Original citation:
Taki, T. (2010). Reviewing its self image and redefining its role as a regional power: contemporary Japan and international population movement. [Coventry]: Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick. (Working paper no. 273)

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Redefining its self image and redefining its role as a regional power: Contemporary Japan and international population movement

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CSGR Working Paper 273/10
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
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Abstract

What sort of change in policy may be possible if a state reviewed its structural conditions and the significance of its own power with regard to other actors in international relations? This paper asks this question with regard to contemporary Japan’s policy towards an issue arising from the arrival of migrants in post-Cold War years, in particular whether to provide safety to migrants within the country. Japan used to be ‘a country without migration’ until the 1970s, but from the 1980s onwards has been in transition to be a key destination for international population movement (IPM). This paper surveys the literature on Japan’s international relations, examines theories of IPM, and describes the history of modern Japan focusing particular attention on its experiences of international migration. If Japan did not provide a safe environment for migrants, that would be questionable as being a differential form of treatment. What obstructs the provision of safety is a world view informed by an atomistic view of international relations and an understanding of history which is only focused on a limited time period. In contrast, what can contribute to reducing such a barrier will be a combination of natural law thinking, a relational view of international relations, an understanding of history with a time frame over several decades, and a recognition that current IPM is a reflection of Japan’s economic power in the neighbouring region.

Key Words

International migration, regionalization, globalization, Japan, migration policy
Introduction

How an actor of international relations conceives its external environment affects that actor’s identity, and eventually its actions. What sort of change may be possible, then, if an actor reviews its understanding of its structure, as well as the significance of its actions upon other actors? This paper asks this question with regard to policy to address issues arising from international migration in contemporary Japan. Japan demands analytical attention, because it is an industrialized country with a considerable influence in the world, and it is also in transition from being a country of non-migration to a destination country of migration. After almost 30 years since becoming a destination country for international migration, there is an increasing degree of recognition for the need for a migration policy in Japan. Against the above background, this paper pays particular attention to a state’s provision of safety – whether or not to include migrants as referents of the provision. ¹

There are four chapters in this paper. Chapter 1 accounts for the characteristics of international relations between Japan and East Asia in the modern era in order to provide an analytical background for the paper. It then examines the significance of IPM regarding the characteristics of the state. Chapter 2 conducts a review of theories put forward to explain IPM and examines whether there is one theory to explain IPM in accordance with a relational view of international relations. Chapter 3 presents a concise history of Japan and IPM since the late 19th century in order to examine to what extent it is plausible to consider IPM to Japan as an ‘irregular and unusual’ event in Japan’s international relations. Chapter 4 contemplates how Japan could change its actions towards migrants after having become a destination country.

The argument of this paper is as follows: an understanding of international relations maintained by an actor in a destination country will affect the way such an actor acts towards migrants. With an atomistic view of international relations and an understanding of history which only focuses on a limited period in time, the actor would consider IPM as an ‘irregular and unusual’ event in international relations, which could justify differential treatment of migrants. In contrast, it is possible to conceive of IPM from a viewpoint informed by a combination of natural law thinking, a relational view of international relations, an expanded understanding of history over several decades, and recognition that current IPM is a reflection of Japan’s economic power in the neighbouring region. From such a viewpoint, IPM will be considered as a ‘regular and usual’ event in international relations. This makes it more difficult for an actor in a destination country to give differential treatment to foreign nationals within that territory.

1. The Significance of International Population Movement to International Relations and the State

This paper considers the responses made by a destination country of IPM as one aspect of that country’s international relations, because such responses constitute an interaction with foreign nationals, even if the actions themselves might take place within the territory of the destination country. The responses of the destination country towards issues arising from IPM would often be considered as domestic politics. However, if the focus of analytical attention is switched from place to the counterpart of the response, this may be seen as an interaction between the destination country and foreign nationals who are considered to be migrants in the destination country.

   According to Ruggie (1998), International Relations theories may be classified into two groups, depending on the conception of the relation between interest and action. One of them
considers that the interests of an actor are given before it takes an action. It is possible to expect that such an actor aims to maximize the given interest. Focusing on the maximization of a given interest, Ruggie calls such theories of International Relations as ones of ‘neo-utilitarianism’, which can refer to neo-realism and neo-liberalism in a conventional sense. In contrast, it is also possible to consider that the identity of an actor affects what constitutes an interest to him/her. An actor would examine what can and should be her/his interest, before actually attempting to maximize it. Ruggie calls such a theoretical approach ‘constructivism’.

This article holds a constructivist viewpoint, and it considers that an actor of international relations may be able to redefine its interest in response to a change in international structure. A change in the actor’s identity may be followed by a change of interest for the actor, as well as actions taken by the actor (Ruggie 1998, Wendt 1999, Hay 2002, Yamada and Oyane 2006). Japan’s international relations can, to be sure, be discussed from a constructivist perspective. Hook et al. (2005) argue:

Japan’s international relations should be viewed as the product of a dialectical, or two-way, relationship between international structure and domestic agency, which determines the action of the latter in response to the former in the context of interest perceptions (pp. 44-5).

Some Key Characteristics of International Relations between Japan and East Asia

This section probes into some key characteristics of the international relations between contemporary Japan and East Asia. Since the beginning of the modern era, Japan has experienced three world orders, namely, Sino-centric, Imperial and the Cold War. Keeping this in mind, how can we characterize international relations between Japan and East Asia in the post-Cold War years? The following attempts to make such a characterization adapting arguments by Hook et al (2005).

A key characteristic of international relations in the post-Cold War years is that a new world order is being formed while regionalization and globalization are progressing in tandem. Regionalization refers to ‘a dynamic process leading to the formation of units of social interaction with at least some degree of geographical proximity and interdependence in the economic, political, or security dimensions’ (Hook et al 2005: 35). Hook et al go on to define globalization as:

a set of dynamic processes leading to the lowering of borders to all forms of interaction, which challenges the way people communicate, interact and do business with one another around the globe. It signals the fact that one state can no longer be isolated from others, and it heralds the interlinking of human relationships across space and time (pp. 36-7).

Globalization matters, because the significance of state borders since the modern era is decreasing in relative terms (though not totally disappearing). Scholte describes this as ‘the rise of transterritoriality’(Scholte 2005). Interconnections beyond space and time are often referred to as the result of the influence of globalization. This article, however, directs attention to ‘the fact that one state can no longer be isolated from others’, as quoted above. In addition to the material forces of globalization, it is also important to note that an understanding of actors in international relations and their ideas affect world politics (Hay 2002: 204; Scholte 2005).
In what ways, then, can regionalization and globalization affect international relations? The process of regionalization has considerably contributed to intensifying and formulating three core regions, namely Europe, North America and Asia, in the post-Cold War political economy (Hook et al. 2005: 35-6). Meanwhile, globalization has not only affected the capabilities of states operating within the international system but it also questions the ideas that are premised as the constitution of the state. These are the reasons why we need to pay attention to the influences of globalization (Hook et al. 2005: 37).

It has been confirmed that regionalization and globalization are contributing to the formulation of a new world order in a post-Cold War world. How, then, is regionalization in East Asia – where Japan is located – in progress? Regionalization in East Asia has been led by various states since the 1960s, in particular the member states of ASEAN. Regionalization in East Asia is known to be ‘unofficial’ compared with that of Europe and North America because of a relatively low degree of institutionalization (Hook et al. 2005: 36). Having said this, throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War periods Japan has promoted the consolidation of East Asia as a political unit and encouraged economic concentration and integration between Japan and East Asia, as well as among countries within the region (Hook et al. 2005: 36). Measures taken to achieve these aims include the Japanese government’s ODA provided to countries in East Asia for more than 40 years, and foreign direct investment and trade by private companies. Japan has directed a considerable part of its economic influence towards East Asia. In 2003, more than half of Japan’s ODA, 17% of FDI and 44% of its entire trade were carried out with countries in East Asia (Hook et al. 2005: 17).

