Hoerl, Christoph (2011) Causal reasoning. Philosophical Studies, Vol.152 (No.2). pp. 167-179. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9474-7

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Abstract

The main focus of this paper is the question as to what it is for an individual to think of her environment in terms of a concept of causation, or causal concepts, in contrast to some more primitive ways in which an individual might pick out or register what are in fact causal phenomena. I show how versions of this question arise in the context of two strands of work on causation, represented by Elizabeth Anscombe and Christopher Hitchcock, respectively. I then describe a central type of reasoning that, I suggest, a subject has to be able to engage in, if we are to credit her with causal concepts. I also point out that this type of reasoning turns on the idea of a physical connection between cause and effect, as articulated in recent singularist approaches of causation.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Causation, Causation -- Mathematical models, Reasoning
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophical Studies
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0031-8116
Official Date:	January 2011
Dates:	Date Event January 2011 Published
Date of first compliant deposit:	3 April 2017
Volume:	Vol.152
Number:	No.2
Number of Pages:	13
Page Range:	pp. 167-179
DOI:	10.1007/s11098-009-9474-7
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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