INTRODUCTION

SLEEPING BODIES

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Sleep is an inescapable fact of the human condition. Sooner or later, happily or otherwise, we are all called back to this (blissful) state of oblivion which, like death itself, places temporal limits on all our waking projects and conscious involvements in the intersubjective world.

This may constitute one very good reason why, despite its ubiquity or universality in both human and non-human species, sleep has been such a neglected topic of discussion and debate in the social sciences and humanities in the past. Why, after all, study this void or blank in all our lives? What indeed is there to study or report on! To the extent, moreover, that agency is wedded to consciousness or wakefulness, what possible interest can the social sciences and humanities have in sleep or sleeping? At most, one might conjecture, the world of dreams and dreaming opens up some rich and fruitful areas of inquiry, not least the social, cultural and historical significance of dreams and dreamers, but sleep as such is surely a step too far.

A variety of recent work, thankfully, has begun to challenge any such waking prejudices and preoccupations, opening sleep up to critical scrutiny within the social sciences and humanities. Early sociological forays into sleep, which seem to have largely gone unnoticed (Aubert and White 1959a,b; Schwartz 1979, Taylor 1979), have now been joined by a variety of more recent contributions within the social sciences and humanities (Williams 2005, Steger and Brunt 2003, Ekirch 2001).

So what key issues does sleep raise for a Body & Society audience, and why should we take sleep seriously as a legitimate topic of interdisciplinary inquiry? Given the fact that sleep is embodied and embedded in everyday/night life and a key feature of all societies, past and present, the simple answer to this question is that it is potentially relevant to many if not all forms of inquiry pertaining to the body and
society; another lens through which to view body/society relations. More specifically, a focus upon sleep illuminates at least five key social scientific concerns.

(i) (Un)consciousness; liminal bodies/lucid minds

First, and perhaps most obviously, the study of sleep provides a powerful and potent opportunity to problematise and explore wakeful, consciousness. Phenomenologically, sleep involves a loss of consciousness and (partial) withdrawal from the world. It is what Leder terms a ‘recessive’ mode of embodiment, not simply from the world but from myself: where sleep is, ‘I’, as conscious waking agent am not (1990: 58). This withdrawal is only partial, however. As Freud (1973) notes, events in the (waking) world around the sleeper, such as noise, are sometimes appropriated and given new significance in dreams (on which more below), indicating that the sleep/dream and waking worlds are not entirely closed off to one another. Furthermore, as Merleau-Ponty (1962) notes, such events might suffice to draw the sleeping individual back into the waking world, waking her up. This is only possible because the sleeper is not fully disconnected from the waking world, because their withdrawal from it is only partial. The sleeper is still ‘in’ the waking world, still attached to it, albeit in a state of partial withdrawal.

If we accept that this liminal state is an embodied state, that sleep is a bodily transition, then it serves to illustrate the wider point that our being-in-the-world is irreducibly embodied. The role of the body in ‘giving’ us a world is illustrated by its power to pull us back from that world. The loss of our grip upon the world which is evident in sleep serves to illustrate the role of that grip in waking life. Our embodiment is the source and vehicle of the sensual wakefulness that opens us to the world and constitutes our being-there but it equally facilitates, indeed necessitates frequent temporary withdrawal. Moreover, there are various in-between positions, from drowsiness, through daydreaming to ‘nodding off’, that we can, generally without awareness and sometimes against our explicit intentions, drift onto. Our being-there in any given situation is, in virtue of our embodied subjectivity, not equivalent to our physical presence. In such cases we are inclined to say that we are present in body but not in mind or spirit but, phenomenologically, it is evident that
our ‘not being there’ is a failure to be there fully in body. To ‘drift off’ is to lose one’s embodied grip on and involvement in a situation.

The involuntary aspect of sleep (on the voluntary aspect see below), the fact that we have to sleep sooner or later, may ‘drop off’ without realising it and may fight variously against tiredness and/or insomnia, is also interesting insofar as it highlights the impersonal and organic backdrop to (inter)subjective life. As with illness we see that ‘normal’ waking consciousness emerges out of and is dependent upon an organic foundation that runs far deeper than itself and is, in effect, beyond and beneath its own control. Moreover, again like illness, our struggles with tiredness, insomnia etc. represent modes of bodily dys-appearance (Leder 1990). The bodily absence that, according to Leder, characterises our usual experience, is disturbed when we must struggle with a body that is either shutting down before we want it to or not shutting down when we want it to.

