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Moral aspirations and ideals

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Brownlee, Kimberley (2010) Moral aspirations and ideals. Utilitas, Volume 22 (Number 3). pp. 241-257. doi:10.1017/S0953820810000178 ISSN 0953-8208. [ 🗎 Public].

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0953820810000178

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Abstract

My aim is to vindicate two distinct and important moral categories – ideals and aspirations – which have received modest, and sometimes negative, attention in recent normative debates. An ideal is a conception of perfection or model of excellence around which we can shape our thoughts and actions. An aspiration, by contrast, is an attitudinal position of steadfast commitment to, striving for, or deep desire or longing for, an ideal. I locate these two concepts in relation to more familiar moral concepts such as duty, virtue, and the good to demonstrate, amongst other things, first, that what is morally significant about ideals and aspirations cannot be fully accommodated within a virtue ethical framework that gives a central role to the Virtuous Person as a purported model of excellence. On a certain interpretation, the Virtuous Person is not a meaningful ideal for moral agents. Second, I articulate one sense in which aspirations are morally required imaginative acts given their potential to expand the realm of practical moral possibility.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Conduct of life, Ethics, Value
Journal or Publication Title: Utilitas
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISSN: 0953-8208
Official Date: 2010
Dates:
DateEvent
2010Published
Volume: Volume 22
Number: Number 3
Page Range: pp. 241-257
DOI: 10.1017/S0953820810000178
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit: 23 December 2015
Date of first compliant Open Access: 23 December 2015

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