Soteriou, Matthew. (2010) Perceiving events. Philosophical Explorations, Vol.13 (No.3). pp. 223-241. ISSN 1386-9795Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2010.501904
The aim in this paper is to focus on one of the proposals about successful perception that has led its adherents to advance some kind of disjunctive account of experience. The proposal is that we should understand the conscious sensory experience involved in successful perception in relational terms. I first try to clarify what the commitments of the view are, and where disagreements with competing views may lie. I then suggest that there are considerations relating to the conscious character of our perception of events that speak in its favour.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Perception (Philosophy), Relationism, Representation (Philosophy), Events (Philosophy), Knowledge, Theory of|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Philosophical Explorations|
|Number of Pages:||19|
|Page Range:||pp. 223-241|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
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