A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick

http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/53136

This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright. Please scroll down to view the document itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
Social Theory and Later Modernities: 
The Turkish Experience

By

Ibrahim Kaya

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

University of Warwick, Department of Sociology 
June 2001
To the Memory of my Mother
Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank Professor Peter Wagner for his supervision; his critique and comments provided me with a great opportunity of revising my perspective and I benefited greatly from the works he suggested. During the doctoral study, I have presented some material arising from the thesis in two seminars and two workshops. At Warwick, I gave a talk about non-western experiences of modernity in a seminar on ‘Advanced Social Theory’ and my thanks go to those participants who provided both critique and comments. Again, at Warwick, I presented a paper on the relations between Islam and modernity in the workshop on ‘Plurality of Modernities’, organized by David Toews. I would like to thank all participants. And in Florence, at the European University Institute, I talked about ‘later modernities’ two times, first in the workshop on ‘varieties of modernity’ and second, in a seminar on ‘European Modernity and Beyond’, both organized by Peter Wagner. I am grateful to all participants and particularly to Johann Arnason, Heidrun Friese, Shin Jong-Hwa and Peter Wagner. Last, but not least, I am very grateful to my father who has helped me most during the most difficult times in my life.

Declaration

I have published an article from the work on the thesis under the title ‘Modernity and Veiled Women’, European Journal of Social Theory, 2000, Vol. 3, No. 2.
Summary

This thesis investigates the socio-historical developments of Turkey in the light of current developments in the tradition of comparative-historical sociology by according a central place to the ‘concept of varieties of modernity’ in the analysis. The debate on varieties of modernity is a response and a contribution to new theoretical developments regarding modernity. And this thesis is set in the conceptual context of the current debate on varieties of modernity by aiming at understanding the Turkish experience as a particular model of modernity. The starting-point of the thesis is the possibility of the emergence of ‘multiple modernities’ with their specific interpretations of the ‘imaginary significations of modernity’. As a consequence, a critique of perspectives that reduce modernization of non-western societies to Westernization emerges immediately. Thus, the assumed equivalence between the West and modernity is problematized through the themes of the ‘plurality’ of civilizations, histories, modernizing agents and projects of modernity. The concept of ‘later modernities’ is suggested as a category for certain varieties of modernity, entirely different from the Western model. The term ‘later modernities’ refers in particular to non-western experiences that came about as distinct models of modernity, different from the West European experience, in the absence of colonization. In this context, the Turkish experience is a particular modernization an analysis of which is able to clarify the argument for varieties of modernity: the Turkish experience has been so far analysed only as a mere case of Westernization. By analysing both civilizational patterns and modernizing agents of Turkey, this thesis suggests that Turkish modernity cannot be read as a version of the Western model. This conclusion is reached through examining Turkish history in terms of a ‘singularization of culture’ against the view that sees Turkey as a border country between the West and Islam. It is argued that the division between West and East is, in fact, irrelevant in the case of Turkey. Therefore, the Turkish experience, as later modernity, does not express a Western model of modernity nor does it correspond to a ‘pure’ Islamic East. The distinctive traits of Turkish modernity are analysed on the basis of the following themes: the nationalizing process, the configuration of state, society and economy; Islam; the woman question. Finally, the lessons from the Turkish experience for a social theory of modernity are discussed in terms of conclusions.
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

1. The Theme of Varieties of Modernity

The theme of varieties of modernity, in its new form, has come to fore at a time when the primary interest of the social sciences is no longer the transformation of societies from tradition to modernity. Rather, in recent decades, social science deals with a ‘new’ phase of modernity: termed postmodernity, late modernity, high modernity, liquid modernity respectively by diverse theorists. In this current development, one element has been central to the theorizing of modernity: the fact that a notion of modernity has spread around the globe so quickly. As a critique of modernity or as a perspective of a so-called ‘new modernity’, postmodernism led some observers to pay renewed attention to modernity’s current phase.\(^1\) The debate on multiple modernities could be seen as a response and a contribution to new theoretical developments regarding modernity.

Recently, several works have appeared treating the ‘plurality of modernities’.\(^2\) This may show that current events under conditions of modernity not only give rise to arguments between the defenders of modernity and postmodernists, but also, for some, they make it feasible to employ the concept multiple modernities in the exploration of the contemporary social world. Thus, the debate on varieties of modernity, as a sociology of knowledge would show, is not an intellectual product that does not seriously consider the social, but rather, a reflection on the realities of the social world.

In the first place, it might seem to be surprising that the theme of multiple modernities has come to the fore at a time when the end of the crucial conflicts and tensions between societies has been largely celebrated with an insistence on the ‘happy ending’ of the war between the socialist and the capitalist blocks (see, for example, Fukuyama, 1992). This, however, should rather be unsurprising,
because the collapse of the Eastern bloc, in contrast to widely shared assumptions, indicated in reality that the ‘convergence’ thesis was far from being achieved. In contrast to those who argued for the end of conflictual relations between human societies, the collapse of communism revealed that societies should be seen as ‘distinct’ from each other. Therefore, the realities of the social world failed to prove the conceptualizations which assumed that societies were converging. Two cases are of particular importance: the Islamist movement and the case of East Asian specificity, both of which played a crucial role in the emergence of the debate on varieties of modernity.

The Islamist movement emerged at a time when the new world order was being prepared. Thus, some western writers were of the opinion that after the collapse of communism, the major conflict was to be that between the west and Islam. Islamic societies not only rejected the new North American and Western European convergence thesis but, at the same time, showed that they ‘differed’ from the owners of the project of a new world order. First, in social science, the ‘reaction’ of Islam was taken as showing that postmodernism’s observation was convincing: Islam, it was assumed, resisted modernity and the West (Ahmed, 1995; Sayyid, 1997). This observation meant to prove postmodernism’s assumption of the end of modernity, rather than trying to understand the motivations of Islamist movements in order to open a discussion as to whether Islamic societies are modern too but in ‘different configurations’. What the theme of varieties of modernity, in this regard, should then argue is that the Islamist movement is far from demonstrating how modernity came to an end, but it is rather the expression of the ‘distinguishing’ features of ‘Islamic modernities’ (chapter 6 and 7).

The theme of varieties of modernity emerges in works on Japan and, to a lesser degree, on some other East Asian cases, for example South Korea. This is not surprising in that Japan was the first non-western country to become a highly advanced modernity. The specificity of Japan, on the one
hand, and the development of some other East Asian countries, on the other, have led some scholars to pay attention to the region (Eisenstadt, 1996; Arnason, 1997). Some of the following crucial theoretical questions could arise from these studies on East Asia and, in particular, on Japan: if modernity is a western project, how did East Asia, by keeping its civilizational distinctions, produce modernities with diminished contact and without imitating the west? What are the ‘particular’ elements in these countries, particularly in Japan, that brought about very advanced modernities?

Taking Islamism and East Asia, as peculiar indicators, into consideration gives rise to the most crucial question: can modernity not be interpreted as having variations? In other words, can it not be argued that there are distinct modernities with their ‘specific’ interpretations of ‘imaginary significations of modernity’? It could be said that the above questions have played a great part in the emergence of the debate on varieties of modernity on which this study is built. Thus, this thesis is set in the conceptual context of the current debate on varieties of modernity by aiming at understanding the Turkish experience as a particular model of modernity. So far we have briefly mentioned some realities on the social ground from which the debate about varieties of modernity stems. It is now necessary to discuss what this perspective signifies in terms of theory and research.

Most of all, the perspective of varieties of modernity should, in two respects, be able to show that modernity may no longer be read as a uniform progress towards final integration. In the first case, modernity should be viewed as a phenomenon open to definitions and interpretations and as a condition under which conflicts and tensions are constantly at stake. This observation expresses a break with mainstream modernization theory which emphasises that an individual society should be understood as an integrated functional system (Parsons, 1971). Once modernity is seen to be unable
to unify or integrate a single society, the ‘universalization’ of human societies under conditions of modernity must be rejected. Thus, in the second case, modernity should not be understood as progress towards universalization. In that modernity cannot end conflicts and tensions between social actors in a single society, nor can it end conflicts and tensions between societies and between civilizations. Thus, modernity should not be viewed as a unifying phenomenon. It could be shown that there are different, even conflicting, interpretations of modernity which do not permit human history to come to an end. Thus, both the integration of individual societies and the ‘universalization’ of world societies must be rejected, in order to elaborate a concept of varieties of modernity.

This perspective constitutes a break with Eurocentric theorising, but it should also be noted that ‘it is obviously incompatible with postmodernist positions...’ (Arnason, 2000a: 1). Rather than viewing a radical pluralism of life-styles and cultural worlds as an indication of the failure of ‘the project of modernity’, the perspective of varieties of modernity should read the plurality of cultural worlds as an indication for the possibility of different interpretations of the imaginary significations of modernity. This possibility could indeed make it plausible to talk about varieties of modernity. For this argument to be developed, the perspective of varieties of modernity needs to define the themes of its analysis as explicitly as possible. In other words, in what way this perspective could overcome a ‘Eurocentric’ view of modernity needs to be shown explicitly. In the following consideration, some of the most basic themes shall be outlined.

**Historical Background:** A study of varieties of modernişty should question the universalist perspectives of history. It needs to pose questions to the universalistic assumptions of history most importantly by portraying the plurality of histories, for example that of feudal Europe versus the centralised Ottoman empire. In this light, it could become tenable to argue that ‘different’ historical
backgrounds do not necessarily converge under conditions of modernity. Thus, an analysis of varieties of modernity is necessarily a comparative-historical analysis of modernity (chapter 3) with a rejection of evolutionary-universalist theories of history.

**The Varieties of Modernizing Agency:** The plurality of modernizing agents should be taken to be an important factor in the formation of different modernities. Due to historical/contextual distinctions, the agents of modernization differ from place to place. The conflicts causing change do not take place between the same actors in all places. For example in feudal Europe, ‘civil’ conflicts gave rise to the bourgeoisie as an important agent of modernization, whereas in the imperial-patrimonial Ottoman empire, the central conflict emerged with regard to responses to the rise of the West, which gave rise to a new elite that produced the Turkish project of modernity (chapter 3 and 4).

**The Multiplicity of Projects of Modernity:** Modernity could be appear in different versions due to factors which define the views of the agents of modernization. In this respect, it is important to insist on the fact that institutional spheres of modernity could be formed in different ways. Modernity does not explicitly define or found institutional spheres automatically. It is due to this fact that Western modernity aimed at imposing ‘capitalist’ economy, ‘liberal’ democracy, and ‘autonomous’ individuality as universal and explicitly defined, closely linked, realities. Nevertheless, modernity was not understood beyond in the same way as in the West. It is possible, for example, to examine socialist modernity as a different configuration of the institutional spheres of modernity. Rather, the institutional spheres of modernity should be taken as a means of questioning, critique and interpretation so that an observation of varieties of modernity could become plausible (chapter 2 and 3).
**Civilization:** The perspective of varieties of modernity should no doubt consider the relation of modernity to civilization. All other themes within the perspective are indeed related to civilization. A most important element in defining the views of ‘modernizing actors’ is, for example, the civilizational legacy on which their projects are built. Thus, the analysis of multiple modernities is also a civilizational analysis (chapter 3 and 4). Therefore, it seems most important to consider the civilizational characteristic of modernity.

Varieties of modernity, as a theme, has come to the fore at a time when the nation-state seems to have lost much of its credibility. It should not, therefore, be surprising that the perspective of varieties of modernity accords a central role to civilizational analysis. In other words, civilizational analysis concentrates on units of larger dimensions and of longer duration than for single societies. Based on this observation, it questions the perspectives of society as a self-contained nation-state (Arnason, 2000b). Furthermore, this civilizational perspective necessarily questions the idea of civilization in the singular - a product of the eighteenth-century European intellectual climate – so too is it necessary to argue for a plurality of civilisations (chapter 4). Thus, the idea of multiple modernities, undoubtedly, needs to consider relations between modernity and civilization so as to see whether civilizational characteristics are the peculiar dynamics that shape modernities (chapter 3). In terms of the civilizational characteristics of modernity, two scholars are to be considered: Shmuel Eisenstadt and Johann Arnason.

Eisenstadt, a prominent authority on civilizational perspective, reads modernity as a new civilization, which is thought to come about due to the ‘revolutionary’ dynamics of modernity. The modern revolutions, according to Eisenstadt (1978: 177), by means of breaking away with the past, brought about the civilization of modernity. In contrast, Arnason does not view modernity as a separate civilization in itself. Rather, for him, modernity could be described as being both more and
less than a civilization (1997; 2000a). In terms of the dependence of modernity on civilizational legacies, in the contexts in which it is present, modernity is less than a separate civilization; while it is more than a civilization in terms of global transformations (Arnason, 2000a).

In terms of the civilizational characteristics of modernity, this study sides with Arnason’s view, but with a slightly different observation: modernity is understood as a human condition rather than as a separate civilization. Modernity could be seen as being a human condition in that under the conditions of modernity, both opportunities and 'discipline' meet people. In other words, modernity is a human condition which provides new opportunities, e.g. individual liberty, but the modern condition is also an unforeseen disciplining condition. But this human condition does not define how people should live their lives, and it is important here to stress that modernity is not a separate civilization. Therefore, civilizations are important in terms of the shape of modernity. However, civilizations are not the only distinguishing elements of modernities, so too are ‘cultural worlds’ that may be able to produce ‘different modernities’ in the same civilization (chapter 3 and 4). Therefore, it may be useful to observe that some societies might distinguish themselves as a civilizational family with insistence on their own ‘particular’ traits (Turkey is a peculiar case in this sense). As Friese and Wagner (2000) observe, any civilizational analysis may refer to ‘cultural theorising’. Therefore, a cultural theory of modernity is needed for the study of varieties of modernity.

Thus, a distinction between civilization and culture seems to be necessary for showing that a culture belonging to a civilizational zone may particularize itself, thus producing a different modernity. However, when defined in this way, it becomes problematic: when culture is insisted upon as a value system (modernization theory), social change may not be able to be explored.
Therefore, we need to pay further attention to culture and, it must be stressed, that without ‘social actors’ no culture could produce a new world or a modernity in this respect.

The perspective of multiple modernities should view culture as open-ended, understructured, an imperfectly integrated complex of interpretative patterns (Friese and Wagner, 2000). It is that culture is not strictly structured, therefore, its openness to (re)interpretations make it desirable for social actors to bring about innovation. Thus, the agency of modernization needs to be considered in each experience rather than paying our total attentions to macro socio-historical moments as does Arnason (1993; 1997). No doubt, cultural patterns are not reducible to individual forms of action, but at the same time the capability of actors to create new meanings and new pictures of the world must be emphasised (Castoriadis). Thus, the creativity of action should never be neglected in analysing multiple modernities. In sum, neither the centrality of analysis of major socio-historical moments and civilizational/cultural frameworks should be exaggerated nor should the creativity of action be neglected.

I have outlined four basic themes for a sociology of multiple modernities. However, it should be emphasised that these themes are not very distinct. Rather, there are relations between them, that could be clarified as follows: historical background constitutes the most general category, and civilization concerns that against which modernizing actors define their projects of modernity. Thus, the four basic elements for a reading of varieties of modernity are not autonomous realms, but rather, there are interrelations between them, that could be dialectical, conflictual or peaceful.

The above observation has pointed to some central characteristics of the perspective of multiple modernities. Now it is necessary to continue introducing the arguments and goals of this study.
2. The Concept of Later Modernities

It is an essential goal of this study to question ethnocentric (western) theories of modernity. More precisely, this study aims at problematising present-day mainstream social theory, a product of western experience, with the theme of varieties of modernity. For this goal to be achieved, it is argued that an immediate distinction in terms of varieties of modernity remains between the West and the East. The distinction has been developed as one between western ‘original’ modernity and ‘later modernities’. For historical reasons, West European modernity has been termed ‘original modernity’, and modernities emerging in the East, including the Russian experience, ‘later modernities’. This distinction does not privilege western modernity, but accepts that modernity emerged first in western Europe. Nevertheless, being an ‘older’ modernity does not credit western modernity as the only model of modernity. The consideration of modernity as being identical with the West is due to the following historical reason: it was assumed that western Europe, with its distinct characteristics, produced modernity, so that any other modernity necessarily based itself on the existing model. The concept of later modernities breaks with this theorizing mainly by observing contextual distinctions and a plurality of projects of modernity which have not allowed for the West to serve as the model of modernity for the East. Thus, the specificity of the West should no longer matter or, in other words, the West should be seen as just another civilization among many.

In a broad sense, ‘later modernities’ refers to Eastern modernities, but more explicitly it observes those modernities which emerged in the absence of colonization. In other words, later modernities are those modernities which came about on the basis of ‘indigenous projects’ rather than being modernized by the dominant forces of imperialist, western modernity, such as in the case of Algeria. Thus, a later modernity is a modernity which cannot be grouped among the countries whose developments are far from being ‘autonomous’. And more importantly, in order to be able
to speak of a later modernity, it should possess elements which should be distinct enough to problematize the western understanding of modernity (chapter 3).

Thus, the distinctions between western modernity and later modernities are examined so as to argue that it is no longer tenable to view the modernization of non-Western societies merely as ‘westernisation’. Rather, it is important to observe that self-questioning and self-problematization are the basic dynamics for societies in the transformation to modernity (chapter 3). And these self-questionings and self-problematizations are far from being mere outcomes of the rise of the West. An analysis should consider the fact that before the rise of the West, there were already some tangible ‘conflicts’ in terms of interpreting the world and the self in some Eastern societies - that marks the self-transformative capacities of civilizations and societies - rather than reducing the modernization processes of non-western societies to the outcome of Western modernity’s impact.

In terms of the theoretical direction of the concept of later modernities, the following points should be made. These argue against the ‘convergence’ thesis developed by earlier modernization theory by indicating that modernity means to bring about ‘tension-ridden’ relations rather than being the integrating force of human societies. In other words, under conditions of modernity, conflicting projects of life contest each other, e.g. the liberal Western interpretation of autonomous individuality versus the Islamic insistence on community. The concept of later modernities is not in agreement with neo-modernization theory either. The social theory of Giddens, Beck and Lash (1994) is a neo-modernization theory due to the fact that these theorists emphasise autonomous individuality, the contrast of modernity to tradition and the rationalization of culture (expert system). Emphasising both new individuation and globalization, the theories of Giddens, Beck, Lash and others are indeed continuous with earlier modernization theory.
Nor is dependency theory considered to be a desirable perspective in applying to the exploration of later modernities. Emerging as a critique of modernization theory, the dependency perspective surprisingly read the socio-cultural formations as being one and the same (Amin, 1976). In understanding the world according to a centre-periphery dichotomy caused by western capitalism, the dependency perspective somehow approved the success of the West in shaping the entire world. Therefore, it is, in an important sense, a Eurocentric theoretical observation. World systems theory is also continuous with that tradition. By adding the notion of semi-periphery, it observed the world as one socio-historical system, that of the capitalist world economy (Wallerstein, 1987).

On the other hand it is important to note that this study does not side with perspectives that reduce modernity simply to the imperialist power dimensions of the West (Said, 1978). This study recognizes that Western modernity has possessed imperialist characteristics, but it also proposes that modernity is much more complicated than a mere ‘power’ struggle. The interplay of dynamics should be investigated, e.g. of power-culture. Neither is a theory of civilization as unitary and self-defined taken to be important (Huntington, 1997). This perspective of civilization sees civilizations, as unitary and self-defined, causing conflicts which leave no room for peaceful relations between civilizations.

Therefore, what a perspective of later modernities does not aim to argue is that multiple modernities are necessarily antagonistic. Although, one of goals in this thesis is to argue that in order for a society to be a distinct version of modernity, a ‘different’ interpretation of modernity is unavoidable, there is still a way of showing that since these societies live under the same human condition - larger than a separate civilization - they also share some basic characteristics. Here, I wish to state that the modern condition, that provides opportunity but also disciplinizes human beings, may not be viewed as subject only to civilizational contexts, but it in itself changes
civilizational characteristics. It is, thus, important in this respect to note that this thesis argues neither for globalization nor for localization.

Convergency and divergency need to be considered as not necessarily antagonistic but rather as dialectical partners in the formation of modern histories. Neither is one achieved nor does the other establish itself as the rule of human nature. Neither universalism nor particularism may be seen as providing the full condition of human life. From the beginning, human practice and identity have always followed ‘local’ patterns. In this respect, it is unavoidable to submit to the truth: world interpretations and cultural worlds are subject to a radical pluralism. In other words, in this world, in different places, human beings have built different socio-cultural worlds with no project able to assimilate the differences between the plurality of world interpretations. However, human beings are always aware that all other human beings belong to the same family of species. There has, therefore, to a greater extent always been a universal characteristic tendency amongst human cultures regardless of how distinct they are.

Thus, the concept of later modernities does not understand the existence of different modernities as an indication that there is more conflict among modern societies than in previous ages. In contrast, it is held that modernity, as an actor between civilizations, has a high capability for reducing oppositions between societies and between civilizations. However, globalization is rejected, precisely because it is understood as being the diffusion of Western civilization. In fact, for the achievement of a ‘universal’ world, the ‘recognition’ of ‘different’ modernities is an unavoidable condition. So, globalization will not be achieved on the basis of a specific ‘world-interpretation’, but would have to set 'procedural foundations', which do not read the world as an ‘integrated’ unity. By this I mean that a global world would need a mentality that would recognize all societies as being equal but not as unified on the basis of a specific civilization, i.e. the western desire to unify
the world around its own 'values'. Until this point I have introduced a new concept, the concept of later modernities and now it is necessary to mention the Turkish experience of modernity.

3. The Specificity of Turkey

Turkey has often been assumed to be a bridge between the West and the East, more specifically as a bridge between the Islamic East and the Christian West. This already observes a particularity about Turkey’s ‘civilizational patterns’. Some have seen Turkey as having the capacity to bring Islamic East and Christian West to meet in order to reach a consensus in ending historical conflicts (see Berkes, 1976). However, it could be argued here that to assume that Turkey played such a role is problematic, in that Turkey did not aim to achieve full membership either of the Islamic East or of the West. It has nevertheless been observed, as history shows, that the Turks had gone towards the West while they never leaving ‘Anatolia’, Islamic since Turkish conquest. And thus it was assumed that, in modern times, Turkey could go more towards the West in order to show that a non-western ‘identity’ could be Westernised (see, for example, Eren, 1961).

It should not be surprising then that Turkey has recently been regarded, in contradictory terms as an image of the East in the West and as an image of the West in the East (Stokes, 1994). Therefore, as a contradictory image of significance and power, Turkey is a ‘European Islam’ on the one hand, and a ‘modernizing context’ in the Middle East, on the other. Despite the many apparent reasons to regard Turkey as presenting the West in the East and the East in the West, the reality should be open to discussion. The Islamic East found by westerners in Turkey does not correspond to a ‘pure’ Islamic East; and the West found by easterners in Turkey may not typify the actual West. This is to say that the division between West and East is, in fact, irrelevant in the case of Turkey.
It is, firstly, in this respect that Turkey presents an interesting case for a civilizational perspective. One cannot grasp the meaning of Turkish modernity by observing Islamic civilization as the context from which Turkish modernity stems. Nor can one investigate the Turkish experience by analysing its connections with western civilization as the determining force. Rather, the ‘singularization’ of culture requires interpretation. By 'singularization' of culture, I mean to stress that views that aim at understanding the Turkish experience by using a West-East division as the basis of their analyses necessarily fail because Turkish modernity may be seen as a case in which the opposition between West and East does not correspond. Turkey’s position may be understood by observing the fact that Turkish culture singularises itself. In the formation of the Turkish world in Anatolia, Islamic civilization, no doubt, played a very important part as indeed did the West. However, what needs to be done is to examine the capability of a single culture in terms of its ‘openness’ to the ‘outside world’ and in terms of its success in coping with the ‘outside world’. Borrowings from other cultures, however, should not lead one to conclude that the culture under investigation is not ‘authentic’ or ‘distinct’. On the contrary, it is possible to show that this sort of culture could display a distinct experience due to its assimilation of borrowings.

No doubt precisely due to this feature, Turkey is often observed as neither becoming truly Western, nor easily locatable in Islamic context. Thus, the second important feature of Turkey regarding the theme of varieties of modernity is the interpretations of the experience. The crucial question should not be whether Turkey could become a Western society. The starting-point of previous works on understanding the Turkish experience, therefore, needs to be problematized. It seems that both its critics and its protagonists emphasised Kemalism, in that it aimed at westernizing Turkish society. It is hardly convincing to ask whether a society already considered as belonging to the West was westernised or not. This sort of question could be posed in an Eastern context that did not have close relations or connections with the West before the beginning of modernization, (e.g. India).
Although the West occupies a part in the formation of ‘Turkish identity’ for much longer periods than assumed, Turkish modernity needs further interpretation, because it does not express a western modernity. It is thus a basic argument of this thesis that it is important to explore the Turkish experience as being a different form of modernization rather than viewing it merely as a case of westernization. Certainly, to an extent ‘westernization’ plays a role, but this is not abnormal for a society which long ago made its entry into the West. Nonetheless, it is not westernization which makes Turkey a specific case.

Thirdly, it has often been stressed that Turkey is the first modern, Muslim country and that it thus provides a model of modernity for other Islamic societies. In this respect, a most crucial point in terms of the centrality of the Turkish experience to the theme of varieties of modernity may be demonstrated. It has been argued by many observers that Islam does not separate the worldly and the divine orders and that, therefore, the way to modernity is undermined (Gellner, 1992). Islam is known to be inseparable from political authority and it is, therefore, assumed that Islam does not permit a ‘republic’ and/or a ‘democracy’ to emerge (Watt, 1988). Islam is also viewed as a communitarian model that does not credit ‘individuation’, one of distinguishing elements of modernity. The Turkish experience, however, does not prove these observations.

What may be essential in interpreting the relations between Islam and modernity could be that in contrast to the perspectives of Islam and modernity as clearly defined and closed ways of life, both Islam and modernity could, rather, be seen as open to interpretation. Not only are there different modernities, but there are also different ‘Islams’. Turkey in this respect presents a very interesting case that casts doubt over the view of Islam as incompatible with modernity. Unlike observers who stress Islam as one (see, for example, Ahmed, 1992), the Turkish experience indicates that there is
more than one Islam. Thus, it seems urgent to pose questions to those observers who regard ‘Islamism’ as a rejection of modernity.

Fourthly, the Turkish project of modernity, Kemalism, needs to be reviewed in order to understand whether it merely replicates European Enlightenment. It is in this respect that the Turkish experience deserves attention for seeing how modernity could be projected viewed as having different versions. An interpretation of Kemalist modernity could show that there is not only one project of modernity, but that there may be many. Emerging from an imperial state-system - that was in no way feudal - Kemalism did not look for agents of western modernity upon which to model itself; rather, the actors were already at hand for modernizing Turkey. Kemalism was built according to a specific historical-cultural legacy. Therefore, it did not have the same notion of modernity as did westerners. Not only the historical background but also the individual actors who formed Kemalism imagined a modernity which was different from the western model. Thus, Kemalism needs to be interpreted as a different project of modernity.

So far, I have briefly outlined the specificity of Turkey to the debate on varieties of modernity: civilizational particularity, the westernization-modernization argument, the Islam-modernity debate, and the existence of a different project of modernity. I shall now identify what I specifically aim to examine in order to understand Turkish modernity as a different model.

In mainstream social theories, modern society is viewed as a self-contained society, the nation-state (see, for example, Giddens, 1987). The transition from ‘local’ characteristics of human practice to wider network relations and the transition from the imperial-state tradition and from small, regional polities to nation-states are assumed to mark the beginning of the modern epoch. However, this study, though accepting the centrality of the nationalization process to the modern experience,
reads modern society as not completely breaking with civilizational legacies and does not take the
nation-state to mean a ‘harmonious’ collectivity.

Recently, it has been argued that national boundaries and the centrality of the nation-state are being
undermined by the two forces of globalization and localization. Turkey seems to be presenting an
interesting case in that, on the one hand, it seeks to achieve full membership of the European Union
while, on the other hand, inside its borders a problem ‘shakes’ its integrity: that of the Kurdish
question. These situations need an interpretation which considers civilizational and cultural
characteristics and which observes the question of ‘ethnicity’. Thus, the nationalizing process and
its aftermath in the Turkish experience is analysed by considering the themes of civilization, culture
and ethnicity (chapter 4).

The redefinition of collective identity and its symbols could be equated with a social revolution
(Eisenstadt, 1978). This has a special place in the Turkish case. Not only is the ‘invention’ of the
nation important for the present purposes, it is also important to note distinct characteristics of one
country-building process among others. Turkish modernity shows, for example, that it is not
necessary to privilege previous history and traditions in the nationalizing process, but rather that
history could be used ‘negatively’.\textsuperscript{10} Or, for example, it is not always the rule to develop imperial
institutions for political and economic development, as assumed by Arnason (1997; 1998). Rather,
the Turkish experience presents a unique pattern of transition from an imperial state-system to a
non-imperial one, unlike as in the Japanese experience, Japan becoming an imperial centre in East
Asia where it played a marginal part before (Arnason, 1997). Thus, a different picture of nation,
nation-state and civilization is observed, showing how the nation could be differently interpreted
(chapter 4).
In understanding a later modernity, integrating and differentiating forces must be analysed to an important degree so that they could indicate the possibility for different configurations of modernity. The social world constitutes three main spheres: polity, economy and culture. It must be stressed that these spheres do not necessarily determine each other, nor does one of them shape the entire social world. This makes the concept of the plurality of modernities plausible, for example, the industrial economy does not require a standard, universal culture. Thus, there is every reason for ‘social actors’ in different contexts to form these spheres in different ways. And the Turkish experience constitutes a different configuration when we consider forms of state, economy and society (chapter 5). For example, in the Turkish case, unlike the Japanese, integration was much less successful.

Thus, legitimizing aspects of the integrative forces and the self-interpretation of differentiating forces are examined to show that the Turkish experience paints a different picture of the tensions between liberty and discipline. Interpreting some elements as either integrative or differential forces has led, paradoxically, to both discipline and liberty, i.e. Islam was an integrating element of society for the 1980 military coup, while the attempts at Islamizing society caused 'new' conflicts between different parts of the same society. The relations between the state and society and between the state and the economy need to be considered as key indicators for a different configuration of modernity. It is, therefore, argued that in the Turkish case the differentiation and integration of the state, society and economy deserve special attention; for example, the modern state and capitalist economy are much more closely integrated in the Turkish experience than in the West (chapter 5).

In terms of the current debate on Islam’s relations with modernity, Turkey presents a particularly interesting case for observers who want to understand the nature of relations between modernity
and Islam. This is so for two reasons. First, with its particular project of modernity – Kemalism – Turkey has often been noted as a model of modernity for the Islamic world. Secondly, however, the Iranian Islamic revolution posed a serious question whether Kemalism had failed because Iran had, to a large extent, chosen the Turkish way of modernization as its model for development. By analysing modernity and Islam in Turkey, this thesis argues that in terms of relations between Islam and modernity, a different interpretation is needed (chapter 6).

With references to ‘idealized’ versions of Islam and modernity, concrete historical experiences cannot be explored. However, this has not been paid attention to so far. What can be understood from previous work on the relations between Islam and modernity is either a sense of Islam as being either incomparable or fully comparable with western modernity. But it must be considered that neither Islam nor modernity can be shown to be explicitly defined, so closed, ways of living. Thus, by analysing modernity and Islam as projects open to interpretation, this thesis questions modernist, postmodernist and traditionalist perspectives of Islam (chapter 6).

Gender relations no doubt are capable of playing an important part in shaping the entire social world. And it is in modern history that the place of woman in society has become a crucial debate, giving rise to some disputes over goals in modern history. More than in any other social setting, it is perhaps in Islamic societies that the female question occupies a special place in the projects towards the ‘good life’. A distinguishing characteristic of Turkish modernity could explicitly be read by considering the ‘female question’ (chapter 7). Some of the most crucial tensions between Kemalist modernity and Islam regarded women’s liberation and the Turkish experience expresses this characteristic explicitly. By examining the central place of the female question in the Turkish experience I show how both Kemalism and Islamism, as counter projects, have seen women as key actors for the achievement of their ambitions. The analysis of Islamist, veiled women is taken to
serve as a cornerstone both for understanding Kemalism’s distinction among other projects of modernity, and in seeing how the female question has reasserted itself in the current phase of Turkish modernity. The chapter is also considered as serving to show that the Islamist movement should not be understood as a rejection of modernity. Therefore, the two basic goals in analysing Islamist women are, firstly, to show that due to historical background characteristics certain modernities display different characteristics and that Islamism deserves attention beyond being viewed simply as fundamentalism (chapter 7).

The lessons to be learned from the Turkish experience serve as theoretical conclusions to the theme of varieties of modernity (chapter 8). In other words, the main findings of this analysis of a ‘later modernity’ point to the usefulness of a concept of varieties of modernity.

However, a conceptual analysis of modernity needs to be completed before attempting to investigate the crucial distinguishing points of later modernities and the specificity of Turkey. Therefore, we begin with an analysis of modernity as a ‘field of tensions’ (chapter two). Once an argument is made for the plurality of modernities, a view of modernity needs to be developed showing the openness of modernity. In order to do this, modernity shall be conceptualized as a field of tensions that cannot be assumed to be an entity or as an a priori project of the good life.

Modernity refers to differentiation, but nevertheless it does not end with (final) integration. Since modernity is open to interpretations, the project of modernity cannot be completed once and for all. Therefore, the ‘openness’ of modernity is unavoidably observed, although one question demands interpretation along the following lines: how far is it open? The consequences of openness requires another interpretation for understanding modernity’s current phase.
Chapter Two

MODERNITY AS A FIELD OF TENSIONS

1. Introduction

In current debates on modernity, theoretical and practical issues predominantly centred on questions about modernity’s lifetime can be increasingly noticed. In recent social theory, in particular, the central concern seems to regard questions, related to the current phase of modernity, such as whether modernity is exhausted, or whether it is an ‘unfinished project’. Modernity is, therefore, theorised as either dead or incomplete. Despite the oppositions between these two theoretical perspectives, both sides have understood modernity as a coherent whole. The central point which apparently makes these two theoretical perspectives work is the view of the concept of modernity as coherent.

Thus, modernity is explained as being, over the last two centuries or so, a single, uniform, coherent world (see Kolb, 1986). It is for this reason that modernity can be conceptualized as either reaching its end or as an incomplete project. These are the conclusions to which ‘postmodernism’ and ‘modernism’ have thus far arrived. In other words, reading modernity as a coherent whole has led some observers, on the one hand, to conclude that modernity is a dead end, while, on the other hand, others reconstruct modernity as the incomplete project of Enlightenment.

It is no accident that the debate between Habermas and Lyotard has become a vantage point for observing the tensions between the two central theoretical perspectives of modernity in recent years. These two central theoretical perspectives, namely postmodernism and the defence of
Enlightenment modernity - maybe better termed ‘the defence of modernity modernism’ - agree as to the coherence of modernity, despite their distinct understandings of this coherence. It is due to this assumed coherence of modernity that both perspectives have attracted enough supporters. In other words, it is easier to argue for or against modernity, when modernity is viewed as a coherent whole.

Once modernity is defined as a totality – rational, ethical etc. - it becomes impossible to think about any alternative perspective beyond its rejection or defence. Think of modernity, for example, as a totalizing logic on the basis of instrumental rationality; in this case, one would have to read modernity as a dark age, causing the Holocaust, Hiroshima, Chernobyl, etc.. This would be so, because if an epoch is unifying - and unified - in a one fundamental way, there cannot be any way of talking about it other than marking it as a destroying or dehumanizing epoch. But, on the other hand, read modernity, for example, as an emancipating project; in this case, one would have to celebrate it as the bright age, bringing about liberty, universality, social security, etc.

From the above considerations, one could readily argue that modernity is a double-edged phenomenon. In fact, both dark and bright ‘stories’ have taken place in modern history. Indeed the Holocaust, ethnic cleansing, etc. occurred but so did ‘development’. A Japanese person who lost his loved ones in Hiroshima may view modernity as a collapsing, dehumanizing epoch. A Turk, whose history was marked by nothing else than war-making may understand modernity as an humanizing epoch. Should this reveal that modernity is a double-edged phenomenon? Not quite. Viewing modernity as a double-edged phenomenon would also imply holding a coherent vision of life. In other words, dividing modernity into its dark and bright sides could easily lead some to conclude that modernity is a ‘totalizing’ epoch. This could be done by the insistence on one side of viewing
the other side as a side-product. Therefore, in reducing modernity to a double-edged phenomenon, there is always a risk of viewing modernity as a totalizing epoch.

A rejection of the idea of modernity as a coherent whole or even as a double-edged phenomenon, should of course indicate that it is more multiple more than anything: ‘Our horizons are multiple, and that multiplicity is not itself a collection or a system appearing within some last unified horizon’ (Kolb, 1986: 241). Kolb does a wonderful job of showing that, beyond Hegel and Heidegger, there are other ways of understanding modernity. In other words, one does not necessarily need to be an adherent of the Enlightenment, nor is it necessarily the case for one to be a ‘priest’ in order to judge modernity from a Christian point of view. To the observers of modernity as a coherent whole, it may be said ‘... that many of the cultural, political, and scientific forces in our lives move in competing and often inconsistent directions’ (Yack, 1997: 130-31).

It is possible, using the concept of multiplicity, to argue that neither is it possible to complete the project of modernity once and for all, nor does modernity come to an end. Indeed the current conditions under which we live are modern, that is, ‘modernity is the only world we have got’ (Berman, 1983). This could be demonstrated, for example, by the ‘computerisation’ of society: in contrast to Lyotard’s view, the computer could be seen as an expression of a ‘discontinuity’ of modernity, the computer possessing an extraordinary capacity for ‘information storage’, an undeniably modern characteristic. But, on the other hand, current conditions also point to the impossibility of completing ‘the project of modernity’ once and for all. This could be demonstrated, for example, with the unfeasibility of ‘communicative action’ for reaching ‘consensus’: in contrast to Habermas’s theory, there is no convincing reason why communicative reason should be able to resolve the problems of ‘divided modernity’.
To talk about multiplicity is to say that modernity is a field of tensions (Arnason). It is a field of tensions, because it is open to interpretation. In other words, because modernity is open to interpretation, tensions are constantly at stake. There is no single, agreed idea of modernity, but there is space which provides opportunities to interpret ‘imaginary significations of modernity’ in different ways. And this space is ‘culture’, or ‘language’ or ‘history’ whose importance is no less than ‘power’ or ‘rationality’: ‘There is too much culture, language, and history we find ourselves always already within, and we do not have the one necessary logical sequence to make things transparent to our gaze’ (Kolb, 1986: 267).

To make this argument plausible, the ‘openness of modernity’ to interpretation must be discussed. In other words, if it could be shown that modernity is possible to be understood as different versions, the idea of modernity as a coherent whole could fall. Therefore, in the next section, the openness of modernity shall be argued for with two questions. First, what is it that makes modernity ‘a field of tensions’? With this question I want to argue that it is modernity which makes it possible for radically plural world-interpretations to express themselves openly. And it is for this reason that the field on which human beings live necessarily becomes a field of tensions. More precisely, because conflicting, opposite views of life find shelter under conditions of modernity, it becomes unavoidable to witness tension-filled relations between human beings.

The second question I shall ask is: how far is modernity open? By this question I want to show that arguing for the openness of modernity does not mean that modernity has no ‘distinguishing characteristics’. First, the openness is itself a distinct feature of modernity. Traditional world-interpretations would not be able to bear that sort of openness. This is why it is argued that the modern age is the bloodiest in history. Second, the argument should show the limitations of
modernity’s openness. In other words, what is possible and what is not possible in the interpretation of modernity must be clearly shown; for example whether ethnocentrism is (not) modern.

In the third section, an argument in terms of contemporary phases of modernity will be proposed, reminding us of the consequences of modernity’s openness. These consequences are creating new possibilities for the further opening of modernity. Certainly, changes in the recent history of modernity are precisely due to its openness and these changes give rise to new theories of modernity. So, finally it will be shown that modernity’s openness to interpretation makes necessary a concept of the plurality of modernities. In other words, it shall be argued that modernity is alive, but that ‘the project of modernity’ cannot be completed once and for all.

2. Openness of Modernity

The perspectives which see modernity as a coherent whole need to be questioned. It has been assumed that modernity as a programme of the Enlightenment has shaped our lives. In other words, modernity is ‘conceived as a closed monolith, incapable of being shaped or changed by modern men’ (Berman, 1983: 24). It seems, in these theories, that modernity is viewed as being an external force to human beings’ lives. That is, whatever has occurred is supposed to be the outcome of modernity as an external force. In other words, the possibility of an age to impose itself as being understood as a singular, fundamental phenomenon is striking.

Rather, modernity could be regarded as an open-ended civilizational horizon, under the conditions of which human beings have freedom to develop their own life-perspectives. This should show that modernity cannot be defined as a closed way of life. However, modernist and postmodernist theories alike have supposed modernity to be an explicitly defined, closed way of life. Here we
shall consider totalising perspectives of modernity using an alternative argument showing that modernity is an open, rather than a closed, way of life.

Totalizing theories of modernity stem from the belief that modernity is driven by unilinear progress, absolute truths, the rational planning of ideal social orders and the standardization of knowledge and production (Harvey, 1990). This constitutes a grand narrative as to the ‘hidden’ reality of modernity that emerges because modernity could in no way be understood as a unifying phenomenon on the basis of a single, fundamental feature.

To begin with, the multiplicity of the cultural-political program of modernity should be stated. The fact that modernity is heavily reduced to the belief in the shapeability of the social on the basis of totalizing reason, plurality and a diversity of ideas and practices in current history makes many observers curious as to whether modernity has exhausted itself. More precisely, modernity is theorised as being the strong belief in the manageability of society to reach an orderly world. Therefore, current modernity is viewed as coming to an end due to its failure to end disorder (Bauman, 1992). However, as Eisenstadt (1999: 67) has argued, the ‘...multiplicity of the modern cultural and political program attest to the fact that modernity was continually perceived, within wide sectors of societies, as being... [an] “endless trial”...’ Thus, from the very start, multiplicity has been situated in modernity. Apart from the totalizing tendency, there has, from the very start, been the other side which emphasised multiple ways of life, the concept of pluralistic. Totalistic perspectives denied the legitimacy of different interests, different conceptions of the good life and the common good and emphasised the totalistic reconstruction of society through political action. In contrast, the pluralistic view saw a plurality of interests and different conceptions of the good life as being legitimate (Eisenstadt, 1999). In this respect, it is also important to note that both the totalistic and the pluralistic views included variations. For example, national socialism, liberalism,
fascism, Leninism, Kemalism or Islamism cannot be viewed as pieces of the same program of modernity. On the contrary, they are radically different answers to how a (good?) modernity should be formed. So, the danger or opportunity does not come about due to one conception of modernity; there are multiple conceptions of modernity.

Tensions between reason-centred totalizing views and pluralistic conceptions of culture have always been at stake in human history. In modernity, these tensions have become radicalized. Tensions in terms of, or due to, the place of reason in human life, the construction of nature and society and individual autonomy reach their high point under conditions of modernity. These tensions could, in brief, be categorised as the tension between liberty and discipline (Wagner, 1994). In other words, using totalistic conceptions, attempts are made to totalize different rationalities and values on the basis of instrumental rationality while, on the other hand, it was modernity which again provided the opportunities for different ways of life to be lived. However, to view modernity as a tension between liberty and discipline might seem to prove that modernity has two central features around which all other features and experiences could be unified. Therefore, it needs to be stated that, in saying that the tensions could be categorised as those between liberty and discipline, I do not at all mean that all the different programs of modernity (socialism, liberalism, Islamism etc.,) are merely tiny pieces of the same grand narrative. In contrast, I do think that both liberty and discipline have variations which cannot be reduced to one another.

Thus, multiplicity is rooted in the cultural program of modernity. Eisenstadt (1999) shows that the search for an ideal social order, political theories of modernity, the accountability of rulers, and traditions of representation and representative institutions, occupied basic places in the program of modernity and come from ‘different sources’: Axial civilizations, feudal Europe, Antiquity and
beyond. It could be understood that ‘tension’ is rooted in modernity. In other words, different, even conflicting perspectives are brought together in the program of modernity, therefore, tensions are unavoidable. For example, while representative institutions refer to plurality - local cultures, different interests etc. – the rediscovery of ancient Greek philosophy could be taken to refer to a belief in an absolute truth. Or, for example, deriving the belief in the possibility of reforming the social from Axial civilizations may not fit coherently with the accountability of rulers. Therefore, the openness of modernity is due in one important way to the fact that modernity is unable to unify irreconcilable perspectives, but rather multiple ‘centres’ of power, culture, rationality find home within modernity which, in turn, maintains modernity as an ‘endless trial’. Since modernity is conceived of as a goal of ‘political action’, it is important to briefly examine this.

Since, in the political program of modernity, the rights to freedom of speech, membership of associations, to protest existing socio-political orders and to participate in social movements are basically granted, multiplicity in ways of life cannot be eliminated. Although for the sake of modernity itself, the modern project oppresses people, its consequences could not avoid leading to multiplicity. The autocratic, totalitarian methods of reaching modernity, no doubt, included dehumanizing processes but, nevertheless, due to the fact that even these totalist methods included the possibility for variation, modern human beings could not be forced to be identical. To illustrate this case, it could be important to consider one of goals of modernizing projects: creating ‘reading public’ (Anderson). This was paradoxical: once reading public emerges, it becomes impossible to master this public in any fundamental way. This reading public could criticise, question and, most importantly, alter existing orders. As a contemporary case, Islamism could only be considered possible under conditions of modernity especially due to the fact that ‘reading public’ came about in Islamic societies as a consequence of modernization. Here I mean that due to the education provided by modernity, current Islamists are able to question existing modern orders on the basis of
a specific interpretation of Islam. If Islamists had not been educated by modernity, it would not have been possible for them to reach the sources of Islam, Koran and Sunna in order to construct a political project. Therefore, modernizing attempts, no matter how totalist, were unable to eradicate multiplicity. The recent ‘computerisation’ of society is in fact an extension of the reading public. Computerisation does not imply an end of modernity because it succeeds reading public.

However, arguing for multiplicity in the modern experience does not necessarily mean that modernity is the equivalent of a ‘peaceful democracy’. In the modern experience, there have always been clashes between different sectors of society. That is to say that since it has been possible for diverse people to interpret modernity in different ways, the world has witnessed the bloodiest clashes between people. In some societies, in some periods, the brutality of the state is at stake and, in other societies, civil wars break out. This, however, is not to argue that modernity can only cause disaster. What could be argued is that, under the conditions of modernity, human beings have more possibilities of destroying one another as well as reaching understanding. Modernity cannot be reduced to brutality because it is within modernity that it is possible to fight against brutality. Human beings have opportunities to defend their cultures, gods, moralities, etc. under the conditions of modernity which makes fighting back possible. If it is modernity which makes oppression possible, it is also modernity which makes it possible for people to fight back.

