Meier, Martin, Minelli, Enrico and Polemarchakis, Herakles (2012) Competitive markets with private information on both sides. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick..

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Abstract

We consider competitive markets with asymmetric information. We dene a notion of equilibrium that allows individuals to act strategically both as buyers and as sellers, and we prove that equilibria exist.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Markets -- Econometric models, Information asymmetry
Publisher:	University of Warwick
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	16 June 2012
Number of Pages:	28
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Description:	First issued July 17, 2011, this version: June 16, 2012
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/51399

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