Narratives of Ethnicity and Nationalism
A Case Study of Circassians in Jordan

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Abstract

This research is an exploration of ethnic narratives of the Circassian community in Jordan, in addition to the nationalist narratives promoted by the state of Jordan, and their reconstruction by the research participants. This research aims to understand how the research participants, as non-Arabs, understand and makes sense of the Pan-Arab ethnonational narratives promoted by the state through the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign and textbooks of national and civic education. It also seeks to understand the ethnic narratives of the Circassian community. It highlights the fact that ethnic narratives are often contextualised, and come to light always in comparison to the other. It also shows how ethnic narratives are gendered, can include or exclude women, and gender relations are ethnicised, or in other words used as markers for group boundaries.

The main aim of this research is to unpack the research participants’ conceptualisations of Jordan and the Pan-Arabism, and to understand the strategies they use to include themselves within these narratives. It intends to evaluate whether research participants see themselves as integrated into the Jordanian society or not. Whereas the community itself is often portrayed as integrated into the society, because many of them are in high governmental positions, and the ceremonial guards of the Royal Family are the Circassians, it is also important to examine whether they believe that they are, and how. This thesis contributes to the literature on ethnicity and nationalism based on a minority with unique profile, and also contributes to the overall body of literature on state nationalism in the Middle East. The research has been approached through the use of both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. It is based on the analysis of textbooks of national and civic education, and the ‘Jordan First’ campaign, in addition to 13 interviews and 62 questionnaires.
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Introduction

The Personal and The Political

Having coffee and my regular morning smoke, outside the Language Centre at the University of Jordan, a Jordanian colleague wearing a colourful badge with the motto ‘Jordan First’ on it passed by. It was wintertime, and I was having my cigarette outside in the cold. That was the first time I had seen the ‘Jordan First’ motto, and I exclaimed ‘what does that mean?’ My colleague answered vehemently ‘this is a campaign to prioritise the welfare of the state of Jordan over personal greed’. I asked if I could wear one, and where she had got it. Then she hesitantly answered ‘yes, you can if you want to. Ask at the Student Union, they might give you one but I am not sure’. After advising me that smoking is not good for girls or for their reputation, she left me wondering why they only ‘might’ give me a badge. I started thinking that maybe it was because I am Palestinian.

A few weeks earlier, students were organising a demonstration on campus against the Israeli occupation of Palestine. I was having a smoke with friends, and I suddenly heard screaming and tear gas bombs dropping from outside the university campus on demonstrators. Students started running away in various directions. The bombs started falling next to me and my friends, one of whom lost consciousness. I dropped the cigarette and helped carry her away from the action. Amidst the mess, a male friend exclaimed ‘how come you did not lose consciousness like the other girls?’ He then explained ‘it must be because you smoke, it makes you stronger!’ At that time, the demonstration had already been torn apart, some students were being carried to hospital, and the Jordanian SWAT team was encircling the university to make sure that they caught the organisers, who could be identified with the help of some Jordanian students affiliated to the secret intelligence services. This was also confusing for me, because the demonstration was against ‘Israel,’ and why would an
‘Arab’ country want to silence the ‘Arab’ Palestinians, who were demonstrating against the illegal occupation of their own land.

A couple of weeks later, same old story. Having a smoke outside the humanities building, I saw a group of students pushing and hitting each other. The fight stopped for half an hour, then suddenly, a gang of men emerged carrying truncheons and leather belts, screaming ‘women out of the way! Move out of the way!’ I left the whole humanities building because lectures were cancelled anyway amidst the anarchy. The next day, I asked in the department about the reason behind all this. I was told by a Palestinian friend that a Palestinian man had had a fight with two Bedouin Jordanians, and the Palestinian was ‘so strong that he broke someone’s hand’. But the injured man’s tribe did not let this go, and reorganised their men to beat the Palestinian boy’. I asked what happened then, and he said ‘all the Palestinian men at university got together, and both sides had casualties but no one was killed, and they did not capture the Palestinian man’.

On another occasion, I was also socialising on campus with friends, a group of handsome men sat opposite to us. I asked one of my male friends if he knew them. Then, he said ‘yes, they are Circassians, they are very proud people, they are not Arabs; they come from somewhere in Russia and they consider themselves Jordanians, and Jordanians love them’. At that time it occurred to me that during my school years, we were taught that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country. My school years were in Jerusalem, and we followed the Jordanian curriculum at that time. I also remembered being taught that all borders between ‘Arab’ countries are fictitious, that all ‘Arabs’ are the same and that they share the same culture. In the real world, this never seemed to be true.

The Circassians are loved by the Jordanians I heard, although they are not ‘Arabs’, while the ‘Arab’ Palestinians are not equally accepted. From that moment, my interest grew more and more to learn about why the ‘non-Arab’ Muslim
Circassians are welcomed on ‘Arab’ lands, while Palestinian ‘Arabs’ apparently are not treated the same way. I also heard that the Circassians attain good governmental positions and that they are the ceremonial guards of the Royal family. In contrast, I, as a Palestinian, always felt excluded and discriminated against. This contrast triggered my interest in researching the Circassians in Jordan, because it posed questions of the differential integration of the Circassian and Palestinian communities in Jordan.

Through my experiences in Jordan and what I had heard about the Circassian community, I felt that the Circassians were more integrated than the Palestinians. Integration is, however, multi-layered, and it can be looked at economically, politically and socially. There is, therefore, no single measure for integration. On the economic and political levels, Circassians in Jordan seem to be integrated, as it is generally agreed that they ‘have become largely a middle-class urban community with a strong presence in the civil services and national military establishment’ (Chatty, 2010: 122). In this sense the Circassians are accepted and have become part of the majority, or a ‘dominant minority’ (ibid: 122). However, this does not necessarily mean that they identify themselves, or are identified as ‘Arabs’ in a state that defines itself as an ‘Arab’ state. This research looks at how Circassians situate themselves in an ‘Arab’ context and how, while they are excluded from the state’s narrative of ‘Arabism’, they are in other senses integrated into Jordanian society; a situation which contrasts with that of ‘Arab’ Palestinians.

In light of this contradiction, I was interested in exploring whether Circassians identify with the state of Jordan and how they understand their position in Jordanian society. A comparative study of Circassians and Palestinians has been impossible because the state of Jordan bans the production of any research on the Palestinians. Although I would have liked to do a comparison between the

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¹ One of my friends wanted to conduct research on Palestinian refugees in Jordan. After contacting the department of Palestinian affairs in Jordan, she was informed that she would not be allowed to
Palestinians and the Circassians, the Circassian experience provides rich information about the life of a minority group in the state of Jordan, in terms of their understanding and conceptualisation of ethnic narratives, and their interpretation and reconstruction of the nationalist narratives promoted by the state. This research was not only designed for that, but also because of my personal interest in understanding the relationship between the Circassian community and the state of Jordan, and to see if their reconstruction of nationalist narratives of the state is different from my own construction, as a Palestinian.

My interest in Jordanian nationalism grew with time. This idea of a ‘nation’ contrasted with what I had been taught in school, that all ‘Arabs’ share the same ‘Arabic’ culture, the same ‘Arabic’ language, and that they are one nation. However, I always felt in Jordan like a Palestinian, discriminated against, and with no legal standing. I came to realise that what we are taught in national and civic education textbooks from the first till the twelfth grade about the ‘Arabs’ being one nation is not applied in reality. Realising that the Circassians are not ‘Arabs’, yet are welcomed on ‘Arab’ Jordanian lands more openly than the ‘Arab’ Palestinians, made me interested in trying to understand how and why the Circassians are more accepted on social and political levels in Jordan. To understand this relationship between the Circassians and the state of Jordan, I designed this research to unpack the ethnic narratives of the Circassian community in Jordan, and also to unpack the nationalist narratives of the state of Jordan. I became interested in how research participants made sense of the concept of ‘Arabism’, and of their own ethnic narratives as a ‘non-Arab’ diasporic community. To identify and understand the state’s nationalist narratives, I chose to refer to the national and civic education curriculum and the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign, because they are the main platforms explaining the state’s nationalist ideologies.
My interest grew in the ‘Jordan First’ campaign, first and foremost, because it gave me a feeling of exclusion as a Palestinian, and I started wondering if ‘non-Arab’ Circassians would feel the same. The ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign was launched in October 2002, when I was doing my undergraduate degree in Jordan, during a time when I felt discriminated against as a Palestinian. Moreover, the textbooks of national and civic education that I studied at school from the first to the twelfth grade, vehemently emphasise the fact that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country and Jordanians are part of an ‘Arab’ nation. During my undergraduate years in Jordan I felt that this was not reflected in reality. For example, around 70 percent of guest workers in Jordan are from the ‘Arab’ Republic of Egypt (Hazaimeh, 2010), but several human rights reports have been issued about the maltreatment of these Egyptian workers in Jordan (United States Department of State, 2010). Palestinians, who are ‘Arab’ Jordanian nationals, are reported to be

‘underrepresented in government and suffer discrimination in appointments to government and military positions, as well as admission to universities and access to university scholarships’ (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2002: paragraph 2).

Therefore, the ‘non-Arab’ Circassians not only represent a unique profile of a diasporic community in the Middle East, but also cast doubt on Jordan’s claim to be an ‘Arab’ state. It is important to bring forward here the argument that the fluidity of the term ‘Arab’ makes it difficult to understand who the ‘Arabs’ are, or what ‘Arabism’ is about. At the same time, the fluidity of the term Circassian makes it problematic to presume who the Circassians are, or to classify them into fixed categories. Therefore, throughout the thesis I will be using the term ‘Arab’ in scare quotes, due to the fluidity and ambiguity of the term. One of the main points to be clarified is that, given that this thesis is based on the viewpoints of research participants, the terms ‘Arab’, ‘Arabism’, and ‘Circassian’ are used according to the meanings attributed to them by the research participants, from below. For those
reasons, this research aims to understand the position of the Circassian community in Jordan from their own point of view. It aims to unpack the themes of textbooks of national and civic education, in addition to the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign, and to explore how Circassians make sense of those themes. It is designed to identify the relationship between the Circassians and the state of Jordan, from the point of view of research participants. It seeks to evaluate the conventional wisdom that Circassians are accepted in Jordanian society, from the research participants’ viewpoints, and how they conceptualise this notion of acceptance. It is an exploration of narratives of ethnicity and nationalism. It looks at the narratives of ethnicity that Circassians use to identify themselves, as a group. It evaluates the narratives of nationalism promoted by the state of Jordan, and how those narratives are reconstructed by research participants. The research also investigates gender relations as part of ethnic and nationalist narratives, and how those narratives are themselves gendered. This thesis is designed to answer the following research questions:

- What are the ethnic narratives mobilised by the Circassians in Jordan? Do they differ depending on age and gender?
- What are the nationalist narratives and ideologies the state of Jordan promotes through ‘Jordan First’ and textbooks of national and civic education?
- How do research participants make sense of and reconstruct state narratives?
- What is the relationship between the state of Jordan and its Circassian community? Is the conventional wisdom relating to their integration accurate?

This thesis is divided into eight chapters, the first three start with setting the research context, locating the research within the literature, and exploring the methodologies used for this research. The second part of the thesis, from chapter four, presents the research findings and answers the research questions. Due to the
The complicated history of Circassian diaspora and the Middle East generally, the first chapter of this thesis presents some background information about the Circassian people, where they originate from and shows how their links to Islam date back to the Islamic Abbasid Caliphates (from 750 to 1258). Chapter one also looks at the history of the Ottoman Empire, its expansion and dissolution. Background information presented about the Ottoman Empire shows how the Circassian exodus took place during Ottoman times, and how the Ottomans collaborated with the Russians, following the Russo-Ottoman wars, to remove the Circassians from their original homeland. The chapter also shows the bad migration conditions Circassians went through, and how they were subjected to the Ottoman slave trade during, and even before, their migration. It also explains how upon their arrival in what is now called Jordan, the area was under Ottoman rule, and it also shows how the identity of the area changed from being Islamic under Ottoman rule, to ‘Arab’ following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The chapter also shows the process of formation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, from an emirate under the British mandate of Palestine and Transjordan, to a kingdom, and also explores the history of Amman, explaining the historical context of Circassians in Jordan. The chapter also traces, historically, the tensions between the Palestinians and the Kingdom of Jordan, the assassination of King Abdullah I by a Palestinian, and how those tensions escalated to cause a civil war in 1970, under King Hussein’s reign. This chapter is important to clarify the context of the research historically and sociologically.

Chapter two provides a review of the literature around the main concepts deployed in this research. It discusses the concepts of ethnicity, nationalism, diasporic communities, state ethnonationalism and narratives of the state. The chapter explains that there are two views of the concept of ethnicity, one as socially constructed, which holds that ethnic groups do not exist naturally, and a second concept, which assumes that ethnic groups emerge naturally or that ethnicities are primordial. It explains how the first definition of the term ethnicity is used in this
research, as socially constructed, and that social actors use narratives to define social
groups that are also constructed and not based on natural forms of attachment. The
chapter also discusses the concept of nationalism, and explains that I also use this
term as a social construct, and that states use narratives to promote nationalism. It
sheds light on the fact that ethnicities and nationalisms are often (re)constructed and
the boundaries of ‘nations’ and ‘ethnic groups’ are fluid. Chapter two explains that
states themselves use all available means, such as media, campaigns and education,
to promote narratives of nationalism and the nation, such as the ‘Jordan First’
campaign. Chapter two also sheds light on the gendered aspects of those concepts,
and explains how ethnicity can be gendered, and how gender can be ethnicised. It
shows how gender is central to the study of ethnicity and nationalism, particularly
because it serves as a marker of group boundaries, which in turn causes women to
be controlled as ‘bearers’, ‘preservers’ and ‘reproducers’ of the nation.

Chapter three presents the story of the research, from its early beginnings. It
explains the process of its development and the methods used, how the research
developed into its current state, and the stages the research and the researcher went
through. The research included analysis and identification of state nationalist
narratives promoted by textbooks of national and civic education, as well as the
‘Jordan First’ campaign. The analysis was followed by interviews and a distribution
of questionnaires to individuals who had identified themselves as members of the
Circassian community. The chapter also discusses the emergence of unplanned
ethnography as a consequence of a lengthy period in the field, and reflects on my
own position in the field, as an ‘Arab’ Palestinian, and my feelings during the
interviews.

Chapter four, Narratives of Ethnicity, the first analytical chapter, deals with
the narratives that research participants identified as part of their group identity. It
shows that narratives of ethnicity always depend on context and are relational, often
being used to emphasise the boundaries of the group in relation to the ‘other’ and in
this case the ‘Arabs’. Research participants referred to two types of narratives: narratives drawing on concepts of origin portrayed as fixed, and other narratives that view ethnicity as changing. It explains how participants believe that family names, roots, origin, race, blood, and colour are non-changing and everlasting. It also demonstrates that those ‘non-changing’ narratives of ethnicity are usually seen as inherited from the father’s side, and that women cannot transfer ethnicity and family names to their children, because of the patrilineal kinship system of Circassian society. Moreover, the changing aspects of ethnicity, as identified by research participants, relating to culture, upbringing, traditions and language, are also defined in relation to the ‘other’. The chapter briefly identifies how gender relations are used as part of these ethnic narratives, and how ethnic narratives are gendered. Elaboration on how gender relations are part of ethnic narratives, and ethnic narratives are gendered is provided in chapter five, Gendering Ethnicity and Ethnicising Gender.

The fifth chapter shows how narratives of gender and ethnicity intersect, leading to the ethnicisation of gender, and the gendering of ethnicity. It shows how research participants attempted to highlight the differences between them and ‘Arab’ society in terms of gender relations, by talking about differences in terms of marriage and kinship structures, and the ‘Arab’s control’ of women vs. the Circassian notion of ‘respect’. It shows that the preservation of language, culture and upbringing is the responsibility of women in Circassian society. Nevertheless, the fact that these ethnic narratives are seen as ‘changing’, in addition to the patrilineal system of descent, undermines women’s roles in the reproduction of ‘non-changing’ ethnic narratives.

Chapters six and seven focus on the relationship between the research participants and the state of Jordan. Chapter six draws on the narratives of state nationalism promoted in textbooks of national and civic education, and the ‘Jordan First’ campaign, and looks at how research participants reconstruct those narratives.
State nationalism, or Jordanianism, is deconstructed into two main components: ‘Pan-Arabism’ and Pan-Islamism, and deconstruction shows that Islam is used to legitimise the concept of ‘Arabism’ as a form of nationalism. This chapter also shows how research participants tended to de-ethnicise narratives of Jordanianism to position themselves within Jordan.

Chapter seven also shows that, despite the fact that the narratives that the state of Jordan promotes do not view Islam as part of a nationalist ideology, research participants in their (re)construction of the narratives of the state believe that Islam constitutes an important part of the state’s narratives. On the other hand, the Hashemites and the land were also used as a way to de-ethnicise the Jordanian narrative from its ‘Arabist’ nature by research participants, although textbooks of national and civic education promote the Hashemites as ‘fathers’ of ‘Pan-Arabism’, and the land as an ‘Arab’ land. Chapter seven focuses on the strategies research participants used to reflect their loyalty and belonging to Jordan, and it also highlights their discomfort with attempts to exclude them from the Jordanian nationalist narrative. It shows how they make an effort to create harmony from the contradictions between ethnic and nationalist narratives. It also explores how their feelings are torn between belonging to Jordan and being pulled towards historic Circassia, their original homeland.

Chapter Eight, the conclusions, explores the research’s contribution to knowledge, the limitations of the study and highlights the main findings emerging from this research. It explores how the thesis has answered the research questions, and how this research provides the literature with an analysis of a unique minority group in the Middle East. It also discusses the question of the integration of Palestinians and Circassians in Jordan, through reflecting on some research findings, in addition to the profile of both groups in Jordan.
Chapter One

Historical Context

Introduction

As this thesis looks at ethnic narratives of the Circassian community in Jordan, this chapter introduces the reader to background information about the Circassian people, where they originate from and the history of their migration and settlement in Jordan. Further, as one of the main aims of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the state of Jordan and the Circassian community, this chapter provides a historical account of this relationship from the Circassians’ arrival in the area that is now called Jordan to the present day. To do this, in the following sections, I trace the origins of the Circassian people, their links to Islam and to the Ottoman Empire. Circassians, a people with their own language, started coming to Jordan from a historic area called Circassia located in North Caucasia, East of the Black Sea, in the second half of the nineteenth century. Circassians are originally North Caucasian. The term Circassian, nowadays, is largely used to refer to the Adyghe people, inhabitants of historic Circassia, and includes the tribes of Cherkes, Shapsugs and Kabardin. However, more accurately, the term is used to refer to all people from the North Caucasus, including the Adyghe tribes originating from Circassia, and the Abkhaz, Abazins and Ubykh, who originate from areas neighbouring Circassia.

Circassians, or as they call themselves Adyghes, consist of different dialect groups. However, the wars that took place in the Caucasus, which will be explained later, and the conditions of their migration and suffering, brought these groups together (Shami, 1996). For example, the Adyghes and the Abazins had different flags (See figures 1.1 and 1.2); however, due to their shared history of migration they identify themselves as Circassian Adyghes. Hewitt (1999) attempts to explain such a relationship by saying that it could have been triggered by,
‘Their close genetic and historical ties as well as by a shared determination that their languages and cultures must not suffer the same fate that overtook their confrères, the Ubykhs’ (Hewitt, 1999: 74).

Moreover, it is argued that a strong factor that leads all North Caucasian groups to classify themselves as the same people, nation or ethnic group, is sharing Nart Sagas tales which are about the myths of origin of the Circassian people (Gay, 2005); the Nart Sagas are discussed in chapter four in relation to Circassians in Jordan.

![Figure 1.1 Adyghe Flag](image1) ![Figure 1.2 Abazins Flag](image2)

In this chapter, I also provide a brief history of the Ottoman Empire, outlining its centrality to the migration flows of Circassians and other groups of peoples from its Eastern European provinces. The Circassians who migrated were Muslims. At the time when the Circassian migration took place in the nineteenth century, the existence of the Ottoman Empire was based on Islam, which served to unify its disparate ethnic subjects. This went along with the recognition of other religious groups, which were allowed the space to govern themselves. This is discussed here in order to explore the ethno-religious communities that existed in the region and the history of their development. Furthermore, this chapter also highlights the history of the Circassian presence specifically in Jordan; their contribution to the building of the state and the initial problems they faced during the early years of their settlement on what is now considered the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It is important to discuss the Ottoman Empire in this chapter, in order to highlight how
the identity of the land of Jordan shifted from what it was under the Islamic based Ottoman Empire, to a different identity under the Hashemite ‘Arab’ based rule. It is important to clarify this shift, because this thesis also explores narratives of nationalism amongst the Circassians and for that reason I explore how ideas about national identity have changed. The chapter also outlines the development of the state of Jordan.

Furthermore, as I previously explained, my main interest in the Circassian community in Jordan emerged from the contrast between their situation and that of the Palestinians; therefore, this chapter also looks at the history of the Palestinian presence in Jordan; the primary focus of the research, however, is the Circassians in Jordan. I do this because I am concerned with narratives of Jordanian nationalism, and the situation of the Palestinians is important in order to understand the history of Jordan and the development of Jordanian nationalism. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), there are around 2,000,000 registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan (UNRWA, 2010); the Palestinian refugee population constitutes around 34 per cent of the total population of Jordan. Moreover, there are also a large number of Palestinians in Jordan who are not registered as refugees; some claim that Palestinians nowadays constitute more than 70 percent of Jordan’s population and most of them have Jordanian nationality (Israeli, 2003). The Palestinians and the Jordanians speak the same language, Arabic, and are only separated geographically by a river.

This chapter follows the history of the Circassians chronologically, thus I begin in the first section by looking at Circassians link to Islam, then the history of the Ottoman Empire. Afterwards, I look at the history of Circassian migration causes and its conditions, and then I move to the Circassian settlement in Jordan, the history of modern Jordan post-Ottoman rule, Circassians’ position in modern Jordan and Palestinian-Jordanian relations.
1.1 Circassians: Origins and Links to Islam

Circassian is the term used to describe the tribes believed to have inhabited the mountainous area between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Circassians are the inhabitants of the northern part of Caucasia, known as Ciscaucasia, while the southern part, home to different tribes, is called Transcaucasia (See figure 1.3 for map). The region is not only home to the Circassian tribes, which call themselves Adyghe, but also to other groups including Chechens, Ossetians and Abazins (Chatty, 2010). Although the term Circassian originally described the Adyghe tribes, who used to inhabit Circassia and included Cherkes, Shapsugs, and Kabardin, the term nowadays is also used to refer to Adyghes, Abazins, Ubykh and Abkhaz (See figure 1.4 for Map of historic Circassia).

![Figure (1.3) Map of the Caucasus adapted from Chatty (2010: 93).](image)

Circassian links to Islam existed even before their adoption of Islam, through the Islamic Mamluk tradition, which began during the Abbasid period of Caliphs, the third of the Islamic Caliphates (from 750 to 1258). Mamluks were children from
non-Muslim religious backgrounds, who were enslaved and taken away from their families by the Abbasid Caliphs, and trained and recruited to become soldiers. Circassians constituted a large part of the Mamluks\(^2\), which means ‘owned’ in Arabic. The Mamluk tradition also survived through the Fatimid Caliphate (909-1171). Those enslaved children were captured from areas near the Caucasus, and north of the Black Sea. During the Mamluk tradition the Caucasus was ruled by Khazars (7\(^{th}\) to 11\(^{th}\) centuries), and the Mongols (13\(^{th}\) to 15\(^{th}\) centuries) (Meri and Bacharach, 2006). There is a general agreement that Circassian people followed a pagan tradition, before adopting Christianity (Meri and Bacharach, 2006; Taitbout De Marigny, 1837). After adopting Christianity, presumably in the Age of Byzantine during the fifth and the sixth centuries, Circassian groups residing in historic Circassia also retained some of their pagan traditions.

![Figure (1.4) Map of Historic Circassia (1872) (Circassian World, 2010)](image)

\(^2\) Historical sources show that Mamluk children included Turks, Circassians and Georgians (Ayalon, 1949).
Mamluks, taken from the Caucasus into the Islamic world, were not ordinary slaves, as they were trained to become soldiers and were allowed to carry weapons. During the Ayyubid Caliphate (1171-1341), Mamluks revolted against the Ayyubid Sultan and killed him, establishing their own Sultanate (1250-1517) with Cairo its centre of power until they were defeated by the Ottomans. Ayalon (1949) traces how Circassians became predominant amongst Mamluks, and he further explains the establishment of ‘Circassian supremacy’ in the Mamluk Sultanate. The Sultanate’s power did not extend beyond the Levant Region, Arabia, Egypt, Sudan and parts of Libya. However, the Mamluk Sultanate retained the Mamluk tradition and brought in from the Caucasus more enslaved children. Therefore, even though Caucasia was not Islamicised before the Ottomans established their rule there, Circassians had links with the Muslim world and Islam from the time of the Abbasid Caliphate. The Mamluk Sultanate was overthrown by the growing and expanding Ottoman Empire in 1516-1517 (Quataert, 2000). However, the Mamluk tradition was perpetuated. It is has been said,

‘During the Ottoman Era, a Mamluk typically was born outside the region, enslaved through war or raids... Governors or military commanders then bought the slave... brought him into the household as a military slave or apprentice and trained him in the administrative and military arts. Manumitted at some point in the training process, the Mamluk continued to serve the master, rose to local pre-eminence and eventually set up his own household, which he staffed through slave purchases, thus perpetuating the system’ (Quataert, 2000: 47).

The Ottoman Empire was established in 1300, as a small state near Constantinople, which grew to a huge empire including lands in Asia, Africa and Europe. It played an important role in the migration of Circassians and shaping the identity of the regions it occupied. Thus the next section provides a brief history of the Ottoman Empire due to its centrality to the history of the region and the history of migration flows.
1.2 The Ottoman Empire

‘The Ottoman Empire... surfaced as an amalgam of many cultures and traditions. Its legitimacy, however, also was rooted in a “universal” faith - the faith of Islam... Because the Sultans conceived of themselves and their society as Muslim and of their state as Islamic, each monarch had to comply, or appear to comply, with the laws of his faith’ (Goffman, 2002: 8).

The Ottoman Empire, which derives its name from Osman I a leader of a tribe of Turcoman nomads, originated in a small area in western Anatolia. By 1300, Ottomans led by Osman were able to take over most of the Anatolian provinces of the Byzantine Empire. They established the Ottoman Government at that time, and Bursa became its capital. The early expansion of the Ottoman Empire depended on creating alliances with neighbouring rulers and then making them vassals to the Ottoman rulers (Quataert, 2000). The dynasty kept on expanded its empire through warfare; in 1453 the Ottomans were able to capture Constantinople making it the capital of the empire a few decades after its capture. It is noted that the Ottomans’ expansion was steady from 1300 to 1699, and they remained in power till the beginning of the twentieth century (Shaw and Shaw, 1977).

In the early sixteenth century, the Mamluk Sultanate, ruling the ‘Arab’ areas of the Islamic world, was in decline, and in 1516-1517 the ‘Arab’ areas of the Islamic world were taken over by the Ottomans extending their empire East. The Ottomans were also expanding west and they were getting closer to ‘Vienna and German-speaking lands’ (Quataert, 2000: 1). They established their rule in western Caucasia in the early sixteenth century, and Circassians in the Caucasus began adopting Islam in that period of time. The Circassians, as previously explained, were one of the oldest groups inhabiting the Caucasus Mountains. They were organised in tribes of different socio-economic positions, some of the tribes were peasants, others nobles and leaders (Karpat, 1985). Some of the tribes, Kabardin and Abkhaz, adopted Islam in the sixteenth century, with more tribes started adopting Islam in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries (Karpat, 1979), and by 1800 Muslims became the largest religious group in the Caucasus (McCarthy, 1995).

Circassians’ adoption of Islam meant that they came ‘to regard the sultan as the Caliph, that is, the supreme temporal leader in charge of the Muslim community’ (Karpat, 1985: 67). The Ottoman Empire used Islam to legitimise its rule and government. Being in control of the major Islamic holy sites, Jerusalem and parts of Arabia, Ottomans did not make use of ‘ideas of ethnic superiority of one community over another, but rather on the superiority of Islam’ in order to legitimise their rule (Chatty, 2010: 42). This idea, superiority of Islam, or Islam as the unifying factor between an ethnically diverse Muslim community, did originate with the Ottomans, but had been part of Islam from its beginning (Ozcan, 1997). All Islamic Caliphates were based on this concept, which was later coined as Pan-Islamism. The usage of Islam as the unifying element of the Muslim community has been reinforced from the days of Prophet Mohammad, as in many of his documented sayings he explicitly states that all Muslims are equal in law, regardless of ethnic and/or racial origin. As the Islamic Caliphates were expanding, there emerged a need for the acknowledgement of the existence of non-Muslim groups within Muslim ruled lands and the need to give them the space to use their own religious teachings and laws, and this system of governance was called by Ottomans in the nineteenth century the millet system\(^3\) (Quataert, 2000).

The millet system was the organising principle for inter-communal relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims had to abide by the rule of the Ottoman state, while non-Muslims had their own courts. However, non-Muslims were required to pay taxes specific to their position. This form of tax, called Jizya, was imposed on non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire; this did not start with the Ottomans, but was established at the time of Mohammad. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss why Jizya was imposed on non-Muslim subjects; however,

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\(^3\) For a discussion of the usage of the word millet and its usage during Ottoman rule (See Braude, 1982).
its rationale in Islamic Law is so that non-Muslim minorities can be provided with protection. Basri (2011) explains it,

‘If a Muslim ruler fails to protect the life and property of non-Muslim citizens, this Muslim ruler has to return the Jizyah to the concerned non-Muslim citizen. So, it is compulsory for all non-Muslims to pay Jizyah just as Muslims will have to pay the obligatory Zakat in order to help the poor... Non-Muslims will be absolved from military services but if any non-Muslim citizen themselves wish to serve in the army; they may do so, in which case they will be exempted from the payment of Jizyah’ (Basri, 2011: 34).

It has been suggested that the differentiation in treatment between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire shows that ‘Ottoman law did not recognise notions of ethnicity and citizenship’ (Chatty, 2010: 46).

In the nineteenth century, Christian minorities, influenced by France, which became, through the system of capitulations, ‘protector of all Catholics’ (ibid: 49) financing Christian schools and missionaries within the Ottoman Empire, demanded equal member recognition by the state. At the same time in the European areas of the Ottoman Empire, separatist groups began to rebel with support from the Russians. These movements prompted the Ottomans to change their way of governance and to try to put into place the concept of equality between all religious groups. As a result of this Christian and Jewish Ottoman subjects became more privileged than Ottoman Muslims (McCarthy, 2001). This shift from differentiating between Muslims and non-Muslims to attempting to establish equality through sets of law and decrees, created an unequal status between Muslims and non-Muslims, as non-Muslims had recourse to their foreign protectors and religious representatives, while Muslims only had recourse to the Ottoman government (Chatty, 2010).

Despite the Ottoman’s efforts to create equality between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, many Christians, especially in the European part of the empire,
were claiming states of their own. They were supported by the Russians, who wanted to establish their rule on Ottoman lands. This led to civil wars, displacement and dispossession of various groups within the empire, both Muslim and non-Muslim and amongst those groups were the Circassian Muslims. This is explored in the next section, especially with regard to Circassian migration from the Caucasus. It is important to mention here that Circassian migration was caused by instability in the Caucasus region, and at the same time some Circassians were taken as agricultural and domestic slaves, which also, in addition to the harsh conditions of their migrations, added to their suffering. This will also be discussed in the next section.
1.3 Circassian Migration: Causes and Conditions

‘The contemporary map of the Balkans and the southern Caucasus displays countries with fairly homogenous populations... Their ethnic and religious unity was accomplished through the expulsion of their Muslim population... the new states were founded on the suffering of their departed inhabitants. Similarly, Russian imperialism... brought with it the deaths of millions of Circassians, Abkhazians, Laz, and Turks. Nationalism and imperialism appear in a much worse light when their victims take the stage’ (McCarthy, 1995: 1-2).

With the rise of nationalist movements in the Balkans in the late 18th century, including Crimea, Bulgaria, Macedonia and others, and the Russian pursuit of Caucasian Ottoman areas, conflict developed along religious rather than ethnic lines. The expulsion and displacement of Muslims from those areas made them more religiously homogeneous. Karpat (1990) explains how these migrations influenced the identity of Muslim migrant groups. He argues that Muslim migrants in their original homeland identified themselves as Muslims in terms of ‘social behaviour and ritual’ (Karpat, 1990: 131) and that this identity took the form of a ‘passive communal identity’ (ibid: 132). Migration, however, turned their identification with Islam into a ‘dynamic political consciousness,’ (132) especially since the ‘unmixing of people’ (Chatty, 2010: 88) was carried out on the basis of religion.

Muslim migration into the Ottoman Empire began shortly after the Ottoman loss of Crimea in 1771. The Ottomans agreed to recognise Crimea as an independent state under Russian control. The Russians, on the other hand, began to settle Christians from the Ottoman Empire in Crimea, and in 1783 they annexed Crimea (Karpat, 1990; McCarthy, 1995). As a result Crimean Tatars migrated to Ottoman lands, for both religious and economic reasons (Karpat, 1990; McCarthy, 1995). The number of people in the 18th century Crimean migrations is estimated at 100,000 (McCarthy, 1995).
Migration into the Ottoman Empire from Crimea intensified after a series of wars with the Russians, in ‘1806-12 and 1829 (Russo-Ottoman war), especially after the Crimean war of 1853-6, since the Muslims had supported the Ottomans and allied the armies’ (Karpat, 1990: 132). Bulgarians revolting against the Ottomans allied with the Russians to fight the Crimean Tatars becoming involved in many battles against the Ottomans (McCarthy, 1995). The Crimean Tatars, and many other groups including Circassians, were killed, expelled and forced to migrate from their homelands. The example of Crimean Tatars is important, because in light of the work of Karpat (1990), it shows how religion became the main differentiating element between groups. Major waves of migration started taking place from the Caucasus in the nineteenth century.

The 1829 Russo-Ottoman war was concluded through the Treaty of Edirne, through which Russia annexed the islands close to the Danube River and parts of the Caucasus, specifically the coastal areas adjacent to the Black Sea, where historic Circassia was located, and the Ottomans acknowledged Greece as a state. The Circassians and other tribes were unhappy with the result of the treaty, and continued to fight the Russians without Ottoman support. A series of battles took place between Caucasian Muslims and Russian armies, Circassians, fighting alongside other groups, briefly occupied almost the entire area between the main Caucasian range, the Kuban River, and the Black Sea (Henze, 1992). However, Caucasian groups were defeated in 1864. During that period of fighting very few Circassians left their homeland, and mass migrations began in the late 1860s.

Leader of anti-Russian resistance, Sheikh Shamil, ‘managed to meld together followers from disparate tribes with a combination of Islamic revivalism and the subjugation of aristocracies who opposed him’ (McCarthy, 1995: 33). Shamil was captured by the Russians in 1857 (McCarthy, 1995; Chatty, 2010), and shortly after his capture, exhausted, fighting tribes, including the Chechens, Daghestanis and Circassians, were defeated. By 1864, the Caucasus was under total Russian control,
and another treaty was concluded between the Russians and the Ottomans to remove Muslim peoples from the areas occupied by the Russians. Between 1859 and 1864, Russians intensified their attacks against the Circassian people, aiming to uproot them from their lands, as they wanted to take over the fertile Circassian areas (McCarthy, 1995). Glyn Williams says,

‘The Russian army engaged in demographic warfare that would today be considered mass ethnic cleansing. Well over a million Circassians (the largest ethnic group living on the northern Caucasian flank) were forced from their Caucasian homelands between 1859 and 1864’ (Glyn Williams, 2000: 93).

‘Russia claimed to possess a superior Orthodox Christian culture, and she regarded Islam as the inferior cultural system of a people she had defeated and was ruling with an iron hand. The Circassians... were looked upon as “primitive.” Russia sought to “civilise” them’ (Karpat, 1985: 67).

The aim of the Russian ethnic cleansing of the Circassians, and other Muslim groups in western and northern Caucasus, was to turn the ‘Caucasus into a Christian land, loyal to their empire’ (McCarthy, 1995: 34). This ethnic cleansing has been described by some scholars as genocide due to the number of deaths it caused (Henze, 1992; McCarthy, 1995). It is important to note that not all Circassians were removed during the same period of time; flows of migration took place in stages, and the conditions of their resettlement were often as difficult as their migrations.

Ottomans and Russians had to cooperate in removing the Circassians from their homelands. The majority of Circassians were sent by sea to Anatolia in Tarabzon and Samsun on the Black Sea, others were taken to Bulgaria to Constanta and Varna (Chatty, 2010; Karpat 1985). McCarthy (1995) notes that old men, women and children were encouraged and forced to migrate, while able-bodied Circassian men were kept as forced labourers. On the other hand, the conditions of the boats Circassians were transferred in were very bad, and migrants suffered from disease.
Circassian refugees were given no assistance or aid, McCarthy (1995: 36) estimates that around 20-50 refugees died every day in Trabzon in 1863, in 1864, 500 died every day, and in Samsun 50 were dying each day, and, by 1864, around 520,000 Muslims had been forced to migrate to the Ottoman Empire (Chatty, 2010). Karpat (1985) explains how these migrations had adverse effects on population growth and the ethnic composition of the Ottoman Empire, and also shows that Christians were migrating from the Ottoman Empire to Russia. This exchange of populations led to the creation of almost religiously homogeneous communities in the Russian occupied lands. Although large numbers of Circassians were taken into Ottoman lands, some remained in Circassia and further flows of migration took place in 1877-1878 due to the Russian-Ottoman war.

It is estimated that between 1859 and 1879 around two million people were forced to leave the Caucasus, and only 1.5 million survived due to the adverse conditions of migration (Chatty, 2010). Migration from the Caucasus continued to take place till the beginning of the twentieth century. Karpat (1985) estimates that around half a million people left the Caucasus between 1881 and 1914. The Russian government ordered that the Circassians should be settled ‘at considerable distance from our frontiers and in all cases not closer than the line Erzincan, Tokat, Amasya, and Samsun’ (Karpat, 1985: 69). The Russians wanted to keep the Circassians as far away as possible from the lands they occupied, and the Ottoman collaborated with them to remove the Circassians from their homeland. The Circassians were known to be troublesome, because they fought the Bulgarians and this is why the Ottomans happily collaborated in their removal.

At first, Circassians were welcomed by the Ottoman government in the European provinces of the Empire. However, following several incidents where Circassians attacked Bulgarians, when Bulgaria was still under Ottoman rule, and at a time when Circassians were serving the Ottomans in suppressing Bulgarian revolts, Circassians became less welcome. Eventually, Ottoman soldiers had to turn
their fire against the Circassians to stop them attacking Christian Bulgarians, who had, in turn, killed large numbers of Muslim Bulgarians, as a result of their war for independence (McCarthy, 1995). This led the Ottomans to push the Circassian Muslims further towards the ‘Musulman Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire’ (Lewis, 1987: 96), in order to protect Christian Ottoman subjects. Circassians expelled from Bulgaria took refuge in Thrace and Macedonia; however they had to be transferred again to Anatolia and Greater Syria\textsuperscript{4} (Chatty, 2010). Resettlement of Caucasian migrants was based on three main principles; the creation of a frontier, resettling them in environmentally similar areas, and preventing any one group from becoming a majority’ (ibid: 98-9). Resettlement policy towards Circassians was to divide them into small groups and disperse their leaders (ibid).

The Ottoman Immigration Commission provided assistance to migrants, and became responsible for resettlement of refugees (Lewis, 1987). Although the Commission was created in 1860, there was some delay before the Ottoman Empire was able to provide basic needs assistance to migrants (Lewis, 1987). Migrants suffered from the very bad conditions of migration; disease, poverty, deprivation and lack of assistance led to the death of hundreds of thousands of Muslim migrants. In addition to the bad conditions of migration, Circassians were also faced with the problem of the Ottoman slave trade. The Ottoman slave trade continued, even during waves of migration, and many Circassians were subjected to slavery. The Circassian migration into Ottoman lands brought with it a large group of agricultural and domestic slaves (Toledano, 1982). As many Circassians were transferred in boats, they were abused and trafficked by slave traders, and some children were sold by their families because of poverty and need. Toledano (1982) notes that due to the chaotic conditions, and the lack of organised transfer of the Circassians in the early 1860s, ships’ captains used to enforce a transportation fee of

\textsuperscript{4}Greater Syria, or \textit{bilad al-sham} is a southern Ottoman province, which consisted of what is now known as Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, ‘Israel’, Jordan and parts of Iraq.
one slave child per thirty persons on boats. The Ottoman government had to intervene through the Immigration Commission to abolish this trend.

‘The hardship of immigrant families and kidnapping by unscrupulous dealers meant that many children were enslaved and separated from their families, where previously slave families had been kept together. Attempts to rectify this were made by the Ottoman government through the Immigration Commission, even buying their freedom to reunite families in cases of unlawful enslavement’ (Lewis, 2004: 132).

On the other hand, some families sold their daughters into the harems of the Ottoman elite. ‘Circassian women often reached the harems of the urban upper-class of the empire, not infrequently attaining positions of prestige and comfort as wives of middle- and upper-level functionaries’ (Toledano, 1982: 8). However, it is important to note here that Circassians used to sell their daughters to slave dealers even before their migration, as many of them were poor agricultural families (Toledano, 1993). There are also documented cases of the bad treatment of Circassian slaves in the Ottoman Empire (ibid).

As previously mentioned, Circassian migrants were resettled in Eastern Anatolia and Greater Syria, or *bilad al-sham*; however, the conditions of their resettlement in those areas were unfavourable, especially due to the arrival of large numbers of people, and the decreasing ability of the cities where they landed to absorb them. Karpat (1979) estimates that around 25,000 Circassians came to Southern Syria in 1878 and between 10,000 and 15,000 arrived in Aleppo in the same year. Table (1.1), adapted from several sources, estimates the numbers of Circassians arriving in Greater Syrian ports, and the destinations to which they were, or would be, sent. Lewis (1987) provides estimates of the number of Circassian families settled in Greater Syria between 1905 and 1906, which are presented in table (1.2).
Table (1.1) Numbers of Circassians arriving in Greater Syria by year, port, and destination if applicable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Port/City</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Destination if Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Homs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Nablus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Intended to land in Kavalla, diverted to Cyprus</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>Latakiiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Hama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>Damascus via land from Anatolia</td>
<td>100 families</td>
<td>Sent to Jaulan Heights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>150 families</td>
<td>Half to Qunaytrah Half to Zarqa’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Alexandretta</td>
<td>364 families, 1,454 individuals</td>
<td>Aleppo and Raqqah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from (Chatty, 2010; Lewis, 1987; Karpat, 1979; 1985)

Table (1.2) Estimates of numbers of Circassian Families in Syrian provinces (1905-1906)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Number of Families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qunaytrah (Jaulan Heights)</td>
<td>1,949 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transjordan</td>
<td>2,250 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near Homs</td>
<td>670 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vilayet of Beirut</td>
<td>550 families</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Lewis, 1987).

The arrival of Circassians and other Muslim migrants in Anatolia and the ‘Arab’ areas of the Ottoman Empire changed the ethnic composition of those areas. As Quataert (2000) puts it,

‘The migration acted like a centrifuge in Russia and the Balkans, reducing previously more diverse populations to a simpler one... The societies of the host regions, for their part, became ethnically more complex and diverse while both the originating and host societies became religiously more homogeneous. Thus, the Balkans became more heavily Christian than before (although Muslims remained in some areas) while the Anatolian and Arab areas became more Muslim’ (Quataert, 2000: 116).
Conflict along religious lines created religious homogeneity and ethnic heterogeneity on Ottoman land. The ‘Arab’ areas of the Ottoman Empire received ‘non-Arab’ Muslims, and the Balkans became more Christian.

The military skills of the Circassians also influenced where they were settled, with the Ottomans settling them and granting them lands in the frontier districts of Greater Syria, due to the Circassians’ ability to stand up to Bedouins and other locals (Chatty, 2010; Lewis, 1987; Rogan, 1994). Many sources state that Circassians, upon their arrival in bilad-al-sham, considered the lands to be Muslim holy lands.

‘Circassian immigrants arriving in the sultan’s lands in Syria removed their shoes before walking on the holy soil of this… ‘White soil’ of the Ottoman Empire’ (Glyn Williams, 2000: 104).

Circassians were settled in Transjordan, which was part of Greater Syria, in Jerash in 1884, in villages of Amman in 1878, in Wadi al-Sir in 1880, in Na’ur in 1901, in Zarqa’ in 1902, in Sukhna and al-Rusayfa in 1902-4, and in Sweileh in 1906 (Rogan, 1994: 46; Lewis, 1987; Shami, 1996: 307). Rogan (1994), explaining the importance of those settlements, says,

‘These settlements in particular were of critical importance to Ottoman expansion in Jordan. All were refugees from Russian wars who were grateful Ottoman subjects with no loyalty greater than that to their Sultan. They built sturdy villages, which they inhabited year-round. As their livelihood was bound to agriculture, they cultivated their lands extensively. Outsiders to the local order, they resisted bedouin claims to a share of their harvests and fought back when attacked’ (ibid: 46).

Thus, the Circassian presence in Transjordan allowed the Ottomans to maintain their rule over the land, and their power over the ‘Arab’ Bedouin tribes. In following section I review historical sources on Circassian settlement in Jordan, and the history of Jordan under Ottoman rule.
1.4 Circassian Settlement in Jordan

As this account thus far has shown, the Circassians began to arrive in Jordan when it was part of the Ottoman Empire. At that time, present-day Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and parts of Iraq were one administrative entity, called bilad-al-sham or Greater Syria, under Ottoman rule (Doumani, 1992). The official language of the Empire was Ottoman Turkish, Arabic was spoken in the Levant region, Arabia, North Africa, Iraq and Kuwait and the whole Empire was unified by Islam. Jordan, as well as the rest of Greater Syria, came under the Ottoman Empire’s nominal authority in 1516 and this lasted until the mid-nineteenth century (Rogan, 1994). Under Ottoman rule, the capital of Transjordan was al-Salt, which was equipped ‘with extensive administrative facilities by the Ottomans’ (Rogan, 1996: 92). After the revolts in the Balkans and once the empire had lost parts of its European provinces, it sought to ‘extend its rule in Arabia’ (Rogan, 1994: 33). Before this Jordan was left to power struggling Bedouin tribes and some sedentary communities (Chatty, 2010; Rogan, 1994). For a long time, Jordan had been regarded as a desert area. Johns (1994), for example, says,

‘Until the middle of the twentieth century, European travellers in Southern Transjordan interpreted the landscape through which they rode as man-made desert dotted with abandoned ruins of the biblical and classical civilisations... periods of dense settlement and high population - Byzantine, Ayyubid - Mamluk and modern - alternate with periods of sparse settlement and low population - Umayyad-Abbasid, and late Mamluk to Ottoman’ (Johns, 1994: 1-2).

However, to extend their rule over present-day Jordan, the Ottomans attempted to change local realities, and did this by making use of a settlement policy, which took the form of ‘the basing of a community in a particular site or village, and the award of title to land’ (Rogan, 1994: 45). Rogan (1994) identifies three waves of settlement in Jordan: the first included local peasants establishing new villages ‘for reasons of
economic gain or intercommunal strife’ (ibid: 45). The second wave is that of refugee communities including Chechens and Circassians. The third wave came as a reaction to the second wave, as Bedouin tribes started creating Bedouin plantation villages ‘immediately after the government awarded land grants to the Circassians in Amman and Wadi al-Sir and to the Christians in Madaba’ (Rogan, 1994: 47). The Ottomans regarded the nomadic tribes in the area as an obstruction to ‘regular cultivation and direct administration’ (Rogan, 1994: 33).

The area of Transjordan witnessed extensive Ottoman construction of government building and settlements in the period between 1840 and 1910 (ibid). There were two types of land in Jordan, mahlul and mudawara; mudawara land refers to the lands owned by the Ottoman Sultan, and the mahlul refers to pieces of land ‘repossessed from the cultivators for a variety of reasons, including to build the Hijaz railroad and to settle Circassian and Chechen immigrants’ (Fischbach, 1994: 99). The first permanent settlement in Transjordan took place in 1878 in Amman, the present-day capital of Jordan, and amongst the first settlers were the Circassians (Chatty, 2010; Rogan, 1996; Shami, 1996). The Ottomans’ main concern in their settlement policy was to protect agricultural lands from nomadic Bedouins in order to be able to collect tax revenues. Settling Circassians in frontier districts given the Ottomans’ belief in Circassians combat skills was a way of doing this.

Circassian settlements in Amman (1878) were the first settlements of those which, later, became part of Jordan (Shami, 1996). The first Circassian group arriving in Amman were the Shapsougs. Upon their arrival, Shapsougs took shelter in caves and ruins around the Roman Amphitheatre in Amman, later they built permanent houses and to this day there is an area in Amman called al-Shapsoug Street. The second group to settle in Amman were Kabarday and Abzakh (1880-1892) (Shami, 1996). According to Ottoman documents, there were three quarters of Amman,

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss fully all settlements that took place in Transjordan. However, Rogan (1994) provides a detailed account of settlements and Ottoman policies in the area of Transjordan.
Kabarday, Abzakh and Shapsoug (Hmoud, 1996). A third wave of Circassian Kabarday arrived in Amman in 1902 (Lewis, 1987; Shami, 1996). By the early 1920s, Amman, present-day Jordan’s capital, was described as a ‘Circassian village’ or ‘Circassian town’ (Rogan, 1996; Shami, 1996; Mola, 2009). At that time, Amman was not yet the capital of Transjordan, and al-Salt was expected to become the capital of the state of Transjordan. During their time in Transjordan, when it was still part of the Ottoman Empire, Circassians developed the area. For instance, they were the first to introduce wheeled vehicles (Quataert, 2000; Rogan, 1994) and ‘their villages and fields were soon interconnected by a road network that could accommodate their wicker carts’ (Rogan, 1994: 48). Lewis (1987) says that Circassians became involved in agriculture and trade ten years after their arrival in Jordan.

Lewis (1987) suggests that the Circassians were hated by Bedouin tribes when they first arrived into Jordan. One of the reasons they were hated was the fact that Circassian settlers were exempt from paying taxes to the Ottoman Empire, because of the 1858 Refugee Code established by the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Circassians refused to pay tribute to the Bedouin tribes in the form of Khuwa. Bedouin tribes imposed on peasants and other permanent settlers in Jordan a tax in Khuwa money in return for protection. However, the Circassians were able to protect themselves from the Bedouins. On the other hand, Circassians were associated with the Ottomans and, due to their alignment with the Turkish Ottomans, and the fact that cavalry regiments were often formed of Circassians and Chechens, the presence of Circassians in present day Jordan was not welcomed by the Arabic-speaking Bedouin tribes. Further, Circassians’ willingness to become part of the Ottoman Army meant that many of the men wore Ottoman Army uniforms (Chatty, 2010). Despite previous conflicts between Circassians and Bedouins, by the end of the 1890s ‘the Circassians of Amman had entered into alliances with the major Bedouin tribe in the area, the Bani Sakhr’ (Chatty, 2010: 117). This alliance was based on agreeing to support each other in cases of conflicts with others. However, this did
not mean that peace between Bedouins and Circassians was established forever, as Circassians’ association with the Ottoman Empire was too strong.

In 1905, Mirza Wasfi Pasha, who was a brigadier in the Ottoman Army, founded the Voluntary Circassian Cavalry, which aimed to maintain stability locally and fight the Bedouin tribes. The Cavalry, which consisted of 1200 soldiers, also served the Ottomans in suppressing the Druze’s revolts of 1909-10 (Chatty, 2010; Jaimoukha, 2001). The Ottomans made further use of the Circassian Cavalry during the First World War to protect the Hejaz railway, which connected Constantinople and the Arabian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The railway linked the Arabian provinces of the empire with its capital in order to gain more control over the region and for economic reasons. This railway came through Amman, and Circassians, in addition to guarding the railway, also participated in its construction (Shami, 1996). Setting up the railway brought an economic boom for the Circassians in Amman, as firstly they were well-paid for working on the construction site, and secondly Amman became an urban centre that attracted many merchants.

However, with the emergence of the Great Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule in the Arabian provinces of the empire, the Circassians’ association with the Ottomans was not helpful. The Ottomans were defeated and had to withdraw from Transjordan in 1918, and the Caucasian minorities in Jordan found themselves in a difficult position. As allies of the Turks, they were not welcome on ‘Arab’ occupied lands, and there was an initial mistrust towards them (Le Mee, 2004; Rogan, 1996). However, this did not last for long and shortly after the Ottomans’ defeat, this mistrust was overcome. The following section sheds light on the transfer of rule from the Ottomans to the Hashemites in Jordan and the relation between Circassians and what is now the state of Jordan.
1.5 Jordan: Post-Ottoman Rule

The ‘Arab’ Revolt against the Ottomans was led by Hussein bin Ali\(^6\) of the Hashemite family from the Hejaz region of Saudi Arabia; he was the official leader of the ‘Arab’ Revolt, aimed at creating a single unified ‘Arab’ state, through, as historical sources cite, entering an alliance with ‘the British and the French’ against the Ottoman Empire (Halliday, 2000b: 208). With the support of the British Empire Army Forces, the ‘Arabs’\(^7\), or as many argue, the British, seized the Levant region\(^8\) and parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, after deposing the Ottomans, the ‘Arab’ speaking region came under British and French mandate. Although the main objective of the Hashemites, Hussein bin Ali and his sons, in defeating the Ottomans had been to create a united ‘Arab’ state, colonisation did not allow for that. Rather, the most suitable solution was to divide the Levant region into separate entities. Faisal and Abdullah, Hussein bin Ali’s sons, carried on the struggle for the independence of the ‘Arab’ states, ruled by their Hashemite father. However, the colonial powers only allowed for the creation of separate states in the region under their mandate; Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Palestine. Syria, under French mandate, was granted to Faisal bin al-Hussein, who a few years later was expelled by the French. His brother, Abdullah, on the other hand, threatened to wage war against the French in Syria. However, the British, in an attempt to avoid problems with their French allies, created a protectorate for Abdullah, which later announced its independence under the name of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1923.

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\(^6\) Hussein bin Ali had been appointed by the Ottomans the Sharif of Mecca in 1908 and he remained so until he proclaimed himself king of the Hejaz region. However, his kingdom-hood did not last long, as he was conquered by the Saud family in 1924, and he sought refuge in Cyprus.

\(^7\) History later revealed that British and French support of the ‘Arabs’ came in accordance with a secret agreement between the British, the French, and Russia—the Sykes-Picot Agreement concluded that: “the two colonial powers were to divide the ‘liberated’ ‘Arab’ territories among themselves (114)” TIBI, B. 1997. Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State, New York, ST. Martins Press.

\(^8\) The Levant Region includes what is now known as Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel.
Prior to the Emirate of Transjordan gaining independence, in 1920 the British sent Captain Brunton from Palestine to Jordan to report on the political situation there, as Transjordania was ‘a vague name for an undefined territory newly under British mandate’ (Rogan, 1996: 92). Burton advised that if Transjordan is to be ruled from Jerusalem, it should be ruled from al-Salt, as the road between al-Salt and Jerusalem was the main road linking the East Bank of the Jordan River to the West Bank (Figure 1.5 British Mandate of Palestine and Transjordan). Further, al-Salt had a population of around 10,000 making it the largest populated area in Transjordan (Rogan, 1996). Amman’s population, on the other hand, in the early 1920s, was estimated between 3,000 and 5,000 and was characterised as a Circassian village, as mentioned previously (Shami, 1996). However, political influence shifted from al-Salt to Amman in the same year, when the British created a small reserve force that was based in Amman (Rogan, 1996).
The Circassian village, Amman, became an area of political activity under British control in the early 1920s. In 1921, after meetings between the British and Emir Abdullah, Britain agreed to grant Abdullah administration over Transjordan for six months as a probation period. Abdullah arrived in Amman in March 1921. He, however, did not have total administrative control, because Britain insisted that major decisions would be made from Palestine (Rogan, 1996). At the beginning the Emirate of Transjordan wholly depended on the British financially (Peak, 1958). In November 1921, Philby was appointed as the Chief British Representative in Amman, and his responsibility was to oversee the administration of Emir Abdullah (Rogan, 1996). From December 1921, the administration was moved from al-Salt to Amman, because of the central position of Amman as a capital, and the existence of a military base in East Amman (Rogan, 1996).

Rogan (1996) documents, through looking at Philby’s diaries, that when the administration was moved to Amman, there were still hostilities between the ‘Arabs’ and the Circassians, as well as general mistrust. Philby states in his diaries that Mirza Pasha Wasfi, the founder of the Voluntary Circassian Cavalry serving the Ottomans, ‘with deep emotion expressed the hope that Great Britain would always maintain its attitude of protection of the strangers like themselves sojourning in the land and not leave them to the tender mercies of the Arabs’ (Rogan, 1996: 97). By 1922, Amman had become the official capital of Transjordan, and almost half of the population of Amman was Circassian except for some Greater Syrian merchants and political refugees (Rogan, 1996; Alon, 2005). Shami (1996) writes about how the making of Amman, the Circassian town, a capital city had impacted the identity of Circassians living there, this is given special attention in the next chapter. Briefly, ‘with the rapid growth of the city of Amman, and the state apparatus, the Circassians were on their way to becoming a numerical minority as more and more Arabs were drawn to the newly established capital from different regions of Jordan as well as from Syria and Palestine’ (Shami, 1996: 318).
With the rapid expansion of Amman, Circassians felt the need to differentiate themselves from others. Thus in 1932 the first ethnic association, the Circassian Charity Association, was established with the support of Emir Abdullah. Shami (1996: 318) says that the establishment of the association is related to Amman’s expansion, ‘the integration of the Circassian neighbourhoods into the wider and more complex urban fabric’, and to Circassians’ socio-economic position in Amman. Circassians turned their allegiances from the Ottomans to the Emir Abdullah, and started playing important roles in the building of Transjordan as an independent state. For example, there were many Circassians in the Arab Legion and the Transjordan Frontier Force (Bocco and Tell, 1994; Chatty, 2010). Thus they were ‘well represented in the officer corps of the nation’ (Chatty, 2010: 119).

At the beginning of his reign, Emir Abdullah found some difficulties in controlling the whole area of present-day Jordan, and the authority of the Transjordanian state was limited to settled areas at the beginning (Bocco and Tell, 1994). Bringing the disparate Bedouin tribes under state control had been achieved by the support of the British government through the British General John Glubb, who succeeded in ‘harnessing the Bedouin to the purposes of the Mandatory regime’ (Bocco and Tell, 1994: 108).

It is also suggested that during his rule as the Emir of Transjordan, Abdullah I (1921-1946) enhanced his position amongst the Bedouin tribes of Jordan through strengthening his personal ties with them. Wroblewski (2008), for example, documents that Abdullah I used to grant personal gifts from the property of the state to community leaders as a way of befriending them. In addition to internal affairs, the Emir of Transjordan was also busy with other issues relating to the country’s stability. According to the website of King Hussein I, the previous ruler,

‘The period between the two world wars was one of consolidation and institutionalization in Transjordan. Abdullah sought to build political unity by melding the disparate
Bedouin tribes into a cohesive group capable of maintaining Arab rule in the face of increasing Western encroachment. Abdullah realized the need for a capable security force to establish and ensure the integrity of the state in defence, law, taxation, and other matters. Accordingly, he set up the fabled Arab Legion as one cornerstone of the fledgling state’ (The Royal Hashemite Court, 2001).

The extract above, taken from an official state source, attempts to emphasise that Hashemite rule of Jordan is ‘Arab’, and as we can see there is no mention of the Circassian community or any other non-Arabic speaking community. This suggests a shift from being part of an Ottoman-state that defines itself as Islamic, Circassians came under an ‘Arab’ promoted sense of identity. Although the Hashemites had failed to create a unified ‘Arab’ state in the region, they still maintained that Jordan was an ‘Arab’ state. Between 1921 and 1946, Transjordan remained under the control of the British Mandate.

Several negotiations, and treaties with British authorities, led to the declaration of total independence of Transjordan in 1946, and brought the British Mandate over Transjordan to an end. In 1946, the Emirate of Transjordan was announced as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, named after the Hashemite family, to which Abdullah I belonged, and he then became king of Jordan. Not long after the birth of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the British mandate of Palestine ended and allowed the creation of ‘Israel’ on parts of Palestinian lands, the rest being taken over by Transjordan. The creation of ‘Israel’ caused severe tensions in the region. At that time Abdullah I proclaimed himself, as King of Jordan, to be responsible for Palestine, which later came to be called the West Bank, because it was located on the west bank of the Jordan river (Figure 1.6).
In 1950, Abdullah annexed the green section of the third map from the left to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, except for the Gaza strip which was annexed to Egypt, while all other Palestinian lands became part of the illegal Israeli occupation⁹.

Figure 1.6 Map of Occupied Palestine, Loss of Land

Circassians in Jordan were part of the building of the Hashemite Kingdom, and it is largely assumed that they are integrated into Jordanian society, at least economically and politically. For example, Abd-el-Jawad (2006) says,

‘Throughout their life in Jordan, many of them have occupied important government positions at all levels, e.g. prime ministers, ministers, deputies, army and police chiefs, and have always seen themselves as co-founders of the country... they have enjoyed full citizenship rights and duties’ (Abd-el-Jawad, 2006: 52).

⁹ As a Palestinian, who believes that the creation of the state of ‘Israel’ on Palestinian land is illegal, I choose to use scare quotes, throughout the thesis, when referring to ‘Israel’. 
Kaya (2004) also claims that ‘the Circassian population in Jordan enjoys an essentially privileged position, having long been closely connected to the Crown’ (Kaya, 2004: 224). Moreover, since Jordan has the only Circassian-language school in the Middle East, many would believe that this reflects Circassians’ privileged position in Jordan, compared to other neighbouring countries. Furthermore, as part of Jordan’s electoral system, Circassians are allocated three seats out of 80 in the Parliament (Reynolds and Elklit, 1997); the ethnic quota law responsible for this allocation has not been applied to the Palestinians. In conclusion, the presence of Circassians in Jordan predates Jordan becoming a constitutional state ruled by King Abdullah I in 1928 under British rule. Circassians came to Jordan when it was part of the Ottoman Empire and were part of the processes of building Jordan as an independent nation-state.

