TRADE UNIONS IN TURKEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR DEVELOPMENT, ROLE AND PRESENT SITUATION.

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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgements</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) The Thesis: The Conceptual and Analytical Perspectives for the Understanding of Turkish Trade Unions.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Why TURK-IS?</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Why 1960-1990s?</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Why European Context?</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Method of Study.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Outline of the Thesis.</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART I</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Major Developments in Trade Unionism in Various Countries in 1960s and 70s.</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) The Post-war Settlement.</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) The Experience of &quot;Corporatism&quot;.</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Conclusion.</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Economic, Social and Political Structure of Turkey and the Development of Trade Unions in Turkey in the 1960s and 70s.</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) The Economic and Political Context Before 1960 and the Beginning of Trade Unionism.</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Political and Economic Developments from 1960s Until 1980: Import Substitution Industrialisation and Emerging Societal Corporatism.</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) The 1960 Legal Reforms and the Rise of Turkish Trade Unionism.</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Towards the Emergence of a New Trade Union Movement.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Conclusion.</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Chapter 4

**TURK-IS: History, Principles and Organisational Framework.**

(i) The Internal Structure of TURK-IS.  
(ii) The Principles and Ideology of TURK-IS.  
(iii) Activities of TURK-IS.  
(iv) Representative Function of TURK-IS.  
(v) Conclusion: Some Comparison and General View.

Notes

# Chapter 5

**The Role of TURK-IS in Turkish Industrial Relations (1960-1980).**

(i) Relations with the State and Politics.  
(ii) Organisational Developments.  
(iii) Collective Bargaining Activity.  
(iv) Strikes and TURK-IS.  
(v) Conclusion.

Notes

# PART II

# Chapter 6

**The Changing Environment and European Unions in the 1980s.**

(i) Effects of the Challenges of the 1980s on Trade Unions.  
(ii) Trade Union’s Responses to Crises.  

# Chapter 7

**The Challenges of the 1980s and After and its Impacts on Turkish Unions.**

(i) The 1980 Military Intervention Period.  
(ii) Transition Period Towards Democracy.  
   (a) Anti-Union Legislation:  
      (ii) An Assessment of the Legislation in the Light of International Standards.  
   (b) Cultural and Ideological Offensive:
Chapter 8

Turkish Trade Unions' Responses in a Hostile Environment and the Changing Role of TURK-IS.

(i) The 1980 Military Intervention Period. 223
(ii) Changing Strategies in TURK-IS Unions Traditional Stand. 227
(iii) The Major Strikes, the Mobilisation of Workers and TURK-IS. 249
(iv) More Recent Developments and Growing Unrest Once again among the Workers. 259
(v) Conclusion: A Rediscovery of the New Political Solutions? 262

Notes 264

Chapter 9

Conclusion and Suggestions.

(i) General View: Defining a New Role for Turkish Unions and “Political Mediation” in an Area of Uncertainty. 268
(ii) A Discussion Concerning Alternative Model of Trade Union Actions in the 1990s for Turkish Unions. 278

References 289

List of Tables:

Table 1: Number of Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations and their Membership. 59
Table 2: Strikes by Sectors 1963-1980. 63
Table 3: Workdays Lost Due to Strike Action. 64
Table 4: Strikes 1963-1992. 250
Acknowledgements

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on the trade union movement in Turkey with particular reference to the Turkish confederation of trade unions (TURK-IS) and its members. Case studies were conducted in both TURK-IS and its member unions, widely, based on open-ended interviews with union officials, but also involving the analysis of union's reports, documents and journals, the observation of workers education seminars and visits to the state's institutions and employers' organisations. The main purposes of the thesis have been to illustrate the changing nature, role and struggle of the Turkish unions in the context of the changing economic, political and social structure of Turkey. It also focuses on the dominant trends in trade unionism in a European context.

The study argues that an explicit and theorised understanding of internal and external pressure on the trade union movements as they emerge in many countries, is of fundamental significance to the Turkish trade unions. It is argued that the trend in the Turkish labour relations in the 1960s and 70s seemed to be the co-operation of unions in the formulation of policies, related to national economic performance and social stability in politics. In other words, unions were tolerated to provide both economic and social stability at macro level and manageability and certainty at micro level in the light of the industrialisation process.

In this context, Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) was the model of capital accumulation, which required trade unions to become integrated within the new economic and political policies in order to secure an economically and politically stable industrial relations framework. In this respect, the Turkish unions played a mediating role between the state, employers and workers.

It is also argued that the changing system of capital accumulation (a move from ISI to "market liberalism") in the 1980s has endangered the traditional institutional arrangements. The traditional role of interest representation for unions, particularly as mediation between the ruling class and working class, has become problematic. The decline of union power, due to changes in their environments, has also weakened the value of central labour organisations as mediators between the state, employers and workers. The anti-labour policies seems to have been the outcome of strategic interventions of the governments and employers. In this context, particularly in the 1980s explicit reference to theoretical frameworks have tended to increase in favour of "strategic choices" and "union identities".

The study argues that in the Turkish case, unions have not been faced with a complete policy of exclusion. In other words, the material conditions of "integrative" "collaborative" or "corporatist" policies have been reduced, however, they have not been completely eliminated. The reasons for this might be that although the economic power of TURK-IS and its members was no longer so important for the government, the political mediating role of unions became significant in the period of the 1980s, which included the transition to democracy, the process of integration of Europe, the implementation of austerity policies and the fear of the possible failure of the parliamentary regime.

I argue in the thesis that under the painful and complex process of economic and political reconstruction and the development of democracy the Turkish trade unions have been faced with a number of tactical and political options in the rapidly evolving issue of European Integration and of democracy and the increasing uniformity amongst member of TURK-IS. The Turkish case suggests that trade unions can achieve a position of influence in industrial relations systems as long as they pursue politically motivated strategies by setting a new agenda for members, articulating the broad long-term interests of the working class and finally displaying collective responses and collective responsibility. In this respect, it is argued that there is still a significant scope for a more active initiating and co-ordinating role for central labour organisations and unions can pursue more comprehensive and tenable trade union strategies.
Abbreviations

AFL-CIO American Federation of Labour Congress of Industrial Organisation.
Agac-Is Wood and Lumber Workers' Union
Bass Banking and Insurance Employees
Basin-Is Press Technicians' Union
Basisen Banking and Insurance Workers' Union
Belediye-Is Municipal and General Workers' Union
Cimse-Is Cement, Ceramic, Glass Workers' Union
DGB German Trade Union Federation
Demiryol-Is Railway Workers' Union
Deri-Is Leather and Shoe Workers' Union
DISK Confederation of Reformist Trade Unions
Dokgemi-Is Port, Dock and Shipbuilding Workers' Union
DP Democratic Party
ETUC European Trade Union Confederation
Genel Maden-Is General Mineworkers' Union
GSSE General Confederation of Greek Workers
HAK-IS Confederation of Righteous Trade Unions of Turkey
Hava-Is Airway Workers' Union
ILO International Labour Office
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ISI Import Substitution Industrialisation
JP Justice Party
Kristal-Is Glass Workers' Union
MISK Confederation of Nationalist Trade Unions of Turkey
MP Motorland Party
OECD Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development
Petrol-Is Petroleum, Oil and Chemical Workers' Union
RPP Republican People's Party
SDPP Social Democratic Populist Party
SPO State Planning Organisation
Tekgida-Is Food, Tobacco and Drink Workers' Union
Teksif Textile, Knitting and Clothing Workers' Union
TISK Turkish Confederation of Employers' Associations
TLP Turkish Labour Party
TPP True Path Party
UGT-P Portuguese General Workers' Union
UGT Spanish General Workers' Union
Yol-Is Construction and Building Workers' Union
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

(i) The Thesis: The Conceptual and Analytical Perspectives for the Understanding of Turkish Trade Unions.

This is a study about the trade union movement in Turkey with particular reference to the Turkish Confederation of trade unions (TURK-IS) and its members in the light of cross-national perspectives. The study examines the development, model, role and struggle of TURK-IS which is the country's leading labour organisation.

Trade unions are expected to accommodate both their members and their external environments. Their role, policies and strategies are shaped in terms of the relations between the external and internal environments of the unions. The influence of trade unions can be also seen as a product of their successful interaction with their external and internal environments (Hartmann and Lau 1980). In this context, the nature of unions is based on their capacity for both mobilising or constraining their members and seeking the opportunities for the recognition and concessions from the state and employers.

Some scholars have concentrated on organisational explanations of trade union movements irrespective of the overlap and complex relations between unions' internal and external environment (Martin 1962, Windmuller 1975). Martin (1989:110) argues that:
"it is trade union movements themselves, rather than the political and economic context in which they operate, which must be given priority in any attempt to establish a workable typology of such movements. In other words, the distinguishing criteria of the typology need to be derived directly from the trade unions and whatever aspects of their structure, behaviour, or experience is involved".

These studies lacked elaboration of the impact of external forces on the union's external influence. On the other hand, some analysts employed a more elaborate formulation or classification of different national trade union movements in terms of the nature of the politico-economic systems (Kerr at al 1964, Dahrendorf 1959). A number of authors also grouped trade union movements by considering the relations between trade unions and governments, political parties, or collective bargaining such as (Millen 1963, Davis 1966 and Clegg 1976). However, these approaches mentioned above seem problematic in the Turkish case, since the relations between unions and other elements such as unions and working class party relations, workshop organisations etc. are either weak or absent. They also fall well short of providing satisfactory explanations for the analysis of changes in economic and political situations and of the struggle of the working class at crucial times.

In fact, academics' interest in the role of unions in national labour relations increased with the emergence of studies on the capitalist state and the issue of corporatism (Schmitter 1977, Panitch 1977, Lehmbucb 1977). In this sense, there is no doubt that significant emphasis was given to the role and function of the trade unions. Therefore, the themes "mediating agency" or "intermediary organisation" were pursued in the discussion to describe the general character and posture of trade unions. For example, Muller-Jentsch's (1985) distinction between co-operative, militant and social contract
forms of intermediary trade unionism offered important comments on the elaboration of the role of national trade union movements, although he did not say much about how trade unions adopt or change co-operative, militant or social contract forms of their intermediary role within the continued crises of capitalist structural framework or how the relationships (among state, employers and workers) which trade unions maintain affect each other (1).

Significant here is the understanding of trade unions and their role as institutions and processes of mediation. This point is important to make sense of the nature and the process of trade unions within the Turkish context. This discussion can become a theoretical starting point. It offers the crucial potential for looking at the establishment and development of trade unions; their relations with external and internal environments and their struggles from the perspective of the state, employers and workers relations.

Hence, in interaction with the external and internal relations of trade unions, the economic and political context and organisational strength play very important roles in understanding a country's union developments, roles and responses against the background of both external and internal developments. In this sense, a conceptual and analytical framework can be explored so as to illustrate the complex and potential impact of external and internal forces on the national union movements and labour organisations.

Most academics in Europe have described the last decade as the crisis of trade unions. Among the important reasons given in explanation of the decline of union power are: considerable changes in the economic and political environments, the occupational and sectoral structures, the structure of potential membership and employers and management strategies. The profound changes in the environment of trade unions have
had a significant impact on the trade union movement including a decline in union membership and strikes, an increasing diversity of interest within unions and workers, a decline in the authority of central confederation and the threat of their image.

As in the case of most European countries, unions in Turkey have also been affected by the changing environment of the 1980s. While some of the developments seem to have been similar, factors which could be given for the deteriorating union situations may have been somewhat different in Turkey. The aim of this study is to attempt not only to discuss some parallel developments which are universal in character in many countries, but also to explore the key factors and outcomes unique to the Turkish case. In other words, in the light of changes in other countries' trade union movements, what are the distinctive and similar developments in the Turkish case. In order to draw a clear picture of Turkish unions the main purpose is also to analyse the undergoing external conditions, constraints, institutions, policies and strategies which have been likely to influence and reshape the role of unions under the changing circumstances of the 1980s and after.

In this thesis, the basic approach to understanding the contemporary Turkish trade union movement is that Turkish unions are located in the particular economic, social and political context of Turkey. Therefore, trade unions should not be treated in isolation from the economic, political and social factors influencing them. It is simply in the dynamic, complex and contradictory interplay of economic, political and social relations that trade unions are established and developed. In other words, the formation, development and role of trade unions should be placed in their historical context and nationally specific political and economic settings and structural constraints.
In this study the Turkish unions' changing nature, role and struggle are analysed in the context of the changing economic, political and social structure of Turkey. It also focuses on the dominant trends in trade unionism in a European context and relates them to the empirical reality of Turkey. Within this framework, the understanding of Turkish unions might be dependent on continuing changes in the politico-economic system and the relations between state, employers, workers and other institutions. In short, they can be regarded as natural outcomes of their environments.

During the period from World War II until the 1960s and partly the 1970s, due to the sustained capitalist expansion, reasonable concession between state, employers and unions was witnessed in many countries. This period is widely accepted as "institutionalisation of conflict" in industrial relations. This type of industrial relations system let unions enter into a specific set of mediating processes (Hyman 1989).

While the capitalist expansion continued to provide the margin for compromise among opposing interests by setting up peaceful and orderly relations, mostly, in the name of "national interests", the notion of "pluralistic industrialism" gave rise to "industrial relations pluralism" in which workers' disruptive power was controlled. Therefore, the trend in labour relations in the 1960s and 70s seemed to be the co-operation of unions in the formulation of policies, related to national economic performance and social stability in politics.

In a somewhat similar way, although the capital expansion or development and labour movement were weak compared with European countries, the economic and political strategies of governments in Turkey in the 1960s and 70s required the recognition of unions as intermediary organisations. This can also be seen as an attempt to establish a "pluralistic industrial relations system" in Turkey in the consideration of social stability
and economic development policies through "integration" or "collaboration" and sometimes "social contract". This labour "inclusive" policy was also, most probably, due to the recognition of governments of the potential disruptive power of trade unions.

From the beginning of the establishment of the industrial relations system in Turkey in the 1960s as bargainers with state and employers, unions tended to be considered as an indication of "business" unionism, albeit not often in the American sense, because, unions also pursued militant wage and social policies. As a result of ideological developments, the attempts for centralisation of union structure and militant wage claims, the effort for a "social contract" was witnessed in the late 1970. However, in the Turkish context, in comparison with most European countries corporatism did not become a significant notion as a part of social democratic ideologies of macro economic policies. Rather, it appeared as a consequences of "the pragmatic needs of government to come to terms with the power of unions and their members to disrupt" (as Hyman (1989:172-173) described it for English case). In other words, the economic and political crises and instability further required the co-operation of unions once more, this time through "social contract". On the unions' side, the slogan of "organisational needs" was a popular term, particularly in TURK-IS. In other words, the statement of Flanders (1969:238) "institutional interests of their organisation in survival and growth" for unions was also helpful to understand the point of Turkish unionists' views at the time. In short, the main concentration for Turkish unions was to preserve the integrity of the union and avoid a collapse of its strength. In this period, it might be over simple to define Turkish unions either as "Business" type or "social contract " type, but, they were likely to be identified between the two categories. However, the emergence of novel, changing and frequently difficult economic and political circumstances for trade unions in the 1980s and 90s, has opened the question of the relationship between unions and their environments and their changing role once more to discussion not only in the
industrial relations arena but also in society as a whole. The political and economic crises of capitalist development have again required new labour strategies, whether "inclusive" or "exclusive" for governments. It is a fact that in most countries in the 1980s and after, the traditional role of interest representation for unions, particularly as mediators between the ruling class and working class, has become problematic.

The profound changes in the environment of trade unions have had a significant impact on trade union movements in many countries. The fact is that the ability of unions to disrupt the priorities of the ruling class in the same period has been undermined. Thus, the political and economic consideration of collaborative or corporatist strategies for governments has been diminished. In these circumstances, the "exclusive" labour policies of governments seem to have become more crucial. This is important because the decline of union power, due to changes in their environments, has also reduced the value of central labour organisations as mediators between the state, employers and workers. In this sense, one of the changes of the 1980s, observable in all European countries, was "the very widespread diminution of the role played by central organisations" (Baglioni 1990:10). This development seems to have "decomposed the intermediary character of unions" (Müller-Jentsch 1988:176). It is also likely to weaken internal authority of unions and diminish their external recognition as a bargaining partner.

On the other hand, there seem to be new professional associations, quasi-trade unions and unionisation of expanding sectors and other independent organisations being established outside the framework of the central confederations. According to Hyman (1994) these developments may also encourage a more active initiating and coordinating role for central confederations. He also suggests various options (e.g. company union, social partner and social movement) available to trade unions in Europe in the 1990s. Taking Hyman's ideal models as a starting-point, the Turkish case shows
that room for manoeuvering still exists. Although the outcome can be somewhat different; depending on unions' distinctive objectives, tactics and strategies.

At least for the Turkish case it would be wrong to argue that unions have been faced with a complete policy of exclusion. Although the material conditions of "integrative" "collaborative" or "corporatist" policies have been reduced, they have not been completely eliminated. For example, Ozal's government challenged the status of TURK-IS as the main representative of Turkish workers, but it did not diminish its role. The reasons for this might be that although the economic power of TURK-IS and its members was not so important for the government, the political status of unions was still significant in a critical period which included the transition to democracy, the process of the integration of Europe, the implementation of austerity policies and the fear of the possible failure of the parliamentary regime.


The study focuses not only on social institutions, but also the broad political and economic context, therefore, it should be considered in this light. This is necessary given a context where comprehensive labour studies are not yet well-developed. There is neither a tradition of debate on the working-class movement, nor complementary institutional histories of trade unions. In other words, Turkish literature on trade unionism is inadequate in two crucial respects. First, the institutional forms of trade unionism as a focus are absent. Second, it lacks anything approaching a serious explanatory theory of national trade union movements.
The debates on trade unionism have also never been of a sufficient level. There are several grounds for this yet by and large the following factors can be suggested: First, the almost hegemonic nature of positivism and pluralism in most Turkish social sciences. Secondly, the legalistic orientation of Turkish studies, which denies a wider conceptual and analytical approach. There have chiefly been a lack of study about the economic, political and ideological issues of workers-unions-state-employers relations. In fact, most of studies on trade unions were based on explaining Turkish labour legislation. Therefore, the major problem which appeared during the course of this study was the lack of any field work about trade union organisations in Turkey. Moreover, in the English language, secondary literature on Turkish unions was also absent. As a matter of fact, the field of industrial relations is a new discipline in Turkey where only a very limited study has been done so far.

In a few studies the methodologies used were concerned with collecting data from institutions dependent on the state, including official Ministry of Labour statistics rather than focusing on more direct methods such as interviews with union officials, local labour representatives or observation, particularly on the conditions of employment and general attitudes of the states and employers. In addition to this, the absence of alternative critical views on trade unionism in Turkish literature is also crucial. More importantly, none of these studies such as Tuna (1964), Hale (1977), Dereli (1968), (1984) (most of them were short articles written before the 1980s) has a cross-national perspective which would allow readers to make comparison on various important issues.

However, it can be mentioned that a more comprehensive historical account of the trade union movement in Turkey can be found in writers' works such as Rose (1962), Isikli (1967, 1979), Tuna (1964), although most of these studies dealt with trade unions developments during relatively short historical periods and none of them is up to date.
Even so, irrespective of their weakness, these studies contribute to our understanding of labour history and trade unionism in Turkey.

Broadly speaking, considering the empirical side of study, two important points have to be made. The first is that as far as trade union organisations are concerned, the thesis focuses on the country's leading labour organisation, TURK-IS and its member unions which are national in scope. However, it does not neglect the activities, attitudes and aspirations of workers and organisational and collective means of struggles. Especially, the empirical research work has been carried out on two levels. The first is to be "external" relations of TURK-IS such as relations with the state and employers organisations. The second is to be "internal" relations of the confederation such as the relations between the confederation and industrial organisations. The study concentrates on the Turkish confederation of trade unions (TURK-IS) and its affiliates from the national level of confederation down to industrial organisational level so as to answer the questions raised during the interviews and more importantly develop my arguments on Turkish trade union movements. Then, the relation between the two levels will be also be examined, how the external and internal relations of TURK-IS shape the objectives, strategies and roles of the confederation, and with what problems.

Thus, the external and internal approaches are preferred in the hope of offering interesting insights into the level of importance different trade unions attach to their national structures. Hopefully, the benefit of this is that it enables us to understand the external and internal relations of the confederation and to provide an analytical and comparative study. In this context the present study, which adopts a more analytical view of the trade union movement in Turkey, should be seen as an attempt to provide a more critical approach to Turkish unions. In short, the thesis seeks to illustrate what the contemporary experience of Turkey can tell us about trade unions in Turkey. It also
takes a cross-national analysis of trade union movements into account. Particularly it is concerned with the patterns, development, role and policies of Turkish unions under the changing economic, social and political climate of Turkey.

(a) Why TURK-IS?

As a case study, TURK-IS and its members are of interest for two reasons in particular. In the first place, it occupies an important position in the hierarchy of contemporary Turkish pressure groups considering its formal and informal links with government and its relations with employers and political parties (although it does not have a direct close link with any political party). Second, its capacity for attracting public attention is crucial and finally it has a long history in the Turkish labour movement especially under the changing economic, social and political structure of Turkey (TURK-IS, which has 32 affiliates with total membership of 1,784,663 is the largest labour confederation in Turkey).

My first exploratory visit to Turkey in April 1992 allowed me concentrate on all members (industrial unions) rather than select a number of industries or industrial unions. The key reasons for this is that firstly, as far as the level and development of the Turkish industrial relations system is concerned, there is a significant need to do research about national level actors (the state, employers and trade unions) before going into sectoral or workplace level. Even in Europe, academic interest has only recently shifted from national to workplace level. Considering that Turkish unions have only 30 years of history (compared with over a century of European trade union history) and the absence of academic debate even at the national level, it can be clearly seen why the study focuses on this level. Second, the relations between unions and other elements,
such as unions and working class party relations and workplace representation have not emerged in Turkey. Therefore, these kinds of relations can not carry much weight for the investigation of the Turkish trade union movement. Finally, in Turkey particularly in the 1980s, the same model of struggle and responses among all unions in different sectors or industries was witnessed against external pressure. This might make the Turkish case more interesting. How can Turkish unions produce the same responses against the challenges of the 1980s? how do unions provide this unity and how does this happen? The main reason for this is, probably, because most of the members of TURK-IS are organised in the public sector. All these facts also lead us to take all members of the confederation into consideration.

(b) WHY 1960-1990s?

The period of this study is from 1960, the year when the first steps were taken to establish an industrial relations system in Turkey, to the 1990s. In fact, the 1960s witnessed two significant developments in Turkish labour history. Firstly, the constitution of 1961 provided articles 46 and 47 on trade union freedom, the right of workers to bargain collectively with employers and the right to strike. Secondly, this coincided with a period of rapid economic development. Moreover, the 1980s was a crucial turning point in the history of the country's trade union movement as it marked the implementation of another round of more restrictive labour legislation in 1983. With reference to the role of TURK-IS in the industrial relations system, the 1980s were significant years since it remained as the only strong and effective leading labour organisation. What is more, the change in government leadership in October 1991 is said to have brought a "new" shift in the political and economic approach of the government, which in turn resulted in significant changes in labour relations.
It is for these various reasons that the study is confined to 1960-90s, a period which covers the formation, development and changing role of TURK-IS. This suggests that the periodization of the study is sufficient for a proper appraisal and understanding of patterns, development, role and struggle of Turkish unions.

(c) Why European Context?

Regarding the Turkish trade union movement, a number of reasons for the selection of a European context or of the European conceptual and analytical perspectives can be suggested. First, I reject comparing Turkey with the framework of developing or third world countries. This is because most studies on developing countries have taken as their prototype the colonial or post colonial state and its implications for trade union movement, which is the common political form in Afro-Asia. However, the inappropriateness of this approach for Turkey is quite obvious. As Hale (1977) argued: given the descendants of one of the major powers of renaissance Europe, Turkey's post-renaissance history has more in common with that of Austria-Hungary than with that of Nigeria, India or Brazil.

Therefore, Turkey's industrial progress is unique among developing nations due to the absence of a colonial overlay. Moreover, it is also not quite safe to relate Latin American experiences to the Turkish case simply by taking military interventions into consideration. Military take-overs seem to reflect a complex combination of factors unique to each country, with diverse consequences. How can one explain that after the military interventions of Turkey, unions always immediately restructured and re-emerged as an indispensable social partner of the Turkish industrial relations system, unlike most Latin American countries?
In terms of a systematic analysis of the development of each country's economic, political, social and democracy process it is quite possible to say that there are important similarities between Turkey and particularly Southern European countries. In addition, through Turkey's various memberships of such international organisations as the council of Europe, and OECD, she seems more close to European countries in many respects. It is possible that Turkey can be part of the European Community (EC) in a future time. Turkey made an application on 14th April 1987 for full membership to the European Community (EC) in accordance with article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. Various attempts have already been undertaken by Turkey in order to adapt its economic and social structure to EC standards. More importantly, all Turkish unions are linked to European trade unions at international level.

(d) Method of Study.

Although my intention is to restrict the investigation to the nature of and extent of Turkish unions, a study of trade unions in Turkey requires the analysis of existing knowledge and evidence in European literature in order to reach more general conclusion for the Turkish case. This approach is termed a "comparative review" (Hyman 1992b). There has been a tendency in Turkish literature to focus on the formal legal structures as a basis for comparison, rather than to address the more complex information practices and processes of trade union movements in other countries. A comparative approach to the study of Turkish trade unions would be a useful way of verifying hypotheses or of producing generalisations derived from research findings in a variety of natural contexts. Since the thesis is mostly about Turkish unions, the comparative dimension in the study is organised around a number of central topics rather than being in the form of a side by side treatment of a number of individual
countries. This method can be called "integrated approach" (Bean 1985). This is to avoid a concentration on the domestic minutiae and empirical details of union practices within the particular countries which may be available elsewhere in detail. The intention is to deal with material theme by theme rather than country by country. In short, the thesis has been informed by a wide reading of the secondary source material in European literature.