Certain of the limits of agency are revealed in these examples but so too is the reflexive process whereby agents must tend to and manage their bodies in an effort to maintain the necessary embodied basis of that agency. The management of our waking life presupposes, in some part, the successful management of our sleeping life. We have an ‘early night’ in anticipation of a ‘big day’, knowing that we will be incapable of our best performance and may not even be able to sustain our usual ‘self’ in the absence of sleep. Sleep, in this sense, is a fundamental resource or at least a means of preserving and generating the physical energy that is a key resource of human agency.

Sleepwalking and talking further complicate our picture of agency. They constitute forms of action which seemingly lack the reflexive self-monitoring of waking experience and, indeed, its relation to the waking world. On one level these experiences serve to sharpen our sense of what it is to be an alert, wakeful agent. And yet on another they suggest that our agency is not exclusively of that kind. They complicate our sense of what agency is or is not and point to the possibility of our inhabitation and involvement in worlds other than the waking world.
Likewise dreams. In their ‘lucid’ form dreams are apparent to us as such. We know that we are dreaming and might even seek to control them. History is littered with lucid dreamers, including the Marquis Leon Hervey de Saint-Deny who, in the nineteenth century anonymously wrote *Dreams and How to Guide Them* (1982/1867) -- see La Berge’s (1985) for a modern day up date on these techniques.

Not all dreams are of this kind, however, and in many cases dreams are not apparent as such to the dreamer. It was this uncertainty that Descartes was able to exploit to great rhetorical effect in the *Meditations*: how do I know that I am not dreaming now? Dreams can feel as real as waking experiences and often lack any signal that would indicate that they are, indeed, dreams. Fortunately we do not have to resolve Descartes’ dilemma but it is useful because it demonstrates, again, the embodied basis of our being-in-the-world. The corporeal transformation that takes us from waking to sleep and back effects a switching between worlds; from the waking world to the world(s) of our dreams. Which of the two worlds we are in lies to some extent beyond our control. It is determined by our bodies.

(ii) Practices, Interactions and Networks

We have emphasised the involuntary aspect of sleep but it is equally a practice. As Mauss (1973/1934) noted, sleep is a technique or more precisely a body technique. Where, when and how we sleep (e.g. our posture and the equipment, such as a bed, involved) varies across history and cultures. If not exactly learned, it nevertheless follows a pattern, shared by others in our society, to which we become accustomed. Moreover, even if the transition from wakefulness to sleep is ultimately beyond our control we may deploy rituals in an effort to hasten its arrival or otherwise control it. Merleau-Ponty gives one example of this:

I lie down in bed, on my left side, with my knees drawn up; I close my eyes and breath slowly, putting my plans out of my mind. But the power of my will or consciousness stops there. As the faithful, in the Dionysian mysteries, invoke the God by miming scenes from his life, I call up the visitation of sleep by imitating the breathing and posture of the sleeper. The god is actually there when the faithful can no longer distinguish themselves from the part they are playing, when their body and their consciousness cease to bring in, as an obstacle, their particular opacity, and when they are totally fused in the myth. There is a moment when sleep ‘comes’, settling on this imitation of itself which I have been offering to it, and I succeed in becoming what I was trying to be. (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 163-4)
Merleau-Ponty cannot make himself sleep. The transition to sleep lies beyond his voluntary control. However, he can attempt to induce the state by imitating it or acting it out. By acting out the state in ritual form he can, on occasion, tap into the power of his body and set in motion the process which will take him into sleep (see also Crossley 2004).

This final ritual, moreover, of pulling up one’s knees, shutting one’s eyes and waiting, is often the last of a series of rituals, including the cleaning of teeth and the removal of daytime clothing, that prepare the individual for this transition. In all of these ways we channel, mark and seek to control this involuntary and inevitable aspect of our lives, making it a personal act and not simply a third person physical process, akin to breathing of digestion.

These are often not solitary rituals, however, and sleep is often a negotiated, if not a collective activity. Our capacity to sleep requires the cooperation of others. They must respect our right to sleep and refrain from interfering with it, directly or indirectly. This may be granted automatically but it may have to be fought for. Neighbours and, indeed, children of shift workers may have to be persuaded to keep noise at low levels, for example.

