Roessler, Johannes. (2013) The silence of self-knowledge. Philosophical Explorations, Volume 16 (Number 1). pp. 1-17. ISSN 1386-9795

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Abstract

Gareth Evans famously affirmed an explanatory connection between answering the question whether p and knowing whether one believes that p. This is commonly interpreted in terms of the idea that judging that p constitutes an adequate basis for the belief that one believes that p. This paper formulates and defends an alternative, more modest interpretation, which develops from the suggestion that one can know that one believes that p in judging that p.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Self-knowledge, Theory of, Belief and doubt, Practical reason
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophical Explorations
Publisher:	Routledge
ISSN:	1386-9795
Date:	January 2013
Volume:	Volume 16
Number:	Number 1
Page Range:	pp. 1-17
Identification Number:	10.1080/13869795.2013.744084
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/51139

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