A sequential selection game with vetoes
Alpern, Steve, Gal, Shmuel and Solan, Eilon. (2010) A sequential selection game with vetoes. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.68 (No.1). pp. 1-14. ISSN 0899-8256Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.05.006
We study a selection game between two committee members (the players). They interview candidates sequentially and have to decide, after each interview, whether to hire the candidate or to interview the next candidate. Each player can either accept or reject the candidate, and if he rejects the candidate while the other accepts her, he can cast a veto. The candidate is hired if accepted by at least one player and not vetoed. The total number of vetoes available for each player are fixed in advance. We prove the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium if there are a finite number of candidates types. For a general candidate distribution we prove the existence of a subgame perfect ε-equilibrium. We exhibit situations in which a player prefers that the other player would have an extra veto, and even prefers to give one of his vetoes to the other player.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Operational Research & Management Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
|Journal or Publication Title:||Games and Economic Behavior|
|Page Range:||pp. 1-14|
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