This is partly a matter of living at close quarters and generating noise but not exclusively so. Anxious parents may find it difficult to sleep until they hear the reassuring click of the front door, and friends and family living at a distance can be a cause of worries which, in turn, are a cause of sleep disturbance. Indeed absent others may be a greater cause of worry and sleeplessness than those we know to safely tucked up (or banging about) in the room next door. The actor is no less at the centre of a social network built around their self when they pull up their knees and ‘call up the visitation’ as when they are immersed in the flow of a busy day. It may only be when they finally get to bed that worries from work, distant family and friends begin to occupy their thoughts.

Sleep is also negotiated, implicating the other, in the sense that we make ourselves vulnerable to others when asleep and must accommodate that vulnerability in the practice of sleep (Aubert and White 1959a,b, Williams 2007a). Such vulnerability
might be direct, in the sense we are not alert and not able to guard ourselves or our property. Accommodating to this danger might involve locking ourselves in our houses and only allowing into the house those whom we trust to respect our ‘sleep rights’. Aubert and White also note, however, that taking time out of the flow of social life to rest can be risky in the sense that our competitors might take advantage of our absence and seek to get ahead, as in the story of the *Hare and the Tortoise*. It is for this reason, they speculate, that we tend to have collectively agreed sleeping times, enshrined in such things as legal opening hours. If nobody is allowed to trade between particular hours then all can sleep safely in the knowledge that they are not missing a trick. Of course the move towards a 24-7 society undermines this safety mechanism.

If sleepers have, or least seek to claim certain rights, however, they may equally find themselves subject to certain duties, not least the duty, expected by an employer, to get a good night’s sleep in order to be able to work, and the duty, demanded by a school, that a child is made to sleep. Networks of various kinds are involved here to. Others expect us to sleep properly. They observe and assess the extent to which we are ‘getting enough sleep’. And they may be in a position to impose sanctions if they believe that we are not getting sufficient sleep. We are expected to manage our sleep appropriately, fulfilling our own needs. At least we are as adults. As every parent knows, children have to be ‘put to bed’ and have their need for sleep regulated for them.

(iii) Gender, Sleep and the Life Course;

The doing of sleep varies according to gender and across the life course. Whilst sleeping consumes a large proportion of time in the early years of life, particularly in infancy and the pre-school years, the scope or potential for compromised sleep increases as we age. Moreover, sleep disruption is gendered. Empirical work by Hislop and Arber (2003), for example, suggests that women are ‘disadvantaged’ regarding their sleep rights, given a variety of family and caring roles across the life course, in conjunction with disturbances from their partners, particularly snoring men. The latter necessitates a variety of management strategies on women’s part, including relocation to another bedroom (see also Arber et al. 2007, Hislop 2007, Hislop and Arber 2006).
Other researchers have also begun to explore gender and sleep across the life course, focusing upon such issues as power, inequalities and resources within families (Pahl 2007), the dilemmas of sleep in circumstances of domestic violence (Lowe, Humphries and Williams 2007), and the social organisation and significance of sleep for people with dementia in contexts of care (Martin and Bartlett 2007).

Despite this important work we still know relatively little about the social patterning of sleep and sleep rights in relation to other factors such as class and ethnicity. We know enough, however, to suggest that sleep, like so many other embodied practices, is structured in part by wider patterns of social inequality.

(iv) Centuries/Cultures of Sleeping;

Practices of sleep are related to wider patterns of social organisation in other ways too. Elias (1978/1939), for example, in his historical account of the civilizing process, draws attention to the privatising of sleep and the ‘etiquette of the bedroom’ over the centuries in European society. Gradually, like other ‘animal’ or ‘natural’ bodily functions, sleep is removed behind the scenes of social life, sequestrated from view, having previously been a much more public, if not collective or communal affair, with daytime sleep a commonplace (see also Gleichman 1980).

Our sleeping patterns indeed have changed quite dramatically over time. Ekirch (2001), for instance, notes how a pattern of ‘segmented slumber’, or ‘first’ and ‘second’ sleep -- with a nocturnal interlude for quiet contemplation or other individual or collective activities -- was common in pre-industrial times: a pattern which was fundamentally altered, he argues, with the introduction of artificial light. This indeed, for Ekirch, signifies a ‘loss’ of sorts, compromising (through this valued nocturnal interlude) our ability to remain in touch with and share our dreams.

