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On the “tension” inherent in self-deception

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Lynch, Kevin, Ph.D.. (2012) On the “tension” inherent in self-deception. Philosophical Psychology , Vol.25 (No.3). pp. 433-450. ISSN 0951-5089

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.622364

Abstract

Alfred Mele's deflationary account of self-deception has frequently been criticised for being unable to explain the "tension" inherent in self-deception. These critics maintain that rival theories can better account for this tension, such as theories which suppose self-deceivers to have contradictory beliefs. However, there are two ways in which the tension idea has been understood. In this article, it is argued that on one such understanding, Mele's deflationism can account for this tension better than its rivals, but only if we reconceptualize the self-deceiver's attitude in terms of unwarranted degrees of conviction rather than unwarranted belief. This new way of viewing the self-deceiver's attitude will be informed by observations on experimental work done on the biasing influence of desire on belief, which suggests that self-deceivers don't manage to fully convince themselves of what they want to be true. On another way in which this tension has been understood, this account would not manage so well, since on this understanding the self-deceiver is best interpreted as knowing, but wishing to avoid, the truth. However, it is argued that we are under no obligation to account for this since it is a characteristic of a different phenomenon than self-deception, namely, escapism. © 2012 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophical Psychology
Publisher: Taylor and Francis
ISSN: 0951-5089
Date: June 2012
Volume: Vol.25
Number: No.3
Page Range: pp. 433-450
Identification Number: 10.1080/09515089.2011.622364
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
URI: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/49278

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