Japan is the largest provider of ODA to East Asia (Hook et al. 2005: 17). According to Hook et al. (2005), Japan’s Ministry of Economy and Industry considers ODA as ‘a means to enhance the vertical integration of the economies of the region into Japan’s own economy in order to establish a regional division of labour’ (p. 231). Owing to the government’s provision of ODA, Japan’s multinational corporations have been able to establish technical and production linkages among East Asian countries, as well as between Japan and East Asia (Hook et al. 2005: 231). Foreign direct investments by Japanese companies have performed a role similar to ODA in enhancing the integration of the economies of East Asian countries. During the post-WWII years, there were four peaks in Japanese firms’ foreign direct investment in East Asia: (1) from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, (2) from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, (3) in the late 1980s, and (4) in the early 1990s (Hook et al. 2005: 231-2).

From the 1990s onwards, Japan has been a major trade partner for East Asian countries importing large amounts of industrial products (Hook et al. 2005: 233). Hence Japan stands in a predominant economic position in relation to East Asia through the formation of a complex network of manufacturing production systems and trade (Hook et al. 2005: 17). Furthermore, since the beginning of the 21st century Japan has been in negotiation with several countries to conclude FTAs, with an aim to strengthen industrial integration between Japan and ASEAN countries (Hook et al. 2005: 245).

This section has demonstrated that Japan’s ODA, foreign direct investment and trade contribute to economic integration between Japan and East Asia. To illustrate this, the increase in foreign direct investment and trade are shown in Figures 1-A, 1-B, 2-A and 2-B.
Figure 1-A  Japan’s Trade 1950-2003
(Compiled by author based on Hook et al. 2005:530-45)

Figure 1-B  Japan’s Trade with East Asia 1950-2003
(Compiled by author based on Hook et al. 2005:530-45)
Figure 2-A Japan’s Foreign Direct Investment 1965-2003
(Compiled by author based on Hook et al. 2005:530-45)

Figure 2-B Japan’s Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia 1965-2003
(Compiled by author based on Hook et al 2005:530-45)
The extent of Japan’s economic influence described above has not been a coincidence but was the result of intentional decisions made by Japan’s policy agents. In this connection, Hook et al. (2005) argue that Japan has been able not only to reunite itself with East Asia but also to reformulate the East Asian region largely in accordance with Japan’s own image; as a result, Japan has contributed to the potential making of an East Asian cooperative region (Hook et al. 2005: 248). In other words, Japan (to be more precise Japan’s policy agents in charge of the country’s foreign policy) has consciously constructed interdependent relations with East Asia.

The Significance of International Population Movement to the State

This section considers the following three issues: (1) the influence of international population movement (IPM) on characteristics of the state; (2) the influence of IPM on the concept of international relations held by a destination country for IPM; and, (3) how a destination country might change its actions following a review of the concept of international relations.

This paper focuses on IPM because it can modify the characteristics of states. Two Japanese sociologists, Momose and Ogura (1992a), upon examining labour migration’s impact on Japan write that labour migration is a manifestation of international population movement 3) which ‘urges a transformation of the “nation state”’ (p. i). Similarly, Koido (2002), researcher in international sociology, argues that the spread of labour migration ‘shakes up the framework of the nation state most considerably compared with other various trans-border processes, and directly presses for transformation of social structure’ (p. 31).

According to legal definition, the three constituent factors of the state are sovereignty, territory and nation (1933 Convention on Rights and Duties of States). However, in order to consider the influence of IPM on society and the state, the use of the terms ‘territory’ and ‘nation’ may obstruct a dynamic understanding of the influence of international relations on IPM, and vice versa. Therefore, this article uses the terms ‘area’ instead of territory, and ‘constituent population’ instead of nation. In other words, this article considers the state as being made up of sovereignty, area and constituent population. This modification intends to make it more possible for analysts to think in terms which are not restrained by values and/or assumptions that are attached to nationalistic thinking. How, then, can IPM force us to reconsider existing assumptions about the state? With regard to the influence of IPM on contemporary Japan, the following points have been made by various scholars.

A first aspect is to gain an understanding of the areas where economic activities take place. Ogura (2002), an international sociologist based in Japan, considers that labour migration shows us ‘that the labour market is being internationalized, and no longer concealed within a country’ (p. 13). It is therefore evident, Ogura continues, that ‘to consider economic development within the framework of national economies’ (p. 13) has limited explanatory power. Behind Ogura’s argument exists his understanding that ever since the slave trade, transborder population movements have always been connected inseparably with economic development and/or stagnation of inter-related regions. For the society of origin, transborder population movements meant the transfer of an economic burden emerged within the process of economic development; and for the destination society the movements have meant the acquisition of a new labour force. Koido (2002) makes a similar point by saying that two transborder movements, namely that of production and labour, are concerned with IPM (p. 31).

Second, with regard to constituent population, only a limited number of states can meet the assumption that the constituent population of a modern state is equal to the nation, and the nation is made of one ethnic group. 4) The existence of and increases in IPM ‘reveals the
fictitious character of the nation state, and deepens the crisis of the “one state, one ethnic group” myth (Ogura 1996: 81). Momose (1992) also writes that issues relating to labour migrants can create a space where the notion of a multi-ethnic state might be understood as common sense in international relations (p. 219).

How, then, may the concept of international relations be reviewed? In what ways can such a review affect the actors in a destination country for IPM? The key to answering these questions lies in how we evaluate an atomistic view of international relations. A widely accepted understanding of international relations holds that it concerns the relations between sovereign states, and each state is the smallest unit of analysis. This paper calls such an understanding an atomistic view of international relations. However, it is becoming increasingly known that this atomistic view does not necessarily fit the reality of international relations, and there are occasions where it is inappropriate to respond to developments in international relations based on such an understanding (Momose 1992: 217). To discuss the response of a state as a migrant destination is exactly a case in point.

It was claimed in the previous section that the understanding of globalization held by an actor in international relations and their ensuing actions can affect world politics (Scholte 2005; Hay 2002). In the case of contemporary Japan, the need to accept labour migrants has received increasing attention since the late 1980s. Momose claims that this increasing attention has compelled Japan as a destination country to ‘review its understanding of international relations’ (1992: p. 214). Whether to understand international relations from an atomistic or a relational view can make a difference in the actions of the destination. This is explained below.

First, from an atomistic view of international relations, the population that constitute a state may be characterized as follows:

a. A state will be symbolized as an entity surrounded by a hard shell such as a ‘billiard ball.’

b. A state border could block all international flows trying to enter the state. At the same time, it would also be difficult to imagine that the influence of one’s own country could cross the border to reach other states.

c. Consequently, international population movement as an international force may be understood as an ‘irregular and unusual’ flow in international relations. To put this in another way, the constituent population of a state – to whom the state is responsible – may be considered as made up only of nationals who are legally confirmed as such. This understanding becomes possible with the assumption that the border blocks (or is supposed to do so) international flows coming into the state.

Even a quick review of the process of modern state making will reveal that the relation between territory and constituent population on one hand, and the border on the other, has been a two-way interaction: while there were cases where the former influenced the latter, there were also other cases where the latter influenced the former (Momose 1993: 85-102). It is not unusual, however, that such interdependent relations between the two are forgotten. When the constituent population of a state was characterized at point ‘c’ above, the state of a destination of IPM could easily justify the differential treatment of migrants compared to nationals (cf. Hall 1998).

An alternative understanding of international relations is possible; one which incorporates a viewpoint of political economy and is more dynamic and ‘realistic.’

a. This perspective tries to understand international relations from a relational viewpoint, which pays attention to mutual relations among actors (Ruggie 1986).

b. State boundaries do certainly exist, and in many cases they can operate as
the state wishes them to. However, there are flows that permeate the boundaries both from outside and within (Cox 1996; Scholte 1997).

c. With the above two assumptions, IPM may be considered as a flow that exists in international relations quite often and ‘regularly’ (even if relatively less often compared with other flows in international relations). (Why an understanding like this is possible will be explained in Chapter 2).

Consequently, from the above understanding of international relations (as well as that of the state and/or border) the constituent population of a state – most of whom are nationals whose status is confirmed by law – should be able to include temporary migrants as well.

