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Publisher’s statement:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926512474148

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The Discourse of Olympic Security: London 2012

Malcolm N. MacDonaldd and Duncan Hunter2

Version 2: Friday, 03 August 2012

Centre for Applied Linguistics,
Social Sciences Building
University of Warwick,
Coventry,
CV7 2LA
+44(0)24-76-5-24250
m.n.macdonald@warwick.ac.uk
dhunter@marjon.ac.uk

Running head: ‘Discourse of Olympic Security’
Size of paper: ten thousand words

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1 University of Warwick
2 University College Plymouth St Mark and St John
Abstract

This paper uses a combination of CDA and CL to investigate the discursive realization of the security operation for the 2012 London Olympic Games. Drawing on Didier Bigo’s (2008) conceptualisation of the ‘banopticon’, it address two questions: what distinctive linguistic features are used in documents relating to security for London 2012; and, how is Olympic security realized as a discursive practice in these documents? Findings suggest that the documents indeed realized key banoptic features of the banopticon: exceptionalism, exclusion and prediction, as well as what we call ‘pedagogisation’. Claims were made for the exceptional scale of the Olympic events; predictive technologies were proposed to assess the threat from terrorism; and documentary evidence suggests that access to Olympic venues was being constituted to resemble transit through national boundaries.

Keywords: CDA, corpus analysis, discourse, security, ban-opticon, Olympics, games, sport mega-event, terrorism.
1. **Introduction**

Twenty hours after winning a bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games, London sustained a terrorist attack on its transport system, which killed 52 people and injured over 770. This combined with memories of the 1972 Munich attack by the Black September Group and the 9/11 Islamist attacks on the Twin Towers to intensify the preoccupation of Games organisers with security for London 2012 (Coaffee, Fussey and Moore, 2011; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2011; Tsoukala, 2006).

Summer Olympic Games have been called ‘sport mega-events’ because of their scale (Roche, 2009); these are highly visible, ‘deeply symbolic’ occasions that take place in large cities, combining intensive media coverage with astringent security and surveillance strategies (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009: 257). Their ‘exceptional’ nature can be used to justify the temporary mounting of extensive surveillance technologies for the duration of the Games. These intensified measures then often become legitimized in perpetuity as part of the ‘legacy’ of a particular Games (Coaffee et al., 2011: 3314; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009: 266). Similarly, sport mega-events can be used to test and develop surveillance technologies that are not only handed down from one Games to another, but also subsequently deployed across large swathes of the population (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009).

The two Summer Olympics which took place in the decade following 9/11 - Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008 - utilized both conventional, human security systems as well as large-scale, computerised, electronic surveillance technologies. The security operation for Athens 2004 involved 70,000 security personnel (Samatas, 2011; Tsoukala, 2006), 35,000 soldiers (Coaffee et al., 2011), AWACS aircraft (Brianas, in Samatas, 2011: 3352), Patriot ground-to-air missiles, police helicopters, fighter jets, minesweepers and a surveillance airship, or ‘blimp’ (Coaffee et al., 2011). Athens also purchased an ill-fated C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Integration) System featuring between 13,000 and 14,000
surveillance cameras, mobile surveillance vans and chemical detectors (Coafee et al., 2011; Samatas, 2011; Tsoukala, 2006). In turn, China invited Greece along with experts from 74 other countries to work with them towards the Beijing Olympics (Yu, Klauser and Chan, 2009: 396). This led to the design and implementation of the massive surveillance system ‘Golden Shield’ (Samatas, 2011: 3354), featuring 24/7 monitoring of citizens by CCTV cameras, Olympic RFID tickets and second generation national ID cards; phone call monitoring by digital voice recognition technologies; and the ‘Great Firewall’ system of online censorship and filtering (Klein, 2008). More traditional elements of the security apparatus included 150,000 security personnel, a 100,000 strong anti-terrorist force equipped with the latest anti-riot gear, as well as hundreds of thousands of unpaid volunteers who patrolled as guards and operated as community informants (Samatas, 2011: 3354; Yu et al., 2009: 399).

This paper will investigate the discursive realization of the security operation for London 2012, drawing on features of Didier Bigo’s (2008) conceptualisation of the ‘banopticon’. It will analyse a corpus of documents drawn up by UK government departments, Games organisers and security agencies in the planning for the 2012 Olympics in order to address two questions: first, what distinctive linguistic features are used in documents relating to security for London 2012; second, how is Olympic security realized as a discursive practice in these documents?

2. Literature review

Relatively few previous studies have undertaken a systematic analysis of the discourse of sport mega-events. Employing a semiotic approach Price (2008) analysed the dramatic appearance of Scimitar Armoured vehicles around UK’s Heathrow Airport in 2003 and the
installation of US Patriot missiles on the airport’s perimeter in 2004 as the representation of ‘a calculated reaction to internal political dissent or other forms of domestic disorder’. Focusing on the Athens Olympics, Tsoukala (2006) carried out a content analysis of relevant articles carried by two prominent US newspapers in the run-up to the 2004 Olympics. Data reveals an assessment of security measures which feature two attributes: ‘Greek dilatoriness’ and criticism of Greek officials and law enforcement agents; and the ‘potentially limitless and unpredictable’ nature of the terrorist threat (p. 51). It is therefore necessary first, to situate our paper within a wider ranging review of studies which drawn on security as discourse; we will then set out Bigo’s (2008) post-Foucaultian conceptualisation of the banopticon, which will operate as the theoretical framework for this study.