Generally speaking, anyone attempting research into Turkish trade unions in industrial relations has to take the problem of methodology into consideration. Although it may need a tight focus, it is sometimes difficult to specify the scope of research due to the variety of circumstances and the complexity of every aspect of trade unionists’ and workers’ behaviour. In the study, the case study method is applied. The main reason to choose this method is that observation and interviews are most frequently used in case study and methods of collecting information can be selected, which are also appropriate for the task (Bulmer 1977, Bell 1987). It should be said that each organisation has its common and its unique features under the different economic and social structure. Therefore, in the hope of the case study, the aim is to identify such features and to show how they affect the implementation of systems and influence the way an organisation functions.

Three separate research visits to Turkey provided the bulk of original documentary, and interview material. Because, most of the empirical evidence was only available through interviews, these have been cited comprehensively throughout the study. Interviews were conducted through direct contact and mostly open-ended informal talk. The questions raised throughout the thesis are shaped not only by myself, but also by the trade unions. In other words, problems were of interest to both myself and the trade unions.
As far as the method is concerned, the basic method used in this study can be summarised as follows:

a) Documents including conference and Annual Reports of and Journal of TURK-IS and of its members have been used.

b) Interviews with the Minister of Labour, Mehmet Mogultay, the president of TURK-IS, Bayram Meral and Executive committee, Salih Kilic and Enver Tocoglu and ex-president of the confederation, Halil Tunc and ex-general secretary of TURK-IS, Kaya Ozdemir, the president of TISK (Employer organisation), Refik Baydur and vice president of KOC, Tugrul Kudatgobilik (the largest and the most important private company with 40,000 workers in Turkey) were conducted and also 28 national unions and 22 local branches of some of these national unions were visited (most interviews were conducted with the leaders of and the members of the executive committee of these unions). In addition to this, 3 union education seminars in different industries were attended and a great number of union officials, shop stewards and workers were interviewed. The interviews took place in Istanbul, Ankara and Kocaeli, three major industry cities in Turkey.

c) Observational analyses based on the interviews and personal contacts have been made.

d) Two popular journalists, Sukran Ketenci and Yildirim Koc (who is also a consultant for the president of TURK-IS) on labour issues were interviewed and consulted by personal contact. At both Istanbul and Ankara universities the academics in industrial relations area were also consulted to share their knowledge and experience in Turkish unionism.

e) A number of institutions visited to gather information are: the Association of Quality for companies in Istanbul, the Ministry of Labour
in Ankara, the State Statistics Institute in Ankara, the Bureau of International Labour Organisation in Ankara, the Archives of two Turkish newspapers, Cumhuriyet and Milliyet in Istanbul, International Labour organisation (ILO) in Geneva in Switzerland and International Confederation of Free Trade unions (ICFTU) and European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) in Brussels in Belgium.

(e) Outline of the Thesis.

The thesis is divided into two parts. While the first part will cover the periods of 1960s and 70s, the second part will include the periods of 1980s and after. In part 1, the approach adopted was to understand the trade union movement in Turkey in the 1960s and 70s in terms of the incorporation of trade unions into the economic and political institutions of the newly emerged Turkish capitalism and of the transformation of their role as representative organisations of Turkish workers. In other words, it was argued that the project of the ruling class in those years was to include trade unions in the formulation and implementation of economic and political goals, notably stable economic growth and social peace. In this part, the terms such as "mediating agency" or "intermediary organisations" used by European academics as Müller-Jentsch (1985), Hyman (1975) were also employed to describe the general character and posture of Turkish trade unions. In other words, it is suggested that these themes in the Turkish context could be also discussed for the understanding of Turkish unions through, perhaps, different explanation or reasons.

In this context, the task in Chapter 2 is to explain the development, patterns and major trends in other countries' trade union movements during the period under examination.
Chapter 3 focuses on an account of the origins and development of Turkish unions in the light of the economic, social and political structure of Turkey. In other words, the economic, social and political structure of Turkey will be examined to understand the conditions of the country in which Turkish unions are operating, mainly, it is to demonstrate the external factors which have a great deal of influence on the development of Turkish unions. The task here is to ask such questions as-

- What were the principal determining features of trade union development and how were these shaped in Turkey and by whom?
- What role did trade unions themselves have in these process, how were they affected by the external and internal environments upon which they act and why?
- How did these relations between the internal and external forces affect the development model of Turkish trade unions?

Chapter 4 concentrates on the history and structure of TURK-IS by illustrating its functions, principles and activities. This is necessary to answer the questions like

- Why, when and how did attempts occur in order to set up a labour confederation in Turkey?
- What were the results and product of such efforts?
- What are the ideology and objective of TURK-IS as far as industrial relations is concerned?
- What is the representative function of TURK-IS both at national and international level?

Chapter 5 gives particular attention to an analysis of the role of TURK-IS in Turkish industrial relations system particularly in relation to the relations with the state, political parties and collective bargaining. It also deals with the important issue of union democracy and leadership.
In part 2, the main purpose is to analyse the external conditions, constraints, institutions, policies and strategies which are likely to influence and reshape the role of unions under the changing circumstances of the 1980s and 90s. Basically, the question here is what happened particularly after 1980 and how far these changes represented a substantial difference from the past, mainly, since 1960.

The task in part 2 is to find out what have been the main changes in the external and internal environments of trade unions and how these challenged their organisation and practice. In this part, it might be also argued that although the challenges of the 1980s and 90s have tended to decompose the intermediary character of unions, the Turkish case suggests that there is still a role for national unions and confederations.

Chapter 6 explores the changes in trade union movements in other countries in the 1980s. Chapter 7 discusses the political, economic and institutional changes and constraints and, more importantly, their impact on Turkish unions. It also deals with such major issues as privatization, anti-labour legislation, cultural and ideological offensive and the changing nature of collective bargaining.

The purpose in Chapter 8 is to analyse how trade unions in Turkey affect the extent and nature of current difficulties. Can trade unions produce effective responses to new external pressures? Do they have such capacities? What sort of opportunities and policies are available to unions and can Turkish unions present an area of strategic choices in responding to the challenges and changes of the 1980s and 90s? In this chapter, it is argued that unions do have such capacities when they act collectively and pursue the economic interests of their members as well as political interests and explains how this happens. And also it argues that trade unions can produce "strategic choice" because they might seek to improve their current sets of contextual opportunities.
In the Turkish context, the key question might be also whether under the changing economic and political environment in the 1980s and 90s the role of trade unions as "intermediary organisations" "mediating agency" is still possible? If not, what can be the changing role of unions in Turkey? This lead us to Chapter 9. Chapter 9 concludes the study by analysing the findings in the light of general discussion and arguing whether alternative patterns of trade union actions in the 1990s for Turkish unions can be suggested through taking the recent conceptual or analytical perspectives on the subject in European literature into consideration.

NOTES:

1) The term, "intermediary organisation" is also used with reference to a unionism committed to reform within the capitalist structural framework. This is a unionism which sees its future and the future of the working class as being determined by close co-operation with capital and the government of the day, and that it is solely prepared to exert its role to the extent that this does not antagonise the power structure (Müller-Jentsch 1985).
PART I
CHAPTER 2

THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE UNIONISM IN
VARIOUS COUNTRIES IN THE 1960s AND 70s.

(i) The Post-war Settlement.

Some similar developments in various countries' trade union movements in the 1960s and 70s have been discussed by scholars. Broadly speaking, it would not be wrong to describe the post-war period as a Keynesian welfare state. At its base is a belief that the post-war boom had a significant effect on the economic role of the state and the political regime of accumulation. The state had to ensure the management of the national economy in order to secure the conditions for continued economic growth and mass consumption. This policy was combined with a political exchange, a compromise between the interests of capital and labour so as to maintain aggregate demand and full employment. Therefore, permanent income increases and a high level of employment were secured in exchange for the abandonment of the politicisation of the production process (Altvater et al 1986, Offe 1984).

It should be stressed that Keynesian economic policies in capitalist societies were all committed to a strategy of post-war reconstruction and economic expansion based on Fordism, “a pattern of capital accumulation”. In other words, the success of Keynesian policies in the post-war period which secured a stable economic growth and full employment was primarily due to Fordism and the hegemony of the USA in the world economy. To the extent that as suggested by many commentators (Baglioni 1989, Jessop et al 1986) in this period the political and economic climate gave rise to the
recognition of trade union rights and collective bargaining and the political acceptance of trade unions as an important social partners in economic and political management. Besides, trade unions did not use their market power by political bargaining, there was a significant link between an expanding welfare system and this pattern of class compromise.

In this sense, Hyman (1992a: 152) argues that "in phases of economic growth it is possible to reconcile competing interests through processes of positive-sum distributional bargaining". In short, the post-war realignment between capital and labour provided a development in the position of labour and labour unions on the basis of collective bargaining and political citizenship.

However, it is well known that in the late 1960s and the 1970s the economic and political climate changed in many countries, basically, the post-war conditions started to decline in this period. This can also be called "the collapse of the post-war regime of accumulation". Most capitalist countries' economies faced several problems such as rising inflation, unemployment and growing recession. In addition to this, the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed an increase of industrial conflict and rank and file militancy. This trend may be called the collective mobilisation of workers. Hyman points out that rank and file militancy did not only express itself through strikes but also through other manifestations of active dissatisfaction particularly in the workplace. Thus, one of the main issues was also the relations between workers and trade unions, particularly, their leadership (Regini 1992).

It is quite significant to note that the organisation of production combined with Fordist lines gave rise to intense work effort and the lack of real carer opportunities for workers. However, it also gave them a high disruptive ability. Moreover, Panitch (1986)
stresses that the industrial strength of workers' organisations increased in the post-war period with the help of a long period of full employment. This development also brought about wage increases. In this case there were two problems for many governments. One of them was the price increases which reduced the countries' foreign competitiveness and the other was, unless price increases were allowed, a profit squeeze, which is the source of capital accumulation. This is why the states pursued incomes policies in order to control money-wage demands in collective bargaining. Employers and governments in many countries wanted to see the participation of trade unions in the management of economic policies as a solution of the crisis.

Therefore, the state developed a corporatist strategy which can also be regarded as neo corporatism or social concertation which enabled the organised socio-economic producer groups to integrate by means of a system of representation at the leadership level and mobilisation at the mass level. This also requires the non-conflicted integration of central trade union and business organisations into tripartite economic planning bodies by coinciding with incomes policies.

(ii) The Experience of "Corporatism".

After collective mobilisation declined in most countries during the 1970s, the late 1970s and early 1980s were regarded as the decade of neo-corporatism or social concertation. Hence, collective bargaining in many countries has been progressively replaced by a political bargaining or, as in the British case, a "social contract". In other words, the institutions and practices of concertation were widely applied in most countries. According to Regini (1992) the key issue was here the relationship between labour and the state rather than the relationship between trade unions and workers. In those years
concertation is said to have been a highly politicised type of bargaining through involving governments, employers and trade unions in the deal. Concertation was also regarded as a highly centralised political exchange; this means that it was the centre of all system of industrial relations.

Let us put it simply, concertation or political bargaining was an institutional framework within which organised economic interests were represented in order to shape the state policy through bypassing the parliamentary process. What was, then, significant for industrial relations was that first of all unions were said to play an important role in the industrial relations sphere and also in the political arena by getting involved in the decision-making and implementation process. This may also have had an influence on union recognition and collective bargaining. Second, union participation in policy-making was subject to an acceptance of capital accumulation and third, union representation had a more problematic relationship with the rank and file. That is to say that leadership collaboration was given an important degree of disciplinary actions in order to prevent rank and file actions during the corporate arrangements (Hyman 1986, Crouch 1978).

It should be emphasised that the experience of corporatism has varied considerably between countries reflecting diversities in their own economic and political developments. It was either long term and stable in the countries like Austria, Sweden and Norway or unstable in Italy and the UK. It also occurred in Germany, although not always in a stable form. Now attention can be drawn briefly to the experience of corporatism which had a considerable effect on trade union movements in several countries. In the British case, much experience of corporatism failed compared with the other European countries. What is necessary to note is that in the 1960s there was a shift towards concertation in wage bargaining in order to secure full employment and
expand the welfare state. Unions participated in economic planning and they limited their pay claims. However, there were no attempts to set out statutory support for collective bargaining or union recognition. In the 1970s in Britain in fact although the TUC sought a co-operative relationship with government, this could not be institutionalised. There were two attempts in the 1970s to establish stronger corporatist arrangement. One of them was in 1972, it was unsuccessful, the other was known as the social contract (1974-1979). The aim of social contract was to make legal concessions and greater participation in economic decision-making for the TUC, but the social contract failed between 1974 and 1976. This was primarily because the labour government did not yield decision-making power to the unions and basically the unions could not provide the support of their members for pay restraint (2) (Hyman 1986, Crouch 1978).

In the case of Italy, in the early post-war period, political exchange was impossible. Economic and social policy making was dominated by ideological consideration. Consequently, the involvement of trade unions was excluded. Also an export based industrialisation pursued by a Christian Democrat government brought about the subordination and political exclusion of labour. However, more significant changes took place in the 1960s. The Italian trade union movements developed substantial overall strength in collective bargaining, in industrial action and the like. Meanwhile, it began to act in a directly political role. The centre and centre-left governments and the strike waves in 1968 and 1969 caused several social reforms and employment support measures, including trade union and employment rights. It is crucial, though, to stress that like the British social contract, Italy had an experience of concertation called "solidarieta nazionale". Italian trade unions wanted to promote long term political exchange with the objectives, for example, a trade-off between wage moderation and influence over industrial and labour market policies in exchange for fostering growth and sustaining employment by taking economic recession and growing inflation in to
consideration. Yet, "solidarieta nazionale" came to an end due to the unions' unwillingness to continue their strategy of political exchange (Baglioni 1987, Cella and Treu 1986). Regini 1984 is quite right in saying that it was the unions' growing awareness of their miscalculation of the benefits which could in fact be obtained from concertation. Therefore, it was not the difficulty of enforcing wage restraint and of controlling workers' disagreements which can be seen in the British social contract case. However, in the 1980s there has been a tendency for corporatism in Italy (although disagreement among parties was witnessed over several issues). Crouch (1978) points out that in the context of Italy and France, the state did not use trade unions as instruments of national cohesion primarily due to the weakness and isolation of the unions from the experience of political exchange.

In addition to this, it might be argued that in these two countries because of the unwillingness of the large communist movement, the experience of corporatism was also limited. In the case of France in the 1960s there was no significant participation between the unions and the French state, in fact, the state was usually suspicious of organised interest grouping. Moreover, French employers were strictly anti-union, particularly in the factories and at the workplace generally, France was similar to Italy in that a labour movement in the post-war period was shaped by the cold war. An important degree of nationalisation was carried out especially during the Gaullist period. Although there were some attempts in order to set up some form of dialogue and co-operation, this did not affect the established patterns of industrial relations in the 1970s. After the socialist government came to power, workplace representation was strengthened under the programme of legislation introduced by Auroux (Pontusson 1983, Hyman 1989). During the dictatorships in Spain, Portugal and Greece the autarchic models paved the way for a more internationalised economy in consideration with both rapid industrialisation and the booming world market in the 1960s. This increased the pressure
for a modernisation of the regime. For example, during the Franco term some concessions such as the factory juries (Jurados de empresa) were granted to workers. This meant that workers were provided with a representative organisation which allowed them to negotiate directly with management and the state. In Portugal in Salazar's period increased economic activity in the same years gave rise to the state to bring a degree of political liberalisation to the middle and working classes and it further resulted in some trade union reforms such as two decrees of the June 1969 reforms. In similar vein, the 1971 decree in Greece was initiated by the dictatorship to bring about an improvement on occupational societies and associations. On the other hand, during the transition period through democracy there were significant demands for "concertation" from the new democratic regimes. For example, while in Spain unions pursued restrictive and more moderate approaches to the state in return for promised economic and political reforms, unions in Portugal tried to maintain labour peace and restraint in the name of defending the revolution (Estivill and De la Hoz 1990, Pinto 1990, Martinez Lucio 1992, Kritsantonis 1992, Barreto 1992).

In the German case the SPD came to power in 1966 and then it encouraged a government-union commitment to inflation-free growth and full employment, furthermore, a programme of "concerted action" ("Konzertierte Aktion") was established in the mid 1960s, combining with the macro-economic goals of state policy and those of the major collective organisations. It is worth stressing that this "concerted action" produced a moderation in wage settlements by co-operation rather than conflict in industrial relations. Although the economic and political climate changed for the labour movement in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, the institutional pattern of "social partnership" seems to have been relatively stable (Fuerstenberg 1987).
In the context of Sweden, the "Swedish model" from the mid 1930s to the early 1970s can be briefly summarised as 44 years of social democratic government sometimes within coalitions, Keynesian economic policy and extensive public welfare provision and tight central regulation of wage bargaining by the union and employers confederations. In the mid-1930s the new relation between capital and labour gave rise to the "saltsjobaden agreement" of 1938, which laid the foundation for labour-management co-operation and consultation. After that, the spirit of co-operation continued to develop through the post-war period. Moreover, the government agreed to pursue the full employment policy in exchange for union support. In addition, economic growth was secured by union commitment to nationalisation and technical developments and during this period a solidaristic wage policy and an active manpower policy were pursued.

Industrial conflict, then, was partly transferred to the political arena. Under the Swedish model Sweden experienced a period of high economic growth and continued industrial peace. It worked well until the early 1970s, but since then a significant change has been witnessed in Swedish labour movement. LO-SAF had usually set a standard bargaining for the remainder of the economy, yet, the growth of the public and private service sector and the decline of blue collar employment and important rise in the white collar federations made co-ordination much more difficult. Furthermore, the movement towards decentralisation in wage bargaining and pressures for tax reductions and curbs on public expenditure has intensified in recent years and finally LO-SAF centralisation broke down. For example, in 1983 the Engineering Employers' confederation reached agreement with its counterpart unions outside of the central round of negotiations. In addition to this wage earner funds introduced did not bring a main change for the labour movement. The 1980s witnessed more employer willingness to deregulate the Swedish model by fragmentation of the bargaining structure, flexible working time arrangements and so on (Hammarstrom 1987, Hyman 1989, Ahlen 1989).
(iii) Conclusion.

The outcomes of Post-war settlements were that the state approaches to trade unions seemed to be consensual. The unprecedented and sustained economic growth combined with full employment enabled workers to receive regular improvements in their wages and work and employment conditions. The development of Keynesian economic policies in conjunction with the spread of Fordist mass production gave rise to an important dimension of the politics of class compromise. Fordism and the Keynesian welfare state encouraged the expansion of trade unions. These welfare reforms, further, strengthened union organisation and their role in industrial relations during the 1960s and the early 70s. In short, European trade union movement experienced the emergence and reinforcement of corporatist patterns of interest mediation. In this context, trade unions significantly came to be included in corporatist arrangements. The trends in economic and political conjunctions were favourable to trade unions. Therefore, the unions made significant gains such as crucial improvements in union rights and democracy, a high degree of unionisation and an extension of the scope of collective bargaining in most European countries.

However, the late 1960s and beginning of 70s witnessed working-class militancy and a marked radicalisation of union demands. This, later, caused unions to increase the political influence and contribute to the centralisation of collective bargaining, mainly through some forms of social contract. Although the Post-war institutionalised relations between the state and the union and employer organisation were affected by the changes in the structural condition of the 1970s (due to oil shock, crises and the recession of the same period and the resurgence of worker militancy), there was still a substantial degree of recognition of the legitimacy and positive role of the trade unions through the widespread use of the institutions and practices of concertation.
In fact, the interests and demands of the working class in relation to the state and employers were crucially mediated in the economic, political and institutional arena by the trade unions. The overall picture in these periods represents that the external and structural conditions reinforced the position of labour and the role of trade unions in the industrial relations systems. Not only the economic situation but also political factors (as in the case of Spain and Portugal with the return of democracy) made this realignment between capital and labour possible in European countries. In the same period, some similar factors which had an effect on the development and role of Turkish unions can be also discussed in the context of Turkey.

NOTES:

1) What was at stake in fact was their ability to accommodate workers demands by forcing them into the traditional channels of representation and intermediation.

2) Panitch 1977 argues that a strategy of incorporation at the level of leadership was fractured by the militancy of the rank and file in the 1970s.
CHAPTER 3

THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF TURKEY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE UNIONS IN TURKEY IN THE 1960s AND 70s.

The task in this chapter is basically to focus on an account of the origins and development of Turkish trade unions in the light of the economic, social and political structure of Turkey. In this context, most of the discussion will be devoted to analysing developments in the economic, political and social structure of Turkey and their impact on Turkish trade union movement in the 1960s and 70s. In other words, it is the intention of this chapter to describe and analyse the factors which have influenced the main direction of organised labour activity in Turkey. However, the years following the second World War which witnessed the beginning of the establishment of the trade unions are also, briefly, discussed in order to convey the historical background of the periods in question.

As a matter of fact, trade unions in Turkey are said to have become very significant agents of the country's economic and political life particularly in the last 30 years. Under the period of Turkey's pluralistic democracy and mixed economic policies trade unions flourished especially after 1960. Although labour unions can be traced to the Ottoman period, they did not play any crucial role in the economic and political system of Turkey until the 1960s. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the structure of the economy and labour force had affected the development of trade unions. According to the State Institute of Statistics (1983), there were only 329,463 workers covered by Labour law in 1948, while unionised workers reached 52,000 and a distribution of the
active population by occupational status shows why the trade union movement did not develop sufficiently: employers and self-employed, 29.5 percent; unpaid family workers, 48 percent; wage earners, 19 percent; unknown, 3.5 percent. The ratio of the total wage-earning population—the agricultural sector included—to the total active population was only 19 percent. In 1955 77.5 percent of Turkey's labour force was in agriculture and related activities, the rest engaged in activities such as mining, construction, manufacturing, commerce services, transportation and communication. The industrial labour force represented only about 25% percent of total employment, which was about 2,720,000 (Rosen 1962). The industrial sector long remained subordinate. In this context, the key factor was the late commencement of industrialisation in Turkey.

As in most developing countries in general and in Southern European countries such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal in particular, in Turkey industrialisation began among rural producers, petty commodity distributors and a number of small household manufacturing enterprises. The specificity of Turkish industrialisation processes raises significant issues and particular points of departure for trade union movements which are considerably different from those found in Western Europe. In this context, it may be crucial to explore the ways and means by which the specification of the industrialisation processes shaped the development of the trade union movement.

In Turkey, in the 1950s, 60s and 70s industrial workers, mainly, ex-peasants recently arrived from the countryside, still retained ties with their family and land in rural areas. But, they did not suddenly become wage earners, since most of them still enjoyed considerable amounts of extra income coming from the land. There were loose ties between the workers and workplace. It is also crucial to stress that the larger part of the labour force was still employed in agriculture, mostly as unpaid family workers, or in handicraft, small shops and small industry, mostly as self-employed. With respect to
industrialisation processes, manufacturing activity was located primarily in consumer goods such as textiles, food, clothing and housing.

Broadly speaking, when the industrialisation effort began to become more complex, its requirements in terms of labour force were met by the political and social incorporation of rural migrants. The policy of the state in the 1950s, 60s and 70s was to regulate the growth of national market. Combined with this economic policy, "populist disclosures" became important on the ideological and political level. In other words, the masses-urban workers, farmers, small producers and shanty town marginals- were included in economic as well as political and cultural practices at national level. For example, high wages for organised workers, subsidised income for farmers and rural petty producers, and suitable conditions for immigrants to the cities were provided. The social, political and cultural consequences of this development for the Turkish working class was that it gained certain privileges, mostly, granted from above, without a struggle for them. On the basis of this background, the ideologies and politics of working class developed. As a result, class struggle specific to the capitalist mode of production was not as yet the mobilising component in political and social transformation of 1950s, 60s and 70s.

There were also some problems within the working class itself such as the lack of class consciousness among the workers combined with lack of experience in the leadership of trade unions. In contrast to the situation in many other countries, where positions of leadership in trade unions were mostly occupied by white-collar intellectuals, Turkish union leaders had come from the rank and file of the manual workers, basically, due to the legal restrictions at that time. Therefore, unions were deprived of sophisticated leaders and intellectual guidance.
Second, the existence of a legislative framework had not been sufficient to ensure the rapid development of trade unions until 1960. For example, the laws allowed only wage and salary earners to join trade unions by excluding an important large portion of the total labour force including the self-employed and workers in family enterprises. In other words, the union movement had been suppressed by various governments through legal restrictions.

Third, (and somewhat related to the second factor) there was a problem of the recognition of trade unions in the workplace due to the hostile attitudes of employers against unions. This is to say that, like employers in Spain, Greece and Portugal, most employers in Turkish industry came originally from agriculture and the commercial sector and developed under state protection. This may be why they often displayed an individualistic mentality, in particular authoritarian practices and paternalistic attitudes at work places.

Finally, public opinion, associated with the media and the discriminating attitude of the ruling class against workers' organisations, also discouraged the development of trade unions. In the eyes of the general public the ruling class tried to give the image that trade unions were agents of leftist movements encouraging communism. Ironically, although there had been two socialist parties founded in 1946 (1), the role they played in the establishment and development of unions had been insignificant, particularly compared with many other European countries' experiences. But, this general opinion about the communist influence on trade unions, largely accepted particularly during the period of the early stages of social transformation, was an important obstacle to the development of trade unions (Tuna 1964, Isikli 1979).
(i) The Economic and Political Context Before 1960 and the Beginning of Trade Unionism.

It can be safely argued that until the 1960s labour relations and working class activities were controlled by various governments. Until 1947 three separate items of legislation, enacted in 1925, 1936 and 1938, had banned the establishment of professional organisations and particularly trade unions. This was basically due to the official state ideology of the 1930s based on the national unity of a classless society. Therefore, these periods had witnessed a complete repression of the labour movement.