A comparison of these two views of international relations suggests that the atomistic view may have been more plausible during the Cold War years because it considers international relations in a static manner. In contrast, the relational view grasps international relations in a more dynamic manner and may have more explanatory power when discussing contemporary international relations affected by regionalization and globalization.

The first section of this chapter explored the characteristics of contemporary international relations between Japan and East Asia. It was claimed that the concentration and integration of the economy between Japan and East Asia has progressed simultaneously with regionalization and globalization. In other words, Japan and East Asia have become a potential unit of regionalization. The section has also shown that Japan has been actively involved in the regional integration of East Asia. The second section clarified the following three points: (1) out of three characteristics of the state, IPM can affect areas where economic activities take place and the constituent population of a state for whom the state is supposed to be responsible; (2) while the destination country of IPM can maintain an atomistic view of international relations, it can also hold a relational view as an alternative; and, (3) from an atomistic view of international relations, the constituent population of a state may be considered to be made up only of nationals who are legally confirmed as such; however, from a relational view, the constituent population could include both nationals and temporary migrants staying in the territory.

2. Theories of International Population Movement

The previous chapter has shown that international population movement (IPM) poses a question about territory and constituent population, both of which are foundations of a state. IPM is thus a force of globalization for the destination country of population movement. This chapter intends to show that IPM reflects a destination country’s actions in international relations, though there is a time lag between such actions and the generation of population movements. For the destination country, IPM may appear as a force of globalization; however, there can be cases where in earlier times the same country had been a force of globalization on other countries, in particular to origin countries of IPM. There are two tasks in this chapter. The first is to review five theoretical approaches to explain IPM in order to demonstrate that different explanations can lead to different understandings of IPM as a flow of international relations. The second task is to focus on World-system approach in order to examine how the relation between origin and destination countries of IPM can be explained. It will be shown that a transformation in the periphery (agricultural area) in the world economy, which follows the permeation of capitalist economies into such areas, constitutes a key to IPM.

Five theoretical approaches to explain IPM

According to Kono (2006), a Japanese researcher in population studies, attention to various factors is required to explain IPM in a plausible manner. It is a common practice to explain
IPM in terms of push factors that exist in a migrant origin society, pull factors in the destination society, and economic factors that emerge in the network that mediates push and pull factors. In addition to these three factors, social and political factors are also important.

There are five major approaches to explain IPM. They are: (1) Neoclassical economics, (2) New economics of migration, (3) Dual labour market theory, (4) World-system theory, and (5) Network theory. The basic arguments of these theories are shown below, following the review conducted by Kono (2006: 13-21). All of these five approaches are valid, and based on a particular case in question an individual analyst can decide which theoretical approach may be employed and to what degree.

Neoclassical economics and New economics of migration are decision making theories based on micro-level economic rationalism. Proponents of these approaches would argue that people migrate when they can expect that their standard of living could improve, based on a calculation between any benefit that can be gained and the cost of migration. According to the former approach individuals make such decisions, but according to the latter, a migrant makes the decision in order to maximize benefits when her/his family members are taken into consideration.

These two approaches consider IPM in terms of the relation between pull factors in industrialized countries and push factors in developing countries. In contrast, according to Dual labour market theory, IPM is caused by the effect of pull factors in a destination country where there is a dual structure in the labour market. In other words, workers in the destination country engage in jobs that are considered to be within the upper half of the dual structure of the labour market, and avoid jobs in the lower half of the structure (the so-called ‘3D’ jobs; ones that are difficult, dirty and dangerous). Migrant workers arrive – some legally and others illegally – in order to meet such a demand.

The next approach is that of World-system theory. Proponents of this approach would consider that IPM is generated because of a structural transformation in a political economy which follows an expansion of the global market economy. Hypotheses put forward from this approach include the following:

a. IPM from developing countries to industrialized countries is an inevitable result of the formation of capitalist markets in the former countries.

b. Capital and products flow into the periphery (explained below) with permeation of economic globalization into the peripheral area. Population moves in a reverse direction.

c. IPM often takes place between countries that were former colonies and colonial masters. This is because a common basis – in cultural, linguistic and administrative terms – has been established between the two countries. Such a common basis is less likely to exist with countries that were not colonies in the past.

The final approach to be explained is Network theory. The network refers to a network of migration in which information exchange takes place between those who have already experienced IPM and/or those who are already resident in a foreign country (destination of migration) on one hand, and people living in a origin country and considering migration on the other. People who plan to migrate internationally can obtain information thorough this network which can make the conditions of their migration more favourable. From this perspective, it is possible to consider that the number of those who migrate will increase as a result of repeated interactions between the circulation of information and the occurrence of migration which contributes to the actual IPM.

In addition to these factors the migration policy of the destination country affects the flow of IPM (Kuwahara 1991: 108-9). The increase in the number of Japanese descendents’ migration from South America to Japan in the 1990s following a change in Japan’s policy is a
conspicuous example. In addition, cultural similarities between origin and destination countries could affect the flow of IPM. Kikuchi (1992) reports that migration from the Philippines to English speaking countries increased after 1974; this is explained in part by the Philippine government’s policy to promote international migration, but also by the cultural factor of a large number of English speakers which made the country more competitive than others.

**World-system approach**

Except for World-system theory, the approaches discussed above assume as given that a legal boundary exists between origin and destination countries. In contrast, it is possible to consider from World-system theory perspective that population movements within a country and the movements between two countries as qualitatively similar and that these two movements constitute a continuous process. With this understanding, legal boundaries between origin and destination countries of IPM may be treated in relative terms. It is for this reason that this paper pays particular attention to World-system theory approach. Whereas the other four theories conceive international relations from an atomistic viewpoint (billiard ball image), World-system theory is suitable to understand IPM from a relational understanding of international relations (non-billiard ball image). To support the above claim, this section first demonstrates how labour movements (population movements) are generated, and then shows what differences there are between domestic and international population movements.

When labour or population movements take place, the ‘periphery’ tends to be an area where the mobility originates and the ‘core’ tends to be the destination (Morita 1987: 6; Kawano 2006: 21; Kobayashi 2006: 244). The core refers to a place where economic development is proceeding actively, whereas the periphery refers to a place beyond the centre of such economic development (Wallerstein 1997). Economic development in the periphery, namely rural areas, will transform economic and social structures of such an area, thereby laying the ground for population movements.  

Flows from the centre to rural areas, such as those of commodity, capital, technology, productive input, culture of consumption, forms of living, shake up considerably conventional structures of production and living that used to be based on a subsistence economy. The consequences of the transformation include: (1) working away from home in order to obtain a cash income to make up for family living, (2) leaving the rural area after losing land to cultivate, and (3) the emergence of surplus labour with increases in productivity in agriculture (Morita 1987: 11).

It has to be noted that the transformation of the economic and social structure in a rural area alone does not necessarily generate population movements. Income differences, family relations, migration networks, law and culture also matter.

What is the significance of the international relations of a destination country to the process of international population movement? A key to answer this question is to consider that in some cases of population movement, state boundaries ‘happen to exist’ between the origin and destination of the movement. In other words, this paper finds a qualitative similarity between population movements taking place within a country on one hand, and those taking place between countries on the other. The international mobility of capital provides a condition under which international population movements become possible despite distance and legal boundaries.  

Sassen (1992) argues that the internationalization of production affects the internationalization of labour; and it is the international mobility of capital that makes the internationalization of production possible (pp. 43-4). It has already been shown that the
conditions for domestic population movements can be generated as a result of the transformation of a rural area following economic development. Some (but not all) of those who have experienced domestic population movements migrate again to destinations in foreign countries (namely, international migrants) (Figure 3).

At the same time, capital – which makes economic development possible – may be obtained within or from outside a country (Iyotani 2001: 28-9). When there is an export–import relation of capital between two countries, the following interconnection may be formed between origin and destination countries of international population movements (Figure 4).

