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Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria : an application to takeovers
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Gill, David, 1975- and Sgroi, Daniel. (2004) Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria : an application to takeovers. Topics in Theoretical Economics, Vol.4 (No.1). ISSN 1534-598X
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1534-598X.1178
Abstract
With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.
| Item Type: | Journal Article |
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| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Stockholders -- Econometric models, Consolidation and merger of corporations -- Econometric models |
| Journal or Publication Title: | Topics in Theoretical Economics |
| Publisher: | Walter De Gruyter |
| ISSN: | 1534-598X |
| Date: | December 2004 |
| Volume: | Vol.4 |
| Number: | No.1 |
| Identification Number: | 10.2202/1534-598X.1178 |
| Status: | Peer Reviewed |
| Publication Status: | Published |
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
| URI: | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/50066 |
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