In the 1930s the policy characterized by state-led industrialisation was etatism. It was influenced by Soviet economic planning. From this perspective, Turkey was, except for Soviet Russia, the first country which applied a central planning strategy for industrialisation. However, it is worth mentioning that the history of etatism in Turkey and the analysis of its roots can only be understood with regard to the complex external and internal forces and factors underlying the emergence of the concept. These include the inadequacy of the private sector at that time, the world depression and the crises of the capitalist system as well as the key theoretical-ideological approaches of public entrepreneurship and nationalist strategies. In fact, etatism was regarded as something that went on hand in hand with the state, bearing the responsibility for the national economy combined with the needs of a great nation. In other words, the state had begun the process of building Turkish industry (Herslag 1988).

The state was closely involved in the process, undertaking infrastructure development, investing in strategic industries such as mining, public utilities, energy, petroleum-based products and textile and paper products through the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). In addition, Etatism was incorporated into the program of the single party in
Turkey, the Republican People's party (RPP) created by Ataturk. It can be said that the identity of the party and state policy had determined economic developments in the 1930s. The historical dimension of the policies of the 1930s was to create an industrial unity by providing a great deal of consensus between the employers and workers.

It was also a period of important diminution in political mass participation in order to protect the authority of the new state. It is not wrong to say that etatist economic policies gave rise to a sort of state corporatism through political demobilisation of interest groups and subordinating associations to the state. Trade unions had not been allowed and the state had had control over a limited industrial workforce via paternalistic methods.

After 1945 Turkey had considerable economic growth. This was a period in which economic policies led to important changes in the role of the state and private sectors and in the form of the division of labour. It would be more accurate to say that the development of domestic industry since 1950 was regarded as the most significant structural transformation in the Turkish economy. In that period, Turkey received American economic aid. Moreover, Turkey adopted a multi-party political system and when the Democrat Party came to power in 1950, it introduced "laissez-faire" capitalism, marking a turning point for Turkey, politically, economically and socially. Therefore, Turkey began to attract some foreign investment, imported capital goods and industrial raw materials. She resorted to external borrowing so as to finance costly infrastructural investments. Also Turkey became a member of the organisation for European Economic Co-operation which helped to promote the ties with the west and to expose the country to more liberal ideas and domestic policies.
There can be little doubt that the economic policies which emerged in the 1950s helped to create the merchant class and gave rise to an investment climate which made it possible to channel their finance capital into industrial projects. In this sense, the accumulation of commercial capital was the genesis of capitalist development in Turkey and the engine for the transition to capitalism which greatly accelerated during the 1950s (Taylan, 1984).

However, side by side with the economic and political developments, in 1947 the first law on the formation of trade unions was passed. The trade unions act of 1947 had allowed trade unions without giving the right to strike. After that workers had begun to join trade unions. However, in the event of the emergence of capitalism and of the multiparty system in Turkey, the state had attempted a paternalistic interest in labour relations through recognising trade unions. This was partly because the transition to multiparty democracy had given rise to a crucial confidence in governments' attitudes towards democracy.

The government made efforts to present Turkey as a democratic nation in the regard of International bodies. In this context, the early membership of International Labour Organisation was part of these attempts. Yet, it would not be wrong to say that the trade unions had been subject to state control because the trade unions Act of 1947 had not enabled the adoption of several democratic principles. For example, trade unions had been encouraged to be national organisations, as the 1947 union legislation had clearly stressed that trade unions are national organisations and their objectives and activities cannot be against national interests (Sulker 1987). In this sense, trade unions were obviously required to subordinate their own economic and institutional interests to national aims. The act had also been limited in scope to manual workers and white collar workers had not been allowed to establish and join unions. In addition, this law had been
in sharp conflict with trade union freedom in terms of the external and internal relations of unions. For instance, trade unions could not join the international organisations without the consent of the government, nor could they engage in political activities including forming open political alliances with political parties. This legislation had also restricted unions' freedom even to control their financial situation.

In parallel with these developments, there was a significant issue which was the great interventionism of the Democrat Party in economic and political life as well as labour relations in the mid-1950s, although the Democrat party advocated liberal economic policies as opposed to etatism and planing. When the Democrat party came to power in 1950, it began to control trade union movements by repressing and arresting union leaders. Moreover, it used state paternalism by seeking workers' support through ignoring the channel of unions and directly distributing material benefits to the rank and file. For example, the ministry of labour assisted expensive programs to build low-cost housing and established minimum wage levels. Besides, it provided a great deal of fringe benefits such as health care, meals, clothing, bonuses for religious holidays, transportation and child allotments (Rosen 1962).

In the meantime, the government provided unions with financial resources. In fact, there was a fund established by the fines levied in accordance with the labour law and it was distributed to the unions by the Ministry of Labour. A system of financial control by this fund, essentially, enabled the government to keep unions under its control and pressure.

In this sense, It might be argued that there is some degree of shared experience between Turkey and Southern European countries, mainly, Spain, Portugal and Greece. In the case of Greece particularly in the formative years of trade unionism state paternalism became very significant. State regulation in labour relations was further reinforced
through a system of financial control. In 1931 the state set up a Workers' Housing Trust funded from compulsory contributions of both employees and employers. Some amount of this fund was also given to unions by the ministry of labour, particularly, during the course of the Metaxas regime in 1936; this system of financial control was used to subordinate trade unions to the government (Kritsantonis 1992).

On the other hand, in the context of Spain and Portugal particularly in their final years of Dictatorships direct and rigid state control of workers was relaxed through a paternalist supervision of employee welfare. In the Spanish case the easing of the system brought about autonomous worker activity at the workplace combined with some individual rights in areas such as employment termination and job classification (Martinez Lucio 1992). In Portugal the authoritarian regime tended to set up a system of industrial relations similar to Western countries via direct state regulations (Barreto 1992). In short, the national level trade union development can be also regarded as an outcome of state paternalism, particularly while different political parties, as in the case of Turkey and Greece, or dictatorial governments, as in the case of Spain and Portugal, sought organised popular support.

It should be also mentioned that the most significant event of the early 1950s was the formation of TURK-IS, the Confederation of Turkish trade unions, as a national centre in 1952. However, the confederation did not play an important role in the labour relations. This was probably because, first, it lacked legal and political protection, second, it concentrated on economic bread-and-butter functions more than any other aspect of trade union activity (this will be discussed in more detail in the chapter 4).

To sum up, the period until 1960 can be summarised by saying that during this time, although trade unions had gained their legal status, they had been subject to heavy
government influence. Besides, trade union development had been limited due to the small size of the working class since Turkey had been largely an agrarian society with a large segment of the population engaged in self-employed subsistence farming. Also, the denial of the basic rights to collective bargaining and to strike had resulted in unions being unable to exert a more effective influence as a powerful pressure group in the country.

Hence, the working class had been forced to accept whatever the government granted. In other words, the initial model of trade union development can be suggested as that of a state-sponsored movement and particularly the formation of a national structure of trade unionism can be described as a result of state paternalism. However, as far as the trade union movement in Turkey is concerned, the decades of the 1960s and 70s were said to represent a gradual tendency of the working class to move towards more organisational, political and ideological independence from the state. Thus, it may be suggested that the 1960s marked a turning point in the Turkish trade union movement.


In the late 1950s the Turkish economy experienced serious problems due to the growing inflationary pressure, crises in the balance of payments and the like. At the same time, the authoritarian practices of the Democrat Party caused social and political unrest. The result was the 1960 military intervention. The 1960s witnessed two significant developments in Turkish history, firstly, the new constitution was established in 1961 after the military coup of 1960. This constitution extended political and democratic rights. Such as collective bargaining and strikes. Secondly, this development combined
with rapid economic development. In the economic context, in the 1960s import substitution industrialisation (ISI) was chosen as an economic instrument in order to result in a smooth transition from a mercantile to an industrial economy (2).

It is a fact that during the post-war periods, most countries were faced with more or less similar economic and political developments (of course there were variations due to the outcome of different historical and national specific processes of each countries). Broadly speaking, the increased importance of the state was witnessed in this period. Particularly, in the Southern European countries (despite weak labour movements) the state socio-economic intervention became very significant in influencing the nature of the industrialisation process.

Combined with the state involvement in the political and economic life, a pluralist industrial relations system was also established. This enabled unions to gain some rights and status including the introduction of coalition rights for organised labour, the granting of collective action and strike rights, the recognition of trade unions by employers, finally and perhaps more importantly, the recognition of unions as “intermediary organisations” in ensuring a crucial framework for the development of economic and political policies.

However, there was crucial scope for diversity in implementation and performance across different economies. This process associated with general set of institutions and policies were referred as the "post-war settlement". This period is widely described as "the Keynesian welfare state". Even in some countries where the state did not adopt an explicitly Keynesian approach, state intervention was to imply aspects of the Keynesian welfare state in order to ensure social stability and the development of private industrial capital, such was the case in Southern European countries and Turkey.
In short, no matter what the countries' regimes (Dictatorship or Democracy) were, aspects of the Keynesian model came to dominate the OECD countries. What can be emphasised is the similarity between a certain economic allocation model in most countries and the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) model in Turkey. The main argument here is that features of the political economy of Turkey during the 1960-80 were affected by the dominant model in the other countries, so was the development of Turkish trade unions. Like Keynesian economic policies, the Turkish model also involved management of the economy by the state, the ascendancy of state managers and the redistribution of income in order to constitute and reproduce a domestic market.

The main concern of Turkish policy makers in the 1960s and partly also those of the 1970s was to set up a wide industrial base through evolving "Etatism" into the "mixed economy", where the state's economic role was to supervise implementation of five year plans and assist the private sector's growth (3) (Toksoz 1988). Regarding the changes in the direction influenced by the constitution, economic and social planning was introduced by a new institution called the state planing organisation (SPO). The role of this organisation was to prepare five-year economic and social plans simply by initiating a new economic policy (ISI).

The key target of the ISI policies in the 1960s was to avoid the economic difficulties of the 1950s (4). What can be argued is here that the state still played a significant role in managing the process of Turkish industrialisation through making the SPO the key body of ISI, as co-ordinator of the economic resources. It should be stated that employers were in favour of the planning period as opposed to the etatism of the 1930s. But, it does not mean that employers in Turkey rejected state intervention in the economy. In fact, representatives of employers organisation did seek state regulation of the economy. For example, the Istanbul chamber of industry supported import controls as quite
important for industrialisation (Eralp 1990). Given the introduction of central economic planning after 1960, there were noteworthy changes in the sectors. Unlike agriculture, industrial and service growth was regarded as the most rapidly expanding economic sector in the planning period. Annual average growth rates were as high as 6.7 percent between 1960 and 1976. Agriculture shrank from 38 percent of GNP in 1960 to 23 percent by 1976, whereas industry's share expanded from 16 to 25 percent and the contribution of services and construction to GNP was at 54 percent (Toksoz 1988, Herslag 1988). In other words, the high rates of growth of GNP were combined with a sectoral shift from agriculture to the industrial and service sector.

On the political level, this period can be labelled as the populist period. In fact, there were elements of populism as far as the political regimes and mechanism particularly for income distribution in the political sphere were concerned. In spite of the fact that populism had been on the agenda since 1946 and continued between 1950-60, it became a crucial political debate in the 1960s and 70s (Boratav 1983).

It is a fact that the constitution of 1961 let trade unions develop and expand their influence on Turkey's economic and political arena and they became a very crucial factor in the determination of income distribution, especially in the urban sector. This liberal constitution also made it possible for the working class to have an impact on the political processes and mechanism thereby leading to the characterisation of this period as containing elements of populism.

Most important of all, perhaps, various governments pursued increasingly ambitious economic goals which were confronted with growing demands from politically organised interest groups such as trade unions. Therefore, there were several attempts from governments to establish a public policy towards associations. This policy was
seeking to encourage co-operation between workers and employers by combining rapid
economic development with democracy and to avoid a return to overt authoritarian rule.

It is immediately evident in the highly significant document below:

"In order to establish an equilibrium among the social classes, it is necessary that the
workers who have an important role to play in the realisation and continuation of
development, should enjoy the same economic and social rights as other social
categories. The rights of the worker must be recognised and he must be conscious of
the important part he plays in the economy as a member of the community and just as
an important factor in production. This is indispensable for obtaining the harmonious
relations and close co-operation between capital and labour, on which planned
development depends in a democracy...The rights of labour to negotiate and bargain
with employers on equal terms will be recognised, solidarity of interest based on
principles of social justice will be created between workers and employers and the
basic right of collective bargaining and strike and lock-out will be legally established
in order to help the development of unions on the one hand and democratic practices
on the other." (State Planning Organisation, First Five Year Development Plan 1963-

The point to be made here is indicated by the fact that since Turkish capitalism was not
as advanced as western capitalism, it is not quite safe to regard this pluralist period as a
means of emergence of societal corporatism. Simply, it emerged differently from
European patterns. Because, most important of all, Turkish pluralism has never been
accompanied by a highly institutionalised system of collective bargaining among a well
organised interest groups such as trade unions and employers organisations or between
those groups and state.
On this point, Schmitter's study (Schmitter 1974) on the issue of corporatism argues the position that there is a clear distinction between state corporatism and societal corporatism. For him state corporatism has been characterized by associations which are created and penetrated by the state. Basically, these associations are subordinated to the state under state corporatism, whereas societal corporatism has been described as characterised by associations which emerged spontaneously, retain considerable autonomy, and themselves penetrate the state. Schmitter (1974: 101-2) went on to argue that:

"The abrupt demise of incipient pluralism and its forceful replacement by state corporatism have involved the enforcement of "social peace" by repressing and excluding the autonomous articulation of subordinate class demands in a situation where the bourgeoisie is too weak, internally divided, externally dependent, and short of resources to respond effectively to these demands within the framework of the liberal democratic state. On the other hand, the gradual decay of advanced pluralism and its subtle displacement by societal corporatism have involved the need to strengthen and stabilise bourgeois-dominant regimes by co-opting and incorporating subordinate classes and groups more closely within the political process".

Taking Schmitter's argument into consideration, it can be emphasised that Turkish experience in societal corporatism was dissimilar to those of European and Latin American countries. This is mainly due to the weakness of capitalist development and the absence of a pre-existing tradition of strong associational pluralism.

Moreover, unlike many other countries in Europe and Latin America, the Turkish experiment with societal corporatism was state-initiated. In other words, the initiative for the corporatisation of interest representation in the 1960s came from the state's
attempt to incorporate the associations of subordinate classes, mainly, trade unions within the framework of liberal democracy to strengthen the problematic and unstable bourgeois-dominant regime. In this sense, it can be also said that the state exercised some causation about any potential mass political and economic demands from the working class.

However, evaluation and comparison with the other countries in terms of corporatist models may be misleading in the Turkish case. The more important question centres on the conditions of developments that are emerging. In this respect, it might be said that the attempts for the emergence of corporatism in the 1960s, and partly in the 70s, cannot be simply an example of the emergence of societal corporatism but rather a highly complex, unusual and unstable mixture of both state and societal corporatist types.

As will be discussed later in this chapter, the attempts to create a corporatist structure in the Turkish industrial relations system failed and conflict between classes reached the highest level in the 1970s. In short, the result of an ambiguous mix of state and societal corporatism in Turkey was to bring about mobilisation and politicisation in the mainly working class masses rather than to produce a social contract between social partners.

(iii) The 1960 Legal Reforms and the Rise of Turkish Trade Unionism.

What needs to be also considered is not only the impact of the transformation of economic and political structures but also the impact of legal reforms on the development of trade unions. There is no doubt that after the military intervention of May 1960 the Turkish trade union movement entered a new era. In this period labour
policy was shifted due to primarily two factors, first, the adoption of the liberal 1961 constitution, which restored the principles of democratic rule and, second, the beginning of planned economic development. Thus, after long resistance of the state and employers the rights to strike and engage in collective bargaining were eventually recognised. The new constitution also included other progressive social provisions such as some provisions on work conditions, wage equity, paid holiday, and social security.

Briefly, the 1961 constitution was not only designed to meet the need of private business but also prepared to create a relatively favourable attitude to the workers' unions. The constitution of 1961 produced Articles 46 and 47 on trade union freedoms, the right of workers to bargain collectively with employers, and the right to strike. However, the rights which the new constitution conceded had to be regulated by special legislation. Therefore, it was not until 1963 that the required enactments-trade unions Act (no 274) and collective agreements, strikes and lockouts Act (no 275) were approved by the Turkish parliament (Talas 1983).

In fact, these two key pieces of legislation were passed in 1963 and regulated the Turkish industrial relation system and union organisation until the end of 1980. It can be pointed out that there were a number of internal and external factors for the introduction of this new industrial relations system. First, trade union leaders were included as delegates in the constituent assembly of 1961. Second, there were threats posed by the gradually growing left-wing ideologies in Turkish society and, finally, within the considerably favourable atmosphere, unions also began to raise their voice as pressure groups, making themselves felt in various activities, including mass open meetings and silent marches. For example, on 31 December 1961 TURK-IS members organised a massive demonstration at Sarachane in Istanbul, with attendance of more or less
100,000 workers, who demanded the implementation of the rights granted in the 1961 constitution (Hale 1977).

In addition to these internal influences, the impact of external forces should also be stressed. Basically, after 1960 several unions and particularly TURK-IS received the government's permission to affiliate with international trade union organisations. Hence, Turkish trade unions started to set up close relations with the federations and confederations of international unions. A number of union leaders visited union headquarters in other countries, attending conferences, conventions and seminars and thus benefiting from the experience of industrially advanced countries. Assistance was extended in the education of union officers and leaders for the Turkish unions by the bodies such as the OECD, the ICFTU and the ITS (Tuna 1964). Moreover, ILO conventions and recommendations had also a considerable impact on the establishment of the industrial relations system in Turkey by softening government attitudes toward organised labour. Therefore, for the government the emergent belief was that collective bargaining with the right to strike was a necessary component of pluralistic democracy.

What is surely significant is the fact that these new rights, for which workers in the European countries had striven for almost a century, were given rather suddenly from above. In spite of vociferous demands of TURK-IS for the right to strike in the period of 1950s, the new legislation was, in fact, not a consequence of continued pressure by workers from below. What is meant by this is that unlike many other countries' trade union movements, the Turkish trade union movement achieved these rights without any real struggle. In reality, the state granted union rights as a result of the prevalent economic and political conditions in Turkey at the time. In this context it can be possibly argued that these rights could be taken away without any resistance from the working
class (5) particularly during economic and political crises due to the lack of the necessary experience of the Turkish working class in labour struggle.

Accordingly, it can be argued that the unions were organised and developed by state influence. The government aim was to create a more centralised system of industrial relations which was a necessary component of the economic model of 1960s. In addition, employers were also in favour of the centralised system of industrial relations to establish a centralised industry wide collective bargaining. This means that moderate union representatives as social partners in the tripartite commissions were allowed to represent workers' organisations.

As a result of all these developments, for the first time unions were given responsibility for selecting workers' representatives and shop stewards at the workplace. Union membership no longer consisted of manual workers only. By abolishing the distinction between manual and intellectual work, white-collar workers were at last allowed to form unions. Financial security was provided by adopting a checkoff system for dues collection. The minimum age for membership was reduced to sixteen. Geographic federations were disregarded and conditions for affiliation became much easier. Trade unions were permitted to affiliate with and withdraw from international organisations without the prior permission of the government and finally trade unions were entitled to budget 5 percent of their income to workers education programs and to make financial investments provided that they did not distribute profits (Dereli 1984, Oguzman 1984).

However, taking principles of trade union freedom into account it is worth commenting that the law laid down detailed rules for the internal organisation of unions and specified their role in providing legal and other forms of assistance for their members. According to this union Act no 274, union's political functions remained severely limited. The act
banned any organisational and financial links between unions and political parties. This can be criticised on the grounds that it made it politically embarrassing to prohibit the unions to engage in politics. This act prevented unions from pressing industrial claims which could be defined as matters of "political" importance. Furthermore, some of the traditional state control mechanisms in labour relations can be seen from the Act as a long list of prohibitions on the right to strike. For example, it was unlawful to call a strike in time of war, general or partial mobilisation, state of emergency or national disaster, in health or educational institutions, in public utilities, or during the validity of a collective agreement. Again according to this Act strikes can also be suspended for up to 60 days by the government in the face of the safety of the nation and strikes cannot be organised so as to influence the decisions of the government or local authority (Oguzman 1984).

Yet, broadly speaking it was widely accepted that the significant provisions of 1963 were welcomed by the unions as the "Magna carta" of the Turkish labour movement. It needs to be also emphasised that major dimensions of the trade unions Act (no 274) enabled unions to strengthen their organisations and also encourage industry-wide bargaining agents within the frame of new industrial relations systems. This came close to TURK-IS's target of setting up itself as the co-ordinating representative of a more centralised trade union movement.

There is evidence to suggest that trade unionism developed very significantly in the 1960s. Unions started to be more persuasive in collective bargaining with employers and strikes as an important weapon of unions began to be used. Under a relatively favourable economic, political and, more importantly, legislative climate, there was a remarkable growth in the number of unions in Turkey in the 1960s. It is immediately evident by the official statistics of the ministry of labour that particularly after the enactment of trade
union Act of 1963, there was an increase in the number of workers' unions as well as employers' organisations. It is important to keep in mind that the organisations of employers and federations were rather slow as compared to the development of labour unions.

As can be seen from Table 1, in 1948 there had been only 73 trade unions with 52,000 members. In 1963 this increased to 565 unions with 295,710 members. However, by the year of 1975 the number of labour unions reached 781 unions representing 3,328,633 members. It is also interesting to note that the development of trade unions and employers organisations in Turkey took place in a relatively short period especially between 1963 and 1970. As has been discussed before, this was basically due to the legal provisions of Acts no 274 and 275 (6) and partly due to the rapid industrialisation of Turkish industry.

Table 1: Number of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations and their Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unions</th>
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<th>Employers' Associations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>295,710</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1,605</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>2,088,219</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>10,760</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>3,328,633</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>8,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>3,900,079</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>10,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>5,695,285</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>9,183</td>
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Source: Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1980.
(iv) Towards the Emergence of a New Trade Union Movement.

As the world economy went into recession, basically due to the upsurge of oil prices, stagflation and unemployment, these developments had an impact on Turkish economy as well. Therefore, in the mid-70s Turkey faced several economic difficulties, such as rising inflation, unemployment and trade deficits. As a result, the Turkish economy was affected by debt and applied to the IMF for the extension of loans and some concessions. The decade of the 1970s witnessed an important tendency of the working class to move towards organisational, political and ideological struggle against the ruling class. As a result of industrialisation and ensuing urbanisation, industrial workers and union membership increased significantly.

Despite the fact that TURK-IS leadership adopted a more intermediate attitude towards government and employers, they began to feel the pressure from the rank and file movement. This was primarily because the transformation of the young and inexperienced working class into a militant and highly industrialised sector took place. There is now a need to analyse the increased influence of trade unions in the Turkish industrial relation system and the emergence of the organised and militant labour movement during the course of the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. In this context, a significant development from the standpoint of the development of unions in Turkey was the birth of DISK, the confederation of reformist trade unions in 1967. Compared with TURK-IS, whose policy was usually criticised as "supra-party unionism" or "business-oriented" philosophy, the guiding principle of DISK was that the real solution of Turkish working class could be affected solely via political organisation and action of the workers themselves. The foundation of DISK by four major unions: the chemical industries workers' unions, the metal workers' union, the rubber workers' union and press workers' union was caused by their breaking away from TURK-IS as a
consequence of a disagreement between unions and the leadership of the confederation in major strikes such as the Kozlu miners' strike in 1965 and the strike at the Pasabahce glass factory in Istanbul in 1966 (Marquilies and Yildizoglu 1984).

After its initial creation, the key development bringing about the emergence of DISK was the role played by the Turkish labour party (TLP), founded in 1961. The first General convention of the TLP in 1963 stressed as an important move the formation of a rival confederation as opposed to TURK-IS (7). TLP, like any other socialist party in Europe, sought to set up an organic links with workers through unions (Dereli 1984). It has often been claimed that throughout the late 1960s and 70s most of the DISK's activities concentrated on political propaganda. For instance, according to the declaration of DISK's foundation (1967:9):

"It is not possible to attain the rights of the labour via economic struggle solely. In order to gain this trade union movement must also engage in political struggle through applying its democratic rights granted in the constitution".

However, although DISK widely stressed the political phase of unionism, it also involved in "bread and butter" aspects of unionism through engaging in collective bargaining. In the light of the foregoing discussion, it may be argued that collective bargaining itself can be regarded as a significant political parameter. It should not be forgotten that unions focused on the political aspect of unionism have to operate in an economic environment. Therefore, due to the economic and political situation of the country at the time (particularly the continued increase in the rate of inflation) the collective bargaining activity of DISK was to contribute to the welfare of workers, since the impact of any wage increase was wiped out immediately by the ensuing price
increases implemented by employers, who did not miss any chance to compensate themselves for any profit loss (Dereli 1984).

DISK members often pointed out the need to engage in politics by supporting parties that would respond to the needs of the working class. For this very reason, after its foundation, DISK gave its support to the TLP in the 1969 general election and later DISK supported the RPP, the Republican Peoples' party, which was ideologically the second closest political party to DISK. This was because, first, the military intervention of 1971 (discussed below) closed the TLP, and second and perhaps more importantly, DISK entered the period of moderation by changing its radical strategies and adapting more social democratic manners (Isikli 1979).

It can very plausibly be argued that the foundation of DISK as a separate confederation can be treated as a division among organised labour. Alternatively, the question raised by some of TURK-IS leaders and officials was whether it was possible to build a unified trade union movement by remaining within the TURK-IS and transforming and reforming it in the interest of the working class in the 1960s (This debate has been on the agenda up to today). But, DISK and TURK-IS began to compete with each other in this period. What also needs to be explored here is that the late 1960s was a time of increasing radicalisation among the masses as the class struggle in Turkey assumed greater visibility. This period also registered the beginning of the economic crisis.