Although the Palestinians are not the focus of this research, it is important to provide a brief history of the Palestinians in Jordan, particularly since the idea of this research developed from the contrast between the positions of the Circassians and the Palestinians in Jordan. There is no census data that provides an accurate number of Circassians present in Jordan. Some say that it is around 44,280 (Rannut, 2009) and others say that it is 125,000 (Petra, 2008), out of a total population of 5,951,000 (The World Bank, 2010). This suggests that Circassians constitute a maximum of two percent of the total population in Jordan. Palestinians, in contrast, constitute a numerical majority in Jordan. Nevertheless, it is assumed that Circassians are in a better position than are Palestinians in the state of Jordan. The following section provides a brief history of the Palestinian presence in Jordan, because of its importance in shaping present day Jordan.
1.6 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Palestinians

Jordan received a great number of Palestinian refugees expelled from their homes and lands during the Israeli Occupation in 1948. Between 1948, following the declaration of the state of ‘Israel’, and 1951, all Palestinians, on the West and the East banks of the Jordan River, were granted Jordanian citizenship. Massad (2001) argues that Abdullah I attempted to erase the Palestinian identity and replace it with an ‘Arab’ Jordanian one. Tensions rose between the Palestinians and the proclaimed king of Palestine and Jordan, until they reached their climax, with the assassination of Abdullah I by a Palestinian in Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem during Friday prayers on July 20, 1951. The assassination supposedly took place because rumours were spreading about Abdullah’s intentions to enter peace negotiations with ‘Israel’ and give up ‘Arab’ Palestinian lands.

Talal10 succeeded his father, Abdullah I, but he was removed from the throne, and replaced by his sixteen year old son Hussein on August 11, 1952. For a long time after Hussein’s succession to the throne, the Palestinian issue remained on Jordan’s political agenda. Several ‘Arab’ countries neighbouring ‘Israel’ including Jordan waged wars against the newly-established state of ‘Israel’, and received large flows of Palestinian refugees as a result. However, Hussein I retained Jerusalem and the West Bank, until he lost control over them during the Six Days War, in 1967. Hussein assured the Palestinians remaining in Jordan that he would keep fighting on their side, and would provide them with whatever support they needed. Between 1967 and 1974, several battles took place between Palestinian guerrillas, supported by some members of the Jordanian Army, and the ‘Israeli’ Army in order to regain lost Palestinian lands. Although the Palestinian guerrillas fought more often than the Army of Jordan, King Hussein remained the sole political representative of the Palestinian people, until 1974, following another upsurge of tension.

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10 One of the very rarely mentioned kings has been Talal bin Abdullah, who only came to the throne in 1951, and was forced to leave his position in 1952, as he was diagnosed with schizophrenia by the British, possibly as a result of his ‘anti-British reputation’ (Satloff, 1994: 21).
In 1970, clashes erupted between the guerrillas who, clustered together as one group, came to be known as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation [PLO], and the Jordanian Army. Black September became the name for the clashes that took place at that time, when the PLO attempted to assassinate the King, and several hijacking attempts took place, which threatened Jordan’s security and stability as a state. As a way to protect his Kingdom, King Hussein declared martial law, and the PLO’s headquarters and grassroots were attacked. The clashes led to the expulsion of all Palestinian armed fighters from Jordan to Lebanon and the Palestinian population, which remained in Jordan, were disarmed. Following those events, when the King of Jordan became aware that the majority of the inhabitants of Jordan were in fact Palestinian, he exerted considerable effort to enhance the viability of the state by trying to erase any Palestinian identity amongst the people and replace it with a Jordanian one. The creation of a Jordanian national identity, as Massad (2001) calls it, has not been easy, for the majority of Palestinians.

Palestinians who remained in the West Bank areas occupied by ‘Israel’ retained their Jordanian nationalities. However, the PLO requested that it be recognised as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In 1974, ‘Arab’ countries pressurised King Hussein into recognising the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Despite hesitancies in complying with the ‘Arab’ countries’ wishes, King Hussein had no other option. And he remained uncertain if this meant that the PLO had the right to represent the Palestinians living on the East Bank. In 1988, negotiations took place between King Hussein and the PLO, which resulted in dividing the Palestinians into two groups. Palestinians living on the East Bank of the Jordan River were declared Jordanian by law, and were to be represented by King Hussein, while Palestinians on the West Bank of the Jordan River were to be represented by the PLO (Chapin Metz, 1989).

Tensions between Palestinians and Transjordanians continue today; however the intensity is much less.
The creation of a Jordanian national identity, however, remained a big issue within Jordan. For example, Massad (2001) refers to the ‘battle of the accent,’ as one way of reflecting the differences between Jordanians and Palestinians. In Jordan, after the 1970 civil war, urban accents were used to identify Palestinians generally, in distinction to the Bedouin accent, which was the accent of the tribes. The accent became a marker of national identity, meaning that Jordanians are seen as those who speak with a Bedouin accent. For that reason, urban Jordanians, including Circassians began using the same accent as Bedouins. Palestinian men wanting to assimilate and live in peace also began to use the same Bedouin accent (Massad, 2001). It is worth noting, though, that Palestinians whose original accents were urban began to use Bedouin accents in the company of men, ‘particularly if these men were Transjordanian’ (Massad, 2001: 251). The Bedouin accent became generally labelled as masculine, opposed to urban accents associated with the Palestinians, which became viewed as feminine. Accents thus became part of national identity, and they became gendered as well, especially given that women are not often seen as nationalistic (Massad, 2001).

The Palestinian issue and the invention of ‘Israel’ created many social, economic and political changes in Jordan, many of them problematic for the creation of a Jordanian nationalist state narrative. This intensified particularly with the Israeli claim that Jordan should be an alternative homeland for the Palestinians, and that by the dismantling of the state of Jordan, and the creation of a Palestine state over the lands of Jordan, the ‘Arab-Israeli’ conflict would be resolved. As the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Jordan’s economy greatly benefited from ‘Arab’ aid to the Palestinian people. However, following the recognition of the PLO, Jordan lost a lot of its foreign funds, which were channelled instead to the PLO.

In the 1970s, Jordan began to suffer from very high unemployment, and yet the labour force continued to grow, following the growing number of Palestinian refugees. The resulting economic crisis did not last for long, but neither did the
subsequent years of prosperity. Between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, demand for skilled labourers by oil exporting countries increased, due to the increase in prices and heavy demands for oil. In 1985, the proportion of Jordanian labourers working in the Gulf, most of whom were Palestinians, amounted to around 60 percent of the Jordanian labour force (Wilson, 1991). This brought into Jordan, through remittances sent to families, the largest proportion of its income. Unfortunately, in 1991 many labourers were expelled from the Gulf countries following the first Gulf War, which not only caused a loss of income to Jordan, but also resulted in high unemployment in a country with scarce resources. Not long after the Gulf War, Jordan’s two main concerns were the Oslo Peace Process\textsuperscript{12} and the economy.

Economic adjustments and reform took place in Jordan, a year after the announcement of the severance of all ties and attachments to the PLO and the Palestinian territories in 1988. Hussein initiated adjustment and restructuring processes in the economy, and in domestic and foreign politics, liberalisation and democratisation (Ryan, 2002). The King kept working on economic reform, which mainly depended on foreign aid, and privatisation. Hussein I ruled Jordan for more than sixty four years, succeeded in preserving the monarchy, and survived several military coups. However, he could not survive Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, and died in 1999. During his illness, Hussein chose his son Abdullah to succeed him and the son ascended to the throne in February 1999. Abdullah’s economic and political policies were not much different from his father’s. But, rather than political stability, he focused all his efforts on the economy and national cohesion (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 1999; Harrigan et al., 2006; Cunningham, 2002). It was Hussein’s

\textsuperscript{12} The Oslo Peace Accords, signed in 1993 between ‘Israel’ and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation [PLO], stipulated that the PLO will have control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The PLO, which later came to be called the Palestinian Authority [PA], was granted pieces of land in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (See figure 1.7 first map from the right), and the Jordanian passports of people residing in those areas were replaced by Palestinian passports. However, the conflict over Jerusalem was left to be discussed later. Palestinians residing in Jerusalem kept their Jordanian passports, and Jerusalem remained under ‘Israeli’ control.
legacy that Jordan achieved political stability, and he established the Hashemite family as the legitimate rulers of Jordan.

Thus, in spite of Jordan’s promotion of a ‘pan-Arabist’ nationalist narrative, it seems that Palestinian and Jordanian identities are located in two contradictory competing narratives. Whereas one might assume that in Jordan those who are considered ‘Arabs’ are favoured over other groups, due to the state’s theoretical adoption of a general ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist narrative, the contrast between ‘Arab’ Palestinians and Circassians suggests that the reality is more complex. Moreover, looking solely at Circassians’ economic and political position in Jordan does not reflect the complexity of their integration, especially as they ‘were not organised as a cohesive political group’ (Chatty, 2010: 119), and those who attained good governmental positions and appear to be fully integrated are actually individuals, who are not necessarily representative of their group. However, Circassians themselves often draw on the narrative of their participation in the building of the state of Jordan, and particularly Amman to explain their integration (Shami, 1996). In light of this, and the history of their incorporation in the state of Jordan, my concern in what follows is with how Circassians explain their ethnicity and how they make sense of being Jordanian when a ‘Pan-Arabist’ narrative is promoted by the state of Jordan.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have attempted to provide the reader with an outline of the history of Circassians in Jordan, during and post Ottoman rule. This has been of particular importance because my research focuses on how Circassians define themselves and what narratives they use in doing so. Circassians began to arrive in the area that is now Jordan in 1878, before it was established as a state. Their arrival was at a time when Jordan was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, which promoted itself as a pan-Islamic state. Since this thesis also looks at how Circassians make sense of the nationalist narratives of the state of Jordan, it is important to explore the shift that took place in how the region was defined. Under Ottoman rule, it was part of a pan-Islamic state and now with the establishment of the state of Jordan, this definition has changed to ‘pan-Arabism’, which at first stance seems exclusive of the Circassians and other ‘non-Arab’ groups who reside in Jordan.

Shami (1996) in her research on Circassians argues that their narrative of building Jordan ‘privileges the Ottoman period, (321)’ and that they have been an indivisible part of the Jordanian people since the establishment of the state of Jordan, particularly since they were living in the land of Jordan before the arrival of the Hashemite Royal family. Despite the fact that the Circassians were associated with the Ottomans, they were able to retain a good position and status within the Hashemite established ‘Arab’ state of Jordan. Their position and status depended, to a great extent, on their presence and residence in agricultural areas, and on their well-established socioeconomic position as merchants in Amman under Ottoman rule. Although there were few Circassians during the period of transition from Ottoman to Hashemite rule, they were economically and politically powerful. The economically powerful position of Circassians in Jordan pre-Transjordan certainly granted them a good position within the newly established state. However, this does not explain how they maintained this position in a state that was based on an ‘Arabist’ nationalist ideology.
The contrast between the situation of Palestinians and Circassians in Jordan appears to contradict Jordan’s theoretical promotion of a ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist narrative. The conventional wisdom about the social acceptance and inclusion of Circassians in Jordan shows that there is room for investigation as to whether this social phenomenon, ‘pan-Arabism’, includes Circassians and how Circassians define and identify with it, if they do. And, although it is largely agreed that Circassians are socially accepted in the state of Jordan, no research has been done on the way Circassians themselves interpret their relation to the state of Jordan; the way they define themselves, as a diasporic community, in an ‘Arab’ state; and whether they see themselves as integrated into Jordanian society. This research, therefore, focuses on participants’ own interpretations of their position in Jordan, their views on their ethnic narratives, and their reconstruction of state promoted nationalist ideologies.

It has to be mentioned, as well, that at the heart of this thesis lies a criticism of the widespread assumption that Jordan, as a Middle Eastern state, is based on ‘Arab’ ethnonationalism, which is de facto exclusionary to ‘non-Arab’ minorities. The following chapter is a review of the literature around ethnicity, nationalism, diasporic communities, and state nationalism. It also explores the small amount of literature on diasporic communities in the Middle East, and nationalist narratives of the Middle Eastern state. It also clarifies how this research is based on the idea that as ethnicity and nationalism are constructed, they are composed of narratives, and those narratives are often, if not always, constructed and reconstructed depending on the context. In other words, this research rejects categorising people into ethnic/national groups according to predefined categories.
Chapter Two

Literature Review

Introduction

‘In their reconstructions, individuals order experiences around the repetition of specific experiential tropes, which then draw on master narratives provided by the state... A narrative analysis of state edicts and autobiographies brings the state and everyday life into the same interpretive frame, allowing for a dynamic, experience-based understanding of the ongoing processes of differential nation-building and state legitimation’ (Borneman, 1992: 19).

This research looks at the narratives of nationalism promoted by the state of Jordan and their reconstruction by Circassians in Jordan, in addition to Circassians’ narratives of ethnicity. It also explores the relationship of the Circassian community to the state of Jordan. State narratives of nationalism are usually promoted through state channels, and the channels this research focuses on are the ‘Jordan First’ campaign, and textbooks of civic and national education taught, as part of an obligatory module, from the age of six till the age of 18, in all Jordanian public and private schools. These narratives can become particularly problematic to diasporic communities when they draw on primordial ethnic attachments. This is especially so when states claim legitimacy through emphasising a tie ‘inferred from the feeling of natural, almost spiritual affinity rather than from social interaction’ (Bacova, 1998: 32). However, since this research understands ethnicity and nationalism as constructs, this chapter discusses how state narratives, including those drawn from ethnic narratives, are reconstructed and reconfigured, by states and by people. The Middle Eastern state, as discussed in this chapter, is proof of this reconstruction.

As explained in the previous chapter, the form of nationalism in Jordan shifted from one based on Islam, which was a unifying element for the ethnically diverse provinces of the Ottoman Empire, to one based on ‘Arabism’. Furthermore,
with the Hashemites’ failure to establish an ‘Arab’ state, nationalism came to be based on being Jordanian; ‘Arabism’ however was not dismissed or disregarded as part of Jordanian nationalism. Chatty (2010: 32) says ‘As the doctrine of ethnic exclusiveness and ethnic nationalism (other than ‘Arabness’) does not largely define the Arab world, the image of a singular closed and primordial group, as defining the state, does not emerge with such clarity’. Since there is no doctrine for ethnic exclusiveness defining the ‘Arab’ world other than ‘Arabism’, I am looking at how the state of Jordan promotes its nationalism, and to what extent ‘Arabness’ or ‘Arabism’ is part of the state’s construction of Jordanianism. I am interested in how the state constructs nationalism ‘from above’. At the same time, I focus on how Circassians (re)construct state narratives of Jordanianism and how they make sense of the concept of ‘Arabism’, if it is part of Jordanianism, ‘from below’.

This focus also contributes to debates on identity and belonging and how they relate to the Circassian community in Jordan. That the Circassians define themselves as belonging to an ethnic group that is different from how the state of Jordan defines the Jordanian nation implies that Circassians could be experiencing contradictory identities and/or senses of belonging. In other words, the Circassians in Jordan, a diasporic community, define themselves as an ethnic group (UNPO, 2008), and are socially accepted in Jordan, which defines itself as an ‘Arab’ state. Their presence as a ‘non-Arab’ ethnic group that is, presumably, fully incorporated into the nation in Jordan questions the assumption that the Middle Eastern state is based on ethno-nationalism and, as a result, is exclusionary towards ‘non-Arab’ minorities. Therefore, in this thesis, I look at both nationalist narratives of Jordanianism and ethnic narratives of the Circassians as a community in the state of Jordan in order to understand how Circassians make sense of the contradiction between being Circassian and Jordanian at the same time, and how they define themselves as Circassian and Jordanian simultaneously. For that reason, I also look at the ethnic narratives Circassians mobilise to define their ethnic group.
Narratives of ethnicity can undergo reconstruction and reconfiguration. The reconstruction and reconfiguration of these narratives render what it means to be of a particular ethnicity fluid and changing. The conceptualisation of ethnicity, and of ethnic boundaries, as (re)constructed and (re)configured is part of the circumstantialist approach to ethnicity. This views ethnicity as a construct, and ethnic grouping as a phenomenon which manifests itself in narratives and shared collective memories, rather than natural affinities. This view is counter-posed to the primordial approach to ethnicity, which is based on the belief that ethnicity is ahistorical, and that groups exist ‘naturally,’ implying the unchanging nature of ethnicity. It is important to note though, that ethnic groups can use both circumstantialist and primordial narratives of ethnicity to draw the boundaries of their group.

The following sections unpack concepts of ethnicity, nationalism, ethnonationalism and state narratives. This chapter explains how state narratives incorporate ideas of ethnicity and nationalism, by drawing on different bodies of work and situating this research within the literature on ethnicity and nationalism as well as the literature on Circassian identity and belonging in Jordan. Reviewing this body of literature also clarifies the theoretical framework of the research. This chapter shows how much of the literature on diasporic communities is Eurocentric, or, in other words, focuses on diasporic groups from the Middle East living in the West and overlooks diasporic communities living in the Middle East. The next section discusses ethnicity.
2.1 Ethnicity

‘A specific ethnic group is constructed by emphasising homogeneity, unity, and timelessness and by disregarding differences, smoothing over contradictions... A particular culture is described in terms of an enduring set of characteristics, behavioural traits, or beliefs, which members of that ethnic group are expected to share’ (Murphy-Shigematsu, 2002: 4).

An ethnic group is constructed through manipulating themes of homogeneity and unity, either through emphasising shared descent or culture (Fenton, 2010). This process of social construction is achieved by using narratives, and those narratives are changing; this means that the boundaries of ethnic groups are fluid and changing. Ethnicity is, broadly speaking, a way of categorising, grouping, and/or dividing people, based on similarities and/or differences, for various motives or reasons. Glazer and Moynihan (1975) draw our attention to the fact that ethnicity, and ethnic grouping can be used as a form of political mobilisation, as a source of stratification, and as an organising principle. However, what does ethnicity consist of? And what makes an ethnic group?

Theorists attempt to understand ethnicity by breaking it up into constituent elements. Some of them argue that ethnic groups have shared ancestry, shared cultural tradition and shared language (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007, Drury, 1994, Jenkins, 2008, Song, 2003). At the same time, ‘claims to sharing descent and culture are decidedly questionable’ (Fenton, 2010: 3). These elements are, therefore, social constructs which themselves hold meanings and serve purposes that are important (Eriksen, 1993, Fenton, 1999, Fenton, 2003, Hale, 2004, Song, 2003). Despite the fact that the meanings of ethnicity are important and can influence social interaction, the meanings themselves can change as elements of ethnicity are not static or unchangeable (Eriksen, 1993). Moreover, the context and meaning of those elements can be determinants of social relations and interactions (Eriksen, 1993, Fenton, 1999, Rex, 1986, Song, 2003). In other words, ethnicity serves as a marker of difference,
particularly in situations where the meanings it holds lead to social stratification. Sutterluty (2006) gives examples of how the widespread belief that ‘members of an ethnic group are blood relatives’ inflames prejudice against the Muslim Turks in Germany (Sutterluty, 2005: 179). In this case the classification of Muslim Turks as blood relatives marks them off from other groups, and is particularly problematic because it means that they are inherently different from ‘others’, implying a primordial tie between them. Fenton (2010) defines primordial ties as ‘those deriving from birth into a particular family, community, religious or language group’ (Fenton, 2010: 86).

Although much of the academic debate attempts to move away from a primordial discussion of ethnicity, this does not mean that people do not view ethnicity in primordial terms. Kukutai (2004) gives us an example which shows the way in which the government in New Zealand defines the Maori in both primordial and circumstantialist way. The government tried to define the Maori people, the indigenous people of New Zealand, in order to provide them with the right to vote for Maori Parliamentary candidates. They set the following criteria to define the Maori:

‘A common proper name; one or more elements of a common culture which need not be specified, but may include religion, customs or language; a unique community of interests, feelings and actions; a shared sense of common origins or ancestry; a common geographic origin’ (Kukutai, 2004: 91).

Identifying ethnicity in a primordial way allows for categorisation and grouping (Brubaker, 2004), which can be problematic in the same way racial categorisation has often led to bloodshed. Based on that, it is important to problematise the primordial view of the term ethnicity, which sees it as natural and identifies it in terms of shared blood and ancestry. In her work on the Mongol realisation of ethnic boundaries, Gil-White (1999) reveals that most of her sample found the primordial perspective most appealing when defining ethnicity (Gil-White, 1999). And, although Eller and
Coughlan (1993) deem the view that ethnicity is natural and unchangeable to be unsociological (Eller and Coughlan, 1993), it is very important to take into consideration the view of ethnic actors. Gil-White states,

‘To insist that actors perceive co-ethnics as sharing biological descent is to describe the manner in which individuals cognize the ethnies they participate in. It does not say that new ethnic groups cannot arise in place of old ones which disappear, nor is it incompatible with this idea’ (Gil-White, 1999: 803).

Moreover, an understanding of ethnicity ‘from below’ would definitely help in unpacking what ethnicity holds and means, and what narratives are used to define the boundaries of a specific ethnic group. Looking at ethnicity ‘from below’ means looking at how ethnic actors themselves view ethnicity. This does not necessarily require a primordial position on behalf of the researcher; rather it means acknowledging that social actors are not passive social objects, that they participate in the construction of ethnicity, and that they have some power over their ethnic choices. For instance, some literature talks about how ethnicity can be used as a resource to gain advantage (Eders et al., 2002, Bagwell, 2008, Drury, 1994, Fenton, 2003). Bagwell (2008) explains how ethnic ties and ethnic networks brought economic advantages for some of the Vietnamese diasporic community in the UK. The manipulation of ethnic ties in this sense cannot be touched upon from above, as ethnic actors themselves in such a case choose to be part of a community for economic advantages. A contradictory example, where ethnic ties serve as a resource to gain advantage, is provided by Keels (2008) who gives an example of how Gautreaux mothers in the USA preferred to live in ‘white’ or mixed neighbourhoods, rather than living in black-dominated neighbourhoods, because the living conditions were much better. In doing so, Gautreaux mothers chose to move away from their ‘ethnic group’ to gain economic advantages (Keels, 2008). Another example of economic advantages gained through membership of an ethnic group is what Bubinas (2003) calls ethnic economies. She says,
'An ethnic economy consists of the ethnic self-employed and their co-ethnic employees. Ethnic economies cater to the needs of their ethnic group, service the general population, and sell goods and services to other ethnic groups. An ethnic economy can consist of one store or a spatial clustering of multiple ethnic-owned businesses' (Bubinas, 2003: 195-6).

Apart from economic advantage, ethnicity can also serve as a resource to gain advantage in terms of political power. Membership of the Alawite sect in Syria, for example, means access to political power, as the ruling al-Assad family in Syria belongs to the Alawite religious sect (Lucas, 1994). Nonetheless, understanding ethnicity as a resource does not explain why it exists in the first place.

Within the circumstantialist approach, many agree that ethnicity is a social construct (Drury, 1994, Fenton, 2003, Jenkins, 2008, Karner, 2007). It is also agreed that descent and ancestry are examples of ethnic markers (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007, Drury, 1994, Jenkins, 2008, Song, 2003, Gil-White, 1999). Moreover, ethnicity has been largely viewed as a product of culture, which is human made and constructed (Fenton, 1999). Ethnic groups use narratives of descent and ancestry to define their boundaries, and their narratives construct descent and ancestry in particular, sometimes intrinsic, ways. Barth (1969), for example, suggests that ethnicity is constructed in situational terms. He argues that this construction emerges through recognising differences between groups. Thus, situational ethnicity ‘derives from a specific group’s recognition that it needs to mark out a differentiated self-identity to create social and physical boundaries’ (Chatty, 2010: 27). For example, groups can draw on narratives of religion, culture, language, and sometimes physical attributes to highlight the differences between them and other groups, and this makes ethnicity situated vis-à-vis an ‘other’. The Circassians did not establish ethnically-based associations or organisations when the land of present-day Jordan was under Ottoman rule; the establishment of the Circassian Charity Association only took place in 1932 when Amman was expanding with a population influx from other places (Shami, 1996).
Takei (1998) suggests that collective memory is a key element for an understanding of ethnic identity. He argues that although people from the same ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural groups may not necessarily be followers of the culture of their group, adhere to the teachings of the shared religion, or be fluent in the language of their ethnic group, they still share a collective memory (Takei, 1998). This collective memory, or even memories, is normally constructed in the form of narratives which are transmitted through upbringing, documentation of historical events, and myths of origin and descent. ‘Most ethnic groups do have a myth of origin, a history of the group, chosen enemies, and stories of traumas’ (Mahanta, 2007: 127). In other words, ethnic groups have particular myths of origin that differentiate them from ‘others’ and so these myths differentiate between ‘us’ and ‘them’. In this way, ethnicity is also situational, because it serves as a boundary marker between groups, and like myths of origin and descent, ethnicity and ethnic identity have other constituents.

Many have argued that shared religion, language, customs, history, and memories constitute ethnicity, and pave the way for categorisation (Karner, 2007, Gil-White, 1999, Hale, 2004, Cornell and Hartmann, 2007, Jenkins, 2008, Song, 2003). However, I would prefer to regard those elements of ethnicity as narratives as well, narratives that might prompt social action and interaction (Karner, 2007), narratives that may lead to categorisation (Kukutai, 2004), and narratives that can lead to discrimination (Bobo and Fox, 2003). They are still narratives subject to change and context, and narratives that keep shifting (Fenton, 1999). Those narratives can in some cases be created ‘from above,’ and they can also be produced and reproduced ‘from below’. They may be originally produced for rational purposes or gains, and later come to hold sentimental meanings, through historical processes. Narratives have never been static, and are always changing and influenced by context.

I am looking at elements of ethnicity as narratives, because I believe that ethnic groups’ boundaries are fluid, and that this fluidity is due to the fact that the
significance of those elements of ethnicity is changing. For example, the Circassians in Jordan may identify themselves as an ethnic group, but what it means to be Circassian may be changing, not because Circassians do not consider themselves as Circassians but because the narratives of the group may change. Thus Shami (1996) demonstrates how the identity of Circassians in Amman was influenced by the fact that Amman, where many Circassians resided, became the capital of Jordan. As Circassian migration to Jordan took place in stages, and not all of them arrived at the same time, Circassians in Jordan developed different senses of identity (Shami, 1996). Shami (1996) explains how there was conflict between early and later Circassian settlers and how the waves of migrants were known by different names. For instance, the last wave was referred to as *muhajirin* by earlier settlers, which means immigrants in Arabic. She explains that an Ammani Circassian identity started to emerge in the 1930s, and Ammani Circassians were seen as superior to non-Amman Circassians, especially the *muhajirin*, and that even their gender practices became different. However, after Amman’s expansion, ‘the incorporation of the *muhajirin* into the Ammani community’ took place for the ‘reproduction of ethnic identity’ (Shami, 1996: 319). Shami’s work shows how ethnic identity is influenced by time and space. She (1995: 80) emphasises ‘the constructed nature of ethnic identification, its shifting nature and malleability to context’.

The narrative approach acknowledges the fluidity of ethnicity due to the changing nature of narratives. It is my contention that Circassians in Jordan may draw their ethnic boundaries through resorting to narratives which can change in time and space. In spite of such change, they continue to consider themselves to be an ethnic group. Dahinden (2008), based on a study of minorities in Switzerland, argues that shifts in ethnic identities, through changing ethnic meanings, is feasible, and can avoid ethnic conflicts. He says,
‘Representations of collective ethnic identities are formed, transformed, reformulated or shifted to other representations of collective identities’ (Dahinden, 2008: 55).

Thus, ethnic narratives are (re)constructed, and (re)configured depending on context. Shami (1995: 80) points out that studies ‘have rarely addressed how this context is informed by the nationalist ideologies of the encompassing states’. In this research I am looking at how ethnic identity, more specifically ethnic narratives of the Circassian community are influenced by the nationalist ideology of the state of Jordan. In relation to the construction of ethnicity and ethnic identity, she (2000) also discusses how the ethnic identity of the Circassian community changed over time and she draws attention to how the identity of the whole Circassian community in Diaspora is influenced by their migration, showing that ethnicity is influenced by context. Although her analysis does not discuss other contextual factors that might have shaped the identity of the community, it provides a good platform for looking at ethnicity in contextual terms. She draws on two texts: one narrates a journey of a Circassian woman in 1993 from Turkey to her original homeland, and the other narrates the journey of a Circassian woman from her homeland to Egypt in 1854. She concludes that Circassian identity is in motion, due to the history of their Diaspora. Shami’s work shows how ethnic identity changes over time because, as narratives, elements of ethnicity are in continuous change. Most importantly, narratives cross borders, borders do not contain them, they are in that sense transnational and not confined within the defined boundaries of nation-states. It is important to note that ethnic identity is not fixed but is changeable, and the meanings attached to ethnicity can be transformed; ‘whether the transformation is the result of centre-periphery interaction in a global system... or the result of physical distance and time spent away from the mythical homeland, the result is the same: a culture affected and somehow changed by new experiences and by the void and loss of contact with the mother land’ (Chatty, 2010: 23).
Identity, however, consists of more than ethnicity. In their theorisation, Anthias and Yuval-Davis say that ethnicity provides ‘a sense of roots’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 6), but research needs to take into consideration the intersectionality of social categories rather than focusing solely on ‘ethnicity’ (Prins, 2006). In her study of narratives of belonging, Prins (2006) argues that narratives of belonging or rootedness are not exclusively based on belonging to an ethnic group. She states that narratives of Dutch and Moluccan women were related to attachment with ‘social class, family, forebears, a particular region or the landscape of one’s childhood’ (Prins, 2006: 288). Therefore, viewing ethnicity as composed of narratives, rather than as ‘a sense of roots’, makes it easier to understand how those narratives may intersect with and/or incorporate other narratives of gender and class. This is because we can have multiple belongings, such as attachment to social class, gender, ethnicity, nationality, etc. The main forms of belonging I am looking at in this thesis are belonging to a ‘nation’ and an ethnic group. As we hold multiple identities, I will look at how Circassians make sense of the contradictory aspects of their identities. For instance, belonging to Jordan, as an ‘Arab’ state, contradicts being a ‘non-Arab’. And if the concept of ‘Arabism’ is based on narratives of descent then this would be exclusionary for Circassians, so I am also looking at how Circassians interpret ‘Arabism’ and how they make sense of their contradictory belongings.

It is also very important to recognise that narratives of class and gender are integral parts of ethnic narratives. Gender relations also serve as a ‘boundary marker’ for ethnic groups (Handrahan, 2002: 46). Sexually, culturally, and physically women are boundary markers for ethnic groups, and speaking of gender relations in ‘other’ ethnic groups or communities is frequently used as a marker of difference. For example, the Western narrative of ‘Arab’ Muslim women in the Middle East conveys women as secluded and mysterious (Waines, 1982). However, this narrative is a construction and is a marker of difference, and is used to support the idea of the superiority of Western civilisation in terms of gender relations. This is only one
example of how gender relations serve as boundary markers. Benton (1998) explains women’s roles in the reproduction of ethnic myths and legends, and clarifies why people emphasise women’s role in the reproduction of ethnies (Benton, 1998). Moreover, biologically defined ethnicities, ethnicities transmitted through blood and descent, and the emphasis on a primordial sense of ethnicity has gender implications. The social view of women as wives, mothers and ‘reproducers of their collectivities’ (Charles and Hintjens, 1998: 8) necessitates and legitimates the control of women’s sexuality. Due to the gender implications of ethnic narratives, and because of the importance of gender narratives in setting ethnic boundaries, it is integral to the study of ethnicity and nationalism to take into account the intersection and the connection between these narratives. In addition to gender, age and class are also important for the understanding of ethnic narratives, as such narratives may differ according to these variables. In other words, ethnic narratives can be reconfigured when they intersect with other forms of social grouping or categorisation.

In conclusion, ethnicity, in this research, is conceptualised as a construct and consequently the meanings it holds are changeable and can be reformulated. Since ethnicity involves boundary drawing, ‘an ethnic minority... is a mechanism of marginalisation, which can have profound effects on how a community creates and maintains its social stability and cohesion’ (Chatty, 2010: 27). Understanding identity and belonging, on the other hand, is not straightforward, especially as we have multiple identities and belongings. This is particularly complex for diasporic communities that identify themselves as ethnically different in the countries where they reside. The Circassians view themselves as ethnically different, yet at the same time they are part of the state of Jordan, as citizens, as their position in Jordan shows. The state of Jordan, on the other hand, identifies itself as an ‘Arab’ state, which can be exclusionary to the Circassians especially if ‘Arabism’ is viewed in ethnic terms. I therefore look at the narratives the state of Jordan promotes to define its identity and
how Circassians (re)construct those narratives to position themselves in relation to the state’s definition.

Social actors exercise agency in reproducing and (re)constructing the narratives of ethnicity and nationalism which they use to make sense of the contradictions of their identities and belongings. Migration flows make it difficult for diasporic communities to see themselves as members of and belonging to only one group, or community. Moreover, belonging to a minority group is often linked to ethnicity, and belonging to a nation-state can be understood in terms of national identity and/or citizenship. Based on that conceptualisation, ethnic group identity is often influenced by the discourses or narratives of the state which controls the place where they reside. Shami states,

‘the historical experience of displacement and resettlement provides powerful symbols that continue to inform contemporary processes of identity formation and perpetuation... displacement not only puts into question the identity of the displaced group, but also the national discourse of the host country’ (Shami, 1994: 8).

In this research I explore both the identity of the Circassians and the nationalist narratives of the state of Jordan. I analyse the narratives of descent, culture, religion, customs, and language, through which social groups, the Circassians in this case, claim solidarity, as well as difference, based on ethnicity (Spickard and Burroughs, 2000). Furthermore, in the same way that ethnic communities construct, produce and reproduce their narratives, states themselves produce and reproduce narratives of their own to construct identities for themselves. However, states have stronger platforms and more power than ethnic actors. States may use education, media, their constitutions, and policies to create and recreate their narratives; the difference is that state narratives are contained within the boundaries of the nation-state. Since this study focuses on the relationship between the Circassian community and the state of Jordan, it explores the narratives of the state, and the narratives of the
Circassian community. In the following section, I review the literature on the concept of nationalism, and the difference between the terms ethnicity and nationalism. Later I move to the conceptualisation of the state in the Middle East, with a particular focus on ways of producing and reproducing state narratives through education and nationalist campaigns. Some literature is also drawn from non-Middle Eastern states regarding the issue of promoting narratives of the nation.
2.2 Conceptualisations of Nationalism

‘Like ethnic ideologies, nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents and, by implication, it draws boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby become outsiders’ (Eriksen, 2002: 7).

There is a considerable debate about the meaning of the term nationalism. Like ethnicities, I argue that nationalisms are socially constructed and are based on narratives, narratives of nationalism being similar to narratives of ethnicity. However, there are differences between what nationalism and ethnicity mean. Therefore, this section attempts to draw a distinction between ethnicity and nationalism, or in other words, between narratives of ethnicity and nationalism. The debate on the difference between ethnicity and nationalism has been blurred in a way that makes it hard to draw the connection between the two. Eriksen (2002), for example, argues that nationalisms are based on ethnicities but that not all ethnic groups have nationalist movements. He links nationalism to claiming a state: ‘a nationalist holds that political boundaries should be coterminous with cultural boundaries, whereas many ethnic groups do not demand command over a state’ (Eriksen, 2002: 7). On ethnicity and nationalism, it has been said that,

‘There is no inherent difference (although sometimes there is a difference in scale) between ethnic and national collectivities. What is specific to the nationalist project and discourse is the claim for a separate political representation for the collectivity. This often -but not always- takes the form of a claim for a separate state’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 25).

Greenfeld (1992) also argues that ethnic nationalism makes the words nationality and ethnicity synonyms, and that national identity has to do with the realisation of possessing certain group characteristics, or elements of ethnicity. Like ethnicity, it is problematic when elements and/or narratives of nationalism are perceived in primordial, inborn, and inherited ways. Since the term nationalism is largely used in relation to nation-states, ethnic nationalism ‘constructs minorities into assumed
deviants from the ‘normal’, and excludes them from important power resources’ within the system of the state (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 11). This shows the strong relation between ethnicity and nationalism; however, to be more specific instead of considering all forms of nationalism as ethnic, I would rather use the terms ethnonationalism to describe feelings of belonging to a nation based on ethnicity, because there are other forms of nationalism as well.

McCrone (1998), for example, speaks of Scottish nationalism, drawing on literature, he says that Scottishness is based on the idea of sharing a territory, rather than an ethnicity, and for that reason Scottish nationalism has been ‘a late, and not very convincing, developer (23)’. He uses the term civic nationalism to describe the type of Scottish nationalism, and says that this concept is weak when compared to nationalism based on ‘a community of blood’ (McCrone, 1998: 23). The example of territorial Scottish nationalism shows that nationalism can exist on a non-ethnic basis.

The term nation means people in English language, which makes nationalism an ideology of peoplehood. Fox (1990) says,

‘Nationalist ideologies refer to the production and conceptions of peoplehood. Sometimes the peoplehood conceived by a particular nationalist ideology requires an independent state or autonomous territory for its realisation’ (Fox, 1990: 3).

Smith explained five usages for the term nationalism,

‘(1) a process of formation, or growth, of nations; (2) a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation; (3) a language and symbolism of the nation; (4) a social and political movement on behalf of the nation; (5) a doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular’ (Smith, 2001: 5-6).

Smith’s set of usages indicates the various ways that the term has been used in literature. Connor (1994), who uses the terms nationalism and ethnonationalism
interchangeably, defined nationalism as feelings of loyalty and attachment to a group of people, to whom individuals believe that they are ancestrally related. Despite the fact that he contends that nationalism, in its ‘pristine sense (xi)’, is based on ethnicity, his contention is problematic, because loyalty to a state as a political community is related to a great extent to concepts of nationalism and citizenship. It is important to say that nations, when referred to in ethnic terms, are ‘defined in terms of “communities of sentiment” that form the political basis on which state authority rests’ (Barking and Cronin, 1994: 111). In political and social sciences great attention has been given to the relationship between the state and nationalism, in its civic and ethnic forms.

‘The central political institution of our age, the state, is also a product of nationalism. Specifically, it is an implication of the principle of popular sovereignty... it is only a form of government, and this form is characteristically modern and necessarily bureaucratic... the distinguishing characteristic of the state became its impersonality’ (Greenfeld, 2006: 164).

There is no consensus on whether the state is the product of nationalism, or nationalism is the product of the modern state order. Whereas Greenfeld believes that the state is the product of nationalism, Gellner argues that nationalism emerges when the existence of the state is ‘already very much taken for granted’ (Gellner, 1983: 4). It is important to keep in mind that nations do not necessarily exist before nationalism, and nationalism does not necessarily exist before the existence of a nation. This is because what it means to belong to a nation is constructed, and nationalism can be (re)constructed and (re)configured. However, the main concern of this thesis is state-nationalism, or in other words how states define who belongs to the nation and who does not. By state-nationalism, I mean the ideologies states promote and adopt to define the boundaries of the nations.

Some theorists of nationalism link the formation of nations to the creation of the modern state system (Gellner, 1983, Hobsbawm, 1990, Anderson, 1991, Breuilly,
1993, Billig, 1995). Those theorists claim that before the emergence of the nation-state, nationalist discourses did not exist. For them, nationalism is a political ideology that the ‘elite’ attempt to promote in order to gain of political and socioeconomic power. It means that rulers construct nationalism as a way to legitimise their claims to sovereignty and political power. Speaking about Indian nationalism, Chatterje says,

‘Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist— but it does need some pre-existing differentiating markers to work on... the two crucial social groups which carry the struggle forward are the proletariat and the intelligentsia. The intellectuals will exchange second-class citizenship for a first-class citizenship plus greater privileges based on rarity. The proletarians will exchange hardships-with-snubs for possibly greater hardships with national identification’ (Chatterje, 1986: 4).

Dobrescu (2003) also speaks of nationalism in Romania, and traces its creation to a movement by ‘the younger offspring of the local ruling elites on their return from their academic studies in Western Europe’ (Dobrescu, 2003: 396). Massad (2001) also argues that a Jordanian national identity only emerged following a civil war with the Palestinians in 1970 (Massad, 2001). Anderson (2001) adds that the state of Jordan attempts to define a national identity through the Kingdom’s textbooks (Anderson, 2001), an idea which will be discussed in detail in chapter six.

However, what remains unanswered following this argument is what makes up Palestinian or Kurdish nationalisms, which are not contained within a nation-state. Both the Palestinians and the Kurds struggle to establish a state of their own, yet their nationalism is not truly recognised by any political or sovereign body. In his study of a Palestinian national identity, Khalidi (2010) argues that one of the main problems facing Palestinians in their struggle is that

‘In spite of lip-service in favour of recognizing the existence of the Palestinian people—there remains today the familiar
undercurrent of dismissiveness of Palestinian identity and Palestinian national claims as being less genuine, less deep-rooted, and less valid than those of other peoples in the region’ (Khalidi, 2010: xxiii).

The Palestinians’, and the Kurds’, claims to a state of their own are good examples of how nationalism can exist before the existence of the state. Many peoples who consider themselves nations, are in fact stateless. However, it must be said that Palestinian nationalism may reflect a reaction against the Israeli occupation and dispossession of the Palestinians in 1948. The same can be said about Kurdish nationalism, which was inflamed by the partition of the lands of Kurdistan between Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Syria. Those examples show that nationalisms exist as a result of nation-states. Yavuz (2001) emphasises this, by saying that nationalisms are constructed by ‘identity entrepreneurs’ (Yavuz, 2001: 3). He says,

‘It is the modernizing nation-state which formed the Turkish nation and nationalism... Since Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran evolved in response to modernizing nation-states, it constantly stresses its ethnic ‘difference’, sometimes even evoking racism to historicize itself’ (Yavuz, 2001: 3).

When nationalism is portrayed through narratives that focus on primordial forms of attachment such as national sentiments for kinship, ancestry, and culture, it becomes problematic for people who do not fit ‘ethnically’ within the paradigm of state-ethnonationalism. However, the significance of those sentiments in our lives makes them, although constructed, worthy of attention to understand the conflicts that arise from the primordial conceptions of the nation and nationalism amongst people themselves. On that point, Connor (1994), says that people have a psychological need for ancestral attachment, and whether it is real or imagined, this tendency exists (Connor, 1994). However, Connor also attempts to draw a distinction between patriotism and nationalism- patriotism represents feeling towards the state, while nationalism reflects feelings towards the people. By doing so, Connor’s conclusion
has its resonance in developmental psychology, about humans’ love and belonging needs.

Greenfeld (1992) disagrees with Connor by saying that people might have a need to belong, but that this belonging does not necessarily have to do with ethnicity, or nationalism; it might be related to class, religion, or even the family. In that I agree with Greenfeld and Billig that this need ‘to belong’ does not necessarily have to be to a nation. This desire for attachment in the pre-nation-state era manifested itself through identifying with religious groups, or even within the family unit, rather than the nation (Billig, 1995). Based on this argument, I would say that the nation in its form and implications is a product of modernity. Other forms of categorisations and concepts of otherness existed before that, but narratives of history, culture, religion, or ethnicity are continuously used to justify the legitimacy of nations as sovereign powers. In this, I am agreeing with Breuilly, who says that he treats the nation,

‘as a modern political and ideological formation which developed in close conjunction with the emergence of the modern, territorial, sovereign and participatory state’ (Breuilly, 2001: 32).

In his definition of nationalism, Hobsbawm suggests that,

‘It holds that groups defined as ‘nations’ have the right to, and therefore ought to, form territorial states of the kind that have become standard since the French revolution’ (Hobsbawm, 1996: 256).

On the other hand, Banton (2004), in his example of the Québécois in Canada, says that calling the Québécois a nation ‘is to lend authority to political claims. To describe Québécois sentiment as nationalist is a step in the same direction’ (Banton, 2004: 809).

Hastings (1997) and Smith (1986) approach nationalism in primordialist terms. Hastings talks about the construction of Englishness based on ethnicity,
which later turned into a form of nationalism (Hastings, 1997). Smith, on the other hand, argued that ethnicity was important in the pre-modern era, and that it also became the basis of nationalism, because nations shared culture and language (Smith, 1986). Smith also says,

‘The merit of the primordialist paradigm is that it draws our attention to the long-term significance of popular attachments, kinship and cultural bonds. The primordialist approach asks why it is that so many people are prepared to risk their lives defending their ‘kith and kin’ and ‘hearth and home.’ And why millions are prepared to lay down their lives for their ‘nation’’ (Smith, 2000: 2).

Regardless of the scholarly approach to nationalism, ethnonationalism exists as a phenomenon and some states define themselves in ethnonationalist terms. The problem with ethnonationalism, when utilised by the state to define the nation, is that it can be exclusionary to all other ethnic groups. Whereas ethnicity and nationalism relate to issues of ‘belonging, community, identity and loyalty’ (Shami, 1995: 79), the term ethnicity is often used to refer to minority group cultures while nationalism has been related to claiming a state. Furthermore, to define states as ethnic is problematic because states are not mono-ethnic, and when states promote mono-ethnic narratives they automatically exclude diasporic communities, who if not adopting the narratives of state ethnonationalism are not seen as full citizens. No nation nowadays can remain self-contained, in a world where it has become ‘almost literally possible to have a foot in two countries’ (Basch et al., 1994: 23). Although, in practice, some states promote their nationalist narratives in ethnic and primordial terms, this does not mean that states are ethnically contained, and problematising this phenomenon is important.
2.3 The State: Power over Narratives?

‘Behind the appearance of thinking it, most of the writings devoted to the state partake, more or less efficaciously and directly, in the construction of the state, i.e., of its very existence... social science itself has been part and parcel of this work of construction of the representation of the state which makes up part of the reality of the state itself’ (Bourdieu, 1999: 55).

Like several, if not all, other institutions, states are generally based on constructed narratives; narratives of independence, narratives of state ideologies, narratives of the nation, myths of foundation amongst others. As social scientists, historians, and academics, we contribute to the narratives of the state; as Bourdieu argues, the mere idea of social scientists’ theorisations of the state enforces the existence of states, and contributes to their reality. Some say that states derive their legitimacy from drawing on narratives of ethnicity and culture, whilst others emphasise that they are territorial, or multi-ethnic or multi-cultural. As previously explained, no society can remain self-contained, and a mono-ethnic state does not exist in reality. Moreover, like narratives of ethnicity, narratives of state nationalism can be (re)constructed and (re)configured. Although the state institution is principally regarded as the legal representative of the nation, the confusion in respect of what is the nation remains unresolved, because it changes with time. An example of that is the state of Jordan. Jordan’s nation-state-ness is continuously being (re)constructed and, within that process, ethnic minorities are also (re)constructed (Massad, 2001, Anderson, 2001). More specifically, the Royal Family in Jordan came to power after defeating the Ottoman Empire, by exploiting narratives of ‘Arabism’, and of ‘Arab’ unity. When establishing a ‘Pan-Arab’ state became impossible, the Hashemite Family resorted to different narratives of nationalism to legitimise their claims to sovereignty. Owen (2004) discusses this change in ‘Arab’ states’ nationalisms and says,
‘Matters were somewhat more difficult in the Eastern part of the Arab world, where the existing states still seemed somewhat artificial entities to many of their own people, and where most of the separate regimes had traditionally relied on political appeals to Arabism to augment their own legitimacy… One index of the shift towards a more localised set of symbols and practices that linked particular Arabs to particular pieces of land was the construction in capital cities like Amman of tombs of local unknown soldiers. Another was increased attention to the celebration of specific national days, few of which had any symbolic pan-Arab component’ (Owen, 2004: 64).

This shift in the narratives promoted by ‘Arab’ states shows that belonging to a nation is (re)constructed and (re)configured according to circumstances, and that nationalism and nationhood are changing; this questions the idea of them being primordially based. It also entails that as narratives of state nationalism can be (re)constructed, who belongs and who does not belong to the nation can also be (re)constructed. In other words, ethnic groups or minorities can be (re)constructed depending on circumstances and political aims. This further emphasises the idea that states are constitutive; they have the power to write the history of their nations, and channel that history through available media. Anderson (2001) talks about how the state of Jordan writes the nation through the Kingdom’s textbooks. Kumar (2006) states,

‘The past of the nation is not simply deeper and longer than in the case of other social groups; it is virtually constitutive. That is why historians have been central to the task of establishing claims for nationhood, and in the elaboration of nationalist ideologies’ (Kumar, 2006: 7).

Stolcke argues that the modern state consists of a territory, a government, and a people, however ‘circumscribing the ‘people’ proved to be the most controversial issue’ (Stolcke, 1997: 61), for policy makers and social scientists. For that reason she concludes that the importance of defining the people derives above all from the fact that without a people, governing a territory ‘makes no sense’. But, who are the
people according to textbooks of national and civic education in Jordan? I find it particularly useful to separate the state institution ‘from both the nation and the civil society’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 12). This is because an ethnonational state, whose members share common territory, ancestry and history is particularly challenged by labour migration, diasporic communities, and refugee flows, who might not share the same ethnicity with the state where they end up residing. Soysal, for example, mentions that well-defined boundaries of nation-states are obstacles to labour migration;

‘Within the modern nation-state system, it has been relatively easy to move capital around, whereas the free movement of populations has been problematic. Nation-states with well-defined boundaries and sovereignty rules present obstacles to labour migration’ (Soysal, 1994: 14).

Smith (2002) states that the concept of an ethnic nation state where ‘one can be a member of only one state and nation at a time’ (Smith, 2002: 199), is no longer viable. Parekh (2000) argues that the fact that nation-states are not mono-ethnic challenges primordial notions of nationhood, and could mean the end of the nation state. He states,

‘no society can remain culturally self-contained and isolated… the idea of national culture makes little sense, and the project of cultural unification on which many past societies and all modern states have relied for their stability and cohesion is no longer viable today’ (Parekh, 2000: 8).

However, national and cultural unification projects do take place, one example being the ‘Jordan First’ campaign. This, like many others around the world is based on cultural unification and creating national unities. Some western countries claim to be multi-cultural; however, multi-culturalism itself has almost become a new form of nationalist ideology. Multiculturalism has become a source of pride for many western states. It is beyond the scope of this research to define multi-culturalism; but it is important to note that it has its problems (See Yuval-Davis 1997). This research,
in parts, is designed to explore how the state of Jordan promotes campaigns of cultural unification, and to what extent it is succeeding. Therefore, this cannot be done without looking at it as a political institution that promotes a specific nationalist ideology, tailored to create national unity and to unify its disparate subjects under the banner of Jordanianism. Therefore, an understanding of the state as a political institution is important. Anthias and Yuval Davis (1989) define the state as,

‘A body of institutions which are centrally organised around the intentionality of control with a given apparatus of enforcement (juridical and repressive) at its command and basis... Different forms of the state will involve different relationships between the control/coercion twin which is the residing characteristic of the state’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989: 5).

The state has the power to produce ideologies, and promote narratives, through education and the media. This does not mean that state’s ideologies always prevail though, because narratives are also produced on other social levels such as the family (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Weber’s definition of the state is useful to understand the nature of the state in the Middle East; he says that the state is,

‘a compulsory political organisation with continuous operations... as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to monopoly of legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order... the authority of its administrative staff is claimed as binding within a territorial area and this claim is upheld by force’ (Weber, 1978: 54-5).

However, one should acknowledge the people’s agency in bringing about political change within the state system. The Middle East and North Africa contain eight surviving monarchies, and for a long time the regimes in Egypt and Syria, despite being republics, were quasi-monarchies and the presidency was inherited. In 2000, following Hafiz al-Asad’s death, his son Bashar automatically took over, and in Egypt it was expected that Husni Mubarak’s son would follow. State rule in these
republics has now (2011), however, been challenged by a “people’s revolution”, and this in itself is proof of the collective power that the people have over and/or against the state. Monarchies in ‘Arab’ states are based on the absolute rule of the monarchs, and the kings have the final word in governance (Kostiner, 2000). And although the concept of liberty is linked to the concept of law in Western society, and thus linked to the state, in the Middle East the concept of liberty is largely viewed as ‘anti-statal… the more extended the concept of the state, the narrower the scope for freedom’ (Ayubi, 2006: 24).

Sharabi (1988) argues that the state in the Middle East is neopatriarchal. In other words, he tries to say that rulers of the state themselves are patriarchs, who have absolute power. He explains,

‘Between ruler and ruled, between father and child, there exist only vertical relations: in both settings the paternal will is the absolute will… significantly, the most advanced and functional aspect of the neopatriarchal state… is its internal security apparatus, the mukhabarat… in social practice ordinary citizens not only are arbitrarily deprived of some of their basic rights but are the virtual prisoners of the state, the objects of its capricious and ever-presenting violence’ (Sharabi, 1988: 7).

Sharabi’s observations on the neopatriarchal nature of the state in the Middle East consider the state as an institution which serves the interests of the ruling class. When the Hashemite family failed to establish a ‘pan-Arab’ state, they changed their narratives and strategies to legitimise their rule. They moved towards more localised narratives to monopolise power, to mobilise the people on the territory, and to distinguish themselves from other ‘Arabs’ (Owen, 2004). However, important questions remain to be answered: how does the state of Jordan define who belongs to the nation and who does not? Is the Jordanian nation defined in terms of ethnicity? Do state narratives consider Circassians to be part of the ‘nation’? How do Circassians themselves define themselves and (re)construct state narratives of
Jordanian nationalism? And what are the gender implications of a neopatriarchal state?

Defining the nation in primordial terms also places women in a disadvantaged position, particularly in the ‘Arab’ world, where women are largely perceived as wives, mothers and sisters, responsible for the reproduction of ethnic identity (Charles and Hintjens, 1998). In ‘Arab’ states, the family unit is the main block of society (Moghadam, 1993), and for that reason preserving the patriarchal family unit and maintaining control over women by confining them to the private sphere is seen as necessary to preserve ‘Arab’ culture. Moreover, the state is seen as an extension of the patriarchal family unit (Sharabi, 1988). For example, kings or rulers are portrayed as the ‘fathers’ of the communities they rule, as heads of societies, and the nations are portrayed as their families. Like in patriarchal families, the king or president has absolute power over his community, and the nation should respect, fear and follow the ruler. The use of the patriarchal family metaphorically to describe rulers’ relation to citizens enforces the paradigm of the patriarchal family and vice versa, the preservation of the patriarchal family reinforces the power of the rulers. Furthermore, within the patriarchal domestic sphere, women are expected to reproduce narratives of the nation.

Women have been largely excluded from studies of nationalism, and feminists have pointed out this absence. Some explain this exclusion by referring to the confinement of women to the private sphere and their marginalisation in public. The public/private dichotomy, in addition to implying that nationalism and nationalist narratives are produced by elites or states or intellectuals, excludes women by default from the nationalism debate. However, as Yuval-Davis (1998: 2) states ‘it is women- and not (just?) the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia- who reproduce nations, biologically, culturally, and symbolically’. Yuval-Davis is right in her argument that women reproduce nations, but at the same time although women are part of the myths of origin of nations, they are largely excluded from myths and
narratives of foundation (Benton, 1998). Thus the ethnonational narratives of the nation in monarchical states in the ‘Arab’ world are problematic for both women and ethnic minorities. They may have exclusionary effects on both minorities and women in terms of access to state resources, and they may imply that women and minorities are second class citizens. For instance, in many countries in the ‘Arab’ Middle East, women do not transfer their citizenship to their children, although they are members of the community, and supposedly part of the nation. Thus, women’s position challenges the whole concept of citizenship in the Middle East. Martinello, for example, theorised that ‘the individual enjoys the rights associated with citizenship because she or he belongs to a political community defined as a nation-the nation-state’ (Martinello, 2002: 117). The concept of citizenship is very much linked to the concept of nation. In other words, if states define belonging in ethnonational and gendered terms, some citizens might feel excluded from the ‘nation’. Others, in contrast, might attempt to include themselves by (re)constructing what the nation is in their own terms. Chatty’s work on the Circassians revealed that ‘identity and ethnic affiliation’ are self-defined and fluid. Thus ‘a Circassian one moment can perceive himself as Jordanian, Palestinian, Syrian or Turkish’ (Chatty, 2010: 126). My focus, however, is on whether state promoted narratives of nationalism exclude or make Circassians feel excluded, particularly in light of the promotion of a ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist ideology. Chatty (2010) explains that for many Circassians being Circassian and Jordanian are not contradictory; but if being Jordanian is linked to being an ‘Arab’, then how do Circassians create a harmony of those contradictions?

It is worth noting here that access to a full citizenship is contextualised, and there are several factors, which render many unable to attain full citizenship (Pierson, 2004). Those factors range from state policies such as those in the Middle East (Joseph, 1996a), to gender roles within familial contexts, and their relation to access to full rights of citizenship (Walby, 1997, Baines, 1996, O’Connor, 1998, Lister,
In Jordan, the exclusion of women from enjoying full rights of citizenship is due to the fact that national identity is seen to be transferred through the fathers, rather than the mothers. Children are born into the family of the father, hold the father’s name, and kinship is identified through patrilineality (Barakat, 1993), and this marginalises women in nationalist narratives.

Several scholars in their theorisations of citizenship conclude that belonging to a state has its roots in territorial and historical bonds, and that this involves reciprocal rights and obligations between the state and its nationals (Anderson, 1991, Brubaker, 1989, Castles and Davidson, 2000, Hobsbawm, 1992, Jacobson, 1996, Piper, 1998). However, and at the same time, labour migration and other forms of migration challenge a concept of citizenship based on common history and/or territory. This is because, as Cohen puts it,

‘The nation-state is often too large and too amorphous to be the object of intimate affection… Bonds of language, religion, culture and a sense of a common history and perhaps common fate impregnate a transnational relationship and give to it an affective, intimate quality that formal citizenship or even long settlement frequently lacks’ (Cohen, 1996: 517-18).

Habermas also shares Cohen’s view on the formal relationship between the citizen and the state. He explains that ‘the nation of citizens does not derive its identity from common ethnic and cultural properties, but rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights’ (Habermas, 1994: 23). Most Palestinians in Jordan have Jordanian citizenship but at the same time they are underrepresented in the public sector, and are discriminated against. Therefore, if belonging to a state is based on citizenship, and if citizenship promotes equality why are Palestinians in Jordan disadvantaged? And why are women in the Middle East not treated as equal to men, even in legislation? Young (1990) argues that group differences are neither natural, nor real, ‘they are made and constantly remade in social interactions’ (Young, 1990: 133). Young explains that even when states try to
apply anti-discrimination policies, this is not necessarily reflected in society or during social interaction. For example, Young might explain this by claiming that, even if women were granted equal rights by the states in the Middle East (and they are not), this would not necessarily mean that the society would accept it and apply it per se, because gendered and ethnic ideologies also exist ‘from below,’ which influence the position of women and ethnic minorities in the society. His argument is that the people, and not necessarily the state, shape social relations.

On the other hand, if state agencies, and/or rulers, define their citizens in ethnic terms, such a definition can exclude diasporic communities who consider themselves ethnic minorities. Van Gunsteren, for example, explains citizenship through membership of a ‘historical community, its past and its future’ (Van Gunsteren, 1988: 736). However, diasporic communities all over the world cannot share a past that is gone, but can share in the future of a particular community. In that I also agree with Cohen, who explained that the relationship between the citizen and the state is formal, and does not necessarily reflect bonds of religion, language and culture (Cohen, 1996).

This sort of membership, Cohen (1996) explains, also allows room for diasporic communities to be members of their respective states, and at the same time bond with people who share their religion, language, culture, or ethnicity. Although legally, as citizens, members of diasporic communities are supposed to hold equal rights, they are often exposed to racism, xenophobia, and most recently a newly acknowledged form of phobia, Islamophobia. Werbner for example states,

‘In existing beyond the nation-state with its fixed boundaries and clearly defined categories of inclusion and exclusion, of participatory rights and duties, citizenship and loyalty, Diasporas as scattered, uncontained and uncontainable, minorities have historically been the target of racialised and xenophobic nationalist imaginings’ (Werbner, 2002: 121).
The case of Circassians in Jordan is different from the Palestinians and there is a conventional wisdom that the Circassians are more accepted in Jordan. Although one would assume that as a diasporic community the Circassian minority in Jordan may also be disadvantaged, because they do not ‘fit’ within the state’s definition of the nation, nations and nationalisms are constantly reconstructed, and within the process of reconstructing nationalist narratives, the Circassian community might have come to be included within this definition. Also, it is important to recognise people’s agency in relation to including themselves in state promoted narratives about the nation. Thus, Circassian integration might be related to their ‘emphasis on the importance of community solidarity, good citizenship, and political awareness’ (Chatty, 2010: 129). To expand on the concept of diaspora, and diasporic communities, the following section discusses the position of diasporic communities, and the difference between diasporic communities who have a recognised ‘original’ homeland and those who do not. The next section is designed to explain how and to what extent the Circassian community in Jordan fits within the diaspora paradigm.
2.4 Diasporic Communities

‘Its new currencies in globalist discourse confound the once (presumed to be) clearly demarcated parameters of geography, national identity, and belonging... Diaspora can perhaps be seen as a naming of the other which has historically referred to displaced communities of people who have been dislocated from their native homeland through movements of migration, immigration, or exile’ (Evans Braziel and Mannur, 2003: 1).

To start with the terminology, diaspora refers to displaced, relocated, or dislocated communities belonging to a collectivity, ethnic or national, in places other than their ‘original’ homeland (Evans Braziel and Mannur, 2003). Diasporic communities may, or may not, want to preserve their ‘original’ national or ethnic identities in states where they reside. Taylor (1994: 63) suggests that for those communities the ‘centre’ of their identity is ‘elsewhere’, or in other words, beyond the boundaries of a primordial state-nationalism and affiliation (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007). However, I suggest that we have multiple identities, thus to say that the centre of one’s identity is elsewhere is inaccurate. In other words, our identities are not only influenced by our ethnicity, or ethnic affiliation, but also by the context and the place where we reside. Therefore, I disagree with the assumption that diasporic communities de facto identify with their ‘original’ homeland, or the homeland of their ‘ancestors’, particularly because identities are subjective and the many contextual factors influencing them lead us to have multiple identities that can transcend primordial notions of ethnicity and nationalism.

