Description and evaluation in jurisprudence
Priel, Dan. (2010) Description and evaluation in jurisprudence. Law and Philosophy, Vol.29 (No.6). pp. 633-667. ISSN 0167-5249Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-010-9081-y
In the last three decades or so a prominent view among legal philosophers has been that while legal theory is evaluative because it requires making judgments of importance, it can remain morally neutral. This view, which I call the 'orthodox view', was first articulated by Joseph Raz and has since been supported by many other prominent legal philosophers. In this essay I examine it, and argue that it is indefensible. I begin by examining the terms 'description' and 'evaluation', and show that they are ambiguous in a way that most current discussion does not realize. I then rely on this analysis to develop several arguments against the orthodox view. I argue that defenders of the orthodox view have considered only one such argument, and that even with regard to this one their response is unsuccessful.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Law|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Law and Philosophy|
|Number of Pages:||35|
|Page Range:||pp. 633-667|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
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