In the meantime, a considerable increase in unionisation continued significantly both within DISK and TURK-IS. Yet, DISK-affiliated unions differed from those of TURK-IS in that they distinguished themselves by their successful leadership of long and bitter strikes. Thus, it is not so unsafe to suggest that the result of the formation of DISK and the competition between DISK and TURK-IS may have given rise to increased
unionisation as well as increasingly militant behaviour on the part of unionists. It is a fact that TURK-IS unions mostly organised in the public sector whereas DISK unions tended to concentrate on the private sector. In the public sector wages were generally higher than in the private sector. Higher wages in the public sector can be attributed to the government political consideration and the state enterprise managers in the workplace. Hence, any threat of militancy on the part of unions induced public sector managers to give concessions in order to forestall any actual militant action.

In addition, since TURK-IS was the dominant confederation and it also tried to establish a good connection with the governments as a part of its policies (despite its "above-party politics") in order to secure this conflict free relation. Until the mid-1970s there were relatively few industrial actions in the public sector (see Table 2 below). In other words, public sector unions remained outside the struggles. The reason for this should be sought in the logic of labour-management relations in the public sector

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 2: Strikes by Sectors 1963-1980.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Years</strong></td>
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<td>1979</td>
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<td>1980</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Strikes were not allowed due to the military intervention of 1971

It should be mentioned that this period (particularly between 1967 and 1970) witnessed working class struggle through strikes, marches, demonstrations and even factory occupations mostly led by DISK affiliated unions in the private sector (Margulies and Yildizoglu 1984). It is crucial to stress that during the 1960s the number of strikes and of workers participating in strikes increased rapidly. In fact, the working class began to enjoy economic and political gains and made the ruling class seek an urgent need to curb trade union power.

According to comparative data on work days lost per worker in manufacturing and work days lost per striking worker (see Table 3), the workdays lost per worker in manufacturing were as much as the other countries in comparative perspective. The workdays lost per worker also show that Turkish trade unions had longer strikes compared with various countries' unions. Moreover, the duration of strikes also appeared to increase during the course of 1963 and 1973.

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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<th>Workdays Lost per Worker in Manufacturing*</th>
<th>Workdays Lost per Striking Worker**</th>
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</table>

* The ratio of workdays lost in manufacturing industry to total employment in that industry.

** The ratio of total workdays lost due to strikes in all sectors to the total number of workers involved in strikes.

This is also to say that workers' activity seemed to be more "political" through demanding beyond economic gains. Therefore, what this picture shows us that Turkish unions became increasingly militant and politicised in this period. As the labour movement began to threaten the ability of the ruling class to manage the country, parliament proceeded to discuss altering the trade unions Act of 1963 at the beginning of 1970s. The main aim for this amendment was said to recreate and strength the role of TURK-IS within the labour movement as opposed to the increasing growth and influence of DISK.

According to the proposed law 1317, which aimed to limit trade union rights in general, a trade union could organise only at the national level if it represented at least one-third of the workers in that particular branch of industry. The minister of labour also often spelled out that unions which became tools of ideological movements, mainly, DISK-affiliated unions would automatically be abolished as soon as the law was passed. At the same time, the leadership of TURK-IS was trying to establish good relations with the political power (Justice party, the right-wing party) since the members of TURK-IS were mostly organised in the public sector. However, the response of the working class, particularly among the DISK members, turned out to be the first spontaneous, large-scale political action of the working class in Turkey when DISK and its supporters (over 100,000 workers) marched to protest against the government's curbs on trade union rights. As a result, there was bloodshed on 15-16 June 1970 (Sulker 1987).

Moreover, in 1970 and 1971 strikes reached their peak level and affected many sectors of the economy. When we look at the statistics of the ministry of labour for those years, it is quite clear that there was a considerable increase in strike activity; the work days lost due to strikes were 476,116 in 1971 with 10,916 participating workers and 659,369 in 1972 with 14,879 participating workers (Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1991).
Finally, the economic and political crises of the late 1960s gave rise to the military intervention of 1971. Yet, as opposed to the general views of most trade unionists in Turkey, it can be argued that the effect of this military period on the trade union movement was not so serious. Although the regime immediately imposed martial law in the provinces, mainly, in industrial cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Kocaeli, Adana and so on, the prohibition on collective bargaining rights and the right to strike was very short-lived. This is to say that the impact of the military intervention of 1971 on the working class was limited (9).

This was, mainly, because, first, the military was unable to set up a coherent and stable regime without a mass support base. Masses in general were reluctant to admit the legitimacy of military intervention and to lose the rights granted by the 1961 constitution, secondly perhaps more importantly, there were also further problems caused by the split in the ruling alliance due to competing interest within the groups like industrial/financial capital and landed/commercial. They simply did not agree on a national consensus which may have formulated the restructuring of the state to change the channel of access to the use of state power against the organised union movement. As a result, the military had to allow a general election in 1973 and social opposition including parties and trade unions re-emerged in Turkish economic and political life.

In the analysis of Turkish unions, it is crucial to take some political developments of the 1970s into consideration. After the election of 1973 the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), under its new social-democratic leader, Ecevit, formed a coalition government with the religious National Salvation Party (NSP) (Ugur 1976). What is significant here is that trade unions were attracted through RPP's populist and social democratic slogans. There is little doubt that the trade union movement gained momentum after the 1973 general election. More public sector unions broke away from TURK-IS and joined
DISK. As TURK-IS began to lose its credibility within the labour movement, the
division between social democrat and right-wing unions within this confederation
became more pronounced (Koc 1986a).

Hence, the failure of 1971 military regime and the masses' increased awareness of the
contradictions of capitalist development led to the politicisation of the unions, including
the public sector unions. When the mid-1970s came to a close, the crises of the Turkish
economy combined with political unrest further increased the intensification of the
struggle and the growing politicisation of daily life. It is well known that in the late
1960s and the 1970s the economic and political climate changed in many countries as
the post-war conditions started to decline. This can also be called "the collapse of the
post-war regime of accumulation", during which most European countries' economies
faced several problems including rising inflation, unemployment and growing recession.
In addition to this, the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed an increase in industrial
conflict and rank and file militancy. This trend might be characterized as the collective
mobilisation of workers. Therefore, Turkey shared more or less the same experiences as
the other countries in this period.

Throughout the period, unionisation rose rapidly. While there were 737 trade unions
with 2,088,219 members in 1970, it went up 912 unions with 3,900,079 in 1978
(Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1980). Besides, a record number of workers were on strike
in 1974, the workdays lost because of strikes were 1,109,401 with 25,546 strikers
participating (Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1991).

It is also important to bear in mind that workers began to join unions in terms of their
political approaches. Political parties, particularly small religious fundamentalist and
nationalist parties, started to seek workers' support through their allied confederation of
trade unions. The confederation of Nationalist workers' unions (MISK) was influenced by the extreme right-wing National Action Party and HAK-IS was sponsored by the religious National Salvation Party. While MISK rejected any "social-class" concept by advocating co-operation among all sectors of society, HAK-IS also denied the class conflict between employers and employees by stressing the solution within the framework of Islamic principles.

As far as the trade union movement in Turkey was concerned, the other political development was the first Nationalist Front government, which replaced the RPP-NSP coalition in 1975. It was a coalition of right-wing parties (JP, NSP, and NAP). This coalition government was often accused of being hostile to trade unions particularly during the major strikes by using the security forces.

In 1976 the Nationalist Front government proposed to keep the state security courts set up by the military regime in 1971. However, DISK protested against this proposal by declaring a general strike and so approximately 300,000 workers responded. The politicisation of unions continued throughout the year. In 1976 and 1977 more than half a million workers and other social classes including teachers and students gathered in Istanbul for a May day demonstration organised by DISK. But a May day meeting in Istanbul in 1977 ended up with violence; nearly fifty people died (Berberoglu 1982).

Broadly speaking, throughout the 1970s trade unions continued to be very active in collective bargaining negotiations and in strikes. The increasing unionisation combined with the militant labour movement during the 1970s made possible the signing of relatively favourable wage contracts. Therefore, real wages in almost all sectors rose by 5 to 7 percent every year in these periods. But, a sharp decline by 10 percent in real wages was seen in the course of the years 1971-72 of the military regime during which
strikes were banned. Wages increased again after the fall of the military government. They went up rapidly by 21 percent in 1975, by 5 percent in 1976 and by 22 percent between 1976 and 1978. Yet, the biggest drop in real wages was registered by around 23 percent between 1978 and 1980 (Boratav 1983). Meanwhile, massive lay-offs were widespread in all sectors, particularly by using the lock-out method. This also resulted in unemployment. While there were 2 million unemployed in Turkey in 1971, it increased 3.5 million by the end of 1978 (Berberoglu 1982).

If it is quite true to treat industrial conflict as the significant reality of the working class movement, it can be suggested that, the case of Taris' strike in January 1980 was the most important event for the Turkish working class (10). When the Nationalist Front government began to lay-off many workers with a left-wing identity and replace them with its own supporters, workers went on strike. As a result the spontaneous strike brought about an occupation and later bloody clashes with the police and army forces. In fact, this main strike at the beginning of 1980 gathered wide support from the many other trade unions and social classes (Berberoglu 1982). The years of 1979 and 1980 saw the escalation of political unrest in the country and registered as strike-prone years in the history of Turkish labour movement. The work days lost due to strikes were 1,303,253 in 1980 with 84,832 participating in strikes (Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1991).

Having explored the increasing struggle of trade unions particularly in the late 1970s it is also necessary to raise the question of what the responses of employers and government were. Basically while the economic and political situations were getting gradually worse, the representatives of employers' organisations and of government began to blame unions for the growing economic and political crises. For this very reason, first, the ruling class can be accused of seeking to undermine the political and democratic
framework established by the 1961 constitution, (after failing in the 1971 military intervention) from which trade union organisations benefited, through using anti-labour strategies particularly during major strikes. Second, on the political level employers did try to bring two major parties, RPP, (social democrat), and JP, (right-wing) together to form a coalition government. Probably, by doing so, they would further seek a compromise from the labour confederations. Yet, all these attempts failed due to the political division between those parties. Finally, it can be argued that, for the ruling class, the Turkish economy - particularly under the increasing world economic recession and its impact on Turkish industry - required a new economic model based on a closer integration with international capital. This is to say that there was a need to open the economy to the world markets by applying export-orientated strategies rather than import-substitution policies.

Therefore, the IMF’s austerity measures in January 1980 were introduced. However, it is a fact that the restructuring of the Turkish economy further needed some political changes since unions were affecting capital accumulation and aggravating the economic difficulties. One of the conditions for the implementation of IMF austerity programs was to lower real wages and to secure political stability. Finally, in September 1980 the military intervened and ended long term political instability. It was obvious that this military intervention was dissimilar to previous ones in that the 1980 military regime wanted to create a desirable political and economic climate for the ruling class in which the IMF programme could be easily implemented through suppressing all opposition groups particularly trade unions.
(v) Conclusion.

In summary, the discussion can be concluded by suggesting the determinants of union development in general. By doing so, the development model for Turkish unions can be argued through exemplifying some European countries' experiences, particularly Spain, Portugal and Greece. So, the few differences and similarities may be explored in terms of the issues and processes of trade union developments in order to employ more analytical understanding of Turkish trade unions.

In this perspective, it can be argued that the development of autonomous union movement in Turkey possess some of the characteristics of trade unions in its counterpart countries mentioned above. In other words, in Turkey and those countries in question, the development of the independent trade union movement was influenced by significant internal and external economic and political factors. For instance, there has always been a link between the development of more autonomous trade unionism and the process of democratisation and also the economic and political models of Northern European countries in particular has had an impact on contemporary trade unionism in these countries.

As has been suggested several times in this chapter, the emergence of the autonomous trade union movement originally resulted from government-directed changes at the beginning of the 1960s. It is a fact that most trade union rights including the right to strike and collective bargaining were granted from above by the ruling class without any long and spontaneous class struggle from workers themselves, as was the case in most European countries. This also partly explains the question why the development of the Turkish trade union movement was largely affected by legislative enactments rather than
spontaneous pressures from below, which characterized most of the European labour movements, at least in their formative years.

In this context, it can be argued that the integration of some part of the working class, particularly trade unions into the economic and political system shaped the attitudes of the working class. In other words, associated with the historical underdevelopment of the working class both as an economic and as a political force, the economic and political model of 1960s relegated the working class to a passive status without affecting the designation of economic and social policies.

The ineffective political role of the Turkish working class during the emergence of the autonomous labour movement can also be related to the late and limited development of an industrial working class. This was basically due to the late industrialisation process. It also applies to some other countries’ cases. In some countries where industrialisation developed later than Britain more paternalistic care was taken of workers and their organisations by the state from the outset, for example, in the case of Germany paternalism has always been an important factor in industrial relations and industrial development and in Greece the paternalistic attitude of the state became very significant in shaping both the development of the trade union movement and the industrialisation process.

In addition, it is also safe to suggest that pressures from the working class played a limited and insignificant part in the transition to democracy in the 1960s. In fact, during the unions' formative years, trade unions in Turkey were not established and developed on a basis of class consciousness and neither were they influenced by communist or socialist ideologies of parties or French-style anarcho-syndicalism, as in the case of Spain, Portugal and Greece.
Moreover, due to the absence of ideological domination within trade unions, unions in Turkey did not suffer from internal political splits as compared with their counterparts in other countries (if we omit DISK, which broke off from TURK-IS). The reason why ideologies of the left failed to take root in the Turkish labour movement is that socialist parties and unions linked with them were easily closed and suppressed. Even after the progressive trade union Act of 1963, the government prohibited unions from engaging in political activity including a direct link with any political party.

It can be also argued that the external factors combined with internal elements in the shaping of more autonomous trade union movement in the 1960s. This is to say that the world economic and political tendencies, particularly of European countries, played an important role in the development of unions in Turkey. The emergence of social and economic regulation in the 1960s, especially, the post-war Keynesian experience and the rise of social democracy in the West, helped the Turkish working class to benefit from those developments.

The model of accumulation called "Import Substitution Industrialisation" ISI (resembling the Keynesian policies in many ways) accorded with the demands of employers and, more significantly, those of the industrial working class. In other words, the project of the ruling class for the new accumulation model also conformed with the short and medium interests of the organised working class. The right to unionisation, collective bargaining and strikes as well as some social reforms were granted in accordance with the requirements of the new model of accumulation and Turkey's pluralistic multi party democracy.

Therefore, for trade unions these institutional channels which had been set up in European democracies after long struggles strengthened their position. There were
considerable efforts to implement several progressive reforms borrowed from the Western models in Turkish labour law such as instituting an adequate election procedure for the determination of the sole bargaining agent, strengthening the employment security of workers and establishing a quasi-European co-determination system.

In this context it should be stressed that in the 1960s and part of 1970s, the development of the trade union movement can only be understood through the world political and economic conjunctures and the development of ideologies, particularly social democracy on the one hand and through government-directed bureaucratic reforms from above on the other. Briefly, it can be argued that until the end of the 1960s the unions were dependent and under control by the state. After that, provisions relating both to basic and social rights and, more crucially, to trade union rights allowed unions to become pressure groups in the Turkish industrial relations system. In other words, there was a shift from the state-controlled union movement to an autonomous and independent union movement.

However, let us not forget that, like the Southern European countries, in Turkey the state played a central paternalistic role in shaping and regulating both the development and strategies of the trade union movement and the formation of a modern economy through expansion of private industrial capital. Again this was basically due to economic and political considerations of governments combined with the influence of the world economic and political conjuncture of the 1960s. Unlike their counterparts in Southern European countries, pressures from the working class played a limited role in the transition to a more independent and democratic union movement in the political sphere.

The strategies of unions were said to be determined to stay out of politics by focusing their activity mostly on economic functions. And they were often accused of being
inactive in the designation of policies for labour-management relations. Furthermore, they were also regarded as being weak in organising workers' activities as a political force. However, it can be suggested that evaluation of trade unionism in Turkey only according to "economic" dimensions could be misleading.

At the beginning of the 1970s Turkish unions engaged in a more radical and militant activities. Essentially, the crises in the model of economic regulation and political unrest resulted in the unions adopting new radical policies. In other words, Turkish unions began to aim at going beyond the narrow class interests of members by stressing more and more the need to create a union model in which they could respond to the larger goals of working class in the 1970s. In this sense, it resembled many of the characteristics of trade union movements in southern European countries which had regained their momentum after dictatorships or military interventions and contributed to the socio-political structure and the democratisation process of the country.

Finally, it can be confidently argued that the analyses of trade unionism in Turkey can be considered as part of the development process of "internal" and "external" determinants. And also that the struggle for, and process of, democracy is related to the struggle for more autonomous and democratic trade union movements. Unfortunately, the question of democracy and the development of trade unionism were hit by the military intervention of 1980. This can also be regarded as a historical turning point for the Turkish trade union movement. Turkish history often shows that there has been a significant link between the developments of the Turkish democracy and of the unions. The periods of the 1980s and on further illustrate this link and will be discussed in more detail in the second part of this thesis.
NOTES:

1) Two socialist parties, the Turkish socialist party and the Socialist workers and peasants' party of Turkey had been set up in 1946. However, they were closed by the Martial law command in the same year. For more detail see Sulker (1973), Turkiye'de isci hareketleri.

2) ISI was dependent on foreign imports in the form of technology and intermediate goods.

3) Industrialisation strategies from 1950 (liberalisation period) to 1960 was import substitution through strong protectionism, whereas since 1960, central economic planning was implemented to develop co-ordination between the state and private sectors. In that period much of the attention was also paid to encourage the consolidation of private sector production.

4) Hershlag 1988 also argued that the planning strategies of the 1960s and 70s were widely the pragmatic results of the impact of modern econometric models, of growing urban pressure and of the need to integrate Turkey in the world economy and the European economy.

5) The case of 1980 military intervention is the most important example here. There was not any real resistance from the working class during the 1980 coup.

6) The legal provisions of Act No 274 regulated the constitution and conduct of trade unions, while Act No 275 defined forms of the collective agreements, strikes and lockout see (Oguzman 1984).

7) It is very important to look at the relations between TURK-IS and the TLP so as to understand the creation of DISK particularly since the main unionist members of the TLP's were also members of Executive committee of TURK-IS (Isikli 1979).
8) Strikes covered larger numbers of workers and were more prolonged in the 1960s and throughout the 1970s.

9) Of course if we ignore the temporary arrest of some DISK bureaucrats and the close of The Turkish labour party (TLP) which DISK was in alliance with.

10) Taris is a public sector agricultural processing complex near the city of Izmir, which employed more than 10,000 workers.
Although there had been serious attempts to set up a labour confederation prior to 1950, in Turkey the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TURK-IS) was formed on 31 July 1952 (at a time when the right to strike and collective bargaining in line with the ILO standards were not yet exercised in the country). Attempts to achieve such an organisation had derived from both internal and external influences. As far as internal influences are concerned, until 1952 the need for such a top level central organisation had long been discussed between the federations, birliks (regional organisations) and industry-based unions.

The nucleus of TURK-IS was founded by the efforts of the Turkish Textile Workers' Federation (1). Various meetings took place in Istanbul, Bursa and Izmir early in 1950, involving the representatives of large unions, of the federations and of birliks. A steering committee was appointed to draft a constitution, and the first convention of the confederation was held on 6 September 1952 in Izmir.

The second organisational stimulus for the emergence of a confederation came from external forces. The most important of these was American influence. The impact of American labour policy on the developing countries was very clear. It tended to affect trade union movements, particularly in developing countries, through its labour agencies (mainly AFL, AID and partly ICFTU). In the case of Turkey these attempts had started in the confederation's formative years. A labour official from AFL, Boris Shiskin, had
come to Turkey to talk to union leaders to encourage the establishment of a labour confederation. He had also promised Marshall aid in the event of a confederation. In the same year, January 1951, on behalf of ICFTU Irving Brown had also come to Turkey (2). He had also mentioned the sizeable direct budgetary support as well as free membership of ICFTU (Koc 1986b).

It can be said that the American aid program succeeded not only in setting up a central confederation but also in influencing the philosophy and policies of TURK-IS, whose leaders experienced their first taste of unionism in "Business type" or "wage conscious" unions rather than "political unionism". Therefore, as a result of the deliberate policies of American labour agencies Turkish unions had not been able to benefit from the tradition and experience of the European working class, at least in the confederation's formative years. In the first TURK-IS convention in 1952 there had been 69 delegates representing several unions as well as the federations and birliks (TURK-IS 1962). In the early years of the confederation, there were 55 affiliates of TURK-IS, including the federations, Industry-based trade unions and directly affiliated unions representing 294,697 members (Tuna 1964).

According to a survey carried out by TURK-IS the number of its members was to be around 1,350,000 in 1975, representing 85% percent of all unionised workers in the country. However, the 15th congress of the confederation was attended by 458 delegates representing some 1,600,000 members in 32 affiliated unions. As of the beginning of 1993 TURK-IS had a membership of 1,784,663 organised within its 32 affiliated unions. Most affiliated unions are members of their relevant international bodies. The Confederation has eight regional offices in Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir, Adana, Sivas, Diyarbakir, Samsun and Eskisehir and 58 "city" representative functions.
throughout Turkey. Also the TURK-IS organisation comprises 823 local unions in 32 affiliated national unions.

According to the constitution of TURK-IS, the confederation may not accept any new application for affiliation from a union which has organised workers in a branch of activity which is being represented by one of the existing affiliates of the confederation. Therefore, the application can only be carried through mergers.

TURK-IS admits into membership merely those organisations which have been organised at the national level. It is a fact that particularly after the trade union Act of 1963, TURK-IS decided to organise the union structure on the basis of national industrial unions. According to the 5th TURK-IS convention's decisions (TURK-IS 1962), it was suggested that unions in Turkey should be organised within the national level and the national unions to be affiliated to TURK-IS could be organised within 28 industrial categories.

Reviewing several TURK-IS congress reports (particularly since 1960) and responses given during the interviews, two key reasons can be suggested for the centralised industrial unionism. First, whereas craft unionism was well established in most European labour movements from the very beginning, the Turkish legal system always encouraged the principle of industrial unionism. Second, according to TURK-IS sources (1963:12)

"Industrial unionism should be based on a nation-wide centralised structure, it was clear that rival unionism would cause internal struggles and strife within the labour movement".
Therefore, the fear of TURK-IS at the time was the concept of rival unionism which was aimed at weakening the trade union movement. In December 1961, a committee was established by TURK-IS's executive committee in order to prepare a report based on the structures of various European labour union movements. This report suggested that Turkish trade unions were identified by a large number of unions representing only a small membership percentage of total workforce. And also according to the report, the affiliated organisations to TURK-IS were grouped as four categories: regional organisations, federations, industry-based unions and directly affiliated locals. The report also stressed the need for a centralised structure for Turkish trade unions. As a result, TURK-IS begun to co-ordinate the reorganisation campaign and TURK-IS, with the financial and technical assistance of ICFTU, set up six regional offices (TURK-IS 1963).

The aim of these regional offices was to stimulate the amalgamation and reorganisation of the small unions and the other type of unions, federations and birliks, within each industry so as to establish strong and effective national unions which were to be affiliated with TURK-IS. It should be mentioned that from the speeches of TURK-IS leaders in the fifth General congress reports of TURK-IS (1962), it is obvious that the leaders of TURK-IS advocated the German model, which was based on a centralised network of sixteen national unions. However, the congress decision was to set up twenty-eight national unions.

However, broadly speaking, the efforts of TURK-IS in centralising the structure of its affiliates did fail. In the reports of the Executive and Administrative Committees presented to the Sixth convention of TURK-IS (1966) TURK-IS itself admitted the failure of its attempts for a centralised structure and the reason given for this failure was the differences in opinion, personal disagreements and political rivalries among leaders (3).
The new trade union Act No. 2821 was enacted in May 1983. This new system of trade unions should be treated as an important legal regulation for both the understanding of the present organisational framework of unions and the centralisation demand of TURK-IS.

Some of the main principles of new trade union Act of 1983 can be summarised as follows. It is clearly stated in the new Act, Article 3, that trade unions can not be organised according to any profession or workplace. Therefore, the principle of "industry-based national union" was accepted. It was the end of the most important debate since its establishment within the TURK-IS. Basically considering the wishes of TURK-IS, in the 1983 trade union Act, federations were cancelled and confederations were kept as higher organisations. According to the Act, at least five trade unions from different work fields can organise a confederation.

The work fields or industrial categories were determined by the Ministry of Labour. The work fields of workers' unions were stated and their number was decreased from 34 to 28. Although birliks (regional unions) and federations were abolished to centralise the trade union structure, in the Act it is made possible for the union to be organised by intervention of "elected worker representatives" for conveying the private problems of workplace, finding solutions, and more importantly for the purpose of being a bridge between the members and the unions themselves.

Broadly speaking, the trade union Act of 1983 resulted in TURK-IS having a highly centralised union structure. Without any doubt, the unification of organisation at many levels reinforced the power of unions. This structure seems to be in line with the requirement for centralism which has been inherent in the political and administrative organisation of TURK-IS. However, the important question here is how much of the
power is used by TURK-IS as the confederation and how much authority is delegated to the confederation from national industrial unions. The relationship is not clear enough for any definite judgement to be made about the highly centralised structure of unions in Turkish context (we return this issue when the role of TURK-IS in Turkish industrial relations is discussed).

(i) The Internal Structure of TURK-IS.

According to the constitution of TURK-IS, mandatory and voluntary organs in accordance with the trade unions Act of 1983 Act. No.2821 are described as follows:

Mandatory organs:

(a) Congress; the supreme authority in the determination of the policies and programmes of the organisation is the general congress. It convenes once every three years and is composed of delegates elected by the congresses of the affiliated unions, on the basis of their membership. The general congress elects the five members of executive board.

(b) Executive Board; it is composed of five members: President, General Secretary, Financial Secretary, Secretary of Education and the Secretary of Organising, elected by secret ballot by the Congress. The executive Board is the supreme organ of the confederation in between congresses. Basically, it is charged with the responsibility of implementing all the decisions taken by the congress. In other words, it has the authority to act on behalf of the confederation and is responsible for directing the activities of the organisation and giving effect to the decisions and recommendations of the Congress.
(c) Board of Auditors; the Congress elects from among its delegates a board of auditors composed of three members. The board is responsible to hold audit of the accounts of the organisation at six months intervals.

