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The Seinsfrage and the place of the objective in Heidegger's early work

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Hernandez, Juan P. (2011) The Seinsfrage and the place of the objective in Heidegger's early work. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2581842~S1

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Abstract

The thesis is guided by the question: What is the subject matter of
Heidegger’s philosophy in the period of Being and Time? I start by arguing
that Heidegger’s formulation of the question of being is ambiguous
because the term ‘being’ is open to at least two interpretations. I claim that
this ambiguity has motivated two types of reading of Heidegger’s early
work. On the first reading, Heidegger’s philosophy is understood as
attempting to infer metaphysical claims (claims about what-is, or being in a
traditionally metaphysical sense) on the basis of claims about the structure
of Dasein’s understanding. This reading typically renders Heidegger an
idealist. On the second reading, Heidegger’s philosophy is taken to have
no metaphysical ambitions, and thereby to be limited to elucidating the
structure of Dasein’s understanding. I argue that both types of reading are
inadequate and diagnose them as grounded in a Cartesian presupposition
that Heidegger rejects. On the basis of direct textual evidence and a
number of theoretical considerations I assert that although the second
type of reading is right in that the primary object of Heidegger’s philosophy
is the conditions of understanding and that the idealist reading is wrong, it
is a mistake to deny that Heidegger’s philosophy has metaphysical
implications. I claim that Heidegger’s exposition of the conditions of
understanding involves a larger picture from the outset, a picture that
delineates the relation between understanding and entities, and locates
the objective in relation to Dasein. On this picture, 1) empirical entities are
unqualifiedly independent of Dasein, 2) we have direct cognitive access to
these entities as they are in themselves, and 3) there is no a priori
unintelligible entities or aspects of entities. I address a number of potential
objections to this way of interpreting Heidegger’s work.

Item Type: Thesis or Dissertation (PhD)
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976 -- Criticism and interpretation, Ontology
Official Date: December 2011
Dates:
DateEvent
December 2011Submitted
Institution: University of Warwick
Theses Department: Department of Philosophy
Thesis Type: PhD
Publication Status: Unpublished
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: Beistegui, Miguel de, 1966-
Sponsors: Colfuturo (Columbia)
Extent: 341 leaves
Language: eng

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