An, Jingfeng, Gemmill, Gordon and Thomas, Dylan C. (2010) The agency effect of repurchases on closed-end funds. European Financial Management, Vol.18 (No.2). pp. 240-270. doi:10.1111/j.1468-036X.2009.00529.x ISSN 1354-7798.

Research output not available from this repository.

Request-a-Copy directly from author or use local Library Get it For Me service.

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

Share prices rise after companies announce repurchases, but there are differing views as to why this happens. Repurchases are announced by closed-end funds when their discounts are widening (market-to-book is falling). The immediate post-announcement effect is a small jump in a fund's share price, but the main effect occurs over the next four years during which time there is significant outperformance both of the fund's price and of its investment portfolio. Liquidity of the shares does not change. Repurchases, if executed, reduce the size of a fund and therefore the manager's fees. Our findings are consistent with directors using the threat of repurchases to discipline managers whose investment performance has been poor, leading to a closer alignment of pay and performance. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Journal or Publication Title:	European Financial Management
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
ISSN:	1354-7798
Official Date:	2010
Dates:	Date Event 2010 Published
Volume:	Vol.18
Number:	No.2
Page Range:	pp. 240-270
DOI:	10.1111/j.1468-036X.2009.00529.x
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item