2.1. Discourse of Security

Early forays into security discourse focused on analysing the role of metaphor (e.g. Chilton 1995: Chilton and Ilyin 1993; Thornborrow, 1993); and this has been taken up more recently in security studies (e.g. Hülsse and Spencer, 2008; Stump, 2009). Thornborrow analyses a corpus of press reports on defence summits to compare representations of European defence in English and French. Although Europe is represented as a person in both datasets, more metaphors of architecture and structure are used to conceptualize security in English; and more system metaphors were used to conceptualise security in French (116). Chilton and Illyn then take up one specific structural metaphor, comparing the uses of ‘house’ as a metaphor for Europe in English, French, German and Russian. Working with a relatively unsystematic corpus of ‘public utterances and texts of principal leaders’(27), they also conclude that metaphors are not transferrable from one language to another, but are processed in accordance with local institutional and discursive interests. Metaphor has also been analyzed in the speeches of EU policy makers to uncover the discursive construction of Turkish ‘exceptionalism’ (Yanik, 2011). Metaphors such as ‘door’, ‘latch and key’,
‘crossroads’ and ‘gate’ were used to highlight Turkey’s position at the intersection of different continents. Relating more specifically to terrorism discourse, Hülsse and Spencer (2008) analyse a diachronic corpus of articles taken from Das Bild between 2001 and 2005 in order to consider how Al-Qaeda was constituted metaphorically over the period between 9/11 and 7/7. Principal findings indicate that there was a shift from the use of military metaphors to those of criminality, transforming Al-Qaeda ‘from an external into an internal enemy, and from a legitimate into an illegitimate actor’ (585).

In recent years a constructivist, discourse-based approach has been taken up by research in international relations, political geography and security studies. Many studies have adopted the ‘linguistic turn’ in order to reject realist conceptualizations of security. From a realist perspective the term ‘security’ is conceived of as object and language as its means of its representation; from a constructivist perspective security is constituted through language and discourse (Aradau, 2010: 493). This linguistic turn originated in the conceptualization of security as a speech act (e.g. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1989; Wæver, 1995). On this argument, security is realized when a particular issue is placed beyond normal political conventions, thereby eliminating liberal obligations for democratic debate or attention to individual rights. This is achieved when a politician says it is so: ‘the utterance itself is the act . . . by uttering “security”, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it’ (Wæver, 1995: 55). The illocutionary force of a successful securitizing speech act is to bring about ‘intersubjective understanding…within a political community’ of the need for exceptional measures to tackle a particular threat (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 491; Stritzel, 2007: 358-361). Examples of security discourse which have been analyzed using this approach include: documents relating to the positioning of Turkey’s security policy as it comes closer to EU membership (Bilgin, 2005); Australian discourses constituting the
Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and East Timor as ‘failed states’ (Lambach, 2006); and discourses of Australian environmental security in relation to that of Asian countries (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2010). However, despite later attempts to broaden securitization theory beyond the momentary intentionality of a single actor (e.g. Wæver, 2001), securitization theory has been criticized for underdeveloping the role of social context, and in particular for prioritizing the role of the actor over the audience in the linguistic act (McDonald, 2008; Stritzel, 2007).

In stating that they are ‘moving away from a focus on intent’ (226), Sovlacool and Halfon (2007) appear to position themselves over against the Copenhagen School, defining discourse as “a historically emergent system of objects, concepts, categories and theories that mutually reinforce each other, thereby stabilising meaning and identity”(225). In order to explore the discursive construction of the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq, they analyse documents from strategic reports, presidential speeches and press briefings, identifying four ‘narratives’ relating to: “the evilness of Saddam Hussein, the helplessness of the Iraqi population, America as protector, and the international legitimacy of Iraqi reconstruction” (238). However, these are ultimately over-determined by the ‘historical erasure’ of the US sanctions on Iraq in the run-up to Gulf War II. Taking both a retrospective and prospective view, Krebs and Lobasz (2007) assess how the dominant discourse which the US Republican administration established in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq became ‘hegemonic’, unassailable by the Democratic party. Finally, Morrissey (2011) uses one particular institutional site, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, as the unifying element in his exploration of the ‘discursive tactics’ used in calling for a long-term commitment of US forces to oversee American political and economic interests in the Middle East (442). In so doing, he reveals the role of the “military-strategic studies complex” in advancing the ‘aggressive geopolitics’ of the USA and supporting its ‘imperial ambition’ (459).
Foucaultian approaches of different hues have also been adopted in the analysis of security discourse. Drawing on the thesis that that ‘the production of a truth, or the creation of knowledge through a discourse, is an exercise of power (2005: 164, after Foucault, 1980: 93-4), Ibrahim examines the 1999 portrayal of the ‘Chinese boat people’ in a corpus derived from six principal English language newspapers. Evidence indicates that these newspapers constituted the migrants as a security threat and imputed them with criminal status, due to their ‘undocumented and illicit arrival ’ (180). Within the context of European security, Mälksoo (2006) analyses a wide ranging corpus drawn from speeches, interventions, remarks and articles by the foreign policy ‘establishments’ of three Baltic countries - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (276) - to reveal perceptions of their relationship with the EU. Here, discourse is understood as ‘a relational system of signification that constructs social realities and is productive/reproductive of things defined by it’ (277). In the event, it appears that the ‘Baltic Three’ remain positioned on the margins of Europe, as ‘the embodiment of the liminality in the European self-image, in the course of a perpetual politics of becoming “more European”’ (288). Applying a later Foucaultian epistemology (2008) of ‘governmental rationality’ to peace-building in post-conflict societies, Chandler (2010) examines how the role of civil society has been constituted in three different discourses which have been subject to ‘transformation and inversion’ through modernity (Foucault, 2008: 118). Neither the discourse of race which embedded the ‘external intervention and regulation of non-western countries’ in a eugenicist ideology or the discourse of culture which superseded it as an ‘essentialising discourse of inequality’ are now sustainable as constituting grounds for peace-building in post-conflict societies. However, a discourse of civil society which privileges liberal notions of autonomy and conceives of intervention as enabling the individual can simultaneously legitimize and explain intransigent post-conflict social, economic and
political problems, while vindicating a judgemental and moralistic position towards them (387).