Looking at diasporas in primordial terms implies that diasporic communities have their own ethnicities, which are inherently incompatible with the nationalism of the state where they reside (Triandafyllidou, 2006). In our world nowadays, mass communication and the internet have made it possible for diasporic communities to preserve their ties with their original homeland and, at the same time, live in a different context (Yuval-Davis, 1997); this preservation involves a process of
constructing social discourses which transcend national boundaries (Basch et al., 1994). However, access to this type of mass communication only became available in the second half of the twentieth century. Therefore, recently emerging diasporic communities are more likely to remain in contact with their original homelands than diasporas which appeared before that time.

The Circassian diaspora originates in the nineteenth century, at a time there was no wide access to communication technologies. Therefore, one may assume that the ethnic narratives of Circassians in Jordan have developed, in the context of their lengthy stay in Jordan. I have already established that ethnic narratives are constructed and (re)constructed depending on time and space, thus this research looks at ethnic narratives of the Circassian community in Jordan, during the period of fieldwork. Although it is widely assumed that diasporic communities challenge the paradigm of states which base their nationalist narratives on notions of primordial ties, such as kinship relations, culture, language, and narratives of the past, this does not necessarily have to apply to the Circassian community in Jordan, particularly since they came to Jordan before it existed as a state. Nonetheless, the assumption that diasporic communities challenge the concept of the nation-state is based on the idea that diasporic communities have their own ethnic narrative, and if states are ethnonational then diasporic communities are automatically excluded from the ‘nation’, and consequently from belonging to the political community of the state where they reside. Literature on the Circassian community in diaspora is scarce, as is literature on diasporic communities in the Middle East generally. In her study on the well-off Armenian Diaspora in Lebanon and Syria, Migliorino (2008) looks at ‘how the Armenian refugee community has struggled to find… its ‘permanent’ space as a distinct cultural community in the Arab East’(Migliorino, 2008: 2). She suggests that what started at the beginning as nationalism in exile became later a form of diasporic transnationalism. Comparing the experiences of Armenians in Lebanon and in Syria, Migliorino suggests that, whereas in the state of
Lebanon the Armenians are more visible as a community (because the state is based on sectarian power-sharing), in Syria where the state denies the relevance of ethnic minorities, they are not a marginalised community either. She says, ‘Since President Hafiz Al-Asad seized power in 1970, the Syrian regime has developed a complex and ambiguous model of relations between the state and ethno-cultural groups. While officially denying their relevance, the regime has continued to use ethnic and sub-ethnic allegiances as a strategic power resource. This context has created for the Armenians (as for other social groups) some protected spaces where the community could continue to preserve… its diversity’ (Migliorino, 2008: 4).

Perhaps, King Abdullah I granted Circassians good governmental positions and privileged them over others to use them as a strategic power resource. However, that does not mean that they were provided with the space to preserve their diversity. The difference between the examples of the Armenian community and the Circassian community is that the former preserved its language and even built churches, while very few Circassians in Jordan speak Circassian. Research on Circassian language maintenance showed that 72 percent of students of the only Circassian school in Jordan used Arabic at home; 6.5 percent used only Circassian, and 15 percent used Circassian as a second language (Rannut, 2010). Of course the history of the Armenian and the Circassian diasporas is totally different, and this dates back to the millet system that existed during Ottoman times. As mentioned in the previous chapter, at a certain point the Christians, including Armenians, in the Ottoman Empire became more privileged than the Muslims, including Circassians (McCarthy, 2001). Another difference between the Armenians and the Circassians that should be taken into account is that the Armenian community are internationally recognised as a diaspora, the genocide practised against them is internationally recognised, and on maps of the modern world there is a country called Armenia, which makes the preservation of transnational ties with the homeland more feasible and possible.
Redeker Hepner (2009) draws our attention to how Eritrean diasporic communities, although in exile, lead nationalist movements in Eritrea (Redeker Hepner, 2009). She reflects on the transnational nature of these Eritrean sentiments. For the Eritrean diaspora, an Eritrean state is pretty much taken for granted, and their national sentiments are towards reforming and liberating the state. Butler-Smith (2009) also draws our attention to an actualisation of a new form of self-consciousness and status amongst the Jewish diaspora in the United States, following the establishment of a Jewish state in 1948 on Palestinian lands (Butler-Smith, 2009). She speaks about a ‘transition (160)’ and a change from Jews being ‘associated only by virtue of a shared universal faith—Judaism represented only a religion, not a nationality or a people’ (Butler-Smith, 2009: 166), to a people and a nation. Kostantaras (2008) in his study of diasporic literary texts argued that ‘national revival movements from early modern times to the present have often drawn intense support from those dwelling outside the nation’ (Kostantaras, 2008: 700-1). In her study of the Somali diaspora, Kleist (2008) also suggests that diasporic communities, or diasporas act ‘as agents of developments in their countries of origin’ (Kleist, 2008: 1128). In an ethnographic study of the Jewish migration from rural Morocco to ‘Israel,’ Boum (2010) explains that one of the reasons why migration took place was because of the failure of the newly emerged Moroccan nationalism in the early 1960s to accommodate the Jews; however, before the establishment of the state of ‘Israel,’ the Jewish population in Morocco did not face such a problem. She further argues that the creation of the state of ‘Israel’ led to the emergence of transnational sentiments amongst the Jewish community in Morocco (Boum, 2010). This, however, does not mean that those diasporic communities whose original homeland is not recognised as a state do not have the same sort of sentiments as other diasporic communities. An example of that would be the Palestinian diaspora. Mavroudi (2007) argues that the Palestinian diasporic community in Athens construct their own sense of belonging to Palestine, through narratives, and memories they transfer over generations (Mavroudi, 2007). Despite the fact that they cannot refer to a
Palestinian territory on maps of the modern world, narratives are transmitted from generation to generation, about ‘the ancestral villages and the material houses their family once occupied’ (Mavroudi, 2007: 398). In real life, most of those material houses were destroyed and replaced with Jewish settlements, which means that they no longer exist. Yet, those imagined narratives remain significant, and the fact that they are constructed and (re)constructed does not make Palestinian nationalist feelings less important or legitimate.

I agree with Croucher (2003) who argues that despite the fact that the concept of the nation is ambiguous, and fluid, particularly when a state is non-existent, it is very important, and integral to the lives of those ‘fighting for a state of their own’ (Croucher, 2003: 17). A famous Palestinian saying reflects the strength of nationalism amongst Palestinians even without the existence of the state: ‘every person is born in a homeland, except the Palestinians, their homeland is born in their hearts’.

‘The term ‘diaspora’ remains in a sense problematic when applied to the Palestinian case. Yet Palestinians in exile do constitute a diaspora community... there is a Palestinian transnational community/nation... Although both politically and individually the attachment to a glorified homeland remains exceedingly strong, there is also a tale to be told of transnationalism and globalism’ (Lindholm Schulz and Hammer, 2003: 227).

It is very important here to draw a distinction between feelings of nationalism amongst diasporic communities which already have a territorial state, and those who struggle to establish one of their own. Therefore, I would say that the sentiments of diasporic communities vary according to the place where they reside, and also according to time, as they depend greatly on changes in the political sphere of their native territories. For example, the Kurds in Iraq, Iran and Syria, are not a diasporic community; however, they have ethnic narratives that are different from those prevalent in their respective states. This shows that it is not only ethnic narratives of diasporic communities that can contradict the idea of the ethnonational
state, but also native inhabitants of lands are not always satisfied with their states’ ethnic narratives and may construct a counter-narrative of identity and belonging. Yet again, identities and belongings are fluid and self-defined and we can have multiple identities and belongings. It is the contradictions between different identities that I am looking at.

‘For even people remaining in familiar and ancestral places find the nature of their relation to place ineluctably changed, and the illusion of a natural and essential connection between the place and the culture broken. "Englishness," for instance, in contemporary, internationalized England is just as complicated and nearly as deterritorialized a notion as Palestinian-ness or Armenian-ness’ (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992: 10).

The term diaspora is helpful in emphasising that ethnicities and nationalisms have become largely deterritorialised and not restricted by political boundaries. This has also pushed and paved the way for

‘A certain shift in national ideologies in many western countries and multi-culturalism has become a hegemonic ideology which... has eased somewhat the pressures on immigrants to assimilate’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 18).

Thus, when states attempt to define their nations based on a primordial notion of ethnicity, or when states use narratives of ethnic nationalism, they are attempting to territorialise something that may no longer be territorialised.

Using the term diaspora to describe communities that identify themselves as ethnic groups overlooks the importance of space and time in (re)constructing and (re)configuring ethnic narratives of communities and may obscure the existence of different and varying narratives of the same ethnicities. This is because the term diaspora implies that diasporic communities are homogenous regardless of gender, class, place of diaspora, and the context (Anthias, 1998). Hart (2002) discusses nationalism amongst Palestinian children in camps in Jordan. He describes how
‘the ideas which young people express about themselves as members of the community of the mukhayyam (camp) indicate a creative and generationally specific engagement with a wide range of discourses and practices not confined to Palestinian nationalism alone’ (Hart, 2002: 37).

Unlike the sample of Palestinians in Athens research by Mavroudi (2007) and discussed earlier in this section, Palestinian refugees in Jordan have Jordanian citizenship, and live in a Palestinian camp community, which they consider a Palestinian space. Their ideas suggest that narratives of ethnicity are affected and influenced by the context, and are always in processes of reconstruction. Chatty (2010) explains that the refugee status of Palestinians gives them ‘a sense of marginality and exclusion’. She adds that Palestinian refugees ‘have found the medium to express their cultural coherence and their social reality’ (Chatty, 2010: 229-230) through education and that ‘there is a physical reinforcement of ‘Palestinianness’ in the places they occupy’ (ibid: 230). This suggests that narratives of identity and belonging are influenced by time and space, which reflects their contextual nature. Anthias (1998) states,

‘If there is an ethnicity in the diaspora (and there clearly is), then like all ethnicities it formulates itself in relational and contextual terms; different narratives around identity and culture come into play to pursue particular political projects’ (Anthias, 1998: 569).

The diaspora paradigm succeeds in understanding transnational movements and the role technologies have in preserving the ties between diasporic communities, and their place of origin (Robertson, 1992). Anthias (1998) mentions that one of the main problems of the diaspora paradigm is that it assumes a natural bond between diasporic communities and their original homeland, and this also creates a problem of understanding the intersectionality of class, gender and ethnic relations, which constitute narratives on their own. Therefore, to consider a particular group a diasporic community, one must take into consideration that the ethnic narratives
and/or ethnic boundaries of diasporic groups are highly contextualised, and that they can also be configured by class, gender, and socio-political situation in the original homeland and in the country of residence. This is particularly important to highlight in this research, because each Middle Eastern state is different, and what might influence narratives of ethnicity of Circassians in Jordan may be different from what influences Circassian narratives of ethnicity elsewhere in the world. In addition, state narratives of nationalism can also be (re)constructed; this means that the assumption that all minority groups are *de facto* excluded from state narratives because they identify with their countries of origin is in fact not accurate. This is because each state is different, and the narratives of the state can also change over time, as discussed in the next section.
2.5 Narrating and (Re) Narrating the Nation

‘The Middle East, like many other regions of the world, is heterogeneous and comprises of numerous ethnic, national, religious and linguistic societies, groups and sects. Much of the troubles facing this region revolve around the treatment or mistreatment of its minority population. Most of the post-Ottoman states are yet to evolve a national identity that would encompass and reflect their multi-ethnic social composition’ (Kumaraswamy, 2003: 244).

Although I agree with Kumaraswamy in his contention that much of the trouble facing the Middle East is related to inter-group conflict, this does not necessarily imply mistreatment of minority populations. It is, therefore, important to clarify here that the western concepts of majorities and minorities do not apply to the Middle East (Kedouri, 1983). This is well illustrated by the cases of Circassians in Jordan and Armenians in Syria and Lebanon who are considered to be integrated, especially politically and economically. Kedouri (1983) explains that the terms minority/majority are western terms, and that the form of classification used during Ottoman times was the millet system, previously explained. He adds that after the fall of the Ottoman Empire ‘“national minorities” came into existence’ (Kedouri, 1983: 280). Thus, like ethnicities and nationalisms, minorities are constructed and (re)constructed. Under the millet system, the Circassians were not seen as a minority but instead were seen as part of a religiously defined group, the Islamic ummah. With the emergence of ‘Pan-Arabism’, Circassians were once again seen as Circassians. This demonstrates the importance of context in the defining of minorities.

In the Middle East, many states resort to ethnonational narratives to define the nation, and since ethnicity is constructed and (re)constructed, those narratives can be reformulated to include or exclude people at different times. The story of the development of nation-states in the Middle East might reveal more than just people’s desire for self-determination to challenge colonialism. The complex nature
of the Middle East derives above all from its history. A history of united Islamic lands, a history of colonialism, and a history of new states struggling to achieve forms of nationalisms, either inclusive of all their ethnic minorities or simply denying the relevance of ethnic minorities, all contribute to our understanding of the current status of Middle Eastern states. There is a huge body of research on the identities of Middle Eastern states themselves, but very few focus on how nationals of those countries make sense of, (re)construct and (re)configure state narratives, and how people (re)narrate the nation ‘from below’; this shows little acknowledgement of people’s agency. Several commentators talk about and criticise the mere existence of Middle Eastern states, because they view them as lacking legitimacy and not encompassing minorities (Anderson, 2002, Anderson, 2001, Halliday, 2000b, Kumaraswamy, 2003, Massad, 2001), but they forget that all Middle Eastern states are modern products of colonisation, and this has prompted states to seek a way to legitimise their sovereignty by constructing narratives of nationalism. Although Massad (2001), for example, wrote on what being a Jordanian or a Palestinian is, he fails to recognise the fact that states in the Middle East were created before the promotion of state nationalist narratives amongst the people took place (Kumaraswamy, 2006). This however does not mean that the Circassian, the Palestinian or the Jordanian people are products of state narratives, rather it means that what is meant by a Palestinian or a Jordanian is continuously changing and being (re)constructed. Although individual ‘Arab’ states started resorting to localised narratives of nationalism after failing to achieve a ‘pan-Arab’ state, most of those states also define themselves as ‘Arab’, but what it means to be an ‘Arab’ can also be (re)constructed to accommodate and include ‘others’.

Moreover, those studies fail to look at the role of Islam in shaping state nationalist narratives. For example, Ali (2003) states that ‘in a world without nations or nationalisms, the Islamic identity came close to being a universal ‘nationality’’ (Ali, 2003: 62). Ali’s argument presumes some kind of unity between all Muslim
communities, who are heterogeneous and are of different ethnic origins. Roy (2002) also emphasises that Muslims, regardless of their ethnic culture, share a common religious culture. Asad (1993), on the other hand, argues that ‘there cannot be a universal definition of religion,’ because such a definition is the outcome of ‘discursive processes’ (Asad, 1993: 29). However, a valid argument here would be that the predominance of Islam in the politics of states with Muslim majorities led many scholars to wonder whether the paradigm of the nation-state is viable in the Middle East or not (Zubaida, 2001). Zubaida (2001) states that,

‘The nation state has been a ‘compulsory’ model at independence of former colonies and dependencies, partly for lack of any other respectable models of statehood… various brands of nationalism have held sway during and after independence in most Third World countries, and those of the Middle East have been no exception’ (Zubaida, 2001: 121).

Scholars such as Zubaida (2001) and Aburaiya (2009) base their arguments on studies of state policies in the Middle East, rather than the narratives of the people living on those territorial lands. Many states struggled in that sense to portray an image that is in accordance with the ‘compulsory model’ of the nation-state to emphasize their legitimacy. On the state of Iraq, Zubaida (2002: 214) said that the creation of a nation that is ‘territorial, economic, and social reality,’ followed the creation of a state, which used totalitarianism to guarantee the survival of its sovereignty. Those studies do not explore the ways people, of different ethnicities; make sense of and (re)construct narratives of the state. Most of the studies of nationalism in the Middle East focused on narratives of the state, and exclude how people make sense of and (re)construct those narratives (Aburaiya, 2009, Asad, 1993, Austin, 2003, Coury, 2005, Hagopian, 2009, Kurzman, 2007, Munson, 2003, Steunebrink, 2008, Zubaida, 2001, Zubaida, 2002).

Promoting narratives of the nation-state in order to create a sense of nationalism amongst citizens is a global phenomenon, not only in the Middle East.
Zhao (2000) talks about China’s struggle to create a form of state nationalism, after being criticised for not fitting into the modern world order of nation-states. In the early 1990s, the state led an educational campaign which ‘called for maintaining a ‘consciousness of suffering’” (Zhao, 2000: 18-9). Also, he mentions that the state added patriotic education to high school and colleges’ curricula, highlighting the achievements of the Chinese people. Another study of Taiwan and China also notes that both states used their control over higher education ‘to propagate official beliefs to students for citizenship’ (Law, 1995: 349).

There are also several methods governments use in order to promote a sense of nationalism and national unity amongst their populations. As Whitmeyer (2002) puts it,

‘They have control over public education... and within public education things happen like the suppression of unofficial languages. Governments may organize nationalist organizations of adults and of children. They declare nationalist holidays and commemorations, and organize nationalist parades and celebrations. Increasingly important as technology of mass communication has improved, governments often control the mass media, such as newspapers, radio, and television, either directly or indirectly. They can thus control information concerning nations and their deeds, or even exhort people to nationalistic action’ (Whitmeyer, 2002: 327).

The use of education in promoting state nationalist ideologies is common in the world, under the banner of citizenship education, civic education, or even social education, or covertly in history or geography, sports, etc. The state of Jordan uses national and civic education curricula in schools. Textbooks of civic and national education in Jordan are also part of a strategy to promote state narratives of nationalism, and because such channels are important, I have chosen to look at the narratives the state of Jordan promotes, and the way people consume those narratives.
As states create and promote narratives, those narratives can be resisted, and this resistance might prompt reactions amongst people who feel excluded. An example of contesting state nationalism provided by the indigenous movements in Bolivia, which called for reform in the political system in Bolivia in order to recognise their rights and culture (Yashar, 1998). Following those movements, which emerged in several countries in Latin America, ‘Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru adopted or modified constitutions to recognise the multiethnic, multicultural nature of their societies’ (Van Cott, 2000: 207). Speaking of Bolivian state national identity, ‘national identity did not include indigenous populations nor their rights. What emerged were states, formed by Europeanised mestizos, preoccupied with building one homogenised nation and one population’ (Arocena, 2008: 11-12). This shows that states are constantly trying to define their nations following the building of the state, and this is not confined to ‘Arab’ Middle Eastern states.

States’ narratives of the nation are continuously reconstructed and changing, which makes the boundaries of nationhood fluid, and not fixed. The same applies to ethnic narrative of minority groups, as they are highly contextualised and vary according to time and space. On the one hand, one must acknowledge the role people play in (re)narrating the nation, because through an understanding of their narrations of state nationalist narratives, we can develop an understanding of the relation between diasporic communities, such as the Circassians and the states where they enjoy citizenship, and how Diasporas define themselves within nation-state boundaries. On the other hand, although states, generally, own powerful means to channel their narratives of nationalism, some of those narratives can be rejected and resisted by those who do not feel included in them.
Conclusion

Very little has been said about diasporic communities in the Middle East, and research on the Circassians in Jordan is scarce. Although there is a conventional wisdom that the Circassians are integrated into Jordanian society, there is no research that shows whether Circassians themselves feel this way or not. This study looks at the ethnic narratives of the Circassian community in Jordan. However, an exploration of ethnic narratives should take into account the idea that ethnicities are (re)constructed and (re)configured, or, in other words, that narratives of ethnicity are contextualised, and this makes ethnic boundaries fluid. At the same time, state-promoted nationalist narratives are also (re)constructed and (re)configured; this is clear from the example of modern Middle Eastern states. So, within those (re)constructions and (re)configurations what it means to be part of the nation can also be (re)narrated in various ways. For that reason, I suggest a move from regarding ethnic and diasporic communities as ‘deviants from the “normal”’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 11), to looking at how those (re)constructions take place.

This suggestion goes hand in hand with the idea that minorities can also be (re)constructed and that what it means to be part of a minority can also change. For instance, the Circassians, as a group, have been constructed and (re)constructed as their history shows. When they were under Ottoman rule the millet system governed inter-group relations, and their position changed, from refugees suffering from the hardship of their flight, to settlers, to land owners and to a relatively advantaged and ‘dominant’ minority, politically and economically. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that they are integrated socially, or that their position will remain the same in the future. Furthermore, since we have multiple identities and belongings, it is important to recognise that ethnicities and nationalisms can be (re)configured and explore how Circassian narratives of ethnicity might have been influenced by their presence in Jordan and how they make sense of the state’s nationalist ideology. The
case of Circassians represents a significant case study that can demonstrate how ethnicities have been constructed in Jordan.

The literature around nationalism, on the other hand, tends to look more at the nationalist narratives of the state, rather than focusing on how those narratives are received by people; this research attempts to address this by looking at narratives of the state ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ at the same time. The state of Jordan uses education and nationalist campaigns to promote state nationalist narratives; however, state narratives can be resisted and rejected. Looking at how the Circassian community makes sense of state narratives will help us identify whether the state of Jordan is successful in delivering those narratives to all those living in Jordan, and can also identify any potential conflicts between the Circassians and the state of Jordan. It will also contribute to an understanding of whether Circassians feel excluded or included in those narratives, and will show whether there is any resistance on the part of Circassians to those narratives. This also takes into account the fact that people, and not only states, exercise agency and participate in the narration and (re)narration of the nation, despite states’ ownership of powerful resources that facilitate the promotion of such narratives.

Within the process of narrating the nation, women, as part of the nation in the Middle East, are marginalised from many narratives of the state, as well as narratives of ethnicity. Women are regarded as reproducers of the nation and as wives and mothers, as responsible for rearing the next generation to ensure the persistence of the nation. This justifies the exclusion of women from the public sphere, and limits their roles to the private. It may also lead to control over women’s sexuality, in order to guarantee the nation’s survival. ‘Arab’ states are champions in this field, and the exclusion of women from the public sphere is facilitated by law (El-Azhary Sonbol, 2003). A comprehensive understanding of ethnic narratives should take into account gender differences, because gender relations are often used as markers of ethnic boundaries. Generational differences are also important,
because ethnic narratives depend on time and space, and may differ according to age. The next chapter explains the research approach, that is to say the methods used to answer the research questions, and it tells the story of the research.
Chapter Three  
Methodologies

Introduction

‘You go and do your field work, and however you come back you’re going to be different than you were before you underwent the ritual. So the researcher is the focal point of awareness. Research is interpreted as a personal journey of discovery possibly leading to transformation’ (Brew, 2003: 7).

This thesis is based on practical research, a fieldwork journey, a process of transformation of the research, and the researcher. As my interest in the Circassian community grew because of personal experiences of discrimination as a Palestinian in Jordan, this research has been a journey of self discovery, which influenced the research, and shaped its methodologies. The research process has been guided by the following research questions,

– What are the ethnic narratives mobilised by the Circassians in Jordan? Do those narratives differ depending on age and gender?
– What are the nationalist narratives and ideologies the state of Jordan promotes through ‘Jordan First’ and textbooks of national and civic education?
– How do research participants make sense of and reconstruct state narratives?
– What is the relationship between the state of Jordan and its Circassian community? Is the conventional wisdom relating to their integration accurate?

To answer the research questions, I adopted a flexible methodological approach. This is because this research relies heavily on the narratives research participants use to define their ethnicity, and on their reconstruction of state narratives of nationalism. I initially intended to use qualitative data collection techniques, to give research participants voice, to unpack the ethnic narratives they see as important, to
understand their reconstruction of the state nationalist narratives, and to find out whether they believe that they are integrated into Jordanian society. I also wanted to use qualitative data collection methods in order to identify the differences between the ethnic narratives of older and younger generations of the Circassian community. However, due to fieldwork difficulties related to access, this had to change. Instead of depending mainly on interviews, I carried out 13 interviews with members of the Circassian community, and administered 62 questionnaires. I also kept fieldnotes which I later realised was a form of ‘unplanned ethnography’. In order to identify state nationalist narratives I analysed materials provided in books of national and civic education used in schools from the first to the twelfth grade, the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign document, and the official websites of King Abdullah II and King Hussein.

This chapter explains how my methodological approach is well-suited to answer the research questions, and how quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques were designed to make sure that I was able to identify ethnic and nationalist narratives. I begin with an explanation of the general methodological approach of the research. I explore how and why this research made use of feminist methodologies, and of the concept of narratives to provide an understanding of the narratives of the Circassian community. I then move towards explaining how and why I see ethnicity and nationalism as constructions that are not based on primordial, or ‘real’, basis of categorisation. The chapter also discusses how, as a Palestinian in Jordan, I was faced with difficulties in the field, ranging from obtaining a residence permit to feeling uncomfortable during the interviews. The political sensitivity of the topic and my vulnerable position in the field undoubtedly influenced the research process. This chapter also includes a discussion of the ethical considerations of this research and my insider/outsider status in Jordan, as a Palestinian Jordanian.
3.1 Methodology: Feminism and Narratives

‘Feminist methodology is specifically concerned with how, or whether, knowledge produced about social life can be connected with the social realities of women... Feminist methodology is informed by feminist epistemology; in particular, who can be agents of knowledge, what can be known and how knowledge is validated, and the relationship between knowing and being (ontology)’ (Landman, 2006: 430).

Methodology is about linking theory to practice in social research. It is, as Harding (1987) puts it, ‘a theory and analysis of how research does or should proceed; it includes accounts of how the general structure of theory finds its application in particular scientific disciplines’ (Harding, 1987: 3). Stanley and Wise (1993) urged for a feminist sociology that does not only focus on women and their experiences but also on men and their behaviours (Stanley and Wise, 1993). I suggest that gender relations, and women’s experiences, are integral to all areas of studies, especially in relation to ethnicity and nationalism, because gender, ethnicity and nationalism intersect, and looking at this intersection is important for understanding narratives of ethnicity and nationalism. The application of feminist methodologies can provide ‘an inclusion of women not as a special case deviating from the norm, but as one of many different groups in an open and heterogeneous universe’ (Duncan, 1996: 3); this is how feminist methodologies are applied in this research.

In the initial research design I had planned to interview both men and women and to include a gender analysis of the data. However, in the field I began to realise that I should not only look at gender differences. I began to develop a feminist consciousness, and became more aware of how gender relations are used as ethnic and national boundary markers. This research includes an evaluation of the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign and books of national and civic education, and as I began analysing these documents in the field, I started to notice that in these documents there is particular emphasis on gender roles. Books of national and civic education include sections about the role of men and women in society, and about the family
unit as the basis of the ‘Arab’ society. In addition, I started to notice that interviewees often referred to gender relations as group identity markers. Moreover, my daily exposure to gendered narratives of nationalism in the media, in the workplace, and with friends, made me aware of the importance of gender in popular representations of nationalism, and the importance of looking at the intersecting narratives of gender and nationalism. Therefore, the adoption of a flexible methodological approach helped me to develop a well-suited theoretical framework for the research that is informed by the research questions and the nature of the research. This also allowed me to develop a suitable methodology determined according to the topic under inquiry (Blaxter et al., 2006, Bryman, 2004, Crotty, 1998, Patton, 2002).

The analysis process also revealed that narratives of gender are as central as narratives of ethnicity, and nationalism to this research. Riessman (1993) for example refers to a ‘click moment (vi)’ between her and the interview transcripts she attempted to analyse, when she realised the importance of narratives (Riessman, 1993). As explained in the previous chapter, where I suggest the use of narratives to explore elements of ethnicity and nationalism, there are also gender narratives. I found that gender narratives, as well as ethnic narratives, are apparent throughout the interview transcripts, and the questions yielded lots of narratives. Riessman (2004) states,

> ‘As nations and governments construct preferred narratives about history, so do social movements, organisations, scientists, other professionals, ethnic/racial groups, and individuals in stories of experience’ (Riessman, 2004: 705).

I believe that this research is a feminist research because it does not focus on ‘introducing another meta-narrative, one based on woman, women, or feminist standpoint epistemology’ (Zalewski, 2000: 62), but suggests moving away from viewing ‘women’ as a category deviating from the ‘male’ norm. This is to argue for a move away from viewing women as the oppressed, and men and other actors as
oppressors, and towards considering gender relations as systems that are situated socially and changing, and that they can be (re)constructed and (re)configured like ethnicities and nationalisms. ‘Men, women, boys, and girls are located within systems where expectations around roles and responsibilities are sites of struggle and definition’ (Trinder, 2000: 50); however, there are also other intersecting and interlocking systems that shape social actors’ life experiences as well, such as ethnicity. Moreover, studies of ethnicity and nationalism have often ignored how narratives of ethnicity are gendered, and narratives of gender are ethnicised. Therefore, the use of a feminist approach in this study is not only suitable for understanding and analysing the interview transcripts, but is also essential to expand the literature on ethnicity and nationalism in the Middle East, which often tends to disregard gendered narratives of ethnicity, and the ethnicised narratives of gender.

This research can also be situated as a narrative account of the research participants (re)constructions of ethnicity and nationalism.

‘The concept of narrative has been central to the feminist critique of objectivist accounts of individualisation which are regarded not only as determinist, but also as tacitly reproducing a masculinist view of the world. Narrative becomes a central analytical tool for feminism because a cluster of issues associated with gender and sexuality are regarded as particularly amenable to narration’ (McNay, 1999: 318).

Finally, I am identifying and analysing narratives because of my belief that ‘social life itself is storied’ (Somers, 1994: 614), and by highlighting the narrative accounts of research participants, I am also emphasising that ethnicity and nationalism are subjective, and that the research participants are agents contributing to those narrations.
3.2 Research Construction

‘Although internally diverse, ranging from reflexive feminism and social psychoanalysis to post-modernism, post-structuralism or post-Marxism, these new approaches share a common theoretical ground which is aimed at challenging universalism, positivism and the totalising objective of ‘conventional’ sociology’ (Malešević, 2004: 143).

This research looks at ethnic narratives of the Circassian community, how the research participants reconstruct state nationalist narratives, and whether they believe themselves to be integrated into Jordanian society. This means that it constitutes a narrative of its participants’ subjective interpretations. Recognising this, my methodological approach is shaped by my belief that social actors can be both subjects and objects in the social world, they can be agents of change, and they may become subject to change. Throughout the course of research design, planning and during fieldwork, I have adopted a social constructionist ontological stance that recognises social entities, or social phenomena such as culture, as socially constructed, and that social actors play a role in this construction (Bryman, 2004).

This anti-positivist epistemological orientation is also relevant, as it looks at the meanings people, men and women, give to ethnicity and nationalism, and the influence of ethnicity and nationalism on their lives. Holstein and Gubrium (2005) state,

‘The interpretive practice engages both the hows and what's of social reality; it is centred in both how people methodically construct their experiences and their worlds, and in the configurations of meaning and institutional life that inform and shape their reality-constituting activity’ (Holstein and Gubrium, 2005: 484).

Additionally, my rejection of the positivist paradigm stems above all from the fact that positivism looks at knowledge as ‘abstract, objective and absolute’ (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009: 30). I see this as particularly problematic for this research, because I view ethnicity, and nationalism as constructs; however this does
not deny their existence, it rather views them as ‘situated, indexical’ (Stanley and Wise, 1993: 8) and changing. Adopting a view of ethnicity and nationalism as socially constructed is to suggest that those concepts are not fixed, and that the views of social actors matter most in their (re)construction. In other words, to view ethnicity and nationalism as fixed social realities denies social actors their ‘emotions, rational thought, motives, personality traits, intentions, memory… all these constituents of the self become historically contingent constructions of culture’ (Gergen, 1994: 70) and one might slip into the trap of generalisation, by not recognising differences between social actors themselves. In this, I share the belief that social identity is constructed, not fixed, and changes in time and space through interactions and negotiations (Hall, 2000, Giddens, 1991, Gergen, 1994). Moreover, this is to emphasise that my concern is with how social actors make sense of such concepts, i.e. to understand them ‘from below’.

It is important to recognise that sociologists themselves contribute to the production of those constructions, and the knowledge produced in this research is constructed and is very much influenced by my views of the social world. Although I do not belong to the Circassian community, I belong to another group in Jordan, the Palestinians, and my belonging certainly situates me within the context of the research and influences my ways of looking at the Jordanian nationalist campaign and the books of national and civic education. For example, I must recognise that those documents made me feel excluded from Jordanian society; however, this does not mean that they make the research participants feel the same way. I could not simply be a ‘disinterested scientist’ (Guba and Lincoln, 2008: 261). Therefore, it is very important for the validity of the research to also acknowledge the influence of my own conceptions and experiences as triggers for this research. In social science research, researchers almost always have opinions and views, which are likely to be expressed, presented in, and even influence the research approach, and its reporting (Blaxter et al., 2006).
For example, before fieldwork, like most people in Jordan, my perception was that the Circassians were integrated into Jordanian society. However I chose to find out whether they see themselves as integrated or not. I also had assumptions about who the Circassians are, and that they are not ‘Arabs’. Therefore, my realisation that those assumptions are constructions, prompted me to abandon those assumptions, by speaking about the ‘Arabs’, the ‘Circassians’, ‘native Jordanians’, and ‘Palestinians’ from the perspective of the research participants and exploring their own definition of these groups. For example, the word ‘Arab’ was used by interviewees to refer to either those who speak Arabic, or the majority population in Jordan. Native Jordanian was used to describe anyone who belongs to one of the Bedouin tribes, who were nomadic on the lands of Jordan before its establishment as a state. And the word Palestinians was used to describe people originating from the West Bank of the Jordan River, and residing in Jordan.

Critical reflections on oneself, as a researcher and a participant in the field, enable the reader and the researcher to understand the phenomenon under study more clearly. Reinharz (1997) states,

‘Unless the researcher (and subsequent reader) knows what the researcher’s attributes mean to the people being studied, the researcher (and reader) cannot understand the phenomenon being studied... then fieldwork reports will combine a full discussion of what the researcher became in the field with how the field revealed itself to the researcher. Field research will then strike a balance between self and other in its reporting and will also report the process of change’ (Reinharz, 1997: 4).

For example, my encounters during fieldwork, with the state of Jordan and research participants, altered the way I perceive myself and my identity. Although I went into fieldwork with a researcher’s identity, I personally went through a process of transformation. Because reflexivity and reporting on issues that face the researcher in the field are important for the understanding of the research, the following sections explore how I, as a researcher, went through a process of transformation.
Reflexivity is important to provide the reader with better understanding of the research and the researcher, as a producer of knowledge, as someone who co-constructs it. This emphasises that I am critical of the positivist view that there is only one reality- the reality of the researcher, and that I am by no means assuming that there is one truth, and one reality. On positivists’ rejection of reflexivity, Stanley and Wise (1993) state,

‘It suggests that researchers can objectively find out this real reality- they can stand back from, remove themselves from emotional involvement in, what they study. It depicts social science as the search for social laws in order to predict and so control behaviour’ (Stanley and Wise, 1993: 117).

Harding (1993) argues that ‘strong objectivity’ can be achieved through a systematic examination of all social values affecting the research project. This reflexive approach has been an integral part of this research. Social values, fieldwork events, and ‘researcher identity’ have greatly influenced the scope of this research. These accounts give ‘a lively insight’ into research, because personal accounts are sociologically and politically important (Roberts, 1981). The following section is a personal account of my vulnerability in the field as a researcher, and the issues that came up during fieldwork that have influenced the research process.
3.3 Vulnerability in the Field

‘Social science is becoming more aware of the importance of researcher safety and well-being... although risk in the field is a frightening experience for the researcher, it does on many occasions enrich our understandings of the research site and enables us to think and write about social life as insiders’ (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000: 2).

One of the most important aspects of empirical research is fieldwork, where events, problems, and emotions arise. It is very important to acknowledge fieldwork events, which sometimes may disrupt the original design of the research, because those events may ‘testify to the existence of an actual situation’ (Pettigrew, 1981: 63). Despite the fact that I have a Jordanian passport, I am originally a Palestinian, and my legal status in Jordan is precarious. One of the main issues that faced me during fieldwork was how to carry out the research, especially because the topic under inquiry is politically sensitive. This political sensitivity forced me to be reflexive.

For Palestinians, speaking about Jordanian nationalism is a taboo in Jordan because it is always assumed that Palestinians are against Jordanian nationalism. As I have previously mentioned in chapter one, the Palestinians constitute more than 70 per cent of the Jordanian population. The history of the Palestinian presence in Jordan reinforces the view that Palestinians are very critical about the whole existence of Jordan as a state, and this is perceived as threatening for the existence of the state of Jordan. This conception was first formed when some Israeli officials said that Jordan should become an alternative homeland for the Palestinians, and some members of the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organisation] suggested that Jordan lacks ‘the principal foundations of statehood’ (Al O’ran, 2009: 70), claiming that Jordan has always been part of historic Palestine. The tensions intensified after the PLO’s attempt to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy in the 1970s (See chapter one). For these reasons, Palestinians expressing dissatisfaction with or criticism of the state of Jordan are often persecuted and could face death sentences.
Knowing that, and hearing about cases of Jordanians of Palestinian origins being persecuted, threatened with death and seeking asylum in Western countries, I had to be very careful in relation to the way I presented the research, and gathered the data in the field. The first political problem I faced during fieldwork was obtaining a residence permit. As a Palestinian Jerusalemite, I was interrogated at the borders about the reasons behind my stay, and when I explained that I will be there for research purposes, I was granted one month residence permit, which I had to renew in Jordan, after obtaining a security permit for my research. Before the end of the first month, I went to the Palestinian Division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where residence renewals are issued. I was granted a permit to stay for one more month, during which time I had to obtain permission to conduct the research from the internal security services, the mukhabarat, the ‘intelligence’.

Fear of the intelligence services, particularly because of my topic, overwhelmed me. I tried to bargain for more than one month, without visiting the intelligence headquarters, and I was granted another permit after explaining that my research is about the Circassian people, who are very loyal to the monarchy, and that my research will draw attention to the ‘generosity’ of the Jordanian people and government towards the Circassian people. This ‘white lie’ allowed me two more months, during which I had to obtain a paper from the Circassian Charitable Association in Amman saying that I was working under their supervision. Despite the fact that I have a Jordanian passport, and I am internationally recognised as a Jordanian, I was also told that I had no right to stay there, without proving my affiliation, and work with the Circassian Charitable Association. The reasons given by the Ministry of Internal Affairs were that my passport does not allow me to stay, work, and live in Jordan without justification, because I am a Palestinian Jerusalemite. During that same period, I contacted a Circassian friend of mine, who offered help and managed to set up a meeting for me with the chair of the Circassian Charitable Association in Amman. The Circassian Charitable Association is the
biggest Circassian organisation in Jordan, and has around seven branches in cities all over the Kingdom. I thought that it would provide a perfect access point to the Circassian community, as it holds names, numbers, and addresses of Circassians. Bursting with excitement, I went to the meeting, explained my research to the chair, who was, at that time, very interested and satisfied with the aims of the research.

To formalise my stay in Jordan, as requested by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I had asked the chair of the organisation to provide me with a consent paper explaining that I am conducting my research in collaboration with the organisation. In return, he asked me to provide him with a formal letter on headed paper asking the charitable association to provide me with access. Unfortunately, a couple of days later, I tried to call the association several times, and called the chairman on his personal number, but he did not answer my calls. After several attempts and calls, the chairman of the association called back and said that the association refused to provide me with a consent paper and with access to the community as a whole. They said that their refusal was based on the fact that I was a researcher at the University of Warwick, and in 2007 a researcher from the same university accessed the community through the association by lying to them about the nature of his research. They thought that the university itself had some hidden agenda, and that a conspiracy theory was being woven against Circassians in Jordan. Phillips’ research was a comparative study of Circassians and gypsies, and for Circassians it is very offensive to compare them to a marginalised group. Phillips (2008) managed to get away with the data needed for his research, and mentioned in his thesis that in the final months of his fieldwork the Circassians refused to grant him access, and that he received several threats from community leaders because of a comparison that is ‘insulting and potentially dangerous to their standing in Jordan’ (Phillips, 2008: 145). Phillips (2008) mentioned in his thesis that the Circassians spread the word in the community about his thesis, and at that time, I feared that they would do the same in my case.
During this time, I embarked on an analysis of the official documents of the ‘Jordan First’ campaign, books of national education and other official documents. Those revealed that Jerusalemites who have Jordanian passports can *de jure* stay in Jordan as they please. However, my vulnerability in Jordan does not relate to my legal status; it is mainly based on my Palestinian origin. I found out that legally the ministry of internal affairs has no right to question my presence in Jordan, and all the problems they created for me were not legally sanctioned. I believe that such incidents are very important to mention because they provide a very useful insight into my precarious position in the field. Those incidents also show how the personal is political, not only in terms of gender, but also in relation to origin, ethnicity, and gender. Additionally, ‘all aspects of the political are necessarily and inevitably reflected within the personal’ (Stanley and Wise, 1993: 86). Moreover, such incidents influenced the way I view Jordan. Jordan, the country which claims to be the bearer of ‘Pan-Arabism’, is known for its mistreatment of ‘Arab’ Palestinians. This not only influenced my view of Jordan, but it also made me critical of the whole claim of the existence of a ‘Pan-Arab’ nation. It also influenced the way I perceive my identity; I specifically started feeling less of an ‘Arab’ or a Jordanian and more of a Palestinian. This is because I felt I was not treated as a Jordanian citizen and I was more of a second class citizen. Those feelings intensified throughout my encounters with the state of Jordan during fieldwork. It has been important to account for those personal experiences and changes in my identity as a researcher, because they make sense in political terms and they can partly explain why I believe that Palestinians are disadvantaged in Jordan. If many Palestinians face the same issues with the state of Jordan, then they are less likely to feel Jordanian and more like to feel Palestinian.

Another incident took place in the field, when I had to obtain security clearance from the Jordanian intelligence apparatus so as to be able to work at the US embassy in Jordan. I went to the intelligence services headquarter in Amman, where I filled in an application form, entered after being searched, approached a
counter, and handed an officer the application together with other documents. He asked me to be seated and, as a good citizen, I did. The officer made several phone calls, after which he called my name. He said: 'Nour, you are Palestinian'. I said: 'yes, originally Palestinian, but I have a Jordanian passport'. He asked me if I had a work permit, I said no, and then he said that I will have to get one. I did not know what to say, but suddenly I felt that I was being stripped of my basic rights, and so I said: 'No, I do not need one. I am a Jordanian citizen. The constitution of Jordan guarantees my rights as a citizen, I deserve equal treatment, unless you want to undermine the authority of deceased King Hussein on the date of his death'. I do not know how I said this, but I knew that King Hussein wanted to maintain Jordan’s sovereignty over Jerusalem, and so residents of Jerusalem are recognised as Jordanians internationally and, supposedly, nationally. My words did not have an impact on the man, he instead started saying you are Palestinian, you are Palestinian, and I continued saying no I am Jordanian. In the end, I decided to leave empty handed with no clearance, and with a completed application form. It occurred to me that such difficulties are being systematically imposed on the Palestinians, and that it is not a matter of law; it appeared to be indirect deterrence measures against the Palestinians in Jordan. Subsequently, I decided to resort to a friend who has connections in the Jordanian intelligence services; he managed to get the permit for me, and I was able to start working.

Being reflexive here and shedding light on my position as a Palestinian researcher in Jordan is very important. First of all, this shows that despite the fact that narratives of ethnicity and nationalism are constructed and (re)constructed by social actors, this does not deny the existence of social power ‘from above’ that can reinforce narratives of ethnicity. In other words, even if I wanted to perceive myself as a Jordanian, discrimination against Palestinians and stripping from them their rights as Jordanians made me feel less of a Jordanian and more of a Palestinian. Secondly, my personal journey of discovery during fieldwork is very important for
this research particularly because it deals with narratives. Thirdly, although the state of Jordan emphasises its adoption of a ‘pan-Arabist’ nationalist ideology in textbooks of national and civic education and despite the fact that the ‘Jordan First’ campaign is designed to promote a form of nationalism that is inclusive to all citizens, my perception of my national identity has been influenced by my experiences in Jordan and by how I am perceived by others as a Palestinian. In that I am saying that the neopatriarchal state of Jordan has power over my experiences that in return influence my own narratives; this supports the idea that narratives are shaped by experiences and can be indicators of integration and this is why I am looking at Circassians’ narratives of ethnicity and nationalism.

Finally, my experience as a Palestinian is not only personal, because it reveals patterns of the treatment of Palestinians in Jordan. For example, I have also heard stories about people who hold the same legal status as myself, and who were illegally deported back to Jerusalem. This made me aware of the fact that I was in a vulnerable position in the field, and that I should be careful in the way I ask my interview questions. To preserve my safety and protect myself, I had to play with the words, and manoeuvre around the aims of my research avoiding political ‘taboos’ that undermine the monarchy. For Palestinians, simply speaking about nationalism and statehood in Jordan is a taboo, let alone evaluating nationalist campaigns, and books of national education. I had originally intended to conduct interviews with members of the Circassian community from different age groups, and analyse the ‘Jordan First’ campaign as well as books of national and civic education used in schools. Although the latter proved to be possible due to the easy access to such documents online and books being easy to obtain from schools in Jordan, the former proved to be impossible to achieve, and this prompted me to change my methods and find other ways to access the community.
3.4 Access Points, Sample, Sampling Limitations

After several failed attempts to access the community through formal access points, and after several refusals by members of the Circassian community to be interviewed, I decided to change my research design. I shifted from relying on interviews for data collection to distributing a questionnaire, because it would allow me more access to the community, because people might be more sceptical about recorded interviews. The questionnaires seemed a good idea as they would support the data provided in potential interviews. Before working in the US embassy, I had worked in a translation agency with a Circassian lady, who had shown an interest in my research. The Circassian lady, Thuraya, to whom I told the story of my research, agreed to be interviewed. However, and despite her close contact with the Circassian community, she did not offer to introduce me to others for interviewing purposes. And when I asked her if she would be willing to at least distribute some questionnaires she avoided answering. With time, the relation between Thuraya and I developed into a friendship in the workplace. I worked three days a week, for a minimum of six hours a day. My encounters with this lady allowed me to develop my research diary. Listening to her talk gave me an insight into the dynamics of her life as a Circassian working woman. I listened for hours to her accounts of fascination with Circassian culture and traditions, and how influential her community is in Jordan.

During this time I designed a questionnaire, and decided to ask Thuraya to check it, to see whether it would be appropriate to distribute within the Circassian community and whether it contained anything that would be considered unacceptable to them. The questionnaire included questions about the extent to which they were satisfied with the government, and the meaning of the flag of Jordan. Thuraya told me that it should be easy to distribute, and that I would not be crossing any line with either the government or the Circassian community. However, she did not offer to distribute it, which made me suspect its feasibility. I
was also concerned because of my vulnerable position as a Palestinian without any legal standing in Jordan; I decided to consult some of my family members and Palestinian friends in Jordan.

Shockingly, their feedback was not very good. I was told that it would be dangerous to distribute such a questionnaire on anyone in Jordan, particularly Circassians. My extended family advised me that many Circassians work with the intelligence apparatus, and they might start to question the underlying motive for such research, and criticise how it would undermine the authoritarian nature of the monarchy in Jordan. I could not comprehend these conflicting reactions to the questionnaire, and in an attempt to defend the feasibility of my questionnaire, I told them that a Circassian friend of mine said that it was fine. I was shocked by their answer, they said: ‘You have to be careful; this friend of yours might herself be working with the intelligence’.

Some of them even exclaimed ‘why are you studying the Circassians?’ Others added ‘you choose the most closed community in Jordan, and the most stubborn people in Jordan. You are making your life hard’. To add to my confusion, some of my friends said that the Circassians do not like the Palestinians, and for that reason it might be even harder for me to access the community. To that I responded that during my first encounter with the Chair of the Circassian association, he emphasised that Circassians do not dislike the Palestinians, and that this assumption is not true. Although I did not believe that most Circassians work with the underground ‘intelligence’ services, and I did not believe that they do not like Palestinians, I was still in a very vulnerable position, particularly since my residence permit had expired, and I had decided to stay without renewing it. I started developing a new questionnaire, one that was in the form of indirect questions assessing how Circassians make sense of their identities in Jordan. The questions are discussed in another section in this chapter. After designing the second
questionnaire, I was already employed in the US embassy, and that facilitated my access because US embassy employees are held with high regard and respect.

After starting to work at the US embassy, I noticed that most Jordanians held US embassy employees in high regard. My work provided me with status and privilege. First, it revealed an idealisation of ‘American’ and ‘Western’ lifestyles. Second, it gave people the impression that I was not frowned upon by the government, and that I was someone they could trust, particularly since security clearances are a precondition for working with the US embassy in Jordan. The idealisation of ‘American’ and ‘Western’ lifestyles came across very strongly, in people expressing their desire to live the American lifestyle they heard existed within the premises of the US embassy, and the illusion that the Americans pay well. I felt a change in my status. The fact that I am affiliated to a Western university was not enough for people to trust me as a researcher, but working in the US embassy was. It gave me legal immunity, as US embassy employees are protected by the ‘Americans’, and legally should not be interrogated, imprisoned or threatened by the intelligence services. This changed status gave me the confidence to carry on with the study, and I admittedly used my work with the US embassy as an umbrella of protection.

One day I paid the translation agency, where I used to work, a visit, to finalise some papers, and meet Thuraya for coffee and an interview. Following the interview, Thuraya received a visit from her nephew, who is a young active member of the Circassian community. After being introduced as a researcher and a US embassy employee by Thuraya, the young man, Qasim, happily offered to introduce me to his friends and young family members, for interviews, and also offered to distribute many of the questionnaires himself. Interviewing older generations seemed hard, as Qasim told me that old Circassian men do not talk much, and that young people nowadays are more interested than their parents in making the world aware of their existence. For him, helping in the research was a win-win situation;
he thought that research on Circassians would help make people more aware of the Circassians, but he also figured that this could be a step forward to make the world recognise the 19th century genocide against Circassians.

Snowballing was used as a sampling technique for the questionnaire and the interviews. For the questionnaire, I asked some friends, including Qasim, to distribute the questionnaire to people they knew, who considered themselves Circassians. And, I conducted interviews whenever possible. One access point for the questionnaire was through a young lady I used to work with at the US embassy, whose mother was Circassian. She offered to distribute the questionnaire through the Circassian charitable association in Sweileh, because she knew the chair. She asked me to provide her with 50 copies, but she returned only 14 completed questionnaires. It seemed that asking the Circassians about their views on nationalism was a sensitive topic. Five of the interviewees filled in questionnaires before the interviews, and before the interviews I used to provide a one hour introduction to the research, its aims and its goal. I felt I had to justify my questions, and provide them with details about research confidentiality, and the use of pseudonyms to conceal their identities, as they had requested. This lengthy procedure took place because of the political sensitivity of the topic, and because people tend to be critical of Palestinians who speak about Jordanian nationalism.

Most of the interviews took place in a flat I shared with a friend, with the presence of my flat mate, who was responsible for the entertaining of Qasim in the living room, while I interviewed his friends in the kitchen. Qasim served as a gatekeeper to the respondents. He used to call whenever he found someone willing to participate and bring them over, reassuring them that I was someone they could trust. His role was very important, and I believe that without his participation, as a gatekeeper for his contacts, ‘there can be no research’ (Cree et al., 2002: 50). Not only that, but also Qasim played a major role in demonstrating my credibility to participants (Emmel et al., 2007). For example, he used to come into the kitchen and
make coffee during the interview in order to show the interviewees that he knew me well, and that I am a credible, trusted friend, an ‘Arab’, who has Circassian traits in terms of openness and acceptance of their culture and traditions. Most interviewees said that they did not always feel comfortable around ‘Arabs’ because of their ‘sexism’ and ‘closed-mindedness’. The fact that I was receiving them in my home, the house of two young women living alone, and away from family, made them feel that I led more of a ‘Western’ life style, which they see similar to theirs. In addition to that, and to gain their trust, Qasim always introduced me as a researcher and a US embassy employee. For instance, I had learnt from the interviews that Circassians view themselves as more open than ‘Arabs’, in terms of mixing the sexes. And, for them, particularly young men, the fact that Qasim became a close friend, reflected that I was not a ‘traditional Arab’, and made their view of me as ‘other’ less salient. It is important to note that not all the interviews were conducted through Qasim. I also relied on two other friends who had Circassian friends, but seven of the interviewees were contacted through Qasim. Two interviews took place online, with Circassian friends with whom I had lost touch for a long time; I got back in touch with them through internet social networking sites such as Facebook. Many older men and women refused to participate in the research. Five men over the age of 51 completed the questionnaire, and only one woman in this age group. Luckily I managed to conduct an interview with one 77 year old man. One of the limitations of this study is that access to older generations of the Circassian community was not easy, and it is difficult to compare age groups according to the questionnaire sample I have. Moreover, seven of the 13 interviewees were men, five of whom were below 25. Further, one of the women interviewees did not consider herself to be a Circassian, but I chose to interview her because her mother identified herself as Circassian. Tables (3.1) to (3.10) provide a description of the interviews and the questionnaire samples. I was only able to conduct 13 interviews, but 62 questionnaires were completed. These allowed me more access to the community and to different age groups. The fact that some agreed to participate in the research in spite of the
Circassian Charitable Association’s refusal suggests that Circassians in Jordan are not a monolithic community.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Residential Status</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Household Income</th>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>Languages Spoken at Home</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tariq</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Arabic/English, Circassian occasionally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atef</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Private Sector Employee</td>
<td>Arabic/Circassian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khairi</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>4th grade</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Elementary school</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husam</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>More than 2500</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Arabic/Circassian occasionally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adel</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Rented</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Arabic/English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asad</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>More than 2000</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Mostly Circassian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qasim</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>More than 2500</td>
<td>Student/Freelance work</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most interviewees and questionnaire respondents had Arabic as their first language at home (Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.9 and 3.10), and very few of both samples spoke Circassian. Moreover, 10 out of 13 interviewees lived in owned houses, and the majority of questionnaire respondents also owned their houses, which can indicate that their financial situation is relatively good. Whereas there were limitations in terms of the age ranges of interviewees and respondents, men are also overrepresented in the sample. Most interviewees were single and young, while the
questionnaire sample included married, single and divorced respondents (Table 3.3). There were limitations within the interview sampling, due to access problems; however, the questionnaires covered a wider variety of people. Moreover, there were several ethical considerations that I had to take into account during fieldwork, and those same considerations restricted me in terms of the type of questions I could ask in the context of Jordan, and in terms of what is appropriate and what is not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Residential Status</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Household Income</th>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>Languages Spoken at Home</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuha</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>BSc</td>
<td>More than 2500</td>
<td>Student/Freelance work</td>
<td>Arabic/English and Little Circassian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muna</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Rented</td>
<td>Vocational Training</td>
<td>Less than 500</td>
<td>Private Sector Employee</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rana</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Owned/245 Meters</td>
<td>Diplomat</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuraya</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Rented/120 Meters</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Private Sector Employee</td>
<td>Arabic/English—Occasionally Circassian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norma</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Owned/350 Meters</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>More than 1500</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiba</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Owned/350 Meters</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>Less than 1000</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table (3.3) Questionnaire Sample Description/ Marital Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table (3.4) Questionnaire Sample Description/ Age Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19-24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19-24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25-30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 51</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>Above 51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary, Primary, Preparatory= 4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Certificate= 8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College= 7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Degree= 14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate degree= 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Training= 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table (3.6) Questionnaire Sample Description/ Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men’s Employment</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Women’s Employment</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent Worker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>Independent Worker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector Employee</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45 %</td>
<td>Private Sector Employee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector Employee</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19 %</td>
<td>Public Sector Employee</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11 %</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11 %</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table (3.7) Questionnaire Sample Description/ Household Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men’s Percentages by Household Income</th>
<th>Women’s Percentages by Household Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 500 JDs</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500- 1000 JDs</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000- 2500 JDs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 2500 JDs</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table (3.8) Questionnaire Sample Description/ Residential Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rented</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Rented</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately Owned</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>Privately Owned</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table (3.9) Questionnaire Sample Description/ First Language at home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
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<td>78%</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circassian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Circassian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
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<td>3%</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table (3.10) Questionnaire Sample Description/ Second Language at home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circassian</td>
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<td>36%</td>
<td>Circassian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5 Ethical Considerations: Insider/Outsider Problematic

‘Relational ethics makes consideration of interactions within a social network the focus of ethical thought… this type of ethic looks at the pattern of human relationships and asks what kind of response is appropriate in the context of these relations’ (Reece and Siegal, 1986: 30).

The ethical considerations of this research depended to a great extent on the cultural context of my fieldwork. Morality and ethics are not universal, and are very specific to cultures, and human relations. In addition to the BSA ethical considerations guiding social research, which I abided by, there were also some other cultural aspects that I had to take account of throughout my interactions with the Circassian community. My position as an insider in Jordan allowed me better understanding of the dynamics of everyday life, and ethics in terms of approaching people. For example, my attempt to access the community through the Circassian Association was so I could obtain the consent of community leaders. This choice was based on the fact that due to the interconnected, tribal and collective nature of Jordanian society, it is important to show respect for the community’s leaders and elders. I also made this choice based on my understanding of Circassian culture, which emphasises respect for older people. Since accessing the community through the association was unsuccessful, I had to resort to other techniques, but this refusal gave me the impression that community leaders may fear that the position of the Circassians could be jeopardised if people conducted politically sensitive research on their position in Jordan. Another example of cultural-ethical consideration was that because most interviews took place in my home, I had to be culturally sensitive by showing hospitality, generosity and interest in the interviewees as human beings, not only as research participants. For example, tea, coffee and cakes were provided each time an interview took place, in addition to showing hospitality by asking them to stay longer after the interview to chat and have some drinks. Interviews lasted for two hours.
Moreover, due to the political sensitivity of the subject of nationalism in Jordan, I made sure that interviewees and participants were informed of the details of the research and its aims, prior to the interviews commencing, in addition to assuring their anonymity and telling them that anything said during the interview would only be used for research purposes. Choosing to use pseudonyms avoided causing harm to the participants in any way or form. Also, being introduced as a researcher and employee of the US embassy helped in terms of gaining their trust, but I had to clarify that this research had nothing to do with the US Department of State, and that it was for a degree I was undertaking. The questionnaires also included a consent form written in Arabic, which also explained the research, and that was signed by respondents (Appendix A: Questionnaire Consent paper) (Appendix B: Interviews Consent Paper).

My insider/outsider status was sometimes problematic during the interview process. Many interviewees felt the urge to criticise the ‘Arabs’ but my ‘Palestinian Arab’ origin initially stopped them; I had to react in a way that would make them feel comfortable to speak. For example in one of the interviews the following conversation took place,

Nuha: You know how the Arabs are… I am sorry, but...

Nour: It is alright, I understand...

Nuha: You must know how conservative, and sexist they are...

Nour: Well, I can assure you I am not judging you on what you say; I would like to hear more about your opinion...

Nuha: You know I do not mean to say that you are like Arabs, you are educated and open-minded...

Nour: Do not worry, I am also sceptical about Arab culture myself, so you can say whatever you want.

Nuha: They do not treat women with respect and they are closed minded. I had an Arab boyfriend, who was very controlling. Then after having a Circassian boyfriend I noticed that we are different.

I also heard comments about ‘colour’ because many of my interviewees believed that Circassians were ‘white’ Europeans. Some interviewees told me that I do not have
the typical ‘Arab’ skin colour. Several made comments about the disloyalty of Palestinians towards Jordan, and how Palestinians are usually not grateful for being allowed to stay in Jordan. Many of the comments made me uncomfortable as a Palestinian outsider, but throughout the interviewing process, I tried to show tolerance and understanding of what they were saying. My insider understanding of Jordanian culture and everyday life allowed me to be culturally sensitive. However, my outsider status as a non-Circassian was a drawback at the beginning of an interview, but once I showed an interest in what they were revealing they felt more comfortable.

It is important to note here that interviewees mentioned that their participation in this research had influenced their perception of their identities, and made them think how contradictory their identities are. This is because in everyday life social actors do not necessarily address or talk about identity issues, nationalism and/or ethnicity. The encounter certainly influenced their views of the social world especially that they had to reflect on their experiences and their narrations of both being Circassian and being Jordanian at the same time. The interviews, as part of fieldwork, have greatly influenced and informed the way I perceive my belonging to an imagined ‘Arab’ nation and made me more aware of how flexible and fluid identities are. I felt that the encounter with the interviewees prompted me to reflect on my own identity and to look at their views reflexively and in a non-judgemental way.

In addition to this, my position in Jordan, as someone belonging to an ‘oppressed’ community, forced me to be more reflexive in my approach, particularly because the research included an analysis of the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign as represented in official documents, textbooks of civic and national education, and the official website of King Abdullah II, and King Hussein I. Data on the state of Jordan did not only come from these documents, as in the field I began to take fieldnotes; in this way ethnographic data became another resource for the research. I
provide a detailed account of the use of ethnography in this research in a later section. Here I want to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that ethnographic data provided a means by which I could be personally reflexive, as Finlay and Gough comment,

‘We want to move beyond definitions of personal reflexivity as mere reflection on subjective thoughts and feelings experienced during the research process. Personal reflexivity also encompasses situating the researcher and his/her knowledge-making practices within relevant contexts, whether interpersonal, institutional or cultural’ (Finlay and Gough, 2003: 37).

Several data collection methods were employed in this research, including both qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques. The methods, however, were not only limited to interviews and questionnaires, as during fieldwork I discovered that I was also relying on the ethnographic data displayed in the research diary that I kept during my stay in Jordan. I call this type of ethnography ‘unplanned ethnography,’ which took place just by the merit of being there. In the following, I explain how interviews, questionnaires, and unplanned ethnography were used in this research, and their benefits to this particular research.
3.6 Data Collection Methods

‘Science certainly needs structure and logic, but it also needs unremitting injections of creativity... What is important... is that all researchers work towards reflexive awareness and informed choice... methodological design is about informed decision-making that involves weighing up pros and cons, and deciding what is best given your specific context’ (O’Leary, 2004: 87).

