The micro-politics of operational adjustment : veto players and the consolidation of demand in the NHS
Watson, Glyn, Chicksand, Daniel and Lonsdale, Chris. (2013) The micro-politics of operational adjustment : veto players and the consolidation of demand in the NHS. Production Planning & Control, Volume 24 (Number 10-11). pp. 948-961. ISSN 0953-7287Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2012.666909
Recent reports about procurement within the NHS have been highly critical. One problem identified in the reports is the fragmentation of NHS demand across an unnecessarily large number of suppliers. This fragmentation is said to increase transaction costs, reduce opportunities for scale economies and reduce NHS leverage over suppliers. It has been suggested, therefore, that an important way of improving procurement in the NHS is the better consolidation of demand with a lower number of preferred suppliers. However, such a policy, because it will create ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ within NHS organisations, has political as well as technical and practical ramifications. In this article, the authors present a model, the Veto Players Model, in order to assist managers to address these political ramifications. In the article, the authors not only demonstrate the utility of this model with regard to demand consolidation policies, but also argue that the model provides useful lessons for change management initiatives more generally.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Operations Management
Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
|Journal or Publication Title:||Production Planning & Control|
|Publisher:||Taylor & Francis Ltd.|
|Number of Pages:||14|
|Page Range:||pp. 948-961|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
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