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Sharing the cost of a public good : an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
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Maniquet, Francois and Sprumont, Yves (2010) Sharing the cost of a public good : an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.68 (No.1). pp. 275-302. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.024 ISSN 0899-8256.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.024
Abstract
We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged.
Under suitable domain restrictions, we give an explicit characterization of all incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules. We then show that there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Games and Economic Behavior | ||||
Publisher: | Elsevier | ||||
ISSN: | 0899-8256 | ||||
Official Date: | January 2010 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Vol.68 | ||||
Number: | No.1 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 275-302 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.024 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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