The data collection methods of this research were chosen to suit what was best in the context of Jordan, and in terms of accessing the community. I combined both qualitative and quantitative research methods in order to collect data that would answer my research questions. Despite the tendency towards linking feminist research to qualitative methods of social inquiry, feminist researchers have also used quantitative methods of surveys and statistical analysis in their work (Maynard, 2004). Harding (2004) claims that the distinctive feature of feminist research is the use of women’s experiences ‘as a significant indicator of ‘reality’’ (Harding, 2004: 460). Her claim does not only limit feminist research to women, but also limits the choice of methods feminists should adopt. However, I would argue that adopting a feminist perspective does not limit one’s choice of methods, on the contrary some feminists argue for the use of both qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques (Jayaratne and Stewart, 1991). Stanley and Wise (1983) state,

‘The idea that there is only ‘one road’ to the feminist revolution, and only one type of ‘truly feminist’ research is as limiting and as offensive as male-biased accounts of research that have gone before’ (Stanley and Wise, 1983: 26).

Despite the fact that this research at the beginning was supposed to employ qualitative research methods, as previously explained, this changed; adapting to change is generally what many have to do when starting fieldwork (Burgess, 1984, Bryman, 2004). This research therefore made use of triangulation in combining qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques.
This type of triangulation has been called a mixed methods approach, which entails the combination of the qualitative and quantitative methods in the data collection process (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Another type of triangulation is known as mixed models, which combines two approaches throughout the research process, ‘such as conceptualisation, data collection, data analysis, and inference’ (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998: x). The quantitative approach had been utilised in this research only in relation to the mixed method approach, and not the mixed model, because it made use of quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques, but it was not a mixed model of conceptualisation.

Whereas many have argued for the use of both qualitative and quantitative techniques, this encouragement is not based on the idea that using both enhances validity (Fielding and Fielding, 1986, Flick, 1992). There are several reasons, and ways of using qualitative/quantitative triangulation in social research. Qualitative methods can be used to help develop quantitative measures, and can be used to help interpret quantitative findings, quantitative methods can also be used to interpret qualitative findings, and both can be used parallel to each others to produce results (Steckler et al., 1992). Steckler et al (1992) developed models that explain the ways qualitative and quantitative methods can be combined in research. Within their models, I place this research somewhere between the second and the fourth model (See figure 3.1 for Steckler et al. model). A different model of triangulation has been developed to fit within the data collection methods I have designed. The core of this model rests on the use of qualitative data to explain quantitative data, and the use of both qualitative and quantitative data to obtain results (See Figure 3.2). Initially, I conducted an analysis of the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign and books of national and civic education, then questionnaires and interviewees were designed in order to investigate how research participants interpret the content of state promoted narratives.
Model 1
Qualitative methods are used to help develop quantitative measures and instruments.

QUALITATIVE → QUANTITATIVE → RESULTS

Model 2
Qualitative methods are used to help explain quantitative findings.

QUANTITATIVE → RESULTS

QUALITATIVE

Model 3
Quantitative methods are used to embellish a primarily qualitative study.

QUALITATIVE → RESULTS

QUANTITATIVE

Model 4
Qualitative and quantitative methods are used equally and parallel.

QUALITATIVE → RESULTS ← QUANTITATIVE

Figure 1. Four possible ways that qualitative and quantitative methods might be integrated.

Figure 3.1 Triangulation Models (Steckler et al., 1992: 5)
I used questionnaires and interviews, in this research, but the questionnaire itself was designed to provide both qualitative and quantitative data, within the questionnaire there were parts where respondents were asked to elaborate on their answers. The interviews, on the other hand, were semi-structured interviews, and provided qualitative data that contribute to understanding the results of the quantitative part of the questionnaire. I found this model of triangulation particularly useful, for three reasons; first it provided the research with richness in terms of the methods used, because the questionnaire gave me access to more participants from the Circassian community. Second, this approach was exceptionally helpful for ‘facilitation’ of the research, and quantitative and qualitative methods in this context were ‘complementary’ to each other (Hammersley, 1996). Finally, ‘by combining multiple methods it is possible to elicit new insights into the causes of and consequences of beliefs and behaviours’ (Axinn and Pearce, 2006: 1). It also adds ‘rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to an inquiry’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 5). The following subsections explain the data collection and analysis methods for this research.
3.6.1 Semi-Structured Interviews

‘In situations where you won’t get more than one chance to interview someone, semi-structured interviewing is best. It has much of the freewheeling quality of unstructured interviewing, and requires all the same skills, but semi-structured interviewing is based on the use of an interview guide’ (Bernard, 2000: 191).

Because of access problems explained earlier, I only had the chance to interview research participants once. And, for that reason, I chose a semi-structured interviewing technique, where I had an interview guide with a list of questions. Bernard (2000) argues that using semi-structured interviewing means that there are questions that should be answered in a particular order. I did not, however, follow the same order in all interviews, and the use of semi-structured interviews also gave me flexibility, when I needed to probe the interviewees on their responses.

The interview guide included questions about the participants’ socioeconomic backgrounds and position in the household, in addition to questions relating the meanings of ethnicity and nationalism in their lives, and as concepts. The interview guide was mainly designed to make sure that the responses covered as much of the research theme as possible. Many of the questions were open-ended, and respondents were asked several times during the interview if they had anything they wanted to add to their answers (See Appendix C). Although semi-structured interviews are generally formal, before the interview, the interviewees were regularly offered something to drink, and sweets during their visit, which is a tradition of showing generosity and hospitality, and which happens to be an ‘Arab’ and a ‘Circassian’ tradition.

Fontana and Frey (2005) explain that the interview is a conversation, and mention that what makes a feminist approach interviewing different is the feminist interviewing ethic, which is based on attempting to create a shared coequal status between the interviewer and the interviewee (Fontana and Frey, 2005). In an attempt
to bridge the differences between me and the interviewees, I always highlighted the fact that I was not a Jordanian, and that I shared a same minority status with them. Moreover, I often alluded to the fact that despite being an ‘Arab’ myself, I did not feel that I belong to the ‘Arab’ nation, and that I found myself in contradiction with my ‘own roots’. This was often responded to with a sense of relief, because most of them said that they did not understand ‘Arab’ ways.

During the interview, it was very important that I stripped myself of any sense of ‘Arab’ nationalism and belonging, in order to gain the interviewees’ trust, so that they could express freely their conceptions of Pan-‘Arabism’. Fortunately, that was achievable, especially as I am very critical of the whole concept of ‘Arabism’ myself. I had to emphasise that I was not an ‘Arab’ nationalist, and that this reflected my detachment from ‘Arabs’. I also had to show an understanding of their stereotypes of ‘Arabs’, whilst also concealing any criticisms, so as not to appear judgemental, and so that they felt they could speak their minds (Davies, 1999, Axinn and Pearce, 2006). Although some of their remarks were racist towards ‘Arabs’, which is something I do not agree with, I felt that I had to hide my feelings of discomfort.

All interviews were tape-recorded, on two digital tape recorders, the main one was connected to a computer set, and the other was switched on as a backup, in case something went wrong. Some argue that tape-recorders might prompt interviewees to censor their speech (Gobo, 2008). In order to counter this I used some techniques to make the interviewees feel more comfortable about what they were saying. At the beginning of each interview, I reemphasised the confidentiality of the interviews, and confirmed that no one would listen to the interviews except for myself. I also said that it was their right, if at any point they wished, to stop the recording, to do so. This, however, never happened, and soon after the first few questions, I felt that the recorders became more and more invisible for them. I found that using tape-recorders has more pros than cons. For instance, it would have been
impossible to take notes of all the answers during the interview, and ‘data interpretation and analysis involve making sense out of what people have said, looking for patterns, putting together what is said in one place with what is said in another place, and integrating what different people have said’ (Patton, 2002: 380). Interviews were also conducted in Arabic language, and with two exceptions, two interviewees found it easier to express themselves in English, so two were conducted in half Arabic/half English. As a professional in the field of translation, I have transcribed/translated all of the interviews, and of course translation has its implications in social research. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that in translation the translator influences the text, which also means that I co-construct the research with participants. I have used a translation style that looks into the meanings of words; rather than simply translating them literally, which is a translation style I have learnt through experience. This approach to translation shapes the text to make more sense. Literal translation has been a criticism of most Arabic translators (Darwish, 2004), and for that reason I avoided it.

Interviewees were asked to sign a consent form. Although the paper said that their identities would be concealed, and that pseudonyms would be used, most of them said that they did not mind the use of their real names. Nevertheless, throughout the thesis, I am using pseudonyms. The interviews, particularly the open-ended questions, provided me with more depth for the research. Additionally, ‘some open-ended questions are used because they are more flexible and allow respondents to supply more depth’ (Cargan, 2007: 94). The open-ended questions allowed me to understand the meanings respondents gave to ethnicity and nationalism. Flexibility in my interview guide was also very important. The interview guide only served as a point of reference to make sure that I covered the questions I wanted to; it was more of a checklist. However, I did not stick to the order of the questions; instead I attempted to make each interview more of a conversation. For example, answers to specific questions led to other questions, in
the form of a mutual conversation; rather than a question-answer relation. During
the interview, I took notes of interviewees’ reactions to specific questions, and their
body language, in addition to the ways they avoided answering certain questions.
Interviewees often mentioned that they enjoyed the interview, because it made them
think; however, I am not sure whether that was part of ‘their culture of politeness
and respect’ or not.

Interviews were used to obtain data that could not have been obtained
otherwise. They not only brought up daily life experiences, but also peoples’ views
on the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism, and self-definition in an ‘Arab’ context,
which many of them do not bring up in their daily conversations. Moreover, it gave
them the chance to voice pride in culture, which is for them something they cannot
do every day. Therefore, I believe that the interviews gave the interviewees the
chance to voice their feelings, emotions, and interpretations of their social world.
And, because the questions were mostly open-ended, they allowed me to get
‘focused qualitative’ data, as they ‘combine the flexibility of the unstructured, open-
ended interview with the directionality and agenda of the survey instrument’
(Schensul et al., 1999: 149).
3.6.2 Questionnaires

‘The goal of using carefully constructed open-ended questionnaires is the same as interviews: to get inside the heads of participants to understand their perspectives... major advantage of questionnaires over interviews are that data can be collected from larger numbers of participants, participants are all responding to exactly the same questions in the same order, and data collection takes less time’ (McGee-Brown, 1995: 202-3).

The use of a self-completion questionnaire has been crucial to this research, mainly because of the access problems I experienced during fieldwork, as explained earlier. The questionnaire allowed me to access greater numbers of participants, and it also enriched the research methods. Although it has been argued that surveys and questionnaires are not compatible with anti-positivism, I would disagree, particularly because this greatly depends on the nature of the questions asked and how they are designed. Bryman (2004) says that questionnaires that explore behaviour and attitudes are interpretive in nature, and allow participants to state their view of the social world as they see it. The questionnaire was designed to ‘report on attitudes as well as behaviours’ (Reinharz, 1992: 84). Moreover, questionnaires can also include open-ended questions that would allow the participants to state their interpretations of the world (Appendix D).

In this research, questionnaires have been used to complement and deepen the data provided through the interviews, and also to obtain data on a larger scale than what could have been achieved through the interviews. The questionnaire was divided into four main sections, each section dealing with particular aspects of respondents’ lives and views. The questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter, stating the aim of the research, how the data would be used, confidentiality, and providing spaces for the participants to write their names, phone numbers, and signature on agreeing to participate. The questionnaires were distributed through contacts, and unfortunately, I did not have the chance to be present during the
distribution process. My contacts distributed the questionnaires, and also brought them back to me; however, I had to validate that the questionnaires had been filled by real people, and so I called the numbers that were provided on the questionnaires, and asked if they were filled in by them. I disregarded questionnaires that were filled with no contact numbers, and no names, and many of them had been returned with no numbers or names or even signatures. I have been told that this is because of the sensitivity of the topic, and people are generally hesitant to talk about such things. Luckily, I was able to validate 62 of the returned questionnaires, and I rejected 20.

The questionnaire was designed to gain more access to the community. It had very similar questions to the interviews, but in the form of a questionnaire. The first section of the questionnaire contained questions about personal information, such as age, gender, income, family members, etc. (See Appendix D for questionnaire). The second section was based on a thorough analysis of the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign, and books of national and civic education used in schools. It contained questions about knowledge of the Jordan First campaign, of historical personalities who are given particular importance in the books of national and civic education, and on their definition of the state of Jordan which also appears in the school books. The third section contained questions on self-identification; on emotions, and feelings, which flag best represents them in certain contexts, and their definition of their origin. The final section was based on their attitudes towards concepts such as ethnicity, homeland, language, and culture. Under each question, space was provided for elaboration, but I noticed that only questions relating to origin were elaborated on. Before distributing the questionnaire, I piloted it with three Circassians I know, and who have been included in the sample, to make sure that it was understandable, and to ask their opinion about the sensitivity of the questions. Based on their responses, I redesigned the questionnaire twice, so that the final version was understandable, and culturally, as well as politically, sensitive.
Moreover, I was very careful in the choice of language in the questionnaire, as they were administered in Arabic. This choice was based on the fact that a very limited number of the Circassians in Jordan nowadays speak Circassian and Arabic is the language taught in all schools. English was not considered because the questionnaire aimed to gather data from as many Circassians as possible and older people are generally less likely to speak English. English proficiency is known to be high amongst middle-class Jordanians, rather than people from working class backgrounds. Additionally, since classical Arabic can be very complicated, I used simple wording that would be comprehensible by people who have minimal literacy.

Despite the efforts put into the questionnaire design, I also heard comments from respondents about it being politically sensitive, and that people were hesitant to answer the questions, because they feared that their participation might cause them trouble. The political troubles people were referring to had to do with feeling that it was a way to measure their loyalty towards Jordan, and that their answers might be interpreted in a way which would be frowned upon by the government and the monarchy. Many of them mentioned that they only completed the questionnaire because they trusted the gatekeeper. Such comments were recorded in my research diary, which provided rich material, and is drawn upon in this research.
3.6.3 Unplanned Ethnography

‘The reality, however, is that ethnographic work is not always orderly. It involves serendipity, creativity, being in the right place at the right or wrong time, a lot of hard work, and old-fashioned luck... as well the unplanned, sometimes chaotic, and always intriguing character of ethnographic research’ (Fetterman, 2010: 2).

Unplanned ethnography has been used by some scholars, leading to the production of books on topics that were written ‘like unintentional pregnancy’ (Stacey, 1998: 27). Other studies also emerge from fieldwork through unplanned ethnographic encounters, or ‘unplanned elements of… field experience’ (Bradburd, 1998: xiii). Gratton and Jones (2004) also argue, in the context of sports, that in ethnography, data collection is often unstructured and unplanned, due to the flexibility of the methodology (Gratton and Jones, 2004). What I am calling unplanned ethnography is based on a ‘series of unplanned ethnographic encounters which simply happen en route to the focal encounters intended to take place’ (Tomaselli, 2005: 8).

At the beginning of fieldwork, I had not intended to use ethnography. However, throughout my prolonged stay in Jordan, I found myself being exposed to narratives of Jordanian nationalism on a daily basis. And since narratives of Jordanian nationalism are a focus of this research, fieldwork turned into the study of the field. Not only that, but throughout my presence in Jordan, I met Circassians at work, on social occasions, and on the streets. This, in addition to other events I experienced while in the field, prompted me to start writing a research diary based on my observations of a daily life that I had for long a time taken for granted, but which became important after I had developed a sociological imagination.

‘The sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals... it enables him [sic] to take into account how
individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often become falsely conscious of their social positions’ (Wright Mills, 1959: 5).

By unplanned ethnography, I do not mean auto-ethnography, which switches the focus to the researcher as the subject of the research, and provides data in the form of an autobiographical narrative (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006). Instead, I am suggesting an approach to fieldwork, which acknowledges that fieldwork is ‘personal, emotional, and identity work’ (Coffey, 1999: 1). It is an approach which takes into account the events researchers face during fieldwork, including difficulties, and feelings of exclusion, or inclusion, because in those events one can find data and answers to research questions.

Ethnography is very useful in terms of providing better understanding and greater insight through the research, it is also important for feminist researchers as it gives voice.

“Giving voice’ was a mantra that was frequently evoked and ethnography was perfectly poised to provide the mechanism for doing so. Ethnography provided an excellent methodology for feminists, with its emphasis on experience and the words, voice and lives of the participants enabling… a ‘view from below’” (Skeggs, 2001: 430).

The main feminist concerns around ethnography revolve around ‘the relationship between the knower and the known’ (Sanger, 2003: 30). Feminist methodologies are based on a rejection of the principle of ‘value-neutrality,’ and involve ‘a commitment to reflexivity’ (Roseneil, 1993: 180). This commitment is about rejecting dichotomies of the knower and the known, the researcher and the researched, and the subject and the object. It is about rejecting the exploitation of research participants (Roseneil, 1993), acknowledging our biases (Wolf, 1992), and avoiding the objectification of an ‘other’ through resorting to dialogic methods (Sanger, 2003, Wolf, 1992). Dialogic methods have been suggested by feminists because they give voice (Sanger, 2003); I would also argue that methods of interaction give voice and great insight.
Giving voice is one of the aims of this research, as it focuses on how people give meaning to and make sense of ethnicity and nationalism. For that reason, using an ethnographic approach throughout my encounters with the Circassians depended on dialogic methods of interaction, rather than observing and interpreting interaction. The terms ethnographic interaction and encounters are more comprehensive than dialogic methods, because through ethnography ‘we begin the ethnographic dialogue, the complex interactions and exchanges’ (Bruner, 1997: 272). Dialogue is also a form of interaction. This is because not only dialogue, but also interactions matter. Interaction might again pose the question of observing behaviours of ‘others’; however, in my defence I would say that one can find a balance between giving voice to people, as subjects of the research, and the observation of interactions. Nonetheless, my own interactions and exchanges within the state of Jordan are not based on dialogic methods of observation. In other words, I use both dialogic and observational interaction methods in this research. The dialogic methods of ethnography were used to give Circassians voice, and the non-dialogic observational methods were used to represent my own interactions and encounters with narratives imposed by the state of Jordan, through books of national and civic education, in addition to the ‘Jordan First’ campaign.

‘Hence, conversations and interviews are often indistinguishable from other forms of interaction and dialogue in field research settings. In literate societies the ethnographer may well draw on textual materials as sources of information and insight into how actors and institutions represent themselves and others’ (Atkinson et al., 2001: 5).

I recorded ethnographic data from the field in a research diary. This research diary was written in word documents, following any event, conversation, or relevant encounter in the field. The research diary, however, is not raw material, which only documents data from the field (Coffey, 1999); it contains a form of analysis as one tends to reflect on one’s own experiences in the field. The research diary in that sense was a ‘thinking place for me to write and reflect through the resistances, challenges
and problems that arose’ (Burke, 2002: 50). It included some form of preliminary analysis of ethnographic encounters, and not only narratives of events. Therefore, analysis had also taken place whilst in the field, and not only afterwards. But that sort of preliminary analysis also left room for reinterpretation and reflections, when reread and rewritten in a different context.

Wolf (1992) gives a very good example of how field notes and research diaries can be read differently depending on the context. In her book *A Thrice-Told Tale*, she draws attention to the fact that the writing of field stories depends to a great extent on the writing context, and the audience. Delamont (2002) also uses the dichotomy of home and away, home to refer to the academic community, and away to refer to fieldwork. I have found that a very useful guide in terms of my reinterpretation of field notes, especially as my stay in Jordan had been an intense and an emotional one. The rereading allowed me to explore more how the field experience had been very stressful. Delamont (2002) states,

‘In the fieldnotes one is angry, incompetent, racist, sexist, lazy, purblind, bigoted, naïve, frustrated, rude, tired, bored, scared and all the other things that cannot be allowed either to show to the respondents or to appear in the final, polished accounts of the work... Once the research is over, the notes are a concrete symbol of the work done, and very precious. They are an emblem not only of work done, but also of sacrifices made, risks taken and hardships endured’ (Delamont, 2002: 66).

The analysis was a critical stage for the research, and the writing of the research. The following section will discuss the data analysis techniques used in this research.
3.7 Research Analysis

‘At the analysis stage, triangulation can also be done by scrutinising the data. When a developing idea has emerged from coding the fieldnotes, the researcher can turn to the files of official documents and the transcripts of the formal interviews and so on to see if there are other data that bear on the same issue’ (Delamont, 2002: 181).

This thesis involved several analytical techniques, ranging from document analysis to analysing interviews, questionnaires and field notes. In the following sections, I explain the conduct of the analysis, and how it has been undertaken for each type of data.

3.7.1 Document Analysis

In order to identify how the state of Jordan defines itself, as a state, and how the nation is defined, I relied on documentary analysis of books of national and civic education, the Jordan First document, and the websites of Jordan’s current and earlier kings. In those documents, the focus was on how Jordan is portrayed, and how the nation is defined. The documents are official public documents, issued by the state. National and Civic Education is a compulsory module taught in schools from the first to the twelfth grade. The textbooks of this module are taught all over the kingdom, following the same curriculum, and passing the module is crucial for students to be able to pass their high school exams. Accessing documents and books was not problematic, as they are available to the public, and are in the first place aimed at the people of Jordan. However, despite the fact that the nationalist campaign ‘Jordan First’ is greatly promoted at street level in Jordan, on the Jordanian national TV, in newspapers, and banners in the street, I found out that there is only one official public document, explaining what the campaign is about. For that reason, I relied on the websites of King Hussein and King Abdullah II to get further information on the campaign. I chose these particular documents because
they include discussions of nationalism, the nation and the future vision for Jordan. I focused on them particularly because they represent an overt way of promoting nationalism. They ‘supposedly’ explain what being a ‘Jordanian’ means. The promotion of the campaign at street levels, on TV, in newspapers, and in banners in the streets was part of my ‘unplanned ethnography’, as notes about them and my feelings towards them were taken during the course of fieldwork, and reinterpreted later at the analysis stage.

The analysis of these documents combined two methods of analysis, content analysis and hermeneutics. Content analysis is largely considered a quantitative method of analysis, through which qualitative text is quantified and analysed systematically (Bryman, 2004, McNabb, 2004). The straightforward nature of the texts analysed made content analysis very useful. The first stage of documents analysis was based on finding predetermined categories broadly including the state of Jordan, and the nation. I intentionally used broad predetermined categories in order to limit the amount of data provided in the texts to those that were relevant for the research. For example, in the textbooks on national and civic education there are several units, which discuss technology and science, which were not relevant to the research. Therefore, using broad predetermined analytic categories helped me to minimise time and effort, and instead of analysing the whole books, the analysis became more focused on issues related to the state and the nation. ‘Summarising content analysis seeks to reduce the material in such a way that the essential contents are preserved, but a manageable short text is produced’ (Marying, 2004: 268). The resulting subtexts were entered into NVivo, software for organising qualitative data, and another stage of analysis took place. The resulting texts from books of national and civic education had to be translated into English, while the other documents were available in English.

The second stage of document analysis combined both qualitative content analysis and hermeneutic analysis. Qualitative content analysis ‘comprises a
searching-out of underlying themes in the materials being analysed’ (Bryman, 2004: 392). The themes emerging from the qualitative stage of content analysis were also coded in NVivo. The application of qualitative content analysis aided the research in terms of gaining a greater insight than that provided though quantitative content analysis. However, I must say that without the application of quantitative content analysis, the analysis of the documents would have taken a really long time. Also, I employed hermeneutic analysis simultaneously with the qualitative content analysis, because of its focus on the meaning of the text through considering the intent of the author. Hermeneutic analysis, as McNabb (2004) states,

‘requires the analyst to (1) decipher the meaning of the text through the eyes and intent of the writer or creator of the text or artefact, (2) according to the time frame existing at the time of the writing, and (3) considering the political and cultural environmental influences existing at the time of the creation of the text or artefact’ (McNabb, 2004: 464).

The hermeneutic analysis accompanied the qualitative content analysis, as the themes were crosschecked against their original sources, the year and historic context in which they were produced, in addition to the language used in the written text. This sort of ‘combined-methods analysis’ helped in contextualising and situating the data, in addition to systematically analysing it. It is also advised to combine content analysis with hermeneutic analysis to complement each other, and to avoid de-contextualising and isolating data (McNabb, 2004). Document analysis took place in the field, at the time of designing the questionnaire and the interview schedule, in order to evaluate the successful delivery of the messages channelled through these documents. For other data sets, such as those arising from questionnaire survey and the interviews different types of analysis were employed.
3.7.2 Analysis of the Interviews

‘Methods exist that can make the interview analysis more amenable... they can be used to organise the interviews texts, to condense the meanings into forms that can be presented in a relatively short space, and to work out implicit meanings of what was said’ (Kvale, 1996: 187).

Narrative analysis was used for the analysis of the interviews. Narrative analysis does not necessarily mean the application of the narrative approach during the data collection period, or in other words, only collecting narratives. One can apply narrative analysis to text gathered in ‘a conventional way for conventional purposes’ (Bryman, 2004: 413). The approach to narrative analysis employed in this research focused on thematic and structural analysis. Thematic analysis focused on the content and themes emerging from the transcribed interviews, and structural analysis focused on the way stories were told. I did not use NVivo for the coding and analysis of the interviews, because I felt that NVivo could lead to a quantification of the data provided through the interviews and thus the narratives would lose their meanings. For that reason, I used ‘old’ analysis techniques, coding the transcripts by using coloured sticky notes, and on paper. I found that ‘old-fashioned’ analysis easier to handle, particularly since I wanted to keep the meanings of the interviews in context and in accordance with the way they were said, thematic and structural. Moreover, emerging themes from the analysis were later supported by the questionnaire results. And, the interview analysis also provided some explanation for the questionnaire results at the same time. This is where triangulation of analysis methods took place, and questionnaire data were scrutinised by returning to the interviews and vice versa. In the following section, I explain questionnaire analysis.
3.7.3 Questionnaire Analysis

Luckily, from the 62 questionnaires I have there were no missing data, which made the analysis of quantitative data easier, and simpler. I used a simple form of bivariate analysis based on contingency tables, and univariate analysis based on frequency tables and diagrams. SPSS was very helpful in producing the tables, and the diagrams for the analysis. However, the quantitative analysis was checked against and supported by the qualitative data. The overall sample of the questionnaire constituted 62 participants, the preliminary stage of quantitative analysis was based on univariate analysis, which consisted of frequency tables, and diagrams. In order to explore the answers more fully, I then did a bivariate analysis, exploring two variables at the same time. In other words, this type of analysis is based on dividing the sample into subgroups, and exploring the frequency of the answers for each subgroup, to examine if there is a relationship between the answer and the variable chosen to create the subgroup. The following tables show the differences between univariate (Table 3.11), and bivariate analysis (Table 3.12) of quantitative data.

Table 3.11 Being Circassian Constitutes a Great Part of My Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the previous table the sample n=62, and the variable I am exploring here is only the frequency of answers to the question to what extent do you agree or disagree
with the statement being Circassian constitute a great part of my identity? This form of quantitative data analysis is useful at the first stage of the analysis because it examines ‘the distribution of cases of only one variable’ (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2009: 415).

Table 3.12 Contingency Table showing the relationship between gender and importance of being Circassian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a more complex form of analysis, bivariate analysis gives more insight into the relationships between two variables. It means ‘searching for evidence that the variation in one variable coincides with variation in another variable’ (Bryman, 2004: 230). However, I would argue that, on its own, this form of analysis might show a relationship between variables, but an explanation for this relationship cannot be provided from quantitative data alone. In that way, triangulation of analysis methods has been an integral part of the analysis of the interviews and questionnaires.
Conclusion

Since this research is an exploration of the narratives of ethnicity used by research participants in defining themselves as Circassians, narratives of nationalism promoted by the state, and their (re)construction by research participants, the concept of narrative is central to it, and the link between the concept of narrative and feminism has been important to clarify. The concept of narrative recognises social actors’ contribution to the (re)construction and (re)configuration of ethnicity, nationalism and gender, and also provides room for the realisation that such narratives can intersect to shape our social world, and depend on context, time and space. Using the concept of narrative allows us ‘to transcend the fixity of the identity concept as it is often used in current approaches to social agency’ (Somers, 1994: 621), and this is very useful in understanding gender.

Furthermore, because understanding the meanings people give to ethnicity and nationalism is important for this research, interviews were used to do this by giving voice to participants. The questionnaires were used to support the interviews, and vice versa. Although the questionnaire provided me with access to larger age ranges, it is still one of the limitations of this study that I only interviewed one member of the older generations of the Circassian community. I also used unplanned ethnographic data that were collected through the prolonged stay in the field. This data provided more insight into and understanding of life in Jordan, and the narratives the state of Jordan attempts to promote. This form of ethnography did not in any way view Circassians as others, and they were not observed as such. On the contrary, the use of dialogic ethnographic techniques helped to explore what they said, rather than observing what they did. Participant observation, in this form of ethnography, was employed in relation to the narratives Jordan promotes. Such data were collected as unplanned events in fieldwork occurred, and were relevant to the research process and to complement data from other sources.
During the research process I also had to be reflexive, and part of that reflexivity involved an attempt to provide an account of my position in the field, and the difficulties I faced in Jordan. This reflexive part of the chapter is meant to provide a better idea about the context of the research. As an ‘Arab’ Palestinian, I was perceived in certain ways by government employees, and my standing in Jordan was precarious. This form of reflexivity fits well within the feminist paradigm, as I believe that acknowledging subjectivity may in some cases strengthen the objectivity of the research (Harding, 1993). Moreover, these experiences are themselves part of my construction of ‘reality’, and the reality of the field. Moreover, in an attempt to overcome my own biases, I also employ the terms ‘Arab’, ‘native Jordanian’ and ‘Circassian’ from the perspective of research participants and not my own.

However, as sociologists we contribute to constructing and (re)constructing knowledge and part of our subjectivity is often our interest in specific areas of research. My approach to this research has been to start from the research participants’ view points, understanding, (re)construction and (re)configuration of ethnic narratives, and state nationalist narratives. This research was designed to give voice to research participants, and to give them a chance to contribute to those (re)constructions. The next chapter starts with reviewing the ethnic narratives of the Circassian research participants from their own view point and understanding. It provides an account of what interviewees believe make them Circassian. It shows that those ethnic narratives are contextualised and are often highlighted in reference to the ‘other’, which was most of the time the ‘Arab’. It also explores how those narratives are often tailored to fit within the context of Jordan. It is an account of research participants’ (re)construction of their own ethnic narratives.
Chapter Four

Narratives of Ethnicity

Introduction

’Sofluid and shifting is the process of ethnic identity... that attention should be directed to people’s own definitions of ethnicity, in contrast to attempts by sociologists to fit people into predefined ethnic groups’ (Marsh and Keating, 2006: 325).

As I argue that elements of ethnicity are based on the narratives that people use to define their ethnic group, this chapter examines the ways in which research participants conceptualise their ethnicities. It is an attempt to answer the questions ‘what are the ethnic narratives of the Circassians in Jordan?’ and ‘do those narratives differ depending on age and gender?’ The concern of this chapter is not how we can classify people into ethnic groups; rather it is how people define themselves in terms of ethnic affiliation. In the second and the third chapters, I have established a critique of primordial views of ethnicities, as fixed and non-changing, and as a means of categorisation. This chapter builds on my argument by showing that people have different conceptualisations of the ‘ethnic group’ and those conceptualisations represent their categorisations of themselves and the ‘other’. As narratives are contextualised and influenced by time and space, this chapter explores the extent to which the ethnic narratives of the interviewees are influenced by the context of Jordan. The narratives have been identified from the interview data, and some of the questionnaire data will be used for elaboration. This chapter reviews narratives of ethnicity, the narratives interviewees used in reference to their ethnic identity, what constructs it, and the components of categorisations they use to identify themselves as ‘different’. Sarup (1996) identified two components of narratives—a story and a discourse. He states,

‘Each narrative has two parts: a story (histoire) and a discourse (discourse). The story is the content, or chain of events. The
story is the ‘what’ in a narrative, the discourse is the ‘how’” (Sarup, 1996: 17).

However, the use of narrative in this research will build on identifying ethnic narratives, rather than discourses, within the stories. This is because I believe that individuals make choices, while they draw from stories and myths of ethnic origin, they at the same time choose the narratives they want to derive from these stories. It is important to note that,

’A people’s conception of itself and its relationship to coterritorial, contiguous, and geographically distant peoples influences the interpretation and transmission of ethnic myths, as well as the shape of society and its aspirations for the future’ (Wexler, 1996: 1).

Ethnic narratives depend to a great extent on drawing on past events, stories, or histories which are also, as we have seen in chapter two, influenced by the context in which people find themselves. The narratives of Circassians living in Jordan are greatly influenced by their context, and that means that they have narratives that might be different from non-diasporic Circassian communities in the Caucasus region. Indeed it became clear during the interviews that the ethnic narratives interviewees used were influenced by their living in Jordan. So although some have argued that what brings the Circassian peoples together as an ethnic group is the Nart Sagas (Gay, 2005), the narratives that emerged in interviews and questionnaires include no mention of the Nart Sagas. The main narratives that emerged were highly contextual, and at the same time were based on two types of narratives; narratives that are viewed as changing, and narratives that are viewed as non-changing. This chapter explores the narratives of respondents, who define themselves as Circassians, in Jordan. Some of those narratives draw on views of ethnicity as primordial, or non-changing, from the view of research participants, as explored in section one. There are other narratives, however, that view ethnicity as changing, as explained in section two.
4.1 Drawing on Myths of Origin

'Different generations may use different combinations of ancestral origin myths and may have different ways in which victimization fits into the narratives of community life and different ways of understanding their roles as diaspora’ (Satzewich, 2002: 220).

Despite the fact that myths of origin are often constructed, and based on transmitted narratives, interviews revealed that people see them as ‘real’, and as a constituent of their ethnicity. This view reflects a tendency to highlight the importance of the ethnic narratives, through which a group defines itself, in spite of the fact that narratives are changing. However, one must draw attention to the fact that myths of origin may differ across time and space. Respondents defined themselves as Circassians, originating from the Caucasus. The term Circassian is largely used to refer to the Adyghe people, inhabitants of Circassia, including Cherkes, Shapsugs and Kabardin. However, more accurately, the term has been used to refer to all people from the North Caucasus, including Adyghe tribes originating from Circassia. This group of people referred to as Circassians speak different languages (Kumakhov et al., 1996). Some historians preferred to call them dialects,

‘The Circassian dialects were all mutually intelligible, especially those grouped under the heading Adyghe, which came to be used by almost all Circassians as a common name not only for their language but for themselves as a people and for their country’ (Henze, 1996: 69).

Most Circassian groups in Jordan, nowadays, refer to themselves as Adyghes, in spite of the fact that there are other Circassian groups in Jordan, such as the Abazins\(^{13} \). ‘Abkhaz groups, also called Abkhazin, who originate from the lands

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\(^{13}\) Adyghes and Abazins have their own flags, (See figures (1.1) and (1.2).)
neighbouring the Kabardian region in the North Caucasus, define themselves as Circassian and are also defined by the Adygei-speaking population as such’ (Kaya, 2005: 131), although they do not speak the Adyghe language.

All groups which define themselves as Circassians do not share language but they share Nart Sagas, which are a collection of stories on the origins of those tribes (Colarusso, 2002). This collection of tales or narratives is said to constitute the main narrative on the origin of all those tribes. Colarusso for example (2002) states,

’In peace, the peoples were organized into a number of tribes, each with its own language or dialect. In war, they united and behaved like a conventional state’ (Colarusso, 2002: 2).

The Nart Sagas are a series of tales and legends told in many narrative forms; ‘the stories narrate the origins and adventures of the Narts, the people of the Caucasian heroic age’ (Gay, 2005: 238). Many argue that the Nart Sagas are the most important constituent of Circassian culture. Hewitt (1999) says that sharing the same constituents of culture allows most North Caucasian groups to think of themselves as one nation, particularly since it is argued that the different languages they speak are derived from the same proto-language (Hewitt, 1999).

Nevertheless, I would argue that diasporic Circassians have different myths of origin, which do not draw from the Nart Sagas tales, but rather draw their ethnic narratives from the story of their Diaspora. They base their narratives in relation to ‘others’, who did not share the same diasporic history with them. The stories they heard from their parents are not the stories of the Nart Sagas, their stories are narratives of genocide and forced migration. And the ethnic narratives they draw from are highly contextualised. For example, in reference to what makes up their ethnicity, most of them either explained it in relation to the ‘other’ ‘Arab’, or in reference to the stories they heard about their flight.

’The forced migrations and the genocide-- these events mean a lot to me. Imagine a people, who were forced to leave their lands, imagine people who were killed to preserve the
bloodlines. For me they mean survival, freedom, and insistence. The wars happened, and are over, and they constitute part of the emotional side of my personality, the story of where I come from’ (Qasim, 22, Male).

Whenever asked about origin, interviewees talked about the history of their diaspora and flight, as what represents their origins, as shown in the quote hereinabove. Norma (22, female) also stated,

‘I know our ancestors went through a lot to leave, to save their lives in order to arrive to Jordan, and that for me represents the story of my origin, and where I come from’ (Norma, 22, female).

This suggests that narratives of ethnicity are contextualised, and whereas Circassians elsewhere might use the Nart Sagas tales to draw myths of their origins, Circassians in Jordan might draw their myths of origin from the history of their diaspora. Interviewees identified three main components of ethnicity, which they see as ‘never’ changing, and those are drawn from their diasporic position. Interviewees often claimed that their family names will ‘never’ change and they will always have foreign names, in comparison to ‘Arab’ Jordanian family names. The fact that they view family names as an important constituent of their ethnic groups, shows that the distinctiveness of their family names in Jordan may represent an important ethnic identity marker. The second component of ‘non-changing’ ethnic narratives is roots and origin, which are based on the history of their diaspora. The idea of roots and origin are also deeply rooted in ‘biology’. This is to say that Circassian respondents see their distinctiveness in terms of bloodlines, genes and colour.

Asked whether ‘the preservation of ‘genes, and bloodlines’ is more of a moral duty’, some seemed to agree, while others did not. Nonetheless, given that those
narratives are viewed as non-changing, this showed that interviewees tended to racialise the differences between them and the ‘other’, as ‘racialisation refers to the process of differentiating people and stabilising these differences, as well as legitimating power relations based on these racialised differences’ (Keskinen et al., 2009: 4). The following will provide explanations and an in-depth review of how those ethnic group identity markers are, although racialised, contextualised, and are based on transmitted narratives, passed on from one generation to another. Although the stories interviewees presented were not identical, they all referred to different variations of the history of their diaspora.
4.1.1 Family Names

'Generally, what makes people Circassians is their family names not more, and not appearances or racial attributes, because there are high-levels of intermarriage now. However, there exists a stereotype that all Circassians are white, and blonde, and so on. But, generally, what makes someone Circassian is the family name and those who know the family name could tell whether someone is Circassian or not' (Husam, 23, male).

Husam’s statement about family names is based on the fact that Circassians in Jordan carry hereditary surnames, given through the fathers, and not the mothers, that they see as having been passed down for thousands of years. Circassian family names represent the clan from which the family originates. Each Circassian family name in Jordan has a significant meaning in Adygei language. The pronunciation of the names is totally different from Arabic language, and in Jordan they are written in Arabic letter, but still the words do not originate from Arabic—making Circassian family names significantly different from those who have Arabic family names. Despite the fact that family names may change under various conditions, interviewees referred to their family names as part of their ethnic identity, and as a part that will never change. One interviewee put it,

‘In our lives, myself, my children, and their children, we will never feel that we are Arabs... because they would never carry the family name of a native Jordanian family, they will never be part of those—there is history, there are names and there are family names’ (Thuraya, 38, female).

By native Jordanians, Thuraya explained that she meant the people descending from the Bedouin tribes, which were nomadic on the land of Jordan before the establishment of the state, and whose family names originate from Arabic language. Ironically, the Circassians were also present prior to the establishment of the Jordanian state, but they neither regard themselves, nor are regarded by others, as native Jordanians. However, the importance of family names to interviewees is

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determined by the context of Jordan. There are several factors that influence this ethnic narrative that are related to the interviewees’ views of themselves in comparison to the ‘other’, or as the ‘other’. Therefore, drawing on the family name as a marker of ethnicity is deeply rooted in the tribal nature of Jordanian society, which emphasises the importance of the family name. In other words, it is important to highlight that what distinguished Circassian family names in Jordan from other family names, is the fact they are not ‘Arab’ names.

In Jordan, surnames are given by birth, and ‘the use of tribal names as family names’ is not only common, but is often a way of categorisation (Alon, 2007: 157). In Jordan, family names allow one to tell where a person is from, and may even help in determining the neighbourhood from which an individual may originate. Instead of asking ‘where do you come from?’, people in the Middle East, particularly in Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territories, commonly ask ‘what is your family name?’ When asked about a family name, an individual is directly placed within a certain group, and may even be classified according to the socioeconomic status of that group. For Circassians in Jordan, the concept of the family name is more significant than it is for Circassians in Turkey, due to the tribal nature of Jordanian society and the associated use of family names (Shami, 1998).

The tribal nature of Jordanian society makes the issue of family names a significant marker of Circassian group identity. However, this does not only apply to the society, as the state is not innocent of reinforcing such a concept either. For example, Rana said:

‘In the records of the department of Civil Affairs, they document that I am Circassian, according to my family name, but on the ID they only write ‘Jordanian.’ Nonetheless, I am registered as Circassian in their records’ (Rana, 36, female).

For Sharabi (1988), this emphasis on the importance of family names and tribes by states in the Middle East represents neopatriarchy, and he states,
'Tribalism is a basic characteristic, without which it is impossible to account for the specific nature of Arab neopatriarchy... the essence of tribal practice is expressed in the individual’s identification with the tribe’ (Sharabi, 1988: 28-9).

Barakat (1993: 39) also argues that many ‘Arab’ nation-states ‘use tribalism to advance their causes’ and that they derive their sovereignty from tribalism. Massad (2001) argues that tribalism represents a great part of Jordan’s national identity, and the monarchy denounces any attempt to criticise tribalism. Additionally, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is named after the Hashemite family, the so-called descendents of the prophet, which makes the narrative of the family name even more powerful amongst Circassians in Jordan.

It is very important to note here that family names are given by fathers in Jordan, and the patrilineal kinship system means that ethnicity is transferred through the father’s side of the family. One carries a father’s surname, the name of the tribe the father belongs to, unless he/she were born to unknown fathers. So Circassian women married to ‘Arab’ men cannot by law pass on their family names or their ethnicity to their children. Hiba, born to a Circassian mother and a Palestinian father said,

‘I am not Circassian, even if it is nice to have a mother from Circassian origin; she has a Circassian family name, but I do not. This is how these things are, we follow our fathers. It is not the mother who decides. I have an Arabic Palestinian family name, and I cannot say that I am Circassian, even if I have Circassian blood in my veins’ (Hiba, 28, female).

This does not only show that women do not have the right to transmit their names, and thus part of their ethnic narratives to their children, but also that the state’s reinforcement of tribalism forces and maintains the patrilineal tribal structure as part of its nationalist narrative and ideology; this is discussed in chapter five.
Moreover, the fact that all tribal family names in Jordan come from Arabic language makes Circassian family names unique and different in the Jordanian context. This makes the Circassians a distinct group, which does not share the traditional form of family names in Jordan. However, this is also dependent upon the context in which Circassians are placed. In other words, for interviewees family names are inherited and exist but their significance depends on the context. Whereas Jordan’s tribal system influences how such self-representations are received, interviewees themselves find pride in their heritage through family names, and use it as a way to identify with each other and to define themselves as Circassians. For example, Asad says,

‘Family names and their preservation are very important. We live in tribal societies; your family name represents who you are, and where you come from. Here in Jordan, we want to keep our family names, because of their significance. We carry Circassian family names and we are proud of them’ (Asad, 22, male).

However, this form of group representation does not show the extent to which members of that group have a sense of belonging towards it. For example, some interviewees explained that their family names are different from ‘Arab’ names, and so ‘Arabs’ would tell that they are not ‘Arabs’, regardless of how Circassian they feel. One interviewee said

‘For me, what makes me Circassian does not necessarily mean that I am 100 per cent Circassian. But basically, my family name shows that I am Circassian’ (Muna, 22, female).

She adds,

‘I believe that belonging is measured depending on practices, and so many may think that I am not very Circassian as others might be. But, for me, I belong to the Circassian community because of my family name’ (Muna, 22, female).

For interviewees, family names represent the ‘obvious’ difference between them and ‘Arabs’ during their interactions.

Holding different family names, in the case of Circassians, allows other people to view them as ‘different,’ and highlights their position as ‘non-Arabs’. On
the one hand, family names can override the disappearance of the ethnic identity of
the Circassian community in Jordan. On the other hand, between Circassians
themselves being Circassian means much more than holding a family name; it is the
set of cultural practices and the extent to which they value them, as part of what they
expressed to be ‘changing’ markers of their identity.

Although interviewees showed pride in their family names, they also
reported incidents they went through because of their family names. An example of
such incidents was when one of the interviewees was stopped by police for an ID
check, and while these ID checks should not take more than five minutes, he was
held for almost 15 minutes, because the policeman was trying to figure out where his
family name originates from, as it does not represent any Jordanian city or tribe. He
expressed his feelings by saying,

‘This incident made me realise that I am different, I hold a
different family name and it made me want to tell people more
about the existence of Circassian people, their origins. I want
the world to become aware of our existence’ (Qasim, 22, Male).

Family names hold history, and this history makes Circassians in Jordan
different from ‘Arabs’, and any other. All interviewees stressed the importance and
significance of family names in terms of identifying them as a group, and as
individuals who are members of that group. Moreover, they also stressed this
concept’s impact on determining their roots and origins, as behind each family name
there is history. However, this history remains [his] story, as family names are
inherited through fathers, rather than mothers. Nonetheless, the role of mothers in
transmitting narratives of ethnicity is very important. Muna (22, Female) said that
she does not feel that she is very Circassian because her mother is Palestinian, and
they never had Circassian upbringing. When speaking about family names, most
interviewees said that they carry Circassian names they inherited from their fathers
or grandfathers, not mothers or grandmothers. One interviewee answered, when
asked what makes you a Circassian,
'What makes me a Circassian is my culture and traditions, my behaviours, my name, my father’s name, my family name, my culture and my history, all of those make me Circassian. I can prove that I am a Circassian by the names I hold; my father’s name is Nart, my grandfather’s name is Hasawa, my other grandfather’s name is Qway, and my family name is Abida. Those names cannot be anything but Circassian... you cannot find Arab names like that’ (Tariq, 22, male).

The emphasis on family names by interviewees is understandable in the context of the Middle East. The emphasis on the family name as part of the ethnic narratives is related to the fact that Circassians have ‘non-Arab’ Circassian names and that the concept of the family name and tracing roots through patrilineality is important in Jordan. Family names seemed the major way research participants distinguished themselves from others. They are, for them, the most ‘obvious’ way to prove their roots and origins, which also appear to be viewed as a ‘non-changing’ part of their ethnic narratives. The following section examines the importance of roots and origin for respondents.
4.1.2 Roots and Origin

‘I am proud that I originate from the Caucasus; that I am Circassian. I am very proud. It is impossible for me to say that I am not Circassian and give up my Circassian identity. This is impossible. Excuse me for saying this, but those who have no roots do not deserve to live. Origin, for me, is very important, and we should be proud of it and even brag about it’ (Asad, 22, male).

Asad and many other interviewees emphasised the importance of their Circassian roots and origin. As previously explained, family names help Circassians identify their roots and origins. A few questions remain, such as ‘what makes notions of origins and roots important?’, ‘what makes them significant and worth preserving?’, and ‘what do those narratives of origin include?’ To answer these questions this section relies on data from the interviews and the questionnaires. When asked to state to what extent they agree or disagree that origin does not reflect their identities, questionnaire respondents were more likely to disagree (69.4%). The figures show that origin is important to Circassians, but less important for women than men, as table (4.1) shows. This suggests that the issue of origin is an important part of the identity of the group. Only 13 percent agreed, and the remaining 18 percent neither agreed nor disagreed (Table 4.1). Questionnaire data also showed that origin seemed to be more important for men, as men were more likely than women to disagree with the statement that their origin does not reflect their identities. The gender gap in these answers reflects that men and women do not share the same view when it comes to origin being part of their identities (Table 4.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (4.1) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘My origin does not reflect my identity’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Answer</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interviews showed that women were more likely to emphasise the changing narratives of their ethnicity, rather than what is seen as non-changing. For example, Norma (22, female), Nuha (22, female) and Thuraya (38, female) emphasised the fact that although they may not transfer their family names to their children they will be transmitting culture and traditions. On the other hand, Muna (22, female), whose mother is not Circassian, emphasised the importance of family name, because she felt herself to be Circassian even though she did not practise culture and tradition, particularly since she said that she did not have Circassian upbringing at home. But she also emphasised the importance of the transmission of culture, although her mother did not do this, because her mother is Palestinian. In chapter five, I explain how women are not seen as transmitters of family names and origin, and how their role in transmitting the ethnic narratives is mainly dependent on transmitting culture through upbringing.

Table (4.2) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘my origin does not reflect my identity’ By Age Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentages of Answers by Age Range</th>
<th>19-24</th>
<th>25-30</th>
<th>31-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>Above 51</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further, answers to the question to what extent they agree or disagree that origin does not reflect their identities, there were also generational differences, as the age range between 25-30 were the least likely to disagree (Table 4.2). However, the
gender gap remains more significant, as fewer women than men believed that their origin reflects their identities.

All questionnaire respondents and interviewees identified themselves as having Circassian origins, originating from the North Caucasus. In the ‘Arab’ Jordanian context, some identified themselves as simultaneously from Jordanian, Muslim or ‘Arab’ origins. When asked if they consider themselves of ‘Arab’ origins only 17.7 percent of respondents agreed, and the majority of them were women.

Table (4.3) Do you consider yourself of an Arab Origin by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>88.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>73.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This group of respondents justified their answers by saying that ‘Arabic language is universal, and being an ‘Arab’ is about speaking the language. For example, it had been said ‘I have been speaking Arabic, the language of the Quran, since I was young, and I was born in an Arab country,’ ‘We would be proud to belong to the language of the Quran’, and ‘I speak Arabic language, and I live in an Arab country’. Another interviewee said ‘I consider myself of a Jordanian origin, and of an Arab origin, because ‘he who speaks Arabic is an Arab’ (Rana, 36, female). This shows that this group of respondents chose to conceptualise the concept of ‘Arabism’ as non-primordial, and to view it as something acquired through speaking the language. Historically, this has been a criticism of the ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist ideology, it has been said,

‘A first difficulty of the Arab Movement was to say who the Arabs were. Being a manufactured people, their name had been changing in sense slowly year by year. Once it meant an Arabian. There was a country called Arabia; but this was nothing to the point. There was a language called Arabic and in it lay the test’ (Lawrence, 1935: 14).
This could also show that the tendency to view the concept of an ‘Arab’ as non-primordial and related to language is due to the fact that Jordan defines itself as an ‘Arab’ country, and a big number of questionnaire respondents consider themselves Jordanian by origin, because historically the Circassians were on the land of Jordan before its establishment as a nation-state. Of the total questionnaire respondents, 62.9 percent say that they are of Jordanian origin, while 37.1 percent do not believe so. The answers between men and women varied remarkably, as 66.7 percent of the men and only 57.7 percent of the women believe that they are from Jordanian origins (Table 4.4). In that sense, men have stronger feelings towards originating from Jordan.

| Table (4.4) Do you consider yourself of a Jordanian Origin by Gender |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Answer | Men | | Women | | Total |
| | Numbers | Percentages | Numbers | Percentages | Numbers | Percentages |
| Yes | 24 | 66.7% | 15 | 57.7% | 39 | 62.9% |
| No | 12 | 33.3% | 11 | 42.3% | 23 | 37.1% |
| Total | 36 | 100% | 26 | 100% | 62 | 100% |

Those who believe that they are of Jordanian origins elaborated on their answers. Examples of such answers would be ‘I lived on Jordanian lands, and so did my father and grandfather,’ ‘I do not have any homeland other than Jordan,’ ‘I was born in Jordan, and I do not know my original country—Circassia,’ ‘I was born in Jordan, and all I have on this earth is in Jordan,’ ‘The presence of Circassians in Jordan for more than 163 years confirms that their belonging is Jordanian,’ and ‘I live in Jordan, and I speak Arabic’. During interviews, respondents attempted to show that they can be considered of Jordanian origins because they have been there for long, and because they do not see being of Jordanian origin as contradictory to their Caucasian roots. Although most of them believe that they are not of ‘Arab’ origins, they choose to ignore that Jordan’s supranational identity is ‘Pan-Arabism’. A 77 year old interviewee chose to answer in poetry;

‘We Circassians are the foundations of this country;
It is well-known where we came from.
Our ancestors migrated from their homeland,
But with the power of faith we formed it [referring to Jordan]. What do you understand from this? We are the founders of Jordan. We are generally, the oldest people who inhabited Jordan. A nearby neighbour is better than a far away brother. I am Jordanian, of a Jordanian origin; I belong to Jordan and not to any other place’ (Khairi, 77, Male).

The same interviewee said ‘I am of foreign Muslim origins, which are not Arab’. Amongst the 62.9 percent of respondents who believe that they are of Jordanian origins, 74.4 percent do not consider themselves of Arabic origins, while 25.6 percent do (Table 4.5). Elaborating on their answers, the majority of the questionnaire respondents, who answered that they consider themselves to be of Jordanian origins, answered that they do not consider themselves to be of an ‘Arab’ origin, and elaborated by saying ‘No, because my ethnicity says otherwise,’ ’My blood is Circassian,’ ‘No, because my grandfather came to Jordan, and he does not belong to the Arabs in the first place,’ ’The way I look, my language, and traditions make me not an Arab,’ ’I am simply not of an Arabic origin, why would I consider myself an Arab, while I belong to different ethnic origins. I am a Circassian-Jordanian, not an Arab-Jordanian,’ ’My origin is Circassian from the Caucasus in Russia,’ and ’I am Jordanian, but not an Arab’.

| Table (4.5) Do you consider yourself of Jordanian origin/ Do you consider yourself of An ‘Arab’ Origin? n= 62 |
|------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 62.9% of n Yes I consider myself of a Jordanian Origin |                  |                  |
| Do You Consider yourself of an ‘Arab’ Origin? N1= 39   | Numbers         | Percentages of N1|
| Yes                                                   | 10              | 25.6%           |
| No                                                    | 29              | 74.4%           |
| Total                                                 | 39              | 100%            |
| 37.1% of n No I do not consider myself of a Jordanian Origin |                  |                  |
| Do You Consider yourself of an ‘Arab’ Origin? N2= 23   | Numbers         | Percentages of N2|
| Yes                                                   | 0               | 0%              |
| No                                                    | 23              | 100%            |
| Total                                                 | 23              | 100%            |

The discourse of roots, history, and origins appeared several times during the interviews, and particularly in the part of the questionnaire that required elaboration.
from respondents. The desire to show that they are Jordanians by origin occurred in the interviews, and all interviewees emphasised that their forefathers contributed to the establishment of Jordan. Four interviewees mentioned that in Amman, the capital of Jordan, before the ‘Arab’ revolt people used to speak Circassian, and that many of the streets in Amman have Circassian names.

Conversely, being Jordanian does not undermine their history, on the contrary they see it as a positive product helping them to live in peace in Jordan. One interviewee puts it;

‘I consider myself 100 percent Jordanian firstly because of citizenship rights and duties, and because of the period of time I lived here... but as for my original root I consider myself Caucasian, because those who turn their back on their history, the future will turn its back on them... As a Circassian, my history has an influence on my personality, but at the same time, I live in Jordan and this has its influence on me... I try to merge our Caucasian history and roots with what is required to be able to live here’ (Adel, 22, male).

Interviewees who did not believe that they are of Jordanian origin, on the other hand, were those who linked Jordan to the concept of ‘Pan-Arabism’. They believe that because Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country, they cannot be of Jordanian origin, and they tended to agree with the concept of ‘Arabism’ based on primordial notions of ethnicity, upon which the Jordanian nationalist ideology was based.

In answer to the question ‘what makes you a Circassian?’, many interviewees talked about their roots, and how they originally come from the North Caucasus. For example, one interviewee said ‘in principle, my roots; my father and mother, make me Circassian... I can never be part of the well-known original Jordanian families, but I am Jordanian, although my family name is not’ (Husam, 23, male). Questionnaire respondents said ‘Circassians are not Arabs, and they are one of the greatest nations with great glories in the world, they are a white Caucasian race’. Emphasising that Circassians are not ‘Arabs’, one interviewee said ‘I consider myself Jordanian, but I would have a problem if people classified me as an ‘Arab’. For me,
when someone asks me I say that I do not have Arabic roots, I have a Jordanian nationality’ (Nuha, 22, female). Six interviewees expressed that they feel confused, and this confusion in terms of their definition to being both a Circassian and a non-’Arab’ Jordanian, as Jordan is an ‘Arab’ state, as many of them explained. This confusion is explored fully in chapter seven, a Harmony of Contradictions.

One interviewee stated ‘when I think about being of Jordanian origin the answer would seem invalid’ (Qasim, 22, male), this is because of the common view that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country, as he, Norma (22, female), Nuha (22, female), and Husam (23, male) explained. However, research participants seemed more comfortable to consider themselves of Muslim origin, rather than Jordanian or ‘Arab’. Around 74 percent of respondents consider themselves of Muslim origins (Table 4.6). The rest who do not consider themselves of Muslim origins said that this was because they believe that prior to Islam they had their own religions, stating ‘Islam spread among Circassians in the late seventeenth century, and the religion at that time was Christianity, but I am a Muslim and my forefathers were Muslims as well’. However, of those who do not believe that they come from Muslim origins, only 11 percent believe that they are of Jordanian origin, while the rest believe that they are neither from ‘Arab’ nor Jordanian origins. It is important to clarify here that the use of the word ‘origin’ to refer to religious affiliation is due to the fact that they derive this particular ethnic narrative from the story of their diaspora. Because, historically, Circassians were forced to migrate and to leave the Caucasus for religious reasons, religion constitutes a great part of their ethnic identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All interviewees thought that it is more comfortable in a Jordanian context to think about them coming from Muslim origins. This was explained by saying that
Islam is the religion of their fathers and grandfathers, which makes them Muslims by origin. Others elaborated on this by saying that ‘Islam does not differentiate between races’. Other interviewees, on the other hand, turned to their history, explaining that the fact that adopting Islam was the main reason behind the flight of Circassians from their homeland obliges them to belong to Islam more than anything else. One questionnaire respondent said that if he does not say that he is of Muslim origin, then this means that his ’forefathers’ sacrifice would be gone in the wind’. Responding to the statement ‘being Muslim constitutes a great part of my identity’, 72.6 percent of respondents agreed to the statement, with no gender or age differences. On the other hand, 69.5 percent of respondents agreed to the statement ‘being Jordanian constitutes a great part of my identity,’ and there were no gender or age differences on this question either. While the numbers seem close, it is important to note that respondents were more likely to strongly agree to the first statement, as 48.4 percent strongly agreed to the first statement ‘being Muslim constitutes a great part of my identity,’ compared to 32.3 percent strongly agreeing on that being Jordanian constitutes a great part of their identities (Tables 4.7 & 4.8).

| Table (4.7) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Being Muslim constitutes a great part of my identity’ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Answer | Men | Percentages | Women | Percentages | Total | Percentages |
| | Numbers | | Numbers | | Numbers | |
| Strongly Agree | 17 | 47.2% | 13 | 50% | 30 | 48.4% |
| Agree | 8 | 22.3% | 7 | 27% | 15 | 24.2% |
| Neither Agree or Disagree | 3 | 8.3% | 2 | 7.7% | 5 | 8.1% |
| Disagree | 4 | 11.1% | 3 | 11.5% | 7 | 11.2% |
| Strongly Disagree | 4 | 11.1% | 1 | 3.8% | 5 | 8.1% |
| Total | 36 | 100% | 26 | 100% | 62 | 100% |
On the issue of identifying themselves as Muslims, nine interviewees mentioned that Islam does not differentiate between the races, and therefore identifying themselves as Muslims seems more ‘comprehensive’. For example, Qasim (22, Male) said ‘I consider myself of Muslim origin, rather than ‘Arab’ or Jordanian origins, because, generally, the concept of origin in Islam does not take into account ethnic or racial origins. Islam says that no racial or ethnic group is superior in relation to others, and we are all the same’. The 77 year old man explained Circassians’ relation with Islam saying,

‘Since we embraced Islam, we believed in God, and this is a faith that runs in our blood. Faith has been running in our blood since our ancestors embraced Islam... most of the foreigners, who embraced Islam; understand Islam more than Arabs themselves... Our Islamic religion does not differentiate between a black and a white person, but nowadays they try to discriminate. The prophet (peace be upon him) says: those who adopt my good steps are to be rewarded, and those who follow my good steps are to be rewarded. When Circassians came to this country, they brought with them good Islamic sunnah, following the prophet’s good steps. When someone dies, the Imam used to walk up 99 steps until he reaches the ‘top of the mosque,’ to remind people of God, and inform people about the death. Each one who heard the reminder used to stop until he [the Imam] finished his speech. Then, the people used to start asking who died, and they were to be informed by the Imam, after the speech. They stopped doing that, they stopped to it everywhere in Amman, Na’ur, Sweileh... they stopped

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that everywhere. Arabs never did that... Circassians brought this with them to this country’ (Khairi, 77, Male).

On the other hand, other interviewees did not see themselves as practising Muslims; however, they still believed that Islam constitutes a great part of their history and the history of their ancestors. The emphasis on the attachment to Islam appears to be separated from practising the religion as a tradition; it rather shows that Islam is part of a non-changing history that is deeply rooted in the story of their diaspora. Norma stated,

‘I am much attached to Islam, because a religious unity is sublime; it is flawless. But at the same time, I do not practise it like other people do. This may be because I look at religion differently. So, I consider myself of Muslim origin, and that will never change. It will always be part of my history’ (Norma, 22, female).

And Tariq said:

‘I consider myself of Muslim origin for sure, because we had a cause. The Circassians were forced out of their lands because they were Muslims. And I am not only following the religion of my ancestors, but religion is deeply rooted in our history. I cannot waste this history just like that’ (Tariq, 22, Male).