We find similar differences across cultures. Steger and Brunt (2003), for example, identify three main types of sleeping cultures: first, monophasic sleeping cultures (common in Northern European and North America) in which sleep is consolidated into one night time block; second, biphasic sleeping (common in Siesta cultures), in which midday napping is practised or valued; finally, polyphasic sleeping cultures,
(such as China, Japan and India) where naps are regularly taken as and when possible. Viewed from this perspective, napping itself provides a barometer or index of changing social, cultural and economic relations. In rapidly advancing countries such as China and India, for instance, napping is under threat for many workers given the pressures of economic growth. In advanced Western societies, in contrast, the workplace nap is increasingly valued or prized, not simply in safety critical occupations but in cognitive sectors of the economy as a ‘brain-boosting’ strategy for that much sought after ‘creative edge’ – see, for example, Baxter and Kroll Smith (2004/5). Questions of time and space, as this suggests, mesh closely with these issues, including the blurring of public/private time-space boundaries through the workplace nap (Baxter and Kroll-Smith 2004/5).

(v) The Politics of Sleep:

Here we arrive at a fifth, and for our purposes final, set of issues to do with the politics and ethics of sleep. Sleep, for example, is inextricably bound up with issues of work-time and work-ethics (Steger and Brunt 2003), particularly in the so-called 24/7 era of ‘fast’ capitalism (Agger 2004). There are signs, moreover, of a growing ‘politicization’ of sleep in contemporary society. Kroll-Smith and Gunter (2005), for instance, highlight the manner in which sleepiness, formerly viewed as a relatively benign state and promise of tranquil repose, is now being joined if not eclipsed by a new discourse or ‘truth’ in which sleep is viewed as an ‘at-risk’ state and a significant health and public safety issue. Viewed in this light, sleepiness becomes a culpable or reprehensible state requiring vigilance on our part, with moral and indeed legal parallels now increasingly drawn between drowsiness and drunkenness. The governance of sleepy bodies, in this respect, is another key feature of late/post modernity, tied to the politics of blame.

The medicalisation of sleep, at one and the same time, proceeds apace, with an expanding list of sleep disorders – from narcolepsy to obstructive sleep apnoea, restless leg syndrome to the newest of all, so called ‘shift work sleep disorder’ (SWSD) – and a growing list of drugs and other forms of intervention designed to monitor, manage or treat them. This includes drugs not simply to send us to sleep, but
potent new drugs such as Modafinil to keep us awake: a wakefulness promoting drug in which the boundaries between treatment and enhancement are likely to become increasingly blurred (see for example Williams et al. 2008, Wolpe 2002). Sleep, in this respect, is a contested biopolitical matter which, in one way or another, concerns us all qua sleeping as well as waking beings.

**Sleeping Bodies: Outline of Papers**

It is against this backdrop of growing interest in sleep related matters, both inside and outside the academy, that this special issue on ‘sleeping bodies’ is located. Each paper actively engages with one or more of the foregoing themes in an illuminating and productive fashion, which at one and the same time both demonstrates the importance of sleep for a Body & Society audience and pushes these agendas forward in significant new ways.

The opening paper by Crook, on norms, forms and beds, takes a valuable historical look at the spatialisation of sleeping bodies in Victorian Britain. Drawing on the writings of both Elias and Foucault, Crook shows how from the early modern period onwards, sleeping bodies were gradually accorded their own space, with the individualised bed, by the nineteenth century, viewed as an ‘essential ingredient’ of ‘civilised society’. These developments however, Crook argues, were not simply the product of ideas of privacy or civility, but also of concerns about the functioning of normal bodies and minds, the governmental agency of space and the moral integrity of the nuclear family. Beds moreover remained problematic, indeterminate spaces, in certain ranks of society society at least, facilitating all manner of perversions, phobias and pathologies. The history of sleep spaces, as such, sheds important new light on the making, integrity and problematisation of the modern body; a history not so much of problems solved or overcome, but of problems ‘redefined’, ‘redistributed’, or ‘refashioned’. Still today indeed, Crook concludes, the bedroom represents a space of ‘struggle’ wherein ‘civilisation battles its varied discontents.’

