Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login
  • Admin

Molyneux’s question and the phenomenology of shape

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Shimizu, Shogo (2011) Molyneux’s question and the phenomenology of shape. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

[img]
Preview
Text
WRAP_THESIS_Shimizu_2011.pdf - Submitted Version

Download (820Kb) | Preview
Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2569018~S1

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

William Molyneux raised the following question: if a congenital blind person is
made to see, and is visually presented with a cube and a globe, would he be able to
call the shapes before him a cube and a globe before touching them? Locke,
Berkeley, Leibniz, and Reid presented their phenomenological view of shape
perception, i.e. their view as to what it is like to perceive shape by sight and touch, in
responding to Molyneux’s Question. The four philosophers shared the view that
visual perception delivers no solid shape. This view would provide a premise for an
argument for immaterial objects. The purpose of my thesis is to reject that argument.
Kant’s view and John Campbell’s externalist account offer a way to reject the
premise of the argument in question. However, my strategy is not to adopt their view.
I pursue Reichenbach’s view that the there is no congruence or incongruence
involved in the visual phenomenology. I develop his view, and propose the view that
visual perception delivers no flat or solid shape. Although my view endorses the
premise in question, I can offer a way to reject the argument. This is because my
view is compatible with a form of externalism about perception (which differs from
Campbell’s). My view can also do full justice to the phenomenological views
presented by the four philosophers.

Item Type: Thesis or Dissertation (PhD)
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Molyneux, William, 1656-1698 -- Criticism and interpretation, Form perception
Official Date: September 2011
Dates:
DateEvent
September 2011Submitted
Institution: University of Warwick
Theses Department: Department of Philosophy
Thesis Type: PhD
Publication Status: Unpublished
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: Eilan, Naomi
Extent: 213 leaves : ill.
Language: eng

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

twitter

Email us: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us