The studies of security discourse carried out in the social sciences and reviewed above all yield valuable insights into the phenomena which they are investigating. However, from the perspective of discourse analysis they often use corpora which are either relatively small scale or ad hoc, and their approach to the actual analysis of discourse at times appears relatively underdeveloped. Often, they appear to be drawing on documentary evidence in order to glean more generalized qualitative data rather than actually analysing distinctive linguistic forms, the impact of specific speech acts, or the contours of discourse. And to us, it would often appear that these approaches are used more as a warrant for adopting a more broadly constructivist stance towards security issues, rather than undertaking a detailed analysis of the texts in questions.

2.2. Banopticon

Foucault’s well-known description of the Panopticon (1977: 195-230) has long done service in critical discourse studies as a metonym for the economical and systematic surveillance of modern populations. By analogy, Didier Bigo has proposed that a contemporary episteme of ‘(in)security’ has led to the establishment of a ‘banoptic dispositif’ within late capitalist societies, and particularly those countries within the European Union (2008: 10).

This formulation of the ban-opticon allows us to understand how a network of heterogeneous and transversal practices functions and makes sense as a form of (in)security at the transnational level. It allows us to analyse the collection of heterogeneous bodies of discourses…, of institutions…, of architectural structures, …of laws…, and of administrative measures…. It allows us to understand that the surveillance of everyone is not on the current agenda, but the surveillance of a small number of people, who are trapped into the imperative of mobility while the majority is normalised … (Bigo, 2008: 32).

One periodic crystallization of this banoptic trend is the quadrennial mounting of the Summer Olympic Games, during which different cities around the world take it in turn to become
‘militarised fortresses’ or ‘super-panopticons’ (Samatas, 2011: 3359-3360). In this paper we consider how key features of the banopticon are constituted within a corpus of official documents relating to the London 2012 security operation.

There are three ‘dimensions’ of the ban-opticon: exceptionalism, exclusion and normalisation (Bigo, 2008: 31-36). Shortly after 9/11, the US and the UK put in place exceptional legal measures through the Patriot Act (2001) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005), which limited the juridical rights of both temporary residents and citizens. However, for Bigo ‘exceptionalism’ refers not only to the continuing maintenance and enforcement of ‘special’ laws in the period after the attack, but also to the ways in which “the ‘dominated’ of a specific time and place are socialised by their rulers to believe that they are deciding what kind of dominating powers are acceptable or not” (Bigo, 2008: 33). The second dimension is the identification and exclusion of individuals who appear to constitute a threat. To do this, modern computer technologies are used to collate and analyse data from a wide range of public, private and police sources in order to detect possible offences that might be carried out by potentially risky individuals or groups. This entails the normalisation of people’s behaviour through pro-active analysis and prediction. This ‘criterion’ of normalization arises principally from the ‘imperative of free movement’ within modern, globalised societies. For Bigo, this imperative does not arise from a dichotomy between those who are permitted access to mobility and those who are not permitted; rather it becomes a touchstone for the normalization of the majority of the population, and a focus for the surveillance of a minority (2008: 36).
3. Methodology

This paper combines techniques of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and corpus linguistics (CL) to analyse a collection of texts in the public sphere (c.f. Baker, 2010; Baker and McEnery, 2005; Baker, Gabrielatos, Khosravinik, Krzyzanowski, McEnery and Wodak, 2008; Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008). Eleven UK institutional sites were identified as pertinent to the security operation for the 2012 London Olympic Games including UK government departments, UK security forces, games officials and private security companies (Table 1). Their websites were searched between 30 March and 3 April, 2012 for documents yielded by the term ‘Olympic security’. Searching continued until hits for candidate documents were exhausted, and the corpus amounted to a near-total population of 176 online documents relating to our search term. The corpus was comprised of a range of genres (including departmental reports and webpages), and formats (including PDF files, Word documents and WebPages saved in Firefox format). The entire corpus was then machine-searched using Wordsmith Tools Version 5 (Scott, 2008) for preliminary statistical data such as keywords, key-keywords and collocations of significant lexical items.

Table 1: Documents relating to Olympic Security (2010-2012) (n=176)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accessed</th>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Firefox</th>
<th>PDF</th>
<th>Docs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31/03/2012</td>
<td>London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games</td>
<td>LOCOG</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/04/2012</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
<td>HMO</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/04/2012</td>
<td>Department for Culture, Media and Sport</td>
<td>DCMS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/04/2012</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/04/2012</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police</td>
<td>MET</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/04/2012</td>
<td>Internal Security Service</td>
<td>MI5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/04/2012</td>
<td>UK Border Agency</td>
<td>UKBA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/04/2012</td>
<td>Private security firm</td>
<td>G4S</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/04/2012</td>
<td>British Security Industry Association</td>
<td>BSIA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/04/2012</td>
<td>Security Industry Association</td>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/04/2012</td>
<td>Bridging the Gap</td>
<td>BTG</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An innovative, mixed-methods approach was then devised, which prioritised qualitative analysis (QAL) and quantitative analysis (QAN) differently in each of two phases. Phase 1 prioritised qualitative analysis (QAL+QAN). Here, a combination of interpretive reading and key-keyword analysis was carried out to identify a core sample of 12 texts in which corpus themes were most densely concentrated. Then, documents were intensively treated and coded for linguistic features and preliminary themes. Phase 2 prioritised quantitative analysis (QAN+QAL). Here, corpus tools were again applied intensively using a combination of concordance, collocation, and cluster data to reveal cross-corpus variations in linguistic phenomena identified previously in the sample. Selections made were also cross-checked via themes suggested by the keyword and keyword distribution data.

4. Results
In the analysis that follows, we examine some of the linguistic features through which the security operation surrounding the 2012 Olympic Games is discursively realized, and map these on to the three key features of the banopticon (after Bigo, 2008): exceptionalism, exclusion and prediction; as well as what we will call ‘pedagogisation’.

4.1. Exceptionalism
A qualitative reading of core texts revealed a number of linguistic devices which were deployed to assert the exceptional nature of the Games. In the following examples, superlative and limit adjectives are repeatedly used to refer to the Games, in order to communicate a sense of their remarkable size and ‘scale’.