All Circassian interviewees and respondents believe that their roots come from the Caucasus, but at the same time, they see themselves as one of the original people of Jordan. Some of them, although few, consider themselves ‘Arabs’ because of the importance of Arabic language, as it embodies the idea of citizenship and belonging, and because it is much more inclusive than ideas of roots and origins. However, a majority believe that they have Muslim origins, and that Islam is deeply rooted in diasporic history. Ethnic narratives, all derived from the history of their diaspora, also include the ‘biological’ ideas about their origins. Respondents referred to differences between them and the ‘Arabs’, in terms of ‘blood, genes, and colour’, and those are also related to the history of their diaspora in Jordan.
4.1.3 Race: Colour, Blood and Genes

‘Five to six men died in a battle to defend a woman, or a child, who would keep the Circassian bloodlines through his descendents. I would want to transfer these bloodlines in order to preserve our identity first and foremost. I want my children in the future to know that there are people who died for them to be here, as a part of a dream Circassians wanted to achieve at that time’ (Qasim, 22, Male).

In spite of the fact that the same interviewee said that he prefers to call himself a Muslim, rather than anything else, because Islam does not differentiate between the ‘races’ as many respondents and interviewees stated, he, and many others, want to preserve their Circassian bloodlines. For many Circassians, preserving bloodlines means a lot because they see that their ancestors’ sacrifice, leaving their homelands, was in order to keep their bloodlines. Another interviewee talking about her feelings towards historical Circassia said that she sees it as ‘a place that represents my blood, as the blood that runs in my veins’ (Thuraya, 38, Female). Moreover, preserving bloodlines, for research participants, seems very important to preserve the identity of the whole group. I have noticed a tendency towards emphasising their ethnic belonging through reference to their blood, and genes. Therefore, nine interviewees out of 13 expressed their desire to guarantee their group survival, and would prefer to preserve their bloodlines, and genetic traits, to be able to place them in the future under a certain category of people—‘the white race.’ One questionnaire respondent said ‘My origin and where I come from is the Caucasus, and the white race.’ Those who mentioned blood, race, and genes as part of the ethnic narratives that distinguish them as a group, explained that their ancestors went through forced migration and fought the Russians to preserve their bloodlines. They saw it as a moral duty towards their ancestry to keep the bloodlines.
Moreover, what makes the issue of blood and race more apparent in Circassian identities is the fair skin most of them have, as they explained. This places some Circassians in a difficult position when they are told that they do not look like ‘Arabs’, or when they are asked if they were Circassians because of the way they look. Some Circassian interviewees emphasised on the issue of colour as being a marker of group identity, while others believe that it is mainly a stereotype. For example, one interviewee said,

‘I would say that my origins are from North Caucasia, which is part of the former Soviet Union. I would say that this is why… I look more of a European than an Arab. I do not say that unless I was told that I do not look like an Arab, and people ask such questions’ (Thuraya, 38, Female).

Thuraya believes that she looks more European than ‘Arab’, and for her that distinguishes her from ‘Arabs’. She further explained that she believed that she is more ‘white’ than the ‘Arabs’, because of her origin. On the other hand, one interviewee, who described himself as a ‘dark’ Circassian, said the idea ‘that all Circassians have white skin is merely a stereotype’ (Asad, 22, Male).

It must be noted that ‘whiteness’, ‘genes’, and ‘bloodlines’ are generally recurring themes in sociological debates on racism. Many interviewees seemed to realise that, and, as a way of defending themselves from being accused as racist, some stated that they might mention cultural differences as a reason to refuse to marry a non-Circassian. One interviewee stated,

‘I prefer to preserve my bloodlines… I am not racist; I might be racist when it comes to choosing my partner… But let’s face it what makes me a Circassian is blood and genetics’ (Nuha, 22, Female).

Although notions of blood, genes, and colour appeared several times in the interviews, one interviewee of mixed parentage and who had a non-Circassian mother chose to say that her family name made her Circassian. For example, an interviewee whose mother is Palestinian said
Although, I also have Palestinian blood in my veins, my mother is Palestinian; I still feel that I am primarily seen Circassian... But, my family name mainly reflects that I am Circassian' (Muna, 22, Female).

Another interviewee, whose mother is Circassian and father is Palestinian, expressed that she does not feel that she is Circassian in any way; she said ‘I may have Circassian blood in my veins but I am Palestinian’ (Hiba, 28, female). This also shows that women’s role in the transmission of ethnic identity is obscured, and reflects that the narrative about how ethnicity is transmitted through fathers gives no role to women. And, in spite of women’s roles as reproducers, the narrative of origin obscures mothers’ transmission of ethnic identity, particularly in terms of transmitting the narratives that are seen as non-changing, which include family names, roots and origin.

On the other hand, others believe that it is important to preserve one’s race, just for their desire to preserve their roots. During interviews, this was justified by telling stories about the massacres and the genocide their forefathers went through to arrive to Jordan, and their respect to the sacrifice of their forefathers who migrated to preserve the ‘race.’ Tariq said,

'It is good to be exposed to other people and cultures, but at the same time one has to preserve their race and culture. Circassians believe that if they avoided intermarriage they would be able to preserve themselves... because they want to preserve their roots. By avoiding intermarriage, Circassians also avoid cultural clashes. This is because we have very strict traditions, which determine all of those things’ (Tariq, 22, male).

Tariq and his family, as he explained, are totally against intermarriage. However, by generalising that all Circassians avoid intermarriage, he is merely trying to defend his position. Some interviewees were of mixed parentages and as previously shown the narrative of origin and blood excludes mothers, and children of mixed parentages are expected to consider themselves part of their fathers’ ethnic group.
Some interviewees also expressed that they believe that their race keeps them away from being ‘Arabs’, as one had said,

‘we are foreigners, even if we remained for 500 years, we will remain pure Circassians, because we belong to a different race—the white race... if you perform DNA testing after one million years you will find that I am from there’ (Asad, 22, male).

Although Tariq and Asad believe that they belong to a group of people that is distinct from others because of blood, genes, and race, it is still important to highlight that their views are constructed. In other words, this emphasis on race, colour, blood and genes is always in comparison to the ‘other’. Therefore, it is important to note that what is considered as ‘non-changing’ elements of ethnicity, as research participants explained, in fact find their significance only in reference to the ‘other’. Furthermore, the above excerpt from Asad’s interview contradicts another excerpt from the same interview. At one point he says that he considers himself to be a ‘dark’ Circassian, and that the idea of Circassians being white is a stereotype, at another point when he is asked what makes him Circassian he says that he belongs to the ‘white race’ and genetic testing would prove that after millions of years.

Moreover, eight interviewees\(^4\) believe that some attitudes and behaviours are carried through blood, believing that Circassians carry certain characteristics relating to their attitudes through genes. For example, ‘the nature of Circassian blood makes them violent and warriors—the whole nation was warriors,’ ‘The Circassians are loyal by nature... It is impossible that a Circassian would betray,’ because of their blood and roots. Although, in fact, those are acquired traits, some still believe that they are given by virtue of birth, which makes them ‘non-changing’ for interviewees. This reflects a tendency to racialise ethnic narratives, for participants to be able to distinguish themselves as superiors in relation to others, and to stabilise those differences.

\(^{14}\) Aya (22, female), Muna (22, female), Tariq (22, male), Thuraya (38, female), Qasim (22, male), Asad (22, male), Norma (22, female), Husam (23, male).
It is also important to note that interviewees shed light on a set of ethics they carry through Circassian upbringing, and that their culture is also part of the ethnic identity of the group. For example, many of them believe that Circassian culture imposes certain rules such as respecting the elderly through which many non-Circassians can tell that they are Circassians. This is also in reference to the ‘other’ and in the context of Jordan. Therefore, the significance of narratives of ethnicity, the stories and the narratives developed from those stories, depend to a great extent on the context. By drawing on social constructs and viewing them as ‘non-changing’ and ‘fixed’, research participants emphasise their ethnic narratives. Family names, origin and blood, were viewed as the most important narratives of their ethnicities, and as non-changing markers of the identity of their group, because they are, for them, based on permanent differences. They also emphasised other aspects of their ethnicity, which they saw as changing, such as culture, language, upbringing and heritage. Despite the fact that language, for example, is real and actual, research participants viewed it as changing, and the fact that they do not speak Circassian any more does not mean that they are not Circassian, because they carry Circassian family names, Circassian blood, and they have Circassian origins, as Jordanians and Muslims. Moreover, the ‘non-changing’ narratives of ethnicity make women unimportant and incidental in the transmission of ethnicity; women do not give their children their names in Jordan, as tracing descent is through patrilineality. It is always the story of the father and the grandfather, and this was emphasised by both men and women interviewees. However, as for the ‘changing’ narratives of ethnicity the role of women is excluded from some and emphasised in others. The following section examines the ‘changing’ ethnic narratives research participants used to explain their ethnicity, and will also show how women are included in some of the narratives and excluded from others.
4.2 Changing Ethnic Narratives

‘I can say that I am Circassian either on the basis of my roots, or on the basis of preserving my culture and traditions. I can call anyone who follows Circassian culture a Circassian, because there are many groups, which are not Circassian by origin, but are called Circassian because of their shared culture and traditions, and because they lived with the Circassians in Caucasia’ (Adel, 22, Male).

Adel distinguished between two types of ethnic narratives, one that is based on roots, and one that is based on culture and tradition. His explanation of what being a Circassian means sheds light on the fact that the narrative of roots and origin can be seen more of a marker of group identity, as Circassian culture and traditions can be followed by non-Circassians. Whereas blood, genes, roots, and family names were viewed as non-changing elements of ethnicity for research participants, other narratives of ethnicity were viewed as changing, and that can be followed by non-Circassians as well. For that reason, the emphasis on the non-changing aspects as markers of group identity has been greater in reference to the other. Culture, upbringing, and language are also narratives of ethnicity. In spite of the emphasis on the importance of those aspects for research participants, they expressed that the Circassians are losing those ethnic identity markers, because they are not as ‘fixed’ as the other ‘non-changing’ ethnic narratives.

For example, individual group members may choose not to transfer their culture and traditions to their children, and the same applies to language as well as upbringing. Family names, origins and blood, however, are viewed as ascribed involuntarily. As we have already seen, in the context of the Middle East, particularly Jordan, where family names, blood and origins are given particular importance for categorisation, through family names one can determine another’s origin, and this can serve as a way of group identity marker. On the other hand, even if raised on adhering to cultural values, or encouraged to learn the language, some group-members may choose to go against their upbringing. Such Circassian
group identity markers do not suffice to define an individual as a member of a group in the context of Jordan. Non-Circassians themselves may also notice such differences in attitudes and behaviours, but those do not suffice to classify one as Circassian in a tribal society. For example, an Arabic idiom, said about someone strictly straightforward, is ‘he has a mind of a Circassian.’ However, not everyone agrees that those who act like Circassians are Circassians, if they do not carry a Circassian family name. For example, Norma said,

‘I know many people who have Circassian mothers and Arab fathers, and although they are Arabs by origin and family names, they have more Circassian upbringing than those who are from Circassian fathers, and Arab mothers. Still, Circassians are those who have Circassian family names’ (Norma, 22, female).

Preserving culture, traditions, heritage, and even language, are used as indicators determining how good of a Circassian a group member is. They are intra-group signifiers of who is a ‘real Circassian,’ and who is not. On the other hand, some interviewees believed that those same signifiers might hinder the acceptance of Circassians by non-Circassians, and might also influence intergroup relations. For example, Circassian interviewees stressed the importance of being punctual when having a scheduled meeting; this was seen as part of Circassian culture in contrast to ‘Arab’ culture. Others, on the other hand, made it clear that the way they deal with Circassians is different from the way they deal with ‘Arabs’. For example, one interviewee mentioned that he cannot be himself with non-Circassians, because that would cause fear and apprehension, and said;

‘I believe that when I deal with people according to my [Circassian] ethics, I feel that people fear this sort of behaviour. Because people think that I have some conspiracy. I rarely deal with a non-Circassian informally. Because I am an alien to non-Circassians, I am a stranger… they do not know who Circassians are’ (Qasim, 22, Male).
In his construction of his ‘ethics’ and ‘culture,’ Qasim is also constructing the ‘other,’ and although he sees culture and traditions as important, he also believes that they can be a cause of difference and disagreement, despite the emphasis on the importance of preserving them, as part of maintaining his Circassian origins. Around 89 percent of questionnaire respondents agreed with the statement ‘it is important for me to preserve my Circassian culture,’ while eight percent neither agreed nor disagreed, and three percent disagreed (Tables 4.9 & 4.10). However, answers to this question show gender differences. Men seemed more likely to agree that it is important for them to preserve their Circassian culture, yet all interviewees and questionnaire respondents emphasised the importance of their culture and traditions. Questionnaire data on the same question showed that there are almost no generational differences.

The importance of culture, as an element of ethnic narratives, seems significant, however at the same time, interviewees emphasised the changing nature of culture, traditions, and language and the loss of those narratives, especially in the context of Jordan. The next section explores aspects of ethnicity that interviewees see as changing and sometimes disappearing, and it also shows how those narratives of ethnicity include women, because of their role in upbringing.
### Table (4.9) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘It is important for me to preserve my Circassian culture’ By Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentages of Answers by Age Range</th>
<th>19-24</th>
<th>25-30</th>
<th>31-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>Above 51</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Percentages</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
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### Table (4.10) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘It is important for me to preserve my Circassian culture’

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<th>Answer</th>
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<th>Women</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
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<th>Percentages</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>50%</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>16</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5.6%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.8%</td>
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<td>3.2%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0%</td>
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</tr>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2.1 Importance of Culture

'We are a nation at a certain point of time that tried to attain a level of perfection. So, I believe that it came from there. We always try to be perfect, and we try to do things perfectly. And we worry a lot about wrongdoing. We always try to do things better than anyone else. For example, I, myself, always try to do things in a very unique and distinguished way, even if it is homework. Even if there is only one way to do homework, I try to be distinguished with making it neat, or print in a nice way. I try to make myself distinguished, as part of my Circassian culture' (Qasim, 22, Male).

Circassian culture in the above quotation is used as a way to emphasise the distinction and uniqueness of Circassians as the ethnic group Qasim belongs to. As previously mentioned around 89 percent of questionnaire respondents agreed that it is important for them to preserve their Circassian culture. Moreover, some explained that preserving culture is a moral duty they have to fulfil. For example, Tariq said,

'I consider history a responsibility, and we have to preserve this history, and culture, and deliver them to coming generations... I feel that it is my duty. It is a duty I like’ (Tariq, 22, Male).

Although culture and traditions may serve as markers of Circassian identity, the loss of culture and tradition means that they are changeable and impermanent, as explained in section 4.2. Culture is viewed as a narrative of ethnicity which makes interviewees different from other groups, and many of the interviewees explained their culture in comparison to ‘Arab’ culture, and how their culture is dissimilar to the ‘Arabs’. Moreover, for many Circassians preserving their culture is seen as part of the preservation of their roots, because culture represents roots, and marks them as different from ‘others.’ In spite of all of the difficulties they face in terms of preserving their culture in Jordan, Circassians still feel that it is a duty they have to fulfil. For example, one interviewee said,
'Culture and traditions are being dismantled in all societies. No one preserved their culture. We were conquered by urbanisation and democratisation, which abolished our culture and traditions... It is important for me to preserve my Circassian culture. As long as I am Circassian, I have to preserve my culture' (Khairi, 77, Male).

On the other hand, all interviewees seemed very proud of their culture, and as I have previously mentioned, they see it as a marker of group identity, and as a way to distinguish themselves from the ‘other’. One interviewee exclaimed;

‘I know a lot of young people, men and women, who do not care much about being Circassian... They do not feel that they are Arabs; their blood and upbringing, their culture and traditions are not Arabic. When non-Circassians listen to Circassian music they do not feel the same as I do. You cannot enjoy Circassian dance the way I enjoy it. You would not understand its moves; you might see it as ugly. You can never forget your roots; you can never forget them (Thuraya, 38, Female).

This excerpt from Thuraya’s interview shows that Thuraya attempts to use aspects of culture such as dances, songs and upbringing as a way of creating a distinction between her, as a Circassian, and non-Circassians. Although Circassian dances and songs can be learnt by Circassians and non-Circassians, she assumes that non-Circassians cannot identify with them or understand them. Whereas Thuraya may enjoy Circassian music and Circassian dances, other Circassians and non-Circassians may not. Most of my research participants enjoyed Circassian songs and dances though. Asked to state to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement ‘I like Circassian songs,’ 87.1 percent of the questionnaire respondents agreed, only around five percent disagreed, and around eight percent neither agreed nor disagreed (Table 4.11). On the statement ‘I do not like Circassian dances,’ 85.5 percent of respondents disagreed, eight percent neither agreed nor disagreed, and only six percent agreed (Table 4.12), with no generational or gender differences in the answers to both questions.
Table (4.11) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘I like Circassian songs’

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
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<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
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<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Percentages</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</table>

Table (4.12) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘I do not like Circassian dances’

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Percentages</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>38</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

Although the number of those who do not like Circassian dances and songs is small, there are still some Circassians who do not like them but who still identify themselves as Circassians. Furthermore, to the question ‘which flag represents your ethnic group?’, all respondents chose the Adyghe flag— the Circassian flag. Identification with the Adyghe flag, as representing their ethnic group, shows that although all respondents identify themselves ethnically as Circassians, their liking or disliking of Circassian dances and songs, which is part of their culture, is not necessarily linked to their identification as Circassians. Moreover, 96.8 percent of questionnaire respondents believe that being Circassian constitutes a large part of their identities (Table 4.13), compared to 85.5 and 87 percent who like Circassian dances and songs respectively. Therefore, this shows that around ten percent of respondents believe that being Circassian constitutes a large part of their identities,
but still do not like their songs and dances. This could also be because they do not like any songs and dances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (4.13) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Being Circassian constitutes a great part of my identity’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also, many interviewees stressed the importance of preserving culture. For example, one said,

‘In school, we were taught that our history, culture and traditions are the most important things in our lives, because if they vanish, we will feel lost. This is how we were taught at school’ (Tariq, 22, Male).

Tariq was taught in a Circassian school in Jordan. It is important to note though, that in Jordanian schools special emphasis is given to Arabic culture and the importance of preserving it, as discussed in chapter six.

It became clear that when interviewees could not relate to cultural ethnic narratives, they resorted to the concept of roots and origin. For example, one interviewee, when asked about Circassian culture stated,

‘In our family we are not maintaining culture and traditions, but we keep our Circassian identity because it reflects our origin’ (Muna, 22, Female).

Muna mentioned that her mother is Palestinian, and for that reason their upbringing at home was not Circassian. She said that she does not see a difference between Circassian culture and ‘Arab’ culture, and added,
'I sometimes feel that I am a bad Circassian, I have a Circassian family name; my origin is Circassian, but I was not raised on Circassian values or culture' (Muna, 22, female).

In such a case, what only distinguishes her from ‘others’ is her family name. This can show that due to her mixed parentage Muna sees herself as different from other Circassians who practise Circassian culture and traditions, but at the same time she considers that the main elements that make her Circassian are her family name and her roots. Despite acknowledging that culture is an important part of ethnic identity, in its absence, Muna resorts to the importance of the family name for ethnic identity. But, what makes Circassian culture different for some?, and in what ways is Circassian culture different?
4.2.2 Culture: Difference and Disagreement

‘What makes me as a human being a Circassian is the fact that we have culture and traditions. We have culture and traditions, we preserved although we left our lands, and that made our lives more comfortable. And, we believe that our traditions facilitated our interaction within the group and with others’ (Adel, 22, Male).

Many interviewees explained that, in addition to the difference in terms of race, roots, and origins between them and the ‘Arabs’, they consider anyone who does not accept or understand their culture a ‘stranger’ (Asad, 22, Male). Furthermore, differences related to cultural aspects for Circassians can be perceived through Circassians lifestyle and interaction. Cultural aspects, including songs, dances, and costumes, are seen as a way of representing themselves to others. In Jordan, for example, many know Circassians for their dance, as one interviewee put it ‘People here, frankly, do not know anything about us except for the dances, music, and cuisine, and that is it’ (Asad, 22, Male). Another interviewee added that people may even not recognise their dances. She said;

‘I wish one day people would see Circassian costumes and say ‘wow! These are Circassians.’ Not like when I went to the States to dance there, people were saying: ‘where do these come from? Are they from space?’ Scottish, Irish, Palestinian, and Jewish, costumes are at least known. I hope we reach a stage when people recognise at least our music. This is the dream I believe of every Circassian’ (Thuraya, 38, Female).

In Jordan, Circassians have the right to organise concerts, and parties, in which they perform their dances to spread awareness about their culture. Circassian dances, songs, and cuisine, are different from those of ‘Arab’ Jordanians. Some ‘Arab’ Jordanian tribes may prefer not to see Circassian dances because they are mixed, where men and women dance together. However, concerts still take place and those who wish to attend can do so, and those who do not can simply turn down the
invitation. Mixing between the sexes is heavily criticised by ‘Arabs’ in Jordan, including Palestinians and ‘Arab’ Jordanians, and is seen as a violation of religious doctrines. Almost all interviewees defended the Circassian position in terms of mixing between the sexes, by saying that ‘Arabs’ refusal to mix between the sexes is cultural and not based on religion. They also explained that they cannot behave according to their culture, when it comes to that issue, in front of ‘Arabs’. One interviewee explained;

‘We have to avoid talking about openness in front of ‘Arabs’. This is how we have been raised. So, I feel the cultural differences when it comes to such incidents, if I say something about how my family operates and the Arabs show how shocked they are’ (Nuha, 22, Female).

Gender relations were brought up in almost every interview as a significant difference between Circassians and ‘Arabs’. When referring to differences, gender relations are often brought up as a point of disagreement and difference. This is given special attention in chapter five. It is still very important to speak here about upbringing and to examine how interviewees reflected on their upbringing as different, and as a distinctive narrative of their ethnicity. All interviewees mentioned that their mothers were the ones who took care of their upbringing. Again, although interviewees talked about upbringing as an important narrative of being Circassian, they also supported it with the patrilineal kinship attachment to the Circassian group. Hiba, whose father is Palestinian and mother is Circassian said,

‘I cannot say that I am Circassian, I follow my father. My mother brought us up, and my father was away most of the time. But, I am still Palestinian, and I can never be a Circassian’ (Hiba, 28, female).
4.2.3 Upbringing—Adyghe: Perfect Man Theory

Most interviewees found it hard to describe specific differences between them and the ‘Arabs’, in terms of culture, however, they attempted to emphasise that they are different. Whenever they found it hard, they referred to differences in terms of gender relations, which were explained by saying that they had different upbringing. One interviewee said that he has a very close friend, and that he is friends with his sister as well, adding that he even enters their house without knocking; however, he cannot reveal that this is how close he is with the family because ‘Arabs’ would start judging. He said ‘this is the problem with the ‘Arab’ world in general… they would start thinking that I am sexually involved with his sister… and the guy would appear as not masculine, and criticised’ (Asad, 22, Male). He added that this is how he was brought up, and that his culture disallows him to betray trust or be disloyal to people he knows.

Other interviewees mentioned that they had different upbringing, because they were brought up on certain values. All interviewees mentioned the values of loyalty and honesty that Circassians pride themselves on. All interviewees who identified themselves as Circassians talked about loyalty and honesty, and the importance of such traits, which make them respected. These differences are always referred to in masculine terms. Shami (1993) also emphasises this; she notes that through fieldwork she noticed that loyalty, honesty and courage were mentioned to describe how Circassian men are different, and as a group identity marker. For example, one interviewee said,

‘Betrayal in Circassian culture is prohibited, it is inappropriate and unacceptable. We do not betray. But our loyalty comes from our love. And not to betray is part of the perfect man theory. However, if I did not love you, and I did not betray you, I would not be as loyal to you as I would be if I loved you’ (Qasim, 22, Male).
According to some male interviewees, they are brought up on the perfect man theory, the Adyghe. The Adyghe, for many of them, means attempting to reach a level of perfection in everything they do in life. It is about adopting a perfect lifestyle, through honesty, loyalty, courage, and good behaviours. The whole idea of the perfect ‘man’ theory excludes women, and all women interviewees mentioned that it means nothing to them, and that they do not believe that it is true. For example, Nuha said,

‘The idea of the ‘Adyghe’ does not mean anything to me. I do not see myself as a perfect person, and I do not see anyone as perfect. I think that we try to attain a certain level of perfection through our upbringing, and we are asked to be... through the way we deal with others, ethics, and educational attainment, and all of those things’ (Nuha, 22, Female).

Another male interviewee said,

‘The Adyghe, as a concept, means to me the perfect man, who is courageous, generous, and many other virtues and values. This is how we were brought up and raised. I try to make this concept part of my lifestyle, because this is about the culture of my ancestors’ (Husam, 23, Male).

Four interviewees explained that they also see this perfect man theory as a way of maintaining a good image for the Circassians as a group in general, and a positive image for the individual as well. Therefore, preserving a good image and leaving good impression is part of one’s moral duty towards the group. Many choose to give up individual choices for the sake of the group’s image and reputation. As one interviewee put it,

‘Being part of a minority in Jordan is hard. For example, if I gave a bad impression about myself, people would start seeing all the Circassian community badly. So, I have to be conscious and aware of my behaviour at all times, and not to misbehave in order to avoid giving a bad impression about my community. I face difficulties in preserving my identity as a Circassian in Jordan. But if I had been one of those who remained there, and who had not been forced to migrate,
preserving my identity would have been easier’ (Qasim, 22, Male).

Whereas courage, loyalty and honesty constitute good behaviour for men in terms of a good image, for women it is different. Nuha (22, female) explained that, before she went to university, her father advised her to stay away from ‘Arab’ Jordanian men, because they would not understand how Circassians are open, and would accordingly judge her. For women, the image they have to present is more about not mingling with non-Circassian men, and that is given particular attention in chapter five.

Moreover, many interviewees talked about how strict their culture is in terms of not being allowed to make mistakes, particularly with elders. For many interviewees who are proud of this sort of upbringing and behaviour, it may be considered a marker of group identity. This sort of behaviour, respecting elders, is highly praised in Islam. Therefore, all Circassian interviewees mentioned it, during interviews, as a positive group identity marker. For example, they said that they have to stand up when an elder enters a room, they are not allowed to look elders in the eyes, or to sit with elders with their legs crossed. Some interviewees mentioned incidents during which they were recognised as Circassians. One example of that is an interviewee who said,

‘For me, honestly, for example, I see how my friend deals with his father. My friend was once talking to his father in a way; I thought that his father would hit him afterwards. I was shocked that his father started laughing. I was shocked… Honestly, an incident that happened with me was when I befriended a guy of Turkish origin, and he invited me to his place. We were sitting and his father entered, I unconsciously stood up for him, then I greeted him. He then said: Are you Circassian? I said yes, I am Circassian. The next day, my friend said: “after you left, my father said: See my son how Circassians behave? Did you see how he stood up as I got into the room, and he did not sit down until I left the room? This is how Circassians are.” I believe that through our behaviours and ethics we make our identity respected’ (Qasim, 22, Male).
It is important to say here that he was talking about an ‘Arab’ friend. Therefore, respect for the elderly, for many interviewees, was seen as specifically Circassian.

In addition to respecting the elderly, Circassians see that respecting women is part of their culture, as they all explained. Interviewees, men and women, mentioned that respecting women, for Circassians, is as important as respecting elders, and this makes them different when compared to the ‘Arabs’. All male interviewees said that they are not allowed to curse in the presence of a girl, they have to stand up when a girl enters, and they do not look at girls like ‘sex-objects’. This is explored more fully in chapter five. During interviews, and through dealing with Circassians, this seemed to be a very important part of their culture. As a female researcher, I was comfortable interviewing male Circassians unaccompanied.

The emphasis on culture and tradition as an important part of Circassian ethnicity has often been accompanied by expressing regret for losing the language and heritage. Some expressed their inability to practise their old pre-diasporic traditions and Adyghe language in Jordan. The cultural narrative is very important, however, and the loss of many parts of their narratives make it part of the stories they hear about their group. The following section explores how interviewees expressed this loss of traditions, and language, and how they relate it to the inability to practise them in Jordan.
4.2.4 Loss of Traditions and Language

‘There are so many things we cannot do because no one would understand. We would be seen as alien. We are losing big parts of our traditions. Traditions are very important, but they are changing. And, this is the case with everyone. I do not know much about the history of Circassians, except for stories of genocide, but I am Circassian’ (Husam, 23, male).

Another aspect of Circassian culture is the history of the nation, the myths, the stories, and some other traditions such as those related to marriage and death. Traditions related to marriage, for example, may have previously been possible in Jordan, but nowadays Circassians do not practise such traditions as often as before, and maybe the whole tradition has stopped. Traditionally, Circassians get married through elopement. However, this Circassian tradition with regard to marriage was practised long time ago in Jordan, but all interviewees mentioned that it does not happen nowadays. Many interviewees indicated that elopement is one of their traditions without showing pride in it. It was made clear that the society around them, ‘Arabs’ and non-Circassians, would not understand such a tradition. One interviewee put it,

‘In our traditional weddings, for example, we kidnap the groom’s mother following elopement. If I go and tell a native Jordanian friend of mine, he would bring a gun, and follow me to kill the kidnappers. He would not understand that it is a tradition. I believe that we are a closed community. We are a closed community when it comes to matters others would not understand. People here would not understand that elopement is not forbidden in Islam, because when a girl elopes she stays at the groom’s place, and the groom leaves her with his female relatives, until they conduct an Islamic marriage’ (Asad, 22, Male).

Many may give up such a tradition, because it does not go along with the traditions and culture of the majority. For example, a 77 year old interviewee expressed his sadness caused by the loss of authenticity in culture. He said,
’In weddings now, you cannot tell whose wedding it is. Weddings nowadays are not known whether they are for Circassians, Armenians, or gypsies. We are left with no heritage... No group preserved their culture. Arabs, Circassians, and Christians, none of them preserved their culture and tradition. The moment Arabs gave up their tents, they forgot their traditions. They started embracing foreign cultures that are not related to God’s word. This applies to everyone in Jordan, I cannot say about people outside Jordan. This is reality. No wedding ceremony, whether Arab or Circassian or whomever, is really enjoyable nowadays. All of them are celebrating their weddings in hotels, clubs and halls. They transferred the joy to places where it would be forgotten. They exert a lot of expenses that are not necessary’ (Khairi, 77, Male).

This change in cultural practices is seen as threatening for the identity and existence of the group, as five interviewees expressed. For example, Thuraya stated, ‘I am against abandoning the cultural heritage we inherited from our ancestors. The fact that we are losing parts of this heritage makes me fear that the Circassians will not be recognised, and they might lose their identity as a group. I do not want my children to lose this heritage’ (Thuraya, 38, female).

Another element of identity markers would be the acquaintance of Circassians with their history. Interviewees were asked if they knew anything about their history prior to their flight to Jordan. Most interviewees showed a low level of acquaintance with their history, learning only stories about diaspora itself. However, many of them mentioned the name ‘Nart,’ as a Circassian hero, but none of them recognised that the Nart Sagas are about Circassian myths of origins. All interviewees said that their unfamiliarity with their pre-diasporic history represents a loss of an important part of their ethnicity. Some explained that this loss is also due to the loss of the language, and not knowing the Adyghe language because most of their pre-diasporic history is written in Adyghe. Many interviewees explained that they do not know Circassian language, and that is why they cannot be closely in
touch with their written heritage, and history. They also emphasised that language is a very important aspect of their ethnicity. One interviewee said,

‘If we lose the language, we will lose a lot of things after it, such as culture and traditions and civilisation. Those will gradually vanish. So, we must preserve the language’ (Tariq, 22, Male).

Language, for a linguistic minority, would serve as a great identity marker. Nonetheless, very few questionnaire respondents and interviewees said that their main language at home is Circassian, 79.5 percent of the questionnaire respondents speak mainly Arabic at home, and only 19 percent of the questionnaire respondents speak Circassian as the main language at home. Interestingly though, 66.1 percent of respondents agree that speaking Circassian constitutes an important part of their identities, with only 13 percent disagreeing; there were no gender or generational gaps in the responses (Table 4.14).

| Table (4.14) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Speaking Circassian language constitutes a great part of my identity?’ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Answer** | **Men** | **Women** | **Total** |
| **Numbers** | **Percentages** | **Numbers** | **Percentages** | **Numbers** | **Percentages** |
| Strongly Agree | 15 | 41.7% | 11 | 42.3% | 26 | 41.9% |
| Agree | 9 | 25% | 6 | 23.1% | 15 | 24.2% |
| Neither Agree or Disagree | 8 | 22.2% | 5 | 19.2% | 13 | 20.9% |
| Disagree | 4 | 11.1% | 2 | 7.7% | 6 | 9.8% |
| Strongly Disagree | 0 | 0% | 2 | 7.7% | 2 | 3.2% |
| **Total** | 36 | 100% | 26 | 100% | 62 | 100% |

On the other hand, on the statement ‘it is not important for me to teach my children Circassian,’ 59.7 percent of respondents disagreed, 17.7 percent agreed, and 22.6 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. However, men were more likely to disagree with the statement ‘it is not important for me to teach my children Circassian language’ (Table 4.15). On the statement ‘speaking Arabic constitutes a great part of my identity,’ 64.5 percent of respondents agreed, 9.7 percent disagreed, and 25.8 percent neither agreed nor disagreed (Table 4.16).
Table (4.15) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘It is not important for me to teach my children Circassian language’?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
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<th>Men Percentages</th>
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<th>Women Percentages</th>
<th>Total Numbers</th>
<th>Total Percentages</th>
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</thead>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
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<td>52.8%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (4.16) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Speaking Arabic constitutes a great part of my identity’?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
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<th>Men Percentages</th>
<th>Women Numbers</th>
<th>Women Percentages</th>
<th>Total Numbers</th>
<th>Total Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>11</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
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<td>29%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

Interviewees seemed very aware of the importance of language for the preservation of the identity of the group. However, all expressed that it is very hard to speak the language and practise it in an ‘Arab’ environment, where the main language of communication is Arabic, and where all schools either teach in Arabic or in English. The emphasis on the importance of language for the sake of preserving the culture and the identity of the group was evident throughout the interviews. Some respondents blamed their families for not teaching them, others blamed themselves, and others blamed the environment they are living in. Some blame was laid on the environment under the pretext of having to use Arabic more often than Circassian, because ‘my friends are Arabs,’ ‘everyone around me speaks Arabic,’ ‘Circassian language is not used even amongst Circassians,’ ‘we are taught in ‘Arabic
at schools,’ ‘although it is important to preserve one’s language, Adyghe language is not widely used.’

Regret, throughout the interviews, seemed to be a great feeling prevalent amongst Circassian interviewees, and many of them expressed that it is ‘wrong,’ ‘a mistake,’ ‘sad,’ and ‘regrettable’ that Circassian language is being lost. This evident regret was also accompanied with passion, and a desire to restore the language amongst the community. There have been several attempts lately to restore Circassian language. In 2006, young people belonging to the Circassian community in Jordan launched a satellite TV channel that shows Adyghe language lessons, and that airs all of its programs in Circassian language. Moreover, 2008 witnessed the First Circassian Language Conference held in Amman. The theme of the conference was ‘the restoration of its use amongst Circassians in Diaspora’. The latest activities concerning language amongst the Circassian communities in Diaspora reflect their desire to preserve the language because of its importance in terms of preserving the cultural identity of the group. One interviewee stated,

‘Circassian language was taken for granted... Preserving a language is very important—language is an identity... Just recently, people started to become aware of the importance of reinforcing and strengthening, and spreading awareness about the importance of the language, and its relation to cultural heritage. This sort of awareness started just recently, because the youth and the young generations are now suffering’ (Thuraya, 38, Female).

However, the same interviewee later said ‘my language does not reflect my identity. It is way of communication mainly’. This shows that she meant that language does not reflect her identity as an individual, and that it rather has a symbolic resonance for the group. She said,

‘I wish we could reach a stage when all of our children speak Circassian, because I do not want to see the language disappear. Language is more important than music and dances; language is the identity of any civilisation’ (Thuraya, 38, female).
Many interviewees associated language with emotions, and sentiments that connect them to their original homeland, as one interviewee said,

‘Speaking Circassian is very, very important, because this represents the emotional side of me. In the end, I am part of this spinning wheel, which is Jordan—I am part of it. But these are the simple things, the symbolic things, and the emotional things, which connect me to my country of origin, to the suffering of my ancestors. I do not like to lose these things, and I would love to transfer them to my children in the future’ (Qasim, 22, Male).

Others, on the other hand, believe that preserving their identities as Circassians imposes on them the need to preserve and restore the language, and many saw it as a duty which was hard to fulfil, others believe that the language itself is hard to learn. Nonetheless, all stressed the importance of preserving it. For example, Tariq, who just recently started to learn Circassian, when talking about preserving his Circassian identity, said,

‘I believe that it is not an easy duty to fulfil. The first burden that would face me through fulfilling this duty is language. For example, I am trying to study the language, there are some people now who teach it, but in the future those people may not always be there. If we lose the language, we will lose a lot of things after it, such as culture and traditions and civilisation. Those will gradually vanish. So, we must preserve the language’ (Tariq, 22, Male).

Muna, for example, expressed her desire to learn Circassian saying ‘I would love to learn Circassian, because it would reflect my Circassian origin. But no one uses it. It is a difficult language’ (Muna, 22, Female).

Language, culture and traditions, for research participants, are very important parts of their ethnic narratives. However, the emphasis on their importance is always accompanied by feelings of regret and sadness, because all interviewees and most research participants believe that great parts of those narratives are being lost. They also expressed their desire to preserve those ethnic narratives, and to be able to practise their culture, traditions, and language, which are ethnic narratives that remain existent, rather than practised.
Conclusion

This chapter has shown how narratives of ethnicity, although racialised, are contextualised, and situated. It examined research participants’ conceptualisation of the narratives of their ethnicity, and identified two main narratives of ethnicity—narratives of origin and narratives of culture, the former as non-changing and based on racial differences, and the latter as changing. The narratives interviewees referred to were relational most of the time, or in other words they were in comparison to the other ‘Arab’. For example, despite the fact that historically myths of origin of the Circassian people in North Caucasia are presented in the form of tales and stories called the Nart Sagas, none of the interviewees identified them; they only said that ‘Nart’ is the name of a Circassian hero. However, when asked about origin Circassians speak of the history of their Diaspora, forced migration and genocide, and they speak about the history of their settlement in Jordan.

Moreover, interviewees tended to emphasise that family names do not change, and that each name has it history, because they have been the same for thousands of years. The focus on family names can be explained in the context of Jordan, particularly because of the patrilineal nature of tribal ‘Arab’ kinship system, which constitutes a big part of Jordan’s nationalist ideology as a state. The strength of this system may greatly influence the desire of minority groups to adapt to tribalism (Shami, 1998). Added to that, the fact that Circassian family names are different, because they do not come from the Arabic language, underlines Circassians’ particular ethnicity. The concept of family names may not have that much significance in the region of the north Caucasus, because they all originate from the same language. Therefore, I would conclude that the emphasis on particular components of ethnicity is related to the concept of the ‘other’, because they are always emphasised in comparison to the ‘other’. Interviewees expressed that family names prove their ethnicity, and origin.
Additionally, the patrilineal kinship system also has its implications for women, as it excludes them from passing on their ethnic narratives to their children. Women are not allowed to pass down their names unless the children are from unknown fathers. To add to this, origin, blood, roots, and genes were also seen to be transmitted from the father, and not the mother, and they are also related to the history of their diaspora and settlement in Jordan. For example, some emphasised that they have Circassian blood and genes, and that makes them Circassian. One interviewee who has a Palestinian mother was the only one to say that she is Circassian only because of her family name and blood, although she also has Palestinian ‘blood in her veins’. Some interviewees believed that Circassians, by virtue of birth, carry traits such as loyalty, honesty and courage, which reflects to a great extent a racialisation of their ethnic narratives. One can also argue that this focus on ‘blood, genes, and race’ is a way for interviewees to distinguish themselves in relation to others. The chapter also discussed other aspect of Circassian ethnicity, interviewees viewed as very important but which are getting lost and are changing. They expressed regret and sadness for the loss of their traditions and language. However, family names, origin and blood remained at the forefront of their narratives of ethnicity. Their conceptualisations of ethnicity seemed to give great importance to culture, heritage, and language, but the fact that they are not familiar with, and do not practice them makes it hard for these Circassians to distinguish themselves from the ‘other’ by virtue of culture. The use of narratives to identify ethnicity shows that those narratives can be (re)constructed and (re)configured according to time and space. Moreover, most of those ethnic narratives are gendered, and gender narratives are often used as ethnic boundary markers. Thus, narratives of gender intersect with narratives of ethnicity, by expressing that gender relations in the Circassian community are different from those in ‘Arab’ society. And, some ethnic narratives also seemed to devalue women’s role in preserving ethnic narratives. The following chapter is dedicated to gendered narratives, and narratives of gender in details.
Chapter Five

Gendering Ethnicity, Ethnicising Gender

Introduction

This chapter argues that narratives of gender relations can be ethnicised, and narratives of ethnicity can be gendered. In other words, I argue that ethnic actors define their ethnic group boundaries through resorting to narratives of gender, which they see as different, in relation to the ‘other’. Saying that ethnicity is gendered suggests that men and women occupy different places in ethnic narratives. In spite of women’s contribution in (re)constructing and (re)configuring ethnic narratives and their reproduction role, women do not transfer their family names to their children, and ethnicity in the Middle East is mostly transmitted through the fathers. The previous chapter argues that ethnic narratives are contextualised, situated, and almost always used in reference to the ‘other’, as a way to distinguish themselves from the majority in Jordan. This chapter argues that the use of gender narratives as a way to define boundaries of the ethnic group is also contextual and always in comparison to the other ‘Arab’.

Throughout the previous chapter, it has been established that gender analysis of the questionnaire and the interviews in relation to ethnic narratives of the Circassians shows that gender relations are part of the ethnic narratives, and that ethnic narratives are gendered. This chapter deals in more detail with the gendered part of ethnic narratives, and the ethnicised nature of gender relations. This chapter shows how gender and ethnicity intersect, in many and various ways. Gender and ethnicity intersect to form ‘Ideologies, stereotypes and practices employed to underline the specificity of an ethnic group, signal its superiority... Ideas of shared ethnicity mean that members of a group take pains to signal through appearance and conduct their closeness to one
another while at the same time stressing their difference from others’ (Wilson and Frederiksen, 1995: 4).

This intersection of gender and ethnicity creates a gendering of ethnicity, and an ethnicisation of gender relations. More specifically, the ethnicisation of gender means the use, by ethnic actors within their ethnic group, of gender relations as group identity markers, and to describe the distinctiveness of their ethnic group, in relation to the ‘other’. Such narratives of gender relations are utilised as narratives of ethnicity, in contrast to the ‘other’, and in this case in contrast to the ‘Arabs’. As mentioned in chapter Three, interviewees used the term ‘Arab’ to describe the majority group in Jordan. When speaking of gender relations as group identity markers, interviewees always compared themselves against ‘Arabs’. Therefore, this chapter shows how interviewees contrasted themselves against ‘Arabs’, and how they often used stereotypes of gender relations to stress the superiority and difference of their culture. By emphasising negativities in the other, interviewees (re)constructed their ethnic narratives in terms of gender relations. Although the following sections might seem to be about ‘Arab’ people, this is a reflection of how interviewees (re)constructed their ethnic narratives around how the ‘Arabs’ act, rather than how they themselves act.

On the other hand, gendering ethnicity, as well as nationalism, means that ethnic narratives can be gendered in various ways. For example, many of the ethnic narratives men and women used to define their ethnic group excluded women as ethnic actors, such as in the concept of the family name, which is based on the patrilineal kinship system. This chapter discusses how women are excluded from some narratives of ethnicity and included in others, how this exclusion is related to assigning women to the private sphere and excluding them from public interactions with the ‘other’, and how their inclusion in specific narratives related to their domestic roles. It also illustrates how this gendering of ethnicity and ethnicisation of gender has implications for women.
5.1 Ethnicising Gender

‘Ideas of authenticity are defined in terms of fixed gender roles and heterosexual norms... the prioritisation of irreducible gender differences- that also signal irreducible heterosexual complementarity- acts as a display of cultural continuity’ (Fortier, 2000: 168).

Fortier (2000) found that gender roles, ideas of authenticity, and heterosexual norms are often used to define the boundaries of the Italian community outside Italy; my interviewees often placed gender relations at the forefront of ethnic narratives as well. They often used gender relations to refer to intergroup differences, and the maintenance of group identity was often linked to the maintenance of specific forms of gender relations. Interviewees’ ethnicisation of gender relations in that sense is problematic and has its implications. Those implications vary from imposing control over women’s sexuality (Charles and Hintjens, 1998) to emphasising authenticity and difference (Fortier, 2000). Gender relations can serve as identity markers for collectivities. Gender is central to the understanding of how groups construct narratives of ethnicity (Morgen, 1989), particularly when gender relations are placed at the forefront of intergroup differences. Gender relations have been used to draw clear distinctions between groups, and in some cases maintain intergroup boundaries. It is important to note, though, that distinctions based on gender relations may not always be true or factual, and many examples are based on social stereotypes of the ‘other’. An example would be how the Euro-androcentric perspective portrayed Muslim women in the Middle East generally as ‘secluded, mysterious, erotic’ (Hale, 1989: 247). This portrayal of Muslim women can be treated as a social stereotype, and such portrayals do not always reflect reality. Rather, they are usually based on subjectively interpreted observed behaviours. Muslim women were seen as ‘secluded, mysterious, erotic’, because, as Waines (1982: 643) puts it, they were seen ‘through a veil darkly’. Waines (1982) further argues that such perceptions of Muslim women changed over time, but ‘entrenched stereotypes
lingered on’ (ibid: 643). These examples show us how stereotyping of gender relations determines the mode of intergroup, as well as intra-group, interactions.

Social stereotyping has been defined as ‘the process of ascribing characteristics to people on the basis of their group membership’ (Oakes et al., 1994: 1). Social psychologists attempting to explain social stereotypes disagreed on the degree to which social stereotypes reflect reality. For instance, Sherif (1967) rationalised stereotyping through considering it a consequence of intergroup relations. Katz and Schanck (1938), on the other hand, linked stereotyping to prejudice, and argued that it reflects unreasonably ascribed characteristics to people according to group membership, rather than to factual experiences. Whether stereotypes relate to reality or are mere unreasonable fictions, their effect on intergroup relations is indisputable. Given that, Circassians’ use of stereotypes of the ‘Arabs’ in terms of gender relations helps them to identify the boundaries of their ethnic group. And, at the same time, it helps them to differentiate themselves from the ‘Arabs’.

Seteny Shami, a Circassian anthropologist herself, was the first to say that Circassians, when asked about differences between their culture and ‘Arab’ culture, answer always ‘in terms of gender’ (Shami, 1993: 148). This shows us the centrality of gender relations to the identity of Circassians in Diaspora. Shami (1993) adds that ‘gender is a marker of difference that explains and maintains… ethnic boundaries, or indeed boundaries between various kinds of social groups’ (ibid: 149). She further gives examples of ideas of Circassian group identity based on gender relations. These emerged clearly in the interviews I conducted, during which references to kinship systems, marriage, and the way Circassian men treat women were often used to emphasise the uniqueness and distinctiveness of their ethnic group.
5.1.1 Marriage and Kinship

‘Understanding the nature of marriage is essential for understanding any kinship system... kinship and marriage organise productive and reproductive relationships... the organisation of marriage and of the relationships built around it should provide explanations to the organisation of gender relationships’ (Shahd, 2004: 13).

Throughout the research, interviewees often referred to differences between them and the ‘Arabs’ in terms of marriage and kinship. Conceptions of marriage and kinship are linked together, and they are part of the ethnic narratives. One of the main narratives interviewees referred to as a marker of difference between them and the ‘Arabs’, in terms of differences based on intra-group relations, is the practice of first cousin marriages. Despite the fact that not all ‘Arabs’ practise first cousin marriages, or familial endogamy, it has been argued that

‘the Middle Eastern form of familial endogamy, which is the marriage between a man and his father’s brother’s daughter (bint ‘amm in Arabic), or a father’s brother’s daughter (FBD) marriage, is extremely rare outside the Middle East’ (Khlat, 1997: 63).

First cousin marriages, which has been called familial endogamy in social anthropology, was brought up by interviewees as an ‘Arab’ practice they do not share, and do not agree with. Interviewees brought familial endogamy up in the context of highlighting the difference between them and the ‘Arabs’, and also in terms of explaining the narratives of their ethnicity. Shami (1993) also refers to familial endogamy as a central aspect of ‘Arab’ culture, versus the Circassian ‘exogamous orientation’ (ibid: 149). However, her exogamy/endogamy dichotomy is somewhat misleading. This is because, the term endogamy refers to marriage within one’s own tribe or group, and exogamy is the opposite. However, to say that endogamy is prevalent amongst the ‘Arabs’ and not Circassians is misleading because that would imply that Circassians prefer to marry ‘Arabs’, while ‘Arabs’ prefer to marry ‘Arabs’ in the Jordanian context, although she meant the opposite.
For that reason, it is important to clarify here that ‘Arab’ endogamy is familial endogamy and not based on ‘Arabism’ as an ethnicity. Familial ‘Arab’ endogamy is about preferring first cousin marriages, and to say that cousins are potential marriage partners. On the other hand, many research participants expressed that they would not marry a non-Circassian, which shows an inclination towards same group endogamy. All of the married interviewees are married to Circassians, except for the 77 year-old man, whose first wife was Circassian, but after her death he married a Syrian. Questionnaire data shows that of the total questionnaire respondents, 50 percent do mind intermarriage, and 41.9 percent do not mind marrying non-Circassians. The responses revealed a slight difference between male and female respondents. Around 52.8 percent of male respondents stated that they would mind marrying a non-Circassian, and the percentage of female respondents was slightly lower at 46.2 (Table 5.1). Whereas only six percent of male respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, this accounted for 12 percent of female respondents. Interestingly, the largest proportion of those who disagreed with marrying non-Circassians was between the ages of 25 and 40, as 66.5 percent of that age range disagreed, constituting 63.5 percent of the total respondents who disagreed, which shows generational differences (Table 5.2). Therefore, although Circassians do not practise familial endogamy, there is a tendency among research participants towards group endogamy.
Table (5.1) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘I do not mind marrying a non-Circassian’?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (5.2) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘I do not mind marrying a non-Circassian’? By Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentages of Answers for each Age Range</th>
<th>19-24</th>
<th>25-30</th>
<th>31-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>Above 51</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviewees also reflected on the ‘Arab’ practice of first cousin marriages as different from their culture, and used it to show the superiority of their group, by saying that first cousin marriages are ‘disgusting’, or ‘strange’, because ‘cousins are like brothers and sisters’ (Thuraya 38, female, Nuha 22, female, Qasim 22, male, Asad, 22, male, Norma 22, female). Not accepting first cousin marriages reflects the
kinship system of the Circassian society, as the cousin is treated like a brother or sister. For example, Nuha said,

‘I have a male-cousin, who is close to my age, and we were raised together, and we have been to the same school and to the same class, and so on. He studies in the US, so when he comes from the US, I go to sleep over at their place. But no one understands that we can sleep in the same room, without anything wrong happening’ (Nuha, 22, female).

Nuha’s reference to this particular example was meant to emphasise the strict kin relation between her and her male cousin. In spite of the fact that Nuha did not see any reaction from me except for a nod of understanding, she felt she needed to further justify her relation with her cousin. She added that ‘Arabic’ Jordanian people would not understand that they sleep in the same room without anything happening between them. By saying ‘without anything wrong happening,’ she meant to explain that there is no sexual contact between her and her cousin. Interviewees also explained that for ‘Arabs’, female-male cousins relations should be kept under close scrutiny, i.e. the kin relationship between male and female cousins does not amount to prohibiting marriage. It is worth noting, at this point, that Islam itself does not prohibit first-cousin marriage. However, and since sexual contact prior to marriage is prohibited in Islam, and cousins are potential marriage partners, for ‘Arabs’ a very close relation between male and female cousins could lead to undesired prohibited sexual encounters. For that reason, Nuha believes that ‘Arabs’ would not understand that the close relation with her cousin would never entail sexual encounters, because the close kin relations in her community make her cousin more like a brother. In terms of kin relations, within the Circassian community, according to interviewees, the extended family is very important, and the prohibition of first cousin marriages was linked by interviewees to the fact that cousins are raised to be very close like siblings. During fieldwork, I witnessed an interesting conversation between a Palestinian woman and a Circassian woman, which made me realise that there are differences in terms of practices between both communities. The conversation was
inflamed when the Palestinian woman stated that she would love if her 11 year-old son married her four year-old niece in the future. The Circassian woman could not but say ‘how could you think about such a thing? This is disgusting! They are like siblings!’ The conversation went on and on, and reached a point where the Circassian woman explained that she raises her daughter the way she was raised, on the belief that her cousins are like her siblings, and added that she even let them sleep in the same bed. She, unequivocally, said: ‘When you raise them up on that belief nothing wrong would ever happen. First cousin marriages and sexual encounters could never take place in a Circassian family.’

A few hours later, when the Circassian woman left the room, the Palestinian woman said: ‘Can you believe this? It is even *haram*\(^{15}\) in Islam to raise your children in that way. I do not know, but this is too much openness... you cannot control what might happen between them.’ She added that since Islam allows marriage between first cousins, cousins from different sexes should not be spending time together alone after a certain age. It is interesting how the Palestinian woman justified first cousin marriage through Islam, although it is a cultural, rather than an Islamic practice. Moreover, although interviewees talked about the ‘Arabs’ practice of first cousin marriages, it is not only practised by ‘Arabs’. It has been shown that,

> ‘Preferred parallel cousin marriage and endogamy are in fact ubiquitous throughout the Middle East and found among various groups, such as Turks, Persians, Kurds, Christians, Jews, as well as Arabs...’ (Keyser, 1974: 297).

Although first cousin marriages still happen in the ‘Arab’ Middle East, it has shifted from being a preferred form of marriage. It has been said that the main motives of tribal and familial endogamy was to keep women’s inheritance within the same family (Baer, 1998). With processes of modernisation and urbanisation, the tribal and familial motive of endogamy began to shrink.

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\(^{15}\) *Haram* means forbidden, or prohibited, in Islam.
However, seven interviewees referred to the ‘Arabs’ acceptance of first cousin marriages, when talking about cultural difference. This reference was made when research participants attempted to emphasise the difference of their culture, and to prove that they have a specific ethnic identity. On another occasion, the same woman, who defended Circassians’ non-acceptance of first cousin marriages, mentioned a saying by the prophet meant to encourage exogamy amongst Muslims, in order to avoid genetic disorders. The woman did not make this up, as it is documented in Islamic books of the prophet’s sayings. Moreover, this point of cultural difference is more likely to lead Circassian women towards a defensive stance, rather than their male counterparts, because, for women, defending cousins’ relations is part of defending their honour, and women especially are expected to preserve the honour of the family. This is due to the disproportionate condemnation of women’s extramarital sexual activities, compared to that of men’s.

The condemnation of women’s extramarital sexual activities is not only an ‘Arab’ practice, as a woman’s sexual behaviour is greatly linked to the discourse of family honour, and that does not only exist amongst ‘Arabs’. On the one hand, [male] Circassians refer to the respect, freedom, and status granted to women by their culture. It is important to note that most references to ‘respect’ were made by male interviewees, while female interviewees referred to ‘openness’ as part of their culture. The difference between men’s and women’s responses in those terms may mean that women do not feel the respect that their male-counterparts claim to be giving them. The openness women referred to is related to having mixed-sex parties, being allowed to have male friends, and the non-existence of segregation between women and their male relatives. On the other hand, this openness, according to them, cannot be practised according to their culture all the time, because ‘the Arabs do not know’ (Nuha, 22, female), and the ‘Arabs would not understand’ (Qasim, 22, male). And, because the ‘Arabs’ would not understand, Circassian men interfere in the lives of their sisters, daughters, or female cousins. This is as claimed to avoid
Arabs’ anticipated criticisms. Shami (1993) explains this as an attempt by fathers and brothers to ‘limit and control behaviour’, using the excuse of Arabs’ disapproval of ‘the relative freedom of mobility for unmarried women, and the lack of sexual segregation’ (ibid: 155).

Female Circassian interviewees revealed that their fathers, husbands, brothers, or the eldest patriarchs in the household, would interfere in their lives when it came to wearing revealing clothes, behaviours, and freedom of movement. They nonetheless add that this sort of intervention is justified, because they want to avoid ‘Arabs’ criticism, ‘closed-mindedness,’ and intolerance towards women’s freedom. One woman interviewee revealed that her brother used to beat her, because she used to talk to women whom he used to see as immoral. She explained that her brother’s beating lasted for years, until she called the police, and that her mother never tried to stop him. She stated,

‘You cannot imagine the pain I was in; it was very painful. He used to accuse me of being immoral and marring the honour of the family, because I had friends who were different. He kept saying that the Arabs would label me as immoral, and that he is beating me for my own benefit, and for the family’s honour. One day, I could not tolerate it anymore. I called the police, and he stopped the beating’ (Norma, 22, female).

She explained that her brother used the ‘Arabs’ as an excuse to interfere in her life and control her. This shows that the social stereotypes about the ‘Arabs’, in these terms, had been used to maintain the status quo of Circassians gender relations, giving men control over women’s lives. However, it shows that they do not live up to a supposed culture which emphasises women’s respect, and freedom. This example also shows that the preservation of the well-respected image amongst the community depends to a great extent on the preservation of gender relations, which leads to control over women’s lives, and sexuality. One interviewee said that her father asked her to stay away from ‘closed-minded Bedouins,’ and watch out for
men at university. She added ‘he did not want me to enter a society which does not understand my openness’ (Nuha, 22, female). Thuraya, for example, is a married woman who lives alone with her children, because her husband was pursuing his studies abroad. She explained that once a Circassian woman gets married she becomes part of her husband’s family, and she explained that her parents in-law interfere in her life, despite the fact that she is financially independent, and she is the one who provides for the household. She said,

‘Our community is very strict. My in-laws believe that they have the right to interfere in our lives because, once a woman is married, she becomes part of her husband’s family’ (Thuraya, 38, female).

The repeated usage of the term ‘openness’ to describe gender-relations in the Circassian community makes one wonder what sort of openness interviewees are referring to, given most of women interviewees explained that their male family members interfere in their lives. This sort of questioning becomes more salient when Circassians say that they have to abide by the strict ruling of their culture. Elaboration on the term openness revealed that, again in opposition to ‘Arabs’, for Circassians, it means their tendency towards non-sexually segregated gatherings, parties, and social events. This leads us to another form of identity marker related to gender-relations. Gender relations outside familial contexts, in schools, at the university, and at work, do constitute another point of difference. The relation between an ‘Arab’ man and a Circassian woman, or a Circassian man and an ‘Arab’ woman, starting from collegiality and extending to friendship, may reflect to a certain extent differences between both communities. In the first place, it is important to explain how each community views such relations, and how modes of interaction differ between both communities.
5.1.2 Control vs. Respect

‘Another displaced expression of cultural superiority... was gender relations... many cross-cultural comparisons use gender relations as a gauge of cultural hierarchy’ (Lie, 2000: 80).

Another aspect interviewees often referred to in order to mark differences between them and the ‘Arabs’ is the difference between the treatment of women in ‘Arab’ culture and in Circassian culture. Whereas the previous section explored how gender is ethnicised in familial contexts, this section explores how interviewees referred to friendship outside familial contexts. One interviewee summed it up as follows;

‘I am sorry to say this, but for us it is normal to have female friends. I can meet my female friend’s father, mother and brothers. I mean, I can even go to her place. It is a normal thing because we view such relations as either mere friendship or for marriage. Unfortunately, the Arabic society here views female-male relations in two narrow dimensions. Male-female relations for the Arabs can either be sexual or for marriage. They do not understand the notion of friendship. You either marry a girl, or no relation should exist because it would mean sexual involvement’ (Asad, 22 years old, male).

Asad spoke about how he sees friendship between men and women, as a Circassian, and how the ‘Arabs’ see such relations, from his perspective. This was used by Asad as an ethnic narrative, in answer to the question what makes you Circassian, and is in reference to the ‘other’, in the context of Jordan. Interviewees often used stereotypes of the ‘Arabs’ to mark the differences more clearly, and frequently used generalisations such as ‘this is the problem of the Arabic society as a whole’ (Asad, 22 years old, male). Men manage the behaviour of female relatives through controlling their dress, as well as their relations with non-related males, has been regarded as an important aspect of ‘Arab’ masculinity (Ajrouch, 2004). This does not mean that this perceived difference between the Circassians and the ‘Arabs’ is ‘real’, particularly since many women interviewees explained that their male relatives
interfere in their lives. The example of the interviewee, Norma, who faced violence from her brother shows that controlling women and placing restrictions on them is not only an ‘Arab’ behaviour, it is merely a narrative of gender relations, mostly used by Circassian men, in order to differentiate themselves, and thus present their culture as superior, as more ‘open’, ‘open-minded’ and ‘respectful towards women’. Control over women’s lives exists in the Circassian community as well, and control and restrictions, which are often related to closing the door in the face of any daughters’ potential sexual activity, are meant ‘to enhance their worth’ (Ajrouch, 2004: 384). The justification of this behaviour is also linked to the concept of honour, woman’s honour and her family’s, and a woman’s worth has a lot to do with the preservation of her honour. This is further emphasised by old sayings and proverbs. Norma said, ‘you know why he used to do it, don’t you? You know the Arabic saying ‘a girl is like a glass block, once broken it never mends’, he was worried that I will do something wrong and lose my virginity’ (Norma, 22, female).

Several Arabic sayings emphasise that women should not be involved with non-related men in any sort of relation. Furthermore, reference to virginity is evident in the previously mentioned saying, which places high importance, and probably the greatest proportion of importance, on a woman’s hymen, as it serves as a proof of virginity for ‘Arabs’. Accordingly, male interviewees, in addition to one woman interviewee, said that Arabic culture subjects women to control, and places restrictions on them. Although several pieces of research show that many ‘Arab’ men would not get married to women they have had premarital sex with, and that they look at them with disdain, this did not seem to be any different amongst Circassian interviewees (Ajrouch, 2004). Privileging men over women, and giving them more sexual freedom, is seen as an Islamic practice, but in fact, Islam limits sexual freedom for both men and women in the same way. Male Circassian interviewees made use of the stereotypes of ‘Arabs’ oppression towards women to highlight the differences that relate to gender relations in their culture. Several
excerpts from the interviews show men insisting that they treat women with respect. Asked what makes him Circassian, one interviewee answered;

‘For example, it is the relation of guys and girls. I do not remember that I ever cursed in front of a girl, because it is very inappropriate. I do not remember ever that a girl walked in and I did not stand up out of respect’ (Qasim, 22, male).

