Talbot, Lorraine (2013) Why shareholders shouldn’t vote : a Marxist-progressive critique of shareholder empowerment. Modern Law Review, Volume 76 (Number 5). pp. 791-816. doi:10.1111/1468-2230.12036

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Abstract

This paper argues that liquidity, short-termism and low involvement in corporate governance are fundamental ingredients of shareholders’ value maximisation strategies. Neither shareholders nor their representatives will voluntarily adopt restrictions which inhibit their ability to pursue these strategies, such as those presented by the Stewardship Codes. Utilising Marxist and progressive theory this paper evidences the tendency for all capital (including shares) to seek liquidity. It presents historical evidence which shows that political policy can either restrict this tendency, as it did in the progressive and post war period, or facilitate it, as it did in nineteenth century England and in the current neoliberal period. The shareholder empowerment initiatives examined in this paper are therefore best understood as strategies to justify shareholder claims in the current crisis and to thereby protect the neoliberal status quo.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
Journal or Publication Title:	Modern Law Review
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
ISSN:	0026-7961
Official Date:	2 September 2013
Dates:	Date Event 2 September 2013 Published
Volume:	Volume 76
Number:	Number 5
Page Range:	pp. 791-816
DOI:	10.1111/1468-2230.12036
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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