The tensions and clashes in modernity are at stake because it is in modernity that there is a multiplicity of ‘centres’ of power, culture and rationality. Modernity should not be divided in two in order to define the centres responsible for tensions and clashes. Tensions have been seen as being due to the duality between state and society, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between the elite and the people from diverse perspectives. However, regarding tensions, conflicts and clashes, multiple centres should be considered. There is an irreducible pluralism in civil
society, in the bourgeoisie, in the working class and in the state. To illustrate this case, I shall now briefly take some socialist perspectives into account. It cannot be argued that, as an alternative social order to capitalism, there is a standard, agreed, socialist perspective of society. In fact, there is a radical plurality amongst socialist critique of liberal modernity. Is it Leninism, or Maoism; is it the perspective of Enver Hoca or that of Stalin? Is it possible to merge Althusserian Marxism with the Marx of Gramsci? Or is it right to see the Chinese model as identical to the Soviet one? These questions show that there is not one centre which could universally represent the socialist perspective. The working class cannot be seen as a coherent whole. It is therefore impossible to regard the working class as a universal subject which would bring about universal revolution. One could also show that there is radical pluralism within capitalism. As we shall see, for example, the Turkish interpretation of capitalist economy cannot easily be seen as a mere version of Western capitalism.

Another way of seeing modernity as open to interpretation is to think that spheres of human activity can neither define one another nor can one of them shape the entire social world. Modernity, in other words, could be imagined and projected in different versions based on the elements which define the views of modernizing agents. It is that human spheres do not define one another automatically (e.g. industrial economy does not require a universal culture). Or, in other words, modernity itself does not found institutional spheres in one fundamental way. The openness to interpretation importantly lies in the fact that economy, polity and culture remain radically open to discussion and dispute. This could be taken as a basic reason for why, in modern societies, the dispute over the socio-political system never ends in consensus. As Bernard Yack (1997) shows us, socio-economic and cultural practices do not fit coherently together and viewing modernity as a coherent whole, in this respect, is a type of ‘fetishism’: ‘The fetishism of modernities is a “social myth” that unifies many-sided social processes and phenomena into a single grand objective’
(Yack, 1997: 6). Precisely for this reason, liberal Western modernity aimed at imposing ‘capitalist’ economy, ‘nation-state’, ‘autonomous’ individuality as universal, explicitly defined, and closed realities. But one could examine socialist modernity, for example, as a different configuration of the institutional spheres of modernity. It is important here to stress that there is no single space which is essential to our lifeworld, because no single realm or activity could completely define our relations to the world.

However, arguing for the openness of modernity does not mean that modernity does not possess unique features. On the contrary, because modernity is unique in human history, it is open to different definitions. Or, in other words, the uniqueness of modernity is due to its openness. But modernity mostly takes this openness from its two basic features: rational mastery and individual autonomy. Now this might be objected to by arguing that 'totalizing theories of modernity' are also based on the understanding that modernity is about rationalization and individuation. It is true that totalizing theories of modernity have been dependent on the cultural and political program of 'original modernity', and that this program's goals could be summarised as the achievement of mastery and autonomy. First, as Turner (1992: 13) considers, '...the most popular totalizing theory of modernity rests upon a distinction between religion and science, understood as not sets of social practices but as rival, societal ordering principles'. This could show that modernity is heavily assumed to be the emancipation of reason from revalation (see Kolakowski, 1990). In other words, modernity is seen to discredit religious reasoning for analysis. This understanding was to give rise to totalizing perspectives of modernity that saw that '...being modern is being rationalized' (Shils, 1981: 290). Following this, one could believe that modernity leaves no space for ways of relating to being other than rationality (Heidegger, 1977).
Second, the principle of individual autonomy is another source for totalizing theories of modernity. The individual is thought to attain his self-consciousness, identity and autonomy by separating himself from nature, god, society and history (Berger, 1977). In other words, modern man needs to be a self-determining subject (Marcuse, 1941). And for this to be achieved, reason is the unavoidable power to be possessed. Therefore, self-identity formation is understood as a process of actualizing the potentialities of an individual on the basis of reason. And this is a totalizing process. However, by observing autonomization and rationalization as the two processes in modernity, there is still a way of showing that modernity is not a totality or a totalizing project. Autonomy and mastery are to be interpreted differently by different subjects. This marks modernity as a field of multiplicity. This is an argument which aims at showing that openness of modernity is limited to the inclusion of mastery and autonomy. That is, in order to talk about modernity, rationalization and autonomization are unavoidable processes that must be considered.

Looking at rational mastery and individual autonomy, we must always consider the fact that these two imaginary significations could have radically different meanings to diverse people in the world. The question which has to be answered in this respect is this: how is it possible to interpret ‘rationality’ and ‘liberty’ in different ways? It must be stated that modernity is possible in different configurations, because imaginary significations are to do with ‘cultural worlds’ which cannot be unified on the basis of rationality. So, if different ways of relating to the world cannot be unified around rationality, rationality has to be related to these cultural worlds in new and different ways. Or, in other words, ‘traditions’ relate themselves to the world in new ways with the advent of rationalization. It could follow that, since there are different cultures, there are different rationalities too. What then must be said is that, in the experience of modernity, rationality and culture or Enlightenment and romanticism cannot and should not be contrasted. Rather, it needs to be observed that both culture and rationality are important partners in modern experiences. Thus, the
scope of possibility of interpreting rationality and liberty in different ways is the cultural world. In this respect, it is necessary to note that the space for interpretation of modernity could be explained by a view that takes civilization, culture, history and creativity seriously. Emphasising the importance of civilization and/or culture also means considering historical background. That is, history is a powerful factor which provides some possibilities for human action and, since the historical backgrounds of societies are different, those possibilities are diverse. For example, a Turk may find some possible answers to present-day problems by considering Turkish history but these answers may not relate to the problems of another society because of the different history of that society. Finally, omitting creativity of action would mean exactly that modernity is a full product of tradition. However, modernity is a new phenomenon that cannot be fully viewed as an expression of previous history. So, a dialectical reading is needed in understanding the possibility of different interpretations of the imaginary significations of modernity, namely mastery and autonomy.

And the plurality of ideas and practices is an unavoidable outcome of the possibility of interpreting autonomy and mastery in different ways. However, in some recent social theory, a central theme concerns the current phase of modernity, paying special consideration to the question of plurality. We shall see that the plurality of ideas and practices in the current phase of modernity should be seen as a consequence of the openness of modernity rather than as the indication of the end of modernity.

3. The consequences of openness

The current stage seems to be full of contradictions, full of dualities, full of tensions. For example, on the one hand, the idea of globalization is promulgated by many observers as the most powerful force in our lives (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991). Yet the emergence of ‘new communities’, on the
other hand, is seen as celebrating the ‘right’ to be different, (Delanty, 1999). The ‘end of history’ thesis seems to have convinced some, on the one hand, yet religious, nationalist and ethnic movements show the unfeasibility of the very same thesis, on the other. This multi-faceted recent era could be seen as a reflection of modernity in which tensions, contradictions, dualities express themselves more openly.

It is due to the existence of multiple features in the experience of modernity that distinct, irreconcilable, conflicting life-worlds have been competing. This, however, does not refer to a break with modernity, because any one of these life-worlds is strongly tied to the basic characteristics of modernity. More precisely, since the actions of owners of different life-worlds take place under the same conditions which have provided places for them to have their sayings heard, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to go beyond modernity. In his critique of modernity Alain Touraine (1995: 92) wrote: ‘...because modernity is a critical rather than a constructive notion that a critique of modernity must be hypermodern’. Modernity is not unified and includes multiplicity. Therefore, it is neither necessary nor possible to work outside modernity. In other words, if totality is far removed from modernity, it is possible to work within modernity. This is what has been happening, rather than modernity being broken-down. From now on I shall consider some of the most important events of the current era to illustrate that we live under conditions of modernity.

In sociological terms, it is important to look at the position of ‘the social’ under current conditions. Tribes - emotional communities - seem to be replacing ‘mass’ society, seen as a devil by Adorno and Horkheimer (1988). This current situation causes ‘pessimistic’ perspectives rather than optimistic ones. It is seen that ‘unlimited relativism’ makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to live together. This assumption is based on the feeling that the emergence of new communities
means the celebration of the right of ‘difference’ against ‘universalism’. In other words, the ‘universal subject’ is assumed to have collapsed (Delanty, 1999). However, it is necessary to ask if a universal subject really emerged and lived before. For example, it was considered until recently that the reason of Enlightenment brought about universal subjects.

Apart from the rise of ‘relativism’, there is another occurrence which seems to be very important: Classical social theory’s society – the self-contained society of the nation-state - is in question (Giddens, 1987). Globalization is thought to be undermining self-contained societies. This has been indeed responded to by social theories. Recently, there has been a growth in literature on globalization. It could be argued that this literature succeeds earlier modernization theory by viewing the current phase of modernity as a western success (Giddens, 1991). In other words, globalization is held to be diffusion of western civilization. Thus, we notice that in analysing the current stage of the social these two perspectives, namely coherent and divergent visions of life, seem to point to something that cannot be properly read. If there is a rise in importance of local cultures but at the same time a move towards globalization, then, it would not be right to call recent processes either the victory of the ‘convergence thesis’, proposed by modernization theories, or the reversal of ‘society’ by ‘small’ communities. If there are many-sided processes in the current history of modernity, this could be understood as a consequence of the openness of modernity.

Recently, what could be noticed to be a most important characteristic, is the irreducible plurality of cultural-worlds and world-interpretations. This is indeed an outcome of the modern experience, precisely because ‘multiplicity’, situated in the heart of modernity, could have only brought about that sort of plurality. From the beginning there have been plural world-interpretations in modernity, but recently this plurality revealed itself more clearly, particularly by means of new telecommunication technologies. Since modernity is not unified or totalized, it has been possible
for diverse world-views to work within modernity. Thus, it may precisely be said that a most
powerful argument against postmodernism could be that since modernity is an open rather than
closed way of life and since it is multiple rather than being a closed monolith, it is neither necessary
nor possible to work outside modernity. In other words, since ‘critique’ is situated within
modernity, attempts at changing life should not be viewed as attempts to end modernity. Since
postmodernism has understood modernity as a totalizing epoch on the basis of rationality, the
diversity and plurality of ideas and practices are taken to mean that a new social condition begins;
the postmodern condition (Lyotard, 1984). Therefore, the irreducible plurality of ideas and
practices have been taken to refer to the meaning of postmodernity (Bauman, 1992).

The increase of plurality in ideas and practices, however, could be analysed as referring to the
extension of modernity or the widening of the openness of modernity. By this I want to insist that
the amount of modern actors does increase. It can no longer be hoped to see a centre in society
capable of shaping the entirety of social relations. This means that the recent era of modernity
reveals more clearly that modernity has never been a world with an ordering, shaping centre.
Rather, modernity has been without a determining centre, but it has been open to disputes over the
common good or the good life. And the current conditions indicate that ‘elitist’ conceptions of
modernity are in question more than before, because new modern actors from all corners of society
demonstrate what they understand by modernity. Modernity is in the streets more than ever before
now that modernity no longer refers to the program of Enlightenment. This situation is recently due
to the increase of possibilities and choices open to human beings. Therefore, what should be
emphasised is that modernity is an endless trial, because no centre provides the 'content' for social
life (Kolakowski, 1990). If modernity is viewed as a reversal of substantive rationality (Weber),
then, the 'form' could be described as 'rational' by modernity. It could be argued that multiplicity
lies in modernity because its content is to be created by the diverse actions of diverse people. In
other words, because modernity does not define how social life should be experienced, it is the work of people to create their own life perspectives. Therefore, it must be clear that modern society is not a coherent whole, but rather a conflicting, diversity of world interpretations indicating the radical pluralism of cultural worlds. This is to say that the creation of life perspectives is not free from cultural worlds and meanings. Therefore, Weberian pessimism could be overcome, in that substantive rationality which gives meaning to life is not replaced by formal rationality which would not leave space for anything other than the efficiency of instrumental rationality.

What is more astonishing in some current social theories is that the distinctions of non-Western cultures are seen as indicators for the beginning of postmodernity (Delanty, 1999; Gulalp, 1998; Smart, 1990). However, it is crucial to insist that the openness of modernity to interpretation not only make us understand how the plurality of ideas and practices increases in Western modernity, but also, importantly, that there has been increasing attention paid to the perspective of varieties of modernity on which this study is built.

The discussion so far must indicate that there can be no completeable project of modernity once and for all. The multiplicity of ways of life, the plurality of relations of people to the world, multiple histories show that a universal conception of modernity cannot be argued for convincingly. People who are diverse are not convinced by theories aiming to show the feasibility of attempts to complete the ‘project of modernity’ for all. An American would not like a European’s conception of history; a Japanese person would not agree with the view that reduces modernity to a western project; a Russian would not support the ‘end of history’ thesis because of its overly western orientation. To find a way to analyze the current conditions of life, we must think a theoretical perspective which could show us the plausibility of the concept of varieties of modernity.
First of all, the way to analyse current conditions of modernity is by indicating that there is no equivalence between the West and modernity. If this can be shown, the actual possibility of analysing multiple modernities in a convincing way could be demonstrated. If one looks at social theories of modernity with a reading of the social context which theories aim to explore, it could be noticed that these theories are mostly attempts at providing an explanation of the ‘uniqueness’ of the West. From Hegel to Marx, and from Weber to Habermas in social theory a central concern has been to achieve an explanation of how ‘capitalism’ - modernity - emerged ‘only’ in the West.\textsuperscript{15} It is in forming its self-identity, that the West seemed exceptional to these theorists. And it was this ‘exceptionality’ which made modernity identical with the West.

Since the making of the modern epoch first took place in the West, until very recently there was no serious questioning of the purported ‘superiority’ of the West. The modern political revolutions - American and French - and the Industrial revolution emerged in the West. Since then it has been assumed that modernity is equivalent to the West. This provided a criterion by means of which the West is viewed as a category allowing some to draw a picture of the world as divided between ‘the West and the rest’. In other words, the West became a criterion of the good against the evil of the rest. So, judgements about the rest are made on the basis of the criterion: the West.

What then became a common view of the West developed by westerners, but also agreed upon by many Easterners, is that the West presents a particular way of life of advanced civilization against the rest (see Hall and Gieben [eds.], 1992). It is then unsurprising that Heller wrote: ‘modernity, the creation of Europe, itself created Europe’. (Heller and Feher, 1991: 146) So, modernity must be Eurocentric. Thus ‘the project of modernity’ could be understood as being nothing, if not the expression of European identity formation.
By arguing the unique place of rationality in European civilization, then, Weber (1958) was to believe in the exceptionality of the West only in that it could have had a universalizing logic. Therefore, what was achieved by the exceptionality of the West came to be that the distinction between modernity and tradition was shown to be the distinction between the West and the rest.\(^{16}\)

First, the idea of civilization in the singular needed to be developed in order to mark the West as ‘civilized’ against the ‘uncivilized’ rest.\(^{17}\) This was certainly nothing other than the aim to achieve a self-identity for the West. However, it was this ‘other-descriptive’ identity formation which gave rise to Eurocentric social theories of modernity.

In brief, modernity emerged as an outcome of a specific civilization, therefore, if the rest wanted to join modern life, they would have to Westernize first. In other words, in the rest, for a society to modernize, it first needs to ‘deresternize’ itself. Therefore, the West was not only a particular way of life - democratic, civilized and so on - but it also had the historical mission of ‘universalizing’ human societies.

In truth, however, modernity, like any other epoch, should not be identified with a particular geography, civilization or ethnicity. The theme of varieties of modernity provides most important opportunities for clearly showing this. Therefore, in the next chapter, I shall argue that the assumptions of modernity as equivalent to the West must be problematized so as to show the tenability of the concept of varieties of modernity. For this goal to be achieved, it shall be argued that the modernization of non-western societies cannot be viewed merely as westernization or Europeanization. ‘Later modernities’ shall be introduced in order to make sure that existing social theory, a product of Western experience, cannot be validated to analyse non-western experiences of modernity.
Chapter Three

SOCIAL THEORY AND LATER MODERNITIES

1. Introduction

Most social theorists of modernity have been westerners. This is not surprising, precisely because social theory is a product of the western experience of modernity. In the first place, this seems unproblematic: modernity entered human history first in Western Europe.\(^{18}\) Due to this ‘historic’ event, modernity has been conceptualised as a western project and as a property of the West.\(^{19}\) This analysis of modernity has given rise to the concept of modernization as synonymous with westernization or Europeanisation. In other parts of the world, attempts to modernize have been viewed as attempts to westernise, since modernity has been taken to be identical with the West. In this account, the West provided the model of the ‘good life’, therefore, what the rest of the world needed to do was to imitate this established modernity.

There is no reason to doubt the reality: diversities have been playing a constitutive part in the formation of human history. However, since the emergence of western modernity, ‘convergence’ thesis has gained a prominent place in social theory.\(^{20}\) It has done so, because western modernity claimed to be the ‘universalizing phenomenon’ of human societies. And for the very same reason modernity has been associated with the advent of ‘Reason’ for bringing human beings to believe
that there can be no doubt about living together under the same umbrella. Viewing modernity as identical with Reason gave rise to entirely (western) ethno-centric social theorizings.\textsuperscript{21} For example, Weber’s (1958) analysis of the uniqueness of the West influenced many later social theorizings. A key element of modernity, rationality, was seen as unique to the West, therefore, what seemed to be at stake was the weakness of the East in giving shape to history. True, the centre of history had shifted to western Europe with the emergence of modernity.

However, it has been exactly this apparent convergence thesis of Western modernity that led to the radicalization of dualities, oppositions, and differences. It has done so, precisely because in order to achieve both its self-image and its imperial ambition, western modernity needed to distinguish itself. And in doing so, western modernity put the East, as the appropriate opposition, in a position where ‘civilization’ was lacking.\textsuperscript{22} By opposing the East, the West’s objective was to construct its self-image. And for this objective to be achieved, civilization was seen as being in the hands of the West and, thus the West regarded the East as ‘uncivilized’, using this to legitimise western imperialism (see, for example, Said, 1994). Western modernity saw colonization as a crucial method for shaping the world in its own image. By means of colonization, in the eyes of western imperialists, civilization would enter also into eastern countries, while, in fact, this imperialism was distancing the West more. In stark contrast to western hope, a different reality was to emerge: some societies were not manageable along the lines of western modernity. Self-defense, liberation movements came about as reactions to western rupture: Western modernity challenged its others in the name of ‘civilization’, but this challenge created reactions which resulted in different modernities.

It is conceivable, then, that the rise of the West played a part in the entry of ‘different’ modernities into history. Or, more precisely, the rise of the West helped agents to remake the institutional
structure of the East. Therefore, it could be plausible to understand the rise of the West as a double-edged phenomenon. On the one hand, the West killed some of the particular traits of the countries it colonized but, on the other hand, the rise of the West played a part in the ‘radicalization’ of some eastern self-questioning. On this theme, it seems worth while to mention that dependency theory, emerging as a reaction against modernization theory, claimed that the rise of the West had a totally negative effect on ‘underdeveloped’ countries (see Amin, 1976). However, it could be argued that the rise of the West played a part in the problematization of eastern countries’ understandings of the world. I consider that there were already some tangible, conflictual developments making way for different/new understandings of the world in some eastern countries before western modernity challenged them. However, it is important to see western modernity’s contribution in terms of a ‘radicalization of dualities’, which was a basic precondition for ‘inventive’ modernizations. Thus, the crucial point is that eastern modernizations cannot easily be examined as westernization. This is so, precisely because self-questioning in the East did not allow actors of modernization to imitate the western model of modernity, though the rise of the West played a part in the radicalization of this self-questioning. Perhaps, more importantly, since ‘plurality’ is a precondition for human action, the emergence of modernities in the East is unavoidably different.

Thus, against the convergence thesis, it should be argued that the challenge of western modernity radicalized oppositions and differences. Different modernities came into being partly in order to counter-balance the West. In this dimension, for instance, Japanese modernity has received some attention from western scholars (Arnason, 1997; Eisenstadt, 1996), since it has been able to compete with the West in economic power relations. But also, for example, the Russian experience was an ‘extreme other’ or an opposite modernity which created the long period of the Cold War (Arnason, 1993). However, these different experiences of modernity have not been conceptually considered and, therefore, present-day social theory needs to be problematized by arguing that to a
great extent it is invalid for the analyses of these different modernities. It should be seen that there are imaginative processes within other experiences of modernity beyond the imitation of western modernity.

It is worth considering that modernization theory, emerging in the 1940s (and re-emerging in the 1990s), conceptualized modernization as a westernising and homogenizing process: modernization makes societies more like one another, in other words, the world becomes a global village (Roxborough, 1979). Since modernization theory derived its theoretical basis from West European and North American experiences, it is unable to explore unique historical cases (see Nisbet, 1969). Since modernization theory saw modernity and tradition as fully antithetical, there was always something wrong in the East. And the imitation of the western model of the social world was seen as the only possible solution for the East to join the ‘good life’. However, it has been seen that this theory is unable to understand the East. In the 1990s, however, this perspective reasserted itself, this time as ‘reflexive modernization’, ‘globalization’, ‘consequences of modernity’ etc. The language, however, is the same: ‘modernity is a western project’ (Giddens, 1991: 174); ‘models of modernization have been western models’ (Turner, 1999: 4); ‘the end of history [is] the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’ (Fukuyama, 1989). These views inescapably fail, because they argue for a convergence thesis while divergence poses itself as an unavoidable consideration. As has often been emphasised, the proposal of this thesis is that of varieties of modernity. A perspective that identifies a plurality of modernities is more tenable than one that seeks arguments for concepts such as globalisation or westernisation.

In terms of an argument for varieties of modernity, an urgent distinction remains between the West and the East. And to consider this, the distinction should be seen as the distinction between the ‘original’ western model and ‘later modernities’. This is so, because modernity is still regarded
merely as western, while some experiences in the East prove that it has been capable of producing ‘counter’ modernities. The concept of later modernities reflects historical difference and the characteristic distinction that since they are later modernities, they cannot be the same as earlier versions. This observation should make clear my conceptualization that later modernities are different interpretations of the world. Historically different beginnings do not avoid bringing about different modernities and different contexts do not permit modernizing states to simply imitate the western model of modernity. As an alternative to western modernity, there is not ‘one’ later modernity, but later ‘modernities’; Russia, China, Turkey, Japan. Though they share some basic features, for example the fact that reactions against western domination played a significant part in their emergence, their specific contexts meant that they differed from each other too. For example, all these experiences saw the strong state as the main agent of modernization, but their interpretations of the good life differed.

Later modernities hold some elements which may seem estranged from present-day social theory. Due to their different contexts, one can hardly complete an analysis of a later modernity from the point of view of existing social theory. How can one, for example, explain why in the Turkish experience, liberating women was a most important project of the transition to modernity? In the western context, the ‘female question’ was situated within an already existing modernity, whereas Turkish women were regarded as particularly important agents in the formation of a modern society.25

Proposing the concept of later modernities requires answering two unavoidable questions. First, what makes these modernities different? This question should be answered by seeing historical background, civilization, modernizing actors and projects of modernity as central elements. In analysing later modernities, firstly, history and context - civilization\culture - must be taken to be
particularly important elements. Thus, how human beings understand themselves and how they relate themselves to the world are peculiar points that should be analysed in conceptualising modernities. Collectivities, shaped by different norms, values and rules do not interpret modernity in the same way as westerners do: historically different contexts cannot come to be one and the same; to form a modernity from nothing seems impossible. This is a response to the idea of globalization, situated within some of current theorisings. For instance, in Giddens’ terms, the radicalization of modernity means the globalization of modernity (Giddens, 1991). This perspective simply re-emphasises the convergence thesis. However, we shall see that the world is not open to this sort of explicit readings. And second, the interpretation of modernity by modernizing actors and their projects should be taken into account as important factors in the formation of later modernities as different. This is so, because insisting upon history and context as important factors in the emergence of later modernities does not explain the 'dynamic' of modernity. That is, no civilization or history can give rise to modernity without creative social actors and their projects. And it needs to be emphasised that the relations of modernizing actors to the historical backgrounds and civilizations of their respective societies could be conflictual or peaceful, but is necessarily dialectical. For example, a project of modernity in an Islamic society could be defined by actors against Islamic civilization. However, over time, this project of modernity enters into dialectical relations with Islamic civilization that could change some central features of modernizing actors’ perspectives as, indeed, the project could alter some central features of Islamic civilization. Both civilization and the project of modernity could make the modernity of Islamic societies different to the western model of modernity.

The second question is this: do different modernities simply mean that different parts of the world stand against each other more than ever before? This question should be answered by emphasising the relation of modernity to civilization. Modernity neither knows nor recognizes a concept such as
stability and thus it is able to play a part in reducing the opposition between civilizations. In this respect, it is important to look at relations between modernity and civilization. Modernity could be seen as a human condition rather than as a separate civilization. ‘Tradition’ did not present a particular, separate, civilization but, in contrast, reflected a human condition during which there were different civilizations. Likewise, in modern times, civilizations continue to exist and modernity is an actor between them. By means of this second question, I aim to show too that, contrary Baudrillard’s proposal, the ‘nihilistic’ world view is not at stake.

Thus, firstly I shall examine differences which have given rise to different modernities, secondly I shall point out the power of modernity in reducing some civilizational oppositions. Thirdly, I shall introduce a later modernity: Turkey. In the next section, western modernity’s challenge to the globe shall be examined by a view that this challenge provoked the East which distinguished itself by producing highly distinct modernities. In the third part, by understanding modernity as an actor between civilizations, I shall argue that culture in modernity is neither stable nor homogenous and that ‘authenticity’ is no longer tenable in definitions of cultures. In the succeeding section, I shall start examining the Turkish experience of modernity with an analysis of its historical background to point out that modernity is neither a western civilization nor could it be seen as a matter of the origins of particular cultures.
2. Challenge of Western Modernity and Responses

In one way, modernity is an antagonism-creating force; the ‘radicalization of dualities’ is a crucial business of modernity. For example, the tension between social classes dramatically increased in nineteenth-century modernity and this could be seen as a first, powerful indication of modernity as a many-sided phenomenon. A significant amount of attention was paid to this antagonism, particularly by Marx. However, modernity was creating another antagonism outside of modernity’s birth place: the challenge of the West on the globe.

Until the emergence of modernity, there was no remarkable distance between western Europe and other geographical locations. There was no criterion for placing the West above other places. Technologically, no geography had a distinct position which was ‘unreachable’. Some technological differences between places could be found, but there was no geographical ‘rupture’ in modernity’s sense. By radicalising the dichotomy between nature and humanity, modernity forged a great distance between the West and other geographical places: Western Europe seemed to be the unreachable geography of the time.

Thus, western modernity was bringing about tensional dichotomies. Firstly, human beings’ war against nature was radicalised by the advent of science-oriented technology. Second, a growing antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat came about. Then, as a consequence of these developments, western modernity gave rise to two opposing groups of countries: industrialised metropolitan and non-industrialised colonial and semi-colonial countries. On this theme, the military as an important source of power should be considered. Within the modern experience, military power played a crucial part which was, nonetheless, rarely noticed in socio-historical analyses. For western militaries, advanced technology provided easier access to other
parts of the world. Potential war within modernity’s home turned out to be real wars outside it. It was by means of war that western modernity started challenging world civilizations. Thus, colonization entered the history of modernity as a most antagonism-creating dimension.

The East, the old world, met the modern world by seeing how powerfully destructive it was. Western military power was not easily overcome and so, old powers were forced under the rule of western domination. Western imperialism created an opportunity in further developing the rupture and in distancing the West. Exactly from this respect, western modernity was shaking the East which was losing its way. Challenged and shaken eastern societies were losing the sense of their own history and identity and this situation led to their schizophrenia (see, for example, Sheyegan, 1991). But, in turn, this schizophrenia was to awaken the East.

Thus, modernity radicalized an essential contradiction between civilizational places and, in particular, between the East and the West. This dichotomy must be seen as modernity shaking civilizations, aiming to clearly define them as stabilised entities. Already existing disputes were radicalised by the challenge of western modernity; for example, the tension between civilian bureaucracy and ulema, Islamic scholars, in the Ottoman Empire became more noticeable, when western modernity challenged the Empire.

Modernity has been understood as a universal system by most western observers. The emergence of modernity is seen as a radical break with history and this is why the West is seen as providing a universal system for the world. In other words, in the emergence of modernity, the core element was taken as being Reason, and this was why it was seen as impossible to argue for any culture as being the producer of modernity. Human Reason was claimed to be completely independent from the cultural world and, therefore, modernity was seen as a universal project; the key to modernity
are universalistic norms. It should be mentioned that Enlightenment-centred theorizing proposes that modern society is a construct built by equal citizens. Or, in other words, individuals who liberate themselves from serfdom by means of rationalization who freely form a collectivity. Thus, in this representation of modern society, there is no room for culture and it is precisely for this reason that modernity is taken to be universal. Actually, in the first place, there seems to be no problem in this perspective: when human beings achieve autonomy in the world and mastery over the world, and when these free and rational individuals form a society, this collectivity can no longer be taken to be ‘particular’. Then, it came as no surprise that modernization theory did not wish to deal with unique experiences. It must be seen that this perspective pushes historicising and contextualising out of the analysis of modernity. This is why modernization was regarded as a process of the global diffusion of western civilization (Offe, 1987).

On this theme, however, a crucial observation to make must be that the western challenge helped agents in ‘backward’ countries to radicalize self-questioning. An historic force, the rise of the West, helped ‘backward’ countries to create a search for a self-transformative capacity. In relatively powerful countries, in particular, radicalized self-questionings began when western modernity problematized their understandings of the world. This must be called a dialectical power of modernity: it was due to these self-questionings that other modernities came to enter history. The Ottoman Empire could be an appropriate starting-point for such analyses.

The decline and subsequent collapse of the Ottoman Empire could be understood respectively by a reading of the emergence of modernity in the West. However, modernization of the Turkish world started during the same era for the basic reason that the Empire took stock of western modernity’s achievements and advantages. Until the challenge of western modernity, the Ottomans did not have a serious problem in terms of their identity; in their minds they were the masters of the world; the
Empire represented advanced civilization. The Ottoman Empire was indeed a powerful empire, which even threatened the very heart of Christendom; twice capturing Vienna. It is the fact that the Empire possessed the power of being an historical centre which led to a sense of superiority over ‘others’. In the Middle Ages, the poor and ‘backward’ societies of western Europe were the pupils of the Islamic world, whose centre was the Ottoman Empire, in medicine, mathematics, chemistry, astronomy and philosophy. Therefore, Europe of the time had almost nothing to offer to the far more advanced Ottomans. However, the centre of history radically shifted to western Europe when modernity was emerging. In the same era, the 18th and 19th centuries, the Ottoman state - civilian and military elite - was obsessed with one question: how can ‘we’ be saved? A world-power was shaken and this shaken power was for the first time asking what was wrong with itself? It was no surprise that the self-questioning started within the military. Though reforming the military did not make Ottomans catch up with the West, it was the first action towards giving importance to radical institutional change.

Thus, the rise of the West posed unforeseen questions to the Ottomans: should the West be recognised as a power? Are the Ottomans themselves not capable of governing the world any longer? These questions could best be thought of as a search for a ‘new definition’ of the Ottoman Empire. It is no surprise that Islamism and westernism, as well as Turanism to an extent, came to be important paradigms in the 19th century. Historians largely argued that westernism was a progressivist ideology, while Islamism presented a reactionary one (see Lewis, 1996). However, it must be held that both of these views were busy with the redefinition of the Empire; both of them came about as responses to western modernity’s challenge. Once the Empire was, apparently, Islamic, there was no question as to whether it functioned according to Islamic rules. However, when things went wrong, Islamic actors argued for a ‘true’ Islam; it was hoped that Islamism would keep Ottomans apart from the West. It was difficult to maintain this sort of argument, because
Islamists agreed with westernists that the Empire was in a backward position. In order to escape Empire, Islamists proposed that authenticity could be maintained while, at the same time achieving a modernising infrastructure. This was a difficult task; modernity is not likely to be fully based on the ‘origins’ of a country or culture. Westernists went too far too; they found Islam to be an element which was blocking development; they even came to regard the Western domination over the East as inescapable reality; they did not give an importance to an ‘autonomous development’. This was not an easy task either, because bringing about a powerful modernity requires a country to 'autonomously' develop itself as much as possible.

As can be read from the Ottoman experience, western modernity challenged the globe in terms of its civilizational dimensions. For the first time, Western Europe extensively threatened others’ understandings of the world. The East was shaken and, in particular, the Islamic East which met the western, Christian world in war. It must be seen that modernity forced the world to be modern. For example, once modernity entered the Islamic East, two choices were left for Islam: either to be the mandate of modern countries or to fight against western modernity in the aim of ‘self-modernity’. Unlike observers who argued against modernity by assuming that it was possible to reject modernization, it must be said that in either way people had to become modern. For example, Indians who were colonized could not, as a consequence, escape from the conditions of modernity and Turkey achieved modernity without coming under the rule of imperialism. So, there are two options: either ‘autonomous’ modernization or modernization by foreign domination.

The challenge of western modernity could not colonize some countries, while it was able to colonize so many others. A self-defensive movement was the only way to resist the hegemony of the West and this way necessarily opened up a road to modernity. It should be noted that in order to describe a country in the East as a later modernity, a basic method is to look at whether the country
succeeded ‘autonomous’ development. Or, in other words, it is important to look at whether behind the modernization process there was a foreign domination or not. This could be explored by a civilizational perspective.

How some later experiences were successful in comparison to some others could be explored by looking at their civilizational contexts. Japan, a powerful modernity, Russia, an extreme other experience and Turkey, provider of a model of modernity for Islamic countries, could be taken as three important cases in this regard. All these countries could not be easily defined in terms of which civilization they belong to? Japan, in Arnason’s (1997) analysis, was not a proper member of Chinese civilization but rather included elements from different civilizations. And it was this context which was making processes easier in the development of Japan. Turks were neither exactly members of Islamic civilization nor of the western one. They were included in the East in the eyes of westerners, whereas, for easterners they represented the West. Therefore, in Turkey it was easier for Kemalism, as compared to Arabic countries, to develop a project of modernity. Russians struggled to choose between being easterners and westerners; they could be taken as being neither proper Occidentals nor Orientals.28 It is when civilization cannot be clearly defined, that it becomes more possible to bring about innovation. If a country is taken as being a full member of, for example, Islamic ‘tradition’, ‘development’ could be difficult because it should be compatible with that tradition. It is also important that these three countries achieved modernization without coming under the rule of western domination. Perhaps, it is the case that these cultures neither present strong resistance to innovation nor could they be assimilated.

On this theme some forcefully argue for ‘authenticity’ and blame modernization in the East for the reason that modernization is taken to be an imitation of the western model of life (see, for example, Said 1978). This argument apparently aims to overcome orientalism. However, it must be noted
that an argument for authenticity in modern times could not escape from imperialism. For an ‘autonomy’ of collectivity there are conditions in modern times. In order for a nation to be on its own, for example, a modernizing economic world is required. If a country does not make efforts to establish its own modernity, it is easier for outsiders to attempt to modernize it. Eastern countries needed to be powerful in order not to be colonized and this could be achieved only by means of modernization. In either way, modernity entered the world of human beings in the East. In other words, a country has two chances; either to modernise itself without being colonized or to accept colonization and modernization by outsiders. This has a high price as, for example, in the Algerian experience. It is important that different interpretations of modernity are always possible due to cultural differences, even though the idea of modernity is imported from the West. Even if one understands that modernizing agents, in the East, are influenced by western ideas, historical context did not allow them to interpret modernity in the same way as westerners did. And more astonishingly, when differences in later modernities started recently to be noticed, some observers were ready to call these experiences postmodern (see, for example, Smart, 1990; Gülalp, 1998). Those countries, such as Japan, have been seen as being capable of combining tradition and modernity to a greater extent than the West and, for this reason, observers see later modernities as postmodern (see Delanty, 1999:97). However, the reality should not be complicated: these countries have always kept their differences, but are only currently being discovered and due to their difference from Western modernity, they are called postmodern.

Self-defensive modernizations, as a consequence, brought about ‘different’ later modernities. Culture needs to be considered as a decisive element in creating space for different interpretations of the dual imaginary signification of ‘mastery’ and ‘autonomy’. It must be argued that there is no clearly defined, standard modern culture. If there was, it would then have to be accepted that modernization precisely means the global diffusion of western civilization. But this is not the case.
Modernity does not reflect a separate civilization (Friese and Wagner 2000; Arnason, 1997) and thus cultural-civilizational contexts provide some spaces for interpreting rationalization and individuation. And to make this argument plausible, it must be considered that autonomization and rationalization can never be taken as unique to the European Enlightenment. In contrast, in other civilizations, the ideas of autonomy and mastery can be found. It is due to this fact that different elements in later modernities have played decisive parts. Japanese Buddhism, for example, had a place in the modern experience, while in other Buddhist traditions, religion did not contribute to the modernization process as such. Islam, in the Turkish case for example, was differently situated in the emergence of modernity, though tensions were high. Or, for instance, the ‘unquestionability’ of the state in the Turkish and Russian traditions caused, in Turkey, a politically projected experience of modernity and, in Russia, the experience of state-socialism. Therefore, unlike modernization theory and the world-systems perspective, I must insist that particular ways of modernization rely on particular civilizational/historical contexts and on the possibility of different interpretations of mastery and autonomy.  

In brief, it could be argued that social practices appear to be shaped by meanings and beliefs as much as by rationality and/or by power.

Arguing all of this could appear to be an over-emphasis of divergence. Thus, the second question must be dealt with: do later modernities reflect that the pessimistic world-view is at stake or, in other words, could different parts of the world not communicate at all? The western thesis - modernity is universal - created its anti-thesis - later modernities – and, dialectically, a relative synthesis seems to be at stake: the West and the East started to come closer. The power of modernity needs to be seen: culture is important for the creation of different modernities but, in turn, modernity does not recognise stability including culture. We shall see in the next section that culture can no longer be seen as 'authentic' and that it cannot be seen as an integrative sphere of
modern society. And culture should not be taken to be the likeness of people, because otherwise it would be synonymous with structure.

### 3. Modernity as Actor between Civilizations

Different civilizations share some basic elements of modernity. This could be taken as an indication that modernity is not a separate civilization (Arnason, 1997), but rather a human condition. Modernity is almost globalized. However, some distinct human identities and practices can still be remarked. These differences, which are partly due to civilizational contexts, receive an important amount of attention from some observers who argue that modernity is not at stake in some places, while they are used by some other observers to show that postmodernity is at stake in these places.

However, the central point could be made that modernity does not fully permit societies to maintain their traditional cultural values. Though there is every reason for societies to form different modernities, one condition remains: modernity cannot be a full product of a culture. It could be shown that once a society modernizes, it becomes difficult to attain its previous cultural context. This is because modernity does not credit stability. Here it should be held that, in modernity, culture is no longer stable and homogenous. Due to this fact, culture cannot be viewed as an integrating sphere of modern society. Thus, there needs to be a dialectical reading of this cultural agenda; culture makes a modernity different but this culture is no longer homogenous; rather there are distinct interpretations of the world within a single collectivity.
Being different historical phenomena, East and West are not willing to be the same. However, they encounter each other too because it no longer seems possible to lock themselves in their traditional contexts. In other words, different modernities are at stake, but since countries admit to have entered modernity, their traditional cultures are destroyed. A rupture occurs in each modern experience and, therefore, it becomes difficult to maintain uniqueness, despite the fact that there is also a continuity that makes modernities different from each other. It is exactly due to this dialectical occurrence that a dichotomy has recently arisen in social writings, that of localisation-globalisation. But if this dichotomy is fully at stake, a synthesis could be arrived at but, in turn, new theses could be formed.

It could be suggested that within modernising periods, the ambitions of actors of modernization and contextual realities clash. Modernizing state elites have proposed a development which use advanced modernities as a model, but the ultimate goal is not only to catch up with the West; it is, rather, to bring about a more developed version of modernity. In this respect, state elites have the opportunity to read from an already experienced modernity; that of the West. Learning from western experience is required in later modernities. However, what happens when a state aims to follow that model is an historical/contextual resistance to it. In other words, the historical/civilizational context makes it almost impossible to imitate the western model. Elites somewhere come to meet their own socio-historical ground. This is why later modernities are different, but it is also in this respect that modernizing society undermines cultural uniqueness to a greater extent. In brief, history is an important factor in interpreting the meaning of modernity and this is specified as the civilization against which modernizing actors define their projects. Therefore, a project of modernity is subject to a civilizational context, but the project is also able to alter some central features of civilization.
Later modernities could be analysed as based on state-centred political projects, in the first place. The Japanese Meiji state, the Leninist Soviet state and the Kemalist Turkish state, as main agencies of change, made major efforts to create more powerful modernities than the western one. While aiming to bring about development, these states learned from the West though needing to oppose it for two reasons. First, without being against the West, it would be likely that the country would fall into its hands. Second, to move people towards development, a dichotomization was assumed to be necessary: modernity, in this respect, is about the radicalization of a duality of insider-outsider. Uniqueness, therefore, became a very important concept in later modernities; for example, the Turk was taken to be the creator of civilization in Anatolia. In the process of modernization, the original characteristics of the nation need to be emphasised by state elites who generally invent them. However, this indicates the reality that, to a considerable extent, modernization undermines uniqueness.

In terms of loss of ‘traditional culture’ in later experiences of modernity, the formation of a society - nation - is a very central process to be considered. Nationalising or standardising practices and identities have several purposes. Gellner (1964) claimed that nationalization and modernization require one another especially for creating the networks required by industrialisation. Although this view seems true for the western experience, it cannot be held to be the case for later modernities. When the nation-building processes began in later experiences, industrialization or industrial economy was absent. The nation was not built because the industrial economy required it, but because collective action towards industrialization was an immediate need.

For the autonomy of the country, state elites imagined that the collectivity should know its own creations, traditions, and creativity. This imaginary needed to create the nation on behalf of which the remaking of the social world was thought to be possible. Here I think of Anderson’s (1991)
The concept of ‘imagined community’ as sought by state elites in later modernizing societies. In later experiences, it is not at all the case that the nation is a community that tends to produce a state of its own or that modern society require integration and that this is to be found in the idea of nation. In stark contrast, the state creates the nation for the sake of autonomy against colonizing western modernity. Competitive collective action is needed for this ambition to be achieved. Developmental attitudes should surround the collectivity in order for it to be able to compete with western modernity. And to bring about this imagined community, actors of modernization were in need of inventing traditions which were either revised versions of existing ones or completely new. Apparently a ‘bounded collectivity’, the aim was to create modern society on the basis of ‘political’ projects. This is why the nation must be formulated as a product of nationalist ideology, connecting directly to the notion of the loss of uniqueness.

Breaking away from older structures of the lifeworld is achieved by means of standardisation of practices and identities. Local cultures - ethnic or religious - are destroyed by the power of new framework for integrating society, the nation-state. Common language and ‘high’ culture are imposed on the entire population by means of nation-wide, mass education. This process had to be supported by urbanization as a product of industrialization. Gellner’s distinction between low and high cultures could be considered in these terms as a plausible perspective (Gellner, 1983). Already existing distinctions between the high culture of the state elite and the low culture of the rest of the population is radicalized for the sake of socialising low culture into high culture. And in this respect, the notion of ‘invention of tradition’ is particularly helpful for understanding how the authenticity of culture is destroyed. Urban or high culture therefore is imposed on the community. This process is exemplified by the following two cases.
Industrialization and Islamic civilization: with the use of modern technology, firms are established and this situation requires female labour. And when, in an Islamic country, women start to become visible in the economic sphere, it could no longer be easily held that men have the right to marry more than one woman. The dependence of women on men in traditional Islam is altered by means of the participation of women in economy. And when gender relations are altered in an Islamic society, the entire social world could in no way remain unchanged, because women’s participation in the public realm was unfamiliar in traditional societies. In this dimension, what seems important is that established rules, values, norms face a difficulty in terms of surviving. This is so, precisely because culture is heterogeneoised by the emergence of different understandings; dispute comes to the fore leading to the diminished coherence of a culture. For example, in the Islamic East introducing a car to the wedding ceremony could lead to two opposing views on the relation of people to the world. The car could be resisted as the carrier of the bride because all rituals could be changed while a new view could also develop among some people, that the car represents the power of the groom by carrying the bride and making things easier. When the car becomes popular, as is presently the case, praying is no longer possible during the bride’s journey as it was when the journey was made by camel. Once practices are altered, it may also be the case that identities may become destabilised.

Citizenship and Islam: Popular political participation is at stake in modernizing periods and this has the power to alter existing orientations. For example, in an Islamic context, people’s relation to the world changes: people become citizens of a nation-state rather than subjects of the Caliphate. This shakes the power of sheikhs and opens up opportunity for ‘individuation’. The ambiguous achievement of modernity, in this respect, is that, on the one hand, the rise of society is witnessed and, on the other hand, individual freedom is celebrated. Both of these processes change culture; local ‘uniqueness’ is removed and connections between people become thin so that this collectivity
can no longer take its old form. Thus, in brief, it could be argued that modern technology and polity are introduced as purely functional and convenient, in line with older values, but that they then turn out to change socio-cultural relations.

It is possible that in traditional ages norms and values played a central role in holding people together. However, when modernity advances, homogenous culture is destroyed and a political body, the nation-state, replaces culture as the integrative sphere of society. The nation-state, unlike culture, assumes a global power leading to increased interrelations between civilizations. In modernity, solutions even to internal problems do not appear to be achieved without the state’s capacity to play a role at the global level.

To put it more explicitly, modernity cannot easily be ignored by any culture at the moment. The dynamics of modern elements seem uncontrollable in terms of their influence on cultures. There is no cultural boundary which is not touched by modernity. Therefore, 'authenticity' is not the right word to use in the definition of cultures. In this respect, we must pay attention to a voice which argues that ‘modernity has been and will continue to be resisted by many cultures...’ (Mestrovic, 1998: 156). Here, the author is confused about the fact that resistance against the West is taken to be synonymous with the rejection of modernity. Some anti-western movements have arisen in the East for the reason that, culturally, the West is not seen as being compatible with the East. In this respect, western imperialism is the reason why some militant movements shake the structures of some of Islamic countries, for example. Islamism has been seen by some observers as a rejection of modernity or even as postmodernity (Ahmed, 1992). A careful examination, however, shows that Islamism is, rather, a part of modernity (chapter 6 and 7). No doubt, Islamism reflects the reality that culture plays a pivotal part in socio-political life, but it does not reject modernity despite questioning the West.
At this stage, I must make clear that my argument for the concept of later modernities neither shares the assumptions of the postmodernist critique of modernity nor sees a sort of civilizational perspective as being convincing; that is, the sort of civilizational perspective that looks at civilizations merely as creating an impossibility of living together, as developed by Huntington (1997). The modernity-postmodernity debate seems to exist around the same problematic. Against Enlightenment-centred theorizing, postmodern theorizing sees it as impossible to eradicate cultural diversities by ‘rationality’. Not surprisingly, postmodernism also sees culture and rationality as incompatible: not surprisingly because postmodernism is also an intellectual product of a certain stage of the western experience of modernity. By contrasting non-western cultures to modernity, postmodernist scholars take cultural diversities as indications that modernity is over (Gülalp, 1998).