(d) Disciplinary Committee; the Congress also elects from among its delegates a disciplinary committee composed of five members. The Committee has the authority to hear and investigate the charges made against officers of the confederation and affiliated organisation for action deemed to be in contravention of TURK-IS Constitution.

Voluntary organ:

Council of Union Presidents; presidents of the TURK-IS affiliated unions automatically become the members of the Council of union presidents. The Council has the authority to discuss and make recommendations on all matters particularly concerning the labour movement and on matters related with the administration and activities of the Confederation. This Council meets every three months or more frequently if necessary.

Affiliated organisations to TURK-IS and membership represent as at 1993:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Unions</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Membership of ITS'</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>TARIM-IS</td>
<td>S.Ozdes</td>
<td>43,948</td>
<td>IFPAAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Agricultural, Irrigation and Forestry)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKIYE MADEN-IS</td>
<td>H.Kayabasi</td>
<td>63,725</td>
<td>MIF/ICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mining)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENEL MADEN-IS)</td>
<td>S.Denizer</td>
<td>48,857</td>
<td>MIF/ICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mining)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETROL-IS</td>
<td>M.Ceylan</td>
<td>77,380</td>
<td>ICEF</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Oil and Chemical)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEKGIDA-IS</td>
<td>O.Balta</td>
<td>175,492</td>
<td>IUF</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Food, Tobacco, Drink)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEKER-IS</td>
<td>H.Alcan</td>
<td>38,542</td>
<td>IUF</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Sugar Industry)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEKSIF</td>
<td>S.Yilmaz</td>
<td>235,154</td>
<td>ITGLWF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Textile, Knitting, Clothing)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DERI-IS</td>
<td>Y.Kaya</td>
<td>14,249</td>
<td>ITGLWF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Leather and Shoe)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGAC-IS</td>
<td>G.Ercakir</td>
<td>14,655</td>
<td>IFBWW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Wood and Lumber)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SELUULOZ-IS</td>
<td>M.Sari</td>
<td>15,910</td>
<td>ICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Paper and Pulp)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BASIN-IS</td>
<td>A.Guvenc</td>
<td>5,488</td>
<td>IGF</td>
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<td>(Press Technicians)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BASISEN</td>
<td>M.Tiryakioglu</td>
<td>35,536</td>
<td>FIET</td>
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<td>(Banking and Insurance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BASS</td>
<td>T.Yilmaz</td>
<td>10,692</td>
<td>FIET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Banking and Insurance)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMSE-IS</td>
<td>T.Eralan</td>
<td>54,008</td>
<td>ICEF</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Cement, Ceramic, Glass)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRISTAL-IS</td>
<td>I.Eren</td>
<td>16,455</td>
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<td>(Glass Workers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TURK METAL</td>
<td>M.Ozbek</td>
<td>183,948</td>
<td>ITF</td>
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<td>(Metal Industry)</td>
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<td>DOKGEMI-IS</td>
<td>N.Tur</td>
<td>7,168</td>
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<td>(Port, Dock, Shipbuilding)</td>
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<tr>
<td>YOL-IS</td>
<td>M.Bayram</td>
<td>192,149</td>
<td>PSI,IFBWW</td>
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<td>(Construction and Building)</td>
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<td>TES-IS</td>
<td>F.Barut</td>
<td>120,784</td>
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<td>(Energy, Water and Gas)</td>
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<td>TEZKOOP-IS</td>
<td>T.Tamer</td>
<td>41,271</td>
<td>FIET</td>
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<td>(Commercial Clerical Employees)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Memberships</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>KOOP-IS (Office Employees)</td>
<td>A. Balaman</td>
<td>37,664 -</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUMTIS (Motor Transport Industry)</td>
<td>S. Topcu</td>
<td>6,479</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEMIRYOL-IS (Railway Workers)</td>
<td>E. Tocoglu</td>
<td>31,079 ITF</td>
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<tr>
<td>DENIZCILER SENDIKASI (Seafarers)</td>
<td>T. Uzun</td>
<td>13,688 ITF</td>
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<td>HAVA-IS (Airways)</td>
<td>A. Aycin</td>
<td>2,840 ITF</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIKAT-IS (Longshoremen)</td>
<td>H. Biber</td>
<td>8,268 ITF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HABER-IS (Postal, Telegraph, Telephone)</td>
<td>C. Teke</td>
<td>29,958 PTTI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAGLIK-IS (Health Employees)</td>
<td>M. Basoglu</td>
<td>15,002 PSI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOLEY-IS (Hotel and Restaurant)</td>
<td>C. Bakindi</td>
<td>25,402 -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARP-IS (Defence Industry)</td>
<td>I. Cetin</td>
<td>39,064 PSI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGS (Journalists)</td>
<td>O. Erinc</td>
<td>4,438 FIJ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELEDİYE-IS (Municipal and General Workers)</td>
<td>F. Alan</td>
<td>165,429 ICEF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number affiliated: 32
Total membership: 1,784,663

* ITS = International Trade Unions.

* Dual representation in four industry branch exists upon a decision of TURK-IS congress with the understanding that these unions shall merge in the future.

(ii) **The Principles and Ideology of TURK-IS.**

TURK-IS, of course, has its own principles and ideology, like the workers' confederations in other countries. It is quite significant to stress the principles and the ideology of the confederation so as to understand this organisation as a whole. The main constitution of the confederation clearly declares its basic ideology. Particularly, Article 3 stresses the conception of a national, democratic and secular regime. While claiming to fight against fascism and communism, it adheres to the protection of democratic rules.

In addition, some of the fundamental principles of TURK-IS can be summarised as follows (4):

- TURK-IS considers the social and economic problems of Turkey as a whole. It believes that the peace, security and welfare for all Turkish workers depends largely on the solution of all such problems and a rapid and well balanced social and economic development of the society.

- TURK-IS demands that specific provisions of the National Constitution relevant to "social and economic rights and obligations" are fully realised in the shortest possible time. TURK-IS is determined to exert all possible pressure on governing and opposition parties to see to it that the provisions of the National Constitution are fully observed.

- TURK-IS is determined to pursue a policy which will eliminate all grounds for clashes among various classes of the society and thus create a balance, as well as unity and integration among these classes.

- TURK-IS will do its utmost to see to it that extreme centralisation and political interventions that affect most state sector enterprises will be discontinued, and the
workers will participate in management so as to increase productivity and get a fair share from the increased profits.

- TURK-IS will engage in all the necessary measures to ensure that foreign capital will not be allowed to do business in Turkey in all cases when a business can be operated by native capital, nor be allowed to transfer large sums of profits outside of the country. It will strive, at the same time for ways under which foreign investment will be subject to a production tax in amounts which meet international standards and demand from the government the initiation of all necessary measures to make up for the amount of revenue lost due to Government's failure of not having collected such as a tax from foreign investment.

- TURK-IS demands that all measures should be taken to have the private sector operate in a manner and serving the interests of the Turkish community and facilitate the achievement of the plan targets and discipline.

- TURK-IS is determined to conduct an extensive education campaign to ensure that great masses of workers as well as the Turkish general public will use freely and properly their social, economic and political rights (TURK-IS 1968, 1970, 1976, 1979).

What is important in our present context is that the provisions of the confederations' constitution and its principles demonstrate a general picture about TURK-IS. First, TURK-IS recognises and even defends the institutions and rules of the existing socio-political order. Second, it rejects class struggle rather concentrating on promoting national consciousness. And finally it seems that the principles of the confederation mentioned above indicated its objectives in the economic, social, and political fields, and even they can also be considered as some reformist demands from and within TURK-IS.
What is, then, the general policy framework of TURK-IS in terms of the political means and ways? According to a resolution adopted in the fifth general congress of the confederation in 1964, TURK-IS remains entirely independent vis-à-vis political parties and pursues an above-party policy. Since then, TURK-IS leaders have often stressed the policy of "supra-party unionism," a philosophy which is aimed at having the union movement act as a non-party pressure group. As a matter of fact, this policy has been in accordance with the prohibition imposed by the trade union law on the establishment of organic links with political parties. However, let us not forget that legislation has not outlawed individual union members from joining parties or from running for parliament under diverse party affiliations.

(iii) Activities of TURK-IS.

TURK-IS is not involved as a bargaining agent. This is simply due to legal obligation. According to the collective agreements, strikes and lock-outs Act No 2822, labour confederations are not able to engage in collective bargaining (Oguzman 1984). However, TURK-IS exercises a "consultancy" and "co-ordinator" role in collective agreements to be carried out between labour unions and employers organisations. TURK-IS is also determined to co-ordinate almost all union activities, not only with respect to bargaining issues, but also in terms of other industrial relations problems and social and political activities. While individual unions handle dispute settlements matters (particularly in the case of strikes and lock-out), TURK-IS assists their affiliated unions by establishing a central solidarity fund. Yet, TURK-IS has frequently been criticised by their members for playing a limited role in representing the internal unity of Turkish trade unions.
It is very significant, though, to comment that TURK-IS pays a great deal of attention to preparing the views of labour in the preparation and amendment of laws and regulations related to labour and industry and defends these views at all levels. In fact, particularly after gaining new rights in 1963, such as collective bargaining and the use of the strike weapon, the main activities of TURK-IS have centred around economic tasks. As a result, TURK-IS has been expected to be more effective in raising the income level and in standardising the working conditions of larger numbers of wage-earners. To do so, TURK-IS has chosen the way in which it has been able to develop good relations on a permanent basis with the government. Therefore, TURK-IS as a pressure group has been involved in such lobbying activities. This approach can be clearly seen from the fifth general Congress' report (1963:21):

"in order to have better legislation for its members, the confederation closely follows discussions in the parliament. The results of these discussions are recorded on tables indicating the attitudes of parliament members on labour issues. These records are published regularly."

Basically, member unions are encouraged to put pressure on political parties by the voting procedure in general elections. Although establishing any ties with political parties has been forbidden, unions have been able to play an indirect role in political activities mainly by supporting prolabour parties or their candidates. As part of its activities, TURK-IS has also initiated several labour education activities. These are conducted at different levels and cover a wide variety of topics. The technical assistance and co-operation extended by such international agencies as OECD, AID, ICFTU and International trade secretariats have helped to sponsor part of these programs.
Koc (1986b) argues that there is one significant factor that must be discussed in the analysis of the educational activities of TURK-IS. This may be simply termed the "American influence". Especially after 1963, the assistance of the agency for international development (AID) did give financial support to TURK-IS in the form of payment of salaries and travel expenses of regional directors and educational officers, as well as of headquarters staff. What is more, for four years the AID labour division supplied lecturers to assist the confederation's educational programs, and some 200 Turkish union leaders were said to have visited America during the beginning of 1960s. Some unionists during the interviews have also stated that the American support program was intended to set up the tactics, techniques and philosophy of America unions in Turkey.

Therefore, the adaptation of "wage conscious" unionism within the TURK-IS was not so difficult as a part of this direct relation. In addition, these important American influences and the direct budgetary support may have delayed TURK-IS in setting up direct ties with its European partners. A top leader of union affiliated to TURK-IS told the author that due to American influence on the development of TURK-IS, TURK-IS leaders often emphasised the non-political nature of the labour movement. In other words, the American type of unionism prevented trade unions from becoming a political force in favour of the working class and its democratic rights, rather putting them into a position of collaborating with the forces of state and capital.

Various reports of the confederation also indicate that in collaboration with university industrial relations academics, TURK-IS and its members have regular educational programs, particularly to train shop-stewards and rank and file members.
Higher level trade union officials attend the training programs of the TURK-IS labour college in Ankara on a more permanent and regular basis. However, the author, who attended some union seminars within the leather and petroleum and chemical unions, had the impression that there are a number of criticisms against the quality of the trainers and seminars and the contents of courses for workers. There is also a significant complaint about the lack of substantial programs in vocational training. In fact, my findings on the educational programs of the confederation support this discontent. For example, in terms of the trade union Act of 1983, trade unions have to spend 5% percent of all their income on education of members. Yet, when we look at the reports of unions, it is clear that most unions use this money for organising a number of conferences at very expensive hotels, particularly in the big cities, rather than concentrating on labour educational programs.

As far as economic activities of TURK-IS are concerned, its activities also remained limited in this area. In spite of the fact that the Trade Unions acts have encouraged unions to establish co-operatives, there has been little development in this field. Moreover, TURK-IS has often tried to co-ordinate with private and public authorities to support what is called "social housing projects". But, all these efforts have failed. Some large unions such as TEKGIDA-IS in Food industries, TEKSIF in Textile, YOL-IS in construction and building and MADEN-IS in mining have holiday places for members. Some workers and shop stewards to whom I spoke are, however, in doubt about whether these facilities are used by members or top level unionists.

During the course of this study many reports and publications of TURK-IS and of its members have been reviewed. Therefore, the most striking activity for the trade unions, and particularly for TURK-IS, is the time and effort spent in legislative matters. In a number of legislative proposals, such as the social security Act, unemployment insurance
and the amendment of 44 articles of the 1980 constitution, TURK-IS is preparing its own drafts and submitting them to the government and opposition parties as well as media. It also undertakes the printing of journals, some periodicals and books in order to shed some light to its members and inform the media as a whole.

(iv) **Representative Functions of TURK-IS.**

TURK-IS acts as the spokesman and co-ordinator of the majority of trade unions in Turkey, representing its members on both national and international bodies. The representation of TURK-IS at both national and international level derives from not only some legal obligations, such as the main constitution of Turkey and various labour legislations, but also voluntary agreements between TURK-IS and the employers' peak confederations (TISK) and its own constitutions.

This representative function of TURK-IS at national level can be briefly outlined as follows (most of the following functions are based on tripartite bodies) (5).

- Minimum wage board, which fixes the minimum wage at national scale.
- National productivity centre, which is to increase productivity at national level.
- State planning organisation expert committees, which makes recommendations and suggestions in relation to development planning.
- Labour council, the supreme tripartite assembly which is set up to solve problems in the field of industrial relations.
- Board of the social security institution, which is simply established to safeguard the security of workers.
- High board of health of the social security institution, which resolves conflicts in relation to the health problems of workers conflicts arising from collective agreements involving work under strike prohibition.

- Foreign economic relations board, which involves the development of economic, financial commercial and industrial relations between Turkey and other countries, mainly European countries.

- The advisory committee to the EC, which has become a very significant committee after Turkey's application to the EC, deals with co-ordination and collaboration between employers and workers' representatives and the government on matters concerning the EC.

What can be very plausibly suggested, therefore, is that TURK-IS plays a significant role in a wide range of standing consultative machinery on labour issues. In fact, the activities outlined above are considered as a means of encouraging labour and employers' leading confederations to discuss their mutual problems with a view to coming to some understanding or taking voluntary action. Some of this tripartite machinery seems to be reasonably well developed in Turkey. In addition to these tripartite bodies which deal with labour matters in general, TURK-IS also joins a number of official committees which are competent to consider specific technical subjects such as apprenticeships and vocational training, social security and industrial safety.

It is worth mentioning that representation on other bodies, particularly those dealing with macro economic and social issues, has become crucial in more recent years. An example is the advisory committee to the EC and the foreign economic relations board. From the point of view of some officials of TURK-IS and its members who were interviewed, it is generally accepted that on balance they benefit by involvement in these tripartite bodies. This is because these formal contacts strengthen the status of the
confederation, its executive committee and its officials, particularly in the eyes of the member trade unions of TURK-IS the workers belonging to them. In addition, formal contacts they offer a potential means of influencing the government's industrial relations policies. However, the criticism on tripartite bodies raised during the interviews was about the unequal representation between employers and workers organisations in the wide range of standing consultative machinery.

The second vital representative function of TURK-IS is at international level. As far as industrial relations issues are concerned, TURK-IS is the only confederation playing an important role in the international arena. It has a close relation with the International labour organisation (ILO). Thus, It also nominates workers' delegates to the annual conference of the ILO. In other words, all international labour conferences are closely followed by representatives of Turkish workers' unions. They are mostly nominated by TURK-IS and attend the specialist and regional meeting of the ILO. They also participate in the work of the relevant commissions, such as ILO tripartite industrial committees, ILO expert committees and ILO advisory committees (TURK-IS, 40. yilinda).

Furthermore, TURK-IS became a full member of the ICFTU in the year 1960 following eight years' bitter struggle. Relations with international organisations were strengthened when ICFTU, together with International Trade Secretariats, appointed a joint representative to TURK-IS. The national member unions of TURK-IS are affiliated to the International Trade Secretariats which are also associated with the ICFTU. TURK-IS was also a member of ICFTU/ERO until this organisation expired. The confederation joined ICFTU/ARRO in 1973 TUAC in 1975.
Moreover, TURK-IS became a member of ETUC in 1988. In various interviews with trade union officials the author has been told that TURK-IS executive committee's decision to join ECTU was largely influenced by Turkey's application for full membership to the EC and the recent increasing relations between European trade unions and Turkish trade unions.

It is a fact that in the eyes of trade unionist interviewed the membership of ETUC is very important in terms of both the democratic principles of European trade unions and Turkish workers interests within the European community. In addition to the trade unions officials' opinion, it would be also argued that the recent close economic and political relations between Turkey and other European countries (due to the economic and social policies of Turkish governments in the 1980s) and the significant increases in the multinational companies in Turkey have forced Turkish unions to increase their contacts with their European partners.

(v) Conclusion: Some Comparison and General View.

The overall picture so far tells us that like DGB in Germany, LO in Sweden, UGT-P in Portugal, UGT in Spain and GSEE in Greece, TURK-IS is the largest and most important confederation in Turkey. In addition to its lobbying activities as a pressure group, TURK-IS, as the main confederation engages in co-ordinating and representative functions for trade unions. It also nominates union representatives to several quasi-governmental agencies and tripartite bodies. As GSEE in Greece, DGB in Germany and TUC in UK, TURK-IS, is to all intents and purposes the single union centre in Turkey.
The organising stimulus for the emergence of the confederation stemmed from both internal and external forces. The former was the attempts of the existing federations and the latter was the American influence. In this sense TURK-IS's case displays some similarities to GSEE, the Greek General Confederation of Labour in Greece that foreign involvement, particularly American influence, in the emergence and development of the labour confederation was significant. It has been often claimed that United States' agents were sent to Greece to promote "free" trade unions against communism (Coldrick and Jones 1979).

As UGT-P in Portugal, TURK-IS opted for a model of national unions on the basis of branch activity. This model is, basically, inspired from the Austrian and German examples. It should be stressed that there is a considerable variation in the characteristic of unions in different countries. Compared with the other countries' union structure as in Spain and Greece, in Turkey TURK-IS does not include the district or regional unions and national federations. Thus, it has a highly centralised union structure.

In fact, although in some respect they have some common essential elements, trade unions in various countries display a substantial diversity in terms of structure, functions and formal relations with political parties and the state. For example, in their declaration of principles, the UGT-P in Portugal, the UGT in Spain, the GSEE in Greece and TURK-IS in Turkey claim to be autonomous workers' organisation which are independent of political parties, the state and employers' associations. In other words, with regard to the relations between unions and the state or political parties, they do not involve the domination of one side by other.

Although they seem to be neutral in party politics, their political presence is usually the socialist or the social democrat parties. However, in relation to political parties, unlike
its Southern European partners in the case of Turkey, TURK-IS in principle maintains a basic political neutrality. Yet, despite the policy of "supra-party unionism", TURK-IS also rewards its friends and punishes its enemies whatever their party persuasion particularly during the election time.

In considering the policy of the confederation, TURK-IS does not pursue a revolutionary policy of class struggle. In this context, unlike the UGT in Spain, it is similar to the GSEE in Greece and the UGT-P in Portugal. Therefore, it is quite possible to describe TURK-IS as an intermediary organisation (the term is used by Walther Muller Jentsch, 1985). This term is used with reference to a unionism committed to reform within capitalist structural framework. Basically, this is a unionism which sees its future and the future of the working class as being determined by close co-operation with capital and the government of the day, and that it is solely prepared to exert its role to the extent that this does not antagonise the power structure.

In this sense, at least two important reasons can be suggested for the pressures "internal" and "external" on TURK-IS's policy and principles. For internal pressure there are a number of determining factors such as the different political tendencies of leaders of member unions, the lack of a well-entrenched class-consciousness, conservatism of the working class and the reluctance of workers to identify themselves with any leftist group and organisation. On the other hand, in the context of the external pressure, legal restrictions on trade unionism in Turkey and the legal and institutional requirements of the system of collective bargaining are so crucial that social partners are willing to compromise and work together. Here the pressure drives from the economic and political implications of union's action. It is to say that unions are forced to join responsibility for the state of the economy and for stable growth.
As a matter of fact, in the principles of TURK-IS the economic growth of the country as well as a policy of social reforms have been stressed. In addition, in more recent years TURK-IS leaders have often claimed the defence of values and principles of democratic trade unionism.

As the case with the GSEE in Greece, the UGT in Spain and the UGT-P in Portugal, TURK-IS has strong relations with international bodies, including ICFTU, ETUC and TUAC to the OECD. That is why, combined with the consolidation of democracy in Turkey and Turkey's full application for the European communities, TURK-IS' policy and principles are likely to be redefined in accordance with the needs of a modern trade union movement which is more compatible with the structures, functions and formal relations (concerning the political parties, the state and employers organisations) of the European trade union movement. This not only further requires the principles of solidarity in general but also encourages a mass democratic movement in Turkey.

NOTES:

1) In Turkey, federations had begun to set themselves up before the emergence of TURK-IS.
2) Irving Brown worked as the chairman of foreign relation of AFL-CIO. He was also said to have some relations with CIA see Koc 1986 "TURK-IS neden boyle nasil degisecek" Alan Yayincilik.
3) For a detailed analysis of the structure of Turkish trade unionism see Dereli 1966 "Turk sendikaciliginda merkezilesme temayulu ve muhtemel neticeleri" sosyal siyaset konferanslari, vol. 7, Istanbul.
4) TURK-IS has twenty-four principles in the constitution of the confederation of the Turkish trade unions. The first twenty-three of these was approved by the
seventh general congress in 1968. The twenty-fourth was accepted by the eight congress in 1970. These principles were amended and adopted at the 11th general congress of TURK-IS (1979).

5) During the case studies in April 1993 in Ankara, it was difficult to gather some information about representative functions of TURK-IS from the confederation's own sources and the information given officially was not good enough. Therefore, most information is based on the authors' personal contacts, or gathered from the ministry of labour's periodicals and TISK (the main employers confederation's officials in Ankara).
A famous phrase used by Seyfi Demirsoy (one of the ex-presidents of TURK-IS) to describe the role of TURK-IS in the labour movement is that "there is a government in Ankara, there is a parliament in Ankara and there is the TURK-IS in Ankara". In fact, the task here is simply to find out how true this view is. In other words, the role of TURK-IS in the Turkish industrial relations system becomes very important in understanding of role of unions in the Turkish economic and political system. Individual workers do not become members of TURK-IS, but join one of its affiliated trade unions. In essence, TURK-IS is a union of unions. Thus, the role of confederation may be broadly described as involving in everything concerned with the labour movement. It coordinates the labour views and in general, performs various necessary functions and provides assistance to its members.

In this context, it is necessary to raise some questions. Was the role of TURK-IS in Turkish industrial relations explicitly defined in terms of the characteristics of the confederation and its organisational elements (leadership, union democracy, policies and strategies etc.), or of external structural influences? What were the necessary purposes of TURK-IS in its relations with state, collective bargaining, organisational developments, strikes and politics? How far were the strategies, policies and objectives of unions in Turkey shaped by their organisational peculiarities? What were the significant features of interaction between the internal environment and the broader social context?
Also, an important question to ask is whether the theoretical debate on the role of trade unions in a European context can inform us about the role of the unions in Turkey. For some academics the role of trade unions in various countries did not extend far beyond the limits of collective bargaining. In this respect, the effect of the bargaining role of unions was also explained as what was described by the Webbs' "market relations" (Hyman 1971). Hyman argues (1975) that trade unions in many countries were formed as agencies for collective bargaining in order to improve their wages and employment conditions. A number of commentators also argued that some union demands seem to be beyond the securing of economic gains. For Flanders, job regulation was an important term to analyse the function of unions; collective bargaining was not only an economic function, but also a form of political expression. The latter, basically, required the participation of unions or their representatives in the regulation of "managerial relations" (Hyman 1971).

Some authors explained the function and role of trade unions in terms of the transformation of "external" and "internal" determinants of unions. Muller-Jentsch (1985:5) argues that;

"The role and function of trade unions in West European society are to be seen in the wider context of the transformation from "laissez-faire" to an "organised welfare-state capitalism".

This development had a significant influence on trade union organisation and policy. As a result, unions changed from "classical" to "intermediary". Development was characterised by changes in union structure: there was an internal restructuring and a tendency for the centralisation of the decision making process, (mainly, the bureaucratisation of trade unions); changes in union policies occurred (wages and
working hours, organisational objectives and external representation became more important), differentiation between workplace and industry-wide representation took place (new types of workplace institutions emerged and workplace representation became more important); there was an institutionalising of class conflict and an increasing trade union role in economic policy (Müller-Jentsch 1985).

What is required here is an explicit attempt to identify the similarity or difference between the type of unionism in Turkey and what is called the "intermediary" unionism in which the coexistence of union structures and developments may assume alternative forms and may involve different consequences for the role and function of Turkish trade unions. In order to respond to this question four crucial themes namely: relations with the state, collective bargaining, strikes and internal developments are to be discussed below.

(i) Relations with the State and Politics.

One of the significant roles of TURK-IS in the Turkish industrial system is to lobby on general labour and social matters on behalf of its members. In other words, TURK-IS seeks to influence government decision-making on labour and social questions of concern to its members. It will be shown that, since its formation, TURK-IS has had a considerable influence on Turkish governments. However, the patterns of relationships between the governments and TURK-IS have taken different forms in different historical periods of Turkish labour movement.

