Molyneux’s question and the phenomenology of shape
Shimizu, Shogo (2011) Molyneux’s question and the phenomenology of shape. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.
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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2569018~S1
William Molyneux raised the following question: if a congenital blind person is
made to see, and is visually presented with a cube and a globe, would he be able to
call the shapes before him a cube and a globe before touching them? Locke,
Berkeley, Leibniz, and Reid presented their phenomenological view of shape
perception, i.e. their view as to what it is like to perceive shape by sight and touch, in
responding to Molyneux’s Question. The four philosophers shared the view that
visual perception delivers no solid shape. This view would provide a premise for an
argument for immaterial objects. The purpose of my thesis is to reject that argument.
Kant’s view and John Campbell’s externalist account offer a way to reject the
premise of the argument in question. However, my strategy is not to adopt their view.
I pursue Reichenbach’s view that the there is no congruence or incongruence
involved in the visual phenomenology. I develop his view, and propose the view that
visual perception delivers no flat or solid shape. Although my view endorses the
premise in question, I can offer a way to reject the argument. This is because my
view is compatible with a form of externalism about perception (which differs from
Campbell’s). My view can also do full justice to the phenomenological views
presented by the four philosophers.
|Item Type:||Thesis or Dissertation (PhD)|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Molyneux, William, 1656-1698 -- Criticism and interpretation, Form perception|
|Official Date:||September 2011|
|Institution:||University of Warwick|
|Theses Department:||Department of Philosophy|
|Extent:||213 leaves : ill.|
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