The London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games will be the largest sporting event in UK history...It will involve the biggest peacetime security operation ever undertaken in the UK (HMO, 2011a: 5).
The Government has made safety and security at the Games a top priority to ensure that everyone can enjoy the celebrations peacefully. This is important, as the sheer scale of London 2012 will place many demands on policing, the emergency services and security (HMO, 2011a: 5).

Across the corpus, ‘biggest’ (n=38 times), ‘greatest’ (n= 16) and ‘largest’ (n=48) are deployed for a similar hyperbolic purpose, e.g.:

- I am proud to be leading what will be the Police Service’s biggest ever peacetime safety and security operation (MOD, 2011).
- The Government is completely behind the London 2012 ticketing strategy, which will give spectators from all walks of life the chance to see the greatest sporting event in the world (DCMS, 2010: 3).

Another recurrent theme realized through such language associated with the scale of the Games, is the impact they will have on different security sectors.

- The Olympics are the biggest peacetime operation that the Police Service will have had to undertake and it has to be expected that there will be an impact on policing during 2012 (LOCOG, 2012).
- This unprecedented call on private security across the UK could affect your business or organization (SIA, 2012a:1).

There are also a number of references to the simultaneity of the Games with other sizeable British events. These suggest that arrangements for the Olympics form only one part of a larger, contiguous security enterprise:

- In addition, World Pride, the Notting Hill Carnival and the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations are due to take place across the same time period (London Assembly Health and Public Services Committee, 2010: 7).
- Also taking place in 2012 are regular events such as Wimbledon and the Notting Hill Carnival, as well as the celebrations for Her Majesty The Queen’s Diamond Jubilee (HMO, 2011a: 1).

This phenomenon occurs particularly densely in the core texts, but can also be identified across the whole corpus. In the following, non-core text, the sense of scale and simultaneity are combined.

- This summer will see London host the largest sporting events in the world, the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, More than 70% of the Games will take place in London, alongside regular events such as Wimbledon, the Notting Hill Carnival and celebrations to mark Her Majesty the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee (MET, 2012).
These linguistic features realise three different sets of exceptional circumstances surrounding the Games, and provide grounds for the mounting of a correspondingly extensive security operation.

One phrase in particular is used emblematically (132 times in just 12 texts) to constitute the over-arching goal of this endeavour, e.g.:

The Government has made safety and security at the Games a top priority to ensure that everyone can enjoy the celebrations peacefully (HMO, 2011a:5).

We are creating a sporting environment that has safety and security built in, leaving a groundbreaking legacy that will last beyond the Games (HMO, 2011a: 10).

These extracts from core texts, exemplify the way in which the phrase ‘safety and security’ becomes reified as a formula which occurs 254 times across the whole corpus. While the individual nouns, SECURITY and SAFETY, are high ranking keywords (n=1908, LL 11616; n=397, LL 1607), the entire phrase ‘safety and security’ is also remarkably salient in statistical terms (LL=2871). Lexical collocates of the combined phrase are: strategy (n= 57), programme (n=30), delivery (n=27), operation (n=24), plans (n=16), operations (n=13), assessment (n=13), disrupt (n=6); and ensure (n=27). Investigating these, further evidence of nominalisation and reification appear, e.g.:

Assurance of Games-wide readiness: is the delivery of Games safety and security compatible with the broader Games operation (HMO, 2011b:22).

The Centre will support Police and other Services officers delivering safety and security operations to the Olympic Park (HMO, 2010: 7).

Here ‘safety and security’ is again formulated linguistically as a pre-established notion no longer amenable to scrutiny or justification.

The dual adjectival phrase ‘safe and secure’ is also used within the corpus, frequently premodifying ‘Games’, and now presented as being coterminous with the Olympic ethos. In this example, the two properties are accorded a positive evaluation in the form of a mission statement from a core text:
To deliver a safe and secure Games, in keeping with the Olympic culture and spirit. In the context of this Strategy, safe means the protection of people and property from hazards caused by non-malicious incidents. Secure means the protection of people and property from threats, caused by incidents and attacks of a malicious nature (HMO, 2011b: 7).

The positive semantic prosody of the expression can be perceived most easily by investigating its adjectival counterpart. The form SECURE emerges as the 55th strongest lexical keyword (LL 817), with SAFE ranked 97th (LL 553); the combination ‘safe and secure’ occurs 110 times in 51 texts. A concord analysis reveals that the most frequently occurring verbal collocates of the combined phrase are ensuring (n=14), planning (n=13), ensure (n=13), disrupt (n=6) and delivering (n=6). The strong positive semantic prosody lent by these verbs is can be seen in the following:

Our experiences show that access to the ‘window of world intelligence’ is vital to ensure a safe and secure Games (London 2012, 2012).

Looking outside the corpus, the positive prosody of ‘safe and secure’ is exposed by its collocation (in the British National Corpus, 2007) with top ten items such as ‘feel’, ‘children’ and ‘home’.

4.2. Exclusion

Through the Schengen Agreement, 26 EU and non-EU countries have agreed to allow free movement across their borders. However, some agencies and technologies restrict free movement and operate ‘exclusion zones’ even within the Schengen Zone. Examples of these include the large numbers of interviewing rooms used for detention at airports, as well as more extreme cases such as the concealment of detainees in police kennels near Charles De Gaulle airport (Bigo, 2008, p. 37). Despite the lapse of passport controls, Bigo goes on to suggest that the EU borders are still being policed, but now clandestinely by ever more dispersed, and heterogeneous agencies which include not just national and local police forces but also the military, border agencies, private security firms and airline companies.
The UK still has not signed up to the Schengen Agreement and maintains passport controls at its national borders. Within our core documents, we find public assertions by the UK Border Agency (UKBA) of an intensified regulation of access through controls on UK national boundaries during the Games period, e.g.:

When you arrive at the UK border, *you will need to show* the following items to a UK Border Agency officer: A valid travel document (for example your passport); A valid visa (if required); A completed landing card … *You must satisfy a UK Border Agency officer that you meet* the requirements of the Immigration Rules, so even if *you do not need a visa you may need to show* the officer certain documents to support your request to enter the UK. *Your passport will be scanned* and *your landing card and visa will be checked*. The officer *may ask you* for more information about *your visit before allowing you* to enter. If *you hold a visa, your fingerprints will also be verified* (UKBA, 2012a: 3).