But it could be shown that cultural distinctions should not lead one to conclude that modernity is a dead end because these distinctions indicate that there are varieties of modernity. Regarding the pessimistic view of civilizational interrelations, what has been said in this section about culture must be kept in mind: within the modern experience, cultures can no longer be seen as stable entities. In the search for ‘imagined community’, modernization destroys the origins of a culture which loses its capability of being an integrative sphere of the collectivity.

However, if modernity undermines and marginalizes civilizations, how can there still be an insistence on varieties of modernity? It is not only possible, but also necessary, to argue for varieties of modernity. This is so precisely because a ‘dialectic’ is at work. As an actor between civilizations, modernity is capable of reducing some of the oppositions, but there is a limit to this ability. Transformations of cultural worlds always have varieties. The East is no longer the old East due to modernization, but neither is the East the West. Societies are not at the stage some call globalization. Modernity’s alteration of cultures does not necessarily mean that these cultures are
westernised. In contrast, different cultural worlds evolve in different directions when modernity does not recognize these cultures as stable. In brief, universalism and particularism are (counter) partners in modern experiences. Traditions are being lost as a price to pay for modernity, but the context does move to a place where different interpretations of modernity are at stake. It must be emphasised that modernity dictates that societies move towards modernity, but it also leaves space for societies to interpret modernity in their own ways. Modernity does not provide sure ways of doing things, but provides the conditions for interpretation. Thus, modernity’s properties are adapted to different civilizational-cultural frameworks. Distinct models of modernity are at stake due to the fact that no absolute break was achieved with histories and that interpretations of modernity by modernizing actors in the East are not copies of the western understanding of modernity.

As a consequence, we must insist that the western thesis, the universality of modernity, was balanced by an antithesis, the case of later modernities. In other words, the relation between universalism and particularism constituted a basic tension in modernity. Then, dialectically, it became difficult to represent the universal and the particular in distinct ways. This could be illustrated with the problem of the representation of society: For Enlightenment, society is a construct of free individuals shaped by reason. However, a counter argument emerges that society holds particular values which should represent it. And this is an important feature in the confusion leading some observers to interpret the current era as one of globalization and, some others, as one of localization. That is, the world does not allow itself to be read explicitly. Modernity took on some unique features in the East, but transformations also took different directions. Historically, different phenomena do not become the same but, also, modernity’s power in reducing some oppositions must be seen as pointing out that neither is the world at a stage that some call
pessimistic. And here, before introducing the Turkish experience as one of later modernity, I shall try to demonstrate how later modernities could be analysed.

I shall attempt to construct a model for analysing later modernities. Historical sociology, as is well-known, is not only a branch of the discipline of sociology, but it also reflects a method with which contemporary societies could be explored. In other words, using historical investigation, a sociologist is not only exploring past times, he/she also points out how societies ‘change’ and why there are distinctions between present societies. From this starting-point it should be clear that historical sociology is necessarily a ‘comparative sociology’. This is so in two respects. First, the present is compared to the past in order to understand both change and continuity. Second, the unit of analysis is historically compared to other experiences to see the distinct and common characteristics between present societies.

A comparative historical sociology, in analysing a later modernity, must emphasise two concepts: continuity and discontinuity. This dualistic perspective could be helpful in understanding the distinct and common characteristics between present societies. I propose that the history and creativity of ‘modernizing actors’ are two specific elements to be considered in order to answer two questions: how do ‘later’ modernities emerge and why they are different? We should view modernity neither as a complete break with the past, nor should we ignore the centrality of creativity. In brief, it could be emphasised that modernity is not a full product of tradition, but nor is it the full creativity of actors. That is to say that previous structures cannot be viewed as contexts which bring about modernities in the sense of evolution but, at the same time, without considering the historical backgrond, which provides possibilities for the direction of human actions, modernity cannot fully be explored. Therefore, the historical context is a central element in the creation of
different, later, modernities but modernity is not something that comes about without creative actors.

Thus, in analysing a later modernity it should be kept in mind that the reality is historical. Human actions are shaped by given historical possibilities. To an important extent, the time-period of a society could be analysed by looking at the preceding period. Human life is, therefore, an historical process of societies. However, we must also not neglect 'freedom of action'. (Historical) institutions shape human actions that, however, in turn (re)create and change these institutions. Thus, historical sociology must take social setting and action, which create and contain one another, into account. In brief, the history and creative power of modernizing actors must be worked on respectively. Having mentioned the centrality of history and the creativity of modernizing actors, I shall now develop a view of Turkish modernity as a later experience.

4. A Brief Historical Background of Turkish Modernity

Turkish modernity has often been seen merely as a product of Kemalism (Kislali, 1997; Kongar, 1986). This refers to modernity as a discontinuity, that means that to talk about modernity means talking about a radical shift from the past. It is therefore possible to assert that because modernity is taken to be a radical shift from the past, modernization is viewed simply as ‘westernization’. In other words, it is thought to be possible to move from previous social phenomena on the basis of westernization because, it was assumed, that there was no other alternative. Because the West is viewed as an advanced civilization and because the characteristics of the West were different from those of the then Turkish society, advanced civilization is thought to be attained by imitating the West (see Berkes, 1976). This necessarily implies a radical break with previous Turkish history. This is not only what many social scientists in Turkey think, but was also considered desirable by
early Kemalism itself. It is important here to insist that it is impossible to escape an history that maintains some of its central features, even if it is politically interpreted as dead. Thus, without analysing historical continuity one may be unable to discuss present-day Turkish society.

It could be possible to claim that the idea of modernity was imported from the West. However, Turkish society had imported Islam as well. So, should one argue that the Turks have always been ready to imitate inventions from around the world? Yes and no. An historical investigation could indicate that the Turks imported both the idea of Islam and that of modernity, but added their own characteristics to them. Both Islam and modernity have been reinterpreted and, therefore, they have become 'Turkified'.

If one sees the Turkish republic as the true beginning of Turkish modernity, one necessarily needs to consider the Ottoman Empire. This is so because the history preceding the republic could point to the 'discontinuities' of Turkish modernity. Is Turkish modernity merely a product of Kemalist actors? When we look at the central characteristics of the Ottoman Empire, we face difficulties that do not easily allow one to argue that the Turkish republic is a radically new phenomenon. In order to make clear that Turkish modernity cannot be reduced to being a fully Kemalist product, here we shall briefly point out the power of history. And for that, we do not need to return to the long gone history of the Turks. A brief observation of the Ottoman Empire could suffice for showing that historical background did play an important part in the formation of Turkish modernity.

The Ottoman Empire, founded in 1299, was written into world history as a powerful state that had played important roles in the formation of some modern states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as Greece. Modern Turkey is one of the states that succeeded the Ottoman Empire. In other words, Turkey as a nation-state stemmed from the legacies of the Ottoman Empire: if there
had been no Ottoman Empire, there would have been no modern Turkey. So, some of the central features of the Ottoman Empire need to be examined to show, in the further analysis, that a radical break with history was not achieved.

Perhaps, the central point is to ask the following: was the empire a 'static' world that did not permit the 'dynamic', modern, world to emerge? Mostly, observers concentrate on the features of the empire that are viewed as unable to prepare the way for modernity (Mardin, 1994). This is done by referring to the era preceding modernity in the West. Thus, feudalism is supposed to be the only context from which modernity stemmed. (Mahçupyan, 1997). Since the Ottoman Empire indeed was not a feudal state-society, it is seen as impossible to produce modernity. This view is centred on the interpretation that modernity could everywhere be one and the same phenomenon. And since the empire was not feudal, it was assumed that the only way to westernize the Turkish world was in Anatolia. However, we shall see that it should not be seen that Empire is a context from which modernity cannot stem.

The Ottoman Empire was not a feudal society. Therefore, the emergence of modernity was to be different in the Turkish context than in Europe, so that non-feudal contexts can equally give way to modernity. There were no autonomous structures and actors in the sense of European feudalism, but this does not mean that there was no agent of modernity in the Ottoman Empire. In the Empire, domination was not determined by socio-economic criteria, but by the polity and the military. Thus, the bourgeoisie was not to be a decisive force in the modernizing process, but it was not the only possible force that could create modernity. Rather, a continuity was to be at stake. History was to provide some possible answers to the following question: how could the Empire respond to the rise of the West? The intelligentsia, made up by military and civilian actors, was to be the decisive dynamic that was to remain in power and that also survived in Kemalism. Therefore, the Ottoman
Empire did not aim to keep its traditional position, but aimed at modernizing itself. The collapse of the Empire was not due to its 'traditionalist' response to the rise of modernity in the West, as many observers have argued (Berkes, 1974). But the end of Empire came to be the case partly because modernization, in the Turkish world, required its death. Here, I do not argue that modernity necessarily implies that an Empire dissolve itself, but the death of the Ottoman Empire paved the way for Turkish modernity to be formed. Turkish modernity, or rather the Turkish project of modernity – Kemalism - was partly a consequence of the attempts of the Empire to catch up with the West. Now I shall briefly mention the responses of the Empire to the rise of the West.

The beginning of Turkish modernity could be marked by the date 1839 when the Tanzimat - regulations - era began. In the eighteenth century, the rise of the West gave rise to some radical questions in the Ottoman Empire. The superiority of the West was attempted to be understood by the Ottoman intelligentsia. This search created 'new ideas' among new intellectuals called Young Ottomans, such as Namýk Kemal, that gave way to a number of reforms, which were to prepare the way for the emergence of Kemalism. In 1876, the Young Ottomans achieved the establishment of the first constitutional regime, with the first written modern constitution. In this Tanzimat era - 1839-78 - secularism was an important subject of intellectual discussion that was to become a background for Kemalist secularism. For the first time in the Turkish world, a parliment was formed that was to check the economic activities of the state, work out a synthesis of Seriat, Islamic law and secular laws, and change the laws that were assumed to be against the interests of state. The last job - to protect the state - was to be a prominent feature of Kemalism in the 1930s. The efforts mentioned above were being made by the intelligentsia and the Turkish republic's central actors were to come from the same group.
In 1878, the Tanzimat era ended when the Sultan Abdülhamit closed the parliament. But this act was to give rise to new developments of the new ideas of new men, the Young Turks. In 1908, the Young Turks, many members of whom were from the military, acted against the sultan and succeeded in establishing the second constitutional regime. The first modern political party in Turkey was formed and called Ittihat Terakki. The Kemalist Party, the Republican People’s Party, was not the first modern party. The year of 1908 was a very crucial time that later provided some prominent answers to the problematics of Turkish society but, in some periods, these answers were to cause new problematics too. The fact that the establishment of the constitutional regime was achieved by a military coup was to often appear in the history of the Turkish republic.

What is mentioned above should not be taken to mean that Turkish modernity is a product of the Ottoman Empire. Modernity is not a full product of tradition, but a new phenomenon to an important extent. Without creative actors, modernity cannot be produced from within culture or civilization. This is an argument that rejects structuralist and evolutionist perspectives but without omitting a centrality of history in the formation of modernity. Thus, the Turkish project of modernity is a consequence of the Ottoman Empire as well as a new phenomenon created by new actors. So, now briefly Kemalism shall be introduced.

The possibility of varieties in responding to the rise of the West was not rich. By considering the final century of the Ottoman Empire, we can see that there were three precise alternative responses to Western modernity. **Rejectionism:** this was a traditionalist response which assumed that it was possible to reject modernization (a group of the Ulema). **Reformism:** a view was developed against the traditionalist response which argued for the possibility of both ‘development’ and ‘authenticity’ (The Ottoman reformers). **Revolutionism:** Against both rejectionist and reformist perspectives the third option proposed to develop the remaking of the social world.
Kemalism was a radical form of the third. By reading both Ottoman decay and Western development, Kemalism saw no solution other than 'radicalizing dualities' in Turkish society. Revolutionary crises come about through the appearance of dissatisfied or disoriented people and when the purposive revolutionary project reads this dissatisfaction by insisting on oppositional goals, revolution comes about (Skocpol, 1979). And it is here that the Kemalist project of revolution had to 'problematize' majority consensus on the existing system. On this theme, it must be seen that, for the sake of the problematization of consensus, Kemalism had no chance other than to radicalize dualities and oppositions. Therefore, the 'radicalization of dualities' emerged as very specific to the history of Turkish modernity. In the course of the Kemalist revolution, two other factors were important: international pressure and a vulnerable old system. The First World War destroyed the imperial system of the Ottoman Empire and the sultanate was vulnerable. Therefore, it is not surprising that Kemalism appeared as a project for emancipating Turks. In brief, the autonomy of the Turks was the first ambitious goal of the Kemalist revolution.

Thus, the Kemalist revolution’s first aim was to replace one 'imagined community', the Islamic umma, with another 'imagined community', the Turkish nation whose ultimate goal was thought to be to create 'autonomous' modernity. Here it is stressed that in its efforts to achieve an autonomous modernity, Kemalism went to great lengths: modernity was, in the first place, taken to be a universal civilization which, according to Kemalism, could be achieved by a high degree of rationalization of the social world. This was a dual perspective. In the post-First World War era, the first successful movement against western imperialism was the Kemalist movement which provided a model of liberation for colonial countries. Kemalism’s war was nothing if not a war against western hegemony and for the autonomy of the Turks. However, viewing modernity as a universal civilization could not escape the contradiction situated within Kemalism, that of autonomy versus universality; the latter would assimilate the former if it was achieved.
Thus, in the Turkish experience of modernity, the tension-ridden relations between Enlightenment and Romanticism has played an essential role. This may remind us of the German experience. However, the above two concepts could be considered to count in all experiences of modernity, though in highly different contexts. Romanticism should never be taken as a rejection of modernity, but rather as an important part of the experience of modernity (Friese and Wagner, 2000). It is because of this dialectic that the current importance of culture in terms of our relations to the world is seen as a powerful indication that modernity has failed. However, for the Enlightenment alone it would be very difficult to define the meaning of the modern experience. This situation reflects itself clearly when we consider the question of nation, showing that both Enlightenment and Romanticism play parts in the transition to modernity. Thus, in the next chapter, the nationalization process in the Turkish context shall be examined with a view that civilization and culture should be discussed in analysing nation-building and that modern society is not a coherent whole so that the question of ethnicity needs also to be included in the analysis.
Chapter Four

ETHNICITY, NATION AND CIVILIZATION

In the experience of Turkish modernity, ‘nationalization’ obviously occupies a prominent part. This is why the Turkish transition to modernity has often been seen merely as a transition from the Islamic Empire to the Turkish nation-state. And precisely by reference to this transformation, the Turkish experience has often been called ‘unique’. For the reason for this observation is seen in the ‘incompatibility’ of Islam with the idea of ‘nation’. Thus, in a predominantly Islamic society, the fact of bringing about a nation-state is assumed to be a major reason for why Kemalism should be seen to have provided a model of modernity for Muslim societies.

What has been prominently visible in the Turkish experience has been taken as being the foundation of the Turkish nation-state (Kongar, 1985). In other words, the nation is viewed as an end rather than as the means. Although it is possible to show that, to an important extent, the nationalist principle of Kemalist modernity was a means for other ends, the nationalizing process and its aftermath need to be analysed. To put it more explicitly, the nation is generally seen as the social configuration of modern times (Gellner, 1983; Giddens, 1985, 1991) and, thus, it seems necessary to explore the move towards nationalized collectivity in Anatolia.

Some observers see the nationalization process as being obviously related to the ‘ethnicity’ of the community (Smith, 1986; Gutierrez, 1995). This perspective reads nation as an expression of an earlier sense of ethnocentrism. Nationalization has also been stressed, by some observers, as having connections with an idea of ‘civilization’, which came into existence with the emergence of modernity (Gellner, 1964; Elias, 1994 [1982]). That is, modernization was seen to mean ‘civilization’; it is observed that civilization does not refer to a pre-existing category, but is only
something to be reached, becoming civilized. In the Turkish experience, this understanding of civilization was taken to be the case without being critically observed. Then, kültür or hars was seen as peculiar to the Turks, while medeniyet or uygarlık was emphasised as common to the whole of humanity. Therefore, it seems clear that kültür places essential stress on nationality, while urgarlık may be common to all human beings. From this observation, it becomes obvious that a study of nationalization should take ethnicity and civilization into account in order to understand what this process refers to.

Thus, the nationalizing process of Anatolia must be looked at from a view-point which considers the relations of nation to ethnicity, culture, civilization and modernity. This consideration could also provide a means of seeing if the Turkish experience implies a different reading to that of westernization. Therefore, in a comparative perspective the culture and civilization of the Turks need to be observed - before the nation and after - in order to see whether nationalization has a capacity to change cultural-civilizational orientations. So, this chapter looks at the nation in Turkey by considering culture and civilization.

It is useful to observe the relations between ethnicity, nation and civilization in a conceptual perspective, before exploring the Turkish experience. The next section, therefore, concerns two interrelated themes, those of ‘nation and ethnicity’ and ‘civilization and culture’. The following section examines ‘the invention of the Turkish nation and its aftermath’. First, a brief historical observation is made so as to understand the Kemalist version of nationalism. Second, the Kemalist nationalizing process is considered to show what the meaning of nation in Turkey refers to. In the succeeding section, the contemporary problematic of the Kurdish question is analysed in order to test whether the Turkish nation is being shaken.
1. The Relations between Ethnicity, Nation, Culture and Civilization

A. Ethnicity and Nation

As mentioned earlier, one perspective on nation emphasises the ‘ethnic’ element as a tangible ingredient in the formation of nations. In the light of the current literature on nationalism, we see that this perspective is advancing (see, for instance, Wucker, 1997; Guibernau and Rex, 1997). In particular, movements which claim to be based on ethnicity seem to provide the source for the growing adherence to this perspective. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Federation, in particular, leading to the emergence of new nation-states based on ‘ethnicity’, on the one hand, and some ethno-centric movements within the borders of some nation-states, on the other, seem to prove the essence of ethnicity in providing communal ‘self-assertion’. In Turkey, there apparently seems to be a parallel reading of this ethnicity: the Kurdish question occupies an obviously important part in ‘Turkish society’. I shall briefly discuss whether this perspective of nation is tenable.

Mann (1993: 215) wrote the following: [nation] ‘is a community affirming its distinct ethnic identity and history and claiming its own state’. Smith (1986) emphasised the importance of ‘subjective’ factors in the formation of nation by arguing the following: in the form of ethnocentrism the collective memory plays the basic part in the re-production of a ‘self’ over centuries. Or, more recently, Gutierrez (1995: 164) claimed: ‘I argue that the renewal of ethnicity is less a result of external forces than a self-discovery...’. These observations could be viewed as privileging ‘ethnic oneness’ and homogeneity within the nation. Ethnicity, without critical observation, is taken as a ‘given’ historical reality. In other words, ‘powerful’ memories of the ‘ethnic past’ are seen to determine the formation of the nation: ‘...ethnie have emerged and re-
emerged at different periods in several continents and culture-areas right up to the modern era; and that ethnicity has remained as a socio-cultural ‘model’ for human organization and communication...’ (Smith, 1986: 168). This observation inevitably shows the nation as in existence within history long before modernity emerged. It was this assumption that led to the debate on nationalism between Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith. The former, as is well-known, saw no possibility for the existence of the nation in premodern times (Gellner, 1964, 1983) while the latter disregarded the idea of nation as being a modern social configuration (Smith, 1983, 1986, 1998).

Before considering the Gellnerian - modernist - perspective of nation, let me discuss the ethnocentric view of nation, often associated with the works of Anthony Smith.\(^{34}\)

‘Ethnic oneness’ is a chimerical idea to be validated. Even in prehistoric times an ethnically pure community did not exist: there have been processes (marriages, migrations, assimilations, capturing of women, wars) which have always led to intermingling among peoples. More crucially, ethnic purity has never existed, because social traits are not transmitted through biological inheritance but only through education. As Gökalp (1959: 135) considers: ‘Man does not bring with him language, religion, aesthetic feeling, political, legal or economic institutions. All these he acquires later, from society and through education’. Therefore, Smith’s idea of the ethnocentric nation is not tenable in an historical perspective. The argument for connections between ethnicity and nation must show us how it was possible for an ethnicity to see itself as central. The conditions of premodern ages do not correspond to the possibility of forming a nation, i.e. lack of communication between Turks in the South Eastern region of the country and Turks in the Aegean region of the same country.

However, when ethnicity is seen as the feelings of belonging to a cultural group, it becomes a plausible observation. Recently, some have come to admit that biological difference alone does not constitute an ethnic group but that common customs are also an important factor (Guibernau and
Rex 1997). In other words, common traditions, shared ways of life and the memory of the common past are viewed as defining the meaning of ethnicity. Nevertheless, it must be argued that there is no ‘objective’ factor involved in this term: objectively it is impossible to argue for a pure ethnicity, but this does not seem to matter much because the crucial point is the myth through which individuals attribute ethnic unity. Therefore, ethnicity should be defined as classifying people and group relationships. More precisely, ethnicity needs to be seen as follows: a group of people considers itself (and is sometimes regarded by others as well) as being a ‘culturally’ distinctive unity. Nevertheless, for the argument on nationalization, ethnic purity or even the term ethnicity itself should not be overemphasised. In the emergence of the nation, several other elements are as important as ethnocentrism. Firstly, the ‘modernist’ view of nation shall be mentioned.

Gellner (1964: 168) wrote the following: ‘Nationalism is not the awaking of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist...’ He thus sees nation as a purely modern phenomenon detached from the past (Gellner, 1983). Therefore, in Gellner, the first explicit contrast with the ethnocentric view of the nation is that the nation does not in any way necessarily refer to an ethnic past. On the contrary, the nation is a framework, an instrument of modernization. There is thus a direct relation between industrialisation and nationalization. This perspective primarily refers to the notion that the nation epitomizes the culture of modernity. The nation, in other words, as a modern phenomenon which cannot be traced back to premodern times, is a construct of people as a necessary response to ‘objective’ processes of economic, social and political conditions of an emerging modernity. It seems conceivable to view this perspective briefly as follows: in terms of social configuration, the nation shows a certain discontinuity of modernity; modernity does not rely on any principle which existed in previous ages in terms of community type. Therefore, in this perspective, the important conceptualization is the unrelateness of nation to ethnicity. This is so, because an ethnic group is not seen as tending to produce a state of its own.
On the contrary, the emergence of nation is preconditioned by the presence of the state, which is seen as the main force in the formation of the nation (Gellner, 1983). It is therefore clear that ‘ethnicity’ has almost no part to play in the emergence of nation. Rather, the nationalist ideology of the state elite produces nation to meet the needs of modernization. Emphasis is on common language, mass education, ‘high culture’, and communication within a high level of division of labour, possible only under the conditions of modernity.

This Gellnerian perspective of nation is also problematic, although it is more plausible than the ethnocentric view of nation. Gellner describes nation as a product of modernizing periods, but fails to explore how this process was achieved. It is, no doubt, tenable to observe the nation as follows: by means of mass education, urbanization, a high level of communication and political participation, a ‘high culture’ was imposed on society. However, how these processes alone could ‘eradicate’ former lifeworld practices and identities remains unanswered. It must be seen that without ‘subjective’ interpretation by the ‘people’, the emergence of the nation would not be possible. In this regard, two observers of nation may be considered; Anderson and Hobsbawm.

Anderson (1991 [1983]) wrote the following: [nation] ‘is an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’. Hobsbawm (1983, 1990) shows that national traditions are ‘invented traditions’. What is particularly important in these views is that the nation is seen as a ‘creation’ or ‘invention’ and that not only its ‘objective’ conditions but, importantly, people’s image of the nation needs to be focused on. Therefore, following this understanding, the static view of the nation from an ethnocentric perspective and the lack of
‘imagery’ in a Gellnerian perspective may be overcome. The nation is neither an expression of a formerly existing ethnocentrism, nor can it be seen as a product of ‘objective’ processes.

Having discussed some perspectives of nation, we should now briefly answer a remaining question: what then is a nation? As Gellner has shown us, the nation is definitely as a modern phenomenon but, in its emergence, ‘imagery’ played a major part. It is exactly in these terms that it becomes possible to see that nationalist ideology could also use ‘ethnicity’ as the basis for its argument. Nevertheless, ethnicity itself does not define the meaning of the nation; on the contrary, ethnicity is itself ‘invented’ or ‘created’. Thus, nationalism is possible in both ways: one nationalist movement tries to ‘actualize’ the past of an ‘ethnic’ group and privilege it while another demonstrates that not ethnicity, blood, or race but common history and a belief in a common future define what a nation is. It is therefore conceivable to see that there are two kinds of nation-building projects: civic and ethnocentric models. Both use imagery, but the latter also invents an ethnicity. A plausible observation may be that the nation is a product of the nationalist ideology which is necessarily imagery and creative.

What seems most astonishing is that observers do not seem to recognize the unavoidable relationship between the idea of nation and an ‘imaginary signifier of modernity’ - the idea of autonomy: self-determination. The ‘love of autonomy’ by a people in a ‘certain’ land constitutes what a nation is. This is only because an imaginary signification is at stake. A people imagines itself as having autonomy in the world, distance from ‘others’. And exactly by holding this understanding as central to the analysis of the nation, two processes could be considered in the emergence of nation: the disintegration of larger social formations, such as empires, and the standardization of practices and identities in a clearly defined land as the ‘country’ of a specific people. In the standardization process, mass education is particularly important in the sense that it
creates a ‘reading public’ (Anderson) which is therefore influenced so that people start ‘imagining’ that they live within a nation, an ‘imagined community’. So, the nation is definitely related with the imaginary signification of autonomy of a people and its country, and this ‘autonomy’ could be ‘developed’, or indeed could only be achieved, by means of modernization: economic and political processes of modernization are important conditions for the autonomy of a country.

This process of nationalization, however, could not take place without a ‘radicalization of dualities’ - the power of ‘the project of modernity’. There are two dualities are at stake: the problematization of locality in the country and the dichotomization of the ‘particular’ at the ‘universal’: the insider-outsider problematic. It is therefore no surprise that nationalization is often criticised, that it destroys the ‘authenticity’ of local cultures and that it divides the earth between nation-states. Thus, it becomes transparent that the nation is a self-expression of a people and, therefore, the idea of nation is obviously related to civilization and culture, which are the bases for the self-definition or the expression of a people. We now need to look at civilization and culture by considering their relations to nation.

**B. Civilization and Culture**

Civilization could refer to various things, to the level of technology, to the type of manners, to the development of scientific knowledge, to religious ideas and customs (Elias, 1994 [1982]). One could take this observation to argue that there is almost nothing in human life which could not be considered as civilized or uncivilized depending on ‘criteria’. Yet this view would necessarily force
us to admit that, from the beginning, civilization has been tangible in human life. As well-known, this is not the case, but there is a history of civilization: the start of civilization is confined to the beginning of settled life or, in an Islamic interpretation, civilization starts with the emergence of Medina as the Islamic city. While this understanding refers to the fact that human beings have been civilized for a long time, the emergence of modernity created new thinking on the meaning of civilization. Scientific knowledge, science-oriented technology and a secular polity point to the level of civilization. This is nothing other than the expression of the self-consciousness of the West. But, it is this definition of civilization which has circulated around the world and occupied minds for a long time, indeed, to this day.

Modernity has been identified with civilization and, in particular, it was simply taken as being identical to western civilization. More precisely, the concept of ‘civilization’, a product of the eighteenth-century western intellectual climate, expressed the self-consciousness of the West: western society believed itself to be superior to both earlier societies and to ‘other’ contemporary societies (Arnason, 2000b). We could use this to argue that civilization is a self-definition of world-views. In history, any group of people identified itself as ‘civilized’, albeit in different ways. For example, Uygur Turks, who lived in Central Asia long before Islam emerged, saw themselves as uygar - civilized - the contemporary word for civilization in Turkish being uygarlik. Briefly, civilization could be taken as a concept which refers to people’s self-interpretation. However, we encounter a problem, when we see civilization as such. Which groups of people would a civilization include? For example, could Islamic civilization include Greece? It is important here to stress that civilization is not a universal phenomenon in the sense that it divides people on earth. Thus, a plurality of civilization is inevitable. Nevertheless, the theorizing of civilization as identical with western modernity is still powerfully at stake, as shall briefly be shown for the case of Francis Fukuyama.
The collapse of communism led Fukuyama to conclude that history had come to end (Fukuyama, 1992). Fukuyama knows that the clash of ideas has been an important factor in shaping human history and that twentieth century capitalism and communism have been understood to be the two clashing ideas shaping the world. When one of these came to be a thing of the past, Fukuyama was quick to see the liberal democracy of the West as the victor. Since communism and capitalism are seen as the only two clashing ideas and since communism lost the war ‘forever’, liberalism is understood to be the last order and liberal man as the last man; history is thus over. However, Fukuyama is unaware of civilizational distinctions which do not allow for the end of history. In order for one to theorize the end of history, there should no longer be any struggles over time and space. However, in reality the world still witnesses communal and social, international struggles and these are quite often due to civilizational distinctions.

However, considering civilization as classifying people on earth and as causing struggles leaves a problem. For example, when it is admitted that there is an Islamic civilization, does this generalize or universalize all Muslim societies? In other words, could an Islamic civilization overcome ‘differences’ between ‘particular’ Muslim societies? Here we unavoidably meet with the concept of culture.

Elias’s well-known study of the civilizing process shows civilization and culture to be self-consciousness of two world-views: the French and the German. It may be argued that ‘later modernities’ – with Germany being seen as belonging to this category – had kultur while ‘original modernities’, such as the French and the English, interpret themselves as civilisations and, thus, applicable to all peoples. It could follow that this was why original modernity aimed at shaping the whole world in its own image while, for later modernities, their interpretations were specific,
particular to themselves. This observation could and should be used to understand the current era of the social world, but it does pose another question: does original modernity refer only to civilization and later modernities only to culture? In fact, it is not surprising that original modernity uses civilization and culture synonymously; culture and civilization are taken to be one and the same phenomenon. I shall now briefly consider a contemporary perspective on civilization, Huntington’s thesis, to show that culture and civilization are still taken to be synonymous.

Unlike Fukuyama, Huntington has a different response to the post-Cold War era. He developed a theory of the ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington, 1997). Huntington’s observation of ‘differences’, led him to claim that the rest of humanity did not accept the western world as ‘superior’. This was due to civilizational incompatibilities. Firstly, one should be critical of Huntington’s neglect of ‘culture’. Within one civilizational zone, Huntington does not see distinctions between ‘particular’ societies. He underestimates ethnic, linguistic and even ‘religious’ differences. However, it must be observed that conflicts do not only exist between civilizations; conflicts between ‘cultures’ belonging to the same civilization must be considered as well. The best example could be the distinct interpretations of the world by Shia Muslims and by Sunni Muslims despite the fact that, civilizationally, they are alike. Thus, there are civilizations each of which include multiple cultural worlds. Now it is necessary to consider what culture is.

It is useful to start by saying that ‘culture’ is the distinguishing element of human beings: symbolic representation is unique to humans. Therefore, there is no doubt that culture is the learned aspect of human society. It could follow that, from the very beginning, culture has been working to ‘culturalise’ the world. The history of culture is a history of a struggle to give ‘meaning’ to everything. When, for example, the power of nature was considered ‘unacceptable’, it was imagined that there must be a higher category - necessarily cultural - governing that powerful
nature: God was created. But culture’s war did not stop there: it had created God whom it was also to kill. Therefore, culture is what is remarkable about human ‘creative’ achievement. However, when we see culture merely as the creative achievements of humankind, we may be inclined to admit that culture is ‘universal’, but it is not. Culture refers to the intellectual and moral characteristics of particular societies. And culture, in these terms, is generally seen to be commonly held beliefs, values, norms etc. From now on, I shall briefly look at culture in modernity.

Perhaps, it was structural-functionalism which tried hardest to accommodate culture in social theorizing about modern society. Parsons saw three interrelated systems: the social, personal and cultural (Parsons, 1951). However, since Parsons’s theory is firstly obsessed with the problem of the social order, culture is inevitably reduced to being the legitimizing sphere of the social. Therefore, culture is subordinated to the social and, necessarily, it is theorized simply as shared values. In brief, culture is heavily determined by institutional factors according to this perspective. Thus, if one criticizes Marx for being too materialist, one should also criticise Parsons for seeing the social as ‘too’ independent of culture. So, the first conceptualization to be made is that culture should never be reduced to the sustaining of social relations but, in contrast, the power of culture to produce and re-produce the social should be recognized (Weber). Thus, it is important that Weber (1958) understood the Protestant ethic as not just as legitimizing capitalist market relations but, essentially, as providing a way of being moral and rational.

Secondly, it should be stressed that culture is not simply a reflection of material conditions. Culture is not easily considered as a superstructure coming out of the base of the economy. In Marxism, one does not need to look at ‘meaning’, but should understand the material elements that ‘meaning’ reflects. As it is now quite clear, however, human beings are not only surrounded by interest, but by identity too; culture has an ordering power. One should, of course, recognize Gramsci’s theorizing
as to the importance of culture in Marxist tradition. Gramsci (1971: 323-35) theorizes culture as part of the process of domination. The ideological domination of society by ‘organic intellectuals’ is called ‘cultural hegemony’. While this could be important in bringing the concept of culture to Marxist theory, it is not considered that culture also has the power to challenge, criticize or control authority.

Finally, culture should never be seen as clearly defined, or as a closed ways of doing things, otherwise culture would be ‘objective’ and, thus, would not be open to ‘change’ at the will of social actors. Culture is an open-ended, ‘interpretative’ space. It is always open to re-interpretation and to different interpretations. Under changing conditions, culture could be homogenizing but yet diverging, hegemonizing but yet resisting. By this I mean that culture is not at all static but, in contrast, plays a basic role between ‘structure’ and social actors who find culture useful in their attempts to bring about change. From this point, we must grasp the meaning of culture: it is the self-interpretation of society. If we take culture as being ‘collective learning’ because its elements, those of tradition and reason are collective, it refers then to the self-construction of society. However, social realities - conditions - are at times in conflict with cultural goals and it is here that ‘social actors’ find a space in culture to review and reinterpret it in order to make innovations. Otherwise, one might - as is often the case - take culture as determining human action. Therefore, a most important subject, the substance of social science - social change - would become lost. And within modernity, culture is more open to re-interpretations.

The idea of cultural autonomy in 'the project of modernity' refers to two basic ‘ambitions’: the emancipation of cultural knowledge from tradition, God, and political authority and culture’s mastery over nature. Though they are questionable - and often criticized - they provided a sort of autonomy for culture. The separation of three realms of culture - morality, science and art - give
space to social actors to interpret themselves and the world in new or different ways. Although problematic - fragmentation leads to painful results - it should also be recognised that this opens up space for a plurality of world views. The best example could be the fact that, before modernity, Islamic people were not free to express what they understood from Islam due to the total engagement of Islam with political authority and the lack of autonomy. Today, however, under conditions of modernity we witness the emergence of Islamic ‘actors’ who demonstrate what they understand from Islam and from the world.

As a brief conclusion we must focus on culture’s relation to civilization. Gökalp (1959) observed that culture is national, while civilization is international. That is, modern society is a national one in terms of cultural identification. However, the way in which modernity confused Gökalp should be seen: civilization cannot easily be argued to be ‘international’, because there are ‘distinct’ civilizations in modern times too. Then, it seems thinkable that within a civilizational zone, in modern times, there are nation-states which - at least ideally - posses national cultures. Civilization refers to the total sum of the ‘cultural-area’ which indicates some common features of the self-interpretations of some ‘societies’. In other words, there are multiple cultures which belong to the same civilization. However, it must be said that there are some basic commonalities between these cultures if we wish to argue for the plurality of civilizations. Thus, a nation could present itself as a member of a civilization while claiming to be culturally different and, in its constitution, ethnicity could be an important element. In brief, ethnicity, nation, culture and civilization refer to the self-interpretation and presentation of peoples. Now we shall examine the Turkish experience in terms of the nationalization process by keeping ethnicity, culture and civilization as key concepts of the argument.
2. The invention of the Turkish nation and its Aftermath

A. Defining the Turk in a Civilizational Perspective

The Turkish world, in Anatolia, could be described as a cultural-area belonging to the Ural-Altai group in terms of language and to Islam in terms of religion. However, in terms of civilization, it is always problematic as to where to place the Turk. We need to look at the nineteenth-century intellectual climate in the Ottoman empire. Some were sure that the Turks constituted a separate civilization, which included all Turks from the Balkans to China and that their ideal country was called Turan. For some other observers, there was no doubt that the Turks were members of the Islamic civilization; since they became Muslims, their way of life was completely determined by Islamic principles. However, a surprising observation was also to emerge: the Turks belonged to western civilization. None of these perspectives could be refuted easily; each of them constitutes parts of the truth. One could conclude then that the Turks are a people without originality; they have always borrowed from, and been easily influenced by, other civilizations. In the first place this might seem unproblematic. However, the Turks have not been assimilated into a certain, clearly defined civilization. Thus, it is important to ask, have the Turks had a particular characteristic that did not allow them be completely ‘Islamic’, ‘western’ or even ‘Turkish’. Let us start by saying the following: the Turks have always lived with ‘other’ groups of people. Historically, this could be proven by considering all the stages through which Turks have passed.

The Turks were nomadic people who never settled down in a definite place until they reached Central Asia from the Far East. In Central Asia, particularly in Turkestan, the Turks established a ‘civilized’ territory for themselves, before Islam emerged. We see from archaeological findings that
the people living in that region called themselves Turk. This period is seen by some - especially by Kemalism - as the bright era for ‘Turkish civilization’. For example, Gökalp (1959) saw that era as the bright era when Turks constituted their own civilization without borrowings from outside. This might be true, but what we also know is that some argue that when Islam emerged, the Turks found it desirable to take it as a model of life and that Islam ‘civilized’ them. Although, as historical studies show (Aydin, 1994), the Turks did not accept Islam easily, they became Muslim which is one of the elements that distinguishes Turkish identity from its Christian neighbours. Becoming Muslim was, however, not to forget what the Turks had before. Among Muslim societies, the Turkish one differed from the very beginning with its institutions and way of life.

Thus, in contrast to the assumptions of Turks being totally ‘Islamic’, it could be argued that it was not Islam which defined Turkish culture as immaculately Islamic, but that the Turks ‘assimilated’ Islam in making it compatible with their way of life, the elements of which also were not completely of Turkish origin. I want to indicate this reality with two brief examples. First, unlike the Arabs, Turks had man-made laws - Kanun - which was not deteriorated by Islamic, Seriat law. This was why the Ottoman empire formed itself on two different sorts of law; Örfi and Serii. The sultan was never undermined by Islam but, in contrast, the state was able to use Islam as a legitimizing element. The state did not rely on the origins of Islam and this could be considered as a reason why the Ottoman Empire was ‘developmental’ in comparison to other ‘Islamic’ states. Therefore, in this respect, what observers need to be aware of is that, in the nationalizing process of Anatolia, in its move away from the Islamic community, Kemalism had this historical fact behind it. The second feature I want to point out is Alevilik, a reading of Islam unique to the Turks, although claimed by many to be a branch of Shia Islam. This version of Islam, Alevilik, could, in fact, be compared to Protestantism in terms of its openness to innovation. These people do not practice Islamic rules which are explicitly defined in the Koran, but they interpret Islam as the
Koran permitting Muslims to go further in finding ‘perfection’. This could be argued as being a way towards secularisation. Among many cases, the two examples mentioned above should make observers to believe that Kemalism did not just happen to come about in Turkish society but, rather, that the socio-historical ground for that sort of project of modernity to emerge already existed. It should be clear that the Turkish world in Anatolia was not totally located in ‘Islamic civilization’ even before the start of modernization. And, in the later stages of the Ottoman Empire, new experiences led the Turks to meet ‘another’ civilizational zone and, thus, they moved towards the West.

When the Turks conquered Anatolia in the eleventh century, they met there a diverse pattern of tradition, including the Hittitites, the Sumers and others. This often escapes notice but it provided an important source for Turkish identity in Anatolia. While Greek hegemony was replaced, indigenous cultures never deteriorated (see, for example, Lewis, 1961). The indigenous cultures influenced Turkish culture as much as did Islam or Europe. For instance, in Anatolian villages, the houses and mosques are so different to those of Syria and Iraq or, for example, Turkish music which is popular in contrast to Arabic or Persian classical music. During the Ottoman era, the Turks lived with ‘European peoples’ and with Jews: in the Balkans with Serbs, Romanians, Albanians, Bulgarians, etc. and in Anatolia, particularly, with the Greeks. The Ottoman Empire had the largest Jewish community in the world. Some of the borrowings from these peoples were remarkable. For instance, the fez was borrowed from the Greeks but because it was banned by Kemalism, it has been claimed as originally Islamic by Islamists. The Ottoman Empire, in brief, was a ‘western’ state in comparison to eastern states of the time. What, however, cannot be denied was the Turkish element which was even manipulated and disliked by the sultans. These historical trends gave rise to three conflicting ideologies in terms of Turkish identity in the nineteenth century: Islamism,
Turkism and westernism. How and why Turkish national identity emerged could briefly be understood by considering the power of the Turkish language.

Turkish culture seems undeniable especially due to its language. The Turkish language, though it was undermined by the ruling class of the Ottoman empire, never lost its ability to ‘assimilate’ borrowed foreign words. There are many Arabic and Persian, as well as European, words in Turkish. However, there is no way of using these words in their original forms. For example, the Arabic *nerduba* became *merdiven* and *ghirbal* became *kalbur*. From European languages, Europe became *Avrupa*, cigarette became *sigara* etc. Reading the Turkish language’s power of resistance against foreign words could also reveal some clues with regard to which civilizational Turks belong. In some periods when it was impossible to replace European words with original Turkish words, the Turkish language rather used either Arabic, for scientific terminology, or Persian, for general vocabulary. But in some other, especially modern times, the Turkish language eliminated Arabic and Persian words and when it was difficult to replace them with original Turkish words, the Turkish language this time used European words (Gökalp, 1959). One may tend to argue that because Europe is now a centre of history, the Turkish language is more influenced by European languages. However, when Arabic or Persian words were used to replace European words, the Turkish world was much too far ahead of the Arabic and Persian worlds. Rather, when the Turkish world in Anatolia finds itself near to one of these civilizational zones, it resists assimilation by refusing the use of words from that zone.

In brief, until the twentieth century the Turkish world in Anatolia could be viewed as a threefold world in terms of civilizational zones. Ziya Gökalp (1959) has argued in 1914 that the three dominant movements, Turkism, Islamism and modernism, show that the elements which the Turks took from the three civilizations are still not assimilated and remain in conflict with each other.
And for him, it is due to that that ‘Turkish culture is not identical with the civilization of the Turks’ (1959: 179). His solution was to ‘nationalize’ Turkey with an aim of bringing about modernity. We shall see in the next section what nationalization succeeded to achieve. Was it a power to make Turkish culture and the civilization of the Turks compatible? Is Turkey now expressing a ‘healthy’ kültür and uygarlık?

B. The Nationalization Process

As mentioned above, with respect to responding to the questions of ‘collectivity’, three competing views were at stake: Islamism, Turkism and Westernism. None of them achieved its objectives, but it was Turkism which paved the way for the Kemalist perspective of the collectivity. It is important to note some basic views of Turanism - pan-Turkism - in order to see both its continuities and its discontinuities with Kemalism.

Turanism could best be viewed as an outcome of the decaying Ottoman Empire. Turanism should be seen as an attempt to continue with the imperial tradition: the unification of all Turkish people from the Balkans to China was promulgated and, for the achievement of this ‘imagined community’, the country was called Turan. This view could be construed as a pure manifestation of ‘ethno-nationalism’ and any observation of (ethnic) nationalism has to consider the impact of people of the same ethnicity from the outside. It could be shown that ‘Turkism’ in the Ottoman empire referred to the unity of the Turks in the Empire but, at the same time, pan-Turkism was being developed by the Outside Turks. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the rise of pan-Turkism, especially because Turkic groups in Russia - particularly Tatars - were
expressing a will for the unification of all Turkic people under the same political body. Yusuf Akçura, an important leader of Pan-Turkism, should be focused upon here.

A dedicated Pan-Turkist throughout his life, Yusuf Akçura, Tatar in origin, emigrated to Turkey from Russia. He viewed the world of the Turks as one indivisible unity based on evident signs of both cultural ties - especially language - and material bonds - race and blood (Akcura, 1978). In Akçura (1928) the term ‘Turk’ referred to all those of Turkic origin, i.e. the Tatars, Azeris, Kirghiz, and others and they all constituted the Turkish nation. This perspective, alone, made a great impact on Turkist intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire. And there was an external, ‘objective’ factor in the development of Turanism: Russian brutality in Central Asia in the 1860s, and Bulgarian brutality against Turks in the newly established Bulgarian state. Perhaps, a most important factor in the development of Pan-Turkism was the study of Turchology in Europe. By reading some Tuchologists, such as Leon Cahun, some Young Turks began to be proud of their Turkish origins, rather than of Ottoman and Islamic roots. Thus, in the early twentieth century, a Turkist version of nationalism was at stake in the intellectual climate of the Empire.

In the 1910s, Turkism had already advanced itself through journals - especially Türk Yurdu, Halka Dogru - and crystallised into an organization: Türk Ocagi (Heart of the Turks), founded in 1911. The Grand Master of Turkism – as he is called - Ziya Gökalp, was a regular member of that club. More than any other ideologues, it was Gökalp who had an important impact on the Kemalist view of the nation. However, one should see the changes in Gökalp’s view of the Turkish nation in periods. He first emerged as a defender of the Turan but, later on, he concluded Turan to be a ‘utopia’. This meant that Gökalp, of Kurdish origin, came to see that a huge ‘imagined community’, Turan, was not an easily realisable ambition, although he admitted that in the future it could be considered. But what was achievable for Gökalp (1959) was to build a Turkish nation in
The mother land, Anatolia and Rumelia, by privileging features of the Turks. The first problem Gökalp faced was the Islamic definition of collectivity as ‘universal’. For Gökalp, Islam cannot be denied at all in the formation of the Turkish nation, and it is for this reason why Gökalp’s studies could, in a way, be described as an attempt to synthesise Turkishness with Islam. But he was not unaware at all that, in terms of achieving modernity, religion needs to be made a matter of personal conviction. And since modernity referred to western civilization in Gökalp’s reading, he dedicated more attention to the synthesis of Turkish-Islamic identity with the West. There was a hidden Turkey which escaped from notice that was not completely Arabic-Islamic, but Turkish, with its own language and traditions the sum of which is called hars, or culture. Thus, Gökalp’s later views were to influence Kemalism: Turkish culture should be privileged; Turkish history and traditions should be traced back to a pre-Islamic era. No doubt, however, Kemalism was to go further than that leading us now to briefly consider the Kemalist nationalizing process.