Since the establishment of TURK-IS in 1952, the confederation adopted the policy of what is called "supra-party unionism". According to the main constitution of the
confederation, Article 3 also forbade any links with political parties. However, it stated that

"unless the executive committee of TURK-IS and the representatives of its members reached an agreement, the aim of TURK-IS was to stay independent and pursue "above-party" policy (TURK-IS 1970, Ana Tuzuk Madde 3:6)."

In fact, the general idea among union leaders who defended the confederation's "supra party policy" was that the policy of union independence should be supported because if TURK-IS sided with any political party then most of its members would split into the different political lines, particularly, since they lacked common party loyalties (1) (TURK-IS 1973). Unlike the situation in most European countries, political parties in Turkey have not had any political objectives in which they radically differ from each other, either in their conception of trade unionism or their approach to party-union relationships. In this context, TURK-IS's non-commitment policy to any political party should be also understood.

The purpose of TURK-IS in general has been to develop good relations on a permanent basis with the governments and to secure the unity of the unions behind it as their spokesmen and co-ordinator. Yet, the successful achievement of this aim has sometimes turned out to be problematic.

During the years preceding 1960, the hopes of the confederation to establish good relations with the Democrat party (DP) had been disappointed. The Democrat Party in the 1950 election had come to power by promising the right to free collective bargaining and the freedom to strike. This friendly relationship between the DP and TURK-IS was, however, short-lived, because the DP had refused to implement its promises on the right
to strike and adopted restrictive labour policies. Union leaders, who often criticised the government for inaction and inadequacy on some legislative issues, such as the right to strike and permission to affiliate to the ICFTU, had been subject to repression and persecution (Rosen 1962).

Particularly after 1953 the government exerted constant pressure on unions which did not support the Democrat party. In 1957, courts of law were exhorted by the Democrat party government to shut down regional union organisations. Shortly after this the government's policy towards unions became more repressive (Koc 1986a). During the formative years of the confederation a favourable government policy was significant. However, the removal of this support, especially after 1953, demoralised union leadership and the confederation's direct confrontation with the Democrat party gave rise to the division among the already fragmented union leadership into partisan factions (2).

On 19-21 June 1957 the third convention of TURK-IS took place under heavy government pressures. Although some delegates at the congress were accusing the government supporters within the confederation of becoming the tools of the DP government, the Democrat party loyalists in the confederation replaced Ismail Inan, the supporter of the people's party faction, with Nuri Beser, leader of the Democrat party faction within the confederation (Koc 1986a). The change in leadership led TURK-IS to play a passive role in relations with the government. In short, during the 1950s as the national labour centre, TURK-IS was unable to establish itself as the recognised spokesman for the labour movement. Its leaders were frequently told by the government officials that the government had no need for "intermediate channels" particularly since the labour movement was controlled by the government (TURK-IS 1960).
However, the relationship between the state and labour unions in Turkey began to change in the 1960s and 70s. As has been mentioned earlier, after 1960 the principal goals of economic and development policies were the adaptation of the idea of a "social welfare state". The 1961 constitution also set up liberal pluralist freedoms and social and economic rights and duties and encouraged the progressive labour legislation enacted in 1963. Hence, the state policy toward labour was to seek a broad corporatisation of unions, as well as the other associational interest representatives. For this reason periodic meetings were held between the government officials and TURK-IS leaders. The first meeting was held in August 1962 in Ankara. After this several meetings were also organised between government, employer organisations and TURK-IS (Kutal 1977).

The labour policy of the government became one of the key elements in the attempt to reconcile rapid economic development with democracy. Therefore, in order to avoid a return to overt authoritarian rule, some moderate demands for political participation and economic redistribution were tolerated by the government. This approach toward unions was particularly promoted by the conservative Justice Party. It can be argued that, the state was in the need of an "intermediate channel" between unions/workers and employers and the state. The Justice party attempted to develop collaborative class relationships particularly through nation-wide collective bargaining between the leading associations in the key economic sectors, especially, in the public sector. Since TURK-IS was mostly organised in the public sector, the leaders of some large public sector unions were keen on establishing good relations with the Justice Party government (particularly after the Justice Party victory in the 1965 election) (Isikli 1979).

During this period, TURK-IS was helped by the State to set up a representational monopoly at national level. The efforts of TURK-IS for "centralisation" and
consolidation of its power should also be understood by regarding the state's policy toward labour. Thus, the role of the state was said to be crucial in not only affecting the demands of TURK-IS and its internal governance and even leadership selection but also undermining its rivals' power.

The election of the sixth congress of TURK-IS in November, 1960 resulted in important changes in the leading cadres of the confederation. Seyfi Demirsoy who was known as a conservative unionist was elected for the presidency and Halil Tunc, a moderate unionist, was elected secretary general. A well known journalist on labour relations, Refik Sonmezsoy (1991), describes these two leaders as the best team in the confederation's history. They held their position during the period of 1960-1974. This was important for several reasons. Firstly, the relation between the Justice Party and the leadership of confederation was strengthened; and second, this change in leadership further brought about some political tendencies within the confederation despite its "non-partisan politics". First, some unionists within TURK-IS founded the Turkish Workers Party in 1961 and they later split from TURK-IS and established the DISK (a rival left-wing confederation) in 1967. The second political tendency within the confederation was the emergence of the social democratic unions supporting left of centre policies of the Republican People's party (Isikli 1979, Cecen 1973, TURK-IS 1968).

Although it is possible to charge TURK-IS with political passivity, it does not mean that the confederation was totally out of politics. In fact, claims that TURK-IS displayed a lack of political objectives are not accurate. Although any formal relationship with political parties was forbidden by the trade union Act of 1963, as in the case of American unionism, informal support was always possible. In this respect, the first tactic of the confederation was the promotion of the election of unionists to parliament
without considering their party affiliations. The second strategy of TURK-IS was to punish its parliamentary enemies by launching significant propaganda to prevent the reelection of some MPs from several parties whose attitudes seemed to be anti-labour. This was evident especially during the general elections of 1961 and 1965 (Koc 1993, TURK-IS 1969).

The confederation intended to produce a number of tactics concerning a wide range of political matters. For example, the so-called "Twenty-four principles document" adopted by the seventh general congress in 15 April 1968 covered a great number of political issues, including the nationalisation of an important part of the mining and petroleum industries, tax reforms, the limitation of the influence of foreign capital, the extension of public housing and education, and the promotion of land holding (TURK-IS 1968). Taking these principles into consideration, it can be suggested that although TURK-IS tended to remain independent vis-à-vis political parties, the role of the confederation seemed to be as a pressure group in politics. This can be seen from the above-mentioned principles which also demonstrate the dimension and capacities of a political pressure group.

What should be noted is that the social democratic union movement began to develop within TURK-IS in the beginning of the 1970s. These social democratic unions opted for more politically autonomous unionism. This can be clearly seen from their publications called "report of 4" and "report of 12" (TURK-IS 1971). Some of these unions, including the Municipal Workers' Union (Genel-Is) and the Hotel, Restaurant and Tourism Workers' Union (Oley-Is) broke away from TURK-IS and joined DISK. The rest, such as the Road Construction Workers' Union (Yol-Is), the Petroleum Workers' Union (Petrol-Is) and the Office, Commercial and Clerical Workers' Union (Tez Buro-Is) remained within TURK-IS.
Broadly speaking, because of the significant development in the power of DISK in the labour movement and the changes in the policy and leadership of the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP), there was much pressure on TURK-IS to abandon its "above politics" policy in favour of declaring itself to be social democrat in orientation. After 1965, and particularly in the 1969 election, the RPP adopted what was called a "left of centre" programme. This new ideology of the party affected the leaders of some unions associated with TURK-IS as the RPP began to offer attractive proposals to unions.

These structural and ideological changes in the RPP gave rise to some crucial influences on some unions associated with TURK-IS. One striking example is that on 14 January 1971, at a meeting of the TURK-IS management committee, a report was presented by four main TURK-IS union presidents "the report of the four". This report criticised the confederation's policy in general and, particularly, the "above-party" policy. The report also stated that TURK-IS did not efficiently pursue the 24 principles of the confederation (TURK-IS 1971).

In the statement, various proposal were also suggested to consider new strategies for the general line of the confederation's policy. Some of these proposals can be summarised as follows: (a) TURK-IS should be linked to a definite political ideology and unite around a more valid political ideology; (b) Turkish unionism, due to its specific circumstances, should adopt an ideological approach excluding capitalism and Marxism; a social democratic ideology for Turkish unions should be discussed; (c) the struggle of trade unions in the labour movement requires co-operation with a political party of social democratic character. Hence, since the RPP is the only such political party in Turkey, possibilities of co-operation with it should be elaborated (3) (TURK-IS 1971, Isikli 1979).
For these unionists, the RPP, due to its policy, ideology and attitude to labour relations, was the only party which appeared to be suitable for TURK-IS to be together in joint action. Eight national unions and some federations decided to back them. This move was followed later in 1971 by a call from twelve TURK-IS unions for the adaptation of social democracy as their main ideology. This became a more crucial development since the "twelve" had among eight members of the twenty-nine member executive committee of TURK-IS.

The "twelve" also stated their political strategy that the Turkish labour movement should take a share in political power mainly through co-operating with other working people in society. TURK-IS, as a peak confederation, should have an influence on different political matters (TURK-IS 1971). However, despite all these social democracy approaches proposed by the "twelve", TURK-IS did not change its policy. The reason for failure of this development given by the ex-president of the confederation, Halil Tunc, (4) is that

"One broad contrast that may be drawn between the situation in most European countries and the one in Turkey is that trade unionists do not normally hold a right wing ideology. However, conditions are different in Turkey. There are both workers and trade union leaders on the right. Hence, it was not easy for TURK-IS, which had a great number of executives with a "business-unionism" background, to adopt the aspects of political unionism"

In fact, most unions associated with TURK-IS always sought to establish good relation with political power, mainly, governments, as they were organised in the public sector. Therefore, it is hardly a paradox to say that since the right wing parties in Turkey were in office for a long time, it was difficult for TURK-IS to change its policy in favour of
social democracy. It should be stressed that certain factors, such as the absence of a political struggle tradition in Turkish unionism, resulted in the failure of any alternative ideological development within TURK-IS. Broadly speaking, in the 1960s and 70s in spite of the emergence of different political tendencies in Turkish trade unionism, the leadership of TURK-IS was still concerned with safeguarding the unity of the confederation by pursuing its traditional policy. In short, although the executive committee of TURK-IS was constrained and dependent on the state, some unions, mainly the social democratic unions within the confederation, struggled to adopt the tactics and strategies of the autonomous union movement.

On the other hand, as the rivalry between two confederations, TURK-IS and DISK intensified, the Justice Party and TURK-IS improved their relations substantially. The government was also willing to grant official recognition to the confederation's claims as the sole representative of labour. For example, Turkish leaders were given a place as labours exclusive representative in joint consultative boards and regulatory commissions, such as the minimum wage commission, the social insurance organisation, the supreme arbitration board and the state economic enterprises.

The 1970s were the beginning of a period of polarisation and radicalisation of political forces including unions. The response of the government was to move away from the model of pluralist interest group politics influenced by the 1963 legislation and to adopt a more unitary labour policy through granting TURK-IS an effective representational monopoly at the national level. In doing so, the first important intervention of the government was the amendment of the union law in 1970. It simply aimed at undermining TURK-IS's rivals, particularly DISK. The amendment law forbade the existence of unions unless they represented at least one-third of the insured workers in its trade. It was obvious that this amendment would allow TURK-IS to become the only
labour organisation authorised to use the title "Confederation" and enable it to represent the whole labour force at national and international level.

However, massive workers' riots in Istanbul and Izmit on 15-16 June 1970 were an important response to the proposed amendment of the union law. In the parliament, the RPP and the Turkish labour workers' party also opposed the law. Therefore, this trade unions Act was overturned by the constitutional court two years later (Sulker 1976). The reaction of TURK-IS' leaders to the large-scale workers' protest was interesting. While the leader of TURK-IS, Seyfi Demirsoy, and the other members of the executive committee were defending the changes in the proposed law, they also put the blame for the 15-16 June events on the rival confederation, DISK (TURK-IS 1973).

The military coup of 12 March 1971 came in the aftermath of the 15-16 June events, at a time when unions were gaining some autonomy from the State and moving away from the "non-political "philosophy of TURK-IS. In the years following the 1971 coup, TURK-IS changed its tactics against its main rival, DISK. This can be clearly seen from a letter written to the prime minister, Nihat Erim, in May 1971. The general secretary of TURK-IS, Halil Tunc, wrote to him that

"TURK-IS had heard rumours the DISK would be closed down in the near future. As you are well aware, TURK-IS has had a continual battle with DISK, since DISK and TURK-IS have conflicting ideas and conflicting objectives. Despite this fact we must cite our observation that if efforts are to be made to close down DISK, the impression would be given of an overall attempt which aims at doing away with union rights and union freedom" (cited from Hale, 1977: 68).
It can be argued that having written this letter, TURK-IS, first, demonstrated its loyalty to the military government by expressing its good will particularly staying out of high politics and, second, tried to convince unionists and workers in general that TURK-IS was a real representative of union rights and union freedoms. What is more, the confederation may also have felt the fear of some external pressures from national and international democratic organisations.

After the 1971 coup, Turkey returned to civilian rule. However, the election results brought about a series of unstable coalition governments. In this context, the relations between the governments and TURK-IS were also unstable. During the course of nationalist front coalitions of 1975-77 there were continuous conflicts between the trade unions and the government. It is important to point out that the ministry of labour used its power to protect some unions and to repress others (Isikli 1979). The conflict between unions and the government had a considerable impact on the relations between TURK-IS and its member unions. Even when the masses, not only the workers but also the civil servants, students, farmers and small artisans became politically active, TURK-IS was not able to bring them together for common goals. Therefore, the discontent of the rank and file and of local leaders of the affiliated unions substantially increased. In spite of the fact that social democratic unions within the confederation began to raise their voice particularly against the confederation's "non-partisan politics" and its policy toward government, they were unable to gain sufficient power for the executive committees at the 9th and 10th general congress of the confederations (TURK-IS 1976).

It can be argued that the policy of TURK-IS not to set up any link with a political party but to exert pressure on the current government, was not very successful in practice. In fact, TURK-IS was compelled to act this way since antagonising the government might jeopardise the successful passage of labour legislation and collective bargaining
negotiations in public sectors. For this reason there were occasions when the confederation, by condemning several strikes and ignoring workers' demands in collective bargaining, sided fully with the government view.

By analysing the several congress reports it can, thus, be argued that the confederation was never able to rid itself of the accusation by the delegates of turning its back on working class interests and serving the benefits of the conservative parties or, as a shop steward in the leather industry told the author; "It was nothing but a mere satellite of the party in power". However, when faced with such unexpected and occasionally severe criticism from its own member unions and rank and file, they directed some criticism against the government for their inaction and carelessness in the issues like labour legislation and wages. On the other hand, for the government, TURK-IS was desirable for its own purpose, since dealing with a strong central confederation which was seemingly apolitical and which always claimed to be the main representative of Turkish working class would be much easier than trying to cope with various organisations split politically. The nationalist front government was willing to encourage the strengthening of TURK-IS by undermining, at least through indirect methods, the development of alternative labour confederations such as DISK.

Thus, until the late 1970s, although the confederation frequently agreed with the government's views on major policy issues, the relations of TURK-IS with the nationalist front coalition governments can be characterized by uncertainties rather than stability. Firstly, in terms of its policy implementation TURK-IS was not able to rid itself of political considerations in general and particularly the pressures of the party in power, despite its "above-the parties" policy. Secondly, due to some considerable pressure from the different tendencies within the confederation TURK-IS' leadership was unable to exert its central power in practice.
What needs to be also emphasised is that the failure of the government to set up a collaborative type of unionism since 1960 gave rise to the emergence of union pluralism by the end of the 1970s. Consequently, the labour movement seemed to be divided into different factions such as the DISK (the left-wing confederation), the MISK (the confederation of Nationalist trade union) and the HAK-IS (the religiously oriented confederation).

In the meanwhile, in the 1970s the rank and file became more radicalised and the union leadership became more politically active. Faced with continuous pressure from within, the general congress of TURK-IS held on 12-18 April 1976 could not abandon its defence of party neutrality. Thus, at the end of the 10th general congress of the confederation there was not a clear-cut commitment to any political party. Nevertheless, the convention authorised the administrative board of TURK-IS to decide, by a two-thirds vote, whether or not to support a political party in the general election of 1977 (TURK-IS 1976). It would come as a surprise that TURK-IS took a stand favourable to the RPP, the centre left populist party, in the 1977 general election. This meant that TURK-IS changed its approach on the vital question of "above-party" politics at least for a while.

It should be also emphasised that in the third five-year economic plan of the government there was a significant proposal to establish an industrial relations unit to co-ordinate collective bargaining activities, particularly within the public sector, as well as to establish a wages and incomes council for the whole economy. However, this initiative failed, partly for the following reasons. Firstly, public sector managers were not willing to cooperate with the private employers' associations, second, collective bargaining was taking place at local level, and finally, there were disagreements about the wages and income council within the employers' organisations (Dereli 1984).
However, Ecevit's RPP government in 1978 attempted to restrict wage increases by cost of living indices via applying the policy of "the social contract". After long negotiations with TURK-IS, the prime minister, Bülent Ecevit was able to win the support of the president of TURK-IS, Halil Tunc (TURK-IS 1979). As has been mentioned before, the affiliates of TURK-IS were better organised in the public sector. Therefore, various collective agreements were concluded consistent with the terms of the "social contract" in the public sector. The government also seemed willing to adopt the "social contract" as a guideline for collective bargains in the private sector. But, DISK, whose affiliates were better organised in the private sector responded to the "social contract" with suspicion and resentment, despite the attempts of Ecevit's government. DISK leaders told the prime minister that they would agree with the government's proposal provided government undertook some reforms, including repealing the right of lock-out and nationalisation of a considerable portion of the Turkish economy (Dereli 1984, Koc 1986).

As a result, the social contract was abolished when political power shifted to the right-wing Justice party in 1979. At the same time, the social democratic faction within TURK-IS failed once again to come to power in the confederation's convention held on 16-22 April 1979 (TURK-IS 1979).

To sum up, it can be argued that by seeking the collaboration of unions, the aim of the governments, particularly the conservative Justice party and nationalist front governments, was to avoid an independent, politically active union movement which would promote class struggle and present new challenges to the authority of the ruling class. During the course of the 1960s and 70s, although the state attempted to adopt the pluralist model for Turkey's political life, its labour policy seemed to restrict interest representation so as to promote collaborative class relations. In doing so, it preferred
clientelistic relations with favoured unions, mainly, TURK-IS. True enough, TURK-IS had official recognition and a monopoly of representation particularly compared with the rival confederation, DISK. Yet, this crucial exclusive right of representation and the guaranteed access to policy making were exchanged for co-operation in reducing working class demands and promoting social peace.

It should be stressed that the leaders of TURK-IS welcomed the introduction of this mode of organisational representation as a significant opportunity to overcome their traditional isolation during the 1950s. Basically, the main objective of TURK-IS in these periods was to establish good relations with the parties in power. But it was, of course, at the expense of its losing credibility in the eyes of member unions and the working class, because the state interfered in the confederation's internal relations, such as its demand-making, leadership selection and internal governance.

From the beginning of 1960s state control of labour unions was transformed into pluralism. Yet this model of incorporation of labour unions into the economic and political system did not give rise to what is termed "neo-corporatism", including "wage restraint" and "social contract", if we ignore the short-lived experience of the 1978 "social contract" (5).

Among other reasons for the failure of the "social contract" in Turkey was the fact that relations between employers' organisations, labour unions and the state were not highly institutionalised. The industrial relation system was established within neither an authoritarian political system nor a pluralistic democratic system. In this sense, the relations between social partners were expected to produce uncertainty in labour relations. Under these conditions, the role of TURK-IS was shaped to maintain the existing order and social peace. Therefore, TURK-IS, which carefully tried to avoid
political unionism and gave priority to securing wage increases and welfare benefits, was "loyal" to the state.

(ii) Organisational Developments.

The issues of internal environments such as union democracy, leadership, attitudes and factions, are important in understanding the whole union movement because most of the strategies, policies and issues were undertaken by organisations themselves. Union leadership in Turkey differs in many significant ways from union leadership in other European countries. As Dereli (1984) stressed, union leadership in Turkey was held by the leadership of blue collar origin. This was because, firstly, until the 1963 union Act, union membership was limited only to manual workers. Second, Turkish unions had always provided leaders from within their own ranks since the legislations had excluded non workers from union membership, and finally, the intellectuals were not willing to occupy the leadership positions in unions. Although white collar workers were allowed to form and join unions, intellectuals were still reluctant to hold the leadership positions of unions. Before the pre-1963 period most union officials were not professional leaders paid by their unions (Dereli 1975). Leadership was a new experience for most unionists in the 1950s.

One of the ex-general secretaries of TURK-IS, Orhan Balta, (6) told me that in this period membership participation and interest in union administration and elections was high. Rosen (1962) argued that there had been reasonable democracy in union affairs and the rank and file participated actively. He went on to observe the fact that
"the evidence of abundant devotion to democratic principles is doubly striking in a society where political democracy is new, and authoritarian traditions deep-rooted "


The main reason for this is that the trade unions were not very large and bureaucratic domination was almost absent. Only few unions were able to maintain even one full-time officer. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, however, an increased tendency for trade union leaders to consolidate their power positions and resist democratic principles in union administration was witnessed. In other words, Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" began to operate particularly in industrial unions and some of the bigger federations. Broadly speaking, leadership positions were stable, and frequent turnover, particularly among the top posts was rare. Leadership turnover was also very low at confederation levels. For instance, the executive committee of TURK-IS, Seyfi Demirsoy, Halil Tunc and Omer Ergun held the same position from the 4th General congress to the 10th General congress. At both national and local level the picture seemed to be the same (TURK-IS 40 nci yilda).

It should be stressed that the oligarchical tendencies within both TURK-IS and its member unions also resulted in some local unions and branches losing their capacity for independent action, particularly in terms of collective bargaining and financial autonomy. More importantly, this trend lessened potential young leaders' chances of rising to power from local levels (7).

At this time white collar employees did not join unions together with blue collar workers and therefore did not compete for the leadership positions. This was probably because of status considerations and a lack of identification with working class values. As a result, white collar employees preferred to set up white collar unions like Bank-is and Tez-
Buro-is. However, after the 1960s most of the large industrial unions and federations began to employ white collar experts in their research, education, media and collective bargaining departments. Unions employed some technical union staff experts rather than union intellectuals who might have brought new ideologies into the unions.

As indicated earlier, at the beginning of 1960s the state with its emphasis on both social justice and planned economic development was in need of institutional channels for willingly moderating demands and the support of reliable labour leaders. In this respect, although unions were not strong enough to assist the political and economic policies, their co-operation, intermediary role and significant organisational resources would be considerable elements in any long-term compromise. On the other hand, the attempts of the government to set up a centralised industrial relation system was an acceptable proposition for TURK-IS leadership, whose purpose was to establish an exclusive representational cartel in labour relations. The new industrial relations system with its corporatist measures was a welcome opportunity to overcome their traditional isolation and impotence. Although the new freedoms granted to the Turkish trade union movement after the 1960 legislation significantly strengthened the confederation's economic and political bargaining power, its new leaders were rather cautious in exercising this power. The new leadership began to pursue a policy in which they sought the significant exclusive right of representation (being granted by official status as labour spokesman in the country) and the guaranteed access to the policy making process.

In the reformist atmosphere of the early 1960s many of the union leadership's decisions can be explained only through paternalistic and opportunistic manners. This is widely evident during the periods of the Seyfi Demirsoy and Halil Tunc administration. In the course of the 1960s and 70s, Seyfi Demirsoy, ex-president of TURK-IS and Halil Tunc, ex-president of and ex-general secretaire of TURK-IS, directed the confederation's
transformation from an isolated and symbolic structure into a centralised and relatively powerful peak labour organisation. In their words, the attempt was to create "the largest and most effective pressure group" (Halil Tunc 1969:2).

During this transformation period TURK-IS leadership exercised two main policies or tactics. Firstly, it reaffirmed its "above party" policy which was to maintain good relations with political power, mainly the government of the day, to secure their recognition and deal with political split within the confederation and also to gain material benefits. The other main policy of the confederation's leadership was to focus its efforts on organisational purposes, including replacing heterogeneous regional affiliates with vertically structured occupational federations and co-ordinating union bargaining according to centrally determined policies and providing a political consensus among the different factions which were divided into conservative, socialist and social democrat.

The strategy included an effort to achieve the virtually exclusive right of representation and the guaranteed access to decision making process at macro level that TURK-IS leaders were unlikely to achieve independently. In exchange for such rights they pledged continued moderation in exercising trade unions' new rights to strike and collective bargaining. Therefore, official recognition of the confederation as a central labour representative was to be returned for co-operation in reducing working-class demands and promoting social peace.

This premature and artificial attempt to create a centralised representational cartel for organised labour further required internal authority and discipline. In fact, the leaders of the largest unions within the confederation, mainly the conservative faction of TURK-IS, were to concentrate too much power in their hands. On the other hand, small
factions of the confederation, such as social democrats and socialists, were too weak to play a crucial role in its strategies and policies. That is why, although TURK-IS leadership often pointed out the pluralist strategies of organisation, in practice a continued inter union authority and discipline was considered as necessary to protect union leadership's policies from the potentially disruptive impact of the other factions.

It can be argued that pluralism in union democracy in Turkey often aided the attempts of ruling class to preserve the disorganisation and passivity of the working class by letting a group of powerful union leaders to repress rival factions within unions. In this context the most striking example was that a debate about a strike decision in Pasabahce glass factory in 1966 brought about a serious conflict between six affiliates of TURK-IS and the executive committee of the confederation which sided with the government decisions against the strike. As a result, the supporters of Justice Party government within the executive committee of TURK-IS let president Demirsoy suspended socialist unionists from the confederation leadership and asserted greater authority in disciplining members in the name of the unity of the confederation (Sulker 1976, Fisek 1969). There is no doubt that all these developments worked for the interests of the state and employers so as to anticipate or delay the overt political expression of growing working class demands.

