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Children's differentiation between beliefs about matters of fact and matters of opinion

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Banerjee, R., Yuill, N., Easton, K., Larson, C. and Robinson, Elizabeth J.. (2007) Children's differentiation between beliefs about matters of fact and matters of opinion. Developmental Psychology, Vol.43 . pp. 1084-1096. ISSN 0012-1649

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Abstract

Two experiments investigated children’s implicit and explicit differentiation between beliefs about matters of fact and matters of opinion. In Experiment 1, 8- to 9-year-olds’ (n ! 88) explicit understanding of the subjectivity of opinions was found to be limited, but their conformity to others’ judgments on a matter of opinion was considerably lower than their conformity to others’ views regarding an ambiguous fact. In Experiment 2, children aged 6, 8, or 10 years (n ! 81) were asked to make judgments either about ambiguous matters of fact or about matters of opinion and then heard an opposing judgment from an expert. All age groups conformed to the opposing judgments on factual matters more than they did to the experts’ views on matters of opinion. However, only the oldest children explicitly recognized that opinions are subjective and cannot be “wrong.” Implications of these results for models of children’s reasoning about epistemic states are discussed.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions: Faculty of Science > Psychology
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Knowledge, Theory of, Subjectivity, Judgment
Journal or Publication Title: Developmental Psychology
Publisher: American Psychological Association
ISSN: 0012-1649
Date: September 2007
Volume: Vol.43
Page Range: pp. 1084-1096
Identification Number: 10.1037/0012-1649.43.5.1084
Status: Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version: Open Access
Related URLs:
  • http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.43.5...
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URI: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/52

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