In this extract, the prospective ‘visitor’ is addressed directly and insistently through 12 instances of the second person pronoun and possessive adjective, and positioned in a deficit of power, subservient to the ‘officer’ empowered by the ‘UK Border Agency’ (UKBA). Moreover, the repeated modalization of the lexical verb forms - ‘show’, ‘satisfy’, ‘meet’, ‘scanned’, ‘checked’, ‘ask’, ‘allow’, ‘verified’ – demonstrate the multiplicity of minutely detailed moves through which the securitised subject must yield to the ‘gaze’ of the UKBA agent (after Foucault, 1973; 1977).

In addition to this regulation of national borders, quasi-border mechanisms also appear to be discursively constituted in our texts in order to control access and egress from each of the 34 Olympic venues within national boundaries. This core document addresses the ‘spectator’ directly, constructing her as a compliant, sentient agent realised by the non-agentive mental process ‘see’, while the security agents are positioned as active participants who ‘have a role’ and ‘use…methods’, exemplified by the harsh materiality of ‘bag searches’, ‘screening machines’, ‘CCTV’, ‘metal detectors’:

… *you will see* security measures at and around the venues… *We will use familiar methods* that are proven to work, such as bag searches, screening machines, CCTV and metal detectors. As well as police officers, *you will see* stewards, security guards, volunteers and emergency services staff who will all *have a role* in security at the Games (HMO, 2011a).
Looking at the whole corpus, this construction of the visitor’s role is achieved via a number of linguistic devices. In fact, documentary evidence suggests that through a process of systemic mimesis, Olympic sites are being modelled to reproduce the mechanisms of exclusion found on national borders. Paradigmatically, each venue’s webpage carries the invocation:

> When you get to the Olympic Park, you’ll be asked to go through airport-style security screening. With so much going on and thousands of people arriving at the same time, you should expect to wait.

This is followed by another minute specification of the proposed timetable of travel to each of the Olympic venues:

> **Aim** to arrive at the Olympic Park around two hours before your session starts so you have plenty of time to go through airport-style security screening and get to the Millennium Stadium… You should be at the Millennium Stadium 90 minutes before your session starts. **Make sure** you’re in your seat at least 30 minutes before the start time on your ticket for the build-up to competition.

Here a combination of imperative and strongly modalised verb forms convey a sense of urgency to ‘spectators’ and ‘visitors’. This passage continues with a list of bizarrely specific items which spectators are prohibited from bringing into the venues: ‘liquids, aerosols or gels in quantities larger than 100ml’, ‘alcohol’, ‘glass bottles larger than 100ml …’, ‘excessive amounts of food’, ‘large flags, oversized hats and large umbrellas’. All-in-all the behavioural semiotics of access and exclusion from the Olympic venues appears to be homologous with that found at airports on national borders. Through breaking down the technologies of movement into minutely specified 30 minute segments, the micro-populations who temporarily come to inhabit each of the 34 Olympic sites are constituted as legitimate ‘spectators’, (c.f. Foucault, 1977: 135-170).

Through qualitative examination, thirteen of the 200 strongest keywords emerged as constitutive of the banoptic strategy of exclusion (Table 2). Of these, VENUES is by far and away the strongest, e.g.:
The design and construction of the Olympic Park is based on ‘Secured by Design’ best practice and has sought to design out vulnerabilities. Additional security measures at Games venues relating to infrastructure and people will be proportionate to the risk and delivered in the most cost-effective way possible (HMO, 2011b: 11).

Throughout, ‘venues’ are constructed as sites where security efforts which entail the potential exclusion of spectators are concentrated. Security is also the third most frequent lexical collocate of VENUE/ VENUES with, predictably, only Olympic and Games being more frequent, e.g.:

LOCOG will use a private security company to deliver a venue based security operation, which will include searching and screening everyone entering the competition venues (MET, 2012).

Here the longer nominalised phrase, ‘venue based security operation’, serves to emphasise the focus of security upon the Olympic sites themselves. Additionally, the importance of the legacy of Games both in terms of structure and security is evidenced by its most frequently occurring cluster: venues and infrastructure (n=35).

Table 2 Lexis within the strongest 200 keywords relating to exclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Key word</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Keyness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>VENUES</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>3166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>PARK</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>2070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>VISA</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>2028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>BIOMETRICS</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>VENUE</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>1184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>STADIUM</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>SITE</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>CENTRE</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>BIOMETRIC</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>BORDER</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>PARKWIDE</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>ACCESS</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>PERIMETER</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also, within one of our core texts (SIA, 2012a: 2), circumstantial adverb phrases are used (after Halliday and Matthiessen, 2006) to designate the security operation as being widespread, extending beyond the Olympic venues themselves, e.g.:
The Olympic and Paralympic Games will be far more than just a London event.

The need for security stretches far beyond the Olympic Park.

Here, the repeated use of the emphatic premodifier ‘far’ conveys rhetorically the sense of the scope and urgency which the SIA, the security arm of the Home Office, asserts surrounds the London 2012 security operation.

4.3. Prediction

Prediction has become a principal role of the security services, with modern police forces being increasingly organised around ‘a few highly qualified people...[who]...make prospective analyses based on statistical knowledge, hypothetical correlations and supposed trends’ (Bigo, 2008: 35). Distinctive statements emerge within our corpus relating to the identification and assessment of possible dangers facing the 2012 Games. For example, the following passage from a core text includes several closely packed linguistic indicators of the strategy of prediction, embedded within a wider ranging language of contemporary ‘governance’ (Mulderigg, 2011a; 2011b).

A key element of our strategy is to identify any threats to the Games accurately and at an early stage. This enables us to take appropriate action to ensure that they are disrupted before they can have any impact on safety and security (HMO, 2011a: 11).