The next paper by Tahhan sheds further important light on the cultural nature of sleep and sleeping through an examination of intimacy, touch and the body in Japanese co-
sleeping rituals. Drawing upon her phenomenological study of how children are put to sleep in Japanese nurseries (in this particular case a day care centre hoikuen in North East Japan), Tahhan explores the processes through which co-sleeping (soine) becomes a manifestation of intimacy (‘skinship’) between teacher and child. In doing so, Tahhan’s clearly demonstrates how this attunement -- based on the mutual co-mingling of bodies and the reversibility of the flesh (cf. Merleau Ponty) -- is accomplished, taking us far beyond a Cartesian frame of reference to an all-encompassing sensuous embodied space between co-sleepers.

The third paper, by Lee, attempts to problematise notions such as ‘awake’, ‘asleep’, ‘adult’ and ‘child’ though an a-humanist account of persons. Explicitly taking up many of the problems and challenges that sleep poses for the social sciences and humanities -- particularly the problem of ‘agency’ and the question of whether or not to focus on sleep ‘itself’ or the social contexts of sleep (i.e. studies which stop at the threshold of sleep itself) -- Lee draws on recent work in childhood studies to offer an account of the person as a localised, temporary, emergent property of distributed interaction between heterogeneous elements, focusing in particular on the role of ‘transitional objects’ (cf. Winnicott) and ‘affects’. This version of the person, Lee argues, may help social researchers to make sense of both sides of the awake/asleep and adult/child thresholds. The particular contribution of this approach to the biopolitics of childhood and states of un/consciousness is also addressed toward the end of the paper. A focus on persons through this approach, Lee concludes, would help ensure the continuing relevance of the social sciences in a rapidly evolving biopolitical context where we can expect a good deal of attention to childhood and levels of (un)consciousness in the near future.

The next paper by Meadows and colleagues examines the gendered notion of ‘unruly’ bodies through a theoretically informed empirical study of couples’ sleep. Drawing on the work of Elias, Bourdieu and Goffman, they examine what Williams (2007b) has elsewhere termed the relationship between dormativity and normativity, with particular reference to issues of embarrassment in relation to couples’ sleeping behaviours. Bed partners’ feelings and accounts of embarrassment regarding ‘unruly’ sleep behaviours, from this perspective, offer a window onto the normativity or expectations which generate this embarrassment. Breaking or breaching normative
boundaries of (waking) acceptable/civilised behaviour, these authors show, appears to have potential biographical or public reputational impacts: a potential mediated by prior normative expectations, the length and status of the relationship and gender. Whilst sleeping bodies, in this respect, may behave in an ‘unruly’ fashion without fear of disapproval or embarrassment in waking life, women are more likely to experience embarrassment than men, even as relationships become routinised, given their continuing commitment or attachment to normative ideals of embodiment.

The fifth paper, by Wolf-Meyer, moves us from the home to the clinic -- where sleep is monitored, diagnosed and treated -- through an examination of sleep, signification and the ‘abstract body’ of biomedicine. Sleep, as Wolf-Meyer rightly notes, provides an ‘aperture’ through which to examine the mutually constitutive roles and conceptions of the body, modernity and biopolitics in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, particularly in North America where concerns regarding sleep have rapidly multiplied in recent years. Sleep, he argues, has become a ‘mobile object’ and a more ‘porous concept’, thereby enabling its insinuation into spheres of public life (school, family, workplace) which render it increasingly a ‘matter of concern’. Throughout these processes of ‘representation’, ‘problematisation’ and ‘network expansion’, the very concepts of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ or ‘pathological’ sleep are redefined, enrolling diverse populations in their remit through a proliferation of ‘sleep disorders’ and destabilising the very categories of the ‘normal’ and the ‘normative’. Sleep at the turn of twenty-first century, Wolf-Meyer concludes, could not possibly be ‘more political’.