The Kemalist view of nation(alism) was formed as a response to the decaying Ottoman Empire. The Ottomanists proposed ‘Ottomanness’ as a citizenship to which no positive attitude was developed among separating forces; ethnic groups, mainly Greeks, Bulgarians and even Arabs and Serbs. The Kemalist answer to the collectivity problem was transparent and ‘more achievable’. First, one should see that Kemalism broke with the ‘imperial’ ambition of the Empire by declaring a Turkish nation in a ‘certain’, ‘delimited’ territory: Anatolia. Defining the territory, therefore, was the first business for Kemalism. Second, a break with Turkism should be considered: the definition of the Turk is not derived from ‘ethnic oneness’ but, in contrast, a common history and a belief in a common future were taken to be the defining characteristics of the Turkish nation. Third, to Kemalism, nationalization meant the necessary process of bringing about a ‘civilized Anatolia’. Therefore, what had to be done was to ‘disembed’ people in order to ‘re-embed’ them in the form of the Turkish nation. However, this process was not at all an easy one.
The nationalist principle of Kemalism, I suggest, could briefly be understood according to a viewpoint which insists on its ‘territorial’ characteristic. This requires seeing the unavoidable relation between ‘autonomy’ and modernity. I also see that Kemalism’s main concern was to create a Republic: a true Republic. Therefore, unlike observers who see nationalism as an ideology of the rising middle classes (see Mahcupyan, 1997), I argue that nothing less than Republicanism was the most powerful ideological factor behind the nationalization process. In other words, the self-determination of a people in a clearly defined boundary was necessary for the construction of a Republic. Many problems and/or discussions come about due to this very perspective: Republic, due to its very nature, needs to see people as ‘equal’ and ‘free’. This ‘ideal’ could be achieved if conditions were ‘developed’ and nationalization was seen as the unavoidable process for that ambition to be achieved. Therefore, one needs to read nationalization, in the eyes of Mustafa Kemal, as ‘democratization’. For Kemalism, only by means of nationalization could the ‘public’ emerge and the ‘republic’ function from then on. I shall now discuss the Kemalist nationalizing process by keeping the above argument at the centre of the analysis.

For a nationalizing movement, the first tool to use is ‘history’, negatively or positively. Kemalism starts using ‘negative history’, first. The preceding era of the Ottoman Empire was condemned as a dark age for the Turks. It can be seen here how republicanism was the main principle used by Kemalism in its attacks on Ottomanism. The Ottoman Empire was criticized as a despotic empire, understood as a painful experience, especially for the Turks. It could be argued that in imperial state-societies the founding ethnic element suffers from its own dominance, precisely because its ruling class becomes cosmopolitan and remains above the masses. And Kemalism, especially according to Gökalp’s teachings, criticized the Ottoman governing class as being cosmopolitan, imperial, with class interests being put over ‘national’ interests (See Gökalp, 1959). Thus, the ruler
was the cosmopolitan Ottoman and the ruled the Turkish subject according to Kemalism. To submit to the truth, it should be said that during the Empire, the governing class indeed saw the Turks as ignored peasants. So, the Ottoman empire was excluded from ‘true Turkish history’. However, it must be stated that, although Kemalism apparently undermined Ottoman history, the Kemalist republic nonetheless took many features from the Ottoman Empire.

True, against the ‘high culture’ of the sultanate, the ‘people’ were privileged in Kemalism. Although this could be called the first step towards the republic, this republic needed ‘patriots’ who, when necessary, could give their lives for the ‘country’. But history shows that, under despotic rule, no patriotic sentiment can emerge in a country. So, it was not surprising that when the Greeks invaded Western Anatolia, there was almost no ‘collective’ patriotic movement against it. Kemal, achieved the awakening of Anatolians to ‘reality’ and won the first victory against western modernity in the East. Therefore, the Greek invasion of Western Anatolia, in 1919, could be seen as a first important event in helping the national consciousness to emerge among the Anatolian masses. The Turkish war of independence, between 1919 and 1922, must be viewed as the first important step towards national society. For the first time Anatolia was owned by ‘people’ as a homeland. From East to West and from the North to South, this country was, this time, the people’s, a step towards the republic. However, a republic cannot remain just a people’s consciousness of their homeland; what is needed is the emergence of people to participate in the ‘public’ and who are able to ‘criticize’ and ‘question’. And, in turn, these people could only be brought about by nationalization, according to Kemalism.

Problems emerge exactly at the stage when the ‘modernizing’ state feels unhappy with its people who are ‘uneducated’, ‘too traditional’, ‘unskilled’ and so on. Kemalism’s first question, therefore, was how to nationalize Anatolia; nationalization in this respect meaning moving away from
tradition to modernity which is thought to be achievable by nation-wide education, industrialization, urbanization, and ‘civilization’. Thus, one cannot do research on the nationalization of Anatolia without considering the ‘civilizing process’. It is in this respect that Kemalism’s second reading of history emerges: privileging pre-Islamic Turkish history. For Kemalism the Turks always contributed to world civilization, but they lost this ability for a while during, and because of, the Ottoman empire.

One could use Gellner (1983) for understanding the process of nationalization in the Turkish experience, albeit only to a certain extent. Kemalism aimed at civilizing people with the tool of the nationalizing process. However, this process was far from being an aim to completely westernize Turkey, as many claimed. However, a further problematic needs to be seen too: with the teachings of Gökalp, Kemalism saw no problem in combining being Turkish with aiming to become a member of western civilization. Gökalp had taught that religion cannot constitute a civilization: there is no Islamic or Christian civilization, but there are western and eastern civilizations and, since Turkish culture was not alien to western civilization, the further aim must be to fully reach western civilization while keeping Turkish culture ‘unique’ (Gökalp, 1959).

The Kemalist perspective then could be seen as follows: adopting ‘modern’ civilization, stressing Turkish culture and making Islam a matter of personal conviction. At this stage, Kemalist nationalism should be clearly defined. Suna Kili (1980) claimed the following: ‘Kemalist nationalism is not racist and it is not a persecuting nationalism. According to Kemalist ideology one’s Turkishness is not determined by one’s race or religion but by the degree a person associates himself with the ideals and goals of the Turkish republic and through commitment to Turkey’s independence and modernization’. Thus, firstly, Kemalist nationalism is not ‘imperialist’ in the sense that the nation is not used to invade other ‘nations’. Second, Kemalist nationalism is, in
principle, not an ethnic nationalism. Third, Kemalist nationalism is inseparable from Republicanism. Now, I want to consider some basic Kemalist attempts for the sake of nationalizing Anatolia.

Ban of Tarikats: The Islamic umma was an ‘imagined community’ in the sense that members of that community never met and never knew each other. And this ‘imagined community’ had to be replaced by another one, that of the Turkish nation. Kemalism, however, knew well that in the Ottoman Empire, the village and mahalle were the real communities that provided identification. And in order to break with this legacy, Kemalism found the ban of Tarikats important for several reasons. Tarikats would block nationalization with their ‘distinguishing’, ‘classifying’ elements of people. Each tarikat had its own life philosophy, leader and community with which members identified themselves. Thus, the division of people of the same religion into tarikats needed to be dissolved by the imagined community of Turkishness. Tarikats were local-religious communities and by banning them Kemalism aimed at achieving de-localization and secularisation.

Turkish History Thesis: An important intellectual concomitant to the project of the nationalization of the collectivity was the Turkish history thesis, emerging in the 1930s. The thesis holds that the Turks had already developed a settled civilization in Central Asia, in what today is called Turkistan, before the advent of Islam. This established civilization, however, as Aydin (1994) has demonstrated, was exposed to three centuries of the Arab – ultimately, largely accomplished - objective of turning the Turks into Muslims. By leading an outright nationalization of Turkish society, Kemalism aimed at reversing this process and, thus, exacerbated the opposition to Islam since the latter could not support the idea of Turkish nationalism as it could Arabic nationalism due to its assumption of some broad congruence between the Arabic and the Islamic worlds. Thus, Kemalism in the 1930s ‘invented’ a history which showed Hittites and Sumers as being Turkish. I
think that by imagining Turkish history as a bright history, Kemalism aimed to show the Anatolian masses that being a member of an imagined Turkish community was worthwhile: being confident, and feeling uygar - civilized - were needed for moving society towards modernity. One could not read this as racism; Kemalism knew too that Hittites and Sumers were not of Turkish origin, but claiming the history of Anatolia as Turkish history was to make sure that this geography had the potential to go ahead with the help of ‘invented’ historical background. It is for this reason that the first important banks of the Turkish republic were named Etibank and Sumerbank. This reading of history, in fact, gave Kemalism the opportunity of overcoming both Pan-Turkism, which would not name Sumerians as Turks, and Islamism, for which the idea of the Turkish nation was alien. However, in the formation of the Turkish history thesis, apart from the attempts to achieve the goals mentioned above, the physiological state of mind in Kemalism was an important factor. In the Ottoman official education programs and books there was no Turkish, but only Ottoman and Muslim history. While the Arabs, Kurds and Albanians were mentioned as valuable, the Turks were never included in history books. This must make clear that the Turkish history thesis could also be read as a reaction. Thus, for the nationalization of the collectivity, an ‘idealized antiquity’ is perhaps required. When Kemalism proclaimed that the Turks had to bring about a powerful modernity, a background was needed to show that the Turks had already provided a bright antiquity. So, to create modernity in the future first requires the creation of a bright era in the past.

Language Reform: more than any other, language reform played the greatest role in the process of nationalisation. Without creating the ‘reading public’ it would be more difficult to form the nation. Two goals seem to have been prioritised by Kemalism in its language reform. First, language needed to be ‘more’ nationalized; Arabic and Persian words were to a great extent eliminated from the Turkish language by creating new words. Second, making the Turkish language easy to read and write was desirable; the Latin alphabet replaced Arabic script. It can be seen in both of these
aims that the actual ambition was to break with the Arabic influence on Turkish in the same way as the Soviet Union changed the Turkic people’s alphabet in Central Asia to curb the influence of Anatolian Turkish. In a very short time, the new alphabet was adopted both in schools - which were then compulsory - and in the ‘military’, where reading and writing were to use the Latin alphabet which could no longer be replaced by Arabic script. The level of literacy increased from then on. But all of these were not satisfactory enough to make the Anatolian masses curious about the fact that their own language was a very important language in the world: a further effort was needed to make these people imagine how important and beautiful their language was: Sun Language Theory according to which all Ural-Altai languages were based on the Turkish language. The Turks thus owned the Ural-Altai language family group, which included Hungarian, Turkish, and Finnish, rather than being a mere member in it. For the academic study of the Turkish history thesis and the Sun language theory, a faculty was formed at Ankara university: *Dil-Tarih-Cografya Fakültesi*, the Faculty of Language-History-Geography. As the Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory did not last a long time but they provided a source for ultra-nationalists to make some connections between their ‘fascism’ and Kemalism for legitimacy.

Education Reform: For Kemalism, the ‘civilized Turkish nation’ could come about by means of education. Without changing people’s minds or, rather, without liberating people from tradition, nothing could be achieved according to Mustafa Kemal, who claimed: ‘Teachers new generation will be your creation’. Thus, it could be interpreted that Kemalism did not aim to institutionalize a system of the social and political life. 'Actors' were being insisted upon as more important than the 'system': not a new educational system but teachers were emphasised for the creation of new generations. And Kemalist actors worked on education with important projects. First, everyone in the country had to know at least how to read and write. Therefore, primary education was compulsory. But the actual aim was to break traditional, communal ties that were blocking
nationalization and civilization. Therefore, university was a priority for Kemalism. However, nothing could be more important than ‘enlightening’ the village. Village Institutions were founded in villages where teachers were trained who had to teach again in villages. This was an unprecedented educational model in world history. Locality was being broken by teachers who were agents of nationality, but a further aim was to achieve a sort of ‘universality’. Village institutions were a basic educational opportunity for the peasantry with several goals. A most important goal was to enlighten the 'individual' in order for him to know his own world rather than to obey the rules of the sheiks and/or the notables. This attempt was related to 'social power', the aim being to change it as follows: rather than depending on kinship and/or religious leadership, power was thought to be reachable or multiplicity was aimed at in terms of power. So, Kemalism seems to have a different enlightenment project. That is, people could become highly educated 'subjects' in the place where they were born rather than having to move to cities for educational purposes. So, 'urbanization' may not have been understood as a necessary social process in modernization. But this was going too far. Here, we need to stop: village institutions were ‘enlightening’ agents which could not be approved by ‘counter-revolutionaries’. Village institutions were not turning out ‘nationalized’ youth, but were ‘creating’ communists, according to counter groups such as the notables, the sheikhs, the commercial bourgeoisie and the ‘new nationalists’. This should precisely show that nationalism, according to the counter group for whom nationalism should emphasise Turkishness, Islam, norms, values etc., was not what it was for Kemalism.

Here we could claim that Kemalism’s Turkish nation does not close people to the outside world. Breaking away from imperial tradition, ending war-oriented foreign policy – according to Kemal’s saying: ‘peace in the country, peace in the world’ - and giving priority to the Republic were, however, to give way to ‘militant nationalism’ which, in turn, was to aim to teach Kemalism that ‘real’ nationalism had to be based on ‘cultural’ codes, especially Islam. So perhaps Gökalp (1959:
76) was ‘completely’ wrong when he stated the following: ‘A true internationality based on science is taking the place of the internationality based on religion. The participation of Japan, on the one hand, and of Turkey, on the other, in western civilization is giving a secular character to European internationality’. So, I think, it is important to insist that nationalism that aims at something else - civilization in the case of Kemalism - is countered by another nationalism which sees its own institutionalisation as the ultimate goal. The imagined community was once seen as an important instrument for reaching the ‘enlightened’ era but, by another nationalism, it was seen as the ultimate goal with an insistence on its oppositional features. We should briefly consider the anti-Kemalist view of the nation. This is important in order to illustrate that, in modernizing periods, human spheres are radically open to interpretation. Here nation and nationalism do mean different things to different sectors of the same, Turkish, society.

Starting at around 1946, a counter-movement - including the CHP, Kemal’s party - first closed village institutes by replacing them with Imam-hatip schools. An already dualistic - secular and religious - education system was brought back. The first thing to be exploited by the anti-Kemalist movement was, no doubt, Islam whose actors were ready to raise their objectives. Perhaps, it is the case that the counter-group was more ‘realistic’ in that it knew that the Turkish nation had to be easily provoked. However, this counter-group could no longer ignore ‘Turkishness’. Without using ‘Turk’ with Islam, militant nationalism could not be powerful ideology. It could be argued that one perspective of the modern nation is challenged by another totalistic attempt at reconstructing society, fundamentally on the basis of militant nationalism. We will briefly deal with this totalistic project in the next section while discussing the Kurdish question.
4. Nation is Shaken?: The Kurdish Question

Since 1984, Turkey has been struggling to solve a problem which some call an ‘ethnic problem’, while to most it is one of terrorism: the Kurdish question. In sixteen years, this problem has caused tremendous destruction. According to official records, thirty thousand people have lost their lives. In the first place, it seems easier to argue that since Abdullah Öcalan is now in the hands of the state, there is no longer a Kurdish problem. However, a closer observation could show that the problem is not yet over. There is, of course, no doubt that the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) is no longer as powerful as it was before. A battle was won by the state, not just because the leader of the movement, Öcalan, was captured, but because the PKK has already been losing its power since its establishment. This could refer to the fact that, in Turkey, the Kurds are in no way united. Many observers - especially those external - do not, due to this ‘reality’, understand the problem well (see for example, Chaliand, 1994).

There has been a group of Kurds, represented by the PKK and, to an extent, by HADEP (the People’s Democracy Party) whose aim seemed to be to achieve a Kurdish nation-state. This group has never achieved a position as the ‘true’ representative of all Kurds living in Turkey. Therefore, it always remained a separatist, minority group. If it is true that 20 % of the population in Turkey are Kurdish and if the PKK was to win over this population, the state may not have been able to win against the PKK. In other words, not all Kurds wish to see a separate Kurdish state. The problem, therefore, needs to be clearly analysed rather than presupposing it to be an ethnic problem.

As was mentioned earlier, the Turkish state does not recognise a minority group within Turkey. Rather ‘equality’ is the priority; each citizen is provided with constitutional rights and freedoms.
And in Turkey, apart from the Kurds, there are many other ‘ethnic’ groups - laz, Albanians, Arabs, Cerkez etc - and no problem with them has emerged so far. Then why with the Kurds? One might argue that since Albanians, Arabs, Georgians, Jews etc. have their own nation-states outside Turkey, they do not need to fight for them, whereas the Kurds, constituting a nation, have the right to fight for ‘self-determination’. But this argument would indicate, historically, that the Turkish nation-state ‘invaded’ Kurdish areas and ‘constructed’ Kurds with Turks in the name of the Turkish nation. History would not prove this. Within the Ottoman Empire, assuming it was ‘originally Turkish’, there was the ‘Muslim millet’ in Anatolia whose participants were mainly Turks and Kurds. When the empire was disintegrated, Turkey replaced it in the ‘mother land of Turks’. And this new state was founded on the basis of constitutional citizenship rather than on ethnicity by assuming convergence with the population of Anatolia. Therefore, it seems impossible to validate the construction-deconstruction argument. However, this does not mean neglecting a living problem. The question should rather be: was Kemalism completely wrong to assume that Turks and Kurds could live together?

In turn, this could be analysed by the asking of another question: is Kurdism an ethnocentric movement? In other words, have Kurds made the self-discovery that they want to be apart? We could observe that there are two sorts of ethnic movements: one of them is ethno-nationalism, the political demands of stateless ethnic groups seeking to achieve sovereignty and self-rule. Another one is a movement which demands cultural and linguistic recognition within the boundaries of a nation-state. If one considers Kurds in Turkey, one could notice that both of these movements are at stake. I shall briefly consider the separatist Kurdish movement and the demands of Kurds for recognition.
The PKK and the HADEP could be viewed as two separatist political organizations. Öcalan, while a ‘Turkish-state sponsored’ student in Ankara University, started his political career in a socialist student union, but he was quick to be disappointed: he saw in Turkish leftism a ‘social fascism’ towards no other ethnic group in Turkey but towards Kurds. He tried to hold meetings and conferences about ‘Kurdish liberation’ in Ankara University but he was neither followed nor supported by other Kurdish students. Then, he found the solution in going back to his village in Urfa, where the PKK was founded in 1978 (see Mumcu, 1998). He planned a liberation war with guerrillas until 1984 when the first bloody clashes began. At that time, the state’s position was that since there were only 3-5 bandits, the state did not need to take them seriously. However, it was to shock the state but, more importantly, ‘society’: by 1993 three thousand armed men and many teachers in the region had already been killed by the PKK. Nevertheless, it was giving signals that by this sort of guerrilla war nothing could be achieved against the Turkish state and ‘society’. Not due to a strategic advantage or to a powerful military, but because the Kurds were not happier than the Turks with the PKK. This ‘reality’ was to lead a separatist, Kerim Yildiz, to understand the situation and to say that ‘if the Turkish state asked the Kurds to form a separate state, they would refuse’ (quoted in Poulton, 1997: 243). Thus, separation was a dream, not because it was impossible to divide Turkey - though it would have been a terribly bloody attempt - but because the Kurds did not agree with doing so.

Another movement apparently seems more realistic: the demand for cultural recognition. However, the problems within this movement were not less significant. Like France, Turkey cannot recognize ‘difference’, precisely because the recognition of difference by a ‘republic’ would mean an attempt to overcome the republic itself. The situation could be viewed as follows: the Kurds - not all Kurds - want the state to grant ‘minority rights’ and, in response, the state is unable to see them as a ‘minority’, because they are not; they are ‘equal’ citizens in as much as Turks or Albanians are;
they may be different ‘culturally’ – and this was recognized - but this cannot give them the right to be a ‘minority’. It cannot be denied that in Turkey every citizen is a first class citizen. Where life is re-produced Kurds could be found: in the economy, polity, culture, education etc. The question, I think, must be whether the Kurds want to be ‘different’ and, therefore, demand to be a ‘minority’. It could follow that the Kurds want the freedom to be ‘different’ because they find the conception of ‘equality’ problematic. Perhaps, they do so because equality might be thought as meaning ‘assimilation’. At times, a militant nationalism of the Turkish state imposed equality as a rule for the achievement of disciplinization. In other words, the attempts to create society as a coherent whole played a part in the emergence of the Kurdish question (chapter 5). However, one should ask another question: do the Kurds aim to achieve independence for the sake of ’Kurdish identity’? The answer must necessarily be - given that Kurds want to be different - for the sake of ‘ideals’, or identity. However, one cannot close the door there, because a further question poses itself: how do the Kurds live?

By this question I mean the following: in Turkish ‘modernity’ the part which is occupied by the Kurds is not less important than that occupied by the Turks. In other words, who is profiting from ‘Turkey’ is not an easy question. An example could demonstrate this fact quite well: a Kurd who fights for education in Kurdish - that, it is argued, should be provided by the state - does not seem to live up to his ‘ideals’; when it was asked of him: would you send your children to the Kurdish school or to the Turkish one, he answers without any doubt, by saying: ‘definitely to the Turkish school and when they graduate from university, I would like to send them to an English university for post-graduate education’ (Kislali, 1997). Language is seen to be important for having a ‘good life’ but an identity is not emphasised. It becomes difficult to understand what the Kurds really want. On the one hand, the problem could be viewed as such: they demand minority rights, because they understand the conception of equality that the state has proposed since the early 1970s as
being assimilative. On the other hand, the problem does not seem clearly to be one of identity at all, e.g. some of the richest sectors in Turkey are formed by Kurds who do not see a problem in living together with Turks in Turkey. What needs, then, to be understood is the ‘actuality’ of differences between the Turks and the Kurds.

To distinguish between the Kurds in the metropolitan cities of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa and Adana, and the Kurds in the south-eastern region is necessary before trying to clarify differences between the Turks and the Kurds. Some could argue that some Kurds are more Turkish in comparison to some others. In fact, ‘natural’ assimilation, not only of Kurds, has taken place in the metropolises. For example, in Istanbul, if one aims to describe the Kurds, it is hardly possible for the researcher to find a convincing answer. The researcher should use differentiating elements, e.g. language, and then try to see who is the Kurd, who is different from the Turk. When the researcher asks a Kurd about Kurdish characteristics, distinguishing them from the Turks, the Kurd would mention cultural characteristics which they in fact share with the Turks. The researcher would then have to conclude as follows: somebody is Kurdish by virtue of believing himself to be and calling himself Kurd and acting in ways that prove his Kurdishness (see Poulton, 1997). And in fact, the Kurds in the metropolises largely do not participate in ‘separatist’ movements.

A detailed poll about Istanbulians can provide important information. 13.3 percent of Istanbul’s population have Kurdish roots and only 3.9 percent consider themselves to be Kurds, while 3.7 percent saw themselves as Turks although their parents were Kurdish. 90 percent strictly opposed the idea of Kurdish independence.\(^{41}\) According to another poll, only 9.1 percent of Kurds saw \textit{Hep} – the separatist political party - as representing the Kurds.\(^{42}\) But, perhaps more important is the fact that the Kurdish Party, \textit{Hadep}, which won over all previous Kurdish parties, in the 1995 elections scored only 4.2 percent of votes. Given that if the Kurdish population is around 20 percent, 4.2
percent cannot represent the Kurds. A political sociologist, Dogu Ergil, has also done interviews with 1,200 Kurds and only 13 percent wanted to see a separate Kurdish state (see TOBB, 1995). It seems necessary, however, to understand why an, albeit small, number of Kurds are not willing to live together within Turkey. For that, I want to develop a different idea: the incompatibility of Kurds in the region with Turks.

No one so far has asked the following question: do the Kurds have ‘distinct’ features in the South-East? I think they have. They came from a different world system to that of the Turks: a sort of feudalism. The Turks, in their history, never lived within a feudal system, while the Kurds still live according to a version of it. The second difference concerns religious understanding: while in the region the population is mostly Safi, a Sunni school, the Turks never followed this sort of Islam, although the majority of Turks are Sunni too, but of the Hanefi school. An actual difference must also be found in terms of the relations with the central political authority.

A sort of feudalism that has remained alive in the South-East makes it clear that the Kurds in the region have been interpreting the world in a crucially different way from the Turks in Anatolia. This could show that Turkish modernization could not completely succeed in altering the socio-political structure of the South-East. I do think that since the Kemalist project was formed by a consideration of the ‘general’ characteristics of the Anatolian people, it was in order to escape from the modernizers that Kurdish regions would need further attempts and programs to reach modernisation. The problem, in fact, must be traced back to the Ottoman Empire which did not master the region, but left it be governed by local religious leaders, Ahiret Reisi. But the Turkish population was directly related to the central political authority. This must point to the fact that the Turks did not have local leaderships which could function between the people and the state. This reality was known to Kemalism, therefore, in the transition to modernity a revolt against the party-
The plurality of Islam in the Turkish lands has been remarkable. The Kurdish population has adhered to the ‘Safi’ branch of Sunnism as the major Islamic sect. So, one part included, from the very beginning, different or even conflicting, although co-existing, conceptions of Islam, while the other part has been mastered by an ‘Orthodox Islam’ which has rarely appeared in Turkish lands. According to the Safi school of Sunnism, life is required to be followed according to explicit Islamic rules, while the Hanefi school of Sunnism is more open to revision. This could be noticed, when, for example, one looks at the place of women in the public sphere. In the South-East, women have been more controlled by men, that is, strong morality questions define how women must live their lives while, in the Turkish regions, the place of women in the public domain is almost equal to the place of men. Perhaps, the relation of Aþiret to democracy should be seen as a very important factor in terms of the continuity of the distinctions between the Turks and the Kurds in modern times. In the Kurdish areas, most people support a political party that is found to be suitable by the leader of the Aþiret. It could, thus, be understood that individuation is still far from the south-eastern arena. And when, in a democracy, the decisions are made by the patriarchal authority without the participation of the 'people', the possibility of the emergence of disputes between the people in the region could be opposed easily by an idealised homogenous culture. So, the lack of secularisation and individuation in the Kurdish areas may not be capable of being compatible with the way of life in the western part of Turkey. Thus, these differences may not allow two communities to get along with regards many crucial respects of life. However, should these communities fall apart due to different understandings of the world? Should different group have...
the right to be apart? These questions may lead one to think that an extreme relativism would have the possibility of giving rise to clashes between cultures. In other words, if it is argued that every culture has the right to operate on the basis of its specific belief, then, one might have to submit that living in this world would be much more difficult than dying. For example, should Turkish ‘law’ find Kurdish fathers killing their daughters legitimate, because their views of the world are different? Or, for example, should no one speak out against some sheikhs, in the South-East, who tell women to drink ‘dirty’ things in order for them to have children? In this respect, one would have to consider the options for living together.

However, for the rise of the Kurdish question, radical Turkish nationalism should be regarded as an important factor. As mentioned above, the nationalization process was open to interpretation and to disputes. Against the ‘civic’ nationalism of Kemalism, a militant ethnocentric view of nationalism emerged and crystallised in the early 1960s in the political organization of the MHP, the nationalist action party. For this totalistic perspective of nation, Turkish society should be reconstructed on the basis of the values the Turks hold. In an ethnically plural geographical space, Anatolia, this sort of fascist ideology has to find much opposition. Until the 1970s, this militant nationalism had never become powerful and, until the late 1990s, it had never received important support from larger sectors of Turkish society. In the 1970s, however, ideological polarization led to military intervention which sided with militants of radical nationalism by hoping that ‘cultural values’ could hold Turkish society together as a coherent whole. And this nationalist attempt at totalizing Turkish society on the basis of a ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ no doubt was to give rise to further polarization.

In 1971, the military intervened, hoping to discipline the population of Turkey which had enjoyed the liberty provided by 1961 constitution. The 1968 student movement was blamed for the youth
not being educated according to the principles of Turkism and Islamism and that, from then on, the start of a new era on the basis of nationalist principles was seen to be necessary. However, this disciplining was responded to by a new radicalization of oppositions between nationalist militants and leftists. This, however, caused another military coup in 1980, the most disciplining one. The Kurdish question was partly a reason for this disciplinization. However, those disciplining attempts of the state were not at all only against Kurdish identity, but led to high tensions between society and the state. Thus, this problem cannot be argued clearly without considering the relations between society and state. The economy also needs to be considered because it is an area which has the capacity to create high tensions and clashes. Therefore, in the next chapter, we shall examine the relations between the state, society and the economy. This is also important in order to show that state, society and economy can be configured in different ways, making the perspective of varieties of modernity a plausible observation.
Chapter Five

STATE, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY: Tensions between Liberty and Discipline

1. Introduction

The rise of the ‘social sphere’ could be taken to be a major turning-point in the emergence of modernity. From polity to household, a realm of human activity such as the ‘social’ could be noticed to emerge from the late eighteenth-century on when modernity was entering history. The rise of society over smaller communities and families as a new type of collectivity was, in fact, focused on by some eighteenth-century thinkers. As Wagner (1999a: 216) considers: 'In some late eighteenth-century theories, 'civil society' came to be seen as a phenomenon that was different from the state but different from the individual households as well. And it is here that the story of 'society' as a scientific object starts'.

One may not be able to discuss the rise of society without considering changing features in the state system. The socialisation of individuals in a larger context, such as society, needs a 'civilizing state'. The management of an entire population from a single base is a prominent factor in the standardisation of practices and identities. That is to say, modernity in one important way is to increase the dependence of people upon others (Arendt, 1958). And in this process, the modern, centralising state possesses a crucial power. Additionally, economic development requires the integration of local communities on the basis of a centre and thus the state needs to be a highly centralised power in order to manage the life of this ‘integrated’ population. In this business, rationality comes to be seen as a mere element of the state, since a social body is thought to be
governed by a state which does not have connections with the kinship, emotions and friendship which are, therefore, excluded from the socio-political sphere.

It is due to the relative autonomization of the state that, in social analyses, ‘civil society’ was invented as a distinct entity from the state. It can be conceptualised that the state appeared to be a neutral sphere over society without favouring a particular group or class. Being totally for all members of society meant being a power which could be exercised over an entire population in order to bring about ‘civilised’ human beings. In other words, Hegel’s state, the modern state, used Reason to reconcile antagonisms in society and it, thus, understood itself as the enlightening agent of humanity. This observation basically brought about two understandings, one of which assumed the state to be an autonomous sphere and the other which saw the state as an instrument for a powerful social class (for elitist and class theories of the state, see Mann, 1993). To mention two important classical theorists, Marx (1959) argued that the state was the instrument of the ruling class, but saw a relative autonomy and domination of the state over civil society in some experiences. And Weber (1968) emphasised the modern state as a crucial determinant of capitalism. In fact, the state may not be able to be totally seen as an autonomous sphere nor, precisely, as the tool of the dominant social class. The state may be interpreted to be the main political institution whose legitimacy is directly related with an art of reconciling the contradictions in society for the sake of its continuity. Therefore, there must be a dialectical relation of society to the state, e.g. had the state not regarded itself as a civilizing agent, 'civil society' may not have emerged.

Moreover, in the emergence of modernity, a human activity, the economy, was being transformed so that it came to the fore as a driving force in the development of 'civilization'. This change required a socialisation of labour, that is, in stark contrast to the principle of individual liberty of
‘the project of modernity’, basic developments were achieved by collective labour. Once this was taking place, the family was weakened as a separate realm from man’s economic activity. Work was not only for maintaining the family, but was also for the sake of society. That is, ‘work’ became socialised. Within the modern experience, the economy became even more essential than the activity of governing (Arendt, 1958). The polity can even, to an extent, be seen as a sort of economy. ‘Development’ is a basic tenet of modernity and it reflects itself first in the economic improvement of human life: the economy is the unavoidable medicine of both state and society in modernity. When economy and polity come to be seen as distinct entities in social science, another sphere emerges as an object of scientific study: society. However, it must be understood that a clear separation never occurred. For instance, some understand family to be a sphere within the social realm, excluding economy as system (see Habermas 1987), whereas some others see the economy as a constituting activity of civil society, while excluding family as the domain of the private (see Giner 1995).

Since we talk about relations between these three institutions, it must be clear that none of them is autonomous. Rather, the point should be that the state and society play pivotal parts in shaping each other and that the economy is a powerful realm in the creation of ‘tensions’ between state and society, as well as between different sectors of ‘civil society’. In revolutionary cases, in the emergence of modernity, these relations are much more serious than in some other cases; a comparison between France and England, for instance, would show this difference. Here we are investigating those relations in a radical transformation: the Turkish experience. A weak society versus a strong state is generally held to be the starting-point for analyses of the Turkish case (Mahcupyan, 1997; Insel, 1995). The Kemalist state has largely been viewed as aiming to create a ‘western’ society in its own direction by maintaining a high autonomy and ‘brutality’ of the state (see Cakir and Cinemre [eds.], 1992). However, it needs to be seen that Kemalism was an historical
product as well as one of new actors and that it was the successful answer to an old Ottoman question: how could the modern Turkish state be formed? The Kemalist answer was that without the rise of a strong society and a strong economy, the state in modern times could easily be ravaged.

In understanding the Turkish experience in terms of the relations between state, economy and society, I propose the following conceptualisation: an analysis of the ‘radicalization’ of oppositions, dualities and dichotomies. In the history of the Turks, some tensions were present and the emergence of modernity - an experience of modernity in Anatolia - had to radicalise the oppositions by holding in central place ‘imaginary significations’ of the idea of modernity. In this respect, the Kemalist state must be understood as the container of modernity so as to radicalise dualities: religion versus science, individuality versus community, rationality versus culture, nature versus humanity, development versus underdevelopment etc. Therefore, the radicalization of dualities could be taken to be one of the specificities of the history of Turkish modernity compared to other experiences.

Thus, since, in one way, modernity could be understood as the rise of society, economy and the state, the Turkish experience needs to be considered to test whether it refers to a different configuration of these spheres. First, it is considered that a modern state was formed by Kemalism and that it is not simply a copy of the European state system. Second, the rise of Turkish society is looked at with a view that an 'autonomous society' was an ambition of 'revolutionary political action'. Then, the rise of the economy is examined to see that, in modernity, economy comes to the fore. In the concluding section, the relations between state, society and economy in democracy are considered to indicate that it is necessary to read them as the tensions between liberation and disciplining.
The Kemalist State

The Ottoman Empire struggled to catch up with western modernity. During the nineteenth century, modernizing reforms dominated the Empire. The Empire did not, however, achieve its ambitions, particularly because it lacked a ‘society’ and an 'economy' in the modern sense. The Ottoman intelligentsia did not notice that a modern state would need a society on behalf of which the state could bring about actual reforms. In other words, the modern state could not be achieved if a connection was not firmly founded between the state and ‘society’. The Ottoman Empire usually cut relations with people outside the sultanate because the autonomy of the sultan was always an ultimate ambition. In other words, the people would have been a threat to the 'despotic' sultanate if they were not excluded from the centre. This was the precise reason for which conquering the centre was the only way to become the dominant force. The state alone dominated the entire population of the Empire and which, therefore, had to be conquered in order to enjoy possessing power.

Thus, the Empire’s decay and end was importantly due to its strictly negative attitudes towards its subjects. New emerging forces in communities were oppressed, because those forces might have competed with the state which regarded itself as the central power of any activity. Association between different communities was not allowed; the division of labour was restricted on the basis of ethnic-religious communities. Because the state announced itself as the centre of power, any potential force in the collectivity was seen as opposition to the state. For the sake of the present study, some core subjects of the Empire need to be considered.
The Turks were excluded from central power especially since 1453, when Istanbul was conquered. More crucially, due to the division of labour on the basis of the millet system, Turks were not permitted to deal with ‘commerce’ which was the work of Jewish and Christian communities (Çavdar, 1970). The Turks were imprisoned in farming and were forced to provide soldiers to the Empire. This was an intelligent division of labour on behalf of the Empire because threat would have come from the core subjects of this Turco-Islamic Empire due to its very foundational characteristics. The Turks were not able to possess power nor were they able to deal with work constitutive for the emergence of a strong society such as commerce. Since the sultanate was the unquestionable power, all agricultural products were owned by the state. Thus, it could be conceptualised that the Ottoman state regarded itself as the centre of all activity, i.e. if societal centres emerged, the state would have assigned itself to compete with these powers, even by the use of physical power.

It was due to this characteristic that when western modernity hit the Empire both economically and ideologically, it found no power to fight against weakness in the collectivity. The French Revolution with its idea of nation ravaged the Empire because it was easier, due to the ‘millet system’, to establish separate states for ethnic communities. The empire immediately started reforming the army and the civilian bureaucracy, but it did not pay attention to the fact that a powerful social sphere, with a developing economy, was needed for the re-establishment of a powerful state. This sort of attempt can be noticed only from the 1910s when the Empire had been left with only its core subjects, the Turks. However, it was rather late, because the western world was already reshaped on the basis of national societies and states which were searching for more colonies; the Empire found itself in the First World War.
The question of the Ottoman intelligentsia was this: how can a modern state be built? In order to counter-balance the West, a modern state was needed. However, an answer was searched for in reforming the army and bureaucracy without seeing the importance of the rise of society, and of economic development. A project could have been developed by the state in order to found a network within society for developing the forces of production. In many respects, without the rise of society over local communities it is difficult to build a powerful country in modern times. For example, in order for an efficient economy to work, the country needs be centralised. Or, for instance, in order to encourage people towards ‘development’, the state must implement national education. This was to be observed in the Turkish project of modernity, Kemalism, in the 1920s. Here, one should insist that the attempts of the Ottoman Empire to catch up with western modernity were not a mere failure; they provided means of self-critique that played a very important part in Kemalism. The Ottoman reforms, mostly of the military, did not achieve modernity but, at the same time, they played a part in the development of the Turkish project of modernity. The successful answer that Kemalism found in establishing the modern state distinguished Kemalism from the Ottomans, that is, Kemalism emerged as a new phenomenon in the Turkish world.

A modern state could well be founded by a political elite, but this state might be quickly weakened if a social base is not built for it. And Kemalism was aware of this fact. Although it was a difficult task in the 1920s, Kemalism announced that the people were sovereign without condition or restriction (1921 constitution). This announcement already supposed that Turkish society was strong enough not to be oppressed by external forces. It did not, however, affect people’s ways of life immediately, precisely because the Anatolian masses were not aware that the state could be an arena for people’s interests and ideals, rather they were accustomed to a view that people could only be subjects of the state. Therefore, the rise of Turkish society was to come about later.
In this emphasis of Kemalism, an imaginary signification of the idea of modernity could be noticed: the autonomy of society. Autonomous collectivity in Anatolia was an important ambition of Kemalism. Autonomous collectivity, however, was conceived as emerging on the basis of revolutionary political action. And the Kemalist project did not see any solution to problems other than ‘developing’ the Turks. Development was seen as the precondition for achieving autonomy of society in terms of its relations with other societies. This view was unforeseen in Turkish history: the previous state was not one of autonomy for Turks but, for the sake of the continuity of the sultanate, it was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire.

The Turks, for Kemalism, had to be able to form a self-sufficient collectivity which would not let itself be colonized. In other words, Turkish society should recognize its own significations and creations: self-management. Thus, a first priority of Kemalism was that of anti-imperialism which required the Anatolian masses to constitute the ‘Turkish nation’. The self-determination of nations was a basic process on earth in the eyes of Mustafa Kemal. Thus, the first principle in the political program of Kemalism was nationalism. Anti-imperialism was a most essential principle of the Kemalist project of modernity in a distinct perspective. That is, according to Kemalism, not only a defence of national autonomy, but also other nations’ rights to self-determination must be recognized. This feature sharply distinguishes Kemalism from both the Ottomans and from other projects of modernity. It could be suggested that according to Kemalism, a modern state-society does not depend on the outside in two ways: neither should it allow itself to be colonized nor should it colonize other nations. Therefore, according to Kemalism, imperialist countries are not modern.

 Seeing nationalism as a basic tenet of the new state, another tenet of Kemalism was republicanism, because the autonomy of Turkish society was thought to be achieved on the basis of
autonomization of ‘reason’. A central belief of modernity can be seen in this attempt of Kemalism: collective mastery over external forces. Republicanism was the expression of the will of the Turks to escape from external forces, or the redefinition of the place of God in human life. According to Kemalism, ambivalence used to make the Turks believe in the caliph as the ambassador of Allah. The republican state, in stark contrast, claimed to be based on ‘human’ reason for human happiness in this world. Kemalist political philosophy took the republic to be the desirable political system because human beings were thought to be capable of governing themselves. In other words, for Kemalism, rational manageability must be achieved.

Thus, the new political establishment required secularism to be another basic principle. Since, according to Kemalism, the Turks had to be liberated from external forces, mystic orders had to be destroyed. Individuation was another imaginary signifier of the idea of modernity in this respect. That is, human beings have no reason to fear external forces. Kemalism supposed that becoming the reliant-master of his development was attractive to individuals. The 'humanisation' of knowledge and action was understood by Kemalism as a precondition for moving towards a desirable life. Escaping from the Islamic ulema required knowledge of the world and this knowledge had to be secular. This precisely marked a radicalization of the duality between sheikhs and the people for the sake of Enlightenment. That is, there was already a tangible duality between the sheikhs and the people and this duality was radicalised on the basis of strict secularism by hoping to move secular forces towards modernity.

Thus, an ambivalent tenet was needed to be upheld: populism. Achieving a break with mystic orders was thought to imply populism. And for Kemalism, this could be achieved on the basis of two principles: tolerance and equality. In this respect, the basic ambition of Kemalism was to rearrange relations between state and collectivity; the Ottoman empire had created a centre-
periphery dichotomy, between the sultanate and the people. Kemalism aimed to break with this legacy using populism; the state should go towards the people to provide legitimacy. Here, the essential aim was to create a non-class divided society; people must be equal before the law. I claimed this tenet to be ambivalent because, with populism, it was aimed that the people should be able to be critical of existing political orders so that ‘Enlightenment’ itself would have to depend on ‘people’s’ views rather than on those of the ‘political elite’.45

These principles had been those of a project of modernity in the 1920s, when the western world was too far ahead. Therefore, revolutionism was created as another basic tenet of the fact that the Turkish republic was not to be content with a gradual evolutionary progress but, in contrast, the process of modernization was to be speeded up by revolutionary measures. This is a most basic program of Kemalist modernity that opens modernity to interpretation and redefinition. Once revolution is not only allowed but made a central feature in the lives of the people, latter revolts and movements could not be avoided. Or, in other words, if change is legitimate, then, further attempts at changing conditions of life cannot be blocked.

In the transition to modernity a powerful agent is needed. In this respect, Kemalism’s first attempts could be called imitative; a liberal model, to some extent, was accepted. However, Kemalism was quickly becoming very critical of the liberal model with which Turkish modernity had not been created in the 1930s when the Kemalist view of political and economic development was produced: the state was regarded as the agent of the transition to modernity. Statism as another principle was then accepted. However, it needs to be noted that understanding the Kemalist state as the main agent in the emergence of Turkish modernity should not undermine some crucial social actors, i.e. teachers, women and lawyers who were benefiting from the ‘new world’.
To a considerable extent the Kemalist Revolution could be seen as a new phenomenon in world history. In the 1930s, a leftist Kemalist intellectual stated that 'Turkey is engaged in an experiment which is totally unique: the Turkish Revolution is the most just and progressive phenomenon on the post-war national and international scale' (Aydemir, 1990 [1932]: 36). First, as we saw above with its political philosophy, unprecedented in the Islamic world, Kemalism provided a model of modernization for Muslim countries. Such a modern state was formed in a predominantly Islamic country for the first time. Second, the political philosophy of Kemalism can be seen to differ, to a considerable extent, from other western political philosophies. Some argue that the Kemalist state took nationalism, republicanism and secularism from the French Revolution while taking statism, populism and revolutionism from the Russian Revolution (Kislali, 1997). And some go so far as to say that '...there is no reason why one should not regard the westernisation movements as the scientific basis of the Turkish revolution' (Karal, 1997: 12). So, we may be forced to accept that the Kemalist principles were of western origin, given that the idea of modernity was imported from the West. However, as has often been emphasised in this thesis, borrowings from the outside world have been subject to 'reinterpretation'. And here it becomes clear that the six principles of Kemalism had never been placed all together in a political project before it. When this was done, it was done using a different interpretation of these tenets. That is, Kemalism was able to utilise these principles in the Turkish context, that is unlike the Russian and Chinese models, the Kemalist model aimed, as much as possible, towards development in democracy. The uniqueness of the Kemalist state was due to contextual features as well as to the different interpretation of the meaning of modernity by Turkish modernizing actors. A different secularity, for example, could be considered here. In contrast to the Christian view of secularity, in Turkey, the state was seen as the provider of religious services. In other words, the state was not understood to be an autonomous institution opposed to the autonomous institution of Islam, it was rather viewed as being
compulsory to include a religious institution in its system. This was continuous with the previous era. The Ottoman Empire saw Islam as its partner in governing over subjects.

The origins of the Kemalist state deserve to be paid crucial attention. Most Kemalists were military men and this is the main reason why the Kemalist state is readily seen to be a military state (Insel, 1995). The social source of Kemalism, however, was an alliance of different sectors of society. Basically, the military and civil elite, the merchant class, land owners and provincial notables occupied the seats of the Grand National Assembly and of the Republican People's Party. Although it cannot be denied that the Turkish army played a pivotal part in the emergence of Turkish modernity, Kemalism’s political philosophy was in one way to eliminate military features from the political arena. Unlike the Ottomans, Kemalism promised a society and polity which would not be managed by the military.

In the 1920s, one attempt by Kemalism was unprecedented in Turkish political history: the connection between army and government were broken (Aydemir, 1998). For the first time, the military was asked not to act as a political agent. This was a signal that Kemalism did not aim for continuity with the past; the Turks should have a 'civilian' government. Kemal, an ex-general and the first president of the republic as a civilian, forced generals to chose between the military or politics. This was not the only act of Kemal towards cutting connections with the army. More importantly, he entrusted the duty of defending national independence and the republic to the 'youth' and not to the army. As Ahmad (1993: 9) considers: Throughout the single-party period (1923-1945) the army was completely isolated from political life...The army was given a place of honour in the republic but it was also removed from the mainstream of the social and political life of the country. However, the Turkish army could not easily be isolated from politics. Thus, it is not Kemalism that should be blamed for the crucial place of the army in Turkey rather, it would be
interesting to re-read Kemalism’s non-military aims. Despite revolutionary attempts to break with historical military legacy, history emerged to play a powerful role.

