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Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders : a limit theorem

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Busetto, Francesca , Codognato, Giulio and Ghosal, Sayantan (2012) Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders : a limit theorem. Working Paper. Coventry: Economics Department, University of Warwick. Warwick economics research paper series (TWERPS), Volume 2012 (Number 994). (Unpublished)

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Abstract

In this paper, in an exchange economy with atoms and an atomless part, we analyze the relationship between the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of a strategic market game and the set of the Walras equilibrium allocations of the exchange economy with which it is associated. In an example, we show that, even when atoms are countably infinite, Cournot-Nash equilibria yield different allocations from the Walras equilibrium allocations of the underlying exchange
economy. We partially replicate the exchange economy by increasing the number of atoms without affecting the atomless part while ensuring that the measure space of agents remains finite. We show that any sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic mar-
ket game associated with the partially replicated exchange economies approximates a Walras equilibrium allocation of the original exchange economy

Item Type: Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Economics, Mathematical, Economics -- Mathematical models, Business enterprises, Industrial management -- Mathematical models, Industrial management games, Games of strategy (Mathematics), Management games
Series Name: Warwick economics research paper series (TWERPS)
Publisher: Economics Department, University of Warwick
Place of Publication: Coventry
Official Date: 2012
Dates:
DateEvent
2012["eprint_fieldopt_dates_date_type_available" not defined]
Volume: Volume 2012
Number: Number 994
Number of Pages: 17
Status: Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Unpublished
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
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