Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Statistics
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login

The right choice at the right time : a herding experiment in endogenous time

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Sgroi, Daniel. (2003) The right choice at the right time : a herding experiment in endogenous time. Experimental Economics, Vol.6 (No.2). pp. 159-180. ISSN 1386-4157

[img]
Preview
Text
WRAP_Sgroi_Paper8.pdf - Accepted Version

Download (491Kb) | Preview
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1025357004821

Abstract

Herding describes the phenomenon in decision-making where an economic agent disregards his own private information to follow the actions of his predecessors as in Banerjee (1992). With later decision-makers simply copying earlier decisions their private information cannot be inferred by other decision-makers and will be forever lost. There is some experimental evidence on simple sequential herding of this type in the literature, notably Anderson and Holt (1997). This paper differs by allowing subjects to delay their decision-making in order to benefit from observing others'' actions as in more recent herding models such as Chamley and Gale (1994). The results in this paper suggest that subjects will indeed delay when their private information is not sufficiently strong. Despite this ability to wait, as predicted in the theoretical literature, cascades remained ubiquitous and more worrying still, reverse-cascades occurred in which incorrect decisions made by early decision-makers produced informational cascades on the wrong action. In an alternative design, informing subjects that they had made incorrect choices only made matters worse as subjects moved further away from rational behavior.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Collective behavior -- Mathematical models, Information behavior -- Mathematical models
Journal or Publication Title: Experimental Economics
Publisher: Springer
ISSN: 1386-4157
Date: 2003
Volume: Vol.6
Number: No.2
Page Range: pp. 159-180
Identification Number: 10.1023/A:1025357004821
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Funder: Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), Nuffield College
URI: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/50068

Request changes to a record

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Document Downloads

More statistics for this item...
twitter

Email us: publications@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us