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Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, Draca, Mirko and Fons-Rosen, Christian (2012) Revolving door lobbyists. American Economic Review, Vol.102 (No.7). pp. 3731-3748. doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.3731 ISSN 0002-8282.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.7.3731
Abstract
Washington's "revolving door"––the movement from government service into the lobbying industry––is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24 percent drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period, and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | American Economic Review | ||||
Publisher: | American Economic Association | ||||
ISSN: | 0002-8282 | ||||
Official Date: | December 2012 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Vol.102 | ||||
Number: | No.7 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 3731-3748 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1257/aer.102.7.3731 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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