Hoerl, Christoph. (2013) Husserl, the absolute flow, and temporal experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 86 (Number 2). pp. 376-411. ISSN 0031-8205

Preview

Text WRAP_Hoerl_phpr547.pdf - Published Version Download (382Kb) | Preview

Abstract

Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of internal time consciousness has a reputation for being complex, occasionally to the point of approaching impenetrability. The latter applies in particular to his remarks about what he calls the ‘absolute time-constituting flow’,1 some of which Husserl himself describes as ‘‘shocking (when not initially even absurd)’’ (Husserl, 1991, p. 84). [...]

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938 -- Criticism and interpretation, Time perception
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
ISSN:	0031-8205
Date:	March 2013
Volume:	Volume 86
Number:	Number 2
Page Range:	pp. 376-411
Identification Number:	10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00547.x
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
References:	Alweiss, L. (2003). The world unclaimed: A challenge to Heidegger’s critique of Husserl. Ohio University Press. Brewer, B. (2000). Perception and reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —— (2011). Perception and its objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brough, J. (1972). The emergence of an absolute consciousness in Husserl’s early writings on time-consciousness. Man and World 5, pp. 298–326. —— (1987). Temporality and the presence of language: Reflections on Husserls phenomenology of time-consciousness. In A. Schuwer (ed.). Phenomenology of temporality: Time and language. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, pp. 1–31. —— (1989). Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness. In: J. N. Mohanty and W. R. McKenna (eds.). Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook. Lanham MD: University Press of America, pp. 249–290. Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carr, D. (1999). The paradox of subjectivity. The self in the transcendental tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chuard, P. (2011). Temporal experiences and their parts. Philosophers’ Imprint ’11. Clark, A. (2006). That lonesome whistle: a puzzle for the sensorimotor model of perceptual experience. Analysis 66, pp. 22–25. Cohen, J. (2010). Sounds and temporality. In: D. Zimmerman (ed.): Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5. Dainton, B. (2006): Stream of consciousness: Unity and continuity in conscious experience, 2nd edition. London, UK: Routledge. —— (2010). Temporal consciousness. In E.N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition). URL = http: ⁄ ⁄ plato.stanford.edu ⁄ archives ⁄ fall2010 ⁄ entries ⁄ consciousnesstemporal ⁄ Derrida, J. (1973). Speech and phenomena, and other essays on Husserl’s theory of signs; trans. D.B. Allison. Evanston : Northwestern University Press Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. —— (2003). Experience as representation. Philosophical Issues 13, pp. 67–82. Foster, J. (1979). In self-defence. In: G. Macdonald (ed.): Perception and identity. London: Macmillan. Gallagher, S. (1998). The inordinance of time. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Gallagher, S. & Zahavi, D. (2010). Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness. In E.D. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition). URL = http: ⁄ ⁄ plato.stanford. edu ⁄ archives ⁄ win2010 ⁄ entries ⁄ self-consciousness-phenomenological ⁄ Grush, R. (2006). How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness. Synthese 153, 417–450. Harman, G. (1990). The intrinsic quality of experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, pp. 31–52. Horwich, P. (1987). Asymmetries in time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Husserl, E. (1977). Phenomenological psychology: lectures, summer semester, 1925; trans. J. Scanlon. The Hague: Nijhoff —— (1991). On the phenomenology of consciousness of internal time (1893-1917), translated by J.B. Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. —— (2001a). Logical investigations, Vol. 1, trans. J.N. Finlay. London: Routledge. —— (2001b). Logical investigations, Vol. 2, trans. J.N. Finlay. London: Routledge. James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology, 2 Vols. London: Macmillan. Keller, P. (1999). Husserl and Heidegger on human experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kelly, S. (2005). The puzzle of temporal experience, in A. Brook and K. Akins (eds.), Cognition and the brain. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kiverstein, J. (2010): Making sense of phenomenal unity: An intentionalist account of temporal experience. In: J. Kiverstein, P. Phemister & P. Basile (eds.): The metaphysics of consciousness: Essays in honour of Timothy Sprigge. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67, pp. 155–181. Kline, K.A., Holcombe, A.O. and Eagleman, D.M. (2004). Illusory motion reversal is caused by rivalry, not by perceptual snapshots of the visual field. Vision Research 44, pp. 2653–2658. Kortooms, T. (2002). Phenomenology of time: Edmund Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Le Poidevin, R. (2007). The images of time: An essay on temporal representation. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McTaggart, J. McT. E. (1927). The nature of existence, Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Martin, M.G.F. (2004). The limits of self-awareness. Philosophical Studies 120, pp. 37–89. Mensch, J.R. (2010). Retention and the schema. In: D. Lohmar & I. Yamaguchi (eds.). On Time: New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time. Heidelberg: Springer. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Miller, I. (1984). Husserl, perception and temporal awareness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Noe¨ , A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. —— (2006). Experience of the world in time. Analysis 66, 26–32. O’Regan, J. K. and A. Noe¨ (2001). A sensorimotor approach to vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, pp. 939–73. Peacocke, C. (1983). Sense and content: Experience, thought and their relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —— (1999). Being known. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pelczar, M. (2010). Must an appearance of succession involve a succession of appearances? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81, pp. 49–63. Philipse, H. (1994). Transcendental idealism. In: B. Smith & D.W. Smith (eds.). The Cambridge companion to Husserl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Phillips, I. (2010). Perceiving temporal properties. European Journal of Philosophy 18, pp. 176–202. —— (2011). Perception and iconic memory: What Sperling doesn’t show. Mind & Language 26, pp. 381–411. Purves, D., Paydarfar, J.A. & Andrews, T.J. (1996). The wagon wheel illusion in movies and reality. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 93, pp. 3693–3697 Russell, B. (1912). The problems of philosophy. Oxford University Press. —— (1915). On the experience of time. Monist 25, 212–33. Schear, J.K. (2009). Experience and self-consciousness. Philosophical Studies 144, pp. 95–105. Schumann, F. (1898). Zur psychologie der zeitanschauung. Zeitschrift fu¨r Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane 17, 106– 148. Siegel, S. (2010). The contents of perception. In E.D. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition). URL = http: ⁄ ⁄ plato.stanford.edu ⁄ archives ⁄ fall2010 ⁄ entries ⁄ percep tion-contents ⁄ Smith, A.D. (2003). Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations. London: Routledge. —— (2008). Husserl and externalism. Synthese 160, pp. 313–333. Sokolowski, R. (1974). Husserlian meditations; How words present things. Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press Soteriou, M. (2010). Perceiving events. Philosophical Explorations 13, pp. 223–241. —— (2011). Occurrent perceptual knowledge. Philosophical Issues 21, pp. 485–504. Stern, L.W. (2005). Mental presence-time, trans. N. de Warren. In: B. Hopkins & S. Crowell (eds.): The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research V, pp. 325–351 (originally published 1897). Strawson, G. (2009). Selves: An essay in revisionary metaphysics. Oxford University Press. Travis, C. (2004). The silence of the senses. Mind 113, pp. 57–94. Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, color, and content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press VanRullen, R. & Koch, C. (2003). Is perception discrete or continuous? Trends in Cognitive Science, 7, pp. 207–213. Zahavi, D. (1999). Self-awareness and alterity: A phenomenological investigation. Northwestern University Press. —— (2003). Inner time-consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness. In D. Welton (ed.). The new Husserl: A critical reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 157–80 —— (2005). Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. —— (2007). Perception of duration presupposes duration of perception - or does it? Husserl and Dainton on time. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15, pp. 435–471.
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/48646

Request changes to a record

Actions (login required)

View Item