Other young men also mentioned that respecting women is part of their culture and upbringing. On the part of Circassian women, who deal with ‘Arab’ men at work, in schools, supermarkets and universities, reference had been made to ‘Arabs’ non-understanding attitude towards women’s freedom. Nuha mentioned that she has to be careful in the presence of ‘Arab’ men.

‘I feel differences for example, when I invite a male friend over, they think twice before coming…. When I deal with an Arab, I have to be careful. When I deal with a Circassian guy, I feel that the minute he realises that I am Circassian it is different; you feel a spark’ (Nuha, 22, female).

Nuha later explained that she was in a relationship with an ‘Arab’ man, who tried to control her, and she mentioned that she had to lie to him about where she went, and whom she saw. An older female interviewee said that she feels more comfortable with non-Muslim ‘Arab’ men, and feels that they have better levels of understanding in spite of their different religions. She added,

‘Christian Arabs are not like Muslim Arabs; they are used to gatherings where there are mixing of the sexes… I am a Muslim, but Muslim Arabs see Islam differently. They impose sex-segregation although it is not part of the real Islam, which we Circassians practice’ (Thuraya, 38, female).

Thuraya also explained that drinking alcohol is normal for Circassians, and that they do not see it as contradictory to Islam, in contrast to Muslim ‘Arabs’, so she said ‘of course I prefer to befriend people who drink, because otherwise, I will feel out place
with Muslim ‘Arabs’ in gatherings or when we go out’. Norma (22, female), who experienced domestic violence, said,

‘Men are the same anywhere, it does not matter… Now, after becoming strong and standing against my brother, I do not care anymore… I do not need to pretend. My boyfriend now is an Arab Palestinian, and I do not see any difference between us in terms of culture. He is understanding and loving’ (Norma, 22, female).

Norma added ‘but I know that my boyfriend is different from other ‘Arabs’, he is more open-minded, unlike his family’. Shami’s research, conducted between 1979 and 1981, revealed that ‘Arab’ men do not receive invitations to attend Circassian wedding parties, because ‘Arabs are not used to parties where there is a mixing of the sexes, and where women dance’ (Shami, 1993: 150).

The ‘Arab’ Middle East has in fact witnessed a decline in sex-segregation during the past few decades (Moghadam, 2003). In spite of social change, social stereotypes of the Arabic society as a strictly sexually segregated society have lingered on. And, while sex-segregation remains an important aspect in the lives of some families in Jordan, it is no longer the norm. Nonetheless, reference to gender relations amongst ‘Arabs’, by Circassian interviewees, especially men, always alluded to negative aspects of Arabic culture, showing the distinctiveness and the superiority of Circassian culture—a culture that respects women, vis-à-vis Arabic culture that strengthens control over women.

Interviewees also levelled criticism at the fact that ‘Arab’ masculinity largely depends on controlling the lives of female relatives, through not allowing them to befriend non-related males. One interviewee referred to personal experience, which involved criticism from the Arabic society of his childhood friend and his behaviours,
‘I have a childhood friend, we are neighbours, we went to the same school and university, and we were raised up together. For example, his mother and sister call me when they need something. I do not knock on the door when I entre their place, as if it is my own house. For example, late at night I go to pick up his sister, and give her a ride home. This is normal; there is nothing wrong between us... the problem is when some people see us, they start gossiping and talking. They would say: “look! He is obviously trying to hit on his friend’s sister.” And, they would even say: “how does her brother accept that? He must be girren!”... There is nothing wrong between us’ (Asad, 22, male).

Asad fears accusations of having sexual intentions towards his friend’s sister, and his friend fears being accused of being a girren. The colloquial Arabic word girren, particularly used in Jordan and the Palestinian territories, is normally employed to degrade men. It is used to refer to men who are not seen as masculine, because they do not show interest in maintaining their female relatives’ honour. The word is considered very offensive, as it implies that a man lacks masculinity, and thus deserves no respect, due to a loss of his honour. This could be either because he is weak and cannot prevent it, due to an underestimation or negligence of his honour, or because he prostitutes his female relatives. It is important to explain that honour, in this particular context, is an exclusively masculine attribute, which directly places women under the guardianship, and even ownership of men. For a man to be called girren, actual loss of honour, i.e. fornication involving any of his female relatives, is not necessary. A man might be so-called if extramarital sexual conduct on behalf of any of his female relatives was even only assumed (Stewart, 1994).

For Asad, the way people may interpret his behaviour with his friend and his sister is not acceptable for him, because he sees that there is no loss of honour, i.e. there is no extramarital sexual conduct going on between them. This shows that for him, honour is a value he has to respect; it further implies that sexual contact should not take place between them, and, in that particular case, he acts as a protector of his
friend’s honour, by picking up his sister when she needs a lift late at night. He adds: ‘my friend trusts me over his honour, and I would never betray his trust’. Honour, with regard to female relatives, also seems to constitute part of the Circassian mentality, in the same way it does for ‘Arabs’. However, throughout the interviews, interviewees tended to explain that the lack of sex segregation in their culture does not necessarily involve loss of honour. The only difference in that way is that while the ‘Arabs’, according to interviewees, assume a loss of honour when there is no sex segregation, because fornication might take place in such situations, for interviewees, lack of sex-segregation does not mean that extramarital sexual contact is inevitable, and so does not mean a loss of honour.

Male interviewees’ emphasis on the issue of trusting their female relatives also made it clear that, for Circassian men, maintenance of honour, through limiting the sexual activities of female relatives, is important. Additionally, all female interviewees, except Norma, mentioned that their families trust them, and are sure that they would not betray this trust, by wrong doing, and bringing shame on them, which also shows that a woman is part of her family’s honour. It seemed that all women interviewees had a level of understanding and awareness that any extramarital sexual activity on their part would have repercussions for their families’ honour. However, they also mentioned that ‘Arab’ families are different to Circassian families in those terms, because ‘Arab’ women are more oppressed and abide by strict sexual segregation rules. This emphasis on the oppression of ‘Arab’ women by interviewees is mainly explained in reference to sex-segregation. On the other hand, interviewees also mentioned that they have to abide by very strict rules of their culture that are different, but they do not include sex segregation. Sex segregation in ‘Arab’ culture, generally, was contrasted with the strict rules of age-group segregation in Circassian culture (Shami, 1993).

Nuha believes that it is easier for an ‘Arab’ girl to join a Circassian community, than a Circassian girl to join an ‘Arab’ community. She added,
‘I imagine that Circassian guys deal with their sisters differently. If a Circassian guy finds out that his sister has a boyfriend, he would not go mad. But if this happens with an Arab guy, he would start feeling that he is not masculine if he lets it be. I think it is easier for an Arab woman to become part of a Circassian family, than for a Circassian woman to become part of an Arab family. Women in Arab families are more oppressed, so an Arab woman will find Circassian men easier to deal with’ (Nuha, 22, female).

It is evident that gender relations are part of the interviewees’ ethnic narratives, they are often used to emphasise differences, and define the identity of their group. Gender relations are also ethnicised, because they mark intergroup differences, and in the case of research participants criticising gender relations amongst the ‘Arabs’ seems more like a way to emphasise the superiority of their culture, by expressing disgust with first-cousin marriages and dissatisfaction with ‘Arabs’ control over women. This section also showed that most of those narratives with regard to gender relations are constructed, and that those narratives are always used in comparison to the other ‘Arabs’. Interviewees spoke about differences in terms of gender relations inside and outside familial contexts; they attempted to emphasise that Circassian culture has respect for women as one of its values, and Circassian women are allowed more freedom than ‘Arab’ women. However, those references were gendered as men were more likely to emphasise that point. This ethnicisation of gender has also been accompanied with gendering ethnic narratives. In other words, some ethnic narratives are emphasised in ways that overshadow women’s role in transmitting ethnicity.
5.2 Gendering Ethnicity

‘Ethnic identity, dissected by gender, demands a “reading of the silences”… While understanding the unspoken is a crucial aspect of any investigation, capturing the silence is particularly important to feminist research, as it is women’s voices that have been most often dormant’ (Handrahan, 2002: 39).

Literature on the production and reproduction of ethnic, and national narratives, largely obscures the role of women in transmitting nationalism, ethnicity, and culture (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Ethnicising gender and viewing gender relations as part of ethnic narratives has its implications on women, because the preservation of traditional gender relations becomes part of the preservation of the ethnic boundaries of the group. Ethnic narratives are also gendered, and discussions of the ethnicisation of gender must be accompanied by discussions of gendering ethnicity to provide a better understanding of how ethnic narratives can influence women’s lives. On the other hand, by using stereotypes of the ‘Arabs’ and by ethnicising gender relations, Circassian men find an excuse to control the lives of their female counterparts, and the emphasis on the importance of gender relations as distinguishing parts of ethnicity is often used by Circassian men to define ethnic boundaries and highlight their cultural superiority compared to the ‘Arabs’. This section focuses on women’s role in transmitting ethnic narratives, and explores how women are overshadowed by the ‘Arab’ and Circassian patrilineal kinship system, in addition to the state of Jordan itself, which marginalise women’s important roles in the reproduction of the group.

Shami (1993) mentions that older Circassian men blame younger generations for the loss of their culture, while younger men blame women for that loss. She adds that women are accused of not being nationalistic because, according to men, Circassian women do not teach their children the language, and more Circassian women than men married ‘Arabs’. Shami uses the word ‘nationalistic’ here to refer to ethnic affiliation, and she means that women are not as passionate about ethnicity
as are their male counterparts. Statistically, it is very hard to compare the number of women and men who are married to ‘Arabs’ or other non-Circassians. From the interview sample, as I have mentioned before, all the married interviewees were married to Circassians, except for the 77 year-old man. However, questionnaire respondents and interviewees were asked if they preferred to marry non-Circassians. For many interviewees, gender-relation differences between cultures suffice as a reason to avoid intermarriage with the ‘Arabs’. This was also justified by saying that, due to differences clashes might arise in cases of intermarriage. ‘By avoiding intermarriage, Circassians also avoid cultural clashes, because we have very strict traditions, which determine all of those things’ (Tariq, 22, male). There is not much difference in the numbers of men and women Circassians rejecting intermarriage. On the other hand, when asked to what extent they agree or disagree with the following statement ‘My homeland is Circassia’, 65.4 percent of women respondents agreed, compared to 52.8 percent of male respondents. Interestingly, 27.8 percent of men disagreed compared to only 15.4 percent of women, and no woman strongly disagreed (Table 5.3). This shows that women are more likely to view Circassia as their homeland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (5.3) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘My Homeland is Circassia’?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I suggest that this difference is linked to the gendering of ethnic narratives; by this I mean that (re)constructions of ethnicities differ between men and women, due to socio-cultural reasons. For example, questionnaire data also revealed that women respondents were more likely to believe that their identities were shaped at home, rather than at school, when compared to their male counterparts. Almost 69.3 percent of women respondents disagreed that their identities were shaped at school, compared to 41.6 percent of male respondents (Table 5.4). And, 88.5 percent of female respondents believe that their identities were shaped at home, compared to 77.8 of men (Table 5.5). This difference may be a result of women’s confinement to the private sphere.

![Table (5.4) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘My identity and sense of belonging were shaped in school’?](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Additionally, women were more likely to agree that preserving their identity as Circassians is hard. On the question ‘to what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement ‘preserving my identity as a Circassian is hard’, 58.3 percent of men disagreed, compared to 42.3 percent of women (Table 5.6). Female respondents, in response to the statement ‘my origin does not reflect my identity’, showed a variant position, different to that of their male counterparts, as 23.1 percent of women neither agreed nor disagreed, compared to 13.9 percent of men respondents. On the other hand, men were more likely to strongly disagree with the statement, as 44.4 percent of them disagreed compared to 27 percent of women strongly disagreeing (See table 4.1 on page 134).

### Table (5.5) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘My identity and sense of belonging were shaped at home’?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table (5.6) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Preserving my identity as a Circassian is hard’?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly Agree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly Disagree</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Men, also, appeared more enthusiastic towards considering themselves of Jordanian origin; around 66.7 percent of the men, and 57.7 percent of the women, believed that they are of Jordanian origin (Table 4.4 on page 137). Those differences indicate that women find the preservation of their identity, as Circassians, harder than men and that men are more enthusiastic towards belonging to Jordan than women. These differences can be accounted for by exploring the gendered narratives of ethnicity.
5.2.1 ‘Bearers of Collectivities:’ Titanic Roles, Gigantic Responsibilities

‘A mother is a grand school,
If well reared, you establish entire nations’ (Arab Poet Ahmad Shawqi)

‘A girl must not leave her house more than twice: on the day of her marriage, on the day of her death’ (Arabic proverb).

In the 1950s, groups of Circassian women started establishing organisations serving as venues for the community to meet and network. In the seventies, a group of married Circassian women founded a mixed sex school for Circassians (Shami, 1993), run by the ladies branch of the Circassians Charity Association. The school is the only school in Jordan that teaches Circassian language. The establishment of the school and several other organisations reflect only part of Circassian women’s roles in the preservation of their ethnic identity—the public aspect. Domestically, however, their roles, and the expectations of their society, are tremendous, as women are first to be blamed if a loss of their culture, or language, is seemingly taking place.

Domestically, Circassian mothers are not only responsible for bearing the children, rearing them, and household chores; they are also responsible for transmitting their culture and language down through generations. This was mentioned by all interviewees, who also stated that the role of their fathers was not as integral in the preservation of their culture as that of their mothers. Many mentioned that their fathers’ roles inside the household are limited, and they mentioned a lack of communication and sort of formal relationships with their fathers. When elaborating on the sort of relationships they have with their fathers, ten of the interviewees mentioned that this is part of respecting the elderly imposed on them by a culture, which has strict age-group segregation, particularly between a father and his children.
Therefore, Circassian mothers take full responsibility for bringing up the children, which includes teaching them language and culture. Perhaps it is due to the realisation that mothers play such an important role in transmitting culture to future generations, that Circassian men are more likely to disagree with intermarriage. Thuraya said,

‘I am responsible for two children, I am a full-time mother. And, I also have to provide for the household, because my husband decided to carry on with his studies. He keeps insisting that I should teach my children Circassian, but this does not work. It would not work because I cannot do all of these things on my own, and then ask me to teach them Circassian language. I also have to help them with their homework, there is no time for other things. The most I can do is to keep telling them that they are Circassian, and tell them bedtime stories about our people, and that is it’ (Thuraya, 38, female).

One interviewee, whose mother is Palestinian, stated that,

‘My father did not have much impact, but he always tells us that we are of Circassian origin. But he never imposed Circassian culture and traditions. Sometimes, he tries to tell us stories, when he remembers his past, but this rarely happens. He never asked us to learn Circassian language... Many of my Circassian relatives go spend time in Circassian associations but I do not. This is because my mother is not Circassian. Mothers are the basis of the home. And, the father might have a little impact, but his impact is not as great as that of mothers. Those who have Circassian mothers maintain their traditions more than those who are from non-Circassian mothers. Their cuisine is also different—Circassian’ (Muna, 22, female).

Another interviewee, (Nuha, 22, female), whose maternal grandmother is Palestinian, explained that she does not speak Circassian, because her mother’s mother did not speak the language, so her own mother could not speak it, nor teach it to them. She added that her father speaks Circassian, but he never thought about
teaching it to his children. Interviewees who have Circassian mothers appeared more likely to at least understand the language and emphasise the importance of their culture (Qasim 22, male, Thuraya, 38 female, Husam 23, male, Asad 22, male, Norma 22 female, Rana 36 female, Khairi 77 male, Tariq 22 male, Atef, 39 male). This shows that the role of mothers is not only limited to the bearing of the children, but is also responsible for transmitting practices and traditions through upbringing. This also shows that men and women have different roles in this transmission. While women’s roles at home is seen as very important, through raising children, upbringing, and teaching language, men are given the privilege of giving their children their surnames.

Women are the bearers of the culture, the language, and transmitters of ethnic narratives at home. Qasim (22, male) explained that his grandmother from his mother’s side is the one who encouraged him to speak Circassian language; he added that he practices Circassian with his mother at home. Tariq said, ‘Both of my parents were very insistent on me learning Circassian. But the mother always does more than the father, in that sense. Because, for my father, he is a military man, and he has this traditional Circassian mentality, so he does not talk to us much. For example, if he sees me watching a Circassian channel or reading a Circassian book, he mainly commends it, and that is it. But my mother keeps insisting, and she speaks much more, and she directs me towards people who teach Circassian, and she does more. So, my mother has a bigger role than my father in preserving my identity’ (Tariq, 22, male).

However, the fact that a woman loses her family name after marriage makes it hard for Circassian women to transfer their ethnic identity to their children. Hiba (28, female) for example, born to a Circassian mother and a Palestinian father said she feels that she is Palestinian because her family name is Arabic and, in her words, ‘children follow their father’. This emphasises the importance of family names as part of ethnic narratives, and shows that, for Hiba for instance, having her father’s family name makes her non-Circassian, and implies that family names are salient as
part of ethnic narratives. Hiba, however, mentioned that her mother uses Circassian recipes to cook, and she also expressed that she hears a lot about Circassian history and culture. On the other hand, Muna, who has a Circassian family name and a non-Circassian mother, feels that she lacks understanding of Circassian culture. Muna, a 22 year-old female whose father is Circassian and mother is Palestinian, feared throughout the interview that she might not be giving the ‘right’ interview answers she is supposed to give, in order to represent her Circassian community. She kept saying that she was not sure if she was representing her community ‘correctly’ in her answers and, in spite of many reassurances that I was interested in hearing her views, she worried that she is was not helping me to attain an understanding of Circassian culture. Several interviewees emphasised that their mothers play a major role in reinforcing their Circassian identities, more so than their fathers. Husam (23, male) said that his mother encouraged him more than his father to learn the language; he even expressed his mother’s insistence by saying ‘my mother has a very traditional Circassian mentality, but my father does not’. He also mentioned that his married sister tries to teach her children Circassian language, and that his family communicate with each other in Circassian because of his mother’s encouragement. Asad stated,

‘My mother used to encourage us to stick to our culture, and to speak the language. You know how mothers are the ones to stay at home with children. In our home, the father is intemperate and strict, you see what I mean? So, she also acts as a mediator between us and the father. And, she is the first one to teach us how to speak. When you are young, you spend most of your time with your mother. The father goes out to work outside the household, and he does a lot of things. He started talking to us when we got older, and became mature’ (Asad, 22, male).

Thuraya (38, female) and Atef (39, male) said that their mothers played major roles in the preservation of their identity. Atef explained that he speaks Circassian language, but with a Kabardian dialect, very well. He added that his mother is a
Kabardin, while the rest of the family speaks the Jadough, and that is why he speaks and understands the Kabardian dialect more. This example shows that the role of his mother in preserving language is stronger, but he holds his father’s family name. Thuraya mentioned that she always communicates with her mother in Circassian, and that her mother even refuses to answer them when they try to communicate in Arabic. While fathers give names, mothers are responsible for the upbringing, and teaching their children the language.

It was apparent in the interviews that, in addition to their roles as mothers and carers, Circassian women are also expected to be bearers of the culture and expected to transmit ethnic narratives to their children. Moreover, the roles mentioned by interviewees only partly reflect what Circassian women are domestically doing in terms of the preservation of their culture, traditions, and language. It is also worth noting here that all mentioned a lack of communication with fathers due to their strict cultural age-segregation rules. However, this segregation does not apply to the mother, meaning that women and children are placed in the same position, in spite of the age difference between them. Whereas women are responsible for the transmission of ethnic narratives privately, publicly they face burdens as well. For example, Norma said,

‘You know how it is here... When you misbehave it is like the whole community misbehaved. My brother used to beat me because he suspected that I was misbehaving in front of people. You have to behave well, be your best in front of people, because you represent the whole family, community, society, and maybe the whole country’ (Norma, 22, female).

Nuha (22, female) also said ‘I feel that I represent the Circassian community, so I have to watch it all the time’. Publicly, Circassian women must act as representatives for their communities; they carry out the same duties men carry out in those terms, and women after marriage, like in any authoritarian society (Waylen, 1994), are supposed to prioritise the domestic.
Women, before and after marriage, hold their family names, represent their families’ honour, and are supposed to behave in order to reflect their upbringing. However, after marriage, whether married to Circassians or ‘Arabs’, their role becomes more and more tied to the domestic. Interviewees were asked what ethnicity they would consider their children to have if they marry non-Circassians. All men unequivocally answered that their children would be Circassian, and women said that their children would not be considered Circassians. Men explained that if their sisters married non-Circassians, their children would not be considered Circassians, as children are named after their fathers. Despite the fact that all interviewees expressed that mothers are the basis of the home, and that mothers were the ones who reinforced their ethnic identity, women’s roles were overshadowed by the emphasis on the ethnic narrative which family names prioritises due to the patrilineal nature of Arabic as well as Circassian society, and as previously explained, the name represents origin, and a narrative of ethnicity interviewees viewed as non-changing, unlike culture and language.

Yuval-Davis (1997) argues that an understanding of national ideologies must include both an understanding of the public and the private spheres of societies. The Circassian women’s role inside the household was given greater importance than her role outside the household, by male interviewees. And, when talking about the achievements of Circassians in Jordan, it is always in reference to the men, who are ‘loyal,’ ‘strong,’ ‘warriors,’ etc, by both men and women. It is important to note here that when talking about achievements in the public domain of the state of Jordan, the reference to men seems to be justified, because the state of Jordan is patriarchal and women are to a great extent excluded from the public sphere and women are written out of history. Although it is women who have raised these men and taught them their culture, they are nonetheless given a marginal status, by simply saying that children follow the fathers. However, this was seen by many interviewees as ‘natural’, and as part of the ‘norm’. In terms of women’s roles, social norms, between
the Arabic and the Circassian community do not seem to be very different. Whereas, in fact, women are the transmitters of Circassian cultural narratives in the household, the men dominate the public sphere, obscuring the role of women in terms of the preservation of ethnicity. For example, Tariq said,

‘If I marry a non-Circassian, my children will be according to religion Circassian. Because kids follow their father’s name and family name. If my sister marries a non-Circassian, her children will follow their father. But…. No, no they follow their father… but you cannot simply… there is a known proverb that says: ‘the mother does the upbringing.’ The mother is the one who raises the children. So, if a mother is Circassian, she might raise her children the way she had been raised. But, they will follow their father; children will carry the father’s name’ (Tariq, 22, male).

A Circassian woman is expected to raise her children, be responsible of the upbringing, teach them the culture, and the language, in addition to household chores, yet she is a woman who cannot transmit a name and the name carries more weight for Circassians.
5.2.2 ‘I am Circassian like My Father:’ Patrilineal Structures

‘The most common pattern of unilineal descent is patrilineal descent- a system of tracing descent through the father’s side of the family… In nations such as India, where boys are seen as permanent patrilineal family members but girls are seen as only temporary family members, girls tend to be more expendable than boys’ (Kendall, 2008: 492).

In the previous chapter, the notion of family name, and its importance in the ‘Arab’ Middle East and for Circassians, has been extensively discussed. It has been explained that the concept of family name is a very important part of Circassians ethnic narratives, in the context of Jordan, as their names do not originate from Arabic, and are inherited, meaning that their roots can be traced through family names. However, those names are acquired from the father’s side, and the mother does not have any recognition, when individuals define themselves according to their family name. Those who come from Circassian mothers and non-Circassian fathers are not considered by society and the state, and do not consider themselves Circassian.

Interviewees mentioned that those who come from non-Circassian fathers are not Circassian, because people follow their fathers’ group affiliation. For example, Qasim (22, male) said ‘my aunt is married to a non-Circassian and her children are definitely not Circassians’. This shows that to be Circassian, for all interviewees, depends mainly on patrilineal conceptions of descent. This, in addition to the fact that interviewees expressed the view that family names do not change, sheds emphasis on the father’s role as a transmitter of a sort of ‘fixed’ ethnic narrative, according to interviewees’ accounts. The structures that force women into this marginal position, in terms of the preservation of group identity, can be broken into three dimensions: ‘Arab’ or Circassian culture, religion, and state-imposed-policies.

Culture, religion and state-imposed policies provide the basis for patrilineages to find the grounds to prosper and sustain in the Middle East
and this was evident as the patrilineal family structure is seen as unchangeable by interviewees. Differences based on gender-relations are utilised by Circassian interviewees to facilitate drawing their own ethnic boundaries, and showing the superiority of their culture. Interviewees, however, rarely referred to similarities between them and the ‘Arabs’, other than those related to sharing a land, civil rights and religion. Aspects of culture and traditions in common to both communities were normally ignored, as interviewees were seeking elements of group distinctiveness. Those similarities between both cultures are somehow taken for granted, and not seen as significant, because people see them as changeable. Family names are considered part of an unchangeable cultural heritage for men. However, for women, in both the ‘Arab’ and the Circassian cultures, it is changeable. Therefore, more women questionnaire respondents agreed with the statement ‘my origin does not reflect my identity’. This is because women in the patrilineal kinship system are often seen as temporary members of their family, because they become part of the husband’s family after marriage (Kendall, 2008), even if origin does matter for them. It has been established that ‘In the Arab context descent through the male line determines one’s primary identity throughout one’s life’ (Joseph, 1996b: 15). However, this changes for women after marriage, because keeping and transferring family names is impossible. Interviewees explained that this is the norm, and that it is not strange; it is part of both cultures, ‘Arab’ and Circassian. Also, interviewees said that religion emphasises that children follow their fathers’ name not their mothers. It should be noted, though, that despite the fact that interviewees with non-Circassian mothers feel that they are inadequately Circassian, they still insist that they are Circassians, because of their father’s family names.

Moreover, interviewees also referred to state policies as part of the structures that do not allow women to transmit their identity to their children. Atef (39, male) said ‘a woman cannot give children a family name by law. Jordan does not allow women to pass citizenship to their children if married to a foreigner… I believe that
this is the right way to do it. I am Circassian like my father’. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is signatory to the CEDAW\textsuperscript{16} Convention, unfortunately it is one of the states which has reservations on Articles 9.2, 16(1-c-d-g), and 15.4, which are related to nationality, marriage and family relations, and freedom of movement. Law in Jordan states clearly that a woman cannot pass citizenship to her children and husband, and the state retains the right to withhold citizenship rights for women who are married to non-Jordanian nationals.

Such practices and associated narratives do not only marginalise the role a Circassian woman plays in transmitting ethnicity, but also places her in a precarious status. As a Circassian and a woman, Circassian women’s identity is more fluid than men Circassians, because women lose their family names after marriage. This, additionally, seems to add to the hardship Circassian women face in terms of the preservation of their precarious identity, and for that reason women find it harder to transmit ethnicity. It might be because the state of Jordan excludes women from transferring their citizenship and family names to their children, that Circassian women believe they belong to Circassia more than Jordan. And, it is for that reason that they still believe in the ‘dream homeland’ (Nuha, 22, female; Muna, 22, female; Thuraya 38, female; and Rana 36, female). Thuraya (38, female) said ‘Circassia is my dream homeland, I do not know it but it is in my heart! I can never be a pure Jordanian. I carry my father’s Circassian family name, and my children carry their father’s Circassian family name’.

\textsuperscript{16} Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
Conclusion

As some of the ethnic narratives the interviewees (re)constructed to define their ethnicity included gender relations within the Circassian community, this has its implications on women, such as imposing control over women in the name of protecting family honour. For example, the fact that Circassian women constitute a great part of their families’ honour, and that gender relations are used as ethnic identity markers, legitimises men’s control of Circassian women. Further, Circassian women are expected to preserve their families’ honour throughout their contacts, and behaviour outside the house. And this also amplifies women’s duties, as they are expected to represent their community outside the house. Therefore, control over women, women’s clothing and women’s sexuality by their male relatives is practised in many cases using the excuses that the ‘Arabs would not understand’ their ‘openness’. Although many of the ways in which gender relations were used by interviewees to (re)construct their ethnicities might not be based on ‘real’ differences between them and the ‘Arabs’, their use was relational and always compared to the other. Despite this use of gender relations in the Circassian community as ethnic narratives, and markers of group identity, the prevention of women from transferring family names, which are an important part of ethnic narratives, is a Circassian, as well as ‘Arab’ practice, and one which is also reinforced by the state of Jordan.

The patrilineal kinship system overshadows the role women play in preserving the identity of their group. In addition to the domestic household chores, Circassian women are expected to be responsible for the upbringing, transmitting the culture, teaching the language and representing their community publicly. Moreover, the strict age-group segregation in Circassian culture applies to fathers, but not to mothers, placing women and children in the same category. Regardless of all the responsibilities and roles shouldered by Circassian women, by law and by culture, they are not allowed to transfer their family names, nor even their
citizenship. They are there to serve a duty, and fulfil the expectations of their male relatives and of the wider Circassian community.

The patrilineal social system of kinship marginalises women, and obscures the tremendous roles they undertake throughout their lives. This could explain why the majority of women believed that preserving their identities as Circassians is hard. Also, when the state itself does not provide equal rights to men and women, women, whether Circassian or ‘Arab’, would undoubtedly feel excluded from the public sphere, and thus would not have the same degree of belonging to the ‘nation’ as men. This could explain why women Circassian respondents were less likely to believe that they are of Jordanian origin, and were more likely to believe in their ‘dream homeland’, Circassia. The role the state plays in marginalising women, and confining them to the private sphere, is briefly explored in the next chapter on the state of Jordan and its national narratives. The following chapter discusses textbooks of national and civic education, in addition to the Jordan First campaign. The chapter focuses on the narratives the state of Jordan promotes in relation to its nationalism. It also explores how research participants feel about those narratives, and how they (re)construct them in their own words and views. The next chapter attempts to answer two questions. Firstly, what are the nationalist narratives and ideologies the state of Jordan promotes through ‘Jordan First’ and textbooks of national and civic education? And secondly, how do research participants make sense of and reconstruct state narratives?
Chapter Six

State Narratives under Scrutiny

Introduction

As one of the aims of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the state of Jordan and the Circassian community in terms of narratives of nationalism and ethnicity, this chapter looks at the nationalist narratives promoted by the state of Jordan, through the perception of research participants. In the previous chapters, I identified the narratives research participants use to define their ethnicity, and the gendered aspects of those narratives. This chapter identifies narratives of nationalism promoted by the state of Jordan, and shows how those narratives are gendered, and how gender relations constitute part of those narratives. In addition to that, it identifies how the narratives themselves are (re)constructed and (re)configured by research participants to place themselves in the country. This chapter is based on the data provided in textbooks of national and civic education, and the Jordan First nationalist campaign official documents, which constitute the platform through which the state of Jordan promotes and defines its nationalism. Interviews and questionnaires are used to demonstrate how research participants (re)construct narratives of state nationalism.

Like the ethnic narratives of the Circassian community, the narratives of state nationalism in Jordan are often used to emphasise primordial ties to a ‘nation’, and in this case it has often been the ‘Arab’ nation. On the one hand, interviewees’ use of narratives is often in relation to the other ‘Arab’. On the other hand, narratives promoted by the state of Jordan focus on the distinctiveness of the ‘Arab’ nation. Also, many of the ethnic narratives identified by research participants are related to gender relations, and gender relations, when compared to the ‘Arabs’, seemed to serve Circassian research participants an opportunity to emphasise the boundaries of their group. The state of Jordan also resorts to gender relations as part of its
nationalist narratives, and describes the ‘Arab’ nation in terms of gender relations. State nationalist narratives in many cases have exclusionary effects on women in general, and on Circassians in particular. There is a contradiction between the narratives the interviewees used to define their ethnicity, and the narratives the state of Jordan uses to define its nation. However, meanings of the nation are often (re)constructed and (re)configured, and although the state of Jordan might define its nation as ‘Arab’, people contribute to the (re)construction and (re)configuration of the nation as well. For that reason, the understanding of the Jordanian state nationalist narratives should be accompanied by an exploration of how people themselves, and in the case of this research, the Circassian research participants, make sense of those narratives and how they (re)define them. Therefore, this chapter explores the official national identity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the (re)construction of research participants to the nationalist narratives promoted ‘from above’, through civic and national education curriculum, the ‘Jordan First’ national campaign, and the official webpage of King Abdullah II and King Hussein of Jordan.

The following sections identify two main forms of narratives of nationalism promoted and utilised by the state of Jordan. The narratives are about Jordanianism, what it means to be a Jordanian, and the official definition of the state and its citizens. The very meaning of Jordanianism is constructed of two main ideologies, ‘pan-Arabism’, and pan-Islamism, it is gendered, and gender constitutes part of the narrative itself, as will be explained later. The other part of the narratives relates to symbols of the state- the Hashemites and the land, which also symbolise pan-Islamism and ‘pan-Arabism’. Because state narratives are also contextualised and relational, so what might be promoted in Jordan, might not be promoted to the international community. It is important to clarify that the narratives identified in this chapter are promoted on street level, to the people of Jordan.
6.1 Deconstructing Jordanianism

‘Nationalism is simultaneously both ideological and utopic narrative. All nationalism. It seeks to contain the present as it constructs a legitimating past... a crucial part of negotiating nationalism, literally and figuratively, is located in a critical understanding of the complexity of this narrative process and in the construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction of (perhaps only parts of?) the dominant national narrative’ (Layoun, 1999: 94).

As boundaries of nations are generally fluid, nationalist narratives of the state are often (re)constructed. The promotion of state narratives can take place through media, education, and also through things like street banners. During my stay in Jordan, and through exposure to TV advertisements, banners on the streets, and the analysis of the textbooks of national and civic education, I have identified two main narratives the state of Jordan attempts to promote as the official state identity. Those narratives relate to ‘Pan-Arabism’, and Pan-Islamism, emphasising the former, and overlooking the latter. The ‘Pan-Arabist’ narrative focuses on ethnicising ‘Arabism’, with stress on the culture, ranging from gender relations in and outside the household to respecting elders, and emphasising the importance of kith and kin.

Understanding ‘Arabism’ and Islamism as national narratives depends to a great extent on understanding the development of those narratives.

‘Jordan is an indivisible part of the Arab and Islamic nation. Hence, its national identity is Arab just as Islam is the faith of the nation, the fountainhead of its civilisation and the source of values which govern its conduct’ (The Jordanian National Charter, 1990) (Original English).

For a very long period of time, Jordan remained under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, until the Great Arab Revolt in 1916. Jordan went through several transformations, starting from naming the area, to modernisation and reform processes. Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Jordan came under
British rule, along with the occupied Palestinian territories; they constituted the British mandate of Palestine. In 1923, Britain granted Abdullah I nominal governance over the area under the name of the Emirate of Transjordan. He remained the Emir of Transjordan under British mandate until 1946, and later became King of Transjordan, which encompassed the territories of the West Bank, Gaza, Israel, and Jordan. In 1949, following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Abdullah became king of what is now known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, deriving its name from the ruling Hashemite dynasty, originating from the Hejaz region in Saudi Arabia (Anderson, 2001, Simon, 1974). It has been argued that the Hashemites, 'constructed a reality they wanted the new Jordanian citizens to accept, namely the legitimacy of Hashemite rule and the state boundaries drawn by the British colonizers. The purpose was to envision a Jordanian “imagined community” radiating out from and dependent upon the Hashemite kings’ (Anderson, 2001: 5).

Textbooks of national and civic education clarify the Hashemites’ position, and the basis of their ideologies. They also show that being Jordanian to a great extent depends on loyalty towards the Hashemites, as the founders of the state, and its national narratives. The Hashemites promote narratives about themselves as the ‘founding fathers’ of Jordan and ‘Pan-Arabism’ as the ethnicity of the people of Jordan.

However, one may wonder how a family from the Hejaz region was able to rule an area they had no previous linkages with. Several authors explain this through identifying the social structures the Hashemites tend to promote and enforce upon the population of Jordan. Anderson (2001), for example, does this by providing an analysis of Jordanian textbooks, and an unpacking of the Hashemites’ nationalist ideology. It has been concluded, on several occasions, that the Hashemites make use of ‘Pan-Arabism’ and Islamic laws to create Jordanian nationalism that is relevant to that area (Anderson, 2001, Anderson, 2002, Massad,
2001). Many of these studies identify what the Hashemites promote to legitimise their sovereignty, but what they do not pay attention to, however, is the way in which what they promote is (re)constructed by social actors.

Jordan, like many other nation-states in the Middle East, uses both Pan-‘Arabism’ and territorial nationalism as its official nationalist identity. For example, the official name of Egypt is the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Syria’s official name is the Syrian Arab Republic. It has been noted that nation-states in the Middle East have a dual character, one that is based on ‘Arabism’, on the one hand, and territorial nationalism on the other. In Arabic, ‘Pan-Arabism’ is Pan-nationalism, referred to, as Qawmeyah, and the other is territorial nationalism, referred to as wataneyah (Anderson, 2002). Qawmeyah, derived from the word Qawm meaning the people in Arabic, includes all ‘Arabs’ scattered around the Middle East. Wataneyah, on the other hand, derived from the word watan meaning the homeland, refers to the territory of the homeland, rather than the people. Therefore, Jordanianism is about a form of wataneyah and, at the same time, ‘Pan-Arabism’ and Pan-Islamism are part of the nationalist narratives promoted by the state of Jordan. Although much of the focus of those narratives is on ‘Pan-Arabism’, the Hashemites also claimed the throne in Jordan through promoting the fact that they are the legitimate descendents of the prophet, which gives them legitimacy to rule (Appendix F, Hashemite Family Tree). Due to the history of Islam in the region, and the fact that Islam had been used for long during the Ottoman Empire, and before, as a form of nationalist identity to unify diverse ethnic groups and nations, Pan-Islamism remains part and parcel of how the people define themselves, within their territories, and some parts of the ‘Arab’ World still consider it an ideology of unification. The narrative of ‘Arabism’ is also gendered and gender relations are used as markers of state official identity, as explained in the following sections.

17 In 1958, Syrian and Egyptian officials merged Syria and Egypt, under the name of the United Arab Republic, headed by Jamal Abdel Nasser. However, this unity failed in 1961.
18 The Arab World refers to Arabic speaking countries
6.1.1 Pan-Nationalism: Jordan’s ‘Pan-Arabist’ Qawmeyah

‘It is associated with our deep conviction that the survival of this (Arab) nation, and its resurgence, as well as the assumption of its rightful place among other nations, is closely linked to its comprehensive unity. For the Arab nation to be capable of contributing and taking the initiative rather than being at the receiving end of events, and to participate rather than react, it should be acting as one, deserving of its national heritage, and its proud glories, through the resumption of constructive contribution and participation in the progress of humanity as one cohesive nation’ (Original English).

King Hussein’s Address on the Eve of the General Elections
Amman
October 7, 1989 (The Royal Hashemite Court, 2001)

In 1916, the Hashemite Sheriff Hussein bin Ali started the Great Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule over the area of the Middle East. The basis of the revolt was to secure the area’s independence from the Ottoman Turks, aiming at creating a single unified ‘Arab’ state, through, as historical sources cite, entering an alliance with ‘the British and the French’ (Halliday, 2000b: 208). By 1918, the ‘Arabs’, led by the Hashemites, succeeded in overthrowing the Ottomans, hoping to achieve their dream of a united ‘Arab’ state. Unfortunately, their conquest had been taken by the British, who were supposed to only help the ‘Arabs’, and not take possession of their territories. The British and the French allies granted the Hashemites nominal rule over selected areas in the Middle East. Later in its history, British and French withdrawal from the Middle East led to the creation of separate ‘Arab’ states. However, at that time, ‘Pan-Arabism’ came as a form of nationalism to replace another Pan-nationalist ideology, Pan-Islamism. ‘Pan-Arabism’ is a form of cultural nationalism that celebrates ‘Arab nationalism,’ and the origins of ‘Arabs’, despite the presence of ‘non-Arabs’ in the Middle East such as the Kurds and Circassians.

The fall of the Ottoman Empire resembles the fall of the Holy Roman Empire, which came ‘as a reaction to centralised international authority. Its establishment,
which many writers date from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, constituted a rejection of the universalist pretensions of the Holy Roman Empire... to defend the sovereignty and independence of separate states’ (Nau and Lester, 1985: 44). However, in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the challenge had been the creation of a different form of separate states—states based on the notion of ‘Arabism’. In 1952, the term ‘Arab’ appeared for the first time in the Jordanian constitution, as a way of ‘defining the state’s supranational identity’ (Massad, 2001: 40). At the same time, the constitution set definitions of the state’s cultural, religious, and linguistic identities; ‘the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an independent Arab state... Islam is the state religion and Arabic its official language’ (ibid: 40). Although, the main official narratives about the identity of the state are ‘Pan-Arabism’, and Islamism, they are always used in reference to the Hashemites and their achievements. For example, books of national and civic education to a great extent portray the Great Arab Revolt, as the greatest legacy of the Hashemites, and a point of pride for the Jordanian nation. At the same time, they also portray the Hashemites as ‘the fathers’ and the protectors of ‘Arab’ identity (Twelfth grade textbooks, taught to 18 year old students). There is no unit, in the books of national and civic education, which explains the concepts ‘Pan-Arabism’ and Islamism as the official state identity; however, the terms are frequently used as part and parcel of ‘the Hashemite ideology’ (Twelfth grade textbooks, taught to 18 years old). Further, in textbooks the term ‘Arab’ is often used to refer to the people of Jordan, who allegedly attained independence from the Ottomans through the Great Arab Revolt led by the Hashemite Sheriff Hussein. Additionally, the most confusing part of the nationalist narratives identified in the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign and books of national and civic education is that all the narratives about the state’s official identity revolve around the Hashemites. They explicitly suggest that the Hashemite family is the major pillar of the state, not the people or the land, and implicitly suggest that they are the basis of ‘Pan-Arabism’. For example, in the first grade at the age of six, students are expected to read and memorise this paragraph,
‘The Hashemite family led the Arab nation, and established the Arab glory since the days of the old Arab tribe Quraish. The Arab tribe Quraish was a very well respected and a powerful tribe in the Arabian peninsula. The Hashemites service of the holy sites in Mecca and Madina lasted for centuries and history tells of the Hashemites and of their state building, as well as their endeavours to achieve Arab independence, sovereignty and dignity’ (Original Arabic) (First grade textbook taught to students aged six).

In the educational scheme of second grade national and civic education in Jordan under the Homeland theme, pupils (aged seven) are expected to name the leader of the Great Arab Revolt, and recognise his picture, highlight and value the role of Sharif Hussein, memorise the slogan of the Great Arab Revolt and follow it, draw in colours the flag of the Great Arab Revolt, and compare it to the flag of Jordan. For the fourth grade Homeland theme, pupils (aged nine) are expected to recognise the importance of Jordan’s belonging to its Arabic nation, become aware that borders between ‘Arab’ countries are fictitious, be aware of the importance of ‘Arab’ cooperation and autonomy, and identify Jordan’s role in supporting its ‘Arab brothers’. In the fifth grade under the theme National Security and International Peace, students (aged ten) are supposed to be acquainted with Jordan’s regional ‘Arab’ role in peacekeeping. In the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth grades under the theme Jordan’s Cultural History, pupils (aged 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15) are expected to clarify the importance of Arab-Islamic role in shaping the cultural character of the region and value it, and value ‘Arab’ and Muslim civilisation’s contribution to human civilisation. In the twelfth grade, students (aged 18) are taught, under a theme called the Hashemites (position and ideologies), reasons, aims and results of the Great Arab Revolt, and the value and the significance of the Hashemites’ role in the modern ‘Arab’ Renaissance (See Appendix E for units details).

Despite the fact that throughout history the dream of a united ‘Arab’ state has been impossible to fulfil, students in Jordanian schools are taught that borders
between ‘Arab’ countries are fictitious because all ‘Arabs’ belong to one nation, under which umbrella they are divided into separate states according to the land they occupy. Each ‘Arab’ state in the Middle East embraces the notion of ‘Pan-Arabism’ in reference to the nation, and the official name of each country refers to the territory it is occupying. ‘Pan-Arabism’ refers to the ‘Arab’ people, while territorial nationalism, such as Jordanianism refers to the territory on which Jordan had been established. ‘Arabism’ and Islamism are often used to describe the cultural character of the people, the cultural heritage, the language, as well as authenticity. For example, students are taught the importance of kith and kin, and gender relations in ‘Arab’ societies.

In chapter five, gendered ethnic narratives and ethnicised gender narratives of the Circassian community were identified. In textbooks of national and civic education narratives of gender relations are also ethnicised, and narratives of ethnicity are also gendered. In other words, state promoted nationalist narratives are based on ethnicity, i.e. the ‘Arab’ nation is constructed as an ethnic group. Thus, the view that ‘Arabism’ is an ethnicity makes the official nationalist identity of the state ethnonational, and that has gender implications. In other words, like the case with the narratives of ethnicity the research participants used, narratives of ‘Arabism’ ‘from above’ reinforce the idea that women’s role is bringing up the children, teaching them cultural practice, etc. Also, to distinguish the ‘Arab’ nation from others, the rights and duties of women in Islam, which is seen as part of the ‘Arab’ tradition, are discussed and contrasted with women’s rights according to international conferences and decrees. This shows that narratives of nationalism are constructed and contextualised like ethnic narratives, and are used in relation to the other, and to distinguish one ‘nation’ from another, or to define one state from ‘others’. Gender relations, and specifically the preservation of the family unit, are given particular attention in textbooks of national and civic education. The units relating to the family are under the heading ‘family and town’. First, second, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and eleventh grade students, aged six, seven, eight,
nine, 12, 14, 15 and 17, learn about the importance of the family and the town, in terms of social relations, roles and responsibilities of family members, importance of ties with neighbourhood members, and ‘authenticity’. Those themes are always portrayed as part of the ‘Arab’ culture, and Islamic traditions, ‘which constitute the basis of Jordanian society’ (Fourth grade).

Those themes help in reinforcing gender hierarchy and a gender division of labour, of women being carers and men being breadwinners for their households. For example, first grade students are taught to differentiate between the role of their fathers and mothers within the household; fathers as heads of the household and breadwinners, and mothers as carers. This reinforces the gender hierarchy and the ascribed gender roles within the family unit, attributed to ‘Arab’ culture, amongst students. And, this also emphasises the importance of the family unit as the main base of social organisation in Jordanian society. The family unit is often used as a narrative to distinguish the Arabic society from others, and this is emphasised in textbooks of national and civic education. However, the arguments develop as students go on to later grades, to include women’s rights inside the family.

This is all put in the context of nationalist narrative, and a marker of ‘authenticity’ of Jordanian society. The preservation of gender hierarchy and the family unit, as part of Arabic culture, are talked about as if they are necessary to preserve Jordanian society itself. For example, students are taught the difference between the nuclear family and the extended family, and they learn that interconnectivity with their extended families is very important for their wellbeing. The use of gender as a narrative of nationalism has its implications for women, and at the same time seen as a fundamental component of nationalism in ‘Arab’ countries. Most importantly, the insistence on preserving the family unit through promoting it as a national narrative places women under certain rules, and roles, that are seen as vital for the survival of the whole society. Barakat (1993), for example, says,
‘The Arab family may be described as the basic unit of production and the centre of Arab social organisation and socioeconomic activities. It… [is] a patriarchal, pyramidally hierarchical (particularly with respect to sex and age)…’ (ibid: 97).

He goes on to explain that this view of the family unit makes family members responsible for each other’s behaviour, and this makes control over women and children justified on the level of society and the state, because men’s ascribed roles as heads of households give them power and control over women. Sharabi (1988) explains why the family unit is very important for rulers in ‘Arab’ states. He says,

‘The nation as family, a metaphor very dear to Arab rulers-revolutionary, conservative, and semi-tribal alike - is the trans-ideological model of authority common to all neopatriarchal regimes, regardless of ideology or socioeconomic system... the same authoritarian vertical relations existed everywhere, preventing genuine social integration and keeping the majority of the population outside the mainstream of social and political life’ (Sharabi, 1988: 132-3).

The preservation of hierarchal relations within the family unit helps to reinforce hierarchal relations in the public sphere, with rulers at the top of the pyramids, thus excluding the majority of the population.

Using gender relations as a narrative promoted by the state to define the boundaries of its nation serves the state of Jordan in promoting a form of nationalism that is based on Arabic culture. The exclusion of women from the public sphere, as part of the family unit narrative, is also supported by laws that strengthen patriarchal structures in the society, such as civil status laws (El-Azhary Sonbol, 2003). Further, the patrilineal kinship system of the ‘Arab’ society, as explained in chapter five, is also given particular attention in textbooks of national and civic education, as part of Arabic culture, and as a marker of nationalism. The texts bring up the patrilineal kinship system by shedding light on the importance of the extended family in individuals’ lives, as part of Arabic culture and ‘authenticity’. In the seventh grade, students, aged 11, read, ‘the family is the basic unit of society…
the preservation of the authentic form of the family is important for preserving authentic Arab and Islamic traditions’ (seventh grade, students aged 11).

Textbooks of national and civic education serve as a platform to define what is meant by ‘Arabism’, and the reference to Arabic culture, the importance of kith and kin, contribute to making the narrative of ‘Arabism’ an ethnic one. However, the ways people reconstruct those narratives are different. As previously mentioned, students are expected to identify the picture of Sharif Hussein, the leader of the Great Arab Revolt, amongst other ‘Arab’ figures. In an attempt to evaluate the extent to which these books are able to deliver their message to ‘non-Arab’ Circassians, questionnaire respondents were asked to choose a name for the picture of the following personalities; Abdelqader al-Husaini, who is a Palestinian activist, King Abdullah I, and King Hussein bin Talal. Surprisingly, only 3.2 percent of the total respondents got the wrong name for the Palestinian activist, Abdelqader al-Husaini, while 21 percent and 19.3 percent of them responded incorrectly for the pictures of King Abdullah I, and King Hussein bin Talal respectively (Tables 6.1, 6.2 & 6.3).

Table (6.1) Who is in the following picture ‘picture of Abdelqader al-Husaini’?

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Percentages</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong Answer</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
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Table (6.2) Who is in the following picture (picture of King Abdullah I)

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<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong Answer</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (6.3) Who is in the following picture (picture of King Hussain bin Talal)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong Answer</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Additionally, questionnaire respondents were asked to choose the flag, from the flags of Jordan, of the Adyghe (the flag of the Circassian people), and of the Great Arab Revolt, that represented their *Qawmeyah* (a term used to refer to nationalism in relation to the people or an ethnic group); none of them chose the flag of the Great Arab Revolt, and the majority of respondents chose the Adyghe flag (Table 6.4). Circassian respondents are evidently more likely to choose the Adyghe flag to represent their people. This is because the concept of ‘Arabism’ is based on ethnicity, and most research participants did not identify with it. However, on the question of which flag represents your *Wataneyah* (a term used to refer to nationalism in relation to a territory), the majority chose the flag of Jordan, while none chose the flag of the Great Arab Revolt (Table 6.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (6.4) Which of the following flags represents your <em>Qawmeyah</em>?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Answer</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag of Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adyghe Flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag of the Great Arab Revolt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag of Jordan and the Adyghe Flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (6.5) Which of the following flags represents your <em>Wataneyah</em>?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Answer</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag of Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adyghe Flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag of the Great Arab Revolt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag of Jordan and the Adyghe Flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In feedback to the questionnaire, many respondents expressed that they did not recognise the flag of the Great Arab Revolt, and many said they had not seen it
before, although students are expected to recognise it from early stages in their school life. Moreover, respondents were also asked which flag represented their homeland. While no one chose the flag of the Great Arab Revolt, and respondents were divided between the Adyghe (flag of the Circassian people) and the Jordanian flags (Table 6.6).

Table (6.6) Which of the following flags represents your homeland?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Men Numbers</th>
<th>Men Percentages</th>
<th>Women Numbers</th>
<th>Women Percentages</th>
<th>Total Numbers</th>
<th>Total Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flag of Jordan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adyghe Flag</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag of the Great Arab Revolt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag of Jordan and the Adyghe Flag</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement ‘the Arab world is my Homeland’, respondents were more likely to disagree; 48.4 percent of them disagreed and 29 percent of them neither agreed nor disagreed (Table 6.7). However, women were more likely to agree with the statement, 34.6 percent compared with 13.9 percent of men. This reflects different views between male and female Circassian respondents.

Table (6.7) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘the Arab world is my homeland’?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Men Numbers</th>
<th>Men Percentages</th>
<th>Women Numbers</th>
<th>Women Percentages</th>
<th>Total Numbers</th>
<th>Total Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although a great part of the national and civic education schemes in Jordan depends on promoting a ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist narrative to students, this seems to
have failed among the ‘non-Arab’ Circassian research participants, who do not consider themselves part of the *Qawm*, the nation. As citizens of Jordan, Circassians do not consider themselves part of the ‘Arab’ nation, although ‘Pan-Arabism’ is the state’s supranational identity. Around 93.6 percent of respondents agreed to the statement Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country, and none of them disagreed (Table 6.8). This shows that respondents recognise Jordan as an ‘Arab’ country, and ‘Pan-Arabism’ as the state’s pan-national identity. However, at the same time respondents did not associate themselves with the flag of the Great Arab Revolt, to represent their *Qawmeyah*, and that could be due to the fact that ‘Arabism’ is ethnically based, and the word *Qawmeyah* is associated with an ethnically related nation, hence why most respondents chose the Circassian Adyghe flag to represent their *Qawmeyah*.

| Table (6.8) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Jordan is an Arab country’? |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| **Answer**                                                   | **Men**                         | **Women**                       | **Total**                       | **Men**                         | **Women**                       | **Total**                       |
|                                                             | **Numbers**                     | **Percentages**                 | **Numbers**                     | **Percentages**                 | **Numbers**                     | **Percentages**                 |
| Strongly Agree                                               | 21                              | 58.4%                           | 14                              | 53.8%                           | 35                              | 56.5%                           |
| Agree                                                        | 12                              | 33.3%                           | 11                              | 42.3%                           | 23                              | 37.1%                           |
| Neither Agree or Disagree                                    | 3                               | 8.3%                            | 1                               | 3.9%                            | 4                               | 6.4%                            |
| Disagree                                                     | 0                               | 0%                              | 0                               | 0%                              | 0                               | 0%                              |
| Strongly Disagree                                            | 0                               | 0%                              | 0                               | 0%                              | 0                               | 0%                              |
| Total                                                        | 36                              | 100%                            | 26                              | 100%                            | 62                              | 100%                            |

Interviews provided more elaboration on respondents’ attitudes towards ‘pan-Arabism’, the ‘Arabs’, and the Great Arab Revolt. The greatest proportion of interviewees referred to the Great Arab Revolt as a change in history which does not involve them, as they do not consider themselves ‘Arabs’. For example, Nuha stated,

‘I consider myself Jordanian, but I have a problem if I am seen as an Arab. For me, when someone asks me, I say that I do not have Arabic roots, I have a Jordanian nationality, and I belong to Jordan; it is my home... The Great Arab Revolt does not concern me much, as a person. But, ok fine; they got their independence and everything, but good for them’ (Nuha, 22, female).

It is very important to note here that books of national and civic education, when explaining the impact of the Great Arab Revolt, mention that it provided the
basis for nation-state building in the whole of the ‘Arab’ World, implying that Jordan itself is a product of the Revolt. However, when asked if the Revolt triggers any feelings or emotions for them, all interviewees made it clear that it does not concern them, it does not trigger any emotions in them, and that it did not have an impact on them as Circassians. Eight interviewees mentioned that it had been a double edged sword for the ‘Arabs’, as it also allowed the British to colonise the land the ‘Arabs’ liberated from the Ottomans. Others mentioned that it is a Revolt, which was based on demanding freedom and rights, and for that reason they respect it but they do not have any emotions towards it. Moreover, two interviewees mentioned that Circassians played a role in the Great Arab Revolt, and supported the Hashemites in defeating the Turks. However, they mentioned different motives their ancestors had;

‘The Arab revolt is not part of my history; it is called the great Arab Revolt [with emphasis on Arab]. It is part of the history of the Watan I am living in, but this is not my history. The Circassians took part in the Arab revolt, but it was not that big of a role. They were there at that time, they did not do it for the Arabs; they mainly did it because throughout history the Turks betrayed Circassians’ (Tariq, 22, male).

Another interviewee also expressed,

‘The great Arab revolt is like any other revolt. It does not trigger any feelings for me. I respect any revolt if it is based on demanding rights, freedom, ending occupation and injustice. It is like any other revolt, and the world has seen many other revolts’ (Thuraya, 38, Female).

Although a significant part of the national and civic education schemes in Jordan attempt to enforce, under the ‘Homeland’ theme, the importance of the Great Arab Revolt, together with its flag and its slogan, Circassians do not identify with the Revolt as part of their history, and very few of them recognised its flag. Additionally, respondents preferred to look at Jordan as their Homeland, and rejected being part of the ‘Arab’ World. For example, Thuraya said,
'I can say that I prefer to call myself Jordanian-Jordanian, not Jordanian-Arab, or Jordanian-Muslim, because I do not prefer to be an Egyptian-Arab, or an Algerian-Arab, or a Moroccan-Arab. If they make me choose between other nationalities, in addition to Jordanian, I would only take a passport that is Caucasian' (Thuraya, 38, Female).

In addition to books of national and civic education, within the official document of the Jordan First nationalist campaign it is also mentioned that although Jordan First includes a philosophy that places Jordan’s interests at the forefront,

‘The philosophy does not fall back on issues of concern to the Arab Nation, or isolate the country from the wider Islamic circle, in the focal point of which Jordan, under the Hashemites, has always been. According to the Constitution, the Jordanian people are “part of the Arab Nation” and “Islam is the religion of the State”’ (MOFA, 2004) (Original English).

However, interviewees who consider themselves Jordanians of Circassian origins all expressed that they did not feel that they are part of the ‘Arab’ nation, despite the fact that the state of Jordan defines itself in terms of ‘Pan-Arabism’. Textbooks of national and civic education, in addition to the Jordan First campaign, apparently succeed in emphasising the idea that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country, and that its nationalism is based on the narrative of ‘Arabism’, as an ethnicity and culture. For that reason, research participants’ ethnic narratives are different, and contradictory to those of the state of Jordan.

Perhaps the promotion of ‘Pan-Arabist’ narratives failed to create a sense of belonging towards the ‘Arab’ nation amongst research participants. Nonetheless, the narratives are (re)constructed by research participants, as part of a Jordanianism they do not identify with. Some respondents preferred to view the ‘Arabist’ narrative of the state in relation to language, rather than a bond of blood relations,
and that is explored in chapter seven. Although most research participants do not identify with the ‘Pan-Arabist’ narrative of the state, most of them mentioned that they identify more with the state’s religious identity, as part of the nationalist narratives promoted by the state of Jordan. So whilst the concept of ‘Arabism’ appeared throughout all units in the school textbooks of national and civic education, and Islam was not mentioned as a form of nationalist ideology, but rather mentioned to support the ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist ideology, research participants preferred to see Islam as a narrative of Jordanian nationalism.
6.1.2 Pan-Islamism: Overlooked ‘from above’, Emphasised ‘from Below’

‘My homeland is the Islamic world. I live in part of the Arab world, but for me Islam comes first... Jordan contains Muslims and Christians, but since the ruler is Muslim, the country is Islamic. The religion of the country is set according to the rulers. Jordan is an Islamic country, because the head of the state is a Muslim’ (Khairi, 77, male).

Khairi identifies himself as a Muslim, first and foremost, and he draws that as a point of similarity between him and the state of Jordan, which he sees as Islamic. Since the emergence of Islam, the Middle East, the Arabic speaking Muslim world, and the non-Arabic speaking Muslim world has witnessed shifts in terms of the form of collective identity shared by Muslims. As a starting point, Prophet Muhammad asked his followers to migrate, along with himself, from Mecca to Al-Medina erasing all the geographical and tribal boundaries that existed before. This represented a shift from tribal, national paradigms of communities to a community that ‘could strive to transcend this base tribalism in the name of a greater unity’ (Mandaville, 2002: 63).

The creation of such a unity meant that identities of Muslims have to be based, above all, on Islam, and that Islam supersedes all other forms of geographic, ethnic and national divisions amongst them, and labels its followers as ummah (Marranci, 2004). While the term itself had emerged by the mid 1870s (Qureshi, 1999), Pan-Islamism, the unifying notion of the Islamic ummah, as a phenomenon dates from the beginning of Islam (Ozcan, 1997).

The death of Prophet Muhammad, in 632 AD, did not mean the end of Islamic ummah as a form of collective identity, as Pan-Islamism paved the way for the creation of a state; the caliphate. The caliphate represents the political form of leadership of the ummah. Caliphates, headed by a caliph, or head of the state, started to exist straight after the death of Muhammad, and ended by the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The Caliphate governed the Muslim world, and constituted a form of a state, based on religion.
The main caliphates governing the Muslim world were the Rashidun from 632 to 661, the Umayyads between the 7th and the 8th centuries, the Abbasids, between the 8th and the 13th centuries, and the Shadow Caliphate, between the 13th and the 16th centuries, and finally, the Ottomans between the 16th and the 20th centuries. Several other Caliphates had also been established simultaneously with others, such as the Fatimids, who ruled Shiite Muslims between 909 and 1171. However, the right to a single state for Islamic ummah ended with the end of the Ottoman Empire that had been challenged by the rise of ‘Pan-Arabism’, triggered and inflamed by the Hashemite Sharif Hussein bin Ali.

‘Pan-Arab’ nationalist ideology had been criticised, as many looked at it as a divisive factor between the whole of the Muslim community or ummah. For example, Sayid Qutub, the founder of modern radical Islam, stated ‘I believe that the bonds of ideology and belief are sturdier than those of patriotism based upon region and that this false distinction among Muslims on a regional basis is but one consequence of crusading and Zionist imperialism which must be eradicated’ (Quoted in Mortimer, 1982: 271). Islamists, like Sayid Qutub, accused ‘Arab’ nationalists of following western ideals, and serving Zionism (Yom, 2005). On the other hand, ‘Arab nationalists have often considered Islam as a most valuable part of the heritage, turath, of the Arab nation alongside language’ (Zubaida, 2004: 407). Another ‘Arab’ nationalist, Rashid Rida, said,

‘The greatest glory in the Muslim conquests goes to the Arabs, and that religion grew and became great through them. Their foundation is the strongest, their light the brightest, and they are indeed the best ummah brought forth to the world a little knowledge of past and present history shows that most of the countries where Islam was established were conquered by the Arabs’ (Quoted in Haim, 1962: 22-3).