The transition of this sequence of clauses from a mental process (‘identify’) to a material process (‘disrupt’) (after Halliday and Matthiessen, 2006) is suggestive of a causal link between the semiotic processes of surveillance and the materiality of intervention; while the adverbial phrases in the first sentence - ‘accurately’ and ‘at an early stage’ – specify the technical parameters of the security operation. The logical transition between the first and second sentence is realized by the insertion of the less easily classifiable verbs ‘enable’ and ‘ensure’. However, on Mulderigg’s description, these verbs realize a process type specialized to the ‘grammar of governance’ called ‘managing actions’(2011a: 53-58). In keeping with
this contemporary modality of discourse, the use of first person pronominal forms – ‘our’, ‘us’ – also creates a sense of proactive engagement on the part of the government department though a discursive process of ‘personalisation’ (Mulderigg, 2011b: 565-569).

The strategy of prediction is also realized in a number of the strongest 200 keywords in our corpus. Those, which on detailed qualitative examination, appear to be strongly consistent with this strategy are: EMERGENCY (ranked 43rd, LL 941), PLANNING (ranked 89th, LL 575), RISKS (ranked 96th, LL 553), STRATEGY (ranked 102th, LL 530), RISK (ranked 144th, LL 393), FORECAST (ranked 163rd, LL 353), and DETECTION (ranked 196th, LL 299). While the prominence of EMERGENCY can be partly accounted for by the frequent occurrence of the phrase ‘emergency services’ (n=115), some instances nevertheless clearly realize this strategy, e.g.:

Challenges during Games time include public order, crowd control, transport, road traffic, serious crime, emergency planning and counter-terrorism measures (London Assembly, 2012: 14).

PLANNING also collocates strongly with ‘security’, which emerges as its most frequent lexical collocate (n=47), e.g.:

Intelligence will remain critical to the understanding of threats and the evaluation of risk. Safety and security planning and delivery will be intelligence-led and risk-based (HMO, 2011b: 11).

Here, the collocation ‘security planning’ appears within a co-text saturated with linguistic forms suggestive of prediction: the nominal phrases ‘understanding of threats’ and ‘evaluation of risk’, as well as the compound adjective ‘risk-based’ - which appears to have more of a rhetorical than a substantive function. An investigation of RISK and RISKS yields language thus deployed:

And our Olympic Security plans take into account the need to cope with the risk of either planned or spontaneous disorder and to ensure the police have the resources they need to deal with it (May, 2011).

This example is notable for its euphemistic labelling of potential attacks. Many incidences of RISK and its top lexical collocates, assessment (ranked first, n=42) and assessed (ranked
fifth, n=27), are accounted for by documents’ reference to one specific policy - the *Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment:* initialised as ‘OSSRA’. This policy is described as containing:

[…] assessments of the relative severity of a wide range of major accidents or natural events (collectively known as *hazards*) and malicious attacks (known as *threats*), as well as assessments of the potential risks that serious and organised crime, public disorder and domestic extremism may pose to safety and security during the Games (HMO, 2011d: 2).

Here, OSSRA divides risks taxonomically into ‘hazards’ and ‘threats’. Of these, THREAT (ranked 220th, LL 233) emerges as the more salient across the corpus and evidence that it realizes the strategy of prediction can be found in the following:

We know we face a real and enduring threat from terrorism and we know that the games – as an iconic event – will represent a target for terrorist groups (May, 2012).

The most frequent collocate for THREAT is *level* (n=25). This relates closely to OSSSRA’s rating system, which describes perceived dangers from terrorism:

The threat level represents the likelihood of an attack in the near future. The five levels are:

- **CRITICAL** - an attack is expected imminently
- **SEVERE** - an attack is highly likely
- **SUBSTANTIAL** - an attack is a strong possibility
- **MODERATE** - an attack is possible but not likely
- **LOW** - an attack is unlikely (HMO, 2012)

The same document designates the current threat level to the UK as ‘SUBSTANTIAL’. This example would therefore suggest that the predictive function of the banopticon is not only to identify a generic threat, but also to rank it.

In contradistinction to these precise assertions of the likelihood of an attack, an examination of threat as a collocate of TERRORISM indicates that the perpetrators are hardly ever specified, and where they are, only anachronistically (Fig. 1). This concordance data reveals only two attributions of terrorism, to the ‘Northern Irish’ (l.2), and ‘related to Northern Ireland’ (l. 3). Thus there appears to be a general reluctance to actually specify the likely
origins of a terrorist threat within these policy documents. TERRORISM also emerges in its own right as a strong keyword across our corpus (ranked 54th, LL 820). In a core document relating to the security strategy for the Games, the Home Office states boldly:

The greatest threat to the security of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games is terrorism (HMO, 2011b: 12).

However, it is notable that the concept occurs only as an abstraction and, again, the noun ‘terrorist’ does not appear anywhere to attribute agency to ‘terror’.

**Fig 1: concordance for terrorism+ threat**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Concordance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>any given time. Threat from international terrorism The current threat level is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>possibility. Threat from Northern Irish terrorism The current threat level is set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>for setting the threat level from terrorism related to Northern Ireland,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>the level of threat the UK faces from terrorism at any given time. This system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>the UK’s work to counter the threat from terrorism. Our primary objective is to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Terrorism The threat from terrorism to the United Kingdom is real</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>we face a real and enduring threat from terrorism and we know that the games –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>our plans on the basis of a national terrorism threat level of SEVERE; • the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The UK faces a sustained threat from terrorism. Beyond traditional methods of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>basis that the national threat level from terrorism will be SEVERE and requires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>in place to combat the threat of global terrorism. 12.2 Activist minorities Alert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>an increase in the threat level from terrorism to CRITICAL. 52. All delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>setting the threat level from international terrorism. To do this, they consider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>the level of threat the UK faces from terrorism at any given time. Threat from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>to this effort. Whether the threat is from terrorism, serious crime and fraud,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Terrorism The threat from terrorism to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>the threat from Northern Ireland related terrorism and international terrorism,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>strategy to counter the threat of terrorism a close working relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.4. Pedagogisation