However, this happy compromise between TURK-IS leadership and the ruling class did not last long. In the late 1960s and 70s there was a considerable increase in working class militancy, mainly because of the deteriorating economic and political conditions. At the confederation level two key leaders had different solutions and policies for the new situation. Although Demirsoy (President) and Tunc (General Secretariat) shared the same opinions about maintaining the formal above-party policy and the primacy of
organisational consolidation, they disagreed on the way of translating the growing strength of TURK-IS into a more influential role in the labour movement.

For Demirsoy, the political activity of TURK-IS was to be limited to lobbying in parliament and putting some pressure on government, particularly through small numbers of MPs (ex-trade unionists). His effort was to convince the Justice Party government that without the continued co-operation of moderate TURK-IS leadership, the implementation of government's economic policies would not be successful. In addition, Demirsoy also warned government about the increasing effect of socialist unionists promoting class struggles in the labour movement. On the other hand, for Tunc the policies of TURK-IS were to be designed to affect public policy independently of the government by expanding the confederation's bargaining power. The conservative factions of the confederation, who had attained a two-thirds majority in the confederation's central committee by the beginning of 1970s, were not a great comfort to Tunc's liberal views (Sonmezsoy 1991, Isikli 1979).

However, during the 1970s due to demands for greater political unionism, the rival confederation's (DISK) growing popularity among the rank and file, and the emergence of social democracy within member unions, Tunc became an important leader particularly in balancing different factions in the confederation. As a matter of fact, at work place level a great deal of independent action from unions was witnessed; the strike rate increased dramatically and a number of TURK-IS' s own affiliates began to argue that greater political activism was needed to protect labour's legal and political and economic gains. Thus, TURK-IS leadership with Tunc in the leading role, took some crucial steps in terms of its strategies and policies.
Under an increasingly hostile economic and political external environment combined with internal problems such as the intensifying factional conflicts within the confederation, there were crucial demands from the rank and file for basic reforms in the confederation's structure, policies and political role. TURK-IS leadership faced two alternative strategies to reconsider the policy of the confederation. These depended on whether the confederation would continue its role as a seeker of corporatist privilege from the state and employers to establish a representational cartel in trade union movement, or, whether it sought to become a leading defender of the common interests of the Turkish working class. The former was to maintain the traditional line of the confederation's policy to protect economic gains and strengthen its status in labour relations. The latter would involve more innovative policies in which greater organisational efforts and political integration of the working class would be channelled towards more orderly and effective demonstrations of mass political power. By calling for working class mobilisation rather than resisting and containing worker militancy, the confederation could resist the new threats to union freedoms and to the democratic regime itself.

In fact, in analysing the developments within the confederation in the 1970s it is rather difficult to find a clear answer to the question whether TURK-IS leadership chose one of the strategies mentioned above. A modest explanation might be that during Demirsoys' leadership in the 1960s, in order to achieve the confederations' demand for representational exclusiveness the policy of the confederation's leadership was to collaborate with the Justice Party government corporatist strategy for reasserting state control over workers. However, in the 1970s as economic and political conditions were getting worse, employers and managers of state owned companies became hostile to workers' demands at the workplace. The result was a considerable increase in workers' militancy. This was also associated with the rapid resurgence and expansion of DISK in
the same years and demands for greater political unionism within the confederation. As a result, all these dramatic changes in the external environment of TURK-IS forced TURK-IS leadership to adopt a more pluralist strategy for the general policy of TURK-IS.

This new approach did not mean a substantial change both in the traditional "above party" policy of the confederation and in the general policy of becoming the leading representatives of all Turkish working class. Rather, it was an important change in the attitudes of TURK-IS for co-ordinating the growing workers' demands as opposed to external developments and balancing the intensifying factional conflict within the confederation. It should be mentioned that during the 1970s Halil Tunc gradually became the most important leader of TURK-IS. Tunc tried to set up a balance of power between TURK-IS' factions which would stop social democrats from leaving the confederation and reduce his own isolation within the conservative faction. Tunc's fear was that the confederation was likely to face a major split while increasing ideological and industrial conflict aggravated TURK-IS's internal cleavages. In this context, TURK-IS's 1976 general congress was crucial in that considerable changes in the confederation's leadership and decision-making process helped to enhance the influence of the social democratic faction. This resulted from the expansion of TURK-IS' central committee from twenty-four to thirty-six members to accommodate representation for every affiliated member regardless of size (TURK-IS 1976).

Although the conservative factions won a majority, their power within the confederation was reduced through decentralising reforms which benefited the growing social democratic members. After the mid-1970s, as working class militancy increased, the leadership of the labour movement had to adopt a more militant and politically active position. For instance, in order to compete with the more militant rival confederation
DISK and the growing discontent of its own workers, Tunc acquired a more influential role for TURK-IS in national politics. As a result, TURK-IS directed a "partial general strike" against the National Front Government involving 80,000 workers in Izmir. In addition, TURK-IS ordered member unions to set up new local committees to strengthen communication with workers and to prepare union political activity at regional and national level for a campaign against government (Koc 1986a). The main concern of TURK-IS leadership might have been to revise the confederation's lost reputation for militancy, to precluded the slide of its membership toward the rival confederations. In addition, TURK-IS leadership wanted to prove that TURK-IS could lead a politically active labour movement and also it could do so more powerfully than its rivals, mainly, DISK due to its greater ability to mobilise mass protest in a legal and orderly manner.

All these development led Tunc to support Ecevit's proposals that the existing democratic regime and the freedom of trade unions would survive with the help of workers and their social democratic party. However, the main question was that while the conservative faction was still holding a majority of members, it would be difficult to persuade his union colleagues either to extend organisational contacts or to support common platforms with Ecevit's party RPP. In fact, as Ecevit's leadership in RPP pursued a new strategy toward the left of centre policies, the party gradually made serious attempts to set up alliances with organised labour. Therefore, the key tactic of Ecevit was to promote significant changes in the attitudes of leadership and strategies of both TURK-IS and DISK to integrate organised labour into his party's social democratic principles.

After the mid-1970s Ecevit intensified his efforts to formulate such a strategy by boosting crucial militancy in TURK-IS and moderation in DISK. Basically, the policy
was involved in providing greater support to the social democratic groups in power struggles in both confederations. It is true that this attempt to create moderate leftist leadership was somewhat successful. For instance, while this pressure caused Tunc to reconsider the confederation's relations with the social democratic faction within TURK-IS, the new social democrat leaders replaced the older socialist leaders in DISK.

To sum up, in Turkey the complexity of the trade union movement is such that one cannot generalise on the question of organisational developments. And also the theoretical debate on these issues are not quite adequate to explain Turkish unions. As Von Beyme (1980) stressed, the potential influence of union size and pluralistic divisions within the unions play a significant role in the understanding of internal union democracy. In fact, in the case of Turkey when most unions had been small and fragmented in the 1950s, unions did leave greater room for local and plant initiatives by the membership. in other words, while unions had been small (as in the case of "Birliks" and local federations in the 1950s), close membership involvement by direct participation had been more feasible. This had further limited the influence of leadership in union democracy.

However, combined with the attempt of the state to encourage the centralisation of union organisations and the institutionalisation of collective bargaining, throughout the 1960s, however, oligarchical tendencies began to be more prevalent, particularly in industry-based national unions and, to a lesser extent, in some of the bigger federations. Furthermore, an increased tendency of union leaders to consolidate their power positions was witnessed in most Turkish unions. An important term to describe the role of union leaders is used by C. Wright Mills (1948) who pointed out that they act principally as "managers of discontent". In this sense, Turkish unionists were said to act as a buffer between their members and the state.
In the national unions, all authority was vested in the centre, and branches were deprived of independent action usually through curbing the freedom of branch units, both in terms of collective bargaining and financial autonomy. This type of centralised union structure also brought about increases in size and in the diversity of members' occupations and employment situations which presented inherent problems in the organisation of democratic processes. In this context, the theoretical perspectives on union democracy provide no easy answer to the problem of trade union democracy in Turkey. For example, Edelstein and Warner (1975) and Child, Loveridge and Warner (1973) adopted what can be called a "structural" approach which widely focused on organisational factors and formal arrangements including size, membership pressure, and frequency of union conventions or conferences.

These studies argued that organisational elements are quite important in influencing internal union democracy. For instance, for Child, Loveridge and Warner (1973), the larger unions are likely to maintain a fully effective representative system. Yet, in Turkish case in so far as structural forms are concerned, the question of union democracy can be debated. This is to say that compared with small local unions and federations, national industrial unions did not seem to have a more flexible and democratic structure, which permitted the affiliated locals a greater degree of autonomy as opposed to the rather dependent position of the branches of the national-industrial union.

Rather they posed certain built-in oligarchical tendencies. The other perspective, which gives great scope for the effects of collective bargaining arrangements, is the study of Clegg (1976). He argues that power within unions is based on the level of bargaining. While, for instance, industry bargaining concentrates power at the centre and promotes integrated, bureaucratic union government, bargaining at plant or local levels brings it to
the regions or branches. However, in the case of Turkey, this argument was not without its contradiction that in Turkey in the 1960s and 70s although collective bargaining took place mostly at plant level and was stable, union government was not decentralised and the branches did not have substantial independence.

Therefore, by discussing theoretical debates on organisational developments it can be suggested that in the context of Turkey, the external environmental factors such as the economic and political conditions, the country's democracy tradition, ideological developments, industrial relations system and the existence of competing union confederations were more significant than organisational or internal factors in promoting internal democracy.

It can be argued that, historically, Turkish political culture (with its limited democratic traditions) and the significant role of the state in labour relations tended to preclude the development of strong democracy within unions. For example, at the state-owned companies the exclusive status and representational monopoly were given to trade unions by conservative governments and paternalistic managers. The leaders of these unions were often supported by the state. It is a fact that within TURK-IS these unions, which were the largest, best-financed and most influential organisations, had dominating positions in TURK-IS executive committee. Moreover, these state-sponsored unions in the public sector intended to influence the structure and leadership of most smaller and less developed organisations in other industries as well.

Unions leaders in Turkey usually saw their post as a means of promoting their interests in the existing political and economic system of the country. Nevertheless, particularly in the late 1960s and 70s, a more aggressive and combative set of union leaders confronting paternalistic and authoritarian employers and state managers emerged in the
Turkish trade union movement. This was most probably because the rank and file militancy encouraged trade union leaders to maintain a responsiveness to their members' needs if they were to remain in power. This was also notable within TURK-IS. Associated with economic deterioration and political unrest in the country, the ideological developments, especially the rise of social democracy and the emergence of rival confederations, gave rise to a growing commitment to pluralistic values including maintaining decentralised decision making processes, giving the chance of alternative sets of leaders and providing flexibility and autonomy to the branches for collective bargaining disputes. On the other hand, heterogeneity in membership contributed towards a relatively active democratic process. It seems clear that in the 1970s, the representation of different factions within the confederation and the fear of competing rival unions resulted in reasonable improvement in the organisational strength of TURK-IS. Thus, changes in the union's external environment had a profound effect on the internal organisational development.

(iii) Collective Bargaining Activity.

After the legislation regulating collective agreements, strikes and lock-outs of 1963, collective bargaining became the most significant aspects of labour union activities. As in Germany, the state seemed to intend to bring labour and management together to regulate employment conditions by pursuing the policies of protection and providing a legal framework for the development of collective bargaining. This indeed affected the nature and extent of labour unions and gave rise to the recognition of unions as partners in collective agreements.
In this period, trade unions in Turkey in 1960s and 70s employed two strategies in order to obtain their demands. The first and more widely utilised method was collective bargaining. The second was the lobbying activities of unions, mainly, of their leading confederation, TURK-IS. In the 1960s, in combination with the new industrial relations system, collective bargaining was institutionalised in Turkey. Therefore, during the periods of 1963-1980 emphasis shifted to collective bargaining, while lobbying for improved labour legislation and regulations on social issues was given less emphasis.

The collective agreement legislation of 1963 (Act No: 275) stated that the only organisation entitled to make a collective agreement with the employer(s) or employers' association was the trade union (local union, industry based national union or federation, depending on the level of bargaining). According to this Act, Confederations, however, were not granted the authority to enter into binding collective agreements (Celik 1988).

After the first collective agreement legislation in 1963, the nucleus of collective bargaining developed at the local level in Turkey. Industry-wide bargaining which was so prevalent in European countries did not become so crucial in Turkey for several reasons; for example, the undeveloped state of employers' association, and the tendency of public economic enterprises to engage in bargaining separately (Tuna 1964).

In the 1960s and 70s collective bargaining took place either at multi employer-level or on a plant-level. However, although the collective agreements, strikes and lock outs Act no 275 of 1963 stressed industry-based agreements, until the 1980s a great majority of the agreements concluded were at plant level. According to a union's publication (Petrol-is 1986), while in 1963 96 collective agreements covering 9,462 workers (3,394 workers in public sector and 5,968 in private sector) were made in Turkey, this figure reached 2,247 collective agreements covering 279,327 workers in 1977 (215,443 workers in public sector and 63,884 workers in private sector).
The data available indicates that the public sector seemed to be more active than the private sector in the collective bargaining arena during these years. The relatively larger size of state enterprises coupled with their more subtle paternalism and their more receptive attitude toward collective bargaining most probably accounted for this phenomenon. Collective bargaining in Turkey was legally carried out at either plant or enterprise level. Yet, multi-employers' bargaining so, called "group bargaining" in Turkey, also took place, particularly in the sectors where competition among the companies was high and working conditions were similar. However, in the case of Turkey, since collective bargaining has been mostly decentralised to the plant or enterprise level, neither a corporatist model of collective bargaining nor a "dual structure" system has usually been evident in Turkey. The development of multi-employer "group agreements" was not stable. It only covered some of the industries (metal, textile and chemicals) in the private sector and did not prevail in the other sectors. Although the state only once in 1978 initiated a "social contract", the social compromise between the government and TURK-IS was short-lived mostly due to political events.

The problematic and fragmented relations between the social partners trade unions, employers and state in the Turkish industrial relations did not produce a centralised, stable and institutionalised set of relations in collective bargaining. While elsewhere collective bargaining has been regarded as "the great social invention that has institutionalised industrial conflict and as an important institution in all industrialised countries where freedom of association is a reality" (Flanders 1969:7).

It does not seem that this view offers much relevance to the experience of Turkey. The political development, alternating between parliamentary democracy and periods of military interventions, did not help the strengthening of democratic trade union
movement or create the conditions for free collective bargaining. In the case of Turkey, the collective bargaining function of trade unions developed via the interrelated processes of certain economic and political factors. Government intervention in collective bargaining was usually more evident than direct negotiations, particularly in the public sector. Intervention came through the individual labour laws covering a wide variety of subjects such as minimum wages, paid holidays, paid vacations, social security, working conditions, dismissals, retirement, termination of employment and health insurance. This, basically, led most employment conditions to be determined from above, mainly, through statutory government regulation rather than from below, through union-management negotiations.

The system of collective bargaining was regarded as an established institution of western countries by the Turkish government and as a model to be emulated, particularly in line with its industrialisation policies in the 1960s and 70s. In fact, the repeated efforts of the state, particularly at the beginning of 1960s, to introduce collective bargaining as the principal means of establishing wages and conditions of employment was seen as part of the institutionalisation of the industrial relations system in Turkey. In their attempts to control the labour movement from above, the mainly right-wing governments in the 1960s and 70s tended to create an elaborate system of bureaucratic trade union organisations. In this sense, the collective bargaining became the most important function of trade unions in the Turkish industrial relation system.
(iv) Strikes and TURK-IS.

According to the Collective Agreements, Strikes and Lockouts Act of 1963 (Act no 275), only strikes called for the aim of maintaining or improving the economic and social conditions of workers, and strikes carried out in accordance with the provisions of law, were regarded as "legal". However, any action ordered for any other reasons was considered as "unlawful" (Oguzman 1984). As can be clearly seen from above statement, the act protected strikes only conditionally. This was due to the tradition of state control in industrial relations. The authoritarian tradition appeared more forcefully in the other statement in the Act No.275. In spite of the restrictive structure of legal framework as the passage of the 1963 legislation strike activity intensified, the number of industrial strikes increased from 54 in 1968 to 81 in 1969 and 112 in 1970 (International Labour Organisation ILO 1977).

However, most strikes were said to tend to be ineffective due to the central control exercised over industrial action. In other words, the individual workplace union or branches had to get the permission of the national union, which controlled the strike funds. On the other hand, the national unions were also dependent on the main confederation, TURK-IS. Basically, the national unions had to have the backing of TURK-IS before they could undertake a strike (Sulker 1976).

In this context, the role of TURK-IS in Industrial actions becomes significant. There has always been considerable debate between TURK-IS and its member national unions on the strike decisions. Tending to favour the governments' and employers' opinions within a collaborative framework, TURK-IS seemed to display significant restraint on strike action. Particularly in the emergence of increasing worker militancy and radicalisation, TURK-IS leadership tried to play their role as "responsible unionists" in order to
maintain good relations with governments. However, having felt the pressure from below, groups of some national union leaders and workers' representatives often found themselves at odds with TURK-IS leadership during their struggles.

The attitude of TURK-IS on strike action was that TURK-IS opposed the major strikes. This can be openly seen from two main strikes in 1965 and 1966. During the course of an historic miners' strike in Zonguldak in 1965 and 1966, workers staged a riot and marched against a new method of remuneration which the management had put into practice. After a while, over 5,000 workers were involved in an "illegal strike" and the battle between workers and the management increased. By claiming the strike as communist provocation the government used military forces against workers to control the situation. The result was two shot dead and several wounded. The reaction of TURK-IS was to side with the government. The general secretary of TURK-IS, Halil Tunc, condemned the strike as an illegal act caused by communist forces. As a result, this led workers to confront not only the government and TURK-IS, but also their own union leaders in Zonguldak. As the name of the confederation was usually identified with the whole Turkish trade union movement the second incident of great significance occurred in a strike at the Pasabahce glass factory in 1966. A local union, Kristal-is, rejected the existing industry-wide agreement on the grounds that it represented a majority of workers at the plant level. While employers did not accept this argument, TURK-IS also agreed with employers' rejection. However, various TURK-IS member unions supported the Pasabahce workers and gave them financial help. This strike also further culminated in a conflict between TURK-IS and six unions which sided with the continuation of the strike and the opportunities of a plant level agreement against all industry agreements negotiated by TURK-IS (Fisek 1969, Isikli 1979).
The response of TURK-IS was that in October 1966 the confederation suspended its six member unions who supported the strike for varying periods. These unions were Basin-Is (the printing workers' union of Istanbul), Kimya-Is (the chemical workers' union), Kristal-Is (the Glass workers' union), Maden-Is (the metal workers' union), Lastik-Is (the rubber workers' union) and Petrol-Is (the petroleum workers' union). Two other TURK-IS members, Yapi-Is (the construction workers' union) and Bank-Is (the Bank employees' union) which were not among the suspended unions however resigned from the confederation due to its policies on the major strikes (Isikli 1967). It is worth stressing that before the suspension these unions mentioned above also set up an "inter-union resistance council" within TURK-IS. This council played a significant role in shaping the establishment of a new rival confederation of reformist labour unions (DISK) (Kutal 1969).

Shortly after its formation, DISK became the second major labour confederation in the Turkish labour movement. The late 1960s and 70s were also a time of increasing radicalisation of the masses, as the class struggle in Turkey increased. On 15-16 June 1970, over 100,000 workers in nearly 150 factories throughout Istanbul and Kocaeli went on a strike and protested against an effort to weaken the labour movement through amending the legislation governing trade unions. There were bloody clashes between the workers and the government forces (Sulker 1987). As the economic and political crises deepened, the workers' response to the deteriorating economic situation was to stage mass strikes and demonstrations, occupy factories and openly confront the government forces. Between 1970 and 1976 there were 658 industrial strikes, covering over a hundred thousands workers (ILO 1978).

By the mid-1970s, in contrast to the development of TURK-IS, the size and strength of DISK and its member unions significantly increased and the labour movement became
more politically active and militant. For instance, in September 1976 a general strike was called with the demand that the state security courts be abolished. In May 1977 over 40,000 metal workers went on an historic strike against the MESS, the Turkish Employers' Metal Association of Metal Industries, lasting eight months and ending in victory for the metal workers. On 20 March 1978 more than two million workers were involved in a two hours general strike organised by DISK, which also brought together masses, students, farmers and progressives not only big cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, but also in the other cities as Bursa, Mersin, Hatay, Gaziantep, Adana and Zonguldak (Berberoglu 1982). None of these important strikes were backed by TURK-IS.

In some of the main strikes, rallies and demonstrations throughout Turkey, the demands of the Turkish working class seemed to be not only simply economic but also political. However, unlike most developing and Latin American countries, this action did not turn into a strong protest against the government's policies all over Turkey. The main reason for this was that TURK-IS' leaders were not willing to become involved in "illegal" or militant activities. Their concern was still to maintain good relations with the government.

On the other hand, in the face of these events, the attitude of TURK-IS was disappointing for the working class. Its leaders criticised most of these actions as communist-led riots organised by the rival confederation, DISK. It can be argued that for the ruling class to search for communist infiltration in any industrial action is a regular habit, but, it is surprising to see the leaders of the leading labour confederation manifest the same behaviour. In the cases of varied and interrelated reasons for social unrest, asking the workers to obey the law and respect the existing order, as did TURK-IS, seemed to be very meaningless. Therefore, in these years Turkish workers found it
difficult to accept TURK-IS as an organisation which adequately represented their interests.

(iv) Conclusion.

At the beginning of this part of the thesis a number of questions were raised. The task now is to try to respond to these questions. Two significant questions are to be analysed. Firstly, the role of Turkish unions in the field of industrial relations particularly in relations to collective bargaining, state, strikes, organisational and developments and politics. Second, the extent to which the strategies, policies and objectives of Turkish unions were influenced by their own characteristics and external environment.

The system of industrial relations in Turkey was established in 1960 and became part of the liberal pluralist institutions. The Turkish model of industrial relations (and within that model, the process and structures of collective regulation of labour relations) did not display much difference from the general model of pluralist democracies in Europe. During the transition periods to democracy, the regime of labour relations and industrial relations reflected the general model of labour law and industrial relations of the pluralistic democracies of European countries (8). Of course, some features of the historical and national specific processes of the economic and political development of Turkey tended to particularise the role of unions in Turkish industrial relation system from that of the Anglo-Saxon model. The function and role of unions usually did not possess an overt political dimension in dealing with either the policies of the state and employers or the exercise of managerial authority in regulation of conditions of employment. The reason for this is that most of the union functions were heavily regulated by the state.
In fact, this can be attributed not only to the interventionist policies of governments in industrial relations, but also to the narrowness of labour organisation in a country where the trade union movement was weak compared with other countries in Europe. One reason for the complexity of any adequate explanatory model for Turkish unions might be the difficulty of considering unions' role as universal. Therefore, a different explanation is necessary to understand the functions of Turkish unions, and their extension and consolidation.

The increased importance of the state was witnessed in this period. As in other Southern European countries with weak labour movements, the state's socio-economic intervention became very significant in influencing the nature of the industrialisation process. The role of unions in Turkey was, thus, marked by a strong emphasis on legalism and government intervention. Turkish unions under this system operated within a detailed legal regulation and the structuring of these legal rules reflected a procedural emphasis in collective bargaining. The system of protective law encouraged the attitude in unions that the solution of labour problems should come from above. As in Germany, the policies and strategies of Turkish trade unions can be understood by "etatism", a willingness to rely on the state to produce the solution of general problems in industrial relations. In this case, etatist attitudes can play a crucial role in trade union policies. These factors may have also accounted for the absence of pure "market relations" or "managerial relations" in the role of unions in the Turkish industrial relations system.

Alongside the state involvement in the political and economic life in the 1960s and 70s, a pluralist industrial relations system was established. This allowed unions to gain some rights and status as intermediary organisation in ensuring a framework for the development of economic and political policies. Unlike the situation in many other countries, while the labour movement in Turkey was weak and did not posses any threat
to the ruling class, the state was still willing to collaborate with unions, most probably because it considered them as a potential assistance in resolving labour problems during industrialisation.

There is no doubt that the attempt by the state to create an institutionalised industrial relations system also gave rise to significant emphasis on the role and function of TURK-IS. The themes "responsible unionism" "mediating agency" or "intermediary organisations" were pursued in the discussion to describe the general character and posture of trade unions in many countries (Müller-Jentsch 1985, Harmann and Lau 1980). On the other hand, in Turkey the academics like Isikli (1979), Dereli (1984) usually concentrated on the term of "business unionism" to describe TURK-IS ' character. This view may be true for the formative periods of TURK-IS, but was not enough to explain all the confederations' history.

A crucial finding often stressed is the fact that TURK-IS and its unions became better established, and more "mediating agency". However, Müller-Jentsch's description of "intermediary organisation" is somewhat problematic in the Turkish case. Firstly, in the 1960s and 1970s in the absence of any strong craft union tradition, it is difficult to suggest the same transformation towards "intermediary" trade unionism in Turkey. Although changes in union structure and policies such as the bureaucratisation of trade union administration, and the professionalization of union officers and an increased demand in wage issues were evident, this can not be attributed to any transformation processes in the trade union movement. Moreover, conflict resolution through the collective bargaining system was established in Turkey again in the absence of any intensified class struggle. Workplace representation in Turkey did not develop any consultative and participative process of representation at the workplace. What is more, although most initiatives in labour relations did come from above, the governments did
not usually lead to union leaders being co-opted onto bodies where economic policies are discussed or decided.