As Iyotani (2001) claims, the above argument demonstrates that IPM is not generated solely out of conditions in either an origin or a destination country, but is a result of relations between the two countries (pp. 28-9). Kimae (1992) supports this position by stating that ‘the internationalization of labour, which takes the form of labour migration, is often intertwined with the internationalization of capital’ (p. 42). Kimae includes both an expansion of trade and foreign direct investment and subsequent international production as the ‘internationalization of capital’ (p. 59). The implications of this will be discussed below.

It has to be noted that what Sassen argues is not a direct and linear relation between foreign direct investment and international migration, but that it is difficult to deny the
relation between the two. Attention should also be paid to Koido’s point (2002) that Sassen’s theory indicates ‘a possibility where foreign investment does not necessarily reduce or contain labour migration; rather, the investment can expand the migration contrary to the intention of the investing country’ (pp. 43-4).

The discussion so far can be consolidated as follows. World-system theory puts both the centre and periphery in world economy within one context to explain IPM. Morita (1987) characterizes international labour mobility as ‘worldwide flows of labour originating in agricultural areas in the Third World that arrive in large cities in the centre, with multiple layers of stratifications within the process’ (p. 6). Iyotani (2001) also understands international labour migration as ‘part of a worldwide relocation of labour, or international division of labour’ (p. 79). Similar arguments are put forward by Kimae (1992: 39-40) and Momose and Ogura (1992b: 5). It is with this understanding that we can characterize international capital mobility as a driving force – indirect but unable to be disregarded – of international population movements.

Based on the discussion so far, it is now possible to understand IPM not as an external force with which the destination country has no connection but as a force of globalization which the migrant country has something to do with. By exporting capital, a country in the core exerts its economic influence over another country in the periphery that imports the capital. While such an economic influence from the core to the periphery is itself a force of globalization, IPM from the periphery to the core is itself both a reflection and force of globalization. Kuwahara (1999), a Japanese economist who has studied labour migration to Japan, has rightly said that issues relating to migrant workers in contemporary Japan have resulted ‘out of the activities of Japanese capital following the expansion of the Japanese economy, or are issues of Japan’s own making’ (pp. 189-90).

This chapter has considered different theories of IPM, with particular attention paid to World-system theory, and has found the following points. First, there are five theoretical approaches to explain IPM. Four of those approaches assume as given the existence of legal boundaries within the process of IPM. In contrast, the World-system theory discusses IPM without assuming the existence of legal boundaries between origin and destination countries. In other words, it is possible to treat state boundaries in relative terms for analytical purposes. What is common between domestic and international population movements is the mechanism that generates the movement. Differences exist between the two types of population movements including the distance between the origin and destination of population movements, and whether legal boundaries exist between those two locations. Second, this chapter pointed out that the international mobility of capital (capital export) is an economic factor that can facilitate conditions for IPM despite distance and state boundaries. Consequently, IPM occurs as a result of the creation of connections between origin and destination countries for population movement. IPM is, therefore, not an unusual force but one whose existence is usual and ordinary for international relations.

3. Japan in the Modern Era and International Population Movement

The previous chapter has argued that IPM may be understood as a reflection of the interconnections created between origin and destination countries for population movements. Can such a characterization be applicable to the IPM that Japan has experienced in the modern era? With this question in mind, a brief review will be conducted in Chapter 3 to identify attributes of IPM that are concerned with Japan after the country’s entry into modern international society. Those years are divided into three periods that reflect structural changes that occurred to Japan’s international relations: from the late 19th century to 1945, from 1945 to the 1970s, and from the 1980s onwards. Developments since the 1970s in Thailand’s rural
areas will also be reported in this brief review in order to suggest that economic relations between Japan and East Asia generated interconnections which serve as a condition for IPM.

**From the late 19th century to 1945**

After the establishment of the Meiji state in 1868, Japan accepted foreign nationals from the West and China to assist state building, as legal or technical instructors and workers, respectively (Mori 1986: 198-9). In the meantime, emigration from Japan to Asia started in 1876 (Takasaki 1993a: vii). In the first half of the 20th century Japan experienced both immigration and emigration that was similar to its experience in the late 19th century. Emigration had been conducted as a deliberate state policy (Yorimitsu 2006: 236-7). Tanaka (1995) gives the following overview of emigration from Japan between the late 19th century and 1945: the first major destination for the Japanese since 1868 had been North America. From the beginning of the 20th century, emigration to Central and South America, as well as to South East Asia, began. It was around this point when the presence of an increasing number of Japanese migrants was seen as a diplomatic issue between Japan and the US. After the enactment of anti-Japanese immigration laws in 1924, emigration to North America decreased considerably, though it was not entirely terminated. As a result of the decline in number of emigrants to North America after 1925, Central and South America and South East Asia became key destinations for Japanese emigrants. Emigration to Manchuria began in 1932, and after 1942 Manchuria became the only destination for Japanese emigrants (pp. 206-212). By the end of the Second World War in 1945, the number of Japanese living abroad in Korea, China, Sakhalin, Taiwan, the Micronesian islands and South East Asia amounted to 3.5 million (excluding military personnel) (Takasaki 1993a: v).

Another important characteristic of Japan’s experience of IPM is the reception of migrants from the Korean peninsula (Mori 1986: 199-201). Pull factors for this population movement include the economic boom after the Russo-Japanese War (Tsuruzono 2006: 202; Iyotani 2001: 183), and a labour shortage in Japan’s domestic industries during the Asia-Pacific War. One push factor was the transformation in rural areas that followed Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910. The increase in rice exports to Japan exacerbated poor landlord-tenant relations and contributed to the disintegration of farming communities. Consequently tenants from rural areas moved to cities to become odd-job workers or became unemployed. The emigration of Japanese workers to Korea began after the annexation, though their number was not considerable and did not serve as a push factor for Korean emigration to Japan (Tsuruzono 2006: 197). In 1944, Japan conducted ‘forced labour migration’ of Koreans and Chinese (Mori 1986: 199201). The number of Koreans who were living in Japan in 1945 was more than two million (Takasaki 1993a: v; Tsuruzono 2006: 202).

After being defeated in the Asia-Pacific War, Japan experienced a large scale international population movement. Approximately 3.5 million Japanese were repatriated from foreign countries (Takasaki 1993a: xiv) including almost all the 700,000 Japanese who used to live in the Korean peninsula (Tsuruzono 2006: 204). Of the two million Koreans who were in Japan at the end of the war, 1.4 million (pp. 212) left to return to Korea; most of whom had been forced to migrate to Japan during the war (Tsuruzono 2006: 204).

Japan in the late 19th century was a country of emigration. In the first half of the 20th century, Japan continued to send migrants abroad but at the same time it accepted IPM as a consequence of the annexation of Korea and Taiwan. Having annexed a country that had a history distinct from Japan, as well as a part of another country, Japan at the time became ‘without doubt, a multi-ethnic country’, when seen from outside (Momose 1992: 229; see also Oguma 1995). However, Oguma (1998) is right to draw our attention to the following point: Japan in the first half of the 20th century may indeed be characterized as a ‘multi-ethnic
country’ but this does not necessarily mean that Japan’s government and private actors at the time conceived of their country as such, and managed (if at all) ethnic relations.

**From 1945 to the 1970s**

In contrast to its experience in the first half of the century, the size of IPM that Japan experienced in the post-war years was much more limited; from the 1950s to the late 1970s in particular, there was virtually no large scale arrival of foreigners to Japan (Yamanaka 2004: 478; Suzuki 2006: 189). Does this mean that Japan at this period in time had really nothing to do with IPM? It is certainly a fact that population movements across Japan’s state boundaries did not occur. However, with the benefit of hindsight, this paper speculates that even after the 1950s, actions that would result in IPM had been accumulating, as if streams of underground water kept running. During the period from 1945 to the 1970s, the extent of IPM which Japan experienced was limited, but as will be shown below this fact was itself affected by international structures at the time; in addition, it was also, at least partially, a result of Japan’s own policy decisions made under such structural conditions.

