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Give it up for climate change : a defence of the beneficiary pays principle

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Page, Edward (2012) Give it up for climate change : a defence of the beneficiary pays principle. International Theory, Vol.4 (No.2). pp. 300-330. doi:10.1017/S175297191200005X

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S175297191200005X

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Abstract

This article focuses on the normative problem of establishing how the burdens associated with implementing policies designed to prevent, or manage, climate change should be shared amongst states involved in ongoing international climate change negotiations. This problem has three key features: identifying the nature and extent of the burdens that need to be borne; identifying the type of agent that should be allocated these burdens; and distributing amongst the particular ‘tokens’ of the relevant ‘agent type’ climatic burdens according to principles that none could reasonably reject. The article defends a key role in climatic burden-sharing policy for the principle that states benefiting most from activities that cause climate change should bear the greatest burden in terms of the costs of preventing dangerous climate change. I outline two versions of this ‘beneficiary pays’ principle; examine the strengths and weakness of each version; and explore how the most plausible version (which I call the ‘unjust enrichment’ account) could be operationalized in the context of global climate governance.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: J Political Science > JZ International relations
Q Science > QC Physics
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Politics and International Studies
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Climatic changes -- Government policy, Climate change mitigation, International cooperation
Journal or Publication Title: International Theory
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISSN: 1752-9719
Official Date: July 2012
Dates:
DateEvent
July 2012Published
Volume: Vol.4
Number: No.2
Number of Pages: 31
Page Range: pp. 300-330
DOI: 10.1017/S175297191200005X
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Funder: Uppsala universitet

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