"Spinoza, Gueroult, and Substance"
Smith, A. D. (Arthur David). (2012) "Spinoza, Gueroult, and Substance". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research . ISSN 1933-1592Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00611.x
Martial Gueroult’s monumental two-volume work on Spinoza, published almost fifty years ago, is widely recognised as one of the most significant contributions to Spinoza scholarship. One of Gueroult’s fundamental claims, however, is almost universally rejected. This is his claim that in the first few Propositions of the Ethics Spinoza, despite his considered view that there is but a single substance in the world, which possesses all attributes, is restricting his attention to substances of a single attribute, of which there are many. It is these single-attribute substances that are, according to Gueroult, eventually synthesised into a single substance, thereby becoming the latter’s attributes. A detailed case for Gueroult’s interpretation has never been fully set out (even by Gueroult himself). In this paper I attempt to do this, because, despite its widespread rejection, Gueroult’s interpretation of the opening of Spinoza’s Ethics is, I contend, essentially correct. If this is so, almost every treatment of the Ethics that deals with its foundational first few pages is seriously in error.]
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Philosophy and Phenomenological Research|
|Number of Pages:||34|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
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