Emigration from Japan re-started after the war, with destinations being North and South America. However, emigration ceased by the early 1960s because economic reconstruction in Japan’s domestic society solved the ‘surplus labour issue’ (explained below) and the number of emigration applicants declined (Yorimitsu 2006: 236-7; Suzuki 2006: 189). As for immigration, post-war Japan was placed in a situation where it was difficult to accept immigrants, for at least two reasons. The first was the effect of Japan’s international environment, and the second was the effect of Japan’s own policy.

Accepting foreign workers from Korea, China or Southeast Asia was technically difficult for Japan for the following reasons which arose out of Japan’s international structure from 1945 to the 1970s: negotiations to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea began in 1951 but normalization was achieved only in 1965. Due to the influence of the Cold War, official relations with People’s Republic of China were not possible until 1972. Japan managed to restore relations with countries in Southeast Asia earlier than South Korea and China (Iokibe (ed.) 1999); but physical and technical conditions that enable migration (the economic conditions in each country as well as access to international transport) were insufficient.

The second factor that limited immigration to post-war Japan is inter-related with the first. Japan’s immigration control policy at the time limited labour migration from the Korean peninsular. At the beginning, the primary goal of Japan’s post-war immigration policy was to prevent the unauthorized entry of Koreans. This was because the Japanese government at the time conceived of the 500,000 Koreans residing in Japan since before or during the war as a threat to domestic security (Yamanaka 2004: 477-8). This policy was continued when the Immigration Control Agency was established in 1950 following the outbreak of the Korean War (Suzuki 2006: 189).

As demonstrated above, Japan in the 1950s was unable to receive foreign workers due to international conditions and to the policy of the government. In the late 1960s, shortages in the domestic workforce became evident, but the government decided in 1967 against accepting foreign workers; this policy was continued up to 1976 (Suzuki 2006: 189). Consequently, the post-war reconstruction of Japan’s domestic economy appeared to have been carried out – from the eyes of mainstream Japanese – only by Japanese nationals.

Why was Japan’s post-war economic growth possible without accepting foreign workers? According to Mori (1986), a Japanese economist, it was because sources of labour required for heavy industrialization existed within Japan (p. 202). The number of workers supplied from rural areas to industrial/urban areas between 1950 and 1970 is estimated at somewhere between eight to ten million (Morita 1987: 11; Iyotani 2001: 194). As a
consequence, the ratio of employees in Japan’s primary sector which accounted for 48% in 1950 declined to 10% in 1980 (Morita 1987: 11).

Furthermore, in addition to dependence on domestic workers in quantitative terms, measures for the efficient use of labour were also implemented. According to Iyotani (1992), at least three ways to make the most effective utilization of labour were behind Japan’s post-war economic growth. The first was successful improvements in labour productivity through technical innovations (in comparison to Japanese standard in the 1960s). The second was the availability of long working hours from regular workers, and of women and aged workers who often worked on a part-time basis. The third was the retention of flexibility in the labour market, which was possible because of intra-company transfers, domestic labour mobility following industrial restructuring, and large firms’ hiring of temporary workers. These resulted in transferring labour shortages to small and medium-sized companies (p. 105).

It is certainly a fact that, unlike West European countries, Japan did not accept foreign workers during the process of economic restructuring after the Second World War. Nevertheless, this does not imply that post-war Japan was not in need of an additional workforce. As demonstrated in this section, labour was supplied by large scale domestic population movements from rural to urban areas, and various measures were implemented to increase labour productivity. Therefore, as Morita (1987) states, Japan’s post-war economic reconstruction process was different from that of West European countries in the sense that Japan was able to do the task without relying on foreign workers. However, Japan was the same as Western Europe in another sense, namely, it required a supply of additional labour from the periphery (pp. 11-2). As such, post-war Japan was not ‘an exception’, at least in this respect. 15)
Rural areas in Thailand from the 1970s
The previous section has shown that during the period from 1945 to the late 1970s, Japan found it difficult to accept foreign workers from neighbouring areas due to factors arising from international structures at the time. In different parts of Asia, however, conditions were in preparation for international population movements to Japan. For example, a Japanese economist Hirakawa (1987) argues that conditions for domestic population movements were prepared in Thailand in the latter half of the 20th century, due to the permeation of the capitalist economy into, and the subsequent transformation of, rural areas. Hirakawa empirically demonstrates such a process with the use of official statistics compiled in Thailand. A brief summary of his study follows.

In Thailand, population movements from rural areas to Bangkok have taken place since the 1970s. The ratio of Bangkok’s population to all cities in Thailand was 45% in 1947; the figure increased considerably to 55% in 1970, and to 62% in 1980 (Hirakawa 1987: 309). Hirakawa elucidates that such a change in the distribution of population within Thailand was because of two factors: (1) a transformation of the modes of production and living and of social structure which followed industrialization in the country after the 1960s, and the ensuing permeation of a monetary and commodity economy; and, (2) labour mobility from rural areas to Bangkok as a response to the above disintegration of rural society.

Progress in agricultural technology was considerable in central Thailand in the 1970s. Such progress included raising two rice crops a year, replacing water buffalos with tractors to plough fields, introducing new products to grow during the dry season, and introducing chemical fertilizer. With these technologies, ‘the exchange of communal work which was indispensable for rice cultivation disappeared entirely and was replaced by waged labour... Agricultural technologies, forms of management and social relations, have all been converted considerably, while affecting one another, in a short period of time’ (Hirakawa 1987: 320-1).

Rural areas in Thailand in the 1970s were ‘integrated into the monetary economy both in terms of production and consumption; and simultaneously coupled closely with multinational corporations and the world economy’ (Hirakawa 1987: 322-3). Multinational corporations in this context refer to agribusinesses which include Japanese trading companies and joint ventures. The impact of such integration is evident in the following: the average expenses of farming families in central Thailand trebled between the beginning and the end of the 1970s; expenses for fertilizer and insecticide increased five times; and, wages and transportation/fuel expenses – which did not exist before – took up approximately 40% of entire expenses. These data reveal that agricultural society in central Thailand had ‘been transformed rapidly into an industrial product market, and the form of labour has been in transition from the traditional one to waged labour; as a result of these, the need for cash expense has increased’ (Hirakawa 1987: 322). Under such conditions, landless farmers – being unable to benefit from agricultural area development projects implemented by the government – began to work as tenant farmers, or to engage in non-agricultural work to receive a wage (Hirakawa 1987: 323-8).

In consideration of these changes, Hirakawa argues that ‘transformation in Thai agricultural society and disintegration of farms generated dependence upon non-agricultural labour; and there is sufficient reason to assume that all of these developments lie behind labour mobility between rural and urban areas’ (Hirakawa 1987: 328). Migration from rural areas to Bangkok is not necessarily a short-term and linear process but takes some time. A Thai government survey on the process of farmers’ departure from rural areas, conducted with heads of villages in central Thailand, has found that there are two stages in farmers’ migration to Bangkok. During the first stage, farmers go to Bangkok to work for a limited period of time during the agricultural off-season, and they repeat such visits over some years; then, in the second stage, some of the farmers who have been to Bangkok beforehand
eventually leave the rural area for good to migrate to the capital. Those farmers are the ones who have sound prospects of earning a stable income, having acquired skills out of the repeated short-term migrations to Bangkok in the first stage (Hirakawa 1987: 329-30).

Discussion in this section so far has shown that transformations in rural society – which followed the permeation of a monetary and commodity economy within the industrialization process – formed conditions for domestic population movements within Thailand. This permeation into agricultural areas implies that Thailand’s rural area has been interconnected with multinational corporations and the world market. These multinational corporations include Japan’s trading companies and joint ventures. Therefore, as far as the cases reported by Hirakawa are concerned, the Japanese actors contributed, if not intentionally, to making the conditions for international population movements between Thailand and Japan. It is not only private companies but also Japan’s government that has created conditions for IPM. For example, in the late 1970s, the Japanese government increased, compared to the preceding years, the amount of its ODA to the Thai government with the aim of solving problems relating to the civil war in neighbouring Cambodia (Hook et al. 2005: 252).

