Faith in others
Longworth, Guy. (2012) Faith in others. Abstracta, Special Issue VI . pp. 6-32. ISSN 1807-9792Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://www.abstracta.pro.br/
When someone tells us something we appear to face a choice: we can accept what they tell us, or not. Insofar as we face a genuine choice—insofar as it is up to us whether or not to accept what we are told—our deciding in one way or another might be guided by any of a
variety of considerations. Perhaps it is important to us, for practical, prudential, or theoretical reasons, to take a stand as to whether or not something is so. In that case, we might choose to accept what we are told because that is a way of taking such a stand, rather than remaining neutral. More typically, we hope not only to take one or another stand, but to take a stand that is correct or amounts to knowledge. In that case, we accept what we are told because we hope that it is a way to come to believe correctly, or to know, where the latter is something that we desire or need. Alternatively, perhaps we recognize that our interlocutor is competent with respect to what they tell us, so that failing to accept what we are told would amount to treating them as insincere. (Here ‘recognize’ takes an epistemic, rather than honorific, reading: to recognize is to know, rather than to acknowledge an entitlement.) In that case, we might choose to accept what we are told because treating a
person as insincere without good reason is in conflict with the demands of morality. Or perhaps we recognize that our interlocutor is sincere, so that failing to accept what they tell us would amount to treating them as incompetent. In that case, again, there may be moral
reasons for accepting what we are told. And, of course, we may recognize neither the competence nor the sincerity of our interlocutor and yet acknowledge both on moral grounds.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Abstracta|
|Volume:||Special Issue VI|
|Number of Pages:||27|
|Page Range:||pp. 6-32|
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