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Moral reasons : particularism, patterns and practice

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Dabbagh, Sorush H., 1974- (2006) Moral reasons : particularism, patterns and practice. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2091452~S1

Abstract

This is the study of the extent of the patternability of the reason-giving behaviour of morally relevant features in different ethical contexts. Whether or not the way in which a morally relevant feature contributes to the moral evaluation of different cases is generalis able is examined in this research. I argue in favour of a core and constitutive modest-generalistic theme, according to which there are general patterns of word use, to which the reason-giving behaviour of moral vocabulary in different contexts is answerable. To this end, I reject the constitutive particularistic claim which holds that the way in which a morally relevant feature behaves in different cases is fully context-dependent. An account drawn from Wittgenstein with regard to the nature of concepts which emphasises the key role of the concept 'practice' is presented to give an account of how the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature in different contexts is answerable to general patterns of word use. Ross's ethics is introduced as an example of the modest-generalistic position. To substantiate this modest-generalistic position, an apparent dilemma is presented for particularists, e.g. Dancy. In order to resolve the second horn of the dilemma, which is an example of a general problem with which any generalistic account is confronted, the account drawn from Wittgenstein with regard to the nature of concepts is again used. Finally, a distinction between the first order and the second order account of the concept 'practice' is presented to give a more plausible account of the concept 'practice' which has an indispensable role in the Wittgensteinian account.

Item Type: Thesis or Dissertation (PhD)
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Ethics, Metaphysics
Date: February 2006
Institution: University of Warwick
Theses Department: Department of Philosophy
Thesis Type: PhD
Publication Status: Unpublished
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: Luntley, Michael, 1953-
Extent: vii, 216 leaves
Language: eng
URI: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/52298

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