Not all migrants from rural areas to Bangkok continued their moves to a foreign country, nevertheless the existence of domestic population movement created the conditions for international mobility, as shown below. In the 1960s, Thailand experienced a ‘brain drain’ (particularly of engineers and doctors) to the United States. From around 1973, labour migration to Europe began; and from around 1975, after the oil crisis, migration to the Middle East began. After 1982 when the economic boom in the Middle East was over, migration to Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei began. In 1987, 300,000 Thais were estimated to be working in foreign countries with 230,000 of them in the Middle East (Kuwahara 1991: 108-9).

The internationalization of an economy primes labour migration. Sassen (1999) considers that the internationalization of the Japanese economy since the 1970s served to connect Japan and potential migrant origin countries (pp. 156-7); Tsuda and Cornelius (2004) make a similar point (p. 447). The findings in this section show that it is possible to understand the developments in international population movements that post-war Japan experienced (shown in Figures 5 and 6) as a reflection of the increase of Japan’s economic influence towards neighbouring countries – though it is unlikely that those who exercised such economic influence were aware of these consequences.
Figure 5  Foreign Nationals’ Entries in Japan and Residential Registrations 1955-2006 (Persons)  
(Source: Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice 2007: 3, 20)

Figure 6  Foreign Nationals’ Entries by Region 1983-2005 (Persons)  
Japan after the 1980s

In contrast to the previous period, migrants were evidently present in Japan after the 1980s. However, Japan’s social conditions surrounding migrants changed during this period. Suzuki (2006), a researcher on Japan’s immigration, refers to two debates in Japan since the 1980s over migration policy options. The first period of debate covers the late 1970s to the early 1990s. Refugees from Indochina and women workers from Southeast Asia began to arrive in Japan by the late 1970s. However, the presence of these foreign workers in Japan drew the mass media’s attention only in the late 1980s when the number of the workers – in particular men – had increased. Factors behind this increase included a growing wage difference between Japan and countries in Asia that followed the appreciation of the Japanese yen after the 1985 Plaza Accord; a decline in emigration from Asia after the economic slowdown in oil producing countries in the Middle East; and, a lack of workers (in particular in manufacturing and construction) in Japan.

Against this background, whether and how to accept foreign workers was discussed frequently in Japan in the 1980s, and this resulted in a revision of the Immigration Control Act in 1989. This revision aimed to increase the acceptance of workers with professional and technical skills, and also to control illegal workers. The key points of revision in the Act include the following: (1) to review residential permits, (2) to simplify and expedite entry examination, (3) to institute laws to control illegal employment, and (4) to formulate Basic Plan for Immigration Control. The principal consequence of the revision of the Act was the swift increase in the number of foreign nationals of Japanese descendent resident in Japan, in particular Japanese Brazilians. The number of Brazilians who arrived in Japan for the first time was 27,819 in 1989, and it grew to 83,785 in 1991; the number of the Brazilians in Japan who were registered as resident aliens was 4,159 at the end of 1988, which expanded to 286,557, or approximately 70 times, at the end of 2004 (Suzuki 2006).

The second debate took place at the end of the 1990s. There was a growing interest in relying on ‘foreign workers’ as a response to the lack of a labour supply, while the prospect of a decline in the birth rate and an aging society was becoming imminent. The Japanese government has intensified EPA negotiations since the turn of the century and agreements have been reached between the Philippines and Japan, and Indonesia and Japan, to accept nurses and care workers; agreements which are already being implemented (Suzuki 2006). In addition, the Japanese government aims to increase the number of international tourists to 10 million a year by 2010 (Ministry of Land, Transport and Infrastructure 2007).

The above outline shows that the central concern in Japan’s immigration control has shifted from dealing with Korean people to the acceptance of foreign workers from regions other than the Korean peninsular. This change highlights that Japan is responding to an emerging new world order in the post-Cold War years with respect to the mobility of people, just as with other aspects of its international relations.

The findings in this chapter may be summarized as follows. Japan made a transition from an origin country of IPM in the late 19th century, to a country that both sends and receives population movements in the first half of the 20th century. The source of immigration during this period was the Korean peninsular. Then, in the earlier part of the 1945 to the 1970s period, it was difficult for Japan to accept IPM due to structural factors in its international relations; but the want of labour was not felt either. Nevertheless, such a want became evident in the country in the latter part of the period. Whether to accept foreign workers was considered, but Japan at the time decided against relying on labour from foreign countries, and implemented its policy to utilize its domestic workforce more efficiently than before. In Thailand in the 1970s, conditions for domestic and international population movements were being created with the permeation of a monetary and commercial economy in the country’s rural areas. In some cases of economic development, Japanese companies
were actively involved. This indicates that IPM from Thailand was an unintended reflection of Japan’s economic influence. Japan after the 1980s has undergone two domestic debates about accepting foreign workers. It also became evident that a key concern of Japan’s response to IPM has changed, in accordance with the transition of international structures from that of the Cold War period to the post-Cold War period.

This chapter has shown that Japan in the 20th century remained as a ‘core’ of IPM, and has received population movements from different ‘peripheries’ (the Korean peninsular, rural areas in Japan proper, and South-east Asia); and that the reception of population movements was continuous, with an exception during the years from 1945 to the 1970s. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that the IPM that Japan has experienced has been, except for the Cold War years, ‘an ordinary event’ in Japan’s international relations.

4. Review of Self Image and Redefinition of Role: The Case of Japan

The aim of this paper has been to consider how Japanese actors can modify the way they operate towards migrants; the country is in transition from a country that did not accept migration for a few decades, to another that began to accept migrants again in recent years. Before making an attempt to answer the above question, a review of discussions in the preceding chapters is in order.

Chapter 1 has confirmed two points: the character of the international relations of contemporary Japan and East Asia, and how IPM affects the character of a state which is a destination of IPM. The first point is expanded below: the world order in post-Cold War years is being formulated as regionalization and globalization progress in tandem. In this process, states find it more difficult to exist in isolation from each other, and such a situation applies to the relation between Japan and East Asia. Japan has been actively engaged in the regionalization process in East Asia which has resulted in a deepening relation between the two. As for the second point, it has been shown that IPM can modify two of the constituent factors of the state, namely area/territory and constituent population/nation. What can be drawn from this is that migrants who stay in a destination country can be included as a part of the constituent population of the state, in addition to nationals. Making such an argument might appear difficult from the atomistic view of international relations, but is certainly possible from a relational view of international relations.

Chapter 2 examined the possibility of conceiving origin and destination countries of IPM as one, inter-related unit. The chapter also considered that, if the above is possible, how can a destination country characterize the IPM it accepts. Considering origin and destination countries of IPM as an inter-related unit is possible. A comparison of domestic and international population movements, the insights of the World-system theory perspective, and taking the effects of international mobility of capital on population movement into account, has enabled an identification of connections between the two countries. There are similarities and differences between domestic and international population movements. These movements are similar in that the origin of population movements tends to be the periphery of economic development, and the destination tends to be the core. This claim is possible by combining the following two points. First, sociological studies in migration tell us that there are origins and destinations in any population movements. Second, World-system theory argues that there are two areas in the economic development process, namely core and periphery. In addition, domestic and international population movements are different in at least two respects: distance between the origin and destination, and whether legal boundaries exist between the origin and destination. Being able to conceive of the origin and destination as one, inter-related unit is particularly important when discussing Japan’s experiences of migration, which has state boundaries only in the sea. The international mobility of capital,
however, can create conditions to make population movements possible despite distance and the existence of state boundaries. In the Japanese case, the author speculates that attention is often paid only to the above difference between domestic and international population movements. A disregard of similarities between the two population movements may lead to a justification of differential treatment of foreigners by the destination country of migration.

It is often likely that a destination country of IPM has experienced ‘domestic’ population movements in its past during the process of state-making, or, the making of an area of political economy. ‘Domestic’ population movements in the past and IPM today can be different in terms of size of the population movement as well as the legal territory affected by the movement; however, those two movements are similar in how the movements take place. Taking the above point into account, as well as the influence of the international mobility of capital, we can question the claim that IPM is an ‘external force’ or ‘external pressure’ that is nothing to do with a destination country. In other words, considering that capital export can create conditions for IPM, a country that exports capital may become a country that accepts IPM, even if it did not intend such a movement at the time of capital export.