Despite the fact that many ‘non-Arabs’ contributed to the prospering of Islam throughout history, ‘Arab’ nationalists used this claim to religiously legitimise their
‘pan-Arabist’ nationalist movements, and emphasise the superiority of ‘Arab’ Muslims over ‘non-Arab’ Muslims.

Throughout the analysis of books of national education and the Jordan First campaign document, as well as the official website of King Abdullah II and King Hussein I, there was almost no mention of the Islamic ummah, or Pan-Islamism as a form of nationalist narrative. Islam has been, rather, used to define the state’s religion, and always in reference to Jordan’s Islamic heritage and laws. For example, in the sixth grade, students read,

‘The Arabs held the banner of Islam, and spread it around the world. They had the most prominent role in shaping the Islamic civilisations that persisted in the whole region’ (Sixth grade, taught to students aged 11).

In the first grade, under the Homeland theme, students are expected to become proud of their homeland and of its Arabic and Islamic community. In the fifth grade, under the theme Cultural History of Jordan, students are taught the importance of Jordan as a path for the armies of Islamic conquerors, and under the theme the ‘State of Jordan and its Institutions’, fifth, sixth, and tenth grade students are taught human rights and democracy under Islamic law. In the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth grades, under the theme Cultural History of Jordan, students are taught the importance of the Arab-Islamic role in shaping the civilisation characteristics of the region and value it. In the twelfth grade under the ‘Hashemites’ theme, students are expected to trace the Hashemites’ origins, and their position during pre-Islamic and Islamic periods, and they are taught the Hashemites’ role in terms of supporting Islam and valuing it.

In Jordan’s national and civic educational scheme, the Jordan First campaign, and on the official webpage of the kings, Islam is never mentioned in reference to the state’s official identity. This could be explained by the fact that the Hashemites founded Jordan on the ideology of ‘Pan-Arabism’ rather than Islamic ummah. Islam
is always mentioned in reference to the people’s religion, culture, heritage, laws, and history, as part of the ‘Pan-Arabist’ narrative of nationalism. Additionally, in textbooks of national and civic education, Islam, as a religion not as a national narrative, is used to justify the ‘Arabist’ tendency to preserve the family unit, and to maintain the hierarchical relations within the household. It became clear that books of national and civic education make use of verses in the Quran to support the narrative of ‘Pan-Arabism’.

However, questionnaire respondents and interviewees seemed to have another form of identification—one that is based on Islam, as a religion, an identity, and as part of the nationalist narrative of Jordan. The reconstructions of nationalist narratives seem to focus on using Pan-Islamism as an integral part of the narrative of Jordanianism rather than ‘Arabism’.

Asked to state to what extent they agree or disagree with the statements ‘my homeland is the Islamic World’ and ‘My Homeland is the Arab World’, questionnaire respondents were twice as likely to agree with the first statement. Around fifty four percent of respondents agreed that the Islamic world was their homeland, while 23 percent of them agreed that the ‘Arab’ world was their homeland (Tables 6.9 for ‘My homeland is the Islamic world’ and table 6.7 on page 221 for my ‘homeland is the Arab world.’)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.9</th>
<th>To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘My homeland is the Islamic world’?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Answer</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When asked to state to what extent they agreed with the statement that ‘Jordan is an Islamic country’, 76 percent of questionnaire respondents agreed, and only three percent disagreed (Table 6.10). However, questionnaire results revealed that 94 percent of respondents agreed with Jordan being an ‘Arab’ country, and none disagreed (table 6.8 on page 222). This, accompanied with very little mention of Islam in books of national and civic education, shows that Jordanian state is succeeding in delivering the message that Jordan adopts a ‘pan-Arabist’ nationalist ideology. Interviewees provided further elaboration on Islam being considered a source of identification between the Muslims. Whereas many respondents expressed that they see Islam as something shared between them, and the Jordanian majority, others expressed that their Islam is different from that of the ‘Arabs’. Moreover, many interviewees expressed that they would like to see a unified Islamic ummah, but for them it seems like a dream.

| Table (6.10) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Jordan is an Islamic Country’? |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Answer                                  | Men             | Women           | Total           |
|                                        | Numbers | Percentages | Numbers | Percentages | Numbers | Percentages |
| Strongly Agree                          | 11       | 30.6%       | 8        | 30.8%       | 19       | 30.6%       |
| Agree                                   | 16       | 44.4%       | 12       | 46.2%       | 28       | 45.2%       |
| Neither Agree or Disagree               | 7        | 19.4%       | 6        | 23%         | 13       | 21%         |
| Disagree                                | 2        | 5.6%        | 0        | 0%          | 2        | 3.2%        |
| Strongly Disagree                       | 0        | 0%          | 0        | 0%          | 0        | 0%          |
| Total                                   | 36       | 100%        | 26       | 100%        | 62       | 100%        |

Only two Interviewees did not see Jordan as an Islamic country, and their explanation was based on the fact that firstly it contains other religious minorities, and that it does not apply strict Shari’a laws, as Saudi Arabia does. For example, Nuha said,

‘I do not see Jordan as an Islamic country. It is supposed to be an Islamic country, because the Hashemites are descendents of the prophet, but the laws are not Islamic. The Jordanian
constitution is not Islamic at all, and religion for us is different from that of Arabs’ (Nuha, 22, female).

Adel (22, male), also, mentioned that he prefers not to call Jordan an Islamic country because that would mean the marginalisation of other religious groups. Interestingly, part of the upbringing of both Nuha and Adel had been in the USA and the UK, respectively, which might explain why they hold a different position from all other interviewees. Moreover, these two questionnaire respondents had English as their second language spoken at home. This might be because many of them probably have a more ‘modern’ secular view of the state in general. Adel, for example, said,

‘You know, now, we are all human, we live in a global village. Religion should not separate us and we should start thinking in more modern secular ways, because we have bigger issues, like global warming for example’ (Adel, 22, male).

Sharabi (1988) argues that in the ‘Arab’ world it is not possible to separate nationalism from religious identity because, in Jordan for example, the Hashemites derive their legitimacy from Islam, and this has kept them on the throne. He says,

‘No matter how “modern” neopatriarchal society becomes, the popular mass will continue to reject secular nationalism in practice, and to adhere to religious identity’ (Sharabi, 1988: 36).

All other interviewees believed that Jordan is an Islamic country, and defended its laws and rules, saying that Jordan does not have to apply all fundamental old Islamic rules and practices to be Islamic. Several mentioned that the fact that the Hashemites are descendents of the prophet suffice for Jordan to be considered Islamic, and others pointed out that many pieces of its laws follow Islamic rules, such as laws related to inheritance, marriage and divorce. In addition to that, many interviewees mentioned that one thing in common between them and the Jordanian majority is Islam. And, many of them mentioned that Pan-Islamism is more inclusive than ‘Pan-Arabism’ as a notion of belonging, as it does not
differentiate between people’s different origins, between ‘Arabs’ and ‘non-Arabs’. However, they said this from their own perspective, because they identify themselves as Muslims; they see pan-Islamism as more inclusive for them than ‘pan-Arabism’. Muna said,

‘I believe that the Islamic ummah is more comprehensive than the notion of an Arab nation. The term includes everyone. For example, I am not an Arab, and my roots and origins are not Arabic, but what unites me with the Arabs is Islam. The notion of Islamic ummah means a lot to me, as a religion and as a term. It is a more comprehensive notion’ (Muna, 22, female).

One of the main themes in books of national and civic education is students becoming proud of ‘Pan-Arabism’ and the Great Arab Revolt. Interviewees, in contrast, spoke about pride in Islam and the Islamic ummah.

‘The Islamic ummah is the most glorious nation on earth. It is the most glorious nation on planet earth, but they have to stick to their affiliation. But these days, they do not… I would really really love to see a unified Islamic ummah. Islam is a grand religion, it is glorious. I have a lot of Christian friends, and I hear them talk about their religion. Their religion has a message, but the message of Islam is a… I really cannot even describe it’ (Tariq, 22, male).

Qasim (22, male) also mentioned that he prefers to call himself a Muslim, rather than a Circassian or a Jordanian. He mentioned that he feels that he belongs to the nation of Islam, and he has a sense of loyalty towards it. However, interviewees also made it clear that they do not see a unity of Muslims around the world any time soon, because, according to them ‘Islam is hated,’ and because they live in a time of ‘economic ideologies and capitalism.’

Despite the fact that books of national and civic education, as well as the Jordan First campaign document, overlook the notion of Pan-Islamism, and attempt to promote a ‘Pan-Arab’ unity, all interviewees mentioned that they are proud of their Islamic affiliation. Moreover, Islam was been used by most Circassian
interviewees in reference to the shared characteristics between them and the ‘Arab’ majority in Jordan, whereas ‘Pan-Arabism’ is the main narrative the state of Jordan promotes. While interviewees showed that their (re)construction of Jordanianism is strongly linked to pan-Islamism, the state of Jordan uses Islam as a way to emphasise the ‘glory’ of the ‘Arab’ nation.

Furthermore, interviewees’ (re)construction of Jordanianism by emphasising the importance of Islam as part of the narratives of the state, which is not echoed in state promoted narratives, shows that their usage of Islam is related to them being Muslims, and feeling more included in an Islamic view of the state of Jordan. Data revealed other narratives used as symbolic narratives of Jordanianism, with which interviewees could identify and feel comfortable, as part of nationalist narratives. This, in opposition to ‘Pan-Arabism’, is not based on ethnonational narratives of the ‘Arabs’, which excludes Circassians by virtue of their origin. Those symbols of the state are mainly based on loyalty towards the Hashemites, and the land of Jordan.
6.2 Jordan: Symbols of the State

‘Jordan… a land of the free and the proud who bow their heads only to God; a land of responsibility whose people recognize balance in all things, especially between rights and obligations… a land of integrity enjoyed by every one of its own citizens, as well as by the free who seek its protection, and by the true who seek to join their people’s quest to preserve the nation’s right to life and to lead it out of its disarray, weakness, despair and loss, to forge a unified, free, dignified and immortal nation’ King Hussein’s Address to the Nation, Amman, November 5, 1992 (The Royal Hashemite Court, 2001) (Original English).

Narratives of Jordanian nationalism are based on ethnic narratives of the ‘Arab’ nation. However, and despite the recognition of research participants that those narratives are ethnic- ‘Pan-Arabist’, most of them choose to identify with the official religious identity of the state even with the overshadowing of Pan-Islamism in the literature under study. Moreover, symbols of the state of Jordan are also underlined in textbooks of national and civic education, as well as in the official document of the Jordan First national campaign. Those symbols relate to identification with the land of Jordan itself, and with the Hashemite family.

Six year old Jordanian students are taught, under the Homeland theme, symbols of the Homeland. These symbols, according to National and Civic education textbooks, include the King, the Royal Family, the land and its location, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s flag, the national anthem, national occasions such as Jordan’s independence day, and the King’s Birthday. Although those symbols are directly taught to first grade students, students are repeatedly and consistently reminded of them until they finish school. Every textbook of national and civic Education in Jordan includes at least one photograph of the King, Jordan’s map, and the flag. The front and the back covers of each book has a picture of the King, and the flag of Jordan.
Moreover, the morning routine in all public government schools includes reciting and listening to the national anthem, and raising the flag. Additionally, the initial logo of the Jordan First national campaign shows the flag of Jordan held by several hands. Several logos and advertisements later followed, which included a picture of the king, his children, and a map of Jordan made of the colours of the flag. Moreover, as illustrated in books of national and civic education, the national slogan of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is constituted of a trinity of God, the *Watan*, and the King. Moreover, according to Jordanian laws it is a national offence to curse the King or criticise him, but people are not prosecuted if they curse God. Cursing the King is considered high treason against the state.

It is important to note that symbols of the state such as the flag, the King and the national anthem are symbols that represent nationalist narratives of the state. An example of that is the composition of the flag of Jordan. The black line in the flag represents the Abbasid caliphates, the white the Umayyads flag, the green for the Fatimids, and the red stands for the Great Arab Revolt. The red triangle represents the Hashemite dynasty, the seven-edged star stands for the first *sura* in the Qur’an, which is constituted of seven verses, and the star’s central position is meant to reflect the aim of the Great Arab Revolt, to unify all ‘Arabs’.

The national anthem, on the other hand, also refers to the Hashemites’ ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist ideology, and the fact that the King comes from the dynasty of the prophet. It says,

Long live the King!
Long live the King!
His position is sublime,
His banners waving in glory supreme,
We achieved our goal,
On the day you gave us the mark,
A revolution gives us our motivation!
Flying over the shoulders of the highest comets,
Oh! You King of Arabs,
From the best prophet you have.
The honour of dynasty,
Talked about in the depths of books!
All the youthful men,
Are your armed armies
His determination never dies out…
Under your flying flag rests the glory of all Arabs.

Interestingly, when asked about what they see as representing the state, only some symbols of the state were mentioned by interviewees. Interviewees focused on the land, and the Hashemites as symbols of their loyalty towards the state. Only one interviewee mentioned the flag as something shared between him and the majority of Jordanians.

‘I feel great sense of loyalty towards this flag. The flag is a symbol of the state, I am very loyal to it, and I am willing to defend it. Actually, I happened to go through an incident where I had to defend it, and I had to take a stance in defending it. I see the flag as something in common between me and a native Jordanian, because a native Jordanian would also defend this flag by instinct. Other than something by instinct, I see defending this flag is a duty because it gave me a lot of things, it gave me privileges no other Circassian elsewhere in the world was given’ (Qasim, 22, male).

Symbols of the state, as mentioned in books of national education from the first grade to twelfth grade, definitely reflect the state’s ‘pan-Arabist’ nationalist narratives. Although, Circassian respondents didn’t seem to identify with the state’s ‘Pan-Arab’ nationalist ideology, many of them take pride in these symbols, and
consider them as an indivisible part of their lives, as well as the lives of the Jordanian majority. This further shows a tendency on the part of research participants to de-ethnicise these symbols, and strip them of the ‘Pan-Arabist’ narratives they represent. Although the state’s definition does not take into consideration ‘non-Arabs’ such as the Circassians, and the fact that these means of channelling the state’s ‘Pan-Arabist’ official identity and narratives, through books of national education and through national campaigns, overlook the importance of Pan-Islamism for Muslim minorities, research participants appeared to reconstruct those narratives in a way most suited for them. The promotion of such social-nationalist narratives is influenced by the social actors, who are at the receiving end of these channels. For that reason, one might argue that the success of these channels greatly depends on the people, who make sense of those narratives, and who find ways to incorporate and reconstruct them in their lives.
6.2.1 The Hashemites: Loyalty and Belonging

‘God only wishes to remove all abomination from you, ye Members of the Family, and to make you pure and spotless’ (The holy Quran, Surat Al-Ahzab – 33).

The Hashemites of Jordan consider themselves to be Members of the Family, meaning that they descend from the family of prophet Muhammed (Appendix F). In the twelfth grade, under the theme ‘the Hashemites’, students aged 18 are taught the importance of learning the Hashemites’ history and heritage, because of their origin and position in Islamic and pre-Islamic times, their role in supporting and valuing Islam, their national ideology, their role in the Great Arab Revolt, their position in the Palestinian struggle, their role in the modern Arab Renaissance, and their role in building modern Jordan. Under the same theme, students are taught the Hashemite national agreement, and their launching of the ‘Jordan First’ campaign. In the second and fourth grades, under the ‘Homeland’ theme, students are introduced to the Hashemites’ role in the building of modern Jordan. Moreover, several references to the Hashemites role in maintaining national and international security had been made under the theme ‘National Security and International Peace’.

The same material provided in books of national and civic education about the Hashemites is also available on the official website of King Abdullah II. One must also not forget that Jordan is named after the Hashemites—the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Emphasis on Jordan being Hashemite, and the Hashemites being members of the prophet’s family is evident throughout books of national and civic education, and the official website of King Hussein I, and King Abdullah II. Although the Jordan First national campaign document does not put much emphasis on the Hashemites themselves, the document emphasises the Hashemites’ unchanging ‘Pan-Arabist’ approach to regional issues.
Circassians, in Jordan, are known for their loyalty to the Hashemites, as they have been appointed as the ceremonial guards of the Hashemite family for decades, and they have been granted very high governmental positions. The first mayor of Amman, appointed by King Abdullah I, was Circassian. All interviewees expressed their love of, and loyalty to, the Hashemites. However, they all mentioned that they realise that no one in Jordan is considered Hashemite, although the state carries the Hashemites’ name. For example, Thuraya said,

‘We are all Jordanians here, but not Hashemite. This state is a monarchy, ruled by the Hashemites. If you ask me to whom I feel that I belong, to the Hashemites or to Jordanian, I would say that I belong more to the Hashemites. I feel that I really, really, belong to the Hashemites, I trust them blindly. We have been raised on this blind trust, since the time of King Hussein. We have faith in this family, this is for me, and I cannot speak for all Circassians. I am sure that most Circassians feel the same about belonging. We greatly belong to the state, and the rulers of the state’ (Thuraya, 38, female).

Interviewees also mentioned that they take pride in the fact that the Hashemites are descendents of the prophet, and that they built modern Jordan. Interviewees justified their loyalty to the Hashemites differently. Some of them justified it by emphasising that,

‘As I told you, when Circassians embraced Islam, they really clung to it. So, when King Abdullah I came to them and told them that he descends from the prophet, they respected and glorified him’ (Tariq, 22, male).

Although interviewees, who did not agree that Jordan is an Islamic country, saw no correlation between the Hashemites being descendents of the prophet, and the kingdom being Islamic, they mentioned that the Hashemites deserve respect for their role in Jordan and in the whole region. They also expressed that because they are the prophet’s descendents, they deserve to be respected. For example, Adel (22, male) explained that the Hashemites deserve respect for their role in Arabic and Islamic issues.
On the other hand, others explained Circassian closeness to the Hashemite family by mentioning Circassian attributes. For example, Asad (22, male) said that it is because of Circassians’ loyalty they are close to the Hashemite family. Others also mentioned that their love and loyalty towards the Hashemite family is because the Hashemite rulers of Jordan treated them well, and made them feel that they are no different to anyone else in the country.

‘We, Circassians, are known for our loyalty. And loyalty comes from love. And as Circassians, I never met a Circassian who does not like the Royal family; they adore them.... Not long time ago, I went to a Circassian concert. When Prince Ali went to greet the band, and he is the prince and not the king, we all stood up for him. But I stood up for him because I want to stand up for him. I felt happy for standing up for him, because he is proud of us and we are proud of him. We are proud of the King, and the King is proud of us. He appointed us as the royal guards, he does not trust anyone with his life the way he trusts us with his life’ (Qasim, 22, male).

For some interviewees, Circassians’ pride in the Hashemite family also comes from the policies they apply, in addition to the fact that they are Members of the Prophet Family.

‘The Hashemite family had never applied any sort of political or religious extremism, since King Abdullah I till now. I am proud that the Hashemites are descendents of the prophet, especially with the policies they are applying now. I am proud of them’ (Thuraya, 38, female).

Although the Hashemites attempt to portray themselves as ‘fathers’ and bearers of ‘pan-Arabism’ and Circassians do not identify with ‘pan-Arabism’, interviewees seemed to respect the Hashemites for several other reasons, and chose to ignore their ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist ideology. On the other hand, the state of Jordan promotes the idea that the land of Jordan is an ‘Arab’ land, and along with a primordial view of the ‘Arab’ nation, this implies an exclusion of those who do not consider themselves ‘Arabs’.
6.2.2 The Land

‘Democracy in Jordan has become an example and a model, a blessed tree deep-rooted in this beloved Arab land, with its branches reaching towards the horizon of the great homeland’


Jordan is an ‘Arab’ land, according to the Jordanian constitution and several references made by Jordan’s kings, bearers of ‘Pan-Arabism’. Throughout textbooks of national and civic education, students from the fifth to twelfth grades, are taught Jordan’s cultural history theme. One of the most important subthemes of Jordan’s cultural history is recognising Jordan’s Arabic character, and the impact of ‘Arab’ civilisation on the region. Although the land is portrayed in textbooks of national and civic education as an ‘Arab’ land, which was liberated from ‘non-Arabs’, interviewees seemed to ignore this and chose to strip the land from its association with ‘Arabism’. By doing so, research participants are viewing the land in non-primordial terms. This (re)construction of the concept of the land seems to be different between the state’s official documents and in the research participants’ views.

All interviewees mentioned that they share the land with the Jordanian majority, regardless of how the state of Jordan defines the land. Reference to the land, as the *watan*, was made by all interviewees. As shown in section 6.1, the word *watan* in Arabic refers to the territory where someone settles, regardless of origin. For that reason, *wataneyah* is different from ethnonational narratives of Jordanianism, and unlike *Qawmeyah*, which refers to the people, *wataneyah* is always in reference to sharing a territory. The narrative of the land as non-primordial also allowed research participants to identify more with the Hashemite Jordanian state, despite the attempts to promote an ethnic narrative of the land. Interviewees made it clear that they do not share the same *Qawmeyah* as the rest of the people in Jordan. However, when speaking about the land itself, they all mentioned that it is one of the shared
characteristics between them and native Jordanians. They mentioned that it is the land where they settled a long time ago, and to which they have much gratitude.

‘Wherever I settle is my ‘watan’—homeland. For that reason, wherever we go we belong to the country we settle in. My first and last belonging is to Jordan’ (Thuraya, 38, Female).

Many also explained that sharing the land is something that makes all Jordanians work for the sake of the country, more than ethnonational ideologies.

‘The thing in common between me and the Jordanian majority is that we all share the same land. I believe that no matter how much trouble there is between Jordanians and other groups, in the end each one believes that we live on the same land’ (Nuha, 22, female).

Khairi (77, male) said that he loves the land of Jordan, saying that when he was a farmer he became attached to the land itself, and this makes him Jordanian because of his love of the land. He exclaimed during the interview ‘My watan is Jordan. My watan is Jordan—oh how lovely it is!’ Husam (23, male), Adel (22, male), and Asad (22, male), also, explained that when they deal with ‘native Jordanians’, they simply forget about ethnicity, because for them the land is prioritised over ethno-nationalist ideologies. The same interviewees also elaborated that they share the same faith on this land, Jordan. However, they all were hesitant to decide to choose a homeland, between Jordan and Caucasia; they felt as though they were expressing contradictory feelings, which will be explained in the coming chapter.

‘Wataneyah, for me, is the love of the area where I lived in, in addition to my origins; they are both in my heart. I cannot choose one only’ (Atef, 39, male).

By referring to the land as separate from a nation that is primordially connected, research participants were seeking similarities, and commonalities, between them and the Jordanian majority. This reference to the land is made by stripping the land from ethnic and primordial meanings attached to it by the state of Jordan, which reinforces a ‘pan-Arabist’ narrative through its channels.
Conclusion

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan reinforces an ethnonational ‘pan-Arabist’ nationalist narrative through the ‘Jordan First’ national campaign document, textbooks of national and civic education, the websites of the Hashemite Kings, and the constitution. Retaining a ‘pan-Arabist’ narrative is apparently accompanied with an emphasis on Islamism as part of ‘Arabism’, because the ‘Arabs’ were the ones who allegedly held the banner of Islam. The emphasis on a ‘glorious’ ‘Arab’ nation serves the state of Jordan in defining its people as ‘Arabs’. Therefore, ‘Arabism’ seems to be, till this day, a dominant narrative of Jordanianism, and a defining element of the people of Jordan. In their (re)construction of the narratives of the state, interviewees leant towards emphasising Islam as a shared characteristic between them and the majority in Jordan, rather than ‘Arabism’. The majority of interviewees, in their (re)construction of Jordanianism, overemphasised an Islamist narrative, and overlooked the ‘pan-Arabist’ narrative in terms of defining themselves as part of the people of Jordan.

However, questionnaire respondents and interviewees also demonstrated recognition of the ‘pan-Arabist’ narrative promoted by the state. And, although their construction of their ethnic narratives depended on showing their distinctiveness compared to the ‘Arabs’, interviewees recognised that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ state, and yet they still showed belonging to the state of Jordan, by underlining symbols of the state and using them as a way to show the similarities between them and the majority in Jordan. The land and the Hashemite family were used by interviewees to explain their belonging and feelings towards Jordan. In spite of the state’s definition of the land as ‘Arab,’ and of the Hashemites as ‘fathers’ of the Great Arab Revolt, and bearers of ‘Arabism’, interviewees showed that their (re)construction of the concept of the land and of the Hashemites as well does not include the ‘Arabist’ narrative. Instead the Hashemites are seen as descendents of the prophet, which relates them to Islam, and the land as a shared territory that is not based on the
ethnic primordial meanings attached to it. This can show that their (re)construction revolves around defining themselves as Jordanians, and including themselves within state promoted narratives that define the nation.

Along with their recognition that a focus on the state’s ‘pan-Arabist’ narrative of nationalism means the exclusion of those who do not consider themselves to be ‘Arabs’, research participants tended to emphasise their integration through the subjective reconstruction of the narratives as suited them. Sharing the land, religion, and the same rulers were the main commonalities interviewees referred to in order to explain their belonging to the state of Jordan. All interviewees emphasised that they feel integrated into Jordanian society. However, their integration is dependent on their reconstruction of state nationalism.

The contradictions between state promoted narratives, and interviewees’ (re)constructions of those narratives, show that they separate their belonging to Jordan from being ‘non-Arab’ Circassians. Data showed contradictions in the views of research participants, so that when speaking about being Circassian they compared themselves to the other ‘Arab’, and when speaking about being Jordanian their narratives are based on non-primordial narratives. Notwithstanding their emphasis that they feel integrated into Jordanian society, some interviewees showed unease with the ‘pan-Arabist’ narrative and chose to overlook it as a defining marker of the Jordanian nation, while others chose to view ‘Arabism’ in non-primordial terms. Some attempt to overcome this contradiction by focusing on the concept of Islamic ummah as a form of unity that allegedly transcends all ethnic and national boundaries, others attempted to overcome this by stripping the concept ‘Arabism’ from its ethnic primordial implications. The following chapter discusses in detail how research participants attempted to create a harmony of contradictions. It shows how research participants speak about similarities in reference to Jordan, and being Jordanian.
Chapter Seven
Harmony of Contradictions

Introduction

Narratives promoted by the state of Jordan define the Jordanian nation as ‘Arab’, obscuring the existence of people who do not consider themselves ‘Arabs’. On the other hand, although all interviewees and questionnaire respondents identified themselves as Circassians, and all of them realised that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country, a large majority of them consider themselves Jordanians. This shows that, in their (re)construction of what it means to be Jordanian, interviewees ‘from below’ contradict what the state of Jordan attempts to promote ‘from above’. However, interviewees also felt that, by considering themselves Jordanians they are contradicting their ethnicity, because they realise that the state promotes that an idea that Jordanians are ‘Arabs’, and that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country. As previously mentioned, most interviewees use symbols of the state and religion to highlight the similarities between them and the majority in Jordan.

Research participants were inclined to de-ethnicise the concept of Jordanianism, and draw on the similarities between them and the ‘other’ when speaking about their own conception of the state of Jordan and its people. Most interviewees preferred to refer to Islam, the Hashemites and the land of Jordan as part of the Jordanian nationalist narratives, with which they identify and consider themselves part of. Their reconstruction depended mainly on de-ethnicising state narratives and viewing them in non-primordial terms. By doing so, research participants are assuming that in the public sphere they are Jordanians, while in the private sphere they are ‘non-Arab’ Circassians. This separation between the public and the private shows that they view their nationality in non-primordial terms and in their ethnicity becomes significant in the private.
Research participants expressed that they feel that they are faced with contradictions by belonging to Jordan and identifying with the Jordanian nationalist narratives because the Jordanian nation is promoted as ‘Arab’. However, they still emphasise that they feel that they belong and are integrated into Jordanian society. This chapter explains how research participants draw on narratives of commonalities between them and Jordanian society, such as the land and Islam. As this research is concerned with the construction of ethnic and nationalist narratives ‘from below’, and attempts to answer whether the conventional wisdom about Circassian integration in Jordan is true, this chapter focuses on how research participants make sense of such contradictions.

The following sections deal with how research participants reconstruct state nationalist narratives to prove their integration into Jordanian society, in a manner that reconciles the supposed contradictory narratives. The first section of this chapter deals with the narratives of commonalities research participants share with the ‘Arab’ Jordanian majority. It explains that the land and Islam are the two major elements that contribute to their belonging to Jordan. The first section also shows how research participants make use of some of their own ethnic narratives, which they see as facilitators of their integration, and as evidence for their loyalty towards the Jordanian ‘Arab’ state. Those narratives relating to how they see their group as characterised by loyalty and courage enabled Circassian men to attain high positions in the government and the state. It also discusses how research participants expressed their gratitude to the land, for providing the means of survival for their group, and to the Hashemites who entrusted them and granted Circassian men high positions in the government. The second section contrasts research participants’ feelings towards historic Circassia and the state of Jordan. It shows how the feelings of research participants towards Circassia are different to their feelings towards Jordan, leading them to struggle to balance between their attachment to Jordan and to their ethnic homeland.
7.1 Creating a Harmony of Contradictions

‘Jordanians are equal before the law with no discrimination among them in rights or duties even though they may differ in race, language or religion’ (The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan quoted in Massad, 2001: 41).

Citizens of Jordan are equal before the law; however, state narratives of nationalism suggest that Jordanianism is based on the concept of ‘Pan-Arabism’, i.e. the narratives are ethnonational. Whereas the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign aims to create a sense of unity amongst all Jordanian citizens, men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims, and supposedly ‘Arabs’ and ‘non-Arabs’, it still emphasises that Jordanian people are part of the ‘Arab’ nation (MOFA, 2004). The narrative of ‘Pan-Arabism’ obscures the existence of ‘non-Arabs’ within Jordan such as the Circassians. Research participants identified themselves as ‘non-Arabs’ and, at the same time, Jordanian, despite their recognition that Jordanianism is linked to ‘Pan-Arabism’. When asked which flag represents their ethnic group, 100 percent of questionnaire respondents chose the Adyghe flag (flag of Circassia), and three percent of them chose the Adyghe flag along with the flag of Jordan (Table 7.1).

| Table (7.1) Which of the following flags represents your ethnic group? |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Answer | Men | Women | Total |
| | Numbers | Percentages | Numbers | Percentages | Numbers | Percentages |
| Flag of Jordan | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| Adyghe Flag | 35 | 97.2% | 25 | 96.2% | 60 | 96.8% |
| Flag of the Great Arab Revolt | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| Flag of Jordan and the Adyghe Flag | 1 | 2.8% | 1 | 3.8% | 2 | 3.2% |
| Total | 36 | 100% | 26 | 100% | 62 | 100% |

This suggests that none of the questionnaire respondents identified the flag of the Arab Revolt to reflect their ethnic group, and very few consider themselves to be ethnically Circassians and Jordanians at the same time.
Despite the fact that all interviewees consider themselves to be an ethnic minority in Jordan, some chose to reconstruct the concept of Jordanianism by stripping it of its ethnic nature. For example, some chose to de-ethnicise the whole concept of ‘Arabism’. Some respondents mentioned that that the word ‘Arab’ could be used in reference to anyone who speaks Arabic. When asked if they consider themselves of Arabic origin, 17.7 percent of questionnaire respondents answered that they are, because in their view the word ‘Arab’ applies to everyone who speaks Arabic (Table 4.3 on page 136). Many explained that they can be of ‘Arab’ origin, because it is the language of the Quran and because it is a ‘universal language’. For those who consider themselves to be of Arabic origin, the word ‘Arab’ does not imply belonging to an ethnic group; it rather refers to the language, which is seen as universal and not exclusive for a specific ethnic group, because it is the language of the Quran, and ‘Islam does not differentiate between the races’. Those who de-ethnicise the concept of ‘Pan-Arabism’ did not find belonging to Jordan, as an ‘Arab’ state, problematic. At the same time, when speaking about Circassian culture, all interviewees where talking about it in comparison to the other ‘Arab’. This shows contradictions in the Circassian and the ‘Arab’ ethnic narratives amongst interviewees, but it also shows that research participants themselves choose to utilise the differences when they speak about their group, and de-ethnicise those differences when speaking about being Jordanian. This shows that ethnic narratives are contextual.

On the other hand, the majority of interviewees recognised ‘Arabism’ as an ethnicity. However, the strategy that they used to show their belonging to the state of Jordan was to de-ethnicise Jordan, rather than the concept of ‘Arabism’. At the same time, 94 percent of questionnaire respondents believed that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country (See Table 6.8 on page 222). When asked which of the flags represents their sense of belonging, responses were almost equally divided between the flag of Jordan and the Adyghe flag (Table 7.2).
Table (7.2) Which of the following flags represents your sense of belonging?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag of Jordan</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adyghe Flag</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag of the Great Arab Revolt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag of Jordan and the Adyghe Flag</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amidst all this confusion and contradictions in the reconstruction of Jordanianism, and what it means to be Jordanian, the majority of research participants considered Jordan their homeland (Table 7.3). Data revealed that when expressing their view of Jordan, and of their belonging to Jordan, research participants were more likely to refer to ‘non-Arab’ aspects of the Jordanian nationalist narrative such as the land, and religion, in order to de-ethnicise Jordanianism and to show that they can be Jordanian with great levels of attachment to Jordan, without being ‘Arabs’. They also referred to ethnic narratives about how Circassian culture encourages loyalty and gratitude towards the land and the people who welcomed them in the first place.

Table (7.3) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘My homeland is Jordan’?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.1.1 Shared Land

‘We are the founders of Jordan. We are generally, the oldest people who inhabited Jordan. A nearby neighbour is better than a far away brother. I am Jordanian, of Jordanian origin; I belong to Jordan and not to any other place’ (Khairi, 77, male).

The responses of questionnaire respondents and interviewees varied on whether they considered themselves to be of Jordanian origin, although the majority considered themselves to be of Jordanian origin. However, men were more likely to answer yes to the question ‘do you consider yourself of Jordanian origin’ than women (Refer to table 4.4 on page 137). When they were asked to elaborate on their answers, those who did not consider themselves of Jordanian origin wrote that they are of Caucasian origins, but that they are Jordanian citizens. Respondents who believed that they are originally Jordanians mentioned that it is because they were born on the land of Jordan, and because they lived there. One of them said,

‘Although I am not originally an Arab, I was raised in Jordan, as a Jordanian. One country, one land, and one nation--- that is Jordan, and I am part of it’ (Questionnaire respondent Number 26, male).

Another questionnaire respondent said ‘Of course, because all of our blessings and our businesses are in this country’ (Questionnaire respondent number 32). And, others said that they should be considered of Jordanian origin because they were born and raised in Jordan. Questionnaire respondents who believed themselves of Jordanian origins, in fact, do not believe that such a consideration compromises their Circassian identity, as it reflects their attachment to a de-ethnicised land rather than to a people or nation, although the land narrative is constructed in textbooks of national and civic education is one that is related to an ethnic group, the ‘Arabs’. Additionally, in an attempt to gain a level of social acceptance in the state of Jordan, interviewees mentioned that they have to belong and be attached to the land of Jordan, and that their lives are there. For example, Thuraya said,
'I know that we are originally from Caucasia, and I visited it, I had a lot of feelings and I cried when I went there. When I saw it, I just could not believe that this is our land; I could not believe that our great great grandparents left this land. They left it, therefore, when I refer to homeland, I refer to Jordan. My land is Jordan, and my homeland is Jordan’ (Thuraya, 38, female).

All research participants said that they find it really hard to choose one homeland, between historic Circassia and Jordan, because they feel that they are attached to both. But when they think about it ‘rationally,’ as they said, they choose Jordan, with all their emotions and feelings directed towards Circassia, as will be explained in section 7.2.1. When asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement ‘my homeland is Jordan’, most respondents agreed (Table 7.3 on page 249); around 80.7 percent agreed, 12.9 percent neither agreed nor disagreed, and only 6.4 percent disagreed. When asked to what extent they agree or disagree with the statement ‘my homeland is Circassia’, 58 percent agreed, 19 percent neither agreed nor disagreed, and 23 percent disagreed (Table 5.3 on page 192); this shows that respondents were more likely to choose Jordan as a homeland, over Circassia. However, 90 percent of them agreed that their ethnicity constitutes a great part of their identities (Table 7.4), with slight gender differences, as women were more likely to agree with this statement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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This, together with the interview data, shows that research participants tended to view Jordan as a homeland only by stripping it of its ‘Pan-Arabist’ ethnic identity, and this is how they identify it as a homeland. Moreover, when asked to elaborate, interviewees mentioned that their houses, businesses, and everything they own are in Jordan. Also, that it is very hard for them not to consider it as a homeland. When they arrived in Jordan in the nineteenth century, Circassians inhabited agricultural areas in Jordan and this, according to the 77 year old Khairi, is the reason behind their attachment to the land itself.

Many interviewees expressed that when they choose not to identify with ‘Pan-Arabism’, but identify themselves as Jordanians, they feel as if they are contradicting themselves, because Jordan is in fact an ‘Arab’ country. Nuha, for example, said,

‘I consider myself Jordanian, but I have a problem if I am considered an Arab. For me, when someone asks me I say that I do not have Arabic roots, I have a Jordanian nationality, and I belong to Jordan; it is my home. I have been there; I have lived there all my life. My family, and my friends are here, but I do not consider myself an Arab. I do not know if I am contradicting myself, but this is how I feel. When a foreigner asks me where I am from, I say that I am from Eastern Europe’ (Nuha, 22, female).

Nuha’s quote also shows that ethnicity is contextual, and is fluid in that it can change according to the context. All interviewees mentioned that despite the fact that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country, they still see it as a homeland, and consider themselves Jordanians, which suggests that they see being Jordanian as about a non-ethnic, non-primordial nationality, and being Circassian as reflecting their primordial attachments. Even those who chose the Adyghe flag, in the questionnaires, to represent their homeland, preferred to say during the interviewees that their homeland is Jordan. For example, Tariq said,
'My homeland is where my house is, where I live, where I have property, where I am residing—this is the homeland for me. My whole life is here, it is true that I have land and property there and a life there, but most of my life is here' (Tariq, 22, male).

However, he added that he prefers to choose the Adyghe flag, as the flag which represents his homeland, because it symbolises his history, and the place where his people came from. Therefore, it became apparent throughout the interviews that research participants try to create a harmony of these contradictions through developing their own narratives of Jordanian nationalism that allow them to be loyal to Jordan without compromising their Circassian ethnic narratives. Whereas the state of Jordan portrays the land as ethnic, research participants do not. It also became clear throughout the interviews that respondents were referring to de-ethnicised narratives of nationalism, through rationalising that they hold Jordanian citizenship. For example, Adel said,

‘Even if Jordan is an Arab country, I am treated well here, and I am respected... Jordan is the land I am living on, and I have a lot of chances here in Jordan. I can enjoy all of my civil rights. I have rights and duties, and this is part of being a citizen anywhere in the world, this is reason and logic, apart from emotions’ (Adel, 22, male).

All interviewees without exception brought up the narrative of the land, when speaking about their attachment to Jordan. This deconstruction and reconstruction of narratives of nationalism promoted by the state of Jordan seem to help research participants in reconciling the contradictions between their own ethnic narratives, and the ethnic narratives of state nationalism.

It must be reiterated that when de-ethnicising the land of Jordan, interviewees also used ethnic narratives from their own culture to demonstrate their integration
into the ‘Arab’ Jordanian society, and their attachment and belonging towards the state of Jordan. Many of them mentioned that it is their responsibility to integrate themselves within the society, and that their culture helps them in accepting that integration. They all expressed that their integration is part of their loyalty and courage, which are part of the cultural narratives of their ethnicity. They referred to qualities they take on through upbringing, which make them legitimate to receive equal treatment, like the Jordanian majority. These characteristics Circassians described had been largely linked to their feelings of gratitude towards the land, on which they were able to survive following their flight to Jordan in 1886. Also, they have expressed gratitude towards the Hashemites, who have a deeply rooted Islamic standing in the Muslim world, as the claimed descendents of the prophet. The following section explores the narratives of courage and loyalty towards the state of Jordan, which the interviewees drew from their ethnic narratives.
7.1.2 Loyalty, Courage

‘There is in them the chivalry of warfare. As to their arms, it is not pride they have in them, but love they entertain for them. The sense of individual superiority as regards their antagonists, carried to fanaticism, is yet pure of vain-gloriousness. The circumstances of that contest in which they are engaged, environs to them War, with a sense alike of majesty and sacredness. Courage is here virtue in its Roman sense; it is also charity, it is also faith, it is also martyrdom. In it consist the affections of home, the duties of neighbourhood, the respect of ancestry, the care for futurity; and coldly therewith has to be enumerated the sense conveyed in our words, ‘duty of citizenship’’ (Urquhart, 1863: 9).

The excerpt, above, is taken from Urquhart’s writing on the Circassians’ virtue of courage. The unique nature Urquhart describes as Circassians’ virtue of courage, and reference to the duty of citizenship, used by interviewees to draw attention to their cultural uniqueness, and prove their belonging to Jordan. In each and every interview, interviewees mentioned that their Circassian community is generally loyal by nature, and by upbringing. Interviewees were asked to explain the position Circassians attained in Jordan, on the social and the political levels. All of their answers were based on the fact that they are loyal, and courageous, and brought up on those ideals. With an emphasis that they are the ones responsible for gaining social acceptance in Jordan, Circassians always referred to themselves in terms of loyalty and courage, in addition to other traits they are brought up on with, which make it possible for them to live comfortably in Jordan. As Shami (1993) has mentioned, when Circassians are asked to describe their culture, it is always in reference to masculine characteristics in words such as ‘war-like, brave, disciplined, stubborn, one-track minded, honest to a fault, and loyal to the state’ (ibid: 148). Although Shami did not support with examples how such characteristics are masculine ones, throughout my interviews such descriptions had been made in
reference to Circassian men, who have a role in state life. When talking about courage and loyalty, interviewees, including women, talked in gendered terms as though loyalty and courage were exclusively masculine attributes. This, along with the marginalisation of women from the public sphere, makes men feel more attached to Jordan than their womenfolk and, as previously shown, more male than female participants believed that they are of Jordanian origin.

Interviewees appeared to make use of such narratives of their ethnicity in relation to justifying Circassians social position as the ceremonial guards of the Hashemite Royal family. Many of them mentioned that Circassians are qualified to occupy these positions because of their war-like behaviour and braveness. For example, Nuha said,

‘Circassians are qualified, and they fit within the criterion of being guards. Circassians are also loyal. They possess certain qualities; they are loyal, they are honest, and they are straightforward, and these things qualify them for this position’ (Nuha, 22, female).

Elaboration on this was made in relation to their position in Jordan as a whole had. And, many of them said that because of these traits they were able to enjoy the same rights that the majority in Jordan enjoys. For example, Khairi said,

‘We were able to attain our rights, through honesty and faith, loyalty and effort. I am not saying this because I am Circassian, but we Circassians are distinguished because of our credibility. We do not say things that we do not do; we keep our words. We respect our appointments, because this is part of our faith; it is a sign of faithfulness’ (Khairi, 77, male).

On the one hand, interviewees emphasised the fact that Circassian men are generally brought up to possess war-like behaviour in their lives, and for that reason
many of them were able to reach high ranks in the army. On the other hand, several
interviewees mentioned that this is part of the Circassian peoples’ nature, and that
this is a characteristic they are born with. For example, Husam said,

‘The Circassian people in general have values, due to the
nature of their place of origin. They have values; they are
generous, brave, and they treat women well. It is because of the
nature of their snowy and mountainous place of origin; they
are like that, by nature, and all of them are the same’ (Husam,
23, male).

Husam is obviously talking about Circassian men having values of generosity and
bravery. The quote also shows that when speaking about the ‘Circassian people’,
Husam is only talking about Circassian men, as if women were not part of the
Circassian people. It is very hard to relate how snow and mountains could shape the
characteristics of a people, but it is very obvious that interviewees were trying their
best to explain Circassian men’s position in Jordan in relation to the distinctiveness
of their culture and people, and that this explanation was itself gendered.

In addition to braveness and war-likeness, all interviewees mentioned loyalty
as part of the people’s nature, or in other words, the nature of Circassian men. For
example, Tariq said,

‘The Circassians are loyal by nature. They remain loyal to the
people they love. It is impossible that a Circassian would
betray. Circassians wanted to participate in the building of new
emerging state... they did not want to ruin it’ (Tariq, 22, male).

And courage had always been mentioned in relation to loyalty, because no one
would appoint a royal guard, who is courageous but not loyal. Qasim said,

‘He [The King] appointed us as the royal guards, he does not
trust anyone with his life the way he trusts us with his life.
Betrayal in Circassian culture is prohibited, it is inappropriate
and unacceptable. We do not betray. But our loyalty comes
from our love. And not to betray is part of the perfect man
theory’ (Qasim, 22, male).
Again, here, loyalty is part of the perfect man theory—the Adyghe. The perfect man theory is the basis of Circassian upbringing, as they explained. Although it did not have any significance for women, young Circassian men seemed to be very passionate and enthusiastic about emphasising that they are raised to become ‘perfect’ men, who do not err, betray, and who are brave and war-like. This further emphasises what Shami (1993) herself mentioned as ‘male characteristics’, from the point of view of young men. The only elder interviewee explained with vehemence that perfection is only an attribute of the divine, and no one can be perfect except for God. Moreover, many also emphasised that their loyalty towards the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Hashemites is derived from love, and feelings of gratitude, again as part of their upbringing and culture. Many of them mentioned that their love is based on their gratitude and pride of the land, and on the ruling Hashemite family.
7.1.3 Gratitude

‘We are raised to become loyal. Who serves us once; we serve him a hundred times. We are raised to be loyal and grateful to the ones who serve us and treat us well. Whoever gives me a hand once; I remain grateful to him for the rest of my life’ (Asad 22, male).

Asad was talking about the Hashemite family, and loyalty towards the Hashemite family, the gendered language he is using is derived from both state narratives and ethnic narratives, which marginalise women. In other words, he was trying to say that the Hashemites, who are the ‘fathers’ of modern Jordan, gave Circassian men good positions in the government, and thus Circassian men feel grateful to them. Gratitude had been one of the main reasons interviewees attempted to explain their loyalty to Jordan and the Hashemites. Gratitude had been expressed in two main ways; gratitude to the land, which encompassed them after their flight and provided them with the means of survival, and gratitude towards the Hashemites, who treated them as ‘part of the family’ (Adel, 22, male), and granted the men good positions in the military and in Jordan’s political life. Interestingly, the feelings of gratitude were based on the fact that research participants did not believe that it is their right to be granted positions or to be accepted in the society, but that was possible partly because of the generosity of the Hashemite family.

The first form of gratitude, towards the land, which had been expressed by interviewees, meant that Circassians owe the country itself a lot, based on providing them with a new home, after providing them with refuge. For example, Khairi (77, male) stated that he feels sorry for the loss of land, caused by foreign investments, because people nowadays tend to forget how much they owe and how grateful they should be towards the land. He said,

‘We sold the lands, filled our pockets with some money, and we forgot the importance of the land. I used to farm the land, with a cow, and I am proud of that. We used to plant wheat and sell to Palestine, and to Beirut. Dealers used to come from
Amman to take the excess wheat to export them. Now, if you conduct a research, the Jordanian people might not have a kilo of flour to bake bread at home. This is because the government taught the people to be lazy. The government did not improve or develop the nation; rather they caused destruction and deterioration’ (Khairi, 77, male).

Khairi is apparently one of those who oppose foreign investment and the emergence of a global capital market, because in his view it leads the country to deterioration and dismantles culture and tradition. Several other interviewees reflected on their emotions towards the land as a provider for their means of survival, but no one except for Khairi expressed his dissatisfaction with the loss of the lands. Others, also, used the land as a way to express the commonalities between them and ‘Arab’ Jordanians. For example, Nuha said,

‘The thing in common between me and the Jordanian majority is that we all share the same land. I believe that no matter how much trouble there is between Jordanians and other groups, in the end each one believes that we live on the same land’ (Nuha, 22, female).

When asked what she means by other groups, Nuha explained that she meant the original Jordanian Bedouin tribes. Husam (23, male) also mentioned that he deals with ‘Arab’ Jordanians on the basis that they are on the same land, and that they have to work alongside each other as citizens, to develop Jordan. Adel said,

‘At the end of the day we share the land, we have to live in peace, because we are all humans. Humans do tend to group together, but here we are on one land, and our interests are the same…. For the sake of the land, we have to focus on common interests. Imagine if both parts are refusing the other... it would not work. One part has to exert some effort to get closer to the other, for the sake of common interests’ (Adel, 22, male).

Research participants expressed their feelings of gratitude towards the land, as a way to position themselves within Jordan, away from the ‘Arab’ Jordanian ethnic narratives. And, to provide that, notwithstanding their different ethnic origin, their
loyalty to Jordan is not any less, because of the gratitude they feel towards it. Thuraya, ‘on behalf of all Circassians’, said,

‘There is something called gratitude. For me, I feel that my belonging to this country is a way to show my gratitude, it is obligatory... We feel this gratitude, it is in our blood. We feel that we belong to this country, it is in our eyes, we feel it when we hear [nationalist] songs, and we feel it when we see the flag. We were born here’ (Thuraya, 38, female).

The second form of gratitude research participants referred to is gratitude towards the Hashemites, particularly to King Hussein I, as many of them said that they started to feel alienated, in the era of King Abdullah II, which is explained in the coming section. Those feelings of gratitude, which lead them to love, and become loyal to the Hashemites, are based on the fact that when the Hashemites came to occupy Jordan, from the Hejaz region in Saudi Arabia, they did not alienate them, and even appointed a Circassian as the first governor of the capital city, Amman. Additionally, many expressed their gratitude because the Hashemites appointed Circassian men as their ceremonial guards, which means that the trust and relation between them has to be mutual. However, although interviewees saw this act on behalf of the Hashemites, as extraordinary and generous, keeping good relations with the Circassians was mainly because the Hashemites needed allies, and the Circassians at that time were powerful merchants.

Furthermore, many interviewees mentioned that during their upbringing they were brought up on the love and loyalty towards the Hashemites. For example, Thuraya said,

‘If you ask me to whom I feel that I belong to, to the Hashemites or to Jordanianism, I would say that I belong more to the Hashemites. I feel that I really, really, belong to the Hashemites, I trust them blindly. We have been raised on this blind trust, since the time of King Hussein. We have faith in this family’ (Thuraya, 38, female).
Qasim (22, male) also stated that he has never met a Circassian who does not love and who is not loyal to the Hashemite family. Husam (23, male) also said plainly that Circassians are in a good position in Jordan because they have really good relations with the Hashemites, who allocated Circassian men good positions in the government, and in Jordan’s political life. Some mentioned that Circassians had previously supported the Hashemites, when they first came to Jordan to fight the Ottomans, and that made the Hashemites trust them and grant them a status equal to ‘Arab’ Jordanians.

Moreover, those feelings of gratitude towards the Hashemites oblige Circassians, as part of their ‘culture, upbringing and blood’ as they put it, to be loyal to them, love them and never betray them. For example, Qasim expressed his love, gratitude and loyalty towards the Hashemites by saying,

‘When someone treats you well, and makes you feel that you are not less than others, and makes you feel that you are needed, and that your role is highly-valued, you would definitely love this person. If someone provides you with your rights, like any other citizen, and gave value to your existence, you would definitely love him’ (Qasim, 22, male).

It became clear that the reference to gratitude towards the Hashemites reflected a feeling amongst research participants that because they are not ‘Arabs’, it is not their right to be included in the narratives of the state, and that is explained in the last section of this chapter. In addition to feelings of gratitude, research participants used Islam to point out that they also share an Islamic culture with the Jordanian majority, and that they fit in within Jordan, thanks to Islam. They spoke of Islam assuming that it would provide a basis for their inclusion within state narratives, because it unites the community of adherents and that would include them within the state nationalist narrative.
7.1.4 Islam: Preference Unviable

‘The concept of *ummah* embodies the universalism of Islam and provides a framework for religious unity, which accommodates the cultural diversity of believers’ (Hassan, 2006: 311).

Several scholars argue that Islam is not merely a religion, and being a Muslim should involve divesting the self of all forms of national and ethnic identification. Ataman (2003: 90) argues that the ‘Islamic theory of ethnicity’ means that all Muslim ethnic groups are, and should be, one nation, under the banner of a Muslim nation-state, given that Islam is the legitimating power for a nation-state to be built. Whereas theories of *ummah* provide that it should exist, in reality there are very few Muslim countries that are defined as Islamic states, and only four Muslim countries are described as Islamic republics19. Whilst the overall of global population of Muslims is increasing the number of Islamic countries is very low. The dream of a unified Islamic state still exists, even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and the concept of Pan-Islamism as a nationalist ideology persists ‘from below’, although state promoted narratives overlook it.

All research participants identified themselves as Muslims, and all interviewees identified Islam as one of the main things they share with the Jordanian majority. It must be said though, that many interviewees did not believe that Islam nowadays is viable as a way of uniformity in the current world order, because other ideologies have prevailed. For example, Nuha said,

‘I prefer to see Islam as an ideology rather than a religion, because many people do not understand Islam. But I would love to see an application of ideological Islam in economics, politics, and education, but that should be done under a name other than Islam, because it is now hated in the world. I think we should have a united *ummah*, but we should not call it Islamic’ (Nuha, 22, female).

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19 The Islamic Republics of Afghanistan, Iran, Mauritania, and Pakistan
Moreover, several interviewees mentioned that an Islamic state is unviable nowadays due to the presence of non-Muslims in Muslim countries. However, they mostly also mentioned that Islam serves as a point of unification between them and the Jordanian majority. This had been mentioned by most interviewees; however, most of them mentioned that an Islamic *ummah*, as a form of unity is impossible in nowadays world order.

This shows that despite the existence of an Islamic *ummah*, in the minds of Muslims, in reality the non-existence of any state created to encompass all Muslims, makes it more of a distant dream for them. For example, Qasim said,

‘In our current position, I believe that we are not competent to have an Islamic *ummah*... It would be nice to have something like that unity, it would be a really nice thing, because I feel a sense of belonging towards Islam, and I am already there. I already believe in it. If this happens and it works, I will be part of this unity, I will be happy’ (Qasim, 22, male).

In chapter six, Islam has been discussed as a narrative of nationalism overlooked by the state, and emphasised by research participants. It became clear that research participants resort to the narrative of Islam as the means that could bring them together with the Jordanian majority and with the state of Jordan. This view of Islam and the emphasis laid on it as a constituent of a unified culture is a way research participants used to explain their integration into Jordanian society. With all the efforts research participants exerted to show their loyalty and belonging to the state of Jordan and to bridge the gap between their narratives and the ethnonational narratives of the state of Jordan, they all expressed that their feelings are torn between belonging to the state of Jordan and Circassia, their historic homeland. They expressed this and said that these are just ‘irrational’ feelings, because all of them said that Jordan is their homeland and they would not want to return to Circassia.
7.2 Feelings and Emotions

Throughout the interviews, interviewees repeatedly referred to feelings and emotions they encounter as part of being part of a ‘non-Arab’ minority in Jordan, and to feelings and emotions they have been carrying with them for four generations towards their original homeland. It is important to note here that these feelings and emotions are reflections of their ‘irrational thoughts’ as many of them put it, and are not the same as the rationalisations they attempt to make, with regard to the reasons behind their integration. In the previous section, it had been established how interviewees did their best to show their loyalty and attachment to Jordan, through finding common interests and characteristics with ‘Arab’ Jordanians. For example, they reflected on behaviours and attributes they are raised with, their gratitude towards the land and the Hashemites, and some used Islam as a way to explain why they can identify with Jordan and its ‘Arab’ majority.

However, they were also determined to show their distinctiveness as a group, and did not want to compromise their Circassian ethnic narratives. They talked about rationalising their feelings, which is inevitable for them to be able to live in peace with the ‘Arab’ Jordanian majority. They attempted to explain that they practice their culture and traditions at home, and that their ethnicity is to a great extent linked to their lives at home, not in the workplace, in schools, in public life, not even with their ‘Arab’ friends. It became clear that their ethnic narratives are used to describe their private lives and their (re)construction of Jordanianism serves them in public. Their attitude shows that separating ethnicity from state life, for them, is very similar to separating religion from state life. But, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s emphasis on ethnonational narratives of the ‘Arabs’ makes ‘non-Arabs’ vulnerable to confusion and feelings of lack of recognition of their existence. The confusion and lack of recognition stem mainly from the fact that research participants felt that they are not recognised within the nationalist narratives of the state, despite their group’s contribution to the building of the state
of Jordan. On the other hand, they also expressed that it is hard for them to choose a ‘homeland’.

Questionnaire respondents were asked to what extent they agree or disagree with the statements that ‘being Circassian constitutes a great part of my identity’, and ‘being Jordanian constitutes a great part of my identity’ (Tables 7.5 & 7.6). Although it was previously mentioned that most respondents believed that Jordan is their homeland, most also believed that being Circassian constitutes a great part of the identities. Of the total questionnaire respondents, 96.8 percent agreed that being Circassian constitutes a great part of their identities (Table 7.5), and 69.4 percent agreed that being Jordanian is a great constituent of their identities (Table 7.6). The results show that the fact that they were more likely to choose Jordan as their homeland, and believe that their identities are more Circassian than Jordanian, reflects a tendency among respondents to separate their ethnic narratives from their loyalty towards Jordan, and the Jordanian nationalist narrative. Interviewees expressed two sets of emotions, feelings of belonging to Jordan and to Circassia at the same time. Whereas their feelings towards Circassia were more related to the private sphere, they said that they often felt somewhat alienated, and their efforts seemed to be unvalued in Jordan. The following subsections explain in detail their feelings towards Circassia and their feelings of alienation in Jordan.
### Table (7.5) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Being Circassian constitutes a great part of my identity’?

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### Table (7.6) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Being Jordanian constitutes a great part of my identity’?

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7.2.1 Circassia: Pride, Dreams, Bitterness

‘I cannot answer any question about Adyghea\textsuperscript{20}... please allow me not to answer it... I have a bitter answer. Adyghea is the homeland where my fathers and grandfathers came from, I still have feelings and I am sad when I talk about it. I would love to visit it, but I would not like to live there, because I lived in Jordan... Nowadays, there they live differently, I do not accept their current way of life, and I cannot live amongst them’ (Khairi, 77, male).

Feelings of bitterness and sadness Khairi expressed, were due to the differences he feels exist, between him as a Jordanian-Circassian and the Circassians who remained in their original homeland. Khairi’s reference takes us to a different form of ethnicity that Circassians in Diaspora have developed. Many have argued that with technological advancements, and the spread of global means of mass communications, it has become easier for ethnic communities to remain in contact and in constant exchange with their original communities (Karim, 1998). The flight of Circassians many generations ago isolated them from their kin, and provided the basis for the emergence of new forms of ethnic narratives, which is a result of their presence in Jordan.

Through the maintenance of a culture that dates from the nineteenth century, the ethnic narratives of Circassians in Jordan were shaped by the heritage they brought with them, and by the new homeland they ended up in. Interviewees, who have become aware of the differences, found it hard to relate to their Circassian kin in Caucasia. None of them would consider returning to historic Circassia. This, in addition to expressions of bitterness and dreams, had been the main picture interviewees seemed to visualise about their place of origin. It is important to note here that most of my respondents were from the third and fourth generation of Circassian groups in Jordan. However, even the second generation interviewee

\textsuperscript{20} Another name for Circassia
mentioned that it is impossible for him to return, because he did not feel that he had much in common with the Circassians in Caucasia.

‘I lived in the grace of Jordan... When I die, I want to be buried in Jordan. I was born in Jordan, and I will die in Jordan, and I will be buried in Jordan’ (Khairi, 77, male).

Return does not seem like an option for all interviewees, but many of them expressed that they would love to have a Circassian, or Caucasian, passport, which may document their ancestral attachment to the area. Interviewees attempted to defend their position in terms of not having the desire to return to their place of origin, by explaining that they are originally Circassians, and they belong to the group of Circassians. However Jordan remained the homeland in the eyes of many because their lives had been established in Jordan, and not Circassia. For example, Tariq said,

‘For me, my belonging is split between the two. I have been to former Circassia, and we have a land and a house there, but my father, my grandfather, and my grandmother are living in Jordan. And, we ate from this country’s food, and we lived here all our life, but I do not think that it is my only sense of belonging. I have a great sense of belonging there, as well. There was my land, and they took it away from me, and I want it back. I try to get it back. So, let’s say that my sense of belonging is divided as in 60 percent here, and 40 percent there’ (Tariq, 22, male).

Their feelings and emotions towards Circassia had been linked many times, by interviewees, to their history, and the history of their origins, the myths, and the stories about the people, the internationally unrecognised genocide their ancestors went through, and the stories of the flight imposed on them due to their religion. Many expressed that they could not separate themselves from being Circassian and become fully Jordanian because, by doing so, they would be undervaluing the history of their ancestors and their flight. Moreover, all respondents mentioned that it is very important for them to preserve their Circassian identity, as it symbolises
the suffering of their grandparents. When asked whether is important or not for them to preserve their Circassian culture, around 89 percent of questionnaire respondents agreed, with a majority strongly agreeing (see table 4.9 on page 152).

However, interviewees seemed to separate their memories from the memories of their ancestors. Many of them said that their personal memories are in Jordan, but at the same time they expressed that they cannot simply forget the history of their ancestors (Qasim, 22, male, Adel, 22, male, Tariq 22, male, Nuha, 22, female, Thuraya 38, female, Rana 36, female, Atef, 39, male, Husam 23, male, and Asad 22, male). This history is what makes them proud and willing to preserve their culture, in order to safeguard the heritage of their ancestors in Diaspora. Pride in Circassians had been conveyed throughout the interviews by emphasising the good nature of the people, such as courage, loyalty, and respect for women.

Additionally, dreams and hopes had also been mentioned during the interviews, in relation to the people. Firstly, interviewees had dreams about having an official Circassian state, which would provide a basis for their identities to prosper and persist. For example, Nuha said,

‘My dream as a Circassian is the same dream Palestinians have. It is to have a homeland, but sometimes I ask myself if it happened, would I go back? It is a hard question! I want to have a homeland so people would know who the Circassians are’ (Nuha, 22, female).