By eliminating pashas from the political arena, Kemalism’s republican principle seemed to be walking a convincing road. In fact, Kemalism aimed to establish a republican democracy as quickly as possible: one year after the foundation of the republic, oppositions were allowed to form political parties. The Progressive Republican Party was formed against the Republican People’s Party in 1924. In a few months counter-revolutionary actors were seen to be occupying the opposition party. Their ultimate goal was to bring the caliphate back which would have meant the dissolution of the new regime; the democratic republic. A dilemma unsurprisingly appeared: had the opposition come to power, it would not have maintained democracy. The Kemalist state saw that without developing a ‘democratic’, enlightened society, the road to ‘civilization’ would be destroyed. Thus, it was seen that, before reaching the ‘good life’, people have no choice but to trust state elites. Ambiguity necessarily haunts this process: ‘liberty’ is promised but, on the road, ‘discipline’ is seen as being legitimate. This was certainly the view of a leftist Kemalism, powerful at the time. Particularly, in the 1930s, this leftist Kemalism became an advanced political centre for debates about the nature of the regime. A group of leftist Kemalist intellectuals argued that Turkey did not need a multi-party democracy, but a revolutionary party-state system (Aydemir, 1990 [1932]). According to this view, if Turkey had seen itself as a democracy without developing the conditions for it, the consequence would have been disaster. The ‘drunkeness’ of becoming a liberal democracy was seen as false consciousness in a country which provided the model of fighting against the ‘liberal’ West (Aydemir, 1990 [1932]).

A distinct feature of the Turkish experience could be used to demonstrate this theme. Before the rise of society, the state dominated over the collectivity. The Ottoman Empire was already a
'central authority' and, thus, Kemalism in this respect did not meet serious problems. The problem, however, was to build a society. The state, unlike, for example in the British experience, emerged as the teacher of society. The Kemalist state understood itself as the agent of civilization: things had to be done for the sake of people in spite of people. Historical continuity has to be emphasised: the first Kemalists grew up in an old patrimonial tradition which assumed the dominance of the state over society. This could help to understand why the main agent of modernization is the state elite, which has to do with the fact that the actors of modernization differ from context to context. In the emergence of modernizing actors, the conflicts in societies were an important factor. For example, in western Europe, civil conflicts gave rise to the bourgeoisie as an important agent of modernization. However, in the Turkish experience, the central conflict emerged regarding responses to the rise of the West, which produced a new state elite that became the central agent of modernization. But secondary modernizing actors have emerged in Turkey that should not escape notice. Women, teachers and lawyers were important actors in the promulgation of modern ideas.

To achieve its ambitions, Kemalism made important efforts. Between 1923 and 1938, successful industrialization was achieved. A new generation was educated by secular-national education. It was aimed to centralise the country by means of a newly built railway network; the train took modernity with it wherever it went. Peasants were taught mechanical agriculture. However, this attempt was not easy: the aim was to reach a rational society on the basis of political action, but people are also cultural beings. In the next section, we shall briefly examine the Turkish society of the time when Kemalism was making efforts to ‘civilise’ it.
3. The Rise of Turkish Society

In the early 1920s, the Empire was dead. The Turkish peasantry in Anatolia had squandered their energy and their blood in the struggle to conquer and defend alien lands and peoples. They had already seen the state as an evil which had sent them to distant lands to fight wars. In their local settings, they were facing the brutality of the notables and gendarmes. It was this peasant collectivity which was the legacy of the Empire to the republic. Perhaps, more important was the fact that the 'ruled' community of the Empire failed to develop an autonomous power of the state. There was no 'civil society' based on market forces and private ownership. In brief, autonomous cities, towns and estates were absent from the Empire (Mardin, 1969).

In 1927, the population of Turkey was recorded at around thirteen million. Only 18 per cent of this population was living in cities. It was aimed to alter this dominantly agrarian country into a modern one in a very short period. How to make this ‘immature’ society side with the revolutionary project was the definite question of the time. Kemalism needed to ask what sort of structure held this collectivity together in order to find social partners. It was definitely not the bourgeoisie and, thus, not the working class either: in 1915 a report showed that there were only 182 industrial enterprises and 14,046 workers (Aydemir, 1998: 351). Would Kemalism take peasants and politicise them as agents of change? That was not taken to be the case: the Turkish peasantry was not found to be 'revolutionary'. It was also due to this fact that the Turkish experience was a different one. Unlike the Russian and Chinese experiences, the Turkish did not see peasants as its social partners. There was no powerful landed aristocracy in Turkey; had there been so, a revolution could have been developed with peasants. Therefore, the emergence of the strong modernising state as the main agent of change was due to historical legacy.
The Anatolian peasantry witnessed the increasing power of agas - land lords - and esraf - notables - in the last period of the Empire. The state was too distant from peasants, especially in times of crisis, but the agas and esraf were always near, although they were exploited by the same men (Ahmad, 1993). It was this characteristic that led peasants to distrust the state. The new state had struggled to reach this peasantry which needed to be emancipated according to Kemalism. The serious matter was the lack of autonomous social actors who could play a crucial part between the state and the individual. History haunted again: there were not many autonomous agents between the Ottoman state and its subjects. Rather, the relation of the state to the people was much more direct. Only in the last period of the Empire, a sort of landowner class emerged. Thus, Kemalism had proposed that, only by means of esraf and sheikhs, the agents of the peasantry, could the peasants be reached. But due to this fact, unwillingly but necessarily, Kemalism’s allies became the notables who held an important place in the People’s Party.

Kemalism opened up a space of opportunity for people in society to enter into the political arena. In this respect, well-educated, and self-conscious men who were influenced, particularly by Russia, were regarded as the moulders of public opinion, for changing society (Ahmad, 1993). Only the Kemalist elite was seen as the agent of civilisation. This was the case because Kemalism thought that neither with peasants, whom the Kemalists could not influence and win over to their side, nor with the esraf was the revolution possible. Therefore, Kemalism believed that the state had to have a core cadre in order to take decisions and put them into practice.

Modern society, in one respect, means a 'reading public'. However, ‘immature’ Turkish society lacked education; only 8 per cent was literate. Kemalism brought about two reforms: the unification of the educational system and the replacement of the Arabic script by Latin. Overnight, an educated minority of 8 per cent was made illiterate by aiming to bring about full literacy. The emancipation
of the Turks could be achieved, in the eyes of the Kemalists, as thought other revolutionary movements, by education. Although important efforts were made, an immediate question emerged: where were the peasants to be educated? This was an important question, given that the largest sector of society was formed by peasants. Local notables hindered the education of the peasantry although Kemalism at first hoped to enter the villages by means of these men. Under difficult conditions, a unique educational system was to be produced. Educating youths from the village and teaching them about Kemalism was regarded to be a better solution. Village institutions were then formed in the villages, although they did not survive. This could tell us that rather than merely using some actors as agents of civilisation, Kemalism aimed to come closer to peasants by means of educational institutions. By educating the daughters and sons of peasants to be teachers, Kemalism aimed to bring about dispute and opposition in villages; those teachers went back to their own villages to teach children, but also to guide villagers towards a ‘rational world’. To a considerable extent, in a very brief period, village institutions gave rise to ‘enlightened’ groups; differentiation was achieved as was a duality between teacher and Imam.

An hegemony of sheikhs and religious leaders in Anatolia seemed to Kemalism to be necessary to urgently dissolve. The crucial tensions between the modernising state and conservative society were particularly apparent in terms of secularising reforms. Self-management or social instituting, which required rationality, were thought to be difficult as long as sheikhs remained in society. The emancipation of individuality could also be achieved by secularisation, because in order to be self-reliant masters of their own development, human beings have to escape from external forces which requires rationality. Freedom and rationality are dual imaginary significations of ‘the project of modernity’. Economic development is required for the autonomy of society; this was also why people had to be open to this world rather than thinking of the world to come. It is clear that Kemalism emphasised secularism, precisely because, without it, these significations would not
have entered into the minds of the masses. Some could argue that, in the Ottoman Empire, the common factor linking the state and the people was Islam, the Islamic community and the Islamic state (Mahçupyan, 1997). Kemalism aimed to replace this commonality with the process of secularisation. Therefore, when Kemalism abolished the caliphate, some religious men saw the fact that a Muslim collectivity was forced to live under a non-Muslim polity as a serious situation. The Kemalist experience witnessed some bitter events: the Sheikh Sait revolt, the Menemen fact etc. It was only afterwards that the Kemalist state thought that a liberal policy towards counter-revolutionary movements could not succeed. In contrast, the state had to consider religion. Islam had to be considered as a state policy, a public service provided by the state. This control of religion was later to be exploited by right-wing parties against Kemalism (see Aydemir, 1999).

The collectivity in Anatolia was not a coherent whole. Life was maintained in small local communities and differences between them were significant. In this respect, important attempts to eliminate differences for the sake of society can be recognised. It was tried hard to standardise practices and identities. One example could demonstrate this fact quite clearly: the reform of dress style. Since the Ottoman Empire included different ethnic communities, dress style symbolised these differences. It was possible to recognise which tarikat people were from their style of dress. So, the reform of dress style aimed at dissolving the differences due to the origins of local, ethnic and religious communities. In this attempt, Kemalism faced strong resistance from some parts of the collectivity; some did not, for example, want to replace the fez with the hat; wearing the hat was then made compulsory by law. It can be said that, to an important extent, this reform played a part in changing people. For example, in the 1920s, female students wore shorts in a predominantly Muslim society (Göle, 1996). Thus, for the manageability of society, formalisation provides the state with a basic opportunity. Using the power of law, the state is able to reinterpret social reality for its ambitions. However, formalisation could not become a tool for fully mastering society. For
example, the Kemalist state brought about a reading public which, in turn, could not be completely controlled.

As we have seen, the Kemalist era (1923-45) presented a radicalisation of differences, oppositions and dualities while, at the same time, a society was being aimed for. I understand that Kemalism aimed to make the public aware of development, particularly by creating dual situations. For example, the daughters of conservative parents were put in classrooms with boys and without veils so that some parents were not willing to send their daughters to schools. However, Kemal’s adoptive daughters were significations of modern women: one of them had become a professor of history and the other, a pilot. The radicalisation of oppositions marked the rise of society; this must tell us that modern society can never represent a totality. And this reality could particularly be noticed by considering the rise of the economy, which had created disputes, conflicts and clashes which, in turn, played an important part in shaping present Turkish society and state. Thus, in the next section, the rise of the economy shall be examined.

4. The Rise of the Economy

In one way, it is possible to regard modernity as the rise of the economic sphere. In other words, in modernising periods, economic activity comes to the fore, viewed as the motor of 'civilisation'. Economic development has generally been taken to be a most important criterion in terms of the power of modernity. Therefore, within modernity, a prominent distinguishing feature of human beings - work - develops. And this characteristic becomes a driving force for reaching modernity. In other words, modernity is a disciplining phenomenon of economic activity: the basic material
achievements of human beings are achieved within modernity by the systemisation of economic activity.

However, the systematisation of economic activity necessarily requires 'efficiency' which becomes an element in the search for the 'good life'. In other words, economic modernisation implies 'instrumentality': a means-ends calculation. Therefore, rationality emerges as an unavoidable principle for building modernity. This is because economic modernisation requires some basic processes which have been understood to be organised on the basis of the efficiency of calculation. Human reason is viewed as achieving 'high civilisation' by altering standards of living. This is to say that science, as the true guide to life, is taken to reach ends which may not usually be the ultimate ends. It needs to be stressed here that in the rise of economic action, there could always be a risk of erosion of the ultimate values of socio-cultural world. However, this potential danger cannot neglect the necessity of economic modernisation without which modernity cannot be at stake. Thus, the rise of economic action, like the rise of the rational state and national society, is unavoidable for building modernity.

We may recognise that the Kemalist project gave central importance to economic development from the very beginning. Kemalism viewed economic development as a most important process for reaching modernity. The conditions of life could be altered by improving standards of living, and this emerges first in the economic sphere. However, saying that economic development is an unavoidable process for reaching modernity does not mean that the modern economy is a universal sphere of human activity. The modern economy depends also on the historical/civilisational contexts which require the economy to be compatible with the characteristics of the context/civilisation. The Turkish experience, although it is often thought of as a westernising model, cannot be reduced to a European model of economic development. We shall briefly
examine how the Kemalist model of economic development differed from other models and show why Turkey is currently in difficulty to be fully compatible with western liberal economic policies.

The legacy of the Ottoman Empire was a hindrance in reaching a powerful modernity. The new Turkey inherited a seriously handicapped economy from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire (Avcioglu, 1973). A project of modernity had to seriously take this situation into account in order to avoid half-measures. Before attempting to analyse the Kemalist view of the economy, I shall briefly consider why the legacy of the Ottoman Empire hindered economic modernisation.

The institutional shape of the Ottoman Empire possessed elements which were blocking possible economic developments coming from the societal sphere. The empire organised the socio-economic world which mainly included three categories: the rulers, the sultan and his military and the civilian bureaucrats, including the *ulema*, the ruled: 'reaya', both Muslims and non-Muslims, and local leaders: 'eþraf'. In this system, the most prominent feature was the high autonomy of the state. That is, the state was the only decisive force in the Ottoman system. Between the state and society there were no local estates in the sense of European feudalism. This was, particularly, because private property was not guaranteed by the Ottoman system (Mardin, 1994). As a consequence, this led to the Ottoman state being the sole locus of power. That is, there was no upper landed class which could reduce the state's power which, in turn, would have led to the 'freedom' of society’s economic development. The state did not have to compete with a social class. Thus, the Ottoman Empire possessed an agrarian economy and society and an imperial state. This imperial state was exploiting all sectors of the collectivity without favouring any of them. A crucial point here is the lack of autonomous structures and actors which could play a role between the sultanate and the subjects. It could be said that civil society was absent in the Empire. Thus, an important point to consider is what defined domination and authority in the Empire. Domination in
the Ottoman Empire was not based on economic position. Political power with military organisation marked power relations, an historical fact which could explain why, in present-day Turkey, domination cannot be explored purely by considering the economy. In brief, the central dynamic was the political authority which controlled most of the land; status was the first factor determining wealth but a bureaucrat’s wealth remained the property of the state on his death. Within this sort of socio-economic system, the state could best be described as a 'financial' state; that is, the Ottoman state's political economy was to maximise the tax collected from the agricultural sector.

During the eighteenth century, the Empire started to be transformed into a 'capitalist economy' of the time. This was achieved on the basis of free trade which was allowed by the Tanzimat era (1839-76). Ever since, the Turkish-Ottoman economy has been unable to defend itself against European competition. Due to the economic capitulations made to foreign capital, the Ottoman state was reduced to being the *gendarmes* of western capital. As a result, this led the Empire to becoming a semi-colony of the West (Çavdar, 1970). Additionally, the sultanate and its bureaucracy consumed more in its attempt to westernise itself. That is, western states lent money to the sultanate, and the Empire increased consumption. So, the Ottoman bureaucrats developed a new type of consumption without developing a new type of production. This, as a consequence, played a part in the semi-colonisation of the Empire. From the beginning of the nineteenth century until the 1920s, its position as a semi-colony of western powers, particularly those of Britain and France, led to two developments in the Ottoman economy. First, a commercial bourgeoisie, most of whose members were of non-Turkish origin - Greek, Christian and Jewish - arose. Second, Turkish agriculture, in Anatolia was, to some extent, opened to the western market (see Avcioğlu, 1973). However, these two developments were not radical factors in the renewal of society and state. As a semi-colony, the Ottoman Empire, by the end of western imperialist attempts, became the 'sick
man' of Europe, to be divided into many parts and fully colonised by the imperialist powers, particularly Britain and France. As has been mentioned, these attempts to colonise Turkey resulted in Turkish victory. And it was after gaining political independence that Turkey was to establish a new, Kemalist, political economy.

The Kemalist political economy was a product of the experience of the first ten-years of the Turkish republic. In other words, Kemalism did not develop a clearly stated political economy at the beginning of the foundation of republic, rather a view of the economy was developed from practice. Nevertheless, as early as 1923, a new economic policy, based on the centrality of industry, was introduced by Kemalism. First, the first distinguishing characteristic of Kemalism, in terms of political economy, needs to be looked at. Kemalist political economy was 'capitalist' yet, at the same time, anti-imperialist. In the first place, some may see a contradiction in this model. That is, Kemalism was making concessions to foreign capital while working against it at the same time (Kongar, 1985). In fact, there is no contradiction in a political economy being both capitalist and anti-imperialist at the same time. That is, foreign capital was welcome as long as it did not damage the nation's economic development (Ahmad, 1997). However, this sort of political economy was most difficult to completely follow through. Thus, a very crucial perspective of Kemalism needs to be recognised.

Kemalism knew no distinction between political and economic independence, arguing that without an independent national economy, political independence would not survive. Thus, Kemalism regarded the economic views of the rising commercial bourgeoisie and landowners as unfeasible. Both groups had seen national independence primarily as important for political sovereignty. Economic sovereignty was not significant because both groups believed that they had much to gain from economic subservience to Europe (Kongar, 1985). Therefore, it becomes clear that Kemalism
was not simply a bourgeois project. Had this been so, Turkey would have fallen under the mandate of either Britain or France. So, Kemalism was an anti-imperialist political economy which did not accept that Turkey should be the commercial middleman controlled by Europe. The role that was given to the new Turkey by both imperialist nations and the internal commercial bourgeoisie, as a carrier country of commodities between East and West, was not accepted. Against the commercial bourgeois political economy, Kemalism without doubt regarded industry as an essential component of the new Turkey. The question remained, what model of industrialisation was followed?

The first answer was an open economic model based on active state support for private accumulation. This policy was practised between 1923 and 1929. This era was not simply the period of liberalism but, rather, it was an era of state support for private accumulation. The state was not an instrument used by the dominant class, it was a political body that aimed to develop a Turkish bourgeois class. What was the primary goal of Kemalism in supporting private capital? The answer lies in the perspective that it was thought achievable to produce a 'national bourgeoisie' on the basis of active state support for private accumulation. However, there were conditions for supporting private, local or foreign, capital. Since anti-imperialism was a founding principle of the republic, in an open economy supported by the state some crucial measures were taken to protect the national economy. For example, the first private national bank was established by the Kemalist leadership in order to end the dominance of foreigners in the banking system. Thus, the actual goal of the first economic policy was to create a national bourgeoisie through state support and resources. However, this economic nationalism did not yield desirable results; foreign investments could not be nationalised. Although the growth rate reached 8.5 percent, this only disappointed the Kemalists who expected more development. Thus, a self-questioning set in in the late 1920s.
The Kemalist model of development was to come about in the period from 1930 to 1939. The protectionist economy, between 1930 and 1932, as a reaction against the open economy, yielded positive results: the growth rate of industry rose to 14.8 per cent, the highest since the foundation of the republic. At the same time, however, the leadership of the Kemalist party was not satisfied with economic growth. This gave rise to self-questioning, not only due to unsatisfactory development, but also because of the problem in the redistribution of development. The consequences of economic development increased the living standards of bureaucrats and the bourgeoisie, while larger sectors of society did not benefit from it, especially the largest sector, that of the peasantry. The village was not modernised economically and the 1929 depression brought about deterioration in prices for the peasants’ produce who, in turn, started to become dependent on moneylenders. So, economic collapse hit the village. And state support for private accumulation resulted negatively in the fact that corruption became a crucial handicap for the new Turkey. Under these pressures, the Kemalist leadership realised that a new economic policy needed to be developed, starting with the critique of liberalism which was regarded as an undesirable method for the modernisation of Turkey. Since then, the new political economy was to be a statist one: in 1931 Mustafa Kemal proclaimed: 'In the economic area...the program of the party is statism.' (Borotav, 1997: 174) What was Kemalism’s hope with the introduction of the statist economy?

In a statist economy, the state can be interpreted as the owner of the industrial sector and the controller of agricultural commodities. In such an economy, the state could increase prices for industrial goods, while paying low prices for the agricultural goods as their main purchaser. Therefore, investment for further industrial accumulation could be provided. Or, alternatively, invested capital could be used for social and welfare purposes, with a low rate of economic development (Boratav, 1997). In this kind of political economy, the state normally opposes the dominant social class in order to increase the autonomy of the polity in order to become a giant
agency of transformation. However, Kemalist statism did not fully result in the statist model mentioned above.

The Kemalist statist economy came about as a synthesis of the two eras, 1923-29 and 1930-32.\textsuperscript{50} In other words, an open economy based on state support for private accumulation and a protective economy evolved into, a not fully statist, statist economy. With the statist model of development, Kemalism realised some crucial ambitions. Perhaps, the most important success was the nationalisation of foreign investment, given the anti-imperialist nature of Kemalism. The state was regarded as the major productive and investing agent. In the industrialisation process, the state was the decisive force and it was seen to support agricultural commodities. This was achieved by planning the economy. In the post-First World War era, Turkey was the first country, after the Soviet Union, to have central economic plans, called five-year economic plans. The basic development of these plans was the establishment of state enterprises that changed the environment wherever they were built. These policies harmed the interests of the foreign-oriented commercial bourgeoisie, but a small, industrial bourgeoisie benefited from this era (Boratav, 1974). This era as a whole can be seen as a process of capitalist accumulation, in which the state was the dynamic force; and the achievements were remarkable.

In 1939, Turkey was no longer the Turkey of the 1920s that had imported flour, sugar and cloth. Basic consumer goods, as well as a quantity of capital goods, were being produced in national-state factories. This success could be related to three effective measures. First, foreign trade was controlled by the state. This provided a positive import-export balance. Second, the internal market was controlled by the state to an important degree. This resulted positive for further industrialisation. Finally, the state, unlike during the first era, used the invested capital directly for industrialisation rather than for supporting the private sector. This did not allow for economic
corruption to take place. Between 1932 and 1939, economic growth was at around 10 per cent, a higher rate compared to that between 1923 and 1930 (Avcioglu, 1973).

This development altered the socio-economic features of society. Kemalism hoped that all sectors of society could gain from the development, which, in contrast, created crucial disputes. A bureaucratic elite assumed itself to be the agent of civilisation, given that it succeeded to install modernisation, particularly in the economic sphere. The job claimed by bureaucracy was deemed incomplete in the early 1940s. Despite the fact that, in the early 1930s a statist economy, to some extent, replaced an open economy supported by the state for private accumulation, a Turkish bourgeoisie no matter how weak did emerge. In these developments, local leaders, with whom the RPP could not break completely, came to be important merchants and 'capitalist farmers'. This group's ambition was to reduce state control over trade and to widely open the Turkish economy to the western market. Conditions in the village, however, did not improve to a satisfactory degree. Given that some of its main social partners were landowners, land reform was not achieved by the RPP. The prices of agricultural goods did not increase, especially because state investment for industrialisation was regarded as more important. Thus, it is important to insist again that the Kemalist revolution could not mobilise the peasantry. This was partly due to historical reasons. In the social revolutions of France, Russia and China, the peasantry constituted a powerful factor, because the landed aristocracy shared profits, obtained by exploiting the peasantry, with the state (Skocpol, 1979). However, since there was no powerful landed aristocracy in Turkey, the Turkish peasantry did not find the Kemalist ambition of altering the old regime desirable. More importantly, in later modernities, politics is privileged over economy. The state was not based on a 'dominant social class', but regarded itself as the representative of whole nation. The Kemalist view of society was developed in relation to this political economy. That is, Kemalism argued that Turkish society was not formed by opposite social classes but, for the sake of development, the division of labour
was seen as unavoidable. For this reason, the RPP was regarded as the party of the whole nation as it promised not to favour any particular social sector in society. However, as is apparent in the practice of Kemalism, a classless society is the utopian fantasy of revolutionary regimes. As has been noted above, the economic modernisation brought about new dualities rather than resolving contradictions in society.

Although a successful industrialisation was achieved in comparison to conditions in 1923, Turkey did have a long way to go. In 1938, Kemal passed away, his legacy living on as Atatürk, the father of the Turks. From then until 1946, the RPP governed society and economy according to the old, one-party system. Those years, between 1939 and 1946, could be seen as unproductive for the Turkish economy for two basic reasons: the outbreak of the Second World War and the difficulty in putting the five-year economic plans into practice. It could, in brief, be said that the RPP government - one-party system - did alter the Turkish economy, although further alterations were needed for developing a powerful economy. Furthermore, economic problems played a basic role in the transition to democracy. Thus, in the next section, we shall analyse historically the relations of economy, society and state to democracy.

4. The Relations of State, Society and Economy to Democracy

The regime, between 1923 and 1946, was an authoritarian one, but it included the potential for democratisation. This must be a central reason for why, in 1950, Turkey experienced a peaceful transition from an authoritarian to a democratic polity. In general, a one-party government, or party-state system, as an authoritarian polity could be transformed into either democracy or into a totalitarian regime. It could be thought that a party-state system could easily transform itself into a totalitarian regime, while transition to democracy generally requires the mobilisation of society,
which may cause 'civil war' or bloody revolts. However, the authoritarian Kemalist polity forcefully aimed to transform itself into a democracy. This could be explored by emphasising two characteristics of Kemalism. First, Kemalism did not aim to provide a clearly defined, closed, monolithic polity, rather it could be seen as a general foundation for a modern polity, which then was subject to political actors' perspectives on it. Second, the Kemalist Party, RPP, from the beginning included an, albeit limited, plurality.

The Republican People's Party, RPP, founded in 1923, was originally based on the Defence of Right Societies which were founded by local groups during the liberation war to resist the imperialist invasion of Anatolia. These societies were united in a single organisation - the Society for the Defence of Anatolia and Rumelia - at the Sivas congress in 1919. When the Grand National Assembly was established, its main members were the leading cadre of the liberation movement, military and civilian intelligentsia, and those people who had established the defence societies (see Aydemir, 1999). And this structure of the assembly naturally included a potential opposition to the Kemalist group which was known as the first group, with the second group emerging as the opposition. This could be called a limited plurality within an authoritarian polity. Because Kemalism planned to found a democratic regime, this limited opposition was encouraged by Mustafa Kemal to establish a political party in 1924, just one year after the foundation of the republic. The opposition formed the Progressive Republican Party which, however, dissolved itself after the Sheikh Sait Revolt in 1925. Again, Mustafa Kemal encouraged some of the representatives in the assembly to form another political party in 1930, Liberal Party, which was also dissolved because it was dominated by 'reactionary' groups. So, in his life-time, Mustafa Kemal failed to institutionalise a multi-party democracy. This, however, did not put an end to the ultimate ambition of the Kemalist project. The later leader of the RRP, İnönü, the second man of the republic, dedicated himself to completing the unfinished task of founding a democratic polity.
Thus, until 1950, the newly emerging Turkish society was governed by the Republican People’s Party which, through commitment to Kemalism, allowed the transition to democracy. In 1946, a party emerged from within the RPP called the Democrat Party. Announcing itself to be the voice of the nation, the DP reflected the unavoidable opposition which was to come about as a result of the modernising years. The party was formed by an alliance of different sectors of society, i.e. the founder members were Celal Bayar, a businessmen-banker; Adnan Menderes, a cotton-growing land lord; and Fuat Koprülü, an historian. Although the leader cadre of the DP could be seen as products of the RPP regime, the rise of the 'new men' in and by means of the DP should be considered.

The DP was, in the first place, a movement from below. Most of the members of the Grand National Assembly were 'new men', not coming from the bureaucracy, but were mostly local leaders, coming from local settings,. In this alliance, land lords had a very important place and, in fact, the polarisation in the RPP was partly due to its attempts towards land reform in the 1940s. It seemed that the DP was symptom of the maturation of ‘civil society’. 'Enough, the word is the nation’s' was the symbolic slogan of the DP, emphasising the importance of society against bureaucracy. Society had already been polarised during the Kemalist era. Two cultures were already at stake in the 1930s: the secular culture of an influential minority and the Islamic culture of the majority (Ahmad, 1993). A commercial bourgeoisie had arisen; bureaucracy had enjoyed possession of the mission of ‘civilisation’ in the name of economic development; peasants were already being influenced by Kemalist teachers to ask whether the sheikhs were right; the industrial enterprises gave rise to an, albeit weak, Turkish working class.
The Democrats came to power in 1950 by free elections. This marked a beginning and an end; there were losers and winners. The year of 1950 could indeed be viewed as marking the second phase of the Turkish republic. An authoritarian model of development was replaced by a democratic regime. Whether or not the new regime was to be based on democratic principles was directly dependent on the 'new men'. The Kemalist era aimed to develop a foundation of republican democracy for the country and, in 1946, the transition to democracy was both permitted and supported by the RPP. The 'new men' who came to power by means of free elections could have maintained and developed the new parliamentary democratic regime. However, although these 'Democrat' governors were new, a number of them were raised within the RPP until they formed their own party. The question was, therefore: could they rid the country of the mentality of a one-party government? The founding figures of the republic did not only overcome the mentality of the one-party system, they also lost the elections and their position as the only one authority, precisely due to their own decision to allow multi-party democracy. The RPP accepted this result, regarding itself as the opposition party in the assembly and allowing the DP to form a government. Since then, the future of Turkish democracy was to be based on the ideas and actions of the new men. Thus, we need to consider the DP in terms of its perspectives on the economy, society and polity. First, a look at the DP in terms of its political economy.

Any critique of modernity starts perhaps with critique of the economy. Aydemir (1999), however, believes that the DP did not completely differ from the RPP in terms of economic policy, by showing that both parties' economic perspectives were based on the attempt to reach a capitalist economy on the basis of state support for private accumulation. However, as the same author also later adds, the DP was a party which necessarily responded to the demands of the people. Since the DP was elected by the people, not as a party which assumed power by altering the old regime with revolution as the RPP did, it had to consider the people's needs, wishes and interests. This led to the
party having an economic perspective which differed significantly from that of the party that established the republic. So, in a democracy, the economic program of political parties, especially those coming to power by free elections, need to differ from the political economy of an authoritarian regime.

To a considerable extent, the village votes brought the DP to power. An important reason for this could be the fact that the Kemalist era did not bring about change in the countryside to a successful degree. The DP, however, did not achieve power only with the votes of the peasantry, it also emerged as the representative of landlords and the commercial bourgeoisie. So, the social basis of the DP was mainly a coalition of ‘opposite’ sectors in society. That is, the peasantry was being exploited by both landlords and the commercial bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, for the peasantry, the state did not offer better conditions than landlords or the commercial bourgeoisie. The republic promised that the peasants would be real masters of the country. However, the RPP could neither fully achieve its Enlightenment in the village nor could it provide it with enough economic opportunities. The DP relied on votes in the village because it knew that the Kemalist era had disappointed the peasantry. But, equally important was the fact that the language spoken by the new men was a different one than that of the men of Enlightenment, the Kemalists. This language was familiar to the peasantry.

Having mentioned the socio-economic basis of the DP, I shall now consider the DP’s perspective on the economy and society. According to the new prime minister, Menderes, the RPP government practised bureaucratic interventionist capitalism (Aydemir, 1999: 188). For the DP, an alternative economy ran on a liberal model. It could be argued that, within a liberal economy, it could be difficult for the political government to see itself as dealing with the ‘art’ of resolving contradictions in society on the basis of justice. Rather, political authority may leave societal contradictions
untouched. It could follow that this is a central reason for why some regard the DP era as a period of 'freedom' for 'civil society'. For example, some see the Democrats as opening opportunities for civil society by liberalising the economy (Göle, 1994) No doubt, the new government promised to create a millionaire on every street. What is distinct in this perspective is an understanding of development, not considered to be the objective of the whole nation. This government could not agree with leftist Kemalists who regarded development as the condition for the existence of the whole nation.

Thus, creating a millionaire on every street was an objective of the DP, meaning that not everyone in the country could become a millionaire. This should be sufficient to show that, according to the Democrats, society consists of different sectors and that competition between them should be allowed. However, a law-based government was to be interpreted as not providing the conditions for such a liberal model. Rather, the government was to assign itself the role of opening up new opportunities for the groups in society that brought the DP to power. But this kind of liberalism was to oppress counter groups, such as workers and, in turn, it was to mean a deterioration of the democratic regime that was once founded by the Kemalists.

At this stage of analysis, the basic developments that took place in the 1950s need to be considered for seeing the DP in practice. The village was modernised by the DP, although it was prepared for development by the RPP era. But the DP put an end to a long discussion over whether schools or roads were the priority for the modernisation of the village. Motorways were built in the early 1950s and this change indeed gave rise to change, particularly in the village. The integration of the village into the national market, therefore, was achieved by the advent of roads. Turkish agriculture was being capitalised (see Ahmad, 1993). With this development, the basic change experienced in the Turkish experience was the emphasis on agriculture. That is, unlike Kemalism, heavy
industrialisation was not a priority for the Democrats. This was related to the social coalitions of the DP, the commercial bourgeoisie and the land lords.

In societies, forces that are undermined in one way or another come to the fore as decisive dynamics at a later period. The commercial bourgeoisie and the landlords in Turkey, not permitted to achieve their ambitions during the Kemalist era, found democracy at a time when they were to begin to play a determining role in the country. The DP era, between 1950 and 1960, spelt freedom for these groups. Kemalist insistence on heavy industrialisation was not one of their ambitions due to the nature of their fields. Thus, they emphasised that Turkey could gain more from commerce with the West than from the 'difficult' attempts to industrialise the country. It was now time for them to achieve their goals. Turkey was to experience a new event: the power of the existing commercial bourgeoisie increased while new economic actors were to join this group. The merchants that emerged from the countryside became important politico-economic actors on whom the DP depended. These merchants were either landowners or owners of small businesses before becoming important economic figures. They demanded two changes: the mechanising of agriculture and the unconditional opening up of the economy to the western market for the sake of national economy. Both of these demands were positively responded to by the political authority. This was a crucial move that did not account for the anti-imperialist characteristic of the Turkish republic. Later years were to give rise to problems due to the move made by the new government.

For the Democrats, Kemalist Turkey had hoped to realise a utopian fantasy in terms of the political economy. That is, autonomous development was seen as isolating Turkey from international capitalism. For this to be overcome, the Democrats found desirable the fast integration of Turkey into the western world. This move, firstly, provided foreign capital to the DP, that is, American aid for modernising agriculture brought hope to the village but, in particular, to the land lords. For
example, the amount of tractors rose to 44,000 between 1950 and 1960 from 4,000 in 1949 (Aydemir, 1999: 218). In the first place, this mechanisation increased agricultural production which provided more opportunities for the commercial bourgeoisie in terms of trade. Another consequence was that the mechanisation of agriculture moved millions of landless peasants to the cities, which were unable to accommodate these peasants. That is, economic policy during the 1950s did not account for what could happen when agriculture is mechanised in a capitalist economy while industrialisation is neglected in the cities. Not only did unemployment emerge as a central problem, but also, in the cities military and civil officers and workers in state enterprises were not included to benefit from the new era. Workers and officials' standards of living dropped, especially because the government spent all investments and external loans on both the mechanisation of agriculture and on the increasing prices of agricultural goods. This situation was to produce reactions against the DP from the masses who had once supported them.

The rise of opposition to the DP was not only due to economic policy, but also to the fact that the Democrats were not 'democratic' in the true sense of the word. The perspective on democracy in the DP could show that the Democrats thought in terms of 'absolute' power. Due to the DP’s understanding of democracy, when it came to power, it regarded itself as the only legitimate authority. Democracy was seen as the 'hegemony' of the highest votes gained by the party (Aydemir, 1999). Elections, in other words, were seen as the only criterion of legitimacy. This was an important handicap for the DP leadership that was to be a dominant factor in the 'legitimacy' of the 1960 military coup. Multi-party democracy could be interpreted as each social sector forming a political party that works to achieve its own objectives. However, no political party could claim to be the sole 'owner' of the country because democracy does not mean - or should not mean - domination by the party gaining the highest amount of votes. If a political party in power does the
opposite, the regime can no longer be legitimated as a democracy. The DP assumed that since it came to power by democratic election, it had the absolute authority. 53

Two groups in particular reacted to the political economy and political perspective of the DP: the university and the military. The former was to prepare an opposing political philosophy, to be turned into action by the latter. In other words, protest emerged from the university by means of an alternative politico-economic perspective and was transformed into action by the military. However, the reactions of the university and the military against the DP could be seen as the final stage of unhappiness of the larger part of society. The workers’ demands to strike was suppressed; the press was censured by the DP government. The Republicans were harassed by the government in all possible ways. Rising inflation and a stagnant economy forced the Democrats to exploit Islam for political ends. These were indications that the ‘autonomous society’ was not yet mature. Had it been so, the Democrats would have had to have been democratic in the true sense of the word. So, anti-imperialism, secularism, republicanism, and democracy were harmed during the DP era. The urgent question of the time, during the late 1950s, was this: how can a government that does not obey the constitution be overcome? Or, in other words, how can an illegitimate government be forced to give up authority? History was providing possible answers: in 1908, the sultanate had been oppressing the people to the greatest extent in history and the ‘military’ intervened to establish a constitutional regime; at the end of the First World War, the imperialist states aimed to divide and rule Turkey and resistance to it came from the younger military officers that were to found Turkish republic.

There were fights against the government at universities and industrial enterprises but none, other than the military, could powerfully act against political authority. Aydemir (1999) tries to explain this by the nature of the military men. These men were educated according to 'action' and had the
means to act more easily than any other sector of society. But, this view disregards a central feature of the Turkish military: the fact that the Turkish military regards itself as the guardian of democracy, assumed to be the only desirable regime. The Turkish military was given the task of defending democracy by the constitution and, in the late 1950s, democracy had already deteriorated.

On 27 May 1960 a military coup broke out. Some were to call it ‘the second institutional revolution (Walter, 1963). The military intervened to restore democracy. In a stark contrast to other military coups, that of Franco in Spain (1936-75); Abdul Nasser in Egypt (1954-70); the colonels in Greece (1967-75), the Turkish military assumed power for a strictly limited period, relinquishing it as soon as law and order were restored. This coup was unique in Turkish history for the following reason put by Ahmad (1993: 121): The military coup of 27 May 1960 was the first and the last successful military intervention made from outside the hierarchical structure of Turkey’s armed forces. It was not a generals’ coup. It was, in contrast, young officers who achieved a coup for the firm establishment of ‘true’ democracy. It should be called an institutional reform. The military called upon Republican professors to elaborate a new constitution, to be the most democratic Turkey has ever had. The important innovations of this constitution were the constitutional court, whose function was to check the constitutionality of legislation, and the state planning organisation, whose objectives were to provide just economic development and to achieve full employment.

The 1961 constitution should be seen as a Kemalist attempt to carry out the 'unfinished' job: the institutionalisation of a democratic polity and an industrialised economy. The over-disciplined workers were granted freedom by the new constitution: they were given the right to form unions and political parties and to strike. The destroyed autonomy of the university was renewed in 1961. The constitution also provided the guarantee of freedom of the press. Socialists were, for the first
time, given the right to form political parties and to express their critique of Turkish society and state. In the constitution, just economic development and full employment were also emphasised; the state was redescribed as a 'social state', that could mean more than a welfare state. Later years were then to come to tell a different story.

This new move is very important in terms of legalisation of 'oppositions'. The ‘radicalisation’ of opposition bore fruit. It had once been insisted upon by Kemalism in the 1930s that Turkish society was a classless society, but it was now announced that society included opposing classes and that, without granting freedom and rights to the working class, democracy could not be founded. Thus, it is interesting that a project of modernity transforms itself by going hand in hand with society. This project of modernity, Kemalism, assumes responsibility when the country experiences difficulties, especially in terms of the democratic regime. But, this characteristic is not always understood to be power for the sake of 'real democracy', rather, over time, it is reinterpreted as a means of 'disciplining'. This shall be mentioned later, following this continuing analysis of the 1960s.

In the atmosphere following the new constitution, there was a further polarisation of society and politics. Workers established DISK, the confederation of revolutionary workers. The opposition did not remain indifferent; businessmen formed TUSIAD, the association of Turkish industrialists and businessmen. From then on, these two associations were to play important parts in the lives of Turks. Ideological polarisation was mainly between the anti-American left (Kemalists, Workers’ Party, universities) and the pro-American right (rising bourgeoisie, land owners, liberal intellectuals) (see Ahmad, 1993). If one describes the development of civil society as democratisation, the 1960s could be described as a period of such. Some autonomous organisations were formed by the people without the support or influence of the bureaucracy. For example, it was
no longer only Kemalism that opposed imperialism, autonomous leftist student unions were protesting against the imperialist attempts of the USA and the Soviet Union.

In terms of the economy, the 1960s could be called a second era of nationally organised capitalism. With the 5 year economic plan, it seemed that Turkey experienced the second industrial revolution. The growth rate reached 8% in the 1960s. Some new economic actors also emerged in this era. Salaried managers played important roles in both state enterprises and private business. The national bourgeoisie started to transform small firm-based production into big business. Growing industry also increased the percentage of workers in the country. The same years witnessed workers’ movements and strikes with the workers out of control. The Workers’ Party had some seats in the parliament and was the most powerful opposition in the assembly. The freedom at universities allowed students to form their own autonomous unions which played an important part in the development of democracy but, also, in the legitimation of the 1971 military coup.

The decade from 1961-71 was the first in which liberty was enjoyed, but it was to give rise to further disciplinization. The right-wing came to power in 1965, and Demirel, the prime minister, announced as soon as possible: ‘it is impossible to govern society with this constitution’. The 1961 constitution was providing ‘liberty’ more than ‘discipline’, and this the Turkish right did not appreciate. The police could not use physical force against workers and students. This caused the right to believe that ‘communism was on the way’. Certainly, this was an invitation to the army to intervene. Here, we necessarily re-enter the theme of the military.

As has been said, the Turkish military for the first and last time achieved a coup from outside the hierarchical structure of Turkey’s armed forces. Generals had somehow become the tools of young military officers. This became the contrary after 1961. The high command assigned itself and
transformed the very characteristics of the Turkish army: The generals were taken into the sphere of business and industry; OYAK, the Army Mutual Assistance Association was created. In a decade, OYAK became an important partner in the automotive industry, it owned 20 per cent of Petkim (petro-chemical industry), it held Tukas (food canning firm), etc. (Ahmad, 1993). The high command fully controlled the army; opposition was oppressed. As a consequence of those developments, the army defended the system by shelving its Kemalist ambitions. Rather than change and development, the high command’s concern was with this time with ‘stability’. This army looked very different from the army of 1960. For example, the military had once sided with Republicans in creating the democratic constitution of 1961; but, by 1971, the military looked upon the Republican People’s Party with suspicion because of its slogan: ‘this order must change’. Atatürk’s party was, this time, blamed by the generals.

The 1960s revealed that Turkish society included plurality. The democratic 1961 constitution provided ways of expressing this plurality openly. However, plurality, especially the ideas of leftist political ideologies, were assumed to be dangerous and divisive of society. Thus, the 1971 generals’ coup could be seen to be the result of a phobia: communism. The Workers’ Party was dissolved and three student leaders of the 1968 movement executed despite efforts made by the national chief, İnönü. DISK was searched by the police; leftist teachers were targeted. An extraordinary move was made by the army to imprison two intellectuals, Çetin Altan, a socialist, and Ilhan Selçuk, a radical Kemalist (see Ahmad, 1993). Liberty was paid for with unbearable discipline. ‘Revolution’ and ‘change’ became the nemeses of the system and of the military. The atmosphere changed; radical rightists gained the upper hand; the state helped the youth organisation of the Nationalist Action Party, this organisation acted against leftists as vigilantes. In brief, the military moved from being on the side of Kemalist modernity - republican – to the conservative,
ultra-nationalist and modern side that rejected plurality. Thus, creating discipline was an objective of the new military coup that replaced liberty-oriented constitutional laws with disciplining ones.

In contrast to disciplining by the military and right-wing politicians, the people brought the RPP to power, although this act was another element in the radicalisation of oppositions, this time leading to unwanted results. The RPP could not form a government alone in 1973, although the party won 44 per cent of the votes. Ecevit was not willing to make a coalition with the rightists; the only chance was to form a coalition with Erbakan’s Islamist party. The former enemies came to form a government together. But more astonishing was the fact that the two parties agreed on some issues; both were anti-imperialists and both believed in freedom of speech. However, the prime minister, Ecevit assumed that new elections could be held and that the RPP could get rid of the Islamists. He then resigned. Bitter years were to come; all the right-wing parties formed a coalition, called the nationalist front.

The nationalist front’s aim was to fight against the left in any way possible. During those years, the society was occupied by politics based on utopian future-oriented ideologies. Marxist-Leninist workers and students were the main opposers of the radical nationalists. The radicalisation of oppositions shocked Turkish society this time; it was no longer to bring about a move towards ‘significant modernity’ but to create anarchy, which was an invitation to the army. In other words, the nationalist front was a serious attempt to totally reconstruct Turkish society on the basis of ultra-nationalism. The Turkey of the second half of the 1970s seemed to be experiencing a civil war; the police supported nationalists for the sake of discipline, while most intellectuals supported the leftists for the sake of liberty. It seemed that there was no unified society. The high command of the military assumed that stability had been violated. In other words, more discipline was needed.
This internal factor was supported by an external one: the US was targeting Turkey as an example of a ‘moderate Islamic country’; neither a radical one which would block American interests in the Middle East nor the Turkey of before, which included the possibility for ‘socialism’ to emerge as well. Therefore, the connection between the US and the high command should be unsurprising; The disciplining of Turkey needed Islam this time.55

On September 12, 1980, the military intervened in what was to be the most disciplining of the coups. With the 1971 coup, the generals had achieved the abandonment of most of the basic laws in the 1961 constitution. This, nevertheless, was insufficient as the country never achieved stability. It is usually believed that there are elements that can integrate or unify society. This, in fact, necessitates plurality to be overcome, because the existence of plurality usually means the existence of conflicts between people in society. On the other hand, if society could be totalised on the basis of one or more elements, conflict-ridden relations could be stopped: this is always the belief held by totalistic conceptions of society. The 1980 military coup in Turkey could be seen as an attempt at reconstructing society by interpreting Islam as playing the role of keeping the Turks together. It was claimed that if the youth was educated according to Islam, Turkey would be rid of communist youth. This was a totalizing attempt to reconstruct society on the basis of a ‘nationalist Islam’.