Finally, the closing paper by Steinberg takes us into the world of science fiction as another window onto a possible future in which sleep may one day become not simply optional but obsolete: a relic of our dim and distant evolutionary past, shed through genetic engineering. Taking Kress’ ‘Beggars Trilogy’ as her subject matter, particularly the first novel ‘Beggars in Spain’, Steinberg argues that sleep stands at a nexus linking questions concerning bodies and regulation with questions concerning discourse and meaning. Kress’ novels, in this respect, may be read as a ‘thought experiment’ located at the intersection of two points of rupture and cultural contestations regarding the advent of genetic engineering and the prospect of a sleepless society. This in turn raises three key problematics which, Steinberg argues,
have profound contemporary relevance, namely embodied capital, the political economy of fast time, and paranoia and the human condition. Kress’ novels, in this respect, emerge as an allegory of both class and embodied transformations and of the imbrication of knowledge and desire; books which both anticipate and theorise the rise of neo-liberal values associated with work and bodies alongside trends toward a 24/7 society, and the transformations generated by a geneticisation of the social order. What we see in Kress’ novels is a powerfully ambivalent tale of both the late capitalist work ethic and its associated imperatives of bodily repudiation and transformation. Science-fiction in this respect, Steinberg concludes, is not simply of value as a site but also as a source of narrative social theory.

Taken together then, these papers provide a series of rich and novel insights into the social, cultural and historical significance and the (gendered) politics of sleep. Much remains to be done, nonetheless, in this newly emerging field of inquiry and it is to some of these issues that we turn in this final part of our introduction.

Future Agendas

On the conceptual and theoretical level there is clearly great scope for more work which focuses explicitly upon sleep, seeking to define it, unpack its various aspects and explore its significance for the social sciences and humanities, perhaps outlining avenues of possible empirical research. Much of the theoretical work on sleep, to date, consists of small and isolated fragments situated in the middle of reflections upon something other than sleep. We need to move beyond this point, as we have in relation to ‘the body’, to foreground sleep as an object of theoretical reflection in itself. Specifically we need to establish more clearly what we think sleep is and what aspects of it can be should be analysed further.

If sleep is to be more than a mere theoretical plaything, however, such theorisation must be matched by good empirical work which both informs and is informed by it. From the practices and rituals of sleep, to its distribution, impediments and their consequences, the empirical study of sleep within social science is very much in its infancy and we will not move forward with a sleep studies agenda without more studies and more data. Obvious areas for research include: extension of the sleep inequalities agenda to include social class and ethnicity; the negotiation of sleep
within households and neighbourhoods; the impacts on and of sleep in the emergent 24-7 society.

Getting data may call for *methodological innovation*, however. On one level it should be easy to study sleep. We all do it after all. On the other hand, however, our own sleep, as noted earlier, is to some extent inaccessible to us, since we cease to exist as conscious beings when we fall asleep, making us perhaps poor informants, and the sleep of others may prove difficult to access for ethical reasons pertaining to the vulnerability of the sleeper discussed above. Of course this depends, to some extent, upon whether we are interested in sleep or its trappings, including the effects of lack of sleep, rituals of going to sleep etc. And this, in turn, depends upon the abovementioned conceptual work which needs to be done, to pin down both sleep and its significance. Whether we seek to explore sleep or its trappings, however, *careful consideration must be given to the methods of accessing this most elusive of empirical objects.*

Finally, as with other scholarship on the body and society, there is a need for further explicitly *political analysis of sleep*, including what we have here referred to as the politics of sleep in contemporary society. From the gender politics of sleep within families and the governance or biopolitics of sleepy bodies in late or post modernity, to the use of sleep deprivation as an instrument of interrogation or torture, sleep is an important political matter, particularly in present context where sleep rights are themselves contested if not unravelling fast. This, moreover, includes the precarious sleep of those in famine-stricken, war-torn, disease-ridden parts of the world today, whose existence is reduced to little more than ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998). The ultimate grounding for this perhaps, in keeping with Turner’ (2003, 1992) writings on rights, may very well be the problem of bodily vulnerability, which in the case of sleep translates into a double vulnerability given the vulnerabilities which being asleep and going without sleep embody and engender (see, for example, Williams 2007).

Sleep then, to conclude, is a crucial yet challenging issue for scholars of the body to engage with and address. This special issue on ‘sleeping bodies’, as such, may be read
as both an illustration of and an invitation to the promise and potential which such scholarship holds.
REFERENCES


Biographical Information: Simon Williams is Professor of Sociology at the University of Warwick. He has published widely in the sociology of health, sociology of the body, and the sociology of emotions, including a recent (sole authored) book *Sleep and Society: Sociological Ventures into the (Un)Known* (2005, Routledge). His current research is focused on the social, political and ethical implications of developments in the neurosciences, with particular reference to (psycho)pharmaceuticals for the treatment/enhancement of sleep, memory, mood, emotions and cognition. He is also currently writing a book on *The Politics of Sleep* (Palgrave).