Moreover, many expressed how it is frustrating for them when they are abroad, and people do not recognise who the Circassians are. Due to the non-existence of a Circassian state, most research participants said that Jordan is their homeland. They seemed to prefer to choose Jordan as their official homeland and Circassia as a symbol of ancestral attachment. Thuraya put it,

‘No one wants to internationally recognise the presence of our country... I wish, if not me my children, would see this area internationally recognised as a state, but I do not wish to go
live there. I want this recognition, because I want my children to start saying that they are from there, that their origins came from there, and that their great grandparents came from there, that we originate from there. I wish one day people see Circassian costumes and people say: ‘wow! These are Circassians.’ Not like when I went to the states to dance there, people were saying: ‘where do these come from? Are they from space?’ Scottish, Irish, Palestinian, and Jewish costumes are at least known. I hope we reach a stage when people recognise at least our music. This is the dream, I believe, of every Circassian’ (Thuraya, 38, female).

Another dream interviewees tended to bring up during the interviews had been international recognition for the genocide which took place in former Circassia, and which led to the killing and the expulsion of thousands of their grandparents. Interviewees seemed very keen to gain this sort of international recognition, and mentioned that what they had to go through is no less than the Armenian genocide. Qasim said,

‘I wish that one day the genocide against Circassians would be internationally recognised by the UN. I want recognition that we were forced to migrate, we were killed, and we were battered. I do not think that the Jews are better than us. The Jewish people are still receiving compensations for the holocaust. The genocide triggers my emotions a lot; it infuriates my emotions’ (Qasim 22, male).

In additions to their feelings towards their ‘original’ homeland, research participants also expressed their feelings towards their presence in the state of Jordan. They expressed that sometimes they do not feel recognised as part of the nation, and also expressed a fear of losing their governmental positions, and a lack of recognition of their group’s participation in the building of Jordan.
7.2.2 Jordan: Alienation, Fear

‘I remember once a university professor, who teaches national education, saying that the religions in Jordan are: Islam, Christianity, Baha’is, and Circassian. He is a professor, he has a PhD… he has to know who the Circassians are. He is Jordanian, from this country, and he says that Circassian is a religion… this is a shame… this is a shame not on him; this is a shame on us. He is from this country and he does not know. I do not know if this was intentionally said, but this is shameful’ (Qasim, 22, male).

Through dealing with this university professor, Qasim felt his group is not known, and recognised enough. It has been argued that individuals, through social interaction, become aware that they matter and are of value to others, which further enhances their sense of value as individuals (Adams and Marshall, 1996). This appears to be partly the case with research participants, as they mentioned that they do not feel that their community’s participation in the building of Jordan, as a nation-state is recognised. Although, in some way or another, Circassians do feel that their role is indispensable in state life, many of them mentioned that they cannot feel their value appreciated through the intergroup interactions, and in their daily lives. The exclusion of Circassians from the state’s definition and narratives promoted by the state also reinforces this lack of recognition.

The extract from the interview above does not only show that Qasim felt that his group is not respected for its value, in the building of Jordan, but also shows the interviewee’s feelings of alienation, and devaluation. In textbooks of national and civic education, there is no mention, when talking about the people of Jordan, of the Circassian community. And, the only official mention of them appears in the webpage of King Hussein bin Talal. The paragraph begins by a brief history of their flight and ends with the following few sentences,

‘Today, Circassian Jordanians are a well-educated people who continue to play a role in Jordan’s political, economic and
social life, larger than their numbers would indicate. Circassian culture places strong emphasis on respect for the elderly and closely-knit extended families. Marriage with anyone sharing the same surname of either parent is strictly forbidden. Circassians are also well known for their honesty. In fact, Jordanian Circassians constitute King Hussein’s ceremonial guard’ (Original English) (The Royal Hashemite Court, 2001: Para 2).

Moreover, many interviewees exclaimed that they deserve to be mentioned in textbooks of national and civic education, because they consider themselves as an indivisible part of Jordan’s history. All interviewees, without any exceptions, talked lengthily about the role of Circassians in the building of the state, and in supporting the Hashemite Royal family when they first arrived to the region. All of them mentioned that many Circassians occupied high ranks in the army, and in the government. Moreover, several of them mentioned that Circassians were in Jordan before the establishment of Jordan as a state, and before the arrival of the Hashemites. Mention of streets in Jordan having Circassian names, and areas, which are inhabited by Circassians till this day, was made as a way to emphasise their role in the state. They have also used terms such as roots of Jordan, foundations, and founders to describe the role of their group in Jordan. This emphasis was obviously made to show their sense of the value of their group, which they do not see within the official documents of the state, whether in the curriculum or throughout the Jordan First campaign. For example, Nuha said,

‘I got very upset when I realised that books of national education mention the Palestinian case, the Bedouins, the refugees, and do not mention Circassians at all. We should be mentioned. They have to write things about us’ (Nuha, 22, female).

Many interviewees referred to Palestinians, who are part of the ‘Arab’ nation, as a good example of a group who had not been of help or participation in the building of Jordan, and on the contrary attempted to undermine the state authority.
For example, many interviewees mentioned that people see them as more loyal and more Jordanian than the ‘Arab’ Palestinians. Also, many expressed their dissatisfaction with the Palestinian struggle being taught in the curriculum of national and civic education, while their existence, as a whole, is being ignored. The word ‘Palestinian’ almost appeared in every interview, always to compare between Circassians’, and the ‘Arabs’ achievements and loyalty to Jordan. Some of them told stories, in order to show how the Circassians are considered part of the Jordanian people more than the Palestinians. For example, Tariq said,

‘For example, one of my friends at university is from Madaba, and he is a real Jordanian. Once a fight happened at university between Palestinians and Jordanians, so this Jordanian friend of mine poked me and said: did we beat them? This shows that we, Circassians, are part of Jordanians as a group’ (Tariq, 22, male).

This shows that although interviewees attempted to emphasise the distinctiveness of their group in comparison to other Jordanians, they also attempt to show that they are much more part of the Jordanian nation than ‘Arab’ Palestinians. This also signifies that people can have multiple identities, which operate differently according to the situation and are contextual.

Interviewees also said that they would love to see recognition for their existence, in Jordan, in textbooks of national and civic education, like all others. For example, Asad said,

‘I would love to see a whole chapter about Circassians in books of national education. People here are ignorant about our achievements and culture. They only know that we have dances, and might recognise our music, and in some cases our cuisine. But, they do not know that many ministers, and prime ministers are Circassians; they are ignorant about our achievements’ (Asad, 22, male).

Those issues were brought up by research participants to reflect their feelings of being undervalued despite the high levels of loyalty they showed. Moreover, such
lack of recognition had also been expressed in relation to feelings of fear—fear for the loss of their unique identity, and fear that they might lose their role in Jordan.

During my meeting with the ‘chairman’ of the Circassian Charity Association, in Amman, he mentioned that many Circassians of the young generation are very reluctant nowadays to join the army and the government because of the low pay. He added that this makes him concerned that Circassians might start losing their role within Jordan. Several other interviewees mentioned the same concerns. However, one of them (Thuraya, 38, female) added that the policy of King Abdullah II is to integrate the Palestinians within Jordan, and for that reason many Circassian employees were dismissed from the Royal Hashemite Court and substituted by Palestinians. This could, also, explain why respondents attempted to show their loyalty towards Jordan, as much as they could, because they do not want to feel excluded from Jordan’s public sphere and state life. Moreover, in a way, emphasising their loyalty and belonging towards Jordan and their satisfaction with their lives in it, whilst at the same time expressing feelings of confusion and lack of recognition, means that the conventional wisdom about Circassians’ integration is an oversimplification of the experiences of Circassians. It reflects one aspect of reality but not all of it as there are contradictions between Circassians’ (re)construction of Jordanianism and the narratives promoted by the state; the community as a whole tries to create a harmony of their own contradictions.
Conclusion

The assumption that Circassians are integrated in Jordan does not provide a whole picture of the Circassian community in Jordan, as this chapter provided that they feel confusion and lack of recognition of their participation in the building of the state of Jordan. Their expression of positive feelings towards Jordan is understandable, because they do not know an actual homeland other than Jordan. This expression has also been accompanied with emphasis on their feelings of belonging and attachment, and explaining their attachment by referring to what they feel they share with the majority of Jordanians, and to Circassian ‘traits’ such as loyalty and courage which enable their acceptance in society. This also shows the strategies interviewees use in order to attain a level of social acceptance, to define the boundaries of their ethnic group, and to appear as loyal as possible to the country, the land, and the Hashemites. And, by viewing those symbols of the state, the land and the Hashemites, in non-ethnic and non-primordial terms, interviewees attempted to reconcile the contradictions between their (re)construction, and the Jordanian state’s construction, of what being a Jordanian means.

Data also revealed a separation between their ethnicity and their status in Jordan. Interviewees seemed to realise that in a state based on the ethno-national narratives of the ‘Arabs’, they could not reflect their ethnic narratives within the definition of the state, and they would rather separate state life from their ethnicity, through practising their culture and traditions at home, and within the community itself. Jordan is their homeland, which makes them no less than ‘Arab’ Jordanians, as they have explained, but at the same time the preservation of their ancestral attachments is part of their duty and tasks, and for them it does not destabilize their belonging to Jordan. As Thuraya put it simply,

‘I do not have the right to reflect my identity through the identity of the state itself. As you said, we are minorities. According to the constitution of the state, Islam is its religion,
and the state is an Arabic state, and part of the Arab world. If I am to be stubborn, I will face a lot of troubles; this will not work. I am part of a minority, I should be proud of being part of this combination... I can preserve my entity, and not to assimilate, because I want to be, I have the right to be, part of the minorities who are proud of being of different origins and upbringing, but I am also proud of being part of this country. It is an Arab country, of course it is. I cannot say that it is an Arab-Circassian country, or an Arab-Armenian country, between brackets. This is not valid. It is an Arab-Muslim country’ (Thuraya, 38, female).

Because many of the interviewees believe that King Abdullah I granted them good positions in the government out of generosity, most interviewees felt gratefulness towards the Hashemites. All interviewees expressed that they feel either grateful to the land or the Hashemites, or to both. It became clear that research participants leaned towards de-ethnicising the narratives of nationalism promoted by the state of Jordan. The de-ethnicisation of the land and narratives of Jordanianism helped them to position themselves within the state of Jordan, and the society, albeit with contradictions.

Also interviewees felt that their contribution to the building of the state of Jordan is undervalued, and that they lack recognition within that context. Thus, one cannot deny that the primordial ethnic nature of narratives of nationalism promoted by the state seemed to affect research participants, in a manner that made them seek alternative means through which they themselves could attain recognition, and be part of the narratives. On the other hand, feelings of bitterness, and expressions of hope and dreams, were made exclusively towards their original homeland-Circassia. For interviewees, their desire for international recognition for the genocide, which took place in the nineteenth century, seemed as strong as their desire to be recognised for their efforts in building the state of Jordan.
Chapter Eight

Conclusions

This research has been a personal journey of discovery, in addition to making an academic contribution. It provided me with a deeper understanding of the socio-political situation in Jordan, and how it influences groups such as the Palestinians and Circassians differently. Although the focus of this thesis is the Circassians, my initial interest in the Circassian people came from the fact that Circassians are seen as more integrated than the Palestinians in Jordan, at least politically and economically. However, before I shed light on the contrast between the positions of Circassians and Palestinians, I explore how the research questions have been answered throughout this thesis and demonstrate the academic contribution of this research.

The answer to questions about the different positions of the Circassians and Palestinians in Jordan is multi-faceted, and there are various complex factors that need to be taken into account; this is discussed later in this chapter. In the main body of this thesis, however, I have focused on the relationship between the Circassians and the state of Jordan through an exploration of their ethnic narratives and the nationalist narratives of the state of Jordan. I have done this in order to make sense of how Circassians are able to identify themselves as Circassian and Jordanian at the same time, despite the difficulties they experience in doing so (See chapter 7). The starting point, in understanding this relationship between the Circassians and the state of Jordan, was to unpack what it means to be Circassian and what it means to be Jordanian.

This has been guided by my understanding that the boundaries of what it means to be of a specific ethnic group and of a specific nation are fluid, (re)constructed, and (re)configured, as I argued in chapter two. Further, based on the idea that ethnicities and nationalisms are not natural, I argue that ethnic actors often
construct their ethnicities through narratives that can posit primordial and/or non-primordial forms of attachments. The research was guided by the following research questions, with the aim of contributing to the understanding of the relationship between the Circassians and the state of Jordan, and each question has been the focus of different chapters:

- What are the ethnic narratives mobilised by the Circassians in Jordan? Do those narratives differ depending on age and gender? (chapters four and five).
- What are the nationalist narratives and ideologies the state of Jordan promotes through ‘Jordan First’ and textbooks of national and civic education? (chapter six).
- How do research participants make sense of and reconstruct state narratives? (chapters six and seven)
- What is the relationship between the state of Jordan and its Circassian community? Is the conventional wisdom relating to their integration accurate? (chapter seven).

To answer the research questions, I first identified the ethnic narratives the research participants use to define their ethnicity, and the analysis included gender considerations. Later, I identified the narratives the state of Jordan uses to define the nation and how the research participants (re)construct those narratives. The juxtaposition of state narratives alongside research participants’ (re)construction of these narratives, aided an understanding of the relationship between the state of Jordan and the research participants, and revealed how research participants situated themselves as ‘non-Arabs’ who belong to Jordan. Although the literature on state nationalism in the Middle East is vast, it mostly looks at the narratives Middle Eastern states promote rather than the construction of nationalism ‘from below’ (see for e.g. Anderson, 2002, Anderson, 2001, Halliday, 2000b, Kumaraswamy, 2003, Massad, 2001). Additionally, most of the literature on state nationalism in the Middle East is based on criticism of the mere existence of Middle Eastern states because they are ‘modern’, and because the manufacturing of state nationalism in the Middle East was so recent. This research suggests a different approach to state nationalism: as all
nationalisms are constructed and often (re)constructed, research should turn to how people, who are at the receiving end of those narratives, are affected by them, and how they affect the (re)construction of, and contribute to the reproduction of narratives of nationalism. Additionally, literature on minority groups and ethnic minorities is Eurocentric. This research, therefore, contributes to the literature on diasporic communities living in the Middle East, rather than on groups from the Middle East living in the West. It also provides a contribution to the literature on Islam as a nationalist ideology, and critiques the hypothesis that religion constitutes the basis of state nationalism in the Middle East ‘from above’, by instead evaluating it ‘from below’ (Halliday, 2000a, Halliday, 2000c, Halliday, 2000b). The following sections discuss how the research questions have been answered, and identify the major empirical and theoretical contributions of this investigation. I also reflect on the contrast between Circassian and Palestinian integration in Jordan. The final sections of this chapter explore the limitations of this project and suggest further research that could build on the findings presented here.

**Ethnicity**

To answer the research question on the ethnic narratives of the Circassians in Jordan I review in chapter four how research participants defined themselves as Circassian, and what they believe makes them Circassian. Research participants’ construction of what it means to be Circassian is relational and contextual, or in other words influenced by their presence in Jordan. I identified two types of ethnic narrative used by participants to define their ethnic identity: the first type is seen as ‘fixed,’ drawing on primordial conceptions of ethnicity, while the second type is seen as ‘changing’ and ‘dismantling’ based on culture and language. It is important to note that even the use of narratives that draw on primordial conceptions of ethnicity can be seen as contextual and relational and are always used in comparison to ‘the
other.’ However, in light of Circassians’ feeling that they are losing their culture and language and their inability to either speak the language or practise their culture, research participants emphasised the importance of primordial narratives to distinguish themselves from the ‘Arab’ majority in Jordan. Thus primordialism becomes important as a distinguishing element of ethnicity, particularly when research participants felt unable to distinguish themselves culturally and linguistically.

Although ethnic actors draw on primordial narratives to define their ethnicities, scholars should not take this tendency for granted, as even primordial narratives are (re)constructed in contextual and relational terms. Many of those narratives do not necessarily represent the whole of the Circassian community around the world; rather they are based on comparisons between the research participants and the majority of Jordanian ‘Arabs’. This shows that the ethnic narratives of my Circassian research participants are usually constructed in relation to the context within which they live, to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’. For example, participants drew a comparison between their family names, and Arabic family names, saying that their family names originate from non-Arabic language roots, making them unique and different from the ‘other’.

One of the major findings of this research is that, for Circassians in Jordan, narratives related to origin and roots are frequently linked to the relatively recent stories of their diaspora rather than to the older Nart Sagas, which are considered the myths of origin for the whole of the Circassian community (Colarusso, 2002). Therefore, this research reveals that Circassians in Jordan do not share the same narratives of origin, related to the Nart Sagas. This further emphasises the fact that their ethnicity is contextualised, and based on constructed narratives that are influenced in their (re)constructions by the stories research participants hear from their parents, grandparents, and members of their community.
On the other hand, the changing narratives of ethnicity were also brought up by research participants as important markers of difference. Despite the importance of culture as a marker of difference, interviewees often acknowledged the fact that culture changes, and is changing. Further, the emphasis on the cultural aspects of ethnicity meant that many of them see their culture as important. It was also mentioned that their culture conflicts with the ‘Arab’ culture, and the fact that it is changing has to do with the fact they are living in an ‘Arab’ country and cannot always practise their culture. Therefore, practices and traditions remain part of their private lives, whereas the ‘family name’ is what makes them different in the public sphere. In other words, people use family names in the public sphere, and what makes these names different is the fact that they do not derive from Arabic language. Family names are transferred through the fathers, due to the patrilineal system of kinship prevalent in Jordan. This implies that ethnicity is seen as transferred through the father, thus obscuring mothers’ roles in the transmission of ethnicity.

This research also explores the gender implications of the ethnic narratives the participants used to define their ethnicity. This exploration contributes to the literature on gender and ethnicity. Gender has often been overlooked in research on ethnicity and this is particularly true for studies of ethnicity in the Middle East. On the one hand, there is little research on minority groups in the Middle East, and on the other hand, gendered aspects of ethnicity and ethnicised aspects of gender are underrepresented in studies of ethnic minorities, and also in studies of state nationalisms in the Middle East. This failure to highlight women’s experiences and women’s contributions to the reproduction of ethnic and national narratives can be a consequence of associating women with the private sphere and men with the public. Also, associating the preservation of ethnic practices and traditions with the private sphere makes women responsible for the transmission of those practices within their assigned role as mothers. The preservation of practices, culture and tradition is often
associated with the private sphere and with women, who are expected to do the ‘preservation.’

**Gender and Ethnicity**

This research reveals that one aspect of the narratives research participants used to define their ethnicity is related to gender relations within the Circassian community that are seen as different from those with the ‘Arab’ communities. This makes the preservation of gender relations as important as preserving other aspects of culture, especially as they are seen as part of culture. Gender relations often served to set group boundaries, for example, male interviewees often mentioned that in Circassian culture, women are respected, while in ‘Arab’ culture women are ‘controlled’. This distinction that was referred to by men and some women interviewees is not particularly accurate, as one interviewee explained that she was subjected to violence and control from her brother. However, it was a distinction used by participants to emphasise the distinctiveness of their culture. Research participants often used stereotypes about gender relations in ‘Arab’ society to show the superiority of their culture, as a culture of respect to women, and the elderly as well.

Interviewees also mentioned ‘Arab’ first cousin marriage, which is not accepted in Circassian culture. This shows how gender relations serve as ethnic narratives, and highlights the importance of attending to the centrality of gender in studies of ethnicity. Additionally, the research reveals that ethnic narratives are gendered, or in other words, some narratives overlook women’s role in transmitting ethnicity, while others highlight it. For instance, most male interviewees attempted to explain their culture by referring to what they called the ‘Adyghe’ or the ‘perfect man’ theory. The ‘perfect man’ theory means that Circassians are raised on certain values and principles in an attempt to make them perfect men later in life. They also
added that Circassian culture and upbringing, along with the perfect man theory, makes them loyal, courageous, and brave warriors, always in gendered terms, and to always describe Circassian men not women.

Those attributes were also used by research participants to explain why they see themselves as integrated into Jordanian society, and why they have been granted good governmental positions. However, men were the ones who were granted good governmental positions in Jordan, and not women. Therefore, when research participants talk about being integrated they are talking about men, rather than women.

The state of Jordan also promotes its nationalism through referring to gender relations in ‘Arab’ society, and the importance of preserving the family unit and the gender division of labour, as part of preserving the ‘authenticity’ of ‘Arab’ culture. The state of Jordan also deprives women of the right of transferring their nationality to their children, because nationality is *de jure* transferred through the father. The marginalisation of women’s public roles within state narratives also contributes to the marginalisation of women from nationalist narratives. Handrahan (2002) argues that men are more likely to identify with ethnicity than women. However, this research reveals that women were more likely to identify with Circassia as a homeland than men, and that men were more likely to identify with Jordan as a homeland. The association of women and ethnicity with the private sphere, and males with the public, as questionnaire data showed, could explain why women show more attachment towards Circassia as a homeland compared to Jordan, whereas men show more attachment to Jordan. Besides, women in Jordan are treated as second class citizens, as they do not enjoy the rights that men have, and this may partly explain why women participants were less likely to show attachment towards the state of Jordan.
The state of Jordan, and research participants, highlight women’s role in transmitting culture, and research participants emphasised the importance of women’s role in the preservation of cultural practices and traditions, in addition to the preservation of honour, which justifies control over women. Therefore, Circassian women are expected to be reproducers and bearers of collectivities in the private sphere, they are expected to teach their children the language, culture and tradition, and in the public sphere they are expected to represent their group and preserve the honour of their families.

Circassian women’s experiences are different from those of men, and of other women, especially with the strict age segregation tradition within the Circassian community, as this age segregation applies to men, while women are expected to be responsible for bringing up their children. This was explored in chapter five, which showed that women are placed in the same category as children. Whereas most interviewees mentioned that they had ‘formal’ relations with their fathers due to the strict age segregation tradition, the mothers were the ones who are at home, and who are expected to stay with the children; this places women and children in the same category. On the other hand, the fact that Circassian women are expected to represent their families’ honour and their community as a whole, when interacting with other groups, very much influences women’s lives, and places particular restrictions on them due to their gender and ethnicity.

State Promoted Narratives ‘From Above’

Part of this research deals with the narratives and ideologies the state of Jordan uses to define the nation, which is explored in chapter six. Previous research suggests that Islam constitutes the basis of state nationalist identity in the Middle East (Halliday, 2000a, Halliday, 2000c, Halliday, 2000b). Although Islam is used in state narratives promoted in textbooks of national and civic education, it is used to
support the ‘superiority’ of the ‘Arabs’, as they were the ones who ‘carried the banner of Islam.’ Islam is portrayed as part of the legacy of the ‘Arabs,’ and part of the ‘Arabic’ civilisation, rather than a narrative on its own, which defines the people or the nation. The people of Jordan are defined as ‘Arabs’, and not Muslims, in state narratives, and the usage of Islam is limited to representing part of the achievements of the ‘Arabs.’ On the other hand, Islam is also used to give legitimacy to the Royal Family in Jordan, which claims to be descendents of the prophet Muhammed. At the same time, the Hashemite family is presented as the ‘fathers’ of ‘pan-Arabism’, who represent the ‘Arab’ nation. While it remains unclear what the word ‘Arab’ means or refers to, it is talked about in primordial terms.

Anderson (2002) identifies two elements of state nationalism in the Middle East, arguing that nationalism in the Middle East has a dual character or dual nationalism, one that is based on the ‘Arab’ nation, and the other one based on the territory or land. The findings of this research build on his argument, as I identified the same elements of nationalism- ‘pan-Arabism’ and Jordanian territorial nationalism. However, throughout the analysis of textbooks of national and civic education, the ‘Jordan First’ campaign, and other state documents, it appeared that even territorial nationalism is defined in ‘pan-Arab’ terms, as the land or territory was labelled as ‘Arab’ land, and the people who belong to and own the land are ‘Arabs.’ Although the concept pan-nationalism refers to the people, and territorial nationalism refers to the land, in textbooks of civic and national education, territorial nationalism also revolves around the people. Chapter six showed that there is no clear-cut separation between these two concepts, ‘pan-Arabism’ and Jordanianism, as they are very much interlinked, and the state of Jordan appears to be emphasising ‘Arabism’ as the basis of its nationalist narrative.

As the term ‘Arab’ remains unclear, research participants used it to refer to the majority in Jordan, while most of them identified themselves as ‘non-Arabs’, especially when speaking about their ethnic narratives. It became clear that research
participants realised that the state of Jordan uses the term in a primordial sense which is exclusionary for them and disregards their contribution to the building of the state of Jordan. In spite of their realisation of their exclusion from state narratives, research participants believed that they are integrated into Jordanian society because of the fact that many Circassian men attained good governmental positions. (I discuss the idea of integration in more detail below). This exclusion also made them feel that the good treatment of the Circassians in Jordan is due to the Hashemites’ generosity, as they granted them the right to be in Jordan in spite of their ‘non-Arab’ origins. This generosity on behalf of the Hashemites was a way of making allegiances with the Circassians in Jordan. At the same time, research participants seemed to adopt certain strategies to include themselves within the state’s definition of the nation and to reconcile the differences between state ethnonationalism and their ‘non-Arab’ origins. For instance, some chose to de-ethnicise Jordanianism, others chose to view ‘pan-Arabism’ in non-primordial terms, and the majority emphasised religion as part of their (re)construction of the narratives. Those strategies show that the (re)construction of state nationalist narratives ‘from below’ seems very different to how the narratives are promoted ‘from above’, and this has been an area often unexplored in the literature. Research participants’ (re)construction of nationalism contributes to their feelings of belonging to the state of Jordan, and for that reason I chose to look at their (re)construction of state nationalism, as it contributes to our understanding of belonging amongst ethnic minorities.

(Re)Constructing Jordanianism ‘From Below’

The (re)construction by research participants of what it means to be Jordanian is very different from the construction of the state. This shows that, although Jordan is succeeding in promoting itself as an ‘Arab’ country, this does not mean that it is
succeeding in creating a sense of belonging amongst the people of Jordan towards an ‘Arab’ nation. This is because some research participants chose to either adopt different views about ‘Arabism’, or to ignore it as part of their (re)construction of Jordanianism, and their (re)construction appears to be strongly influenced by Islam. First and foremost, Islam appeared to be a narrative that is prevalent amongst research participants, as all of them identified themselves as Muslims, and most of them viewed Jordan as an Islamic country, because the rulers are Muslims and the majority in Jordan is Muslim.

A main theme identified in the ‘Islam’ narrative was the universalism of Islam, and that it is not exclusive for one nation. It became clear that, for research participants, ‘Islam’ is a bond that transcends ethnicities and nationalisms, and a bond they share with the majority of Jordanians. It was also obvious that research participants’ view Islam in non-primordial terms, as a commonality between themselves and the ‘Arabs’ that is not ethnic. Although some argue that there exists an ‘Islamic theory of ethnicity’ (See Ataman 2003), this research revealed that Islam is utilised by research participants when they are trying to draw on similarities between themselves and the majority in Jordan, and when they attempt to reconcile their narratives with the narratives of the state of Jordan. This also makes the theory of the existence of an Islamic ethnicity very contextual, as when participants talked about their ethnic narratives they drew on differences, while when they attempted to explain their position in Jordan, they drew on similarities. On the other hand, Islam was also utilised by some research participants to deconstruct the concept of ‘pan-Arabism’ and strip it of its ethnic and primordial connotations. This leads to the (re)construction of another view of ‘Arabism’.

Some research participants chose to de-ethnicise ‘Arabism’ by saying that it is universal, because Arabic is the language of the Quran. By saying that those who speak Arabic, regardless of origin, are ‘Arabs’ and by saying that Arabism is about a ‘universal’ language, and not limited to an ethnic group, research participants were
including themselves as part of the ‘Arabs.’ Therefore, for some research participants the term ‘Arab’ had the same connotations as Islam, especially when emphasised as the language of the ‘Quran.’ Although language can also be a way to understand ethnicity, some research participants emphasised that the ‘Arabs’ are neither a nation nor an ethnic group. Others who believed that the ‘Arabs’ are an ethnic group chose to look at the land of Jordan in non-primordial terms, despite the fact that the state of Jordan promotes it as an ‘Arab’ land.

The deconstruction and (re)construction of Jordanianism and ‘Arabism’ were used as a way of justifying Circassians’ positions in Jordan by research participants. The (re)construction also shows that, in spite of the primordial narratives the state promotes about the ‘Arabs’, research participants found other ways and strategies to explain their position in Jordan. This (re)construction also shows that, for the research participants, narratives of ethnicities and nationalisms are constantly (re)constructed, (re)configured, and contextualised. Furthermore, research participants, who identified themselves as Circassians, were attempting to find a space for themselves within ethnonational Jordan by linking their feelings towards being Jordanian to the public sphere, and their feelings towards being Circassian to the private sphere. This shows how for them, ethnicity is linked to the private sphere, and their nationalist feelings towards Jordan are not based on primordial notions of ethnicity. Rather what it means to be Jordanian is (re)configured by stripping the notion of Jordanianism of its primordial implications, as explored in chapter four.

It is very important, however, to emphasise that research participants, despite identifying themselves as Circassian and Jordanian, did this with difficulty. My findings show that many research participants, as explained in chapter seven, fear that their political position in Jordan could change, and feel that it is changing due to the different policies of King Abdullah II and the fact that fewer Circassians from the younger generations are joining the army or governmental departments because of
low pay in the public sector. Some even mentioned that Circassians holding governmental positions were being replaced by Palestinians. Therefore, it is important to clarify that the position of a particular group can change, and it seems as if the research participants felt that they, as a group, were going through a stage of transition in their position and status. Chatty (2010) drawing on historical narratives of older generations of the Circassian community argues that Circassians are integrated into Jordanian society. She says,

‘Self-identification of individual Circassians remains firmly based on ethnic qualities, language, culture and customs. For many, these markers sat comfortably with those of national identity. Being Circassian and being Jordanian or Syrian were not contradictory’ (Chatty, 2010: 133).

In contrast the findings of my research show that many research participants felt uncomfortable when attempting to bridge the differences between their ethnic narratives and the national markers of the state of Jordan. This difference between the findings of the two studies can possibly be explained by the differences in the samples. My sample was drawn from the younger generations of the Circassian community, while Chatty’s was drawn from the oldest surviving members of the Circassian community. Although my questionnaire sample included people of varying ages, my interviewees were concentrated in the younger age groups. There may be differences between older and younger generations of Circassians in terms of how they understand and narrate their relation to the state of Jordan. The fact that Chatty found that self-identification of Circassians sat comfortably with their national identity, while, for my research participants, bridging the gap between their ethnic and national identification created difficulty, may not only reflect a difference between older and younger generations, but could also reflect a change in the status of the group, a change in the state’s policies towards numerical minorities and/or that Circassians in Jordan are not a homogeneous group. An example of such
changes is provided by the state’s privatisation processes, which will be discussed and linked to the position of Palestinians in the following section.

Reflections on Integration

I was initially interested in exploring the different experiences of integration between the Palestinians and Circassians. However, in order to do this it is necessary to reflect on the different aspects of integration and how it can be understood. It needs to be looked at on different levels - social, political and economic - but it is beyond the scope of this research to cover fully all these aspects of integration. However, my research findings suggest that Circassians believe that they are integrated into Jordanian society. Many of them mentioned their political participation in the state of Jordan as an example, with the first mayor of Amman being Circassian and Amman being characterised as a Circassian village. An emphasis on their role, as a group, in the building of the state of Jordan also suggests that research participants believe that they are politically integrated in Jordan.

On the other hand, it is important to recognise that accounts of the economic integration of Circassians in Jordan derive from the fact that historically they were amongst the first settlers in Amman, and other Jordanian cities. As their skills and reputation in trade and agriculture are given special attention, even in literary and historical accounts of Amman (see chapter one), they are often portrayed and thought of as land owners and owners of private property. In this study, however, it has been hard to address the economic integration of the Circassians because most research participants were relatively well-off and it is hazardous to generalise about a whole community from such a small sample. However, as highlighted above, research participants felt that their position in the state of Jordan is changing, and they mentioned that some Circassians in government positions are being replaced by Palestinians; this suggests that the relative positions of both groups may be shifting.
Such shifts could be linked to changing state policies, and brings me back to a consideration of the different experiences of Circassians and Palestinians in Jordan.

The state of Jordan, under the reign of King Abdullah II, has been going through major privatisation processes. Ongoing privatisation of the public sector means that state control is weakening; this may contribute to the different feelings expressed by older and younger generations of the Circassian community. In other words, with the shrinking power of the state, the position of minorities privileged by the state might change and, by the same token, the status of groups previously discriminated against by the state could also change, transforming a public sector that largely excludes the Palestinians into a private sector might open opportunities for Palestinians to prosper economically. Nonetheless, returning to the question of the position of Palestinians in Jordan, one should acknowledge that Palestinians in Jordan are a numerical majority, and this means that, unlike the Circassians, they are a diverse group, with different statuses and positions within Jordan.

Despite the fact that many Palestinians still live in camps in Jordan, others have managed to move outside the camps, and live in affluent areas. This means that a generalisation about the economic integration of Palestinians is likely to be inaccurate. In other words, many Palestinians are upper and upper middle class and much of the private sector is owned by Palestinian entrepreneurs. Moreover, the different legal statuses Palestinians have in Jordan also contribute to their varying positions. For instance, some Palestinians have refugee status, while others have full Jordanian citizenship. Even those who have full Jordanian citizenship are still excluded from the public sector, and are not politically represented as an ethnic group, unlike the Circassians who are included through the ethnic quota law. Other Palestinians, specifically, those living in refugee camps, suffer from poverty, lack of good infrastructure and overcrowding. For those reasons, it is very difficult to discuss the economic integration of Palestinians as a group.
On the social level, based on the findings of this research, I am unable to compare the Palestinians and Circassians. Nonetheless, findings show that although the Circassians might be integrated politically into Jordanian society, they identify themselves as different from the Jordanian majority, and define themselves as an ethnic group. Furthermore, as previously explained, research participants found it difficult to bridge the gap between their being Circassian and Jordanian at the same time. References to different cultural practices and origins, in addition to their attempt to present themselves as superior in terms of gender relations, show that the Circassians still define themselves as different, although Jordanian, but a distinctive ethnic group. They retain social distinctions between themselves and the majority population which suggests that their social integration does not involve total cultural assimilation.

Drawing on the history of the two groups and the history of their relationship to the state of Jordan, discussed in chapter one, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions about the differences between Circassian and Palestinian integration. Firstly, their migration processes differ significantly. Whereas Circassian migration took place during Ottoman times, the Palestinian refugee flows took place between 1947-9 when Jordan had already been established as a state. Thus the Circassians had established themselves as a settler community in what is now Jordan, during Ottoman times. Despite the fact that Circassians were used by the Ottomans to stand up against Bedouins and other locals, and that because of this their relationship to the ‘Arab’ locals had been turbulent, the Circassian community became privileged particularly in Amman settlement, which later became the capital of Jordan. As explained in chapter one, Circassians were hated by the ‘Arab’ Bedouin tribes, due to their alignment with the Ottomans. Thus when the ‘Arabs’ defeated the Ottomans in the area, Circassians were placed in a very critical position. However, well-established Circassians in Amman, which was characterised as a Circassian village after the defeat of the Ottomans, benefited from the political activities taking place in
Amman under British control, and the initial mistrust between Circassians and ‘Arabs’ was overcome.

Making Amman the capital of Jordan, and the centre of political activity contributed to the economic and political integration of the Circassian community. On the political level, creating the Arab Legion and the Transjordan Frontier Force in Amman inevitably meant Circassian political participation, as more than half the population in Amman was Circassian. On the economic level, Circassians were established as landowners and the fact that political activity took place in Amman by default allowed economic opportunities, particularly with the rapid increase in the number of inhabitants of the city. These historical factors influenced the relationship between the Circassian community and the state of Jordan, and also contributed to their different standing in Jordanian society, when compared to Palestinians.

The case of the Palestinians is different. For a start, they are numerically a majority in Jordan, while the Circassians are a very small minority. As mentioned earlier, the Palestinians in Jordan now are a diverse group, and one cannot generalise about their position or integration, either politically or economically. However, drawing on the history of the relationship of the Palestinian community to the state of Jordan, what is now called Palestine and Jordan are only separated by one river, and for some time they followed the same administration. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, both areas, nowadays Palestine and Jordan, came under British control. While present-day Jordan attained its independence gradually starting with the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1920, the occupied Palestinian territories remained under British control until the UN partition plan in 1947, which allowed for the establishment of the ‘Israeli’ state on Palestinian territories. Upon the establishment of the state of ‘Israel’, all Palestinians on the West and the East side of the Jordan River were granted Jordanian citizenship, and the remaining Palestinian territories came under the administration of the Hashemite King Abdullah I.
The establishment of the state of ‘Israel’, as explained earlier, also created refugee flows, and many Palestinians from the West side of the Jordan River left their homes and properties and sought refuge in present-day Jordan. Despite the fact that all Palestinians were granted Jordanian citizenship, and both banks of the river came under Hashemite administration, Palestinian refugees wanted to return to the homes they had to flee. This desire created Palestinian nationalist aspirations, and was supported by many ‘Arab’ countries that waged wars against ‘Israel’. The result was ‘Israeli’ control over the whole of the Palestinian territories. Other factors that could have influenced the relationship between the Palestinians and the state of Jordan include the assassination of King Abdullah I by a Palestinian in Jerusalem, and the 1970 civil war in Jordan.

On the economic level, as explained earlier, it is hard to generalise about Palestinian integration, as they are a diverse group. However, on the political level, one can see that throughout their presence in Jordan Palestinians’ relationship to the state of Jordan has not been smooth. In contrast to the Circassians, the Palestinians have nationalist aspirations, and their claim to a nation-state means that, in a very real sense, they are not seeking full political integration in the state of Jordan. This is very different from the Circassians. These factors influence the position of the Palestinians in Jordan, their relationship to the state of Jordan, and the state’s attitude towards them as a group. Thus the lack of political recognition Palestinians experience, within the boundaries of the state of Jordan, can be explained through their history and their nationalistic feelings towards a homeland that they have been struggling to reclaim for over sixty years.

This has been partly pointed out by Massad (2001) and Lucas (2008) who say that Jordanian nationalism was constructed in opposition to Palestinian nationalism in the aftermath of the civil war that took place in Jordan in the early 1970s. Lucas (2008) states ‘a rising new form of Palestinian nationalism would set the stage for the final challenge to the sovereignty of the Jordanian state’ (283). This means that
Jordanian nationalism is constructed in relation to an ‘other’, which in this case is the Palestinians. The Circassians, defined and recognised as an ethnic group by the state of Jordan, are not regarded as threatening to the sovereignty of the state of Jordan, and this contributes to the differential political integration of both groups.

The answer to the question about Circassian and Palestinian integration in Jordan is not straightforward. Nonetheless, it has been important to reflect on the contrast between Palestinians and Circassians in this chapter, as this contrast is what triggered my interest in the Circassian community. Finally, it is important to highlight that the major difference between the Palestinians and the Circassians as groups in Jordan is related to their political standing. In other words, whereas the Circassians are integrated into the government and the public sector and allowed seats in the parliament, as a recognised ethnic group, the Palestinians are not. The numerical superiority of the Palestinians in Jordan also makes it problematic for the state of Jordan to recognise their presence on Jordanian lands as an ethnic or national group, as this would be threatening to the whole entity of the state. Therefore, to sum up the major difference between Circassians and Palestinians can be explained through the differential political integration both groups experience. Having reflected on this contrast, I move to a discussion of the theoretical contributions of this research in the next section.
Theoretical Contributions

The empirical contributions of this research, discussed above, developed my understanding of ethnicity, national ideologies, diaspora, and gender and ethnicity. First and foremost, this research addressed some gaps in the literature on diasporic communities living in the Middle East. This case study of the Circassian community in Jordan constitutes an important contribution to knowledge, as it moves away from the stigmatisation of diasporic communities as having a ‘natural’ bond with their original homelands. Thus the findings of the research show that the narratives of Circassians in Jordan are context dependent, and very much influenced by the prolonged presence of the Circassians in Jordan. The case study also echoes Anthias’s (1998) argument on ethnicities in diaspora being constructed in relational and contextual terms. Furthermore, as ethnicities in diaspora are often (re)constructed and (re)configured, dealing with ethnic minorities as ‘deviant from the norm’ is problematic. In other words, as ethnicities are (re)constructed, the ethnic narratives of specific communities can be formulated in ways that enable ethnic minorities to accommodate themselves in the nationalist narratives of the state where they reside; this appeared to be the case for the Circassian participants in this research.

In addition, the research has also addressed how people define their ethnicities ‘from below’ by building on the circumstantialist approach to the concept of ethnicity. In other words, looking at ethnicity as a social construct helped me to understand and gain further insight into the meanings attached to sharing ancestry, language and culture for research participants; rather than simply how best to classify people into ethnic categories (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007, Drury, 1994, Fenton 2010, Jenkins, 2008, Song, 2003). The research findings also show that although ethnicity is socially constructed, and although my understanding of ethnicity is based on this, ethnic actors often refer to primordial notions of ethnicity to define their group boundaries, as explored in chapter four. This approach to
ethnicity also allowed me to recognise that people have multiple belongings, and should not simply be treated as ethnic actors; they can belong to class, family, gender, and/or a state. The findings show that research participants see themselves both as an ethnic group, and as Jordanian nationals, which shows that their belongings are multiple; this understanding has been facilitated by the use of the narrative approach which also helps in exploring the intersections of ethnicity and gender (Prins, 2006).

Since belonging is multiple, it has also been important to explore gender in relation to ethnicity, and this exploration provides some theoretical contributions to this area. Findings show that there are differences between men’s and women’s identification with ethnic narratives, and that gender relations are used as part of ethnic narratives and as group boundary markers (Handrahan, 2002), as explored in chapter five. The findings of this research build on Benton’s (1998) argument that women play a role in the reproduction of ethnicity, and that they are expected to be responsible for the upbringing and the transmission of ethnic narratives. The findings also show how the social view of women as mothers, reproducers, and representatives of their family’s honour, legitimates control over women and their sexuality. This has not only been evident through the narratives the participants mobilised, but also in relation to the nationalist narratives used by the state of Jordan.

On the other hand, although states own the media through which they promote their nationalist narratives, my approach to nationalism suggests a binary approach to nationalism, ‘from above’ and ‘from below’. This approach does not limit the construction of nationalist narratives to the states or ‘elites’ as ‘ordinary’ people also have power over (re)constructing those narratives; my research findings support this theoretical approach showing that, although the state of Jordan has the power to promote nationalist narratives, research participants (re)construct those narratives in ways that allow them to be included in the definition of the nation. This
approach informs our understanding of ethnicity and nationalism and helps in shifting the focus from the assumption that nationalist narratives are imposed ‘from above,’ to a more informed view of narratives arising ‘from below’.

This thesis addressed and answered the research questions by exploring the ethnic narratives the research participants mobilised, the nationalist narratives of the state of Jordan, how research participants (re)construct those narratives, and the relationship between the state of Jordan and the Circassians from the research participants’ view points. However, this has been done with some limitations, discussed in the following section.

Limitations of the research

Throughout the thesis, I attempted to answer the research questions; however, one of the main limitations of this research has been the limited access I had to older generations of the Circassian community. Due to access problems explained in chapter three, the comparison between younger and older generations of the Circassian community became difficult, as the majority of the interview sample was young men, and the way the sample has been constructed might have influenced the research findings. It became difficult to explore fully the age differences, as the sample was lacking older men and women; however, the 77 year old interviewee’s responses were different from the responses of younger men and women. I had intended initially to use only qualitative data collection methods, but my methods changed to a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. This change had both its limitations and positive impacts. Although the quantitative data provided me with more access to the community, at the same time I could have benefitted from more interviews with Circassians from different age groups. Therefore, one of the main limitations of this research is related to the generalisability of the research findings, as the interview sample is small, and may
disproportionately reflect the perceptions of the younger generations of men in the Circassian community.

Moreover, the biases within the sample made an exploration of class and ethnicity hard, as most interviewees came from similar class backgrounds, and questionnaire respondents as well seemed to be well-off, with relatively high household incomes in the context of Jordan. Therefore, class and its influence on the position of Circassians in Jordan is an area that is worthy of further investigation. The fact that the interviewees and the questionnaire respondents come from similar class backgrounds can either mean limitations within the sample, or that the economic position of Circassians in Jordan is generally very good.

**Future Research**

Despite these limitations, the research has yielded valuable findings that can open the door to potential research into the areas of nationalism and ethnic minorities in the Middle East. Expanding on the research findings might be done through supplementary research on the ethnic narratives of Circassians in Jordan and Turkey and/or Syria; this would be a comparative study of the ethnic narratives identified in this research, and the ethnic narratives of people who consider themselves Circassians living in different socio-economic and cultural contexts. This would be particularly important because many research participants consider themselves Jordanians, as they existed on the land before Jordan became a state, which is also part of the story of their origins, and many mentioned with pride that street names in Amman have Circassian names. This feeling towards the state may not be the case for Circassians in Turkey, Syria, or elsewhere, and may lead to the construction of distinct ethnic narratives. And, research that is dedicated to the everyday life experiences and interactions between those who consider themselves Circassians and ‘non-Arabs’ would also lead to a better understanding of the position of Circassians in Jordan.
This research leads to a questioning of the assumptions that all minorities are de facto excluded from the nation-state, and the assumption that Circassians are integrated into Jordan; it shows that the position of minorities can change. Further research on minority groups that define themselves as ‘non-Arabs’ should take into account the intersection of class and ethnicity. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, it became hard to include class analysis or class comparisons into the research; however, it is an area that is worth further investigation. Circassians represent a unique profile of an ethnic minority in Jordan, especially given that the state of Jordan defines itself in primordial ethnonational terms. Despite their exclusion from the state’s nationalist narratives, research participants constantly looked for ways to include themselves within the state’s definition of the nation, and expressed a particular fear that they might lose their good positions in Jordan, as a result of the constantly changing state policies. Another research project could make a comparison between the Circassians’ and the Palestinians’ (re)construction of state promoted nationalist narratives; such research would, however, be problematic given the prohibition on research into the Palestinians within Jordan. A comparative study, if possible, would be useful to understand the differential position of Circassians and Palestinians in Jordan, and a comparative study could also show how people have different (re)constructions of state promoted narratives.

This research also opens the door for more research to be done in the area of gender and ethnicity. I suggest that, due to the particular neopatriarchal nature of states in the Middle East, women who belong to ethnic minorities have experiences that are different from ethnic minority men, and their experiences are shaped by the intersectionality of gender and ethnicity, which requires further research and investigation. It has been beyond the scope of this research to account fully for women’s experiences based on ethnicity and gender; however, the research sheds light on the particularity of women’s experiences due to the intersectionality of
gender and ethnicity, and shows how ethnicity is gendered and gender can be ethnicised to define the boundaries of ethnic and national groups.

Research that focuses on women’s experiences in relation to ethnicity can be a valuable contribution and complementary to this research, as the experiences of Circassian women can be different from that of Circassian men, and of other women in Jordan, and this is an area that is worthy of further investigation. Although there is a good sum of research on ethnic minority women’s experiences in the West, little has been done on women in the Middle East and, the literature falls short in terms of the work done on the intersectionality of ethnicity and gender. The Eurocentric approach to women in the Middle East assumes that all women share the same experiences, and provides a basis for stereotypes of women and gender relations in the Middle East; it also fails to notice the diversity and the multi-ethnic nature of the region. Thus, this research suggests that a more well-informed approach that takes into consideration the multiplicity of women’s experiences could provide a better picture and better understanding of the different experiences ethnic minority women have in the region, particularly since most states in the Middle East are patriarchal and promote ethnonationalism.
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Appendix A: Questionnaire Consent Paper Sample

Dear participants,

I am writing to you to thank you for your time and effort exerted in completing this questionnaire, and to review your rights as participants and contributors to the success of this research, and to explore with you the aims and the objectives of this research.

Dear participants,

This research is based on a case study of the Circassian community in Jordan, and is part of a doctoral research project for a thesis I will be submitting at the University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom. The study focuses on the Circassian participants’ feelings of belonging, and their preferences when it comes to defining themselves. It explores narratives of ethnicity and nationalism participants use to define themselves, in Jordan.

Dear participants,

It is my ethical responsibility to review your rights, and clarify that all your answers provided in this questionnaire will only be used for the research, and is not based on a research for governments. It is also important to assure you that all the answers you are providing will be handled with confidentiality, and I guarantee your privacy and anonymity. Your participation is highly appreciated, and without your valued participation this research would fail.

Many Thanks,

Nour Abu Assab

**Participant’s Name:** ……………………………………………………………………………

**Phone Number:** ……………………………………………………………………………

**Signature:** ……………………………………………………………………………

**Date:** ……………………………………………………………………………

I assure you again that your privacy and identity will not be compromised, and that the information provided through this questionnaire will only be used for this research, and will not be given to any bodies, or institutions and the material will be treated with high confidentiality. Your privacy is my responsibility!
Appendix B: Interview Consent Paper

Dear interviewee,

I am writing to you to thank you for your time and effort and for allowing me to interview you, and to review your rights as interviewees and contributors to the success of this research, and to explore with you the aims and the objectives of this research.

Dear participants,

This research is based on a case study of the Circassian community in Jordan, and is part of a doctoral research project for a thesis I will be submitting at the University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom. The study focuses on the Circassian interviewees’ feelings of belonging, and their preferences when it comes to defining themselves. It explores narratives of ethnicity and nationalism you use to define yourself, in Jordan.

Dear participants,

It is my ethical responsibility to review your rights, and clarify that this interview will only be used for the research, and is not based on a research for governments. The tape recorders will only be used by me, and to make sure that I do not miss any of the information you provide. It is also important to assure you that all the answers you are providing will be handled with confidentiality, and I guarantee your privacy and anonymity. Your time and effort are highly appreciated, and without your valued participation this research would fail.

Many Thanks,

Nour Abu Assab

Interviewee’s Name: ................................................................................

Phone Number: ....................................................................................

Signature: .............................................................................................

Date: .................................................................................................

I assure you again that your privacy and identity will not be compromised, and that the information provided through this questionnaire will only be used for this research, and will not be given to any bodies, or institutions and the material will be treated with high confidentiality. Your privacy is my responsibility!
Appendix C: Interview Schedule

1) Do you consider yourself Circassian?

2) The questionnaire questions (Appendix D)

3) How do you define yourself as Circassian? What makes you Circassian?

4) Do you speak the Circassian language? Did your parents encourage you to speak it? If yes, who encouraged you more, your father or your mother?

5) Is your ethnicity important for you? Why? What does it mean?

6) Is your culture important for you? How do you define your culture?

7) What is your understanding of the words Wataneyah and Qawmeyah? And how do you define yourself in terms of Qawmeyah and Wataneyah?

8) If asked what do you belong to what would you say?

9) Do you consider yourself a Muslim? What does being a Muslim mean for you?

10) Do you consider yourself an ‘Arab’? What does the word ‘Arab’ mean for you? And whom does it include?

11) Has anyone of your family encouraged you to preserve Circassian culture? Who was it?

12) If you get married to a non-Circassian, what would your children be considered?

13) If your sister/brother marries non-Circassians what would their children be considered? Are you against intermarriage? If yes, why?

14) What was the role of your father and mother in your upbringing?

15) What does the word ‘origin’ mean to you? And how do you define your ‘origin,’ if it means something to you?
16) What does the Great Arab Revolt mean to you?

17) What do you know about the Ottoman Empire?

18) Have you ever heard of the ‘Jordan First’ Campaign? What does it mean to you?

19) Do you consider yourself as Circassian integrated into Jordanian society? How can you explain Circassians’ position in Jordan?

20) How do you define yourself in Jordan?

21) What is Circassians role in the building of Jordan?

22) What does the word ‘native Jordanian’ mean to you? Do you consider yourself a ‘native Jordanian’?

23) How do you define Jordan? ‘Arab’, or Islamic, etc. If you see Jordan as an ‘Arab’ country, how do you define yourself within it? What does being Jordanian mean to you?

24) What do you believe is in common between you and the majority in Jordan? What do you share with the majority in Jordan?

25) Where do you believe that your identity and sense of belonging had been shaped, at home or in school?

26) Where is your homeland? What does it mean to you?

27) Have you ever heard stories about Circassians? Can you tell me about Circassian personalities, or some Circassian tales you heard?

28) What does Islam mean to you? And what does the word ‘ummah’ mean to you?

29) Is there anything you would like to add?
Appendix D: Questionnaire

CIRCASSIAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES
Self-Completion Questionnaire

Please answer the questions in this questionnaire, and bear in mind that all the information provided by you will be treated with confidentiality and are only collected as part of an independent research.

Section (A) Demographic Data

Gender:  □ Male  □ Female

Marital Status:  □ Single  □ Married
□ Divorced  □ Widow

Economic Activity:  □ Employed  □ Public Sector
□ Private Sector
□ Unemployed  □ Independent Worker

Education:  □ Elementary, Secondary, Preparatory
□ High School certificate
□ College diploma or equivalent
□ Undergraduate Degree/ BA, BSc
□ Postgraduate Degree/ MA, PhD
□ Vocational Training

Residential Status:  □ Owned property  □ Rented property

Monthly Household Income:  □ Less than 500 JDs  □ 500-1000 JDs
□ 1000-2500 JDs  □ More than 2500 JDs

Main Source of Household Income (father, mother, brother, etc.): .....................................................

Number of Members in the Household: ..........................................................
Space of the House: ..................................................................................................................

Place of Residence: ................................................................................................................

Nationality/Nationalities: ......................................................................................................

Place of Birth: .........................................................................................................................

Parents’ Place of Birth: 

Father: ..................................................  
Mother: ..................................................  

Languages Spoken at home:  

1. ..................................................

2. ..................................................

Have you ever travelled outside Jordan?

□ Yes □ No

If your answer was yes to the previous question, was that

□ Another Arab country □ another non-Arab country  
□ An Arab and a non-Arab country

Is water available 24/7 in your household?

□ Yes □ No □ Most of the time

Is electricity available 24/7 in your household?

□ Yes □ No □ Most of the time

In winter times, what is the method of heating you use in your household?

□ Central Heating □ Gasoline heater  
□ Electric Heater □ Another type of heater ..............................................................................

What is the main means of transportation you use?

□ Public transport □ Taxis □ private car

How often do you go out for leisure?

□ Once or more a week □ Once or more a month  
□ Once or more a year □ Less than that

Please Specify ........................................................................................................

I visited Circassia

□ Yes □ No
Section (B) Reflections on feelings and Knowledge test

- Which of the following flags reflects your feelings of belonging?

- Which of the following flags reflects your pan-nationalism?

- Which of the following flags reflects your nationalism?

- Which of the following flags represents the ethnic group you belong to?

- Which of the following flags represents your homeland?

- Which of the following flags represents you in an international context?

- The picture below is for:
  - Abd-al-qader al-Husseini
  - King Talal bin Abdullah
  - King Abdullah I
  - King Hussein bin Talal

- The picture below is for:
  - Abd-al-qader al-Husseini
  - King Talal bin Abdullah
  - King Abdullah I
  - King Hussein bin Talal
The picture below is for:

- Abd-al-qader al-Husseini
- King Abdullah I
- King Talal bin Abdullah
- King Hussein bin Talal

Section (C) Questions in relation to self-identification

- Have you ever heard about the ‘Jordan First’ campaign?
  - No
  - Yes
  - Please specify from where? .................................................................

- Have you ever heard about ‘Amman Message’ before?
  - No
  - Yes
  - Please specify from where? .................................................................

- Do you consider yourself of Jordanian Origin?
  - Yes
  - No

Please elaborate: ........................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................

- Do you consider yourself of an Arab origin?
  - Yes
  - No

Please elaborate: ........................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................

- Do you consider yourself of a Muslim origin?
  - Yes
  - No

Please elaborate: ........................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................

- Are you a practising Muslim?
  - Yes
  - No
  - Sort of

Please state to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

- Some say that Jordan is an Arab country, to what extent do you agree or disagree?
  - Strongly Agree
  - Agree
  - Neither
  - Disagree
  - Strongly disagree

Elaborate ...........................................................................................................................
Some say that Jordan is a Muslim country, to what extent do you agree or disagree?

☐ Strongly Agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly disagree

Elaborate ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Some say that ethnic minorities should be provided with help and facilities to be able to preserve their culture and traditions, to what extent do you agree or disagree?

☐ Strongly Agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly disagree

Elaborate ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Section (D) Preferences relating to self-identification

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement, please choose the appropriate answer, and elaborate if you feel the need to.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Elaboration</th>
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<td>Being Circassians constitutes a huge part of my identity</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Being Jordanian constitutes a huge part of my identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Being Muslim constitutes a huge part of my identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speaking Arabic constitutes a huge part of my identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speaking Circassian constitutes a huge part of my identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>My Homeland is Circassia</td>
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<tr>
<td>My Homeland is Jordan</td>
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<tr>
<td>My Homeland is the Muslim world</td>
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<tr>
<td>My homeland is the Arab world</td>
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<tr>
<td>I do not have a homeland</td>
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<tr>
<td>I do not mind marrying a non-Circassian</td>
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<tr>
<td>My best friend must be Circassian</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is not important for me to teach my children Circassian language</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is important for me to preserve my Circassian culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islam, for me, does not constitute a big part of my civilisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>My passport reflects my identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>My origin does not reflect my identity</td>
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<td>My language reflects my identity</td>
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<td>My identity and sense of belonging were shaped at school</td>
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<tr>
<td>My identity and sense of belonging were shaped at home</td>
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<tr>
<td>I like Circassian songs</td>
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<tr>
<td>I do not like Circassian dances</td>
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<tr>
<td>My ethnicity does not constitute a huge part of my identity</td>
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You have reached the end of the questionnaire, many thanks for your participation!
## Appendix E: National and Civic Education Modules

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Family and Town</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Selfhood and Individuality,</td>
<td>– Parents’ Rights,</td>
<td>– Municipal city,</td>
<td>– Geographical location,</td>
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<td>– Roles and Responsibilities of Family Members,</td>
<td>– Town location, and its residents,</td>
<td>– Monuments in the municipal city,</td>
<td>– The main natural geographical phenomena,</td>
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<td>– The Neighbourhood,</td>
<td>– Town monuments,</td>
<td>– Public services,</td>
<td>– Jordanian touristic sites</td>
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<td>– Social Relations,</td>
<td>– Town places,</td>
<td>– Administrative organisation of the municipal city.</td>
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<td>– Public Services.</td>
<td>– Prayer Places,</td>
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<td>– Administrative organisation of the town.</td>
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<td>The Homeland</td>
<td>– Homeland symbols,</td>
<td>– Mode of governance in Jordan,</td>
<td>– Jordan’s relation with neighbouring countries,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>– National occasions.</td>
<td>– The role of the Hashemites in building Jordan.</td>
<td>– Culture and traditions,</td>
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<td>– The nature of the mode of governance in Jordan,</td>
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<td>– The importance of national security,</td>
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<td>– Behaviour in roads.</td>
<td>– National security guards,</td>
<td>– Security and stability,</td>
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<td>and Internation</td>
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<td>– National security institutions,</td>
<td>– Social protection</td>
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<td>al Peace</td>
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<td>– Rules and</td>
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<td>Seventh</td>
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<td><strong>Family and Town</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The Homeland</strong></td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>The State of Jordan and Its Institutions</td>
<td>Jordan’s Cultural History</td>
<td>Cognition, Logic and Debate</td>
<td>Management, Economy and Technology</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------</td>
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<td>- The state (its forms and basis),</td>
<td>- Importance of location,</td>
<td>- Thinking and its strategies,</td>
<td>- Financial institutions,</td>
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<td>- Human rights,</td>
<td>- Cultural monuments</td>
<td>- Observing,</td>
<td>- Money and currency.</td>
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<td>- The constitution.</td>
<td>(Amman and Zarqa)</td>
<td>- Classifying.</td>
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<td>- Elements of the state,</td>
<td>- Importance of location,</td>
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<td>- Labour,</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Functions of the state,</td>
<td>- Cultural monuments</td>
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<td>- Product ion,</td>
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<td>- Forms of the state,</td>
<td>(Jerash and Petra)</td>
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<td>- Public services institutions.</td>
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<td>- Youth clubs and centres,</td>
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<td>- Public fund,</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Scouts,</td>
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<td>- Jordanian labour market,</td>
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<td>- Prince Hassan award for the youth.</td>
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<td>- State budget,</td>
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<td>- Citizenship,</td>
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<td>- Vocational training,</td>
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<td>- Rights and duties,</td>
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<td>- Social security system.</td>
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<td>- The constitution,</td>
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<td>- Belonging</td>
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<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family and Town</td>
<td>Social change</td>
<td>Selfhood, and individualism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modernity and authenticity</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

359
<p>| The Homeland | Characteristics of Development, Youth problems | Education of institutions, Mass Media, Public opinion, Social culture and traditions. |
| National Security and International Peace | Economic stability, National security, Public fund. | The army, Security forces, Armed forces, and development |
| Jordan’s Cultural History | Importance of location, Cultural monuments (Salt and Tafeelah) | Importance of location, Cultural | Importance of location, Cultural | Importance of location, Cultural. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognition, Logic and Debate</th>
<th>Monuments (Madaba, Thibyan, al-Mafraq)</th>
<th>Monuments (Kerak, Shoubak, Ajlun)</th>
<th>The Hashemites (ten of Jordan’s main cities)</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Rationalisation, hypothesis, and speculation,</td>
<td>- Public opinion,</td>
<td>- Knowledge,</td>
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<td>- Debate,</td>
<td>- Tolerance,</td>
<td>- Ethics,</td>
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<td>- Fallacy,</td>
<td>- Intolerance,</td>
<td>- Beliefs.</td>
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<td>- Economic functions of the state,</td>
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<td>- Economic and administrative establishments,</td>
<td>- Income and spending,</td>
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<td>- Budget.</td>
<td>- Public sector employment,</td>
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<td>- Social security.</td>
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<td>The Hashemites</td>
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<td>The Hashemites throughout history,</td>
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<td>The Hashemites ideology.</td>
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Appendix F: Hashemite Family Tree