURN, Secretary-Manager

Bye Laws and Training Rules for Players.

1939-40 Season.

1. All Players must report at the ground for Training at 10 a.m. and 2.30 p.m. daily as requested by the Trainer or Manager.

2. Injured Players must report at the ground when able to do so for treatment as per instructions from the Trainer. All Players must obey the instructions of the Trainer and in all respects assist him in the discharge of his duties. On reporting each time players must sign the attendance book stating time of arrival.

3. Players will be provided with the necessary outfits for training and playing (such outfits to be the property of the Club) and must not be taken away, except with the consent of the Trainer or Manager. Match jerseys must not be used for Training purposes. Immediate report of any defect in outfits must be made to the Trainer so that prompt attention can be given to same.

4. In cases of illness or accident notification of same must be made to the Trainer or Manager as soon as possible. Players are to note that they must Not visit the Club’s Medical Officer without first obtaining permission to do so (cases of emergency excepted), and then only at such times as per arrangement with the Doctor. The Manager or Trainer will give permission when necessary. Players desiring the services of the Doctor in cases of emergency Must get in touch with him at once and advise the Trainer or Manager immediately.

5. Players must Not bring friends in the Dressing Rooms or in the Saloon or other conveyance when travelling to away matches unless permission to do so has been obtained from a responsible Club Official. Players must Not stand about outside the Dressing Rooms on match days when not wanted to play, they must immediately go to the place appointed for that purpose and be available if wanted in case of emergency. All Players required to be in attendance for Home matches must be at the ground at least forty-five minutes prior to the time of kick-off, when travelling to Away matches they must report at the appointed place of departure at least 15 minutes before the time stated for leaving.

6. Smoking is prohibited in the Dressing Rooms and Gambling of any description will Not be permitted on the Club premises. Players are also to note that certain games of Cards are forbidden when travelling to and from away matches, the Manager or (in his absence) the Trainer will give instructions regarding these of any other games.

7. One season will be issued to each Player as a Complimentary and players are requested to see that same does not get in the hands of undesirable persons.

8. The Captains as appointed shall have full control of all players on the field of play and players must respect instructions from them.

9. Players must Not enter premises licensed for the sale of intoxicating drink after Monday in each week, nor attend any Dance after Tuesday in each week, unless in charge of a responsible official of the Club or with permission from the Manager or (in his absence) the Trainer.
10. **Players must be in their places of residence not later than 10.45 p.m. on the Night prior to any match**, unless in charge of a responsible official of the Club.

11. Any Player absenting himself from Training without permission, or just cause or disregarding any of these Rules or Bye Laws will be dealt with as deemed necessary by the Board of Directors, and the **Trainers have strict instructions to report any wilful damage to Club property, Breach of Rules, or unseemly conduct of any kind likely to prejudice the game of Football or interests in connection with same.**

12. Players are cautioned against the use of **Foul or Offensive Language** on or off the field of play, the use of bad language lowers the dignity of the individual and the prestige of the team.

13. Players must **Not ride Motor Cycles** at any time, any player injured in such a way will forfeit all claims of wages from the Club.

Players are particularly requested to make themselves conversant with these Rules or Bye Laws as they will be strictly adhered to, any breach of same will be dealt with by the **Board of Directors** who have power to inflict punishment in accordance with rules.

At all times remember that you have a duty to fulfil both to the Directors of your Club and to the Public who pay admission to see good-class and wholehearted Football. Give of your best at all times, show grit and determination, if you lose go down showing a true spirit.

**Let your conduct at all times be honourable!**

and as true sportsmen.

Source: Jack Curnow Collection
Appendix 14
Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club (1923) Ltd.

Season 1933-34

PLAYER'S TICKET

Name

Rules

Framed by the Directors for the guidance of Players and issued subject to the Rules, Regulations and Bye-laws of the Football Association, Limited.

Frank C. Buckley
Secretary-Manager

Player's Instructions

1. All professionals must report daily at 10 a.m. and will be under the orders of the Trainers for the remainder of the day.

2. The Attendance Book must be signed every morning. Any player failing to sign will be automatically fined 5/- unless a good and sufficient reason is forthcoming to the Secretary-Manager.

3. Special instructions will be posted in the dressing rooms from time to time. Players must make themselves conversant with them.

4. At Home Matches, players, whether selected to play or not, must report on ground at least 45 minutes before kick-off.

5. At away matches the actual train departure time will be put on the team sheet. Players must be on the Station 15 minutes before train departure.

6. The Club Medical Officer is Dr J.H. Richmond, 6, Tettenhall Road. Surgery hours are 6 p.m. to 8 p.m., and players must not visit him at any other time without instructions.

7. In case of sickness or injury that prevents a player attending the Ground, notice must at once be sent to the Secretary-Manager.

8. After all exercises, training or matches, players must expose any injuries, wounds, etc. (however slight) to the trainer for immediate treatment. Serious consequences often follow neglect of this precaution.

9. Players are responsible for their training and playing kit, repairs and replacements necessary, must be pointed out to the trainers. Players must hang up their jerseys, etc., clean their boots and pumps immediately after use, and return to boot room.