Chapter 3 divided Japan’s history in the modern era into three periods in order to review the country’s experiences of IPM. First, during the 1868-1945 period, Japan made a transition from a migrant origin country to a country that both sends and receives migration. The principal source of immigration at the time was from the Korean peninsula. This reflects the existence of a core-periphery relation between Japan and the Korean peninsula at the time. Second, in contrast to the previous period, from 1945 to 1970 Japan was a country that did not accept IPM. Nevertheless, there was a need for an additional supply of labour – population movements – in order to implement economic development. Accepting IPM was virtually impossible due to Japan’s international structure at the time. However, the repatriation of Japanese nationals after defeat in the war made domestic population movements possible. In other words, a core (urban/industrial area) – periphery (rural area) relation existed within Japan’s territory at the time. Third, an examination of the relation between development in rural areas and population movements in Thai rural areas in the 1970s has found that domestic population movements took place after the incorporation of rural areas into the capitalist economy. Domestic population movements laid the ground for international population movements. An inflow of Japanese capital contributed to the above changes in Thai rural areas which suggest that the core (urban/industrial area) – periphery (rural area) relation was created internationally between Thailand and Japan. Meanwhile, it is a fact that some Japanese felt – after the late 1970s and in the late 1980s in particular – that the arrival of IPM was ‘an external pressure.’ It is indeed the case that measures to address new challenges arising from the arrival of IPM are needed in Japan on various fronts. Nevertheless, the above arguments have clearly demonstrated that accepting IPM is not at all a first-time challenge for Japan.

The remaining section of this chapter pulls together the arguments presented above to answer the question raised at the beginning of the chapter.

Transformation of a state’s territory and constituent population following the progression of regionalization and globalization

Acceptance of IPM renders economic and cultural changes to those in the frontline who respond to the various challenges arising from population movement. As such, it would not be unnatural for them to feel that the arrival of migrants is ‘an external force’ to describe their difficulties in figuring out what to do. However, from the vantage point of international relations, is it appropriate to conceive of IPM as an entirely ‘external force’? As has been shown, if a country that exports capital received IPM at a later time, such a population
movement is a reflection of the core-periphery relation. 18) An IPM constitutes one aspect of the integration process of the world economy, and there are cases where the destination country of IPM is actively engaged in such an integration process. When an IPM bears such a character, then, it is not ‘an external force’ which the destination country has nothing to do with. Iyotani’s (1992) account is supportive of the above argument by pointing out that migration in Asia constitutes part of the flows toward the integration of the world economy, with multiple layers of migration in Asia: (1) migration from rural to urban areas within Asian countries; (2) migration to regional cores in Asia, and (3) migration to Western countries and Japan. Formulation of those multiple layers ‘implies that labour mobility in Asia is undergoing restructuring, and has become a part of the integration process of the world economy’ (p. 229). It has to be recalled that Japan has been vigorously engaged in such an economic integration process in East Asia.

Transformation of territory and constituent population, and the need to alter the manner of exercising sovereignty

A country that accepts IPM will need to alter the way it exercises its sovereignty, since IPM affects two of the key factors of the state, namely territory and constituent population. In this connection, Hirowatari (1992), who studied the arrival of labour migrants to contemporary Japan from a legal perspective, argues that international policy adjustments are necessary in order to respond to challenges from labour migration; to do so, states have to go beyond individual interests, just as in the case of global environmental problems (p. 64). Iguchi (2001), a prominent labour economist in Japan, makes a similar point that in order to respond to the effects of regional integration on the international mobility of labour, international cooperation is needed which is in addition to the policy of individual states (p. 163). The emergence of the need for such international adjustment corresponds to the claim that, with the progression of globalization ‘one state can no longer be isolated from others, and it heralds the interlinking of human relationships across space and time’ (Hook et al. 2005: 37).

State’s provision of safety to migrants as an international policy adjustment

It is an argument of this paper that referents of a state’s provision of safety have to be altered to include migrants as an adjustment to changes in international structure in the post-Cold War years. To make such an alteration is to carry out an international adjustment – referred to in the previous section – within the territory of a destination country of IPM. This can apply to various countries, but certainly applies to contemporary Japan.

The state is responsible for providing safety to its constituent population in exchange for their compliance with the law. This responsibility should remain unchanged, considering that no other political institutions are likely to replace the state in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the referents of a state’s provision of safety should be extended to include migrants, in addition to nationals. Locke’s (1968) argument which is based on natural law thinking supports this point. According to Locke, a state is entitled to apply its domestic law to foreign nationals within its territory, and this is justified by natural law. At the same time, however, the same natural law demands that the state provide safety to foreign nationals in the country. In this particular aspect, the state should not recognize any difference in treatment between nationals and foreigners (Locke 1968; Taki 2008).

The need for a new collective identity that conforms to the age of regionalization and globalization

It is not acceptable, from a viewpoint of normative concern, if actors in a destination country of IPM are unable (or do not intend) to provide safety to migrants. 19) However, it is possible to anticipate that such an inability (or the lack of will) exists if actors operate within the
context of territorial nation states. The above inability or the lack of will may be present if the state of the migrant destination country does not recognize its duty to provide safety. A change in identity will be required in order for the actors in the migrant destination state to recognize such a duty.

If someone recognizes another person as a member of the same group of people, then he/she will help the above person, and if not, not; this is why this paper argues that a change in an actor’s identity is required in the migrant destination country. It was claimed at the beginning of this paper that to respond to issues arising from IPM is one aspect of the international relations of a destination country. In this connection, Hall’s (1998) argument on the importance of identity – in particular collective identity – to an actor of international relations is important: a change in the collective identity maintained by social actors will lead to an alteration in interests and concerns of the collective actor that constitutes a social system (p. 161). According to Hall, collective identity informs an actor to take actions based on loyalty towards the group he/she belongs to, and to defend and maintain such a group of people. Loyalty has such significance to members of the same group, but it also makes an actor draw a sharp line between helping or not helping others (Hall 1998: 173-4). This is why, as Sassen (1992) is concerned, ‘to establish a common identity which goes beyond the boundaries of ethnicity, region or nation’ is an important challenge for a destination country of IPM (p. 17).

Taki (2008) proposed the introduction of the notion of ‘associate constituent population’ to construct a collective identity, with which the above-mentioned extended provision of safety could hopefully become possible. The idea behind this notion is that, to a certain extent, migrants should be treated as having an identity common to nationals, even though they do not hold the nationality of the destination country. A state’s constituent population of ‘nationals’ hold an identity familiar to all, but migrants are not ‘nationals.’ There exists a gap that has been generated by the increase in IPM which in turn is a manifestation of the progression of regionalization and globalization. One way to address such a gap is, this paper argues, to adjust the conditions of the ‘constituent population’ of a state to accord with the reality of world politics today. Thus, is it not possible to create an identity which stands somewhere between ‘nationals’ and ‘world citizens’? Can such a new identity be called, for example, ‘associate constituent population’? This concept intends to correspond with the fact that the sphere of economic influence of some countries – in particular Japan – has been expanded within the process of regionalization and globalization, without necessarily rearranging legal state boundaries. Furthermore, the concept takes the following historical event into account: that within the process of modern state making, the formulation of the state preceded the construction of nationhood. In other words, the territory of a state was defined before a collective identity was formed and shared by the constituent population (Momose 1993). The progression of regionalization is similar to the making of a new political entity, even though current states are likely to continue their existence for a considerable period of time. This is why a new source of collective identity, which is in addition to national identity, is needed to meet the realities of new political entities. If this notion of ‘associate constituent population’ is maintained by the actors of a migrant destination country, is it not possible to expect a change in their actions to provide safety to associate constituent members? The need for the formulation of such a collective identity is important in several countries today, and in contemporary Japan this is certainly the case.

As many readers are already aware, in developing the arguments in this paper the author has kept in mind the importance of paying attention both to realities and ideals in world politics (Carr 1981). In some cases an understanding of international relations based on an atomistic view fails to meet the reality of world politics in the post-Cold War years. In contrast, an understanding of international relations from a relational viewpoint can be more
‘realistic.’