In order to provide security, LOGOC required that tens of thousands of specially recruited staff be trained for the 2012 Games. Our core texts reveal an intense concern with the provision and monitoring of this process. For example, this extract includes the following series of instructions:

We have published guidance on our website advising people of the circumstances in which they can and cannot work legally … Security operatives must comply with the law which we and our partners will continue to enforce during this period (SIA, 2012b: 1).
Here the addressers, ‘we’, are positioned in the text as both the authors of the document and the enforcers of prohibitions relating to the integrity of the security operation. This insistence upon the need for legislative control of security operatives recurs elsewhere in this text and throughout the corpus, e.g.:

It is a legal requirement that an individual who provides defined manned guarding services in the UK holds the appropriate licence (SIA, 2012c: 1).

…it is a criminal offence to work in a licensable security role without the relevant SIA licence. (SIA, 2012a: 3).

In different documents, the repeated impersonal formula ‘it is...’ combines with opposing articulations of the same phrase, ‘legal requirement’ and ‘criminal offence’, to construct a ‘doxa’ (after Bourdieu, 1991), stipulating the presence of a ‘licence’ as the authoritative signifier of identity. A further stipulation attempts to eliminate the arbitrary relationship between the ‘title’ on the licence (signifier) and the actual ‘job’ enacted by its holder (signified) in order to delineate stable, and strongly specified, categories of subject.

It is important to note that it is not what your job title is, but what you do that defines if you need a licence. For example, you may be referred to as a personal trainer, or a coach, or maybe a chauffeur, but if you provide any of the licensable services defined in this guidance … without a licence you will be committing an offence and be liable to criminal prosecution (SIA, 2012a: 6).

Here, we have the now customary emphasis introduced by the clause ‘It is important’, the insistent, direct address of the operative repeating the personal pronouns ‘you’ and ‘yours’, and the conclusion of this extract with a double threat specified by the unmodalised future auxiliary ‘will’.

The precise nature of the security provision is further specified through its pedagogic programming. In order to get a licence, ‘operatives’ either have to show evidence of previous experience or undergo a proscribed training programme, e.g.:

Close protection training takes 146 hours, door supervision 30 hours and security guarding 26 hours. This training can only be delivered by training providers who have been approved by SIA endorsed organisations (SIA, 2012a: 2).
Moreover, it is not just ‘security operatives’ who are specified in this document, but also ‘training providers’. Therefore, a clearly demarcated hierarchy of disciplinary subjects appears to be constituted in these documents: ‘we and our partners’ (government agents and their proxies); ‘training providers’ (pedagogues); and, by implication, their trainees.

TRAINING, a keyword in the corpus (ranked 220th, LL 332), is frequently deployed within passages realising this strategy. Less than 5% of incidences of the term, analysed in a randomised sample, appear to relate to athletic training (as one might perhaps expect in a corpus of documents relating to the Olympic Games). Overwhelmingly, it refers to the pedagogic process via which personnel are prepared to assume security roles. In the following, the application of training as a ‘disciplinary’ technology can be glimpsed (c.f. Foucault, 1977):

Bridging the Gap is made up to four short training units dependent on your role. You’ll need to complete the training units required for your role as well as pass an interview and be 18 years old by 1st July before you can start employment:

- Level 2 Award in Door Supervision – 38 hours or four days Skills for Security training (Including Argus Briefing)
- X-Ray operator training (If required for Games Time Role)
- Role specific training  

(Bridging the Gap, 2012)

The concern which is realised within our corpus around the regulation of security operatives is also reflected in the relative strength of ACCREDITATION and ACCREDITED as keywords (respectively ranked 45th, LL 912; ranked 118th, LL 460). Lexical collocates of ACCREDITATION are card (n =34), identity (n =23 ) and, intriguingly, category (n =16 ). Even the ‘indexical’ text of this card (after Pierce, 1998) becomes tightly proscribed by the documents, e.g.

...“accr...
as is the nature of its articulation upon the securitised subject of the 2012 Games:

Many of the people attending the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games venues for official or work purposes will need to be accredited ... Accreditation is the process of identifying and issuing a pass to those individuals who will need access to Olympic and Paralympic venues in an official capacity during the Games... Accreditation passes are used to identify people and their roles at the Games and to allow access to relevant sites ... (HMO, 2011c).

This is confirmed by the word’s regularly associated clusters: identity and accreditation (n=12) and accreditation card (n=12).

5. Discussion

Recent empirical work in international relations and sociology has suggested that a new modality of (in)security has been brought into play within advanced capitalist societies. In particular, it has been proposed that the contemporary ‘management of unease’ establishes a ‘ban-optic dispositif’ in UK, France and other countries in the EU (Bigo, 2008: 10). The range of distinctive linguistic features set out above have been mapped onto three key features of this banopticon: exceptionalism, exclusion and prediction, as well as what we have called ‘pedagogisation’.

Previous research carried out in the fields of sociology, criminology, urban studies and sports science (e.g. Boyle et al., 2009; Coaffee et al., 2011; Fussey, 2012; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2011; Samatas, 2011; Yu et al, 2009) has suggested the Summer Olympic Games generate localised conditions under which exceptional legal, military and policiary measures are put in place which often remain indefinitely after the Games have ended. Exceptionalism is also for Bigo, a principal ‘dimension’ of the banoptic ‘dispositif” (2008: 31-36). Our analysis suggests that a range of linguistic devices were deployed to give the impression that London 2012 constituted an exceptional set of circumstances: the use of superlative and limit adjectives, regular references to the impact of the Games on different security sectors and regular references to their simultaneity with other sizeable British events. In keeping with Tsoukala,
the function of these hyperbolic descriptions was to create a set of imaginary relations between the Games and its wider context, which could be used as a logical pretext to justify the scale and extent of the security operation for London 2012. This security operation was dubbed insistently in the corpus with the noun phrase ‘safety and security’ in order to yoke the positive connotations the word ‘safety’ with the more problematic concept of ‘security’, and imbue it with greater positivity. The combination of nouns was also used so repetitiously, and in a manner which became so devoid of context, that it appeared to become a ‘reified’ concept across the corpus (after Lukacs, 1923/1967).