10. Players must provide their own “splits” and be responsible for their “cleanliness.”

11. Smoking is strictly forbidden on match days, and before training.

12. Dancing after Wednesday night is strictly forbidden.

13. Motor cycling is also forbidden.
14. Players who wish to stay over-night after matches or visit their homes must make their request to the Secretary in time for the necessary arrangements to be made.

15. No person, other than players of officials of the club will be allowed in the Dressing Rooms, either before or after matches or during training hours.

16. Players are strictly forbidden to write, dictate or inspire any article to the press without first submitting such matter to the Directors through the Secretary.

17. This card must be carried at all times and produced when asked for, it must on no account be allowed out of the player’s possession or used by any other person.

18. The Directors wish to point out the Honourable place your Club occupies in the Game and request that every player assist in building up the tone of professional football generally. Everything possible will be done for your comfort and advancement and you are asked to “play the game” in the correct spirit and to conform to the rules and regulations as laid down.

Frank C. Buckley
Secretary-Manager

Source: Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club
### Appendix 15a
County rankings per capita production of football managers, 1880-1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Managers</th>
<th>Manager per</th>
<th>Per Capita index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>573,822</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>114,764</td>
<td>5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strathclyde</td>
<td>239,782</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>133,213</td>
<td>4.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grampian</td>
<td>470,596</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Fife</td>
<td>326,480</td>
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<td>163,240</td>
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<td>Yorkshire S</td>
<td>130,183</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18,597</td>
<td>3.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tyne and Wear</td>
<td>114,324</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19,054</td>
<td>3.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancashire</td>
<td>137,760</td>
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<td>19,680</td>
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<td>Lothian</td>
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<td>37,780</td>
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<td>Glamorgan</td>
<td>384,633</td>
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<td>Gwent</td>
<td>439,684</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>606,800</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60,680</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>Yorkshire N</td>
<td>666,610</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>66,661</td>
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<td>67,830</td>
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<td>95,453</td>
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<td>98,263</td>
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<td>148,630</td>
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<td>London</td>
<td>675,450</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>225,150</td>
<td>0.27</td>
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*Population figures for Appendix 15-16 are based on the 1981 census
**The maps for Appendix 16 are based on the 1974 re-organisation of local government boundaries

Source: Turner and White, *Football Managers*
## Appendix 15b

County rankings per capita production of football managers, 1921-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Managers</th>
<th>Manager per Capita index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shetland</td>
<td>26716</td>
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<td>26716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham</td>
<td>606800</td>
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<td>37925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyne and Wear</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>67250</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>911100</td>
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Source: Turner and White, *Football Managers*
## Appendix 15c

County rankings per capita production of football managers, 1946-1970

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Source: Turner and White, *Football Managers*
## Appendix 15d
County rankings per capita production of football managers, 1971-1993

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Source: Turner and White, *Football Managers*
Appendix 16a

Per capita production of football managers, 1880-1920

Counties of the British Isles

Per capita indices

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4.01-3.01 & \\
3.01-2.01 & \\
2.01-1.01 & \\
1.01-0.51 & \\
<0.50 &
\end{align*} \]
Appendix 16b
Per capita production of football managers, 1920-1945

Per capita indices

- >4.01
- 4.01-3.01
- 3.01-2.01
- 2.01-1.01
- 1.01-0.51
- <0.50

Counties of the British Isles
Appendices

Appendix 16c
Per capita production of football managers, 1946-1970

Per capita indices
>4.01
4-3.01
3-2.01
2-1.01
1-0.51
<0.50

Counties of the British Isles
Appendix 16d
Per capita production of football managers, 1971-1993

Per capita indices

- Greater than 3.01
- 3.01 to 2.01
- 2.01 to 1.51
- 1.51 to 1.01
- 1.01 to 0.51
- Less than 0.51

Counties of the British Isles
Appendix 17

THE LEEDS UNITED ASSOCIATION FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED

and

HORATIO STRATTON CARTER ESQ.

Counterpart/ AGREEMENT

relating to the appointment of Manager

Bromley & Walker
Leeds

1st June 1955

THIS AGREEMENT made the First day of June One thousand nine hundred and fifty five BETWEEN THE LEEDS UNITED ASSOCIATION FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED whose Registered Office is situated at Elland Road in the City of Leeds (hereinafter called “the Company”) of the one part and HORATIO STRATTON CARTER of 125 Otley Road in the said City of Leeds (hereinafter called “the Manager”) of the other part

WHEREBY it is agreed by and between the said parties hereto as follows:-

1. THE Company shall employ the Manager and the Manager shall serve the Company as Manager upon and subject to the following terms and conditions.

2. THE engagement shall be for the period of three years commencing on the First day of June One thousand nine hundred and fifty five subject to the provision for determination hereinafter contained. During the continuance of this agreement the Manager of and on behalf of the Company and he shall do his utmost by lawful and legitimate means to promote develop and extend the interest welfare and business of the Company and he shall not either directly or indirectly engage or be concerned or interested in any other trade occupation or business of any kind whatsoever (except as a shareholder or debenture holder of any limited company not carrying on the business of a similar kind to the business of the Company).

