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On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
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Goertz, Johanna M.M. and Maniquet, Francois (2011) On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.146 (No.4). pp. 1464-1480. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.001 ISSN 00220531.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.001
Abstract
We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [5], [6] and [7]). We show that this result does not extend to elections with more than two candidates. We study a class of simple scoring rules in voting games with Poisson population uncertainty and three candidates. No simple scoring rule aggregates information efficiently, even if preferences are dichotomous and a Condorcet winner always exists. We introduce a weaker criterion of informational efficiency that requires a voting rule to have at least one efficient equilibrium. Only approval voting satisfies this criterion.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Economic Theory | ||||
Publisher: | Academic Press | ||||
ISSN: | 00220531 | ||||
Official Date: | July 2011 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Vol.146 | ||||
Number: | No.4 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 1464-1480 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.001 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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