The second ‘defining trait’ of the banopticon is its ‘ability to construct categories of excluded people connected to the management of life’. This practice of exclusion is closely linked to a contemporary principle of normalisation which ‘occurs primarily through …the imperative of free movement of people’ (Bigo, 2008: 35-36). In short, the banopticon operates through maintaining the free movement of ‘normal’ populations within and across borders; while identifying and restricting the movement of those identified as constituting a ‘threat’ to society, usually being classified along a cline which runs from ‘immigrant’ to ‘terrorist’.

There appeared little doubt on our reading of core texts and subsequent corpus analysis, that control of mobility was a principal tactic whereby power was articulated upon the Olympic subject, whether constituted as ‘visitors’, ‘spectators’ or ‘Olympic Games Family Members’ (‘OGFMs’). Not only did we find linguistic assertions of an intensified regulation of movement across national borders but - most strikingly - a distinctive form of site specialised to the Games, the ‘Venue’, appeared to be discursively constituted with a set of minutely specified controls on the movement of micro-populations into and out of each event. In this respect, the principle of control, surveillance and regulation, which within the Schengen Zone allegedly only takes place on the outer perimeters of member states, now appears to be
subject to a process of discursive multiplication and mimesis actually within the borders of the UK.

However, while we discovered evidence of the principle of exclusion as a general discursive strategy, we found fewer signs of a one key related component of the banopticon: the identification and expulsion of particular groups of subjects. While a range of lexis relating to the strategy of prediction emerged from our analysis - with THREAT being a particularly salient keyword - attribution of the ‘threat’ to the Games to any particular individual, group or movement appeared to be absent; and the only two instances of attribution - to the ‘Northern Irish’ - were bizarrely anachronistic. This refusal to identify oppositional groups as enemy – and noticeably from the point of view of recent history the total absence of the terms ‘Al Qaeda’, Islamist’ or ‘Muslim’ from the corpus – was found even more compellingly in another corpus of documents which related to UK government security between 2001 and 2011 (MacDonald, Hunter and O’Regan, forthcoming). We infer therefore that this elision would appear to be a widespread political tactic articulated within security discourse, at least of the UK government. Instead, the attribution of main threat to the Games was restricted to the abstract notion of TERRORISM; this emerged not only as a strong keyword within our corpus, but also collocated frequently with threat.

In his description of ‘the field of professional of the management of unease’, Bigo distinguishes between ‘two types of policing [that] appear within the parameters of the national police institutions’:

…the first employs unqualified or minimally qualified personnel, who are however present and visible at a local level as an auxiliary to the municipality, the prefecture, or other police. The second type takes the opposite approach by employing a few, highly qualified people, who are in close contact with other security and social control agencies, characterised by discretion and distance…these individuals take it as their mission to prevent crime by acting upon conditions in a pro-active way, anticipating where crime might occur and who might generate it (2008: 21).
The polarisation between the technologies of prediction and our final set of linguistic features, relating to what we call ‘pedagogisation’, confirms this dichotomy within contemporary policing and gave rise to two key areas of problematisation within our texts. The first relates to the identification and regulation of these ‘unqualified or minimally qualified personnel’. And the second relates to the ad hoc recruitment and training that was provided for additional security operatives for the Games; hence the relative strength of the keyword ACCREDITATION within our corpus. In the event, it was precisely this which gave rise to the greatest source of concern in the public sphere in the final few days before the start of the Games. With just over two weeks to go before the opening ceremony for the Games, it emerged that the security firm G4S - 25 of whose documents were included in our corpus - might have fallen as many as 9,000 security personnel short of its promised quota, resulting in the military being required to provide 3,500 extra troops to patrol the Games (Taylor, 2012).

To conclude, this sample of documents would appear to share the same paradox as the discursive formation surrounding Victorian pederasty which Michel Foucault described in the *History of Sexuality Vol. 1* (1984). While it is undeniable that the North-Western reaches of Europe and their transatlantic ally have experienced five terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2011, in the attempt to allay further major incidents, a massive discursive effort has been expended which - rather than dispelling the phenomenon of terrorism - actually constitutes terrorism as a chimera within each ensuing panoply of official documentation. The mantra, ‘[t]he Olympic and Paralympic Games … are sporting and entertainment events, not security events’ (SIA, 2012b), is now transmitted across successive Games, via the ‘Secure by Design’ template constructed in the wake of 9/11 (Coaffee et al., 2011: 3318; Fussey, 2012: 87). However the ‘discursive formation’ relating to security, sampled, above indicates that the reverse is actually the case. The rolling juggernaut of the modern Summer Olympics
appears to provide a quadrennial platform for the talking into being of a hypostatised ‘terrorist threat’ in order to create a pretext for the implementation of periodic massive security operations in major cities around the world. Whilst in less democratic societies such as China, the development and implementation of a surveillance complex does nothing for the democratisation of the state (Samatas, 2011: 3358-60); in purportedly democratic societies such as Greece and Britain, the undemocratic tendencies of such pervasive and potentially permanent surveillance appear to militate against the foundational ideal of the Olympic Games themselves (Tsoukala, 2006: 53).

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Malcolm MacDonald is an Associate Professor in the Centre for Applied Linguistics, University of Warwick, England. His main research interests lie in institutional discourse, with a particular interest in security discourse, global governance and medical discourse; and intercultural communication, with a particular interest in the ethics of intercultural communication.

Duncan Hunter is a Lecturer at University College Plymouth St Mark & St John. He completed his PhD in Applied Linguistics at the University of Warwick. His research interests include corpus analysis and language teaching methodology.