3. THE remuneration of the Manager shall be:-

   a. A fixed salary at the rate of One thousand eight hundred and fifty pounds per annum payable by equal weekly instalments on the Thursday of each week the first payment to be made on the Second day of June One thousand nine hundred and fifty five;

   b. Reasonable motoring hotel travelling and out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the Manager in the execution of his duties to be paid weekly.

4. THE Manager shall not draw accept or endorse any bill or other security for money on behalf of the Company or in any way pledge the credit of the Company unless he be previously authorised by the Board of Directors in any particular case.

5. THE Manager shall at all times faithfully carry out all lawful instructions given to him from time to time by the Board of Directors in and for the conduct of the business of the Company.

6. THE Manager shall subject to any orders or directors given to him by the Board of Directors during his employment hereunder be responsible for and have the control of the training and management of all the football players employed engaged or retained by the Company.

7. THE Manager shall be responsible for all arrangements necessary for the travelling of the players playing in “away matches” and for their fitness on arrival at the away grounds and for their safe and
speedy return to Leeds immediately after all and any such matches unless otherwise instructed by the Board of Directors.

8. THE Manager shall not at any time divulge any information respecting the business of the Company to any person whatsoever other than the Board of Directors.

9. THE Company will require the Manager during the continuance of this agreement and by virtue of his employment as Manager to occupy the dwellinghouse known as 125 Otley Road in the City of Leeds or such other suitable residence as may be agreed upon between the parties without charge for the use and occupation thereof but nothing in this agreement shall be construed to create a tenancy between the Company and the Manager.

10. THE employment of the Manager hereunder may be determined forthwith by the happening of any of the following events that is to say:

a. If the Manager shall become insolvent or commit any act of bankruptcy;

b. Be guilty of theft or any gross default in the conduct of his employment under the terms of the Agreement or misconduct;

c. Be convicted by any Court for any criminal offence;

d. Become negligent or become incapable of performing his duties hereunder by reason of permanent incapacity lunacy or habitual drunkenness or

e. The breach or non-observance of any of the stipulations herein contained or any lawful and reasonable commands of the Directors of the Company.

11. THE Manager shall be entitled to twenty one days holiday during the year or such longer period as the Board of Directors in their absolute discretion may give to him on full salary but all such holidays shall only be taken by the Manager during the period outside the football playing season and then only at such time or times as shall be convenient to the Company and be first mutually agreed upon.

12. IN the case of the illness of the Manager or other cause incapacitating him from duly attending to his duties for a period or aggregate period exceeding thirteen weeks in any fifty tow consecutive weeks the Company shall be entitled forwith to determine the Manager’s employment hereunder without notice.

13. IN case of any dispute or difference arising between the parties hereto as to the construction of this Agreement or the rights duties or obligations of either party hereunder or any matter arising out of or concerning the same or the Manager’s employment hereunder every such dispute and matter in difference shall be referred to a single Arbitrator to be appointed by the President for the time being of the Football Association.

IN WITNESS whereof the Manager and the duly authorised Agent of the Company have hereunto set their respective hands the day and year first before written.

SIGNED by the said Horatio Stratton Carter in the presence of:-

THIS AGREEMENT is made the twenty first day of August One thousand nine hundred and fifty seven BETWEEN the above named THE LEEDS UNITED ASSOCIATION FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED (hereinafter called “the Company”) of the one part and above named HORATIO STRATTON CARTER (hereinafter called “the Manager”) of the other part and is supplemental to the above written agreement.

WHEREAS the parties hereto desire to extend the provisions of the above written agreement in manner hereinafter appearing.

HOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between the parties hereto as follow:-
1. In the event of the football team of the Company holding at the end of the 1957/8 Association football season any of the positions specified in the first column of the Schedule hereto in the Football League First Division Championship Table for 1957/8 the Company shall be pay to the Manager as a bonus and by way of additional remuneration the sum specified in the second column of the said Schedule which is set opposite to the position specified in the said first column thereof which such football team shall hold.

2. In the event of the football team of the Company qualifying for and playing in the sixth round of the competition for the Football Association Challenge Cup in the year 1958 and being defeated in such round the Company shall pay to the Manager as a bonus and by way of additional remuneration the sum of Five hundred pounds.

3. In the event of the football team of the Company qualifying for and playing in the semi-final of the competition for the Football Association Challenge Cup in the year 1958 and being defeated in such round the Company shall pay to the Manager as a bonus and by way of additional remuneration the sum of Seven hundred and fifty pounds.

4. In the event of the football team of the Company qualifying for and playing in the final of the competition for the Football Association Challenge Cup in the year 1958 and being defeated in such round the Company shall pay to the Manager as a bonus and by way of additional remuneration the sum of One thousand pounds.

IN WITNESS whereof the Manager and duly authorised Agent of the Company have hereunto set their respective hands the day and year first before written.

THE SCHEDULE above referred to.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position of the Football League First Division Championship Table</th>
<th>Amount Payable (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SIGNED by the said Horatio Stratton Carter in the presence of:-

Source: Mrs P. Carter
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