Butterfill, Stephen A. (Stephen Andrew). (2012) Interacting mindreaders. Philosophical Studies . ISSN 1573-0883 (In Press)
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9980-x
Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader's target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions are needed to standard theories of the evidential basis of mindreading. The view also has consequences for understanding how abilities to interact combined with comparatively simple forms of mindreading may explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of social cognition.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Philosophy of mind, Social perception, Interaction (Philosophy)|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Philosophical Studies|
|Publication Status:||In Press|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
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