It is hoped that a destination country of IPM would exercise sovereignty in ways that could conform more to the reality of world politics today, and contribute to the making of a fairer and more just order. For that purpose, this paper argues that shifting an understanding of international relations from one based on atomistic views to an understanding based on relational ones, is important.

In the meantime, it is possible to hold a normative concern – when discussing IPM – that discrimination against foreigners should be abolished. The author of this paper does share such a concern and is aware of the significance of a norm that calls for destination countries of IPM to treat nationals and migrants equally in order to prevent discrimination against foreigners. That said, this paper has not treated the existence of such norms as given; in other words, it did not claim that discrimination be stopped because such and such norms exist. Instead, the author considers that actors in destination countries of IPM should better be able, when they understand the realities of developments in world politics, to conform to these norms and contemplate what they can do about those developments. The importance of these norms may be appreciated further when the influence of changes in world politics upon migrants, as well as upon destination countries of IPM, are understood from a realistic understanding of international relations.

Notes

1) For the author’s arguments on the provision of safety to migrants, see Taki (2008).
2) Structure in international relations can be defined as: ‘the external environment in which a state and its people are emmeshed and interact. It consists of other states, global institutions, regional frameworks and organizations, TNCs, NGOs and other political, economic and security actors’ (Hook et al. 2005: 43).
3) When appropriate, this article uses the terms ‘international population movement’ (IPM) and ‘migrant labour’ interchangeably. Some of the literature written in Japan in the 1990s uses the term ‘migrant labour’, but this may be translated as international population movement. One of the reasons for this is because IPM can refer to a wider variety of movements of people with an international dimension than ‘migrant labour’ can. Another reason, inter-related to the first, is because the term ‘migrant labour’ can cause analytical inconvenience when describing the experiences of people who moved internationally. A state of destination country of migration classifies people who enter the country in different categories, such as migrant labourer, students, or tourists, for example. However, there are cases where distinctions between those categories are not so clear-cut. For example, one person can be classified as a labour migrant, a victim of human trafficking, or a suspect and/or defendant in a criminal case at different points in time.
4) However, it is certainly the fact that such a discourse is believed (accepted) in various countries in the world.
5) For a more detailed analysis of the transformation and fragmentation of an agricultural society which followed the permeation of the capitalist economy, see Iyotani (2001).
6) To hold such a view is different from ignoring the fact that physical distance and state boundaries backed by each country’s laws do exist in the world. The author is certainly aware that these factors have to be taken into account when explaining international population movements; a state’s migration policy does affect the volume of population movements.
7) Koido (2002) considers that today’s international labour migration may be characterized as a manifestation of attempts by business to utilize labour in as many multiple and transboundary ways as possible, while the industrial system is being transformed from Fordism to post-Fordism (pp. 68-70).
8) Sassen (1992) writes as follows to show that migration is not a ‘natural’ movement: ‘Migration, or international mobility of labour, does not take place by (coincidence). It ... is made by human activities, demonstrates certain patterns, and is based on a particular historic aspect’ (p. 1).

9) According to Kobayashi (2006), surplus population did exist in rural areas in Japan when migration to Manchuria was being planned; however, by the 1930s when migration began, the economic need for migrants to Manchuria had disappeared and there was in fact a shortage in the domestic labour supply.

10) The numbers of Japanese residents in the Korean peninsula from World War I were as follows: approximately 5,000 during the war; more than 10,000 in 1917; more than 80,000 in 1923; 419,000 in 1930; 1.24 million in 1940; close to 2 million after 1941 (Tsuruzono 2006: 202).

11) To find out how many Japanese migrated to Taiwan after colonization by Japan, and how the Japanese lived there, are future topics of study for the author.

12) Takasaki (1993) estimates this at 1.5 million (p. xiv).

13) Rather than Japan’s acceptance of migrants from North Korea, the IPM that took place between Japan and North Korea during the post-war years was ‘repatriation’ of Koreans. One hundred and ten thousand people applied for the repatriation program, and 93,000 actually migrated. Tsuruzono (2006) writes that behind this migration program existed North Korea’s need for labour for economic reconstruction after the Korean War. Approximately 6,700 Japanese spouses and family members migrated with the Koreans; as a consequence, the ‘repatriation’ program had generated ‘break-ups of families which extend over three countries of South Korea, Japan and North Korea’ (p. 205).

14) Yamanaka (2004) reports that staff members of the Immigration Control Agency included those who had worked for the special political police and had been involved in controlling immigrants from the Korean peninsula before and during the war years; and this is why the Bureau – established in the post war years – considered Koreans as a potential threat to domestic stability (pp. 477-8).

15) A brief note on former West Germany’s experience in accepting labour migrants is in order, to supplement the account why Japan did not (or, was not able to) accept foreign workers in the post-war years. Former West Germany and Japan appear to have a similarity in that both countries were defeated in the Second World War and managed to reconstruct their economies. In West Germany’s case, the source of additional labour supply required for post-war economic growth had shifted from ‘the Germans’ to foreigners; on this point some proximity between West Germany and Japan may be identified, even if the reasons for, and the process of, the shifts in each country are different.

West Germany accepted foreign workers from the late 1950s to 1973. Since the end of the war up to the end of the 1950s, refugees and new migrants from East European countries and the Eastern parts of the former German Empire entered West Germany. The country was in need of accepting foreign workers when the above labour supply was terminated following the building of the ‘Berlin Wall’ in 1961 (Kimae 1987: 221-3). West Germany concluded agreements to accept immigrant workers from the following countries: Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968) (Hirowatari 1992: 64). The number of foreign workers resident in West Germany was 95,000 in 1956, which increased to 1.3 million in 1966, and to 2.6 million in 1973 (Castles and Miller 1998: 71). That West Germany – a country defeated in the Second World War – was able to conclude agreements and accept migrant workers with so many countries is remarkable, in contrast to Japan in the same period. To look into what sort of similarities and differences there are between international relations of Germany and Japan will be a future research question for the author.
The word ‘domestic’ is in brackets here, because such a place may not yet have been ‘inside’ the country during the state-making process.

An understanding of IPM (migrant workers in this case) as an ‘external force’ is evident in that some of Japan’s mass media reports after the 1970s failed to inform audiences of the existence of multiple facets regarding issues surrounding foreign workers. These facets were oversimplified as an ‘external force’, for example (Tou 1992: 30).

Benno (2006) accounts for developments in labour migration in East Asia at the end of the 20th century from World-system theory perspective as follows: ‘rural areas’ in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – from which industrial workers may be supplied in a large number and at low cost – had almost disappeared; foreign workers began to flow in to supplement the above disappearance of workers. In China and South-east Asia, meanwhile, the labour supply from ‘rural areas’ continued. Consequently Benno writes that ‘the East Asian community may be seen as an attempt to create new “rural areas” in East Asia’ (p. 181).

Ito (1992), one of prominent sociologists in Japan, quotes a remark made by a human trafficking broker to suggest that in the 1980s (when an increasing number of women from Asian countries began to arrive in Japan) Japan’s immigration control and police did not consider that issues relating to ‘Japayuki san’ (women migrated to Japan as sex workers) were ones of human rights (p. 325).

This concept is introduced here because it is effective when discussing issues surrounding foreigners and crime (issues of natural rights), and not intended to allow treatment of foreigners as ‘second class citizens’ in other areas of migrant policy, such as issues relating to social rights.

This does not refer to ‘reality’ seen from a viewpoint that considers the existence of international anarchy in ‘objective’ terms, as Statism tends to convey. Instead, this refers to a ‘reality’ seen from a perspective which is informed by International Political Economy, the relational view of international relations, or the ‘subjective’ viewpoint as explained in constructivist terms (Yamada and Oyane 2006).

This is based on the argument by Bull (2000, in particular Chapter 4). If a destination country of IPM was unable (or did not intend) to provide safety to foreigners staying in the territory, it would not be unfair to describe such a situation as ‘order without justice.’

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