Alpern, Steve, Fokkink, R., Lidbetter, T. and Clayton, N. S.. (2012) A search game model of the scatter hoarder's problem. Journal of The Royal Society Interface, Vol.9 (No.70). pp. 869-879. ISSN 1742-5689

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Scatter hoarders are animals (e.g. squirrels) who cache food (nuts) over a number of sites for later collection. A certain minimum amount of food must be recovered, possibly after pilfering by another animal, in order to survive the winter. An optimal caching strategy is one that maximizes the survival probability, given worst case behaviour of the pilferer. We modify certain 'accumulation games' studied by Kikuta & Ruckle (2000 J. Optim. Theory Appl.) and Kikuta & Ruckle (2001 Naval Res. Logist.), which modelled the problem of optimal diversification of resources against catastrophic loss, to include the depth at which the food is hidden at each caching site. Optimal caching strategies can then be determined as equilibria in a new 'caching game'. We show how the distribution of food over sites and the site-depths of the optimal caching varies with the animal's survival requirements and the amount of pilfering. We show that in some cases, 'decoy nuts' are required to be placed above other nuts that are buried further down at the same site. Methods from the field of search games are used. Some empirically observed behaviour can be shown to be optimal in our model.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Operational Research & Management Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of The Royal Society Interface
Publisher:	The Royal Society Publishing
ISSN:	1742-5689
Date:	2012
Volume:	Vol.9
Number:	No.70
Page Range:	pp. 869-879
Identification Number:	10.1098/rsif.2011.0581
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/50862

Request changes to a record

Actions (login required)

View Item