Therefore, so long as these considerations are born in mind, it can be argued that most of the necessary conditions suggested by Müller-Jentsch for the "intermediary" type of unionism did not exit in Turkish labour movement. Secondly, Müller-Jentsch also made a distinction between co-operative, militant and social contract of forms of "intermediary" trade unionism. But, he did not say much about how trade unions adopted or changed co-operative, militant or social contract form of their "intermediary" role within the continued crises of the capitalist structural framework. Neither does he explain how the relationship (among state, employers and workers) which trade unions maintain strongly affected each other. In the case of Turkey, and especially TURK-IS and its members, Müller-Jentch's distinction is not quite clear. TURK-IS and its unions sought to maintain co-operative and orderly relations with the state and employers. In this sense, it is possible to categorise TURK-IS and its members in this co-operative trade unionism group. However, there were attempts for social contract bargaining and a considerable increase in working class militancy, but no stable trend in labour relations can be identified. An increase in working class militancy and strikes were usually due to unresolved debates in the collective bargaining processes, rather than any significant socio and political dimension.

Therefore, the intensity and broader implication of Müller-Jentsch's description of the "intermediary" unionism does not provide an adequate model for the role and function of Turkish unions. It is still possible to suggest that TURK-IS and its members in the periods in question appeared to display "responsible unionism" and their leaders acted as "responsible leaders" but for different reasons.
One thing is quite universal for the trade union movement, that, as noted by Hyman (1975:64), "a trade union is, first and foremost, an agency and medium of power". He also stressed two-way relationships which unions develop with external and internal relationships of control. In other words, for him "a trade union exemplifies the interaction between the two types of power distinguished: "power for" and "power over". Hartman and Lau (1980) also point out in their definition of the functions of confederations that confederations established themselves by co-ordinating the external environment and their own constituents (or the internal environment). Here, they tried to explain the influence of trade union confederations as a product of their successful interaction with their external and internal environments.

In this context, the inadequate explanation of any model for the Turkish case possibly derives from national differences in the development of unions depending on the degree and nature of linkages and relations between state, employers and workers. It can be argued that although sometimes workers' independent actions had a considerable impact on the policies of the leaders of unions, the role of Turkish unions in general in the 1960s and 1970s were largely shaped by their leaders in terms of the external structure rather than internal organisational strength. The external environment includes legislation, the economic and political situation, the policies of governments and strategies of employers organisations. In the framework of my analysis based on Turkish experiences, one notable factor of external environments is the political and economic developments of the country largely influenced by the role of state, of employers and of international bodies or developments.

In other words, my analysis is drawn from the unique experiences of Turkey. On the basis of my case studies within TURK-IS and its unions, it can be suggested that although the role and function of TURK-IS and its members were shaped to co-ordinate
the external and internal environments (these relations of the unions within the internal and external environments are usually interactive), the role, strategies and policies of unions should be widely understood in terms of the pressures from their external structures, mainly, the social context including the political, economic and social developments of the country. Particularly, in the Turkish case, the state intended to maintain the co-ordinating contribution from the major labour organisations due to the economic and political considerations of governments. Traditionally, mainly due to their "etatist" attitude, Turkish unions were usually willing to agree with the expectations of major actors in the external environment. However, because of the internal pressures from the rank and file unions, did not also pursue a merely collaborative role.

In this context, TURK-IS and its leadership, mainly two important men, Seyfi Demirsoy and Halil Tunc attempted on behalf of their members to adopt some strategies or policies to develop their current sets of contextual opportunities. In conjunction with their original goal, which was to seek the external opportunities for the recognition and concessions from the state and employers, they produced two significant strategies: (a) maintaining co-operative and orderly relations with the state and employers simply to establish a representative cartel in Turkish trade union movement: (b) preserving the integrity of the union and avoiding a collapse of its strength particularly through concentrating on its "above-party" policies. There is evidence that the scope for new innovative policies and industrial actions was diminished by the consideration of these two main policies. In fact, TURK-IS usually used its capacity for constraining its members rather than mobilising them to achieve its main objectives.

As a matter of fact, in shaping the organisation's strategies, policies and objectives, organisational needs and survival became very important. For this reason, the leadership of TURK-IS was reluctant to implement a militant industrial policy or develop the
aspects of political unionism. The social and political objectives mentioned in its constitution were usually abandoned in the name of organisational unity. In TURK-IS case, the rigid conservatism was evident and conservative leaders such as Demirsoy and moderate leaders as Tunc and their domination within TURK-IS' members (largely conservative unions) played a crucial role in the policy developments in the organisation as a whole. However, their decisions were heavily affected by external developments rather than the internal environment. This is to say that these leaders tended to render their behaviour more predictable and manageable for their external environment, mainly, the state and employers. They, thus, tried to rely on collective agreement as a main function of all unions for the regulation of working conditions and were particularly dependent on the goodwill of governments to maintain co-operative and orderly relations.

On the other hand, TURK-IS was accused of committing itself explicitly to the philosophy of business unionism. In practice, from time to time this philosophy was also dismissed in the consideration of organisational needs. However, let us not forget that in the context of Turkey the consideration of organisational needs for union leaders was something in which the confederation might seek to improve its external opportunities with the state and employers. Otherwise, organisational unity was not asked for solidarity or democracy, in other words, internal opportunities. It would not be naive to point out that the scope for internal influence, mainly from rank and file on union strategies and policies was limited. The lack of membership involvement in unions can plausibly be attributed to not only the poor records of Turkish democracy in General but also to the rapid growth of a central bureaucracy.
In addition to this internal organisational problem, the social and, more importantly, the ideological isolation of union leaders from the rank and file was also evident in Turkey. Therefore, the role and function of unions may also be understood by the process of collaboration of their leadership. Most of the union function was controlled by national leadership and concentrated on narrow range of employment issues, mainly, wages rather than the socio and political interests of working class.

It can be argued that since the role and function of unions was heavily influenced by the state intervention, the unions became more modest in their strategies and policies and bureaucratic in their internal organisation. In short, Turkish unions, their role, strategies, policies and objectives did not seem to be a product of their successful interaction with the external and environments. Rather, the external structures, the country's context of political and economic developments and conditions may have been more conducive to the rise of a collaborative trade union movement. On the other hand, the organisational environment did not play an adequate role in the transformation of existing union structure into a more democratic and effective union process which could also contribute to educate workers in their understanding of the union movement. Thus, the role, strategies, policies and objectives of Turkish unions in the 1960s and 70s should be placed in their historical context and nationally specific political and economic settings and structural constraints.

NOTES:

1) A personal interview with Kaya Ozdemir, the former education secretary of TURK-IS (01.03.1972-28.12.1986) and currently adviser to the executive committee of TURK-IS (14 October 1993).
2) The leaders of member unions in TURK-IS were divided as the loyalist of either the Democrat Party or the Republican Populist Party in the 1950s.

3) The "report of the four" was prepared and advocated by four TURK-IS union leaders, Abdullah Basturk (President of the Petroleum Workers' union, Petrol-Is), Feridun Sakir Ogunc (President of the Seaman's Federation, DENIZ ULAS-IS), Halit Misiroglu (President of the State Highway Workers' Federation, YOL-IS) and Osman Sogukpinar (President of the Energy, Water and Gas Workers' union, GES-IS) (Isikli 1979).

4) A personal interview with Halil Tunc, the then Secretary-General of TURK-IS (21.11.1960-31.01.1974), and latter the president of TURK-IS (31.01.1974-22.04.1979).

5) Relatively strong trade union movement and substantial increase in the radicalisation of labour were obviously an important obstacles for the government since they were facing rising inflation and political unrest. Therefore, in the absence of a better alternative, Ecevit's government wanted to implement the "social contract".


7) A personal interview with Munzur Pekgulec, who was a shop steward in leather industry for a long time and is currently the secretary-general of DERI-IS (13 April 1992).

8) The 1963 labour legislation in Turkey was heavily influenced by the German and Scandinavian legislation.
PART II
CHAPTER 6

THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT AND EUROPEAN UNIONS IN THE 1980s

There is not much disagreement that the trend towards a model based on concertation and centralisation which was the dominant trend in the second half of the 1970s has now been weakened in many countries (Although it has not disappeared). A number of commentators argue a general crisis in corporatist arrangements, and the types of political bargaining combined with them. This trend has not only been observed in those countries where political conditions were unfavourable such as U.K. (where the strongly right-wing conservatives have been in office) but also where political conditions were relatively favourable such as France, Spain, Greece (where socialist governments came to power). Therefore, it can be argued that the favourable conditions for political exchange seemed to make little difference.

It is quite important to stress that in the 1980s all countries faced more or less the same problems. They had to challenge the hostile external environment. Industrial restructuring and the technological innovation became crucial particularly under the pressure of the international competitiveness of the economy. Therefore, it is a fact that trade unions in most countries have certainly been facing serious problems of adjustment to changed economic, social and political conditions which have an effect on the structure and behaviour of national trade union movements.

Unions have been influenced by prolonged recession, high inflation, the growing public deficit, unemployment, profound modification in productive and economic structures,
organisational and technological innovations, changes in the structures of labour force and government policies of neo-laissez faire implying extensive deregulation and a drive towards maximum flexibility of the labour market. The possible influence of these elements on the dimensions of trade unionism can now be discussed in more detail.

(i) Effects of the Challenges of the 1980s on Trade Unions.

Hyman (1992a) argues that many of difficulties faced by trade unions in the 1980s have been attributed to a growing diversification of interests within each national working class. In this sense, the disaggregation of the working class becomes an important issue in the trade union movement. For Hyman, disaggregation covers a variety of process rather than being a concept. Those processes can be summarised as follows (1) a shift from collectivism towards individualism which basically reflects a decline in the level of trade union membership and reductions in opportunities for organised collective action due to the lack of collectively determined policies and disciplines (2) a polarisation within the working class in terms of core/periphery or insider/outsider relations (3) a growing particularism of collective identities and projects in terms of employer occupation or economic industry (4) fragmentation within the "organised working class" reflected in intra and inter union conflict and a weakening of the authority of national leadership and central confederations (Hyman 1992a:151).

There are a number of reasons suggested in order to explain disaggregation and divisions of trade unionism including the issues of economic stagnation and recession, long term occupational and sectoral shifts, changes in management policy and the organisation of production and cultural, institutional ideological and political fragmentation (Hyman 1992a). It is true that recession has had a considerable influence
on structures of employment and unemployment. It has also resulted in inter-group conflict within the working class. In addition, labour market segmentation has become so crucial by the growth of part-time, temporary and other "non standard" forms of employment. There has been a shift from manufacturing to the service sector in terms of employment. Moreover, women's employment has increased in the labour market and also the non-traditional forms of employment like precarious jobs in small manufacturing companies, in the services and the diffusion of small firms and of the "hidden" economy have developed as a part of the decentralisation of production. It must be stressed that changes in the product market and production system have affected the structure of employment. Therefore, the labour market situation has also changed due to the growth of new occupational groups. Yet, due to changing employment conditions, unions face considerable problems in recruiting members. Furthermore, certainly it should be mentioned that peripheral groups are increasing. For instance, there has been an important increase in part-time work in all OECD countries.

According to Delsen (1990) in most countries, particularly in Europe, part-time employment has continued to grow whereas full time employment has declined. Approximately 75% of the part-time work is concentrated in the service sector. In France, Italy, the Netherlands and the U.K. part-time employment has become the more dominant source of overall job growth. Between 1983 and 1986 three out of four additional jobs in the European community were part-time, 80% of all net additional employment was female. Besides, during the course of 1980s there has also been an increase in the number of temporary jobs. The significance of temporary work varies between countries. For example, the share of temporary employment is about 5% in France and Italy whereas it is more than 9% in the Netherlands. Also in Belgium, France and Ireland permanent employment decreased, while temporary employment increased (Delsen 1990). As a result, it can be argued that the impact of the structural change of
employment on labour organisations can not be ignored. It is worth pointing out that the
growth of new sectors of employment may create new problems for trade unions. For
instance, employees in professional, managerial or administrative positions or those with
technologically advanced skills can give rise to a distinctive interest within the working
class. Their unionisation can also be regarded as a source of inter and intra-union
conflicts. Moreover, an increase in public and service sector (particularly the rise of
white collar trade unions) has shifted the balance of power (Müller-Jentsch 1988,
Kassalow 1987).

Broadly speaking, what should be argued is that in the last decade one of the main issues
has been trade union fragmentation or a relative weakening of centralised authority.
There is also some evidence to suggest that there has been a reduction in the number of
trade unions affiliated to national labour confederations. This is primarily due to the
growth of independent unions particularly in service industries such as TCO or
SACO/SR in Sweden, CGC in France and of associations representing some categories
of professional employees of cadres with quasi union status and objectives (Cella and

Another point to make on the issue of the weakening of central labour organisations is
that, as has been mentioned before, the 1970s and early 1980s can be described as the
decade of neo-corporatism, or social concertation. In those years the instrument chosen
was usually some form of incomes policy which diminished the independence of the
industrial relations system and helped to spread institutionalised relations between the
state, the union and employer organisations. It can possibly be argued that in the 1980s
the economic and political climate began to change and, generally speaking, the main
tendency in the last decade was the expansion of market relations combined with
international competition, industrial restructuring, management initiative and the form of micro-concertation at the plant level.

In line with these developments, the governments in many countries have also opted for two paths of structural reform in public sectors including economic deregulation and labour market reforms. This has been mostly done through both budgetary restrictions and privatisation. Another tendency for companies has also been to contract out some of their activities to outsiders. These strategies in public sector have been used as part of the privatisation process in consideration of a reduction in the numbers of public agencies and institutions.

In general, institutional mediation therefore became less important at the national level (Regini 1992). In other words, the trends towards an increase in the authority of central confederations of trade unions and also employers' associations seem to have weakened as a result of the growing difficulties in central bilateral or tripartite neo-corporatist bargaining, even in countries with the longest tradition of this practice, such as Scandinavia, Austria and Germany. What this tendency suggests is that there is a significant change in the behaviour of trade unions and their central organisations compared with the past. It may be due to the growth of division, contrast and divergence among different central labour organisations or even within the same organisation. The most crucial of these changes is the very widespread diminution of the role played by central organisations in favour of individual associations. This also further weakens confederations' political strength. Thus, it can be stressed that corporatist institutional constraints and collective self-restraint are more likely to exist in neo-corporatist systems where the central confederations are established as effective labour organisations commanding sufficient authority to protect the institutional integrity and their political influence.
It is quite significant to point out that the role of employers has also been a significant effect on trade unions in the 1980s. According to Baglioni (1990:11) there are three typical employer tendencies of recent years. They can be simply summarised as follows; (a) the demand for flexibility, (b) the preference for decentralisation in the management of employer contracts and, (c) the renewed employer political presence. Although employers may vary in practice in their determination to pursue their objectives, some of them seem to have displayed a clear preference for bargaining at the company level. Thus, this trend has led to some pressures to decentralise collective bargaining. Decentralisation in collective bargaining is associated with new employment system such as the expansion of the tertiary sector and non-standard types of employment. A number of observers now believe that instead of "Fordist organisation of production" what is called "flexible specialisation" is now a trend in the production process (Sabel 1989, Sorge and Streeck 1988).

Therefore, in general, the economic and industrial relation system tended to change from the level of macro-economic management to the micro-level of the firm. Management began to play an important role in the process of economic adjustment through regaining the authority lost in the previous decade. As a result, micro-concertation at the firm level emerged in some countries, such as France where a form of concertative workplace politics was encouraged by the Auroux reform in the 1980s, the Auroux reforms created the institution called the "group d'expression". Also in Italy the trend through participative mechanism at plant level was developed in order to encourage greater flexibility in work organisation, however, unlike France, in Italy although the state had a significant influence, it did not occur by legislation (Baglioni 1990, Hyman 1989). The emergence of micro corporatism has been also evident at enterprise level in Spain. Labour and social welfare legislation were implemented through the participation of social actors in new institutions at company level (Martinez Lucio 1992:518). In
addition to these developments, there has been a fundamental change in the approach to the management of labour. Consequently, strategies of individual employers have also become important including the increased employee involvement at the workplace (team briefing, quality circles), human resource management approaches (which basically undermines the collectivism on which trade unions and collective bargaining depend so much).

The levels of collective bargaining have undergone a degree of change, with a trend towards decentralisation from national and industrial level to that of the company in a number of countries. Yet this trend has been far from uniform, being far more pronounced in some countries, such as the U.K., than in others including Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands (EIRR 200, September 1990). As has been already mentioned above, in the 1980s there were clear efforts at a development away from centralised bargaining over wages and towards a new decentralised form of bargaining over the management of work practices in the employers' industrial relations strategies.

In the case of Sweden, the first move towards decentralisation occurred in 1983, when the three white collar industrial unions broke away from their bargaining cartel (PTK) and agreed to bargain separately with the engineering employers' association, VF. In the context of France, the decentralisation of bargaining to the company level has clearly been affected by innovative employers. And in Italy confindustria's industrial relations strategy has also moved from the search for centralised tripartite agreements in the late 1970s and early 1980s to the more recent move towards decentralisation and company level bargaining (IRS 465, June Employment Trend 1990). On the other hand, in Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal there has not been one single trend in collective bargaining. the different levels of bargaining (between centralisation and decentralisation) have presented an unstable picture. However, in general, the trend
towards decentralisation can be explained by referring to the view that management sought to take advantage of industrial relations institutions so that they can provide formalised and non-conflicting workers' participation at plant and company level in the consideration of the growing instability of markets. The overall effect of these changes undermines trade union movement in general.

Yet, this development made trade unions to be less important as social partners in the political market and this further weakened solidaristic trade unionism. In short, instead of institutional mediation, the market relations become crucial and also the increasing deregulation of labour relations was seen in the 1980s. A considerable decline in the various forms of industrial action has also been observed more or less everywhere in the last decade. With the exception of Australia and, in part, Sweden, the basic conflict indicators from 1974 to 1982 (yearly average) are lower than figures for the period 1968-73 (Cella and Treu 1987). In addition, there has been an important decline in strikes in Spain, stability in France and Sweden, instability in Italy and Germany and a substantial decline in Britain and Denmark. During recessions strikes are supposed to become longer and more bitter (as in the British mining strike or the German conflict over working-hours reduction in 1984). Yet, there can be fewer of them as the small-scale, opportunistic strikes typical of periods of expansion decline. Obviously there has been a decrease in the share of traditional bread and butter strikes over wages and working conditions in industry. Some strikes in the industrial sector have had different aims such as shorter hours. Traditional strike aims tends to be more commonly found in the civil service and some public service strikes. In brief, strikes appears to be based on economic variables and to be pro-cyclical. Under the pressure of recession, strikes take on a defensive character and, broadly speaking, tend to decline. Hence, this development has also a negative effect on trade union movement (Baglioni 1990, Crouch 1990).
In the political arena the weakness of the unions has also been witnessed primarily due to changes in the political and economic climate. A conservative regime has been a dominant policy in most countries such as in Denmark, Germany and the U.K. In some countries Thatcherist neo-liberation was regarded as an alternative ideology, which meant that trade union power was undermined and the outcomes of collective bargaining were controlled not as means of compromises among partners but rather via pursuing monetarist policy, including strict money supply control, the high level of unemployment and anti-union legislation. In the other countries where the political climate seemed to be more favourable to the unions such as in France, Greece and Spain, a soft version of monetarist policies (or alternatively as Hyman (1994a) described it "Socialist monetarist" policies) was witnessed.

In other words, apart from some statutory rights and protection for employees, the governments in those countries did not bring any serious changes for trade union movements. Besides, trade unions have suffered from the austerity economic policies in Spain, Portugal and Greece. This development, later, brought about an important influence on trade union solidarity particularly among the major confederations. This is evident during the main general strikes in 1988 between UGT and PSOE in Spain and Intersindical and UGT-P in Portugal (Martinez Lucio 1992, Barreto 1992).

(ii) Trade Unions' Response to Crises.

As has been mentioned before, trade unionism in the 1980 has faced many problems including membership decline, a decrease in the authority of central confederations, inter-intro union conflict and like. As a result, these developments seem to underpin the disaggregation thesis (Hyman 1992a). As opposed to the disaggregation thesis or
pessimistic arguments on trade unionism, a counter argument has been put forward to support the view that "the diagnosis of a crisis of interest aggregation is over-simplified, over-generalised and over-deterministic" (Hyman 1992a: 158).

According to this counter argument, unions are still able to respond to the changing situations in which they have to survive by constructing new types of solidaristic alliances between workers. Also, the impact of the 1980s on trade unionism has been far from uniform, although trade unions have been hit by centrifugal fragmentation in similar vein the impact of sectoral and occupational shifts in employment has been very different. According to this thesis, the issue of a trend from collectivism to individualism can be questioned in that in reality most union members have joined trade unions for instrumental reasons or trade union benefit arrangements. Therefore, in this sense unions in most countries have recently made various attempts to provide facilities in order to recruit or retain members, those efforts can be regarded as means of returning to old model trade unions (Hyman 1992a). For instance, Belgian unions provide unemployment insurance payments and a direct material incentive for workers to become members. Unions can also utilise other forms of "membership retention" including access to a pension benefits in Italy or to retraining facilities for unemployed union members in Denmark and unions in America are also said to turn to new tactics in order to attract workers including offering new services such as credit cards and setting up of union "employee partnership funds" to be used by unions to buy company shares (EIRR 212, September 1991, ILO 1990). Taking development of collective bargaining as a predominant function of unionism and as an expression of collectivist principles into consideration, some caution needs to be exercised about the role of collective bargaining because if collective bargaining in capitalist countries is used as a channel in which individual economic goals are achieved, in this sense "new individualism" can also be
seen more or less same opportunity for trade unions in order to improve the quality of life or achieve economic goals (Hyman 1992a).

It is also worth stressing that another central issue on trade unionism is that sectoral and occupational shifts in employment are said to be an inevitable source of union weakness and decline. However, in fact it is not necessary for new categories of workers to be against collective organisations, as long as unions adjust their policies in terms of distinctive interest of those workers. For example, in Sweden and Finland women are a majority of union members and across the OECD member states the share of women in unions rose from an average of 25% to 31% between 1971 and 1988. It is widely accepted that with women this is proportionately located in part time, temporary and subcontracted work, union organising efforts in such low density sectors will inevitably increase women's representation and the relative weight of service sector employees within the unions (EIRR, 212 September 1991:16-17). As opposed to this growing employee groups, traditional groups such as coal miners, dockers and steel workers no longer possess an important influence on central confederations. In an optimistic view this may lead to a more active initiating and co-ordinating role for central confederations.

Moreover, the 1980s has also witnessed a decline in membership of communist oriented confederations such as the CGT in France, the CGIL in Italy. This is probably due to the relation between pro-labour political parties and trade unions and the action of governments and employers. This development can be referred to a decline in a class-political ideologies. However, it may result in an increase in inter-confederal solidarity between confederations (Hyman 1992a). In Southern Europe, the basis for the confederations' co-operation was strengthened as a result of the unity against the governments' economic austerity programs. What is also argued by this counter
argument is that the crises of trade unionism stems from a traditional style of the trade unionism. That is why the changes in employment can produce an opportunity for trade unions to reconstitute collective relations with the working class by providing solidaristic ties between the unionised and the non-unionised, full time and part time workers and the like.

(iii) Conclusion: The Evaluation of Different Trends.

What is clearly significant is the fact that no single explanation can be given in order to suggest any single trend for the past and present developments in European trade union movements due to variety of circumstances and the complexity of the process between different trade union movements. Thus, it is quite fair to give a more cautious explanation for different developments in national union movements. Obviously, one trend focuses on the recurrence of corporatism which was a dominant policy allowing many governments to involve labour in social concertation or in several incomes policy. Because, during the course of those years when economic expansion and positive-sum political exchange emerged, there was a lesser risk of the disaggregation of the working class, in other words, compared with the past, in the 1990s trade unions suffer from several unpleasant developments in the industrial relation arena. Jessop (1990) suggests that there are a number of reasons which explain possible new attempts for concertation. First of all is that new forms of socialisation like health, education and political parties require informal co-operation among different policies communities rather than concertation among the leading organisations of capital.

Meanwhile, there is quite likely to be a shift towards more worker or union involvement in micro corporatism at the plant and enterprise level. In this respect, Müller-Jentsch's
co-operative dimension of intermediary unionism may be reinforced at company level (Hyman 1994a). Second, governments can be expected to choose a more selective corporatism. Subsidiary reasons include the fact that incomes policies in Fordism depended on Fordist mass workers, now it may occur around the polyvalent skilled workers to the disadvantage of peripheral workers. Finally, taking the separation between the economy and the state into account, a growing trend towards "private interest government" may be expected which would help to develop a different means of mediating between state, economy and civil society. This would also develop the basis for concertation among different "private interest governments" under the dominance of the states.

In addition, due to the governments' considerations about the economic and political implementation of austerity programs, there has been some tendencies towards concertation in some countries in more recent years. In January 1991, the Irish government, the trade unions and employers' organisations reached an agreement which is called the Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP) (EIRR 193, February 1990: 13-15). The attempts by the governments for social concertation between social partners have been also evident in Spain, Portugal and Greece at the beginning of the 1990s (EIRR 235, August 1993: 14, EIRR 244, May 1994: 22-23, EIRR 245 June 1994: 10-11). The relatively soft attitudes of the governments in the Southern European countries may reflect the external pressures of greater European integration and the Welfare politics of the unions (Barreto 1992, Martinez Lucio 1992). In a different vein, it can be suggested that in the European single market case, what is called "Euro-pluralism and pressure politics" can be seen as the emergence of unified European policy (Regini 1992). In other words, in recent years a great deal of attention has also been paid to the implementation of the single European market (SEM). Under the continued internationalisation of the business, the main question is what is to be the form
of trade union framework at the European level. Accordingly much of the discussions on labour movement in a future Europe has been based on the view, that an integrated market may in some way bring with it some sort of European wide negotiations, in other words, unions and employer organisations cooperate at a European level in negotiations on wages and conditions of work. The SEM causes the prospect of larger companies having to introduce European level arrangements on a single-employer basis (Myrdal 1990).

It is also worth mentioning that a changing structure of the labour force is very important; for example, the emergence of new professional and social groups which differ from traditional wage earners. The old proletarian stereotypes have lost their unifying force within