The 1980 generals’ coup, therefore, came to oppose Kemalism especially by its encouragement and support for ‘Islamization’. The generals viewed Islam, in stark contrast to the Kemalist understanding, as the cement holding the Turks together. A lack of Islamic education was seen to be the essential reason for the rise of leftism. The generals included Islamic lessons in the school curriculum; it was, from then on, compulsory for every Turkish student to take religious courses in primary, secondary and high schools; a practice Kemal would have hated. During the three-year long military regime, the Imam-Hatip Schools (schools for training prayer leaders) increased from
258 to 350. The graduates from these schools were given the right to go on to study at universities. The number of Koranic schools increased from 2,610 to 4,715 and the amount of students rose to 155,403 from 68,486 between 1980 and 1989. Without considering this state support one may be unable to analyse the rise of Islamism in the current phase of Turkish modernity. This could be called a state Islamicisation programme for the sake of discipline. Generals thought of Islamic culture as the framework for making people live together. But they were to fail: no longer could culture play such a role; this is why today, Islamic militants pose a danger to the military.

After finishing its business, the high command allowed a multi-party democracy to re-emerge in 1983. Of course, the generals were careful as to which parties to allow; for example, no socialist party could be formed. The coming years were to be known as the Özal years. Basically, the 1980s and the 1990s constituted a continuation of the military's ambitions: an unlimited liberal economic policy as the driving force; Islam made the powerful force of political life; the replacement of ‘radicalisation’ with mutuality. The crucial point must be that the modernising elite was replaced by a technocratic elite; meaning that policy became superior to ideology. Depoliticisation is the key word necessary for understanding the current era in the Turkish experience. Attempts were made to make future-oriented revolutionary politics old-fashioned and this was succeeded, albeit only for a while: Islamism came to fill that place.

It could be conceptualised that what has happened in the current years was the results of that disciplining. When the state takes up a position on the side of a particular group in society, corruption becomes unavoidable. Especially when the state views some groups as partners of the polity in the government of society, it could be interpreted as a resource to be exploited. And in Turkey, during 1970s and 1980s, the state included ‘illegal organisations’ that, it was thought, were used against the enemies that were assumed to divide Turkey. These illegal organisations were
formed by the ultra-nationalists who saw no difference between themselves and the state. Both believed that they were to fight against the enemies of the nation. An organic connection between ultra-nationalist militants and the state was thus formed. That is, the nationalist militants became important actors in the country. A 1996 traffic accident made this fact quite clear: a nationalist terrorist was found in a minibus with an MP from a central right-wing party and a police chief. Therefore, radical disciplining can be thought to have institutionally corrupted the state. And this was, partly, for the sake of having an unlimited market economy.

In the current configuration of the economic sphere, it could be argued that the economy is no longer the old one. The liberalisation of the economy has been creating new winners and losers. If one describes liberalism as freedom and duty, it could become clear that modernity is both liberty and discipline. In other words, individuals are required to act on their own interests, but must also recognise others’ property. A contract is drawn up between individuals, with no absolute freedom being emphasised. Each individual is free, because they are rational, but that makes them subject to ‘universal principles’. That is, a self-interested individual recognises that his claims are acceptable to others who are also rational beings. So, in a liberal political economy, since the self-interested individual strives to maximise the satisfaction of his wants, he needs to market his labour or capital and to buy goods produced by others. As a consequence he becomes a ‘socially productive being’. However, this liberal economy, at least for the Turkish experience, could be seen as a utopian fantasy.

An economy, unable to be legally accounted for has gained a certain force in the country. Corruption has become a dominant feature of the current economy. Why did the promising economy of the 1930s result in the current ‘disaster’? I shall try to answer this question before considering some prominent characteristics of the current economy. The goal of creating a national
bourgeoisie on the basis of state support for private accumulation should have included a proper answer to the following question: what would be the model for the redistribution of the state enterprises built by the people’s effort? Should the state have continued to be a main producing agent or should it have returned - sold - the invested economic institutions to the public for social and welfare purposes? The state, however, from the beginning of the republic had always supported private capital. It was when the bourgeoisie did not require state support any longer, that the problem of privatising state economic enterprises emerged. The state was always the powerful centre with which the bourgeoisie needed to have close relations but, particularly since the early 1980s, the supportive - sometimes controlling - state has been assumed to be no longer necessary. That is, the state’s product, namely the bourgeoisie, no longer regards the state as its 'master'. And when this product, now itself the master, argued that it was capable of doing business better, the state found it feasible to privatise state enterprises.

The corruption in the current economy is directly related to this privatisation process. However, before corruption by means of privatisation, in order to argue for privatisation, governments in the 1980s had to corrupt the state economic enterprises. The Özal governments, between 1983 and 1989, during the period of unlimited liberalism, corrupted the Public Economic Enterprises in order to prepare the argument that privatisation was not a possible solution, but a 'scientific' rule for escaping Turkey’s economic problems (see Cangizbay, 1995). When a state enterprise becomes unproductive and does not yield profit, it should be sold to private capital. Privatisation is simply insisted upon as necessary due to 'objective criteria' and for the sake of 'democracy'. It is not asked whether privatisation is a politico-economic choice of a particular social class, rather the reduction of state power by means of the privatisation of state enterprises is emphasised as a means of making way for democraticisation. Thus, democraticisation is insisted upon as implying economic privatisation. In the first place, this argument seems unproblematic. That is, when the state is made
into a 'technical' state having no economic task, with its job rather being to govern society in order
to dissolve contradictions on the basis of law, it may not able to act as an agent of the population.
Therefore, a further democratisation could be assumed to be at stake. However, this perspective has
to consider an important sector of the country: the peasantry. The percentage of peasants among the
Turkish population is around 35 and is directly related to the state with regards economic activity.
In 1927, only 18 per cent of the population was living in cities. Today 65 per cent of the population
is urbanised. Although this might be thought of as a reference to the development of Turkish
modernity, peasants in the country still play a crucial role. It could be said that economic policies
over the whole period of the republic could not 'proletariatise' the Turkish peasants. Although rapid
urbanisation has been at stake since the 1950s, the amount of people working in the agricultural
sector is much higher than in European societies. This situation could be considered in two ways.
Firstly, the peasantry in Turkey could not be changed because they were not involved in the
Kemalist revolution. Second, the Kemalist interpretation of modernity does not understand
urbanisation to be a crucial component of modernisation. Rather, in the village, modernisation was
thought to be both possible and desirable. It was for this reason, for example, that the village
institutions were to enlighten the villager without encouraging him to move to the city. However,
this policy was open to exploitation by counter politics. That is, the village institutions were closed
down by the coalition of landlords, the commercial bourgeoisie and the Democrat Party. It then
became very important to gain village votes in elections, and, to this end, temporary solutions for
peasants were implemented rather than development. Nevertheless, the village is no longer the old
one. There is a modernity at stake in the village. New economic actors from the village come to
participate in the wealth of the country. Particularly, by means of modern telecommunications
technology, the villager is no longer seen as uneducated and exploitable. The villagers can no
longer be controlled by the polity and the economy. Perhaps, a more important consequence of the
unproletarianised Turkish peasantry is that the government currently aims to found 'village-cities'
as a commitment to Kemalism. Village-cities are a group of villages in the same region connected to each other around a 'central village'. If this project is achieved, a model of a different modernity in the village could be fully fulfilled.

Politics have shifted from confrontation to tolerance; the leftists and rightists, who had rejected existing orders, have been replaced by moderate liberal and social democratic parties. However, this move is responded to be the fact that the Islamist party has emerged as a new radical party. The current years witnessed the state’s Islamisation programme. They have given rise to civil society organisations. Some have formed unions for human rights and others for animal rights. A care for nature has emerged on behalf of some people, while others focus on women’s rights. This feature can be understood as the impossibility of any more manipulating 'multiplicity' and 'plurality'. Neither the state nor culture nor economic criteria can hold the population of Turkey together and homogenise it. To illustrate this situation, we could consider the Kurdish question and the rise of Islamism. No matter how imaginative Kemalism was, the civilisational context challenged, reviewed and assimilated innovations and/or borrowings. The Kurdish question and the rise of Islamism could point to Kemalism's limits. 'Culture' plays a pivotal part in defining the situation in the country. However, there is no single culture that could be thought to hold the Turkish population together. A civilisational duality, Turkey faces a potential war between its cultural worlds. In this situation, the disciplining programme of the state has been a most important factor. The militant nationalism of 1971 to the 1980s, necessarily found that the Kurdish opposition and the Islamisation program of the 1980 military coup played an important part in the rise of Islamism. However, despite all this taking place, multiplicity could no longer be manipulated. That is, society emerged as an arena of conflict and, therefore, 'civil society' organisations began to play an important role in the country.
Now, a Turkish 'civil society' could be said to be at stake. Although this may refer to an achievement of the Kemalist project, the oppositions and clashes between the Kemalists and the non-Kemalists played a basic part in the emergence of a civil society. Kemalism’s opportunity-providing characteristic could be considered to influence the establishment of civil society organisations. Many democratic and anti-fascist organisations are Kemalist. This may be seen as current Kemalism being changed 'towards the people', an important goal of early Kemalism. Therefore, it could be an important opportunity for Turkey if Kemalism can be rescued from the hands of the state as a legitimising element. That is, the biggest organisations in society are Kemalist organisations who do not see the state as such. This is an important change for several reasons: These organisations may achieve being able to say that the state should no longer be able to use Kemalism as a legitimising element, but this can only be achieved if the majority of Kemalists come to understand that the defence of the state does no good for Kemalism either. Thus, a further democratisation of Turkey indeed requires that Kemalism become the property of civil society organisations in order for it not to be used by 'any ideology' as a legitimising tool.

In very brief conclusion, the following points need to be made. Modernity cannot be analysed as a unity. In contrast, the radicalisation of dualities must be seen as a constituting element of modernity. As has been insisted, modernity is a field of tensions. In the Turkish experience, radicalising oppositions have played dual roles: certainly, it moved people towards modernity but the price for such was high. Modern society could not be seen to represent a coherent whole, rather there has been diversity within a limited unity. No doubt, before modernity, the social world included plural cultures too. However, within modernity, two distinct features make cultural plurality unique to modernity. First, cultural worlds are not isolated from one another in modernity, rather the relations between different cultures increase. Secondly, moving from one cultural identity to another becomes open in contrast to pre-modern cultures in which changing cultural group was
very hard, if not impossible. As a consequence of these characteristics, modern society becomes a field of tensions, because the oppositions between multiple cultures are recognised. The radicalisation of dualities between different world-interpretations marks a distinct feature of the Turkish experience of modernity.

In terms of the relations between the state and society, ‘disciplining’ and ‘liberalisation’ must be taken as two peculiar dynamics of modernity. The state assumes itself to be the integrating sphere of society, but doing so has led to bitter stories. The Kemalist state promised liberty by creating spaces of opportunity for people for the creation of ‘autonomous’ society. However, Kemalism could not predict what should be done when/if polarised society becomes violent in searching for solutions. Definitely, Kemalism believed that the army could no longer play a socio-political role. However, the army went further than that: it sided with one part of society in the 1970s and 1980s and took the place of politics in the integrating sphere. Discipline could not be achieved by the power of law, rather physical violence was used.

The issues creating tensions are not only economic, rather the interpretation of the world and people’s relation to it play a basic role in the creation of tensions. Society becomes polarised, not only through the institutionalisation of social classes, but also, as the Turkish experience shows, cultural-civilisational dualities pose irresistible difficulties. This has a special place in the Turkish experience; the Turks have never been proper members of a clearly defined civilisation. This, in the first place, provided an opportunity for moving the Turks towards modernity, that is, when a civilisational framework cannot be clearly defined, it is easier to introduce innovation. However, it is for the same reason that, in Turkey, culture cannot be assumed to hold the Turks together: this was the attempt of the 1980 coup and of the Özal era, but the consequences reveal the bitterness: Islam was used to eliminate ideological differences, but it radicalised the issue. Currently, Islamism
occupies an obviously prominent place in the life of Turkish society. Current events, in terms of the relations between the state and the Islamists, have given rise to interesting perspectives; for example, some view the emergence of Islamism as marking the end of Kemalist modernity (Gulalp, 1998). Thus, it is urgent to consider the question of Islam seriously. In the next chapter, we shall analyse the relations between Islam and modernity in the Turkish experience.
Chapter Six

ISLAM AND MODERNITY: RADICAL OPENNESS TO INTERPRETATION

1. Introduction

Since the date of the Iranian Islamic revolution, the voices of Islam have made some observers curious as to one question: was modernity accepted by different (other than Western) cultures? With the example of the new Islam, Islamism, some began to argue that modernity has been refused by other - non-western - cultures (Mestrovic 1998: 156). More seriously, postmodernism seemed to be convincing to some observers of Islam. It is argued that the Islamist movement clearly expresses that it has become unavoidable to accept the postmodern era (see, for instance, Ahmed 1992; Sayyid, 1997).

In terms of the current debate about Islam’s relations with modernity, Turkey presents a particularly interesting case for observers who want to understand the nature of relations between Islam and modernity. This is so for two reasons. First, with its particular project of modernity, Kemalism, Turkey has often been seen as the model of modernity for the Muslim world. Secondly, however, the Iranian Islamic Revolution posed a serious question for Kemalism as to whether it had failed, because Iran had chosen the Turkish way of modernisation, to an important extent, as its model for development.56

As is well-known, Turkey represents a most secular Muslim society. Yet Turkey is also known for its ‘tension-ridden’ relations between modernity and Islam. More recently, Islamic voices have been more strongly heard than ever before, yet, in turn, secularists speak out against Islamism. To
put it more precisely, on the one hand, Turkey has been regarded as ‘western’ while, on the other, the Islamic face of Turkey is a constant presence on major issues.  

This ‘duality’ immediately divides observers of Turkey into two opposite camps. For instance, Lewis (1988: 4) has stated: ‘In almost all of the sovereign states with a clear Muslim majority, Islam is the state religion; many of them have clauses in their constitutions establishing the Holy law of Islam as either the basis of law or the major source of legislation. The outstanding exception is the Turkish republic, which under the guidance of its first president, Kemal Atatürk, adopted a series of laws in the 1920s...’.

But, on the other hand, for instance, Ahmed (1993: 98) has argued: ‘The challenge to the notion of Turkey as a European nation, the strong, unmistakable signs of Turks rediscovering their Islamic identity are everywhere: the full mosques, the pride in the Ottoman past, the women with their hijab, even men wearing the fez’.

As these opposite perspectives clearly reveal, it is important to pay attention to the question of Islam on the basis of the Turkish experience in order to try to understand the nature of relations between Islam and modernity. By analysing Islam and modernity in Turkey, this chapter argues that a different interpretation is needed: both Islam and modernity could and should be conceptualised as open to interpretation. This has not been done so far. What one can get from works on the relations between Islam and modernity carried out so far, is either the sense of Islam as incompatible with modernity or the sense of Islam as fully compatible with ‘western modernity’. It has never been convincingly observed that neither Islam nor modernity could be shown to be explicitly defined and closed ways of living. There is, in fact, a radical openness to interpretation in both Islam and modernity. Therefore, they can both be lived according to various
configurations. In the same way as the theme of varieties of modernity could open up plausible ways for social theory to review itself, the theme of varieties of Islam could shed light on the understanding of the Muslim world.

As will be argued in this chapter, the Turkish experience clearly shows that both Islam and modernity are not free from the contexts in which they are present. By this I want to stress that there are plural modernities and plural Islams which highly depend on the contexts they find at home. Now, we may turn to ‘Turkish Islam’ and ‘Turkish modernity’, both of which are different from both other modernities and other Islams. What is more significant about Turkey is that neither Islam nor modernity emerged first in the Turkish lands, however, as a consequence rather than being Islamised or Westernised, The Turks ‘reinterpreted’ both Islam and modernity. Therefore, it must be argued that socio-historical experiences cannot be easily explored from the point of view of abstract theories. This means that one cannot justify a society’s level of modernity by using European Enlightenment as the model of ‘standard’ modernity, nor can one explain a society’s ‘Muslimness’ by using the Koran to provide an explicit model of Islamic life.

Thus, this chapter aims at problematising understandings of relations between modernity and Islam by arguing that Turkish society indicates the plurality of Islams and the possibility of different configurations of modernity. As will be shown in this chapter, Islam and modernity need to be observed as projects open to interpretation. First, it needs to be observed why and how Islam and modernity have so far been taken as opposing each other, to understand why some insisted on the necessity for Islam to resist modernity and why some others argued that it was necessary to westernise Islamic societies. In doing so, I shall take a critical look at these understandings of Islam by arguing that realms of human life can be formed differently in different social contexts, both in traditional times and, especially, under conditions of modernity, rather than building arguments on
references to ‘idealised’ - original - versions of the projects of Islam and modernity. Thus, in the following section, the most important themes in terms of the relations between Islam and modernity are considered in order to show why observers could not effectively understand the issue.

In the third part, in the light of the Turkish experience, it shall be argued that none of the following conceptualisations is convincing: A. That there is a certain incompatibility between modernity and Islam. B. That traditional Islam strictly obeys the Koran. C. That the only way for Islamic societies to be modern is through westernisation.

A. Some have viewed modernity as incompatible with Islam and, therefore, ‘traditionalism’ was developed in order to ‘minimise’ modernising attempts. Recently, this argument has again emerged, this time, to show that Islamic movements reject modernity.\(^6\) It shall, however, be argued that Islamism cannot be explored as either a questioning or a rejection of modernity, because it is problematic, as a starting-point, to say that modernity and Islam are incompatible.

B. Some others have understood traditional forms of Islamic life as completely obedient to the Koran, deriving the ideal Islamic way of life from tradition (Ahmed, 1992). Against this perspective, it shall be shown that the plurality of Islamic traditions proves that it is impossible to idealise a particular tradition within Islam as the only way of living Islam.

C. In stark contrast, some have viewed Islam as fully compatible with a western model of modernity.\(^7\) It will be argued that this perspective sees, neither the distinct interpretations of the world by the West and by Islam, nor does it understand the plurality of Islams which could show that some are less, others more, opposing to the West.
Thus, by analysing modernity and Islam as projects open to interpretation, this chapter shall question modernist, postmodernist and traditionalist views of Islam with illustrations from the Turkish experience.

2. Islam and Modernity as Projects

My basic argument in this section will be that, precisely with references to the ‘idealised’ versions of modern and Islamic projects, observers discuss modernity and Islam as being irreconcilable in terms of their understandings of life. No doubt, if one compares socialism and liberalism, for instance, it would have to be noted that there are incompatibilities rather than consensus between them. Nevertheless, this cannot be argued by saying that liberalism represents modernity, while socialism is a rejection of such. On the contrary, liberalism and socialism express two different versions of modernity. By this I want to insist that by referring to western liberal modernity as the standard model of modernity, and to the Koran as the provider of a ‘closed’ way of Islamic life, one cannot analyse the present conditions of Islamic societies. To make this argument plausible it must be stressed that the relation between Islam and modernity cannot be one of total exclusion.

Islamism’s current rise to the fore in Islamic societies, led to the development of two basic views: first, Islamism is seen as decentralising the West, that is, the postmodern era is bringing modernity to an end (Ahmed, 1992; Sayyid, 1997). Second, Islamism is taken to be the manifestation of pre-modern traditional phenomena (see Watt, 1988; Lawrence, 1995). When these arguments are
looked at closely, it is striking that an argument cannot be developed without a consideration of the West. What I mean here is that discussions of Islam’s relations to modernity are, indeed, centred on the ‘equivalence’ between modernity and the West. So, one either needs to reject modernity - because it is the Christian West - or is forced to accept the advance of another civilisation. Thus, an argument for or against Islam’s compatibility with modernity cannot be maintained without considering the West.

However, there is a way of showing Islam and modernity to be compatible without centring the argument on the West. Viewing Islam as hostile to modernity has its roots in the uniform, unchanging definitions of Islam. In other words, it is argued that there has always been one Islam, ordered by the Koran and exemplified by the Prophet (see Nasr, 1988). This understanding neither allows one to argue for a plurality of Islams nor does it credit modernity. This is exactly the point from which Islam is viewed as anti-modern, as a traditionalist world-interpretation (see Watt, 1988; Gellner, 1992). However, the facts should no longer be ‘manipulated’ so as to reveal that there is no singular, uniform Islam, but different Islams. In other words, the Islamic East should not be viewed as a totality; rather the plurality of cultures in the region needs to be recognised.

Islam was a project of the ‘good life’ which emerged in a tribal society in 611. The first practiser and, so the exemplar, of this project was the Prophet Muhammed. Because of this, the ‘sunna’ and ‘hadith’, the sayings and practices of Muhammed, is one of the two sources of Islam, in addition to the Koran. Islam was what the Prophet did. In other words, what the Prophet did was Islam. So, under his authority, disputes could be resolved. The death of the Prophet, however, marked an important event: the dispute over the interpretation of Islam came to the fore. First, succession gave rise to conflicts within Islam. The first division, known as the Shia-Sunni Islam divide, was born out of discussions as to who was able to interpret the law, since the death of the lawgiver, the
Prophet. For the Shia part, the successor should be one of the first Muslims and close to Muhammed. But, for the Sunni part, succession could be solved by election. Since then, different interpretations of Islam have emerged and spread around the geographical space of the Islamic East. The multiple interpretations of Islam were due to differences in ‘cultures’: Islam was not accepted without any revision or question in the cultures outside the birth place of Islam.

Nevertheless, some argue that Islam was always the master signifier in all Islamic societies regardless of their particularities (Gellner, 1992). This argument is maintained by viewing the caliphate as the centre around which global Muslim identity was structured (Sayyid, 1997). One wonders how it is possible to generalise the views of people who lived within the radical plurality of Islams. However, what history tells us is that the caliphate had lost its ‘unifying’ capability, long before its abolishment by the Turks in 1924, precisely because none of the specific interpretations of Islam could assimilate its other multiple interpretations. It should not be surprising then that the Ottoman sultans did not place importance on the caliphate, although it had been passed to the Ottomans in 1517 after the conquest of Egypt.

In brief, the plurality of Islams needs to be considered in understanding the relations between modernity and Islam. As the equivalence between modernity and the West must be problematised, so too must the equivalence between Islam and the Arab world. So far, I have argued that both modernity and Islam must be thought as possible to be lived in different configurations. However, what happens when Arabocentric Islam and Eurocentric modernity are compared needs to be considered. Thus, from now on I shall look at some of the comparisons between Islam and modernity which have been carried out with references to the ‘idealised versions’. The space is insufficient for an extensive discussion of this theme, therefore, I shall choose a few of the most important realms seen as creating crucial oppositions between Islam and modernity.
The principle of the “individual autonomy” of the liberal project of modernity has been looked at as a catalysing element in tensions between Islam and modernity (see Nasr, 1988). An idealised version of a community-oriented Islam neither knows nor recognises a principle such as individual autonomy whereas, in the liberal project of modernity, for the sake of decollectivisation, the emancipation of the individual as a self-reliant master of his life is overemphasised. This means that, under conditions of liberal modernity, the ties between human beings are supposed to be thin with rationality supposed to operate life.

Human beings, however, by their very nature, are communal beings: 'all human activities are conditioned by the fact that men live together' (Arendt, 1958: 34). Without community or society, individuation cannot be spelled out and, thus, modernity, as a human condition, has to be based on ‘sociability’ rather than on ‘isolated’ individuals. In the cultural program of 'original', western modernity, individualism is a purer identity that has is to do with being an individual before being French, Russian, a worker or a Muslim. As Wagner (1994) has considered, an essential ambiguity of Enlightenment lies in the relations between individual autonomy and reason, the common good and human nature that are not individual realities. And, not least due to the fact that moral order and social control imply that individual identity formation be related to social identities, therefore, every identity formation is necessarily a social process. Thus, atomistic social philosophy seems to fail, because individual identity is not free from cultural contexts. Islam, on the other hand, cannot be generalised as strictly communitarian in all the socio-historical experiences where Islam has been present. Rather, Islam is open to interpretation in terms of the relations between individual and society. First, the Koran, as the mere source of knowledge, is always open to interpretation. Therefore, the unity of individuals under the divine intellect seems problematic. In other words, since the Koranic verses do not constitute a unity, rather most of them were solutions to given
socio-historical situations during the prophet’s life time, Muslims take particular verses as guides to life, finding enough room for their ‘own’ understandings of Islam. This could be argued as opening up an opportunity for a sort of individuation. For instance, Ibn Rushd (known in the West as Averroes) could not be easily seen as a mere member of the Islamic umma, in this respect. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, in Islam in contrast to Christianity there is no clergy through which individuals relate to God. When individuals are not guided by clerical authority, an individual perspective of religion should be a greater possibility. Thus, it may be argued that this position of Islam opens up opportunities for a sort of individual life perspective.

What then must be stressed is that the degree of individual autonomy could take various forms depending on the social settings in which modernity is present. For instance, Arnason (1997) in his scholarly work on Japanese modernity, does not give central importance to individual liberty as a distinguishing characteristic of modernity, although I think it would be objectionable to talk about modernity without considering the degree of individuation. However, it should not be understood that I try to make Islam’s view of the individual and community compatible with western understanding. On the contrary, I insist that the ‘liberation’ of individuality cannot be seen as unique to the West, but that, in Islamic communities, there have been ‘highly different’ processes of liberation.

In understanding the ‘world’, the thoughts of Islam and modernity are contrasted in another opposition (see Nasr, 1988; Gellner, 1992). The holder of knowledge in Islam is ultimately the divine intellect, therefore, ‘true science’ is based at a supra-human level. That is, intelligence is a divine gift to human beings; the divine intellect is superimposed on the human intellect. So, the criterion of reality is God. The book is the only source of true knowledge and the basis for arriving at perfection. Modern thought, in contrast, is anthropomorphic, that is, there is no principle higher
than man. Modern thought can be seen as ‘all that is merely human’ and, therefore, it is essential for it to diverge from the divine source of knowledge. Thus, modernity’s ‘true science’ is based on human reason. The ultimate criterion for reality is the individual human being. Perhaps, this is best expressed in Descartes’s well-known phrase: ‘I think, therefore I am’.

The above observation concerns Islam’s relation to modernity in terms of ‘thought’, if looked at without taking an historical approach. It may readily be interpreted from this observation that Islamic sciences are incompatible with rational sciences. However, reality does not prove this. In the emergence of modern science in the West, Islamic scholars were the main figures to teach advanced science and philosophy to westerners. Ibn Sina, Ibn Rusd, Farabi and Ibn Khaldun were not less important than Newton, Descartes, Locke or Kant. These Islamic scholars carried ancient Greek philosophy and an advanced science to the West in the thirteenth century.

In fact, in the Koran, knowledge, ilim, is the second most pronounced word after Allah. The emphasis on knowledge allow some to emerge as important figures in world thought. In contrast to those westerners who argue that Islam did not give rise to great men in human history, there are many exemplary figures. Not only the Koran, but also the ‘Sunna’, Muhammed’s sayings and practices, provide the interpretation that science is central to life. For example, a phrase from Muhammed could be used to interpret Islam as placing essential importance on science: ‘search knowledge even if it is in China’. However, this should not be taken to mean that Muslims should consider ‘modern science’ in the same way as westerners. This question depends on how modern science is interpreted: some social contexts might see it as the instrument for achieving mastery over nature, as westerners generally have done, while some other contexts might view modern science as the way to reach the knowledge of the world without mastering it completely.
Another crucial opposition is found in modernity’s differentiation process against Islam’s equilibrium. The separation of realms of human activity is overemphasised by modernist social theories (see, for instance, Parsons, 1971). Islam, in stark contrast, is regarded as a perfect equilibrium of community, that is, no fragmentation is allowed to take place (Ahmad, 1983). Islam achieves this unity with its unique framework of the ‘final judgement’. In other words, Islamic morality operates all activities and is, thus, a unifying element. This is indeed questionable because differentiation and integration could take various forms depending on contexts where modernity is present. Rather than readily accepting Islam’s equilibrium as incompatible with modernity’s differentiation process, the degree of integration and differentiation could be taken to explain distinctions between western modernity and Islamic modernities.

In fact, modernity can never be seen to provide autonomy for human realms to the same degree in all contexts. Taking civil society as an example: it cannot be argued that civil society means one and the same thing for all modernities. For instance, in the Japanese and Russian experiences, state and society have been much more closely integrated than in the western experience (Arnason, 1997; 1993). This observation should refer to the fact that, in terms of integration and differentiation, a modernity within an Islamic society would not resemble the modernity of a Christian society.

In terms of the discussions about the (in)compatibility between Islam and modernity, the economy occupies a crucial place. Economic activity comes to the fore in modernity as a driving force in the development of the conditions of life. Islam is assumed to resist the centrality of the economy in human life (Berkes, 1976). The economic model of Islamism is often emphasised as an anti-modern economy. However, it could be shown that Islam is compatible with modernity in terms of economic activity as well, although it does not have to accept the western way as its model of
economy. In Islamic countries, both liberal and socialist models of economy have found home despite the fact that these countries have added their own characteristics to them. I shall briefly show that both liberal and socialist models have not met resistance from Islam.

The practices of the prophet Muhammed provide sources for liberals to conclude that Islam encourages competitive economic activity. Muhammed was a merchant himself and he had proclaimed: 'commerce is the basic activity for the survival of the Islamic community'. Not only the life of the prophet but also some verses in the Koran provide ways of showing Islam as compatible with the liberal economic model. For example, the Koran grants the right of individual, private property. Some liberal observers, like Mehmet (1990: 77), could go further: 'In terms of market relations Islamic economic doctrines are most compatible with perfect competition based on private property ownership and private enterprise'.

Socialists emphasise the communitarian characteristics of Islam. It seems that Islam promises equity, rejects profit and delegitimise interest. Therefore, socialism seems, to some observers of Islam, to be a more compatible model. It was no accident that Muammer Kaddafi emerged as the political leader of Islamic socialism, or 'socialist Islam'. Perhaps more importantly, the most influential ideologue of the Iranian Islamic revolution, Ali Shariti, was using socialist tones in his lectures across the country, after completing his Ph.D. in sociology in Paris. Thus, it is clear that Islam is open to interpretations in terms of the economic model as well. It is not that the modern economy cannot be accepted by Islam, but that it could take a different shape in Islamic societies.

For some, the incompatibility between Islam and modernity is unavoidable, especially because secularisation does not apply in Islam (Gellner, 1992). A strong adherent of Enlightenment
rationalism, Ernest Gellner believes that ‘to say that secularisation prevails in Islam is not contentious. It is simply false’ (Gellner, 1992: 5). To show that the opposite could be quite true, it is useful to argue against Gellner’s central reason for regarding Islam as incompatible with modernity. The main feature which is assumed not to allow for secularisation is found, by Gellner, in the absence of clergy. In Islam, Gellner (1992: 8) wrote, ‘no distinct sacramental status separates the preacher or the leader of the ritual from the laity... There is no clerical organisation.’ What Gellner wants to say is that, since in Islam there is no clerical institution such as the church, it is not possible to see Islam and the state as two different institutions.

Secularisation should mean that the single individual can relate directly to God and not through a priesthood and, I think, Gellner would agree with this. Theoretically, it is, therefore, possible to argue that secularisation is in fact much more compatible with Islam, in comparison with Christianity. In other words, since, in Islam, believers are already ‘free’ in their relation to God because there is no clergy through which believers relate to God, it should be much easier for secularisation to take place. A huge effort was made amid much difficulty to separate church from the state in Christian societies, whereas there is no need for such an effort to be made in Islamic societies.

However, for Gellner (1992), since there is no clergy, it is impossible to separate Islam from the socio-political sphere. Without taking an historical approach, as is the case in Gellner, it would be very difficult to judge Islam’s relation to secularisation. History would prove that the opposite is true: it is difficult to find a theocratic state in Islamic history. For example, as we shall see, the Ottoman Empire was never shaped by religious men but, in contrast, it formed its Islamic institutions. Thus, plurality in Islam was at stake from the beginning. That is, Islam did not have to wait for the Renaissance/Reformation. Apart from a lack of historical perspective, Gellner lacks
another crucial point: secularity may refer to something different in Islamic societies. Since Gellner believes in the coherence of modernity, secularisation, for him, must follow the same process everywhere. It should be observed, however, that a version of secularisation is possible in Islam. As Turkey shows, the state does not need to found a separate institution for religion, rather it needs to provide religious services without legitimising itself with religious principles.

Up to this point, I have considered some realms of human life which have been considered most difficult in terms of the reconciliation of Islam with modernity. However, this should indicate the following: modernity and Islam cannot easily be seen as two standard world-interpretations. Both the plurality of forms in Islam and the plurality of configurations in modernity must be seriously thought about. This makes it necessary to use the concept of varieties of both modernity and Islam in exploring the relations between them. In the next section, it shall be shown that the theme of varieties of modernity and Islam is fruitful in the light of the Turkish experience.

3. Turkish Experience: Different Islams and Different Modernities

Firstly it is important to observe the beginning of relations between Islam and the Turks. There are three basic arguments about starting-point. First, it is held that the Turkish world of the time shared some basic features with emerging Islam, leading the Turks to committing to becoming Muslim. Second, the Turks came into the Islamic world as conquerors, later becoming defenders of Islam. Third, the Turks were religiously colonised by challenges from the Arab. I think that these three views could partly point to the reality: Islam, like any other religion, includes common conceptions of life. Therefore, it might share similar features with the Turkish way of life of the time; it is evident from history that the Arabs aimed at turning the Turks into Muslims, but the Turks did not
forget Arabic brutality when they came into the Muslim world as conquerors and found power in themselves.

This starting-point, it could be argued, indicates that it is possible to talk about the concept of ‘Turkish Islam’. In other words, the Turkish way of relating the self to Islam differed. This tells us that the ‘universalism’ of Islam is interpreted differently: the Turks did not wish to abandon their existing cultural orientations for Islam’s universality. Since the Turks were both the conquerers of Islam and of the Islamic world, their relation to Islam differed from other Islamic societies’, e.g. unlike the others, the Turks had a tradition of man-made law, the kanun, which they never let diminish in importance in comparison to the Seriat, the Islamic law. Thus, the existence of a different Islam should be considered, unlike the assumptions of observers who have rejected the ‘regionalisation’ of Islamic history (see Hodgson, 1960).

Here it is important to pay attention to the era preceding the ‘secular’ Turkish republic, the Ottoman Empire. Neglected by most observers, the Ottoman Empire needs rather to be conceptualised as a complex relation between the dialectical forces of Islam and the interpretation of the ‘secular’ world. Many see the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic theocracy (see Turner, 1999; Arsel, 1987). However, in order for a state-system to be described as an Islamic theocracy, there are conditions to which the Ottoman Empire does not fully correspond. First, the caliphate, in a Sunni sect, must be the centre around which ‘global’ Muslim identity is structured. Far from aiming at structuring global Muslim identity, the Ottoman ‘sultanate’ did not even put the status of being caliph to use until the end of the eighteenth century. Secondly, Islamic Seriat law was never prioritised over Kanun as many observers claim (see Watt, 1988; Ahmed, 1993). It is argued that two institutions were used to guarantee that the sultan obeyed Islamic rules (Mahcupyan, 1997). These were Seyhulislam and ulema which expressed the Islamic feature of the Empire. However,
neither of them could ever master the sultanate, because it was the sultan who governed the empire with teams such as the ulema. Therefore, ulema and seyhulislam were built by, not formative of, the sultanate.

If we cannot place the Ottoman Empire in a purely Islamic context, how should we then understand it? In contrast to perspectives which assumed that Islam controlled everyday life in the Ottoman Empire, from law to gender relations, rather, in the formation of the Empire, various elements came from ‘different’ civilisations, Islamic, Byzantine, Turkic and Persian. The Central Asian background, for instance, gave the Ottoman mosques different forms, although some believe that Ottoman architecture was completely Islamic (see Nasr, 1988).

Thus, borrowing from ‘different’ civilisations has a much longer history than assumed. What is crucial for the present purposes is to see how ‘Turkish culture’ was already situated between the ‘West’ and Islam long before the start of Kemalist modernisation. If one wishes to talk about ‘westernisation’ in the Turkish world in Anatolia, one must at least start with the conquest of Istanbul, in 1453, rather than reducing western characteristics in Turkey to being the outcome of Kemalism. Perhaps more important is seeing that, in the Ottoman Empire until the nineteenth century, ‘easternness’ was never idealised (Berkes, 1976: 372). In brief, understanding Turkish history requires a different interpretation than merely placing it in a history of Islamic civilisation.

Thus, it should be argued that Turkey never became a full member, neither of the ‘centre’ in the West, nor of the Islamic East; rather it had always remained peripheral. This does not necessarily refer to the degree of power but, ‘civilizationally’, the Turks were peripheral both to the West and to the East. This could be demonstrated with the example of references in terms of both Islam and
modernity: Islamic studies are of an Arabocentric orientation, while studies of modernity are Eurocentric in orientation. What this could point to may be that if one starts an analysis with a view that modernity and Islam should be defined in original terms, one should not deal with the Turkish experience. I want to stress that the Turkish experience cannot be explored either using Enlightenment modernity or the Arabic version of Islam. Turkey rather needs to be explained with a view which argues that there is no equivalence between modernity and the West and between Islam and the Arab world. This opens up a real possibility of arguing for a different form of modernity and Islam in Turkey.

The peripheral position of Turkey was never so in the sense used by the dependency school. Turkey, in other words, was never a colony of either the Islamic or the western world. European imperialism, from 1914 until 1922, wished to dissolve this position held by Turkey. This attempt resulted in Turkish victory over western imperialist powers as the first success against ‘modern’ imperialism. The Turkish liberation war was not only waged against the West, but also against the Islamic East. It could be seen as a revolt against the consequences of its peripheral position: Mustafa Kemal argued that the caliphate had been paid for in Turkish blood. Other Muslims had left the Turks to defend Islam and, in many cases, had fought against the Turks (Kemal Ataturk, 1983 [1927]).

Mustafa Kemal was in fact pointing to the autonomization – the self-determination - of a culture which had already singularised itself in both Islamic civilisation and in Europe. This is the main point discussed by the critics of Kemalism: Kemalism aimed to westernise Turkish society (see Özel, 1992). Although it is possible to view Kemalism as a project highly influenced by the European Enlightenment, Kemalist modernity cannot be argued to be a simple copy of European modernity. It is easier to contrast Kemalism and Arabocentric Islam but, more difficult in
understanding the Turkish experience, is finding an explanation for why it is different from both the West and the East.

Kemalism did not just happen to come about in the Turkish society of the 1920s, it was continuous with the Ottoman modernising reforms from the ‘Tanzimat’ era onwards, in 1839. If Turkish society was at a stage of ‘Muhammadian’ Islam, then, neither the Ottoman reforms nor the Kemalist modernising trends would find home in this society. Kemalism no doubt broke with Ottoman modernisation in the sense that, for Kemalism, modernisation must be thought as a project, rather than as a gradual reform of some sectors of society. This was an important feature of Kemalism. A history which had already come to the point of breaking away with its ‘peripheral situation’ was brought to the stage of a final break.

Kemalism, therefore, could best be understood as a possible solution to a specific social context at a specific time. Due to this reason, Kemalism read Islam differently to other modernising attempts in other Islamic contexts. When Kemalism emerged in a society which was partly western, it did not find westernising this society to an extent problematic. This could be understood by one of the two views: either one assumes that Kemalism aimed at ending the peripheral position by moving Turkish society towards ‘western centre’, or westernisation was a means for the ‘autonomization’ of Turkish society. The attempt of present-day Turkey to achieve full membership of the European Union proves the first argument: Turkey has struggled to gain a place in the centre of the West. However, one would have to view present Turkish society as a complete success of the ‘historical move’ from East to West. This would not be justifiable on a number of important grounds.

Thus, the crucial question in understanding the Turkish experience should not be whether Turkey could become a western society. This is so, partly because the relation between Islam and
modernity in Turkey was never one of total exclusion. In other words, it was never aimed to exclude Islam from Turkish society and, if it had been so, there would have been no modern Turkish society. But, something unique happened in Turkey in terms of Islam: historical experience - mainly the Anatolian life of the Turks - brought Mustafa Kemal to conclude in the 1920s that: ‘Turkish Islam’ is not an interpretation which can revolt against the secular Republic.

Thus, it should not be surprising that Mustafa Kemal refused to become the caliph himself, as was proposed by the ‘Khalifat’ movement in India (given his popularity as a Muslim hero, it is likely he would have been accepted as caliph). While Mustafa Kemal was a heroic figure in the Muslim world for his stand against European imperialism, he nevertheless abolished the caliphate. The 'Khalifat committee in India was thunderstruck; their icon had been broken and their idol, Mustafa Kemal, had become the iconoclast' (Minault, 1982: 203). This should indicate that Kemalist Turkey was not only breaking away from its ‘peripheral position’ to the Islamic centre, it was also refusing to take a position of leadership in the Islamic centre. Should this further indicate that Kemalist Turkey was moving to take up a position in the centre of the West? It is certain that the Kemalist project planned to advance Turkey to enter an era of ‘high civilisation’ but this cannot prove that Kemalism was simply a westernist ideology. A discussion should be instigated as to whether westernising processes are also connected with the ‘autonomization’ of a singularised culture. Now, some of most important processes of westernization shall be briefly considered.

The adoption of the Swiss civil code: in 1926, the Swiss civil code was adopted and assumed to be a replacement for Islam - Seriat - in the daily life of the Turks. The Swiss civil code, however, was not simply copied, but adopted. This leads to two observations: firstly, borrowing from ‘alien’ cultures was not unprecedented in Turkish life and, second, it should be seen if the radical pluralism of Islams in Anatolia could be maintained with only a secular civil law. One should also
ask whether the adoption of the Swiss civil code was at all continuous with Ottoman modernization. In the Ottoman Empire, two different sorts of law were operating: mecelle and Seriat. Therefore, the emergence of a fully secular law may not be described simply as westernization.

The hat reform: for the sake of nationalization, a reform in dress style was regarded necessary by Kemalism. The hat reform played the role of a metaphorical change for this ambition. Again a borrowing is at stake here: if there was a ‘Turkish’ style of dress, no doubt it would have been chosen over western style. However, Kemalism was interpreted that it orientalised Turkey for the sake of westernization by means of dress reform. However, it is not asked whether the fez was originally oriental; in fact, the fez was another borrowing: it was Greek in origin and, thus, has nothing to do with Islam. It is hard to argue that replacing Islamic dress was the business of Kemalism. Perhaps, more important is that nowhere in Islam is standard Islamic dress mentioned as compulsory. So, it is as possible to practice Islam with the ‘western hat’ as it was with the ‘Greek fez’.

Education reform: when the caliphate was abolished, educational institutions were put under direct state control. However, was this not also the case under the Ottoman state? In the Ottoman Empire, there were two sorts of educational systems: civilian and military bureaucrats of the Empire followed an education which, primarily, had nothing to do with Islam. A second education system yielded Islamic scholars of the Empire. It is, in this respect, unavoidable to doubt that educational reform was a westernizing process. In Kemalist Turkey, similar to the Ottoman Empire, the education system had both an Islamic version, educating Imams and Muftis, and a secular education system for other professions.
Therefore, Kemalism should be taken to mean a radical change for Turkish society; it should not be taken to have been trying to achieve the ‘impossible’. Kemalism, in other words, did not force the Turks to live under a polity unimaginable for Anatolians. The state included Islam within its system; this was historical legacy. The Ottoman Empire did not leave Islam in Anatolia free, rather the state was the most powerful interpreter of Islam. Therefore, the inclusion of an Islamic organization, Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi, in the state system is not a Kemalist invention: the state had to provide Islamic services. But what was new - extraordinary – was that Kemalism brought about a radical pluralism in interpretations of Islam guaranteed by the system, rather than forcing the population to understand Islam according to the state’s interpretation as the Ottoman state did. Therefore, the opportunity-providing characteristic of Kemalism, in this respect, is important to consider.

By means of the education provided by Kemalism for the first time in Anatolia, many people came to interpret the Koran by reading the source directly, rather than receiving and obeying the sheikhs’ perspectives. Therefore, what happens is that, under conditions of modernity, the already advanced radical plurality of Islams increases. Precisely by keeping this reality in mind, it is possible to understand why Mustafa Kemal thought that the Anatolian view of Islam would not revolt against the secular republic.

This may be why present-day Turkey expresses ‘conflicts’ between Islamism and a radical plurality of world-interpretations. Conflicts between the Kemalists and the Sunni orthodox Islamists should be seen as conflicts about which type of modernity to form rather than as conflicts between modernity and Islam. Here, the Kemalists are not considered to be the political followers of Kemalism, but the larger sectors of Turkish society. Therefore, different understandings and interpretations lie amongst this group as well. Some, mostly liberals, view Islam as a religion of
personal conviction, while some, largely Alevies, see Islam as a community-oriented religion but do not require an Islamic polity and, finally, most groups read Islam as an important element of Turkish identity. However, a part, aims at making Islam the ‘master signifier’: Islamism.

Islamism should not be viewed as either a manifestation of premodern traditional phenomena or as a postmodern movement. Islamism could best be seen as a type of project of modernity. It is entirely different from the Kemalist project. Islamist modernity would be totalitarian to some extent as well as an ‘antagonistic’ modernity. As Eisenstadt (1999) demonstrates, the ideological orientations of fundamentalist movements in general, and of Islamism in particular, share various features of the political program of modernity, especially Jacobin totalitarian ones. Therefore, Islamism emphasises the centrality of a total reconstruction of society by the political action of revolution. Islamism, in other words, does not tolerate any ambiguity, but aims at reconstructing the social world in a totalistic way. This shows that Islamism is not a traditionalist world view and that it is a totalitarian response to problematiques of present-day modernity.

What must also be insisted upon is that Kemalists who view Islamism as a traditionalist world-interpretation against modernity cannot be taken seriously any longer (see Tanilli, 1991). Modernity is not only what the Kemalists understood from the word, there are multiple interpretations of modernity and Islamism is one of them. In aiming to protect the larger sectors of society from a Unitarian interpretation of Islam, present-day Kemalists should also think that modernity may not be maintained for so long by excluding some parts of society in the name of democracy. Kemalism itself provided the opportunity for people to interpret Islam in their own ways, so it might have to learn how to cope with ‘difference’. In other words, there is no longer a hope or a chance of living in a harmonious modernity, although neither is it desirable to see a uniform interpretation of Islam achieving power over the polity. It is important to stress that the
conflicts between Islamism and a branch of Kemalism are conflicts between two coherent visions of life. The Kemalists, who see themselves as adherents of Kemal Atatürk, believe that a real modernity could not include those Islamists who question the place of reason in society and politics. Islamists, on the other hand, do not tolerate any ambiguity, but aim to reconstruct society in a totalistic way by revolution. However, this is only one side of the picture, because there are other Kemalists and other Muslims who in fact hold power in present-day Turkey. However, in the emergence of Islamism, the role played by the proto-Kemalist actors should be stated.

