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Description and evaluation in jurisprudence
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Priel, Dan (2010) Description and evaluation in jurisprudence. Law and Philosophy, Vol.29 (No.6). pp. 633-667. doi:10.1007/s10982-010-9081-y ISSN 0167-5249.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-010-9081-y
Abstract
In the last three decades or so a prominent view among legal philosophers has been that while legal theory is evaluative because it requires making judgments of importance, it can remain morally neutral. This view, which I call the 'orthodox view', was first articulated by Joseph Raz and has since been supported by many other prominent legal philosophers. In this essay I examine it, and argue that it is indefensible. I begin by examining the terms 'description' and 'evaluation', and show that they are ambiguous in a way that most current discussion does not realize. I then rely on this analysis to develop several arguments against the orthodox view. I argue that defenders of the orthodox view have considered only one such argument, and that even with regard to this one their response is unsuccessful.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics K Law [LC] |
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Law and Philosophy | ||||
Publisher: | Springer | ||||
ISSN: | 0167-5249 | ||||
Official Date: | November 2010 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Vol.29 | ||||
Number: | No.6 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 35 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 633-667 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1007/s10982-010-9081-y | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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