Secularism creates a tradition in as much as that concerned with the sacred. In the creation of a tradition, 'guardians' play a crucial role. In other words, for a modern project to be formulated as a tradition to be followed by new actors, 'interpretations' of that project by the few are implied. What indeed has happened, in terms of the Kemalist project, is the rise of some intellectuals and politicians that regard themselves as the guardians of Kemalism. Those guardians have held secularism to be the most basic tenet to be protected for the sake of the republic (see, for example, Ateş, 1992). These guardians have partly gained position in the country on the basis of their claim to have access to the 'truth'. They also upheld the secularist principle of Kemalism as a new 'religion' in the country. Once a tradition is claimed to have been developed, the 'exclusion' of 'others' necessarily comes about. This is because tradition, by its nature, implies that its members 'find' others that cannot become members. In Turkey, this has been quite apparent in the fact that radical secularists have formed a 'community of secularism' and, thus, excluding others in the country as 'anti-modern' or 'anti-Kemalist', have brought about more radicalised disputes over the common good or the 'good life'. However, these radical secularists that formed a powerful community and regarded science as the unquestionable authority should not be overemphasised as a factor in the formation of present-day Turkish society. This is, especially because the radical secularists’ tradition necessarily owned spaces that do not include their opposers, but the same
spaces, the metropolitan cities, are currently 'divided' and 'owned', if not 'colonized', by the so-called Islamists. Thus, currently the spaces, the metropolitan cities, the institutions and the universities, that have been seen as the symbols of modernity, are partly shared by the Islamists. This could show that modernity can accommodate the forces that have been interpreted as anti-modern by some modernists. So, Islamism cannot be viewed as a rejection of modernity, but as a movement that plays a part in the modernization of the entire Turkish population.

To conclude, Islamism needs to be briefly considered in order to understand how it could be viewed as a ‘project of modernity’. The current conditions of modernity in Turkey opened up a space for people, previously outside of modernity, to participate in it. The consequences of this openness are now at stake and cause different perspectives of the current stage of Turkish modernity. One of the consequences of this openness is the increase in Islamic politics. The opportunity-providing side of Kemalist modernity allowed some groups to interpret both Islam and, I think, modernity, according to their own views. Thus, the emergence of Islamism, at least in the Turkish case, cannot easily be reduced to the outcome of authoritarian regimes.\textsuperscript{75}

Secondly, the emergence of Islamism should not be reduced to an outcome of economic problems (Gilsenan, 1990). In this view, the petit bourgeoisie felt it compulsory to express itself through Islam to escape from the rule of a secular elite. This is an instrumentalist explanation which does not allow us to do justice to the ‘self-understanding’ of a social group. Thirdly, the problems caused by industrialisation and urbanisation are real factors in the emergence of Islamism (Fischer, 1982). This view insists that urbanization created highly populated shanty towns whose inhabitants could not use the language of urban spaces but were also far enough advanced not to return to their previous position (Kongar, 2000). Therefore, these people find the language of Islamism feasible for the expression of their protests.\textsuperscript{76} All these explanations seem to argue that Islamism is just a
crisis of an existing socio-political order and that the crisis could be resolved within the existing system. In other words, observers view Islamism as a superstructural response to a structural crisis. However, one needs to ask whether Islamism is a logic beyond the system.

This should not, however, lead one to argue that Islamism constitutes a break with modernity. In contrast, it is more convincing to see Islamism as a different project of modernity. Thus, if Islamism could achieve its ambitions, the social world would still be a modern one, but in a different configuration. So, the competing projects of modernity are at stake more than ever before which is unavoidable in a society which includes a radical pluralism of Islams. However, in this respect it is necessary to insist that a project of only one interpretation of Islam in a radical plurality of Islams could not fully achieve its ambitions at all. It is this position which shows the conflicts between the largest part, despite the fact that it includes various, different, understandings of life, and the smaller part of Turkish society. This is not to recommend that the ‘totalitarian’ project of Islamism should not be allowed to express itself in Turkey, but it refers to the fact that this totalitarian project of modernity cannot achieve its ambitions fully in Turkey. The emergence of Islamism as another project of modernity should not lead one to conclude that the owners of two opposite projects cannot live together in the same society. In this society, opposing projects of modernity have existed for a long time, Turkist, socialist, etc. And this is not an abnormality - or anomie - unless one reads modernity as a totality and as a coherent vision of life.
4. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to look for a 'different' conceptualisation of the relations between modernity and Islam on the basis of the Turkish experience. The following main concluding points should be made: Modernity and Islam always remain open to interpretation. In arguing for the plurality of modernities and for different interpretations of Islam, totalistic perspectives of history and the idea of civilization in the singular have to be questioned. In other words, it has to be shown that there is no equivalence between the West and modernity and between the Arab world and Islam.

Civilizational analysis must make a distinction between civilization and culture for the reason that, as the Turkish experience indicates, some cultures might particularise themselves in a civilizational family. The Turkish experience, in this respect, cannot be explored by viewing it as a full member either of Islamic or western civilization. Rather, the singularisation of culture needs interpretation.

It must be stated that, only with a reading of the original messages of Islam and the liberal project of modernity, does it becomes possible to understand the nature of relations between modernity and Islam. Rather, we need to point out the realities of the socio-historical systems in both Islamic tradition and in the experience of modernity. In doing so, we must also be careful in choosing the unit of analysis, such as which Muslims we are investigating and what sort of modernity we are writing about.

Islamism should be read as a ‘project of modernity’ rather than viewing it as a representation of premodern traditional phenomena or as an indicator of the postmodern condition. This point is particularly important because, recently the question of Islamism has given rise to postmodernist and traditionalist views of Islam which tend to become popular. And in Turkey, this position could
well be understood by considering the current stage of discussions about the ‘female question’. Thus, in the next chapter, we shall consider Islamist women’s rejection of modernity in order to point out two central realities: the high importance of women as social actors in the Turkish experience and the unfeasibility of two theses, one of which argues that Islamism is anti-modern, and the other which sees Islamism as postmodern.
Chapter 7

KEMALISM AND ISLAMISM ON THE FEMALE QUESTION

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, my goal was to question the perspectives of Islam that do not allow one to argue for the possibility of modernity in Islamic societies. However, one should not take this to argue that a modernity in an Islamic society is a full product of Islam. This is so, precisely, because modernity is a new phenomenon that requires an alteration of socio-cultural world. Therefore, the agency of modernity is important as well as the context. It is important to stress that, although Islam cannot be seen as incompatible with modernity, there is always conflict involved in the emergence and experience of modernity. And tensions between modernity and Islam have tended to be a central characteristic of twentieth-century Turkish history. More recently, the current socio-political system has faced an outright rejection on the part of political Islamism. Within these recent contestations, the ‘female question’ holds a prominent position, as can be seen not least in the fact that Islamist women appear as some of the most visible militants of the Islamist movement. In many respects, the female question is indeed exemplary of the conflictual relations between Kemalist modernity and Islamism. This is so, as will be argued in this chapter, because some of Kemalist modernity's central transformations altered the role and position of women in society. In this light, it should not be surprising that Islamism, as a counter-project to Kemalism, also puts women in a central place in its movement.

Islamist women are fighting for an Islamist regime and, at the same time, against Kemalist modernity. However, in the Islamist women’s rejection of modernity there are apparent contradictions which a simple opposition between traditional Islam and modernity is at a loss to
explain. It can hardly be seen as a plain rejection of modernity due to the women’s religious belief. The Islamist women are mostly urbanised and educated. The opening of the universities to women was a major element of early Kemalism in order to provide equal educational opportunities and to let women enter the public fora of urban and professional life. Universities were, for Kemalism, among the prototypical modern institutions and the entry of women into public university life was seen as a major step in the development of modernity. Today, then, we find women similarly using the opportunities provided by Kemalism in their role as spokespersons for opposite camps in current disputes. There are secular women, on the one hand, whose most important objective is to prevent the rise of the idea of an Islamic state and society, with Islamist women, on the other hand, working for the cause of Islamism. Although such dualism makes it difficult at first sight to read the contemporary shape of Turkish modernity, it is exactly such apparent contradictions that provide clues for a sociological theory of modernity, as insights namely into some of its unavoidably ambivalent features.

What is at stake? Does one have to conclude from these recent occurrences that Kemalism has failed in bringing an ‘enlightened life’ into the ‘Islamic darkness’? Should the emergence of Islamist women reveal that they are running away from the freedom provided by Kemalism? This context gives the analysis of Islamism in Turkey a particular sense of urgency. If Islamism's rise demonstrates a failure of Kemalism, then such a conclusion is likely to have further repercussions for the understanding of contemporary varieties of modernity and the forms they may take. By trying to understand the actions and orientations of Islamist women in terms of relations between modernity and women, i.e. by asking the question of the relation of modernity to Islamist women, I am attempting to introduce a particular theme into the more general debate on modernity.
Statements such as women must not forget their natural positions, that they must not let their roles and selves be reduced in discussions centred predominantly on equality and that they should be women, that is mothers and wives, in the first place have been again heard more often in recent years. Yet such statements are far from being confined to Islamic societies (Faludi, 1992). These sorts of statements obviously shake a feminism which has been aiming to achieve equality for women, but can be appreciated by another feminism which supports diversity rather than arguing for universality and equality. In my view, it is important to set some of these arguments in the broader context of increasing critiques of modernity. Since, from the start of modern times, the ‘female question’ cannot be separated from the idea of modernity, any concept and self-understanding of women must also be seen as part of an argument about modernity. Equality-oriented feminism could be understood as part of a project of modernity that promised to liberate individuality and guarantee individual autonomy. The liberation of individuality necessarily includes the liberation of women since, otherwise, the project of modernity would lose its other side, namely a commitment to universality. It could be argued that it is modernity which brought women to share the public sphere and, by implication, to become a subject. Thus, if women today oppose these forms of liberty, this should, it seems, be understood as a reaction against some experiences of modernity. By this, of course, I do not mean that the project of liberty has ever been completely achieved. As it was earlier said, the whole history of modernity could be read as a tension between liberty and discipline, i.e. modernity brought about individuals who are masters of themselves but, on the other hand, it disciplined forms of action and limited liberty for the sake of the sustainability of a social and moral order (Wagner, 1994). This observation, however, does not entail any doubt about liberty being an unavoidable feature of modernity. Any argument for an end of the subject then, by contrast, should be understood as a conceptualisation that supposes that a transition away from modernity has already started. Likewise, women criticising the notion of the
subject are, at the very least, in danger of rejecting a key element of modernity. Thus, those women apparently support the idea that modernity has come to end.

As I shall argue, this critique of modernity on the part of woman is much more clearly analysable, and also much more serious in Turkey. Thus, this chapter shall look at Islamist women in Turkey in order to understand why some women appear to withdraw from a conception of freedom as part of modernity. We shall have to analyse how Kemalist modernity views women and in what respect this perspective is opposed to Islam. As a background, the Islamic definition of women has to be considered to understand the tension between Kemalist modernity and Islamism on the female question. Islamism shall be understood as a modern product so that we could understand contradictory elements in Islamist women’s rejection of modernity.

2. Islam and Women

Islam is generally regarded as patriarchal and thus inimical to women’s rights (Arsel, 1987). However, this feature could as well be seen as a characteristic of the conceptualisation of gender differences in traditional ages in general. Or, in other words, when Islam emerged, the social world was patriarchal and, thus, it would be unsurprising if Islamic conceptions were similarly patriarchal. Here we need to be more precise about the situation of women in so-called pre-modern times in general, and about the ways in which Islamic rules did – and, indeed, also did not - become historically implanted in Turkish society.
In discussing Islamic rules about women’s life, it should not be forgotten that Islam’s view of women has always remained open to interpretation due to the contextual realities of the places where Islam has been present. Thus, one needs to take lived socio-historical experiences into account as well as the Islamic rules explicitly defined in the Koran. Gender relations have the ability of playing a part in giving shape to the entire social world. And it is generally assumed as a most difficult realm of life in the aim to resolve oppositions between Islam and modernity (see Çalıslar, 1992). In the Koran, in terms of the gender issue, it could be recognized that for both physical and spiritual beauties and necessities, God created the two sexes in order for them to achieve perfection on earth. The perfection could be achieved with absoluteness and infinity because God himself is both absolute and infinite. Absoluteness, thus authority, is manifested most directly in the masculine state, whereas the female body first reflects beauty and thus infinity. Therefore, it can be said that, for Islam, in order to reach unity, there is necessarily diversity. In Islam, it is this instrumentality which requires authority and obedience: man and woman.

In a male dominated era the above understanding of man and woman was a temporary solution for the gender situation in a specific place: the Arab world. Gender relations always have the possibility of causing problems in any social setting. Therefore, when Islam emerged, a solution was provided for both a specific time and for a specific place. The problem was not resolved, only extended. Since then, in different places and times, Islam’s view of women has remained open to disputes. However, since the incompatibility of Islam with modernity has been argued for, especially with references to the explicitly defined Islamic rules about women’s life, we need to briefly look at these rules.

Since Islam was born as a state-religion (Tanilli, 1990), it aimed at defining all activities of life. It was aimed to determine women’s life in both its public and private aspects by Islamic rules. The
Islamic definition of women is very much alive in the history of Turkish literature, because both its proponents and its opponents find it to be at the core of major disputes in society. Secularists mainly underline the patriarchal features of Islam by arguing that Islam actually sees women as second-class human beings (Arsl, 1987; Çalışlar, 1992). From a contemporary point of view, it is hardly possible to argue against this opinion, because over long periods it was made impossible for women to share the public sphere and to play a full role in society. Since an important argument, to which I will return below, holds that the Turks were not originally Muslims but were religiously colonized, the particular relation of political Turkey to Islam must be understood against the background observation that Islam had actually not determined the life of the Turks completely and that there was no ‘reactionary Islam’ until the date of the emergence of modernity.

Islam aims to organize social life practices on the basis of the differences between the sexes (see Acar, 1991). While men are supposed to be active beings whose practices serve to secure the survival of the community, women are regarded as passive beings who should not have the right to decision on crucial matters of life. It could be suggested that it is aimed to keep women exclusively within the private realm of life in which they cannot even develop a new identity or practice with others without the permission of their husbands. Since women are taken to be essential to the moral order, they should not share life with men because moral corruption would otherwise easily break out. Women are seen as natural creatures on whose shoulders no civilization could develop, whereas men, as cultural beings, have to operate and organize life. The important implication here is that it is part of the fulfilment of this male role to be responsible for the protection of women in every respect. In sum, tradition gives priority to men over women, and Islam just like other religions legitimises this reality of traditional ages.
Islam gives particular importance to questions of sexual morality when discussing the rules of women’s lives. In Islam, women’s behaviour is seen as the primary cause for inflictions on the Islamic definition of morality. This is the major - and unavoidable - connection between veiling and morality in Muslim societies. Women have to be well-veiled in order not to damage public morality. More generally, the case for women’s passivity in an Islamic country is equally founded on this definition of women and their relation to morality. Since the female body always provokes men and arouses them sexually and therefore endangers moral behaviour, women must not take part in the public sphere. It is widely known that a girl wearing a mini-skirt in public was raped in Iran before the Islamic revolution and that many observers believed that the girl had asked for it by wearing the mini-skirt. It is no exaggeration to say that the concern over morality’s hazards played a significant role in bringing about the Iranian revolution.

According to Seriat, Islamic law, women and men are not equal; different statues are assigned to them (see Arsel, 1987). For instance, a single woman is an insufficient witness for a court case; there has to have been at least two women witnessing the situation at the same time. Men can get married to more than one woman and can get divorced when they ask for it, whereas women can neither marry nor divorce according to their own will. The assumption of men’s unquestionable authority over women made it possible to legitimise women’s dependency on men in tradition by means of religion.

In the traditional reading of Islam, women were taken to be the family-creating and sustaining beings; the role of the mother as the creator of the family was, accordingly, mystically over-emphasised. As is undeniable, however, the family as a basic institution in the formation of society was much more central for traditional societies in comparison to those of modernity, since, with the emergence of modernity, many functions of the family devolved into newly formed social
institutions. Within the Islamic tradition, though, the family was also seen as the centre of a moral
community based on the man’s purity, which, in turn, is safeguarded by his wife’s morality. For
Islam, women who live their lives as moral beings within the family help to keep all members of
their family moral. Women are the source and safeguard of social morality. Therefore, for Islam,
the world should be divided into two parts, each occupied by the two sexes: men who have duties
outside, in the public realm, and women who have duties inside, in the private realm.

Men and women are created differently; that is why it is difficult for Islam to consider the equality
of the sexes. Given this understanding, Islam, like Christianity, cannot be compatible with
modernity, since one of the ambitions of modernity, as we shall see, was to liberate women on the
basis of a conception of equality. However, if socio-historical experiences had been exactly those
of obedience to the explicitly stated rules of Islam, or of Christianity, ‘modernity’ may not have
emerged. The multiplicity in historical experiences must be held to show that Islamic rules have
always been revised, reinterpreted and that, therefore, different developments have been witnessed.
In this respect, the Turkish experience of modernity indicates that Islam is compatible with
modernity, because explicit rules had never completely shaped practices. We shall see, in the next
section, that Kemalist modernity prioritised women’s liberation more than western modernity did,
and that Turkish modernity today differs from any other in terms of the importance of women in
the public sphere.

3. Kemalism and Women

It should be noted that Kemalism, as a particular project of modernity, distinguishes itself from
‘original western modernity’ with regard to the ‘female question’ as well. Within Kemalism,
women were included from the beginning as essential actors in building a road to modernity, since
it was believed that women would be agents in bringing about an actual break with previous history and in enlightening social life. Thus, the liberation of women has occupied a primary position in the history of Turkish modernity. Kemalism held that, in order to move towards modernity, liberation must start with that of women. This may be one of the features of Kemalism that still carries relevance for other Islamic societies. If a project of political reform succeeds in changing women and their situation, such as was one of the teachings of Kemalism, therefore the heart of traditional Islamic life is broken and a breakthrough achieved. We shall see in which sense women were essential social actors in building a new, modern country.

Turkish women were considered to be important actors in two basic processes in the Turkish experience of modernity: the nationalization process and individuation. The appearance of women who broke with the Islamic tradition was taken to be a major sign of a new form of social life. No longer defined and confined by their religious identity, many women embraced the national project and saw themselves first and foremost as Turks. And as they demonstrated that being a modern woman was at the core of being a Turkish woman, they showed, at the same time, that a Turk is a contemporary, modern human being, and that Turkey had embarked on the path to modernity. Symbolically, the secular, the national and the gender aspects combined in the early phase of the Turkish project of modernity. Women entering public life had immediately an important part in bringing about a national and secular society since, by means of that change, a radical break with the formal social practices of half of society could be demonstrated. The presence of educated and working women indeed meant an extraordinary change in a society which had an Islamic background.

As mentioned in the fourth chapter, an important intellectual concomitant to this project of the nationalization of the collectivity was the ‘Turkish history thesis’ that emerged in the 1930s. This
thesis holds more specifically that, before the advent of Islam, Turkish women had already been equal to men. It is obvious that the aim was to ‘invent’ a history in order to accelerate modernization. However, it is indeed important to note that Islamic rules, in terms of women’s life as well, were not completely implanted in Turkish society. In villages, as Berkes (1976) shows, women were not veiled according to Islamic rules. This relative diversity of cultural backgrounds may help to understand why it was relatively easier to let women assert public roles in the Turkish experience in comparison to any other Islamic, and in particular Arabic, society. It may be a case of the effectiveness of the longue-durée in history that, after centuries, a formally Islamic rule in Anatolia emerged to support the Kemalist project.

In terms of the Turkish history thesis, it should be noted that pre-Islamic history is celebrated, especially for women’s position in society. Mustafa Kemal’s adoptive daughter, Afet Inan, for example, argued that when Islam was accepted, the status of women deteriorated (Inan, 1974). Or, for a contemporary view on the theme, we can consider the position of the political scientist, Ahmet Taner Kislali who, in an interview on Turkish modernity, argues that ‘before Islam the religion of the Turks was Shamanism and within it women were equal to men, but in the Arabic world at the same time women were less important than camels. Therefore, while Islam was progress for Arabic women, it abandoned the high importance given to women in the Turkish context. Those historical differences reasserted themselves during Kemalism, and Turkey has since provided the model of modernization for the Muslim world’. The emerging hegemony of Islam was accordingly seen in terms of a loss of the society’s Turkish origins. Thus, women were breaking connections with Islam by becoming models of modern life. In Kemalist Turkey, women came to be symbols of modernity so that, for instance, as Göle (1996) shows, female university students wearing shorts demonstrated the degree of modernity in the Turkish society of the 1920s.
In Kemalism the idea of modernity is necessarily related to ‘individual autonomy’. Liberation of individuality, for Kemalism, has to include the liberation of women because, otherwise, modernity would only halfway be accomplished and fall short of its other basic tenet, namely universality. In the light of the aforementioned, we can see that the basic reason for this perspective was the particular condition of developing the project against an ‘imagined’ Islamic past. In the transition to modernity, it is assumed that community has to be replaced by society. And the guarantee of individual autonomy is a necessary precondition for enabling people to escape from communitarian practices and identities. In this respect, again, women came to be seen as essential agents in furthering the societal project of bringing about autonomous individuals. A move towards modernity entails that given rules are no longer unquestioningly accepted, but that attempts to change conditions of life are made; women were at the forefront of breaking dogmatic barriers. By this I mean that women started to believe that the world could be changed by human beings, if they refuse to be slaves of dogmatism, of an established teaching or of the personal whims of the caliph or the sultan. That is why university attendance and science education were central; they gave women the opportunity to be more advanced, rather than merely equal with, men. The important feature of women’s liberation here was that Turkish women, to a considerable extent, liberated Turkish men. When women came to see themselves as subjects, the family started to change profoundly and, gradually, all of its members began to consider self-realization rather than obedience to unquestioned norms as more important than ever.

If the view that women must be publicly visible, educated, working and on the side of modern life is a specific feature of Kemalism, it is obvious that this political project had indeed entered into opposition with traditional Islamic women. Women were active within Kemalist Turkey whereas, in the traditional view, they were passive. In Kemalist Turkey, women obtained equal rights and liberties much earlier than women in many other countries, including France, Italy and Switzerland.
Kemalism, it seems to me, held that after Turkey had liberated women, they would support the Kemalist project whenever it was in danger. Does the emergence of Islamist women show that this hope was misplaced?

4. Islamist Women’s Rejection of Modernity

In contrast to prevailing conceptualizations which tend to see Islamic opposition as a reaction of tradition to modernity (Watt, 1988; Gellner, 1992), I understand Islamism as itself a political project in, and under conditions of, modernity. In order to develop this notion, I will focus on Islamist women’s rejection of modernity, trying to understand their motivations.

The main change Kemalism effected in the position of women was to liberate them from the fate of being merely mother and wife. This means that women were taken to be equal citizens of the republic in stark contrast, for instance, to the Islamist understanding prevailing in post-1979 Iran. While women gained opportunities to more fully share in social life, they were also given responsibilities to enter into the social contract of the modern polity directly rather than through the mediation of men. The freedom of modern citizens goes along with commitments to state and society. Thus, the move toward the status of full subject was not without ambivalence for women. The emphasis Kemalism put on changing the status of women is indeed remarkable, even in international comparison. For instance, female suffrage was granted in Kemalist Turkey in 1934, that is, ten years earlier than in a country often regarded as the historical forerunner of modernity, France. Today, 30% of university academic staff in Turkey are female, a situation that would be unthinkable in any other Islamic country (Kislali, 1997). It was in Turkey in the early 1990s that a
female prime minister led the government; Tansu Çiller, proclaimed that ‘I am a product of Kemalism’. However, rather than explaining anything these observations should make the emergence of Islamist women more astonishing. Why is it that they appear to be fighting for a regime which would not allow them to share the public sphere? Is their emergence a strong indication of Kemalism’s failure?

Firstly, it is necessary to look at the extent to which Islamist women reject modernity before, secondly, considering the contradictions in their rejection. The views of Islamist women seem, in all important respects, to be opposed to the views a ‘modern woman’ would hold. Islamist women accept that which normally cannot be accepted by modern women - the superiority of men - so that one can conclude that, really, they reject modernity. In these Islamist women’s view, women have to do what their husbands tell them, a view modern women normally cannot accept. Women have to be first of all good wives to ‘Muslim husbands’ whereas, in the modern conception, both women and men are simply human beings. In the Islamist polity, in particular, women cannot have the right to participate in decision-making or even to vote, whereas in modernity’s view, women are equal citizens in all respects, from choosing the government to becoming governors themselves.

Islamist women see modernity’s women as corrupt creatures, particularly in terms of morality. In their rejection of the West, they even appeal to figures of the anti-imperialist argument. According to the Islamists, modernity represented the superiority of the West, so that their project needs to show that the East is able to compete with the West, that the East provides an alternative to modernity. They find, in religion, a powerful element that can serve to demarcate the East from the West; or Islam from Christianity.
In order to show to what extent Islam differs from the West, Islamists emphasise the position of women at the core of western societies. In their view, it is the women who are super-consumers of imperialist goods. It was the imperialist powers’ access to women that first created moral corruption and, as a consequence, destroyed the Islamic community. Thus, it is possible for them to argue, affirmatively, that the Koran provides a closed order and that women’s position was ‘opened’ by modernists to destroy Islam. Women who do not wear veils cannot be seen other than as corrupt creatures whose action opened society to immoral domination. Islamist women, in contrast, think that they represent moral people and that society’s moral decay could be stopped by veiling women, because the female body has to be out of the reach of men in order to make a moral order sustainable. In all respects, this position seems to be so implicitly and explicitly opposed to modernity that we can assert that Islamist women reject modernity.

However, the analysis cannot stop at this point. The contradictory elements, in this rejection, must be examined for a social theory of modernity. That is, within Islamism, there is almost nothing pure or ‘authentic’, since the escape from modernity seems impossible in any respect. We can begin to point out contradictions by noting that Islamism is historically situated within modern history since it never emerged before. The most important observation underpinning this insight is the fact that present-day Islamism takes its distance from historic Islamic societies. Traditional Islam, before Kemalism, is understood as a false Islam. Islamists refer to the time of the Prophet Muhammed and the four classical caliphs as the era in which Islam achieved perfection (see Gunes-Ayata, 1991). Since this is a reference to a long-gone era, the social forms of which cannot be clearly identified, present-day Islamism becomes a kind of utopianism. It is important to note that this sort of utopianism was never held before the time of the emergence of Kemalist modernity. But if Islamism derives its doctrine from the origins of Islam, one has to ask why it now emerges as a political project.
In terms of political arenas and events, Islamist women show strong evidence of the contradictions in their position. Within Islam, a woman cannot be a political actor herself, however, Islamist women are highly militant political actors. This observation already tells us that Islamism is a political project within modernity. And, with regard to political regimes, Islamist women are in a position which cannot be seen as being compatible with their ideal Islamist regime. While Islamist women accept inequality, they argue at the same time that the Turkish polity is not a democracy and they demand the establishment of full democracy. Democracy, however, is a product of modernity which is based on equal rights, free elections, party pluralism etc., whereas, in an Islamist regime, there can be no political parties, no elections, and no equality between the members of a community. Thus, it is not the case that an Islamist cannot argue the case for having more democracy. Nevertheless, many Islamists today argue that Turkey is not a democracy by comparing it with western democracies. While such comparison may be justified on a number of grounds, it should not be overlooked that Kemalism always aimed at founding a democratic regime. Kemalism did not emerge within a democratic tradition. Therefore, abandoning democracy cannot be seen as an issue for Kemalism. That is, observers must recognize that a democratic polity was Kemalism’s aim, even if its starting-point was very remote from that aim. If today that aim appears not to have been reached, then there are only two directions the argument can take. Either one assumes that the Kemalist project is unfinished; then it would have to be carried further toward modernity. Or it is unfeasible or undesirable and needs to be abandoned, as a project of modernity. In both cases, though, the unavoidable reference is made to modernity. In the former case, an affirmative reference is at odds with Islamist convictions; in the later case, a negative one which then, however, does not allow recourse to modernist argumentation. In both cases, Islamists cannot avoid contradictions, since their reference is to modernity.
Related to this argument on a more general level, the issue of representation provides us with clues for further unavoidable contradictions. Islamist women argue that they have to be represented, whereas representation is, indeed, a characteristic of the modern polity. By this I mean that, in traditional societies, unlike in modernity, there is no issue of representation since rulers do not need legitimation. For instance, in an Islamic community, a religious leader cannot be questioned by arguing that he does not represent the group’s interests or culture since he is a personality chosen by God.

One of the most significant contradictions in Islamism is the conversion of God’s messages into political slogans. But political slogans, like contestations, can be regarded as characteristics of modern politics, where the political class needs to solicit support, or of modern revolutions during which slogans mobilize the population. The politicisation of the masses is a modern condition; thus, key forms of modern political action are used by a counter project which claims to reject modernity.

Perhaps the most striking contradiction resides in the fact that Islamist women aim at transforming social life by means of revolutionary change in the direction of Islamism, whereas this sort of attempt is indeed characteristically modern. In religious understanding, the logic is that life proceeds within God’s will and knowledge so that any attempt at a planned change of that direction would be both futile and meaningless. In contrast, modernity thinks in terms of the future rather than in terms of past or present times and, in doing so, it necessarily uses its own properties, namely rationality, science, technology and revolution, to shape the social world (see Koselleck, 1985).
Thus, when we consider Islamist women’s rejection of modernity, we definitely see it as failing to avoid the means and forms of modernity. They need to argue rationally; they use modern technology; they receive their education at science departments; and, most of all, they aim at making revolution. Revolutionism itself was another important basic principle of Kemalism, connected to the idea of the progressivism of modernity.

As was mentioned above, most Islamist women pursue higher education and are particularly present among university students. Therefore, the example of three Islamist female university students will be used here to demonstrate some of their contradictions.¹⁰⁷

A particularly elucidating example is that of a female Islamist university student who questions her father who has always lived as a Muslim man. She says that ‘I sometimes talk about the verses and hadits of our prophet to my father: ‘Father, when it was necessary, our prophet undertook his own tasks and helped his wife; he swept the house’ - ‘Where’ he asks, ‘where is it written?’ That is, they don’t know such things, and they don’t accept them...’ (Gole, 1996: 104). By this form of argument, the student explicitly avails herself, first, of the educational opportunities provided to her by modernity and, second, by the transformation of social behaviour that allows her at all to argue with her father in an Islamic family. In this and many other examples, the Islamist utopia is evidently ridden with contradictions. Islamists propose that it is necessary for human beings to live in peace with nature but, in fact, they often live in extremely modern buildings which do not even have a socialised natural environment such as a garden. Or, to take another example, Islamists also argue for an ideal of equality in terms of economic life that seems to be influenced by socialism, a modern political ideal. Again, the reference must be utopian since historic Islamic societies never rendered equality possible, not least because Islam did not emerge on the side of powerless. If we
go one step further to assert that it is within modernity that projects of contestation for a better life emerged (see Eisenstadt, 1966), then current Islamism must be understood as essentially modern. In an Islamic family, the parents unquestioningly make decisions for the children and, in particular, for the female children, whereas modern family ideals demand an, at least gradual, emancipation of children from parental oversight. While this feature then appears to mark another important opposition of Islam to modernity, Islamist female university students often argue for the right to make their own choices. For instance, one female student says that ‘My family in Eskisehir allows me to stay here because of my education. Or I can delay my marriage. But, in case I was enrolled in a Koran course, this would not sop them at all, and they could ask me to come back. Perhaps I don’t want to be involved in family affairs before I feel I am a mature person. I don’t know - maybe this is why I like studying’ (Gole, 1996: 114). This example clearly demonstrates that Islamist women produce a new identity under conditions of modernity rather than merely accepting the traditional status of women. If they did not live under broad conditions of modernity, they would not be able to break with the traditional status quo. A new identity formation takes place which, in contradictory form, includes both tradition - veil, physical appearance - and modernity - women’s education and participation in the public sphere.

Since education, particularly higher education, is seen as rather unwanted for females in Islam, it is important to understand the position Islamist female university students take on this question. In Turkey, people find it difficult to understand Islamist female university students because it is normally known that in Islam, education and women are controversial. Reading philosophy or medicine as an Islamist is a difficult position to understand. Since university life is extremely public, one might argue that for Islamist women should not be present there. One of the Islamist female university students says ‘we are studying to widen our horizons, not to be confined to a limited world’ (Gole, 1996: 114). As mentioned earlier, one of the basic contradictions in the
Islamist women’s rejection of modernity is that they argue against traditional Islam by means of an education provided by Kemalism. While Islamist women normally insist that Kemalism intended to eradicate Islamic belief, they should see it as a contradiction that, in Turkish history, it was only by means of Kemalism that they could come to know what the Koran actually says.

Islamist women fight in public and together with men for a new form of social life, an Islamist one. But it is only within modernity that women came to be public actors forming a new world together with men. It seems that there would need to be an either/or situation here. If according to actual Islamic rules, only men engage in changing the overall conditions of life, then Islamist women would have to wait for the men’s struggle to be won rather than engaging themselves against those rules.

5. Conclusion

This chapter aimed at understanding the ambivalent relationship between Islamist women and Kemalist modernity. What was basically found is that Islamist women’s rejection of modernity cannot easily be said to be an actual questioning of modernity. Rather, we can see this relation in terms of modernity’s ability to modernize its critiques. Educated and urbanised Islamist women seem to reject Kemalist modernity which, however, is all around these same women. They are able to question traditional Islam and traditional Muslims because they received ‘modern education’ and learned how to be ‘rational’.

An alternative reading of these Islamist women would emphasise that, under conditions of modernity, they have developed a particular identity part of which is asserting a need to be different from western or westernized women. Towards that end, a recourse to Islam appears, particularly in
terms of sexual morality. By means of veiling, these women actually intend to demonstrate how to be part of a moral community, in contrast to modern, unveiled women who represent moral corruption in their eyes.

At this point, the appropriateness of the initial reference to a feminism which finds the postmodernist critique of modernity powerful should have become clear: Islamist women’s rejection of modernity goes along with such a kind of feminism, although in a highly different context, that of Islamic society. They put the universal principle of modernity into jeopardy without recognizing how dangerous their own conceptualization of life is: may the overemphasis on diversity not make it impossible to live together?

The most problematic finding is that, on the one hand, Islamist women appreciate an Islamist regime like the Iranian one but, on the other, they seriously use the opportunities provided by Kemalist modernity. They seem, for instance, to appreciate education at modern universities and participation in the public sphere, but neither of the two would be possible for women in their ideally projected Islamist regime. They are public actors in the country today, but they could no longer be if their desired regime came about. It seems that veiled women would have to consider whether they would miss existing modernity if one day they lost it for an Islamist one.
Chapter 8

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the Turkish experience of modernity, this study has thus far argued that, to a greater extent, existing social theory is invalid for analyzing ‘later modernities’. Some explicit lessons from the Turkish experience now need to be derived in order to make stronger the proposition that the concept of varieties of modernity should be used to explore ‘other’ experiences of modernity. In this concluding chapter, therefore, I consider what could be learned from the Turkish experience for a social theory of modernity.

1. The Concept of Later Modernities

Since a plurality of histories, civilizations, modernizing agents and their projects indicate the existence of multiple modernities, the problematisation of the assumed equivalence between modernity and the West is unavoidable. When social science accepts the West as another civilization among many, it could be recognized that ambitions to ‘totalize’ the world on the basis of western values have had imperialist ambitions. It is because of this that western modernity necessarily faced legitimate resistance. However, eastern civilizations entered into an era of ‘self-questioning’ partly because of the imperialist intentions of western modernity (chapter 3). Thus, in the rise of the self-questioning of eastern societies, the challenging power of western modernity played a part. Thus, it might be undeniable that the idea of modernity in eastern societies is imported from the West. Nevertheless, an origin of something does not mean that it is the best among its latter ones. The fact that modernity first emerged in western Europe did not guarantee that it would be better there. For example, one could show that American modernity is more
advanced than European modernity, although the idea of modernity in America had been imported from Europe.\textsuperscript{88}

Thus, modernity should not be viewed as the equivalent of the West. Once the West is seen as a civilization among many, it is necessary to submit to the truth: the West is not the only specific context in which modernity can hold; there are other modernities. The concept of later modernities refers to an important category in terms of multiple modernities. The history of modernity could, in one way, be read as an history of tensional relations between East and West (chapter 3). Since eastern modernities emerged after western modernity, they are called later modernities. Challenged and shaken, the East has been capable of responding to the rise of the West with the creation of distinct modernities: Russia, China, Japan and Turkey. This should indicate that both earlier and contemporary modernisation theories fail because original, western modernity did not become the model of modernity for the East. We have shown that Turkish modernity, as a later experience, imported the idea of modernity from the West and, indeed, westernized to an extent. However, the western element in the Turkish experience does not suffice for it to be seen simply as westernization (chapters 4,5,6,7).

Thus, an argument for the existence of later modernities should necessarily question the convergence thesis situated in mainstream modernization theories. Societies in modern times do not converge, but survive their distinctions. This expresses itself currently as a plurality of cultures. It is exactly in this respect that the globalization of modernity as a diffusion of western civilization cannot be taken to be a plausible observation. Modernity is globalized, but this globalization does not refer to a westernization of the world. Rather, the era is now a modern one in the whole world, thus reflecting the multiplicity of modernity. This may show that the current era is no longer West-dominated, but that possibly a post-western era is emerging. The post-western era should not,
however, be viewed as the beginning of postmodernity, because, as we have shown, modernity is not equivalent to the West. Therefore, even if European modernity is being dissolved, or renewed, the current era refers to the existence of multiple modernities. It should become clear that the perspective of later modernities is incompatible with postmodernist positions. Since the perspective of later modernities does not read modernity as a desire to achieve a controlled, totalised world, the existence of plurality in ideas and practices is not taken to refer to the end of modernity (chapter 2). Plural cultures and civilizations could, rather, be viewed as an indication that modernization does not mean an alteration of distinctions, but that distinct modernities are at stake (chapter 3 and 4). The concept of later modernities refers to eastern modernities, but it needs to be observed that these modernities came about without being colonised by the West (chapter 3). Then, for example, the Turkish experience cannot be viewed in the category of post-colonial experiences. Since non-colonised experiences are categorised as later modernities in the East, to talk about a later modernity, it should include elements distinct enough to problematize western understandings of modernity; for example, Turkish women as key actors in the transition to modernity (chapter 7).

However, this is not an argument for 'antagonistic' modernities. This is because another question was also asked: do later modernities indicate that different parts of the world stand against each other more than ever before? By understanding modernity as an actor between civilizations, we emphasised its capability for changing cultures. Thus, modernity is able to reduce oppositions between civilizations (chapter 3). However, this should not mean that modernity should be understood as more than a separate civilization, undermining distinctions between civilizations and leading to a 'global world'. Neither universalism nor cultural relativism seems to be desirable: Western universalism ignores non-western cultures and cultural relativism could be taken to legitimate any culture as being 'barbaric'. Our investigation could show that not only the perspectives of globalization, but also those of relativism need to be questioned. If everything is
relative then nothing could be absolute. And if nothing is absolute, an argument for relativism cannot be maintained. Then, arguments for relativism could be considered to suppose that there are 'absolutes'. But if there are absolutes, then, 'relatives' cannot exist. Thus, it is important to insist that the distinctions between modernities do not necessarily mean that there are principally incompatible modernities; rather, they mean that there are several formations and answers to questions that arise during modern experiences.

Thus, it must be recognized that the world is not open to explicit readings of itself. Rather, in the current phase of modernity, the social world emerges as a high complexity. Dualities and dialectical occurrences need to be looked at with a view that places multiplicity at the centre of analysis. No single process or realm could be considered to be the central determining, ordering or shaping feature of human practice and identity. In this respect, it could and must be argued that neither globalization nor localization should be taken to be the central characteristic which shapes our lives. Plurality is a condition for human action. We showed that the Turks could no longer hope to present a coherent society nor could they hope to isolate themselves from the global world. Neither local cultures and practices nor global occurrences alone could be taken to define the situation. For example, the Kurdish reality shows that society in Turkey is not a totality but, at the same time, Europe is a category that is seen to provide some basic answers to the Kurdish question by both Kurds and Turks.

From this observation we could come to conclude that neither the clash of civilizations nor the end of history could be considered a convincing argument. Fukuyama’s thesis of the end of history seems particularly untenable, because in order for one to conclude that history has come to an end, there should no longer be struggles over time and space. However, the world has faced significant struggles between countries and between civilizations. The crisis of statism and the collapse of the
communist bloc are the background against which Fukuyama believed that it is possible to talk about the end of history. Fukuyama’s thesis of the end of history, therefore, stems from a perspective that identifies the twentieth century as the clash between communism and liberalism. This must refer to the idea that both liberalism and communism did settle all questions about the ‘ultimate goals’ of human beings. And when one of these modern ideals terminally fails, the other one deserves to be called ‘the optimum mode of political organisation’. Thus, Fukuyama (1992: 287) writes as follows: ‘If history leads us in one way or another to liberal democracy, this question then becomes one of the goodness of liberal democracy, and of the principles of liberty and equality on which it is based’. The collapse of communism gave Fukuyama the sense that ‘liberal democracy may constitute the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the final form of the human government and as such constituted the end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1989). What is most striking in this perspective for the present study is that Fukuyama can be considered as a radical westernist since in his view human history is reduced to the Western path of development. He writes: ‘there is a fundamental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary pattern for all human societies – in short something like a Universal History of mankind in the direction of liberal democracy’ (Fukuyama, 1992: 48). And he goes on to claim that ‘The Universal History of mankind was nothing other than man’s progressive rise to full rationality, and to a self-conscious awareness of how that rationality expresses itself in liberal self-government’ (Fukuyama, 1992: 60). Fukuyama (1992: 143-80) takes his westernism from Hegel by understanding him as the first philosopher who maintained that history would inevitably end and this end would come when the liberal state satisfies mankind’s desire for recognition. By comparing Hegel with another Western theorist, Marx, Fukuyama concludes that ‘the end of history’ was thought of either as liberal democracy or as communist society. Against the Marxist end of history, Fukuyama believes with Hegel that liberal societies are free from contradictions because they form themselves on the principles of liberty and equality. This is radically open to question, but my interest here is not
whether communism could provide again an alternative to liberalism; rather I want to show that Fukuyama’s thesis fails because he reduces ‘multiple histories’ to a single Western one. An analysis based on a concept of later modernities, such as the one provided in this thesis, makes is possible to successfully challenge the end of history thesis on socio-historical grounds.

Fukuyama understands history as a single, coherent, evolutionary process by taking into account the experiences of all peoples at all times. He necessarily does so, because it becomes easier to talk about the end of history when a totalising view of history is held as the starting-point. The idea of directional universal history is no doubt western in origin and ethnocentric. From Hegel to Habermas, mainstream social theorists have emphasised history as directional in the sense that the Western way of life stands at its end. The idea of unilinear historical development in fact reached its high point in post-Second World War modernization theory, which, however, had almost disappeared in the 1970s. Then ‘the end of communism’ gave rise to neo-modernization theories that have emphasised ‘convergence’ once again. And Fukuyama should be seen in this light. Even in this context, though, he went extremely far by concluding on the end of history. In Fukuyama’s perspective, the Western liberal way of life has solved all deep contradictions and therefore nothing is left to struggle for or to desire. This is again open to question, but even if liberal democracy had resolved contradictions and if as a result westerners were satisfied, can this be seen to be true for all societies in the world? Can it be said that liberalism achieved its universality? The concept of later modernities suggests that there have been multiple ways to modernity and that those multiple ways give rise to multiple consequences. These consequences do not converge anywhere, neither under the label of liberal democracy nor under that of communist society. Both communism and liberalism are western in their origin, and in later modernities neither liberalism nor communism emerged in the way they did in Europe or North America. In Russia, for example, communism was not free from Russian history and that history did not come to an end, because it certainly did not
find a solution to all contradictions yet. Or, for example, Turkish culture cannot be said to be having an ultimate goal of achieving liberal democracy in the western way. The multiple consequences of the multiple ways have been indicating that history is far from coming to end. For instance, China, Russia and Iran aim to form a bloc whose ultimate goal may not be ‘liberal democracy’ (see Ilhan, 2001). Now, in addition, I want to pick up the case of Islamism to demonstrate that history is not at its end. Islamism is not only a reaction against the new world order, but an expression of a particular identity which may not be able to be seen as a liberal identity, although as a modern one.

Fukuyama (1992: 45) wrote: ‘for a very large part of the world, there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy, and no universal principle of legitimacy other than the sovereignty of the people’. However, he sees Islam as a universal ideology, but concludes that it cannot challenge liberal democracy. So, Fukuyama understands that in order to counterbalance liberal democracy, there must be universal ideology that should be able to reach out to all human beings as human beings. Fukuyama fails to understand that current Islamism’s ultimate goal is not to create a universal world on the basis of Islamic values. Islamism rather aims to keep its distance from the west – liberal democracy. And in doing so, it develops a modernity of its own, which may not meet with the principles of liberalism. Thus, even if it is the case that all big questions are settled in the west, that deep contradictions are resolved under liberal democracy and that westerners are satisfied with that, this can only tell about a particular end of history, that of the west. In Islamic societies, the big questions are not answered yet, and this is why Islamism emerges in the final quarter of the twentieth century and continues in these days. As a consequence, it could be insisted that Fukuyama better consider the plurality of histories and limit his claim to showing a new phase of western history rather than reducing all experiences of the peoples to the western one.
By considering the importance of the plurality of civilizations in shaping human identity and practice, one should not conclude, though, that the distinctions between people are purely cultural by eliminating political, economic and ideological differences, as Huntington (1997) does. In striking contrast to Fukuyama, Huntington (1997: 125) writes: ‘Alignments defined by ideology and superpower relations are giving way to alignments defined by culture and civilization. Political boundaries increasingly are redrawn to coincide with cultural ones: ethnic, religious, and civilizational. Cultural communities are replacing Cold War blocs, and the fault lines between civilizations are becoming the central lines of conflict in global politics’. The importance of culture was certainly once neglected in social theories. To remedy that neglect, however, the discovery of the importance of culture in terms of our relations with the world should not give rise to other one-sided perspectives; i.e. that nothing but culture is the determining element of human practice. But Huntington (1997: 308) does precisely this: ‘cultural identities are central and cultural affinities and differences shape the alliances, antagonisms, and policies of states…’ This is a one-sided perspective that does not accept the insight that the conflicts which give shape to the direction of change should not be reduced to the fully economic, cultural or political; rather, the multiplicity of factors needs to be recognised. No doubt, emphasising the existence of multiple civilizations as important factors in global politics sheds light on understanding the current era of the world. However, what is not acceptable in Huntington’s perspective is that the distinctions between civilizations inevitably demonstrate that the current era is shaped by the clash of civilizations.

In the light of the concept of later modernities, it is possible to show that Huntington’s thesis fails. I shall briefly show this failing by three brief arguments developed in the present thesis. First, ‘distinction’ does not necessarily mean ‘clash’. I have shown that the concept of later modernities is not based on any idea that multiple modernities are antagonistic modernities (chapter 3). I have
developed a perspective in which modernity plays a certain part in reducing oppositions between civilizations. Civilization or culture is important for the creation of different modernities, but, in turn, modernity does not produce overall societal stability, including cultural stability. Modernity does not fully permit societies to maintain their traditional cultural values, that is, modernity is not a full product of a civilization or culture (chapter 3). I shall now pick up the case of Islam, which is seen by Huntington (1997: 209-18) to be the most powerful opposition to Western civilization. By viewing current Islamism as an anti-western ideology, Huntington concludes that a growing civilizational clash is emerging between the Christian west and the Islamic east. It is undeniable that Islamism means in one respect a rejection of the new world order, but this is only half of the story. I have shown that modernity alters cultures and that Islamic societies are not free from this. The analysis of Islamist women has shown that they do not purely turn toward traditional Islam as a source of identity; rather, they have developed a new identity under conditions of modernity (chapter 7). This new identity does not oppose the West as much as traditional Islam would do. Participation of Islamist women in the public sphere, for example, shows that under conditions of modernity women of different places in fact share more than they would have shared in traditional ages. That is, modernity alters cultures and as a consequence civilizational oppositions are being reduced.

Second, the cultural element is not the only important factor in shaping human beings’ lives, although it is very important that culture is saved from earlier neglect in social theories. Not only the cultural element needs to be interpreted in terms of the distinctions and/or similarities between modernities; rather, multiple factors should be analysed. This is, because the social world is complex, it cannot be understood on the basis of one fundamental feature. I have demonstrated that an economic and a political analysis is also necessary to explore the Turkish version of modernity (chapter 5). And if cultural identities are central and defining all other practices, one would be
forced to explore the ‘clashes’ between people who are the members of the same clan, ethnic group, or nation.

Third, some observations on Huntington’s neglect of the distinction between civilization and culture can show that the idea of a clash of civilizations is untenable. Huntington talks about civilizations as if they are blocs pitted against one another. He groups many different cultures together in a certain – totalised – civilization. For example, when he analyses the Islamist opposition to the West, Huntington takes the West and Islam as two coherent civilizations without saying a word about different cultures both in the West and in the Islamic East: ‘following the 1979 Iranian revolution, an intercivilizational quasi war developed between Islam and the West’ (Huntington, 1997: 216). He goes on saying that ‘The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defence. It is the west, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world’ (Huntington, 1997: 217-18). Now, on the one hand, there is the West understood as a totality, including both Eastern and Western Europe and America, and there is Islam as another totality, including Iran, Turkey, Iraq etc., on the other. Now I shall give some reasons why Huntington should have made a distinction between civilization and culture.

In the present thesis, it has been indicated that Turkey cannot be taken to be unequivocally a member of an Islamic civilization; rather, Turkish culture could best be viewed as a singularised one. Then, if, for example, a civilizational war emerges between Islamic and Western civilizations, will Turkey side with Islamic civilization, because the dominant religion in Turkey is Islam? I have
shown that Turkish culture interprets both Islamic and Western civilizations in its own ways, therefore, it singularises itself (chapters 4 and 6). Thus, when the Islamic East is not understood as a totality, it becomes possible to show that there are distinct cultures in one civilizational zone. Huntington (1997: 312) seems to realise this, when he advises that the United States and European countries should ‘achieve greater political, economic and military integration and coordinate their policies so as to preclude states from other civilizations exploiting differences among them’. So, he seems to consider the possibility that the West may not be able to be seen as a totalised, homogeneous civilization. Rather, for example, the distinction of America and Europe could have been taken into account to show that there is no such civilization as a Western one that includes Eastern Europe, Western Europe and America (see Lipset, 1996). In brief, Huntington neglects ‘culture clashes’ within single civilizations. In other words, he does not consider cultural distinctions within a civilization. However, it is the fact that these distinctions have the possibility of giving rise to wars between the nations within a single civilization. Both of the World wars, for example, occurred between Western states. Or, for example, how could one understand the war between Iran and Iraq, that lasted for several years, from the perspective of a clash of civilizations that does not consider internal cultural distinctions in one civilizational zone? Both Iran and Iraq are Muslim societies, but their interpretations of Islam differ greatly.

Thus, it could be derived, from our investigations, that perspectives on the same theme should be questioned. Both modernization theory and the dependency perspective believed that their methods for analysing the process of change are applicable to all societies. While, for modernization theory, the causes in modernizing societies are mostly internal - given that this theory is evolutionist - according to the dependency perspective, the causes are fully external. While dependency perspective is pessimistic, modernization theory is optimistic. However, we indicated that both external and internal factors are involved in the alteration of latecomer societies. In the course of
the Turkish revolution, international pressure, the vulnerable Ottoman Empire and rising intellectuals played pivotal roles. In the alteration of later experiences, therefore, one should not overemphasise one factor while excluding others. In terms of the development of a later modernity, we agreed, to some extent, with the dependency perspective that 'autonomous development' is required. But this development does not necessarily imply a socialist revolution. The development of a later modernizing society is possible according to a capitalist model, too. We noted that the Kemalist model of economic development is highly autonomous although being capitalist at the same time (chapter 5). However, it needs to be said that this sort of political economy - capitalist and anti-imperialist at the same time - is very difficult to fully follow through. Modernization theory was evolutionist and, therefore, 'breaking Social change is explained by viewing the 'dominant value system' as the adjusting sphere of society (Lipset, 1963). However, the disputes over goals are particular dynamics in defining the direction of change (chapter 5, 6 and 7). And in general, classic social theory's main question - how a diversified society could be held together - should no longer be held as a starting-point of social analysis. We showed that the Turkish experience has been shaped by dual, conflictual and tensional relations between different actors. There have been highly violent collective actions which, in turn, brought about measures to end conflicts in society by hoping to hold the Turks together by a 'value system' (chapter, 5). Neither Islam nor nation as an integrating element could unify Turkish society. Thus, the integration of society should not be overemphasised as the theme to be explored, although contradictions in society cannot be left on their own. Thus, for a reading of multiple modernities, neither the integration theory of society, that assumes a social structure as a functionally integrated system, nor the coercion theory of society, that understands social structure as a form of organisation held together by force, should be taken as the substance for the analysis. In both perspectives, society is seen as a whole, either held together by a functional value system or by force. But, as has been shown, modern society can in no way be conceived of as a coherent whole or as a system.
Finally, world-systems theory should be critically observed. For Wallerstein (1984), the unit of analysis is the universal, historical system, the world-capitalist economy. World-systems theory assumes classes and nations to be the central actors of modernity. Therefore, ideology is seen as universal. However, as we have shown, conflicts between social actors, not necessarily coming from opposite classes or nations, play a role in shaping human practice. Reading the world as a contradiction between metropolitan capitalism and the periphery/semiperiphery does not explain how later modernities emerged and how some of them are not less advanced than metropolitan, capitalist western states. Unlike the assumption of world-systems theory's, the solutions to the problematics caused by western imperialism could be resolved on the basis of different models. That is, capitalism and socialism could be seen not as the only two coherent options in the development of latecomers. Rather, both capitalism and socialism, as modern conceptions of society, are subject to civilizational contexts and modernizing agents. Therefore, multiple ways of modernization need to be observed, especially because 'self-questioning' and 'self-problematisation' are the basic dynamics for societies in the transformation to modernity rather than conceiving of the transformations of late comers as simply the results of western imperialism (chapter 3).

Thus, the concept of later modernities does not side with the convergence thesis, but nor does it understand multiple modernities as necessarily antagonistic modernities. This is because, as has been indicated in this thesis, that modernity is neither the property of the West nor is it simply a dimension of western, imperialist power. There are relations of modernity to civilizations and interpretations of modernity by civilizations. Therefore, later modernities are different interpretations of the world and of the self, but they are not necessarily antagonistic.
2. The lessons for present-day Turkey

In the first place, no doubt, modernization is a political issue. To build a modernity is to control an entire population. And, in turn, this implies a political program such as nationalism. Thus, a project of modernity is necessarily a political project. Since a political project, in the first place, means a systematic attempt to alter the existing social reality, a project of modernity needs to be read firstly as a disciplining phenomenon. Thus, it is believed that society could be shaped by a political project. This is so, because society is conceived by modernizers as an autonomous entity regulated by internal laws, rather than by God or nature, which can be fully explored and grasped by human reason. As we have shown, Kemalism reflects this feature clearly. That is, Kemalism was an intervention into society in order to create Turkish modernity. The manageability of society, however, poses questions to political projects. Particularly, the question of how discipline could be achieved, may give rise to violent, revolutionary movements and/or, by means of 'formalization' on the basis of 'law', the disciplining of a population may be achieved. Law is an essential carrier of discipline. Thus, by means of law, the state can reinterpret social reality for its own ambitions. Kemalism should be read in both terms. In the first place, the Kemalist revolution was achieved. Thus, for radical social change, a break with the old regime on the basis of political revolution may be required. And for the legitimacy of the post-revolutionary regime, formalization on the basis of law could provide an essential opportunity. Therefore, modernising agents could reinterpret the social reality. However, as we have shown, there is no single answer or method for disciplining people; rather there are different projects for such.

Thus, as to the importance of Turkey to the theme of varieties of modernity, Kemalism as a project of modernity was explored as a different disciplining project. Planning and controlling came to be the two basic tools used by Kemalist actors, because 'reasonable' agents thought of themselves as
having the right to alter society. This has been done using a different method. Kemalism distinguished itself in terms of discipline for the further goal of liberation. First, the Kemalist revolution was not a 'bloody revolution' in the sense that it did not emerge as a socio-political movement of a particular social class, as in the case of the revolutions of France and Russia (Skocpol, 1979). Since the Kemalist revolution regarded itself as an emancipating project of the whole nation, the regime that Kemalism founded after the revolution of 1923 became a different authoritarian regime. Thus, from the beginning, a limited plurality was included in the Kemalist polity. However, it was also due to this characteristic of Kemalism that the alteration of social reality became a very difficult process, leading to some clashes emerging between the modernizing state and society. Law was viewed as being able to alter social reality. Therefore, reforms were legitimated by the power of the law. Then, law and tradition clashed. Thus, the Kemalist project reflects, first of all, that a project of modernity means the disciplining of the population.

However, Kemalism cannot be conceived simply as a disciplining project, because it was also a liberating movement. The tenets of secularism, republicanism, populism, revolutionism and nationalism were important for the sake of liberty. As has been investigated, for example, secularism provided different sectors of society with opportunities. For example, women came to enjoy participation in the public sphere, especially following secularist reforms (chapter 7). Or, for example, by means of nation-wide education, Islamic actors came to reinterpret Islam as a political religion (chapter 6). This means that even if a project of modernity aims to strongly modernise the socio-cultural world on the basis of a specific conception of modernity, its own alterations provide opportunities for the people to interpret the world and themselves in their own ways. And the tensions between liberty and discipline were to give rise to new events. That is, the Kemalist project was open to later interpretations. However, the following should be noted: Modernity is open to different interpretations. Society cannot be shaped on the basis of one fundamental
conception of modernity (chapter 2). Kemalism could be conceived of as an outlook; it did not intend to impose a closed system of thought on the polity and society in the long run. Although Kemalism is still interpreted differently by different political actors, bureaucratic elites converted Kemalist thought into a state ideology. It is basically for this reason that the Kemalist project has provided ways for both disciplining and liberation (chapter 5). We have pointed out this particularly through examining the state, society and the economy.

We showed that the configuration of the state, society and the economy is different in the Turkish experience (chapter 5). A main method for analysing the Turkish case was shown to be one that sees the radicalization of oppositions in society as central. We showed that the rise of Turkish society, economy and the Kemalist state indeed depended on the creation of dualities (chapter 5). For the sake of radical social change, Kemalism aimed to create contradictions, because revolution was assumed to imply radical disputes over the system. This feature is specific to the history of Turkish modernity. For instance, emphasising science as the only true guide to life, radicalized some existing dualities between some Islamic scholars, the ulema, and new rising modernist intellectuals in the 1930s. This duality did not disappear but, in contrast, has played a basic role in the history of the Turkish republic. Therefore, without considering the radicalization of dualities, the Turkish experience is difficult to analyse. And it became clear that relations between state and society could be summarised as the tension between liberty and discipline. The analysis of twentieth-century Turkish history showing that the whole century was a high clash between liberty and discipline (chapter 5).

In the analysis of the relations between the state, society and the economy, we have noted that the realms of the social world are not separable from one another. Undoubtedly, there is a relative autonomy of each sphere, but this cannot be sufficient for arguing that absolute autonomy is
possible. Rather, the state and society have the power to shape one another and the economy is a crucial area that shapes relations between people in society as well as in terms of the relations between the state and society. Particularly, in terms of the economy, we have noted that Turkish society and state cannot be viewed as autonomous realms. The economy has played a constitutive part in shaping twentieth-century Turkish history. Thus, the administration - polity - and production - economy - are dominated by instrumental rationality so that the 'system' could dominate the actors. That is, economic power, such as labour, exchange and consumption, and political power such as the regulation of society, the maintenance of boundaries and geopolitical activity have partly shaped modern Turkey. Therefore, it is important to insist that to be modern is to face a paradoxical situation. That is, human beings are overpowered by the rule of law or formal rationality, yet they have the opportunity to fight to change their world in order to make it their own. On the one hand, the 'system' - administration and production - aims to standardise the practices and identities on the basis of formal rationality but, on the other hand, it is again under conditions of modernity that human beings have the opportunity to make their own identities without being completely determined by the system. Basically, it is for this reason that currently the masses once excluded from the modern system come to participate in the modernity of Turkey. They - Kurds, Islamists, leftists etc. - were once outside modern discourse, now they express an irrevocable plurality. The best example of the current configuration could be the existence of multiple television channels. Until the late 1980s, there was only the state television, but now there are several private channels that reflect this irrevocable plurality. That is to say that, under conditions of modernity, plural world-interpretations cannot be eradicated, even if totalising attempts are made use physical power.

Thus, in brief, for a reading of multiple modernities, the configuration of the state, society and the economy could be observed as a vantage point. Within this, the position of the tension between
liberty and discipline could provide clues as to the distinctions of the modernity under investigation. How the state conceives itself and how society presents itself are prominent questions to be answered in order to mark how a different interpretation of modernity is possible. For instance, the Leninist state regarded itself as proletarian, yet a very distinct Russian experience has been written in world history. Or, for example, Turkish society was unable to present itself as fully Islamic or western, therefore, thus leading to a distinct experience among Islamic and western countries. No doubt, the formation of the economic sphere needs to be examined carefully to point out some of the distinctions between modernities. For instance, the Turkish bourgeoisie cannot be found to be similar to western ones. In this, of course, the forces that define domination in society are an important factor to be observed. Since domination was not purely determined by socio-economic criteria in the Turkish experience, the Turkish capitalist class could be conceived of as a product of a state-centred political project, and this feature distinguishes present Turkey from western countries.

History showed its power, particularly in terms of the actors of Turkish modernity. In the history of the Turks, autonomous intellectuals, such as the *ulema*, had already acted as carriers of models of cultural and social orders, and thus their emergence from the Kemalist elite as modernisers should not be surprising. We indicated that the emergence of Kemalist actors as the main agents of modernisation was directly related to the historical background (chapter 3). History provides possible options for human action and, therefore, it is an inescapable power that plays a pivotal role in shaping the modern experience. Thus, without considering the power of history, one cannot explore present Turkish society. As has been shown, for example, the role of the military cannot be explored by looking simply at power relations, rather a historical mission to protect democracy assumed by the military to be its duty has been an important factor. The importance of history in the shape of Turkish modernity, however, cannot be taken to mean that no 'break' occurred in the
Turkish experience. Without breaking moments, modernity cannot emerge. Thus, although history played a part in the emergence of the Turkish project of modernity, new ideas were introduced by the Kemalist actors playing another constitutive part. The idea of a democratic republic, for instance, was not known to the Turks before Kemalism promulgated it. Thus, for a reading of multiple modernities, 'continuity' and 'discontinuity' must be taken as a central point marking both the power of history and the creativity of social actors. It is exactly here that we should insist that both the critics and the advocates of Kemalism need to be problematized. An absolute break with previous history was not achieved by Kemalism so that a completely new Turkey - a western nation - was not brought about. Against the critics of Kemalism, it could be said that Kemalism cannot be conceived as an aim to change the natural evolution of Turkish society by bringing about a revolution for the sake of westernisation. Rather, both continuity - the power of history - and discontinuity - the power of the project - should be examined to explore the proposal that Turkish modernity is neither a western modernity nor a product of Turkish tradition.

It could be derived from this analysis that some of the main problems and achievements of present-day Turkish society are connected to the two basic principles of Kemalism: secularism and nationalism. Of course the latter actors and projects are also important for this situation. However, the founding principles of Kemalism have been important factors in the emergence of the Kurdish question and the problem with Islamism as well as in providing opportunities that have been enjoyed. Kemalism, on the one hand, aimed to dissolve the social ties between people for the sake of delocalization. However, on the other hand, on the basis of nationalism and secularism, it aimed to hold people together: thus, both nationalism and secularism came to be made 'religious' (chapter 4, 6). Although Kemalism cannot be seen to have aimed at institutionalising secularism and nationalism as closed ways of thinking about society and polity, both secularism and nationalism came to be subject to different interpretations by political actors. Secularism has been viewed as the
most important principle of the Turkish republic by proto-Kemalist actors. Therefore, making secularism religious became unavoidable. The ‘religionalisation’ of secularism not only brought about some serious clashes between secularists and Islamists, it has also been exploited by right-wing political parties for political ends. And, as we have shown, the colonization of the polity by a specific culture is often achieved by the use of Islam (chapter 5). When a political project uses secularism as an overemphasised guide to life, a counter project may view Islam as a political religion (chapter 6, 7). Since the question of Islam has occupied an important part in the Turkish experience, this has been considered in chapters 6 and 7.

One may argue that there is a contradiction between chapters 6 and 7 when comparing the argument for the compatibility of Islam with modernity in chapter 6 with the argument about the tension-ridden relations between Islam and modernity in chapter 7. I must make clear here that modernity is not a full product of tradition. In an Islamic context, therefore, a culture or civilization cannot produce modernity without modernising agents. It should thus be suffice to say that, in the emergence of modernity, conflict can always be involved. In the Turkish case, the conflict between Kemalism and some parts of Islamic society should not be understood as Islam, from the beginning, rejecting modernity. In contrast, as we have shown, Islamism, as against Kemalist modernity, proposes a different sort of modernity. It could be conceived of as follows. First, Islam should not be understood to be a civilization that rejects modernity, rather the possibility of a different interpretation of modernity in Islamic societies should be dealt with (chapter 6). Second, insisting on the compatibility of Islam with modernity should not mean that modernity could be conceived as a necessary result of the evolution of societies. Rather, the agency of modernisation needs to be emphasised. On the one hand, I have shown that Islam cannot easily be regarded as an anti-modern civilisation (chapter 6) but, on the other hand, I have emphasised that there are high tensions between Islamic and modern actors (chapter 7). This means that an analysis of Islam and
Islamism should question perspectives of Islam as anti-modern, postmodern or traditionalist. The Turkish experience indicates that Islam, or rather the Islamic East, cannot be regarded as a coherent whole, rather there are distinct 'cultures' in Islamic civilisation, such as the Iranian Shia culture. However, I have insisted that the Turkish case cannot be conceived of as simply an Islamic culture. Rather, the singularisation of culture is emphasised (chapter 4 and 6). Turkey should no longer be emphasised as a border country between Christianity and Islam, rather it refers to a culture that has always borrowed from the outside without being colonized or assimilated. However, in moving towards a secularised society and culture, Turkey has faced some serious problems. Secularism is now somewhat of a religion and this is a reason for clashes between secularists and Islamists. Although the Islamists can no longer be neglected, conflicts due to the nature of the regime are powerfully at stake. A further democratisation of Turkey would, in one way, imply the resolution of this problematic. In other words, without accommodating Islamist actors, the Turkey may remain far from the Kemalist ambition for a democratic polity.

Nationalism provided the means for some to attain power (chapter 4 and 5). Nationalist ideology was not viewed as an option among many ideologies, it was rather interpreted as the important legitimacy of the governments of Turkey. Therefore, the foundation of the republic was important. Nationalism was not only emphasised as a principle, but was put into the constitution as inseparable from the nature of the Turkish republic. Thus, the current problem of the Kurdish question, is directly related to this characteristic (chapter 4). A political lesson for present-day Turkey could be the following. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis has been overemphasised as a guiding principle for Turkish governments over the last two decades. This is the main reason why oppression and corruption are currently at stake. Oppression and corruption do not necessarily come about due to Turkishness, rather a sort of 'legitimizing nationalism' has been corrupting the state and oppressing the people (chapter 5). Thus, what can be said is that nationalism is inseparable from the desire for
power. The state has been 'colonized' by nationalist sentiments. Therefore, it could be argued that the colonization of the state by a particular culture - Turkist-Islamic - has resulted in the 'true republic' remaining far from the scene. In the following consideration, I shall try to show in what way people in Turkey could live together.

Against the nationalists - their primary values are the spiritual and cultural unity of people - patriotic values - the republic and a free way of life - may need to be promulgated by actors who find nationalism problematic in Turkey. Patriotics may give importance to Turkey as a particular country, but they should not attempt to force one way of life upon its entire population. The republic could be interpreted as guaranteeing freedom for living different ways of life. For the nationalists, freedom does not matter, because their ultimate goal is to unite the people under the label of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Thus, solving some of the main problems of Turkey may require a patriotic perspective that emphasises the possibility for everyone in the country to live their lives as citizens without being oppressed by a denial of political, social and civil rights. Cultural oneness does not make a republic stronger, particularly because it does not privilege freedom. In other words, it may be considered that the republic does not need cultural, but political unity that guarantees each cultural or ideological world the right to express itself. However, the republic needs to defend itself from enemies too because a culture might try to colonize the state, in turn leading to the elimination of plurality by 'state-terror' (chapter 5).

Thus, the perspectives that celebrate 'difference', 'division' and 'incompatibility' need also to be problematized. Humanism is currently about the right to 'difference', but why difference has to be privileged needs an answer. The clash of differences could easily emerge in vulnerable countries like Turkey if arguments for the rights of difference become exaggerated. Neither without solving the Kurdish question nor by insisting upon 'separation' can Turkish democracy be developed.
Further democratisation indeed implies the resolution of the conflict between the Kurdists and the ultra-nationalists of Turkey.

The perspective that emphasised that the Turkish nation had to adapt itself to western civilization was responded to by the experience that contemporary civilization came to be subject to Turkish characteristics. This thesis has shown that the modernization of Turkey cannot merely be seen as westernization. This is, not only because the Kemalist interpretation of modernity was different, but also because the features of Turkish society were not undermined by western values, rather, dialectically, the West has been interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, the West has always provided a criterion for Turkey to check itself in terms of whether its goals have been achieved. Yet on the other hand, the West is interpreted as the negative external power to which reactions have emerged. Today, many, from politicians to people on the street, claim that Turkey should be accepted by the European Union while, at the same time, the West is seen as taking a one-sided attitude towards the Turks. This may be so because Europe has played an important part in the shape of twentieth-century Turkish history and identity. It is assumed by some that Turkey is westernized, while some other observers argue that Turkey is far from being a European country. However, an alternative argument would insist that Turkey does not correspond to these two views because it is not a member of a clearly defined civilization (chapter 4). Thus, for a reading of multiple modernities, external forces should neither be excluded nor should they simply be insisted upon as negative. In modern history, relations between societies and between civilizations increase. It is easier for societies to know one another by means of modern telecommunications technologies and, therefore, in a society’s identity-formation, its relations with other societies, positive or negative, play an important part in modern history.
Military and political power played the principal re-ordering role in the Ottoman Empire and Kemalism aimed to bring about multiple competing power relations and actors. As has been investigated, this Kemalist ambition has to some extent been achieved; no longer can the military and the polity be viewed as alone defining the situation. There are either partners or opposers in power relations. However, in Turkey, domination still cannot be merely defined by socio-economic criteria. Domination is still directly related to politics and the military. Currently, the generals still have their voices heard, while some civilian politicians aim to break with the power of the military in terms of the nature of the regime. This question also depends on two forces: Europe and the internal growing ambitions for a more developed democracy. On the one hand, the European Union plays a part in the further democratisation of Turkey by establishing criteria for Turkey’s application for membership. On the other hand, both the Islamic and the Kurdish questions imply a decrease in the role of the military in political power. Thus, for a reading of multiple modernities, the forces that play a part in the shape of domination should be examined. In other words, the shape of domination in a society could show the distinction of modernity in that society.

Three collective actions have taken place in the Turkish experience. Competitive: the Turks in the 1930s competed with western economies. Proactive: most movements that aimed to extend modernity to the masses have been proactive. Reactive: reactionary movements against modernisation emerged from within traditionalist groups. Most social movements indeed concentrated on the possibility of extending modernity towards groups and classes that were once excluded from the system. And modernity as a tension between liberty and discipline emerges particularly in the case that social actors who aim at extending liberty and opportunity face the brutality of the polity and/or of the army leading to clashes. Particularly, leftist movements for liberty have been countered by the militant nationalism of the state in the 1970s and 1980s (chapter 5). Although, currently social movements can no longer be viewed as being determined by a
particular ideology, the conflict between the leftists and the militant nationalism of the state still plays an important role. Thus, social movements in modernity can be viewed, in general, as being of two kinds. One is future-oriented, critical of the existing social order and proposing an alternative order to be attained in the future. This movement employ arguments against both the present-day social order and the past as problematic for a possibly better order in the future. This sort of movement is necessarily 'utopian', but it is this utopian characteristic that has played important parts in the transformation of society, although the idealised future has not been fully attained. The other sort of social movement is 'past-oriented' in that the past is idealised in comparison to problems faced in the present-day. In other words, it is aimed to attain the lost past again. It is this feature that makes this movement utopian as well but, here again, the utopian element plays an important role. However, because the idealised past is privileged under conditions of modernity, those movements cannot be understood as anti-modern movements. That is, a past, which cannot be exactly known, is 'invented' because of the problems that emerge under conditions of modernity. Therefore, neither future-oriented nor 'past-oriented' movements could be conceived of as having anti-modern characteristics, i.e. both the socialist and the Islamist movements have extended modernity towards larger sectors of societies. Another crucial point currently is that social movements are not nation-wide as before, rather regional movements seem more important. For example, a small city in the Aegean region, Bergama, has been protesting against the pollution in the region caused by a foreign-oriented gold firm. Or, for example, in Zonguldak, another small city, workers have been striking for their own rights not to allow the polity to close the state firms in their region. But at the same time there are global social movements that Turks are involved in. For example, green movements in Istanbul are organized by Europeans and Turks together. So, it may become clear that neither localization nor globalization could alone be taken to define the situation. More importantly, for a reading of multiple modernities, the observer should concentrate on the characteristics of social movements in order to understand whether these movements have to
do with specific features of societies rather than viewing them as universal. In other words, through examining social movements, one could grasp the meaning of modernity in societies to mark distinctions. For example, the Turkish Islamist women's movement could show that, in Turkey, a consensus about the meaning of modernity has not and cannot be achieved (chapter 7).

At last, but not least, it could be stated that Turkey is situated within a dual civilisation. However, this should not be taken to mean that Turkey is a border country between western and Islamic civilizations. Rather, as has been indicated, these dual characteristics in Turkey could be conceived of as a 'singularisation' of culture. That is, the division between the West and the East cannot be used as a vantage-point for analysing Turkish modernity. Turkey includes features from both Islamic and western civilizations, but these features are not the same features as possessed by western and Islamic civilizations. In brief, the Turks in Anatolia interpret both western and Islamic values in their own ways and, therefore, they are neither fully Islamised nor are they westernized. From this point we could go further to say that 'civilizational particularity' could play an important role in defining the power of a modernity. Compared to other Islamic societies in the Middle East, Turkey had an easier process of modernisation and played a great part in this 'singularised culture'. However, this is not to say that Turkish culture did not at all resist Kemalist innovations. Rather, for a reading of multiple modernities, the clash between modernising agents and contextual realities should be viewed as important. As the Turkish experience indicates, the idea of modernity is imported from the West by modernising agents in later modernities, but this cannot be assumed to argue that later modernities are westernizing experiences. The dialectical relations between modernizing agents and contextual realities lead to the fact that modernities differ from one another. However, the difficulty in terms of defining the place of a singularised culture on the global arena is problematic. And, for Turkey, the old question is still posed: where should Turkey stand on the global arena? Mostly, the European Union is assumed to be the final door through
which the Turks will pass. However, at the same time, it is said that it is almost impossible for the Turks to become members of the union. An alternative exists: turning back to the 1930s. Many non-western societies were forcibly westernized, while Kemalism acknowledged the western way of life without being a colony of the West. That is, autonomous development was the driving element of the Kemalist project. It was particularly in these terms that the Kemalist revolution was a world-wide revolution. Liberation movements in the East, such as that in India, took the Kemalist victory over western imperialism as their model. And, after gaining its political independence, Turkey practised a foreign policy that opposed the imperialism of the West, close, to some extent, to the Soviet Union. During the period between 1923 and 1938, Turkey was an autonomous country that was not controlled by the western block, an option which it may still follow.

One may argue, then, that there may be still a possibility for Turkey to be neutral and 'independent' as it was in the early phase of the republic. Turkey may leave Europe and move, as the early republic did, closer to the Russian federation, playing a crucial role in an economic co-operation in the Black Sea region. Moreover, the new Turkish-speaking republics take Turkey seriously as their model for their own reconstruction. A neutral Turkey may become a creative country in the Middle East, too (Ahmad, 1993). Despite the fact that it is generally believed that Turkey's future will be shaped in/by the European Union, discussions will ensue in terms of the above-mentioned option.
Notes

1 It cannot be denied that postmodernism, in the last few decades, has played a great part in the development of social theories of modernity, critical or advocative.


3 Perhaps it needs to be mentioned that observations of American modernity as a distinct, other, modernity have been enlightening the field. See, for example, Wagner (1999); Lipset (1996)


5 It could be shown that in the rise of postmodernism, observations of distinct characteristics of the non-western world have played a crucial part, i.e. the Iranian Islamic Revolution has been understood to mark a beginning of postmodernity in its complete rejection of the West. See Sayyid (1997).


7 Distinguishing between original and later versions of modernity, in the first place, may seem to be a parallel analysis with modernisation theory. However, the starting-point of this study is not that original Western modernity provided a model for the rest of the world.

8 Colonial and/or postcolonial experiences could be categorised as another version of modernity unlike the group of later modernities which precisely includes experiences instigated by indigenous actors. Three cases are particularly important: Russia, Japan and Turkey.

9 For example, Eisenstadt (1978 and 1997) intends to view the Turkish revolution as an outcome of the civilizational context, assumed to be Islamic, the axial variety.
Without exception, theorists of nation and nationalism understand previous history and traditions as the basic elements in the formation of nations. See, for example, Smith (1986); Gellner (1983).

Both modernism and postmodernism could be read as coherent visions of modernity.

Both modernist and postmodernist perspectives have viewed modernity as programmed by Enlightenment philosophers. See Yack (1997); Kolb (1986).

Modernity as an endless trial was proposed by Kolakowski (1990)

Eisenstadt (1999) demonstrates that, in Axial civilizations, there have always been tension-ridden relations between mundane and transcendental visions of human societies.

In this text, the West refers to Western Europe rather than to America.

Modernisation theory could be taken to show that modernity and tradition are contrasted by understanding the West as modern against the rest as traditional. See, for example, Eisenstadt (1973).

For the idea of civilization in the singular, see Arnason (2000a).

Though it is undeniable to accept that modernity emerged first in Western Europe, modernity cannot be seen as purely a Western creation. In the emergence of modernity, different elements coming from different civilizations played basic roles. For instance, the West started to learn ancient Greek philosophy from the ‘Islamic scholars’, such as Farabi, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. On the emergence of modernity see the special issue of Daedalus, 127: 3(1998).

Some contemporary social theorists still insist on modernity as being a Western project. See, for example, Giddens (1991); Habermas (1994).

In sociological theory, its best representative is modernisation theory whose birth was, as Eisenstadt (1973: 11) claims, ‘...very closely connected with the great upsurge of interest in “development” of underdeveloped societies...’.
One even described westernisation as a ‘world revolution’ (Laue, 1987). In this perspective it is an ongoing and irresistible process.

While modernity was entering history, a distinction existed between ‘civilization in the singular’ and civilizations in the plural. The idea of civilization was developed, in the eighteenth century, as the opposite of barbarism. Civilized society differed from primitive societies because it was urban, literate and settled and it was seen as identical with modernity and with the west. It could be seen that this new definition of civilization sought to find a self-identity for the West (Arnason, 2000a). although some think that the West already knew what it was before modernity emerged. See Huntington (1997).

Exactly due to this observation, modernisation theory conceptualised both modern and traditional societies as stable and integrated whereas in modernising societies conflicts between tradition and modernity often create inescapable instability. See, for example, Huntington (1968).

For example, one could consider Eisenstadt’s move from modernisation theory, based on structural-functionalism, to a civilizational perspective as showing that modernisation theory had failed.

Some Western authors, such as Turner (1999) claim that women were excluded from the nation-building process, although in the Turkish case, this view does not stand up.

Among few analyses see Giddens (1985); Mann (1986).

In order to see that modernisation theory understood modernity as a universal order, see Parsons (1971), the most influential theorist on this perspective.

Huntington (1997: 139-48) sees Russia and Turkey as ‘torn’ countries in terms of civilizational zone.

For world-systems perspective, see, necessarily, Wallerstein (1079).
However, it is also in this respect that the civilizational perspective forces itself to be considered in social analyses. The increase of relations between civilizations - as an outcome of modernity - does not necessarily bring about ‘global peace’, rather one question comes to the fore: who are we? And the civilizational context is an important provider of answers. For example, during the conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians, Turkey supported the Albanians and Russia the Serbs, not for reasons of ideology or power politics but because of cultural kinship.

For a better understanding of this theme, see Abrams (1982).

Here I use the term ‘creativity of action’ in the sense used by Castoriadis (1987): The ability of agents to help remake the institutional structure of the social world.

In terms of radical social transformations, Lenin’s perspective that, for a radical change, the hegemonic classes should not be able to live in the old way is important (Lenin, 1992).

Here I do not mean that Smith himself is ethnocentric, but according a central place to ethnicity in the analysis of nation is called ethnocentric perspective of nation.

For these three views, see Berkes (1978).

See Cumhuriyet, 10 April 2000. It was reported that some Kurds in the South-East are complaining that ‘since terrorism is over now, we have been forgotten again’. A social democrat author-musician, Zulfu Livaneli, also believes that the state should care more about the South-East now that the bloody clashes ended. In Sabah 13 April 2000.

Outside observers are contradictory and do not confirm each other as to the proportion of Kurds in turkey. According to CIA, it is 10%, for Barkey 20%, while it is 17% according to Rouleauae. Quoted in the Turkish Democracy Foundation (1996).

Some try to convince the public that the Kurds have right to establish their nation-state inside Turkey, because there is no difference between the Kurds and the new Central Asian peoples who were able to found their own states after the collapse of the Soviet union.
However, a crucial point is missed in this sort of argument: Soviet Russia had invaded Central Asia and aimed to Sovietise the people of Central Asia whereas, in Turkish history, there was no similar event concerning the Kurds. Nevertheless, some try to rewrite history for the sake of creating a Kurdish nation. See Kendal (1993).

39 The prime minister of the time, Turgut Ozal, of Kurdish origin, frequently stated on television programmes that the ‘pkk cannot pose a serious question to the Turkish state’.

40 The republic could only grant rights and liberties for individuals and it does not normally view some cultures as being a minority or a majority. The nature of the republic would not permit politicians to grant differential statuses to cultural, social and economic groups. in Turkey, only Christians and Jews were recognised as minorities in 1924 because of the Lozan contract, but the Jews refused minority rights because they found no problem in being Turkish citizens.

41 *Milliyet* 27, 28 February and 1,2,3March 1993.


43 It has often been argued that civil society is reproducing itself as a distinct entity from the state. For this argument, see Gellner (1995); Hall (1995).

44 Divisions in social science, as Wallerstein (1987: 312) put it, came from ‘...the dominant liberal ideology of the nineteenth century which argued that state and market, politics and economics, were analytically separate (and largely self-contained) domains, each with their particular rules (‘logics’).

45 In fact, if one takes Kemalism to be the founder of a modern polity - and not as a power wishing to institutionalise itself as the ultimate order - the populist tenet of Kemalism could be interpreted as a principle of Turkish democracy: governance of people, with the people, for the people.

46 For the impact of the Kemalist project on the entire Islamic world, see Sahinler (1991).
Some go too far to argue that Kemalism projected a ‘new’ civilization. See Ozankaya (1996).

For the social origins of Kemalism, see Ozbudun (1997).

For the crucial place of the military in the Turkish experience, see Hale (1994).

In order to see that Kemalist statism was not simply a response to the Great depression of 1929, see especially Boratav (1974).

It is generally argued that a party-state system cannot be transformed into a democratic regime unless a violent civil conflict is involved. See, for example, Sartori (1976).

The leader of the RRP, the second man of the republic, Inonu, declared in 1946, that he was Kemal’s successor whose ultimate ambition was believed to be ‘democracy’. Therefore, Inonu allowed multiparty democracy even by countering oppositions in his own party. See Aydemir (1999a and 1999b).

The DP understanding of democracy could be taken as ‘tyranny of majority’. This risk in democracy is in fact discussed by Tocqueville (1956).

The Turkish military coup of 1960 may positively be compared to the Portuguese officers in 1974 who brought down the authoritarian regime to then withdraw after having installed democracy.

For American approvement of the coup, see Birand (1987).

For the impact of Kemalism on the entire Islamic world, Sayyid (1997: 70) wrote: ‘...my interest in Kemalism is not to provide an analysis of post-Ottoman Turkey, but rather to demonstrate the wide significance that Kemal’s ideas and policies have beyond Turkey...Kemalism could not be treated as simply a local phenomenon peculiar to Turkey.’ And the same author also claimed: ‘Until the Iranian revolution, the hegemony of Kemalism had not suffered any serious setback’ (ibid.:89).
It should be noted that Turkey is on the waiting list for European membership, but it is also a member in the Islamic Union.

There is a ‘third way’ now: Islamism is viewed as an indicator of the postmodern condition. Not because Islamic societies have reached the highest point of modernity and that they then moved to postmodernity, but that Islamism is viewed to be decentralising the West. Therefore, it is taken to be postmodern (Sayyid, 1997).

The main problematic in works about the relations between Islam and modernity seems to be that both Islam and modernity have been taken to be coherent visions of life (see Gellner, 1992). Therefore, it is argued that two different, standard, and total world-interpretations are incompatible (Watt, 1988; Nasr, 1988).

For traditionalist accounts of Islamism, see Abrahamian (1993). I also find Eisenstadt’s view of modern fundamentalist movements useful in order to see that Islamism is, in fact, far from being a manifestation of Islamic tradition. ‘Although, seemingly traditional, these movements are, in fact, paradoxically, anti-traditional. They are anti-traditional in that they negate the living traditions, in their complexity and heterogeneity, of their respective societies or religions and, instead, uphold a highly ideological and essentialist conception of tradition as an overarching principle of cognitive and social organization’ (Eisenstadt, 1999: 98).

Some tend to argue for full compatibility of Islam(ism) with Western civilization. For an interesting discussion, see Turner (1989).

The following must be noted: an ‘idealized’ or ‘original’ version of Islam refers to the Islam of the Prophet’s life-time and that of modernity refers to the liberal Enlightenment project of modernity.

In Eisenstadt’s (1999: 20) consideration, Islam’s basic drive to create a civilization with the conflation of the political and religious communities was never fully attained, although there have always been some who promulgate this ideal.
Islamic sciences could briefly be divided into five categories: *Hadith*: this study aims to fill gaps in the Koran by the prophet’s sayings. *Tafsir*: it is a study of understanding the Koran. *Fikih*: a study of Islamic law. *Tasavvuf*: this realm of study aims to interpret the secret meanings of the Koran and Muhammed’s sayings. *Kalam*: discussions on the Koran held by the ulema.

For instance, an Emeritus Professor of Islamic Studies, William Watt, believes that the ulema were never able to understand the superiority of the West. Muslims should, thus, be thought of as ignorant and the Islamic world has always been a traditionalist world-view (Watt, 1988). One may always then ask the following question: would it be possible for the Renaissance to have emerged without Farabi, Ibn Rusd or Ibn Sina as it would have been difficult to talk about socio-political modernity if the world had not had Kant, Hegel, Marx?

See also Shin (2000) for an important observation in terms of how civil society is understood differently in South Korea.

Some may want to argue that Iran in the twentieth century has shown a precise model of Islamic theocracy (Abrahamian). An alternative argument, however, would demonstrate that the Iranian regime is not simply based on Islamic law by pointing out that, as recent events indicate, the Iranian revolution is also highly shaped by modern characteristics of polity.

I did not consider one of the most crucial themes, that of the female question, in terms of the relations between Islam and modernity, because the next chapter will deal precisely with a distinct trait of Turkish modernity: Turkish women were essential agents in the transformation to modernity.

For these three views, see Aydin (1994).

According to the Kemalist interpretation, Turkish civilization has met three civilizations: the Chinese civilization, under whose influence the Turks used the Altai alphabet, the Arabic-Persian civilization, under whose influence the Turks used the Arabic alphabet, and the
western civilization, under whose influence the Turks have used the Latin alphabet. See Aydemir (1998). This is important to show that the Turks have been borrowing from and were influenced by the civilizations with which they have met.

71 In this respect, it needs to be noted that Kemalism emerged in a socio-cultural world which had already distinguished itself from the Islamic centre. Therefore, it may not be convincing to use Kemalism as a general metaphor for describing the various Muslim regimes. Some, however, follow Sayyid (1997: 53) who claims: ‘...the purpose [in this book] is to establish Kemalism as a means of reading a wider Muslim political context’.

72 It is interesting to note that, while reactions against the abolition of the caliphate came from outside observers, inside Turkey, the abolishment of the caliphate was approved by the religious men in the Grand National Assembly. During the discussions about the caliphate in 1924, in the Grand National Assembly, Sheikh Saffet Efendi and his friends stated that the only legitimate authority is the Grand National Assembly and this is very compatible with Islam (Aydemir, 1998). So, it seems important to observe that, in the 1920s, the Turkish world in Anatolia had brought about religious scholars who had nothing against the abolition of the caliphate.

73 It is interesting that in two other later modernities, Japan and China, the Swiss civil code was adopted as well (Aydemir, 1998).

74 The hat was introduced to the people by Mustafa Kemal himself in Kastamonu where he had the following conversation with the mufti of the city: Mustafa Kemal: ‘What is the form of the dress in Islam?’ The Mufti: ‘There is no standard form of the dress in Islam. The form of dress depends on interest and need’ (Aydemir, 1998: 244). And in his talk to the public, Mustafa Kemal was asking the public: ‘Is our dress style national?’ And the public answers ‘no’. Then, he asks the further question: ‘Wearing the Greek fez has been accepted as legitimate, then, why should the hat not be legitimate?’ (Aydemir, 1998: 247). It is also important that when Kemal
returned to Ankara from Kastamonu, the amount of people wearing the hat was almost higher than the amount of people wearing the fez. So, one may not be able to argue that the hat reform was a westernising process against Islam.

Some argue that, in the emergence of Islamism, the basic reason was that the authoritarian regime did not allow larger sectors of society to participate in the political arena. Therefore, the mosque emerged as an arena of public discourse that the state could not monopolize. See, for example, Skocpol (1982).

Some of the people who face problems due to urbanization no doubt support the Islamist party, but Islamism’s emergence cannot be understood by emphasising the problems of these people as a central reason. In other words, if problems due to rapid urbanization had not come about, Islamism would still have emerged. In this respect, however, it must be insisted upon that the amount of Islamists in Turkey is vague due to the protesting votes of these people who face problems due to rapid urbanization. In the last general elections, the Islamist party, Fazilet, gained 17 per cent of the vote, but then one needs to search for the amount of the protest votes in this percentage.


Individual autonomy and universality are indeed the principles at the core of the project of modernity and they are the two principles which have been focused upon in critiques of modernity and which enliven the project of modernity.

Modernity has been called into question by some in terms of the ‘women’s issues’. It has been argued that modernity is a male dominated project. In this account of modernity, rationality and industry (these two features in particular) have been used to conceptualise modernity as male-dominated, since it is thought that rationality tells us about man as a
cultural being (since woman represents nature, emotionality and motherhood, she is not able to be rational) and that industry requires powerful physical conditions so that it is an area confined to man. In this respect, modernity - once more - emerges as a many-sided phenomenon but, nevertheless, it cannot be argued that modernity is more male-dominated than other historical ages. Central to my argument is the modern condition in which women could find space to become actors of history then be extended to both sexes. For this argument, see, for instance, Felski (1995).

80 In Islamist women’s rejection of modernity, fear in terms of ontological security could be said to be playing a part, since within the traditional world women feel men to be protecting and supporting them so that they feel safe whereas, within modernity, one necessarily needs to be the subject of one’s own life. Sometimes, it is indeed the case that people prefer discipline over liberty for security reasons, as is well explained by Fromm (1941).

81 For Islam’s view of sexual morality, see, for example, Cosan (1987). For a secularist view on the theme see, for instance, Calislar (1991).

82 See Arat (1995). Arat works on the journal Kadin ve Aile (Women and Family), in order to discuss whether the Islamist women’s movement could be compatible with feminism. It is certainly important that Arat translated the following from the journal: ‘...we know that it is the female bird that makes the nest and nurtures the ties of love among family members. You are the pillars of the nest and the foundation of society. Men become happy and successful because of you, when they come home, they forget the exhaustion of the day, the troubles and turmoil of life, and find consolation in you, sleep happily and contented’ (Kadin ve Aile, 1995, p.3).

83 The interviews with intellectuals on Turkish modernity were conducted by my self in Ankara and Izmir in October 1998.

84 Tansu Ciller, leader of Dogru Yol Party, talked about the Kemalist achievements, when she was elected as prime minister.
It must be emphasised to Islamists that one of the unforgettable principles of Kemalism was anti-imperialism. Kemalism achieved the first success against imperialism in Asia and Africa.

‘...she is completely devoted herself to her husband, she does not show herself to strange men, does not look at them. She does not go out without her husband’s permission, and does not receive any male and female guests at home...’ The above is a description of the ideal woman by the journal Kadin ve Aile. Translation by Acar (1991).

The examples are taken from Gole (1996) but are reinterpreted.

It should be insisted again that, in this thesis, the West primarily refers to western Europe.

For a counter argument, see Eren (1963).

For a counter argument, see Ozel (1992).
References


Avcioglu, Dogan (1973) *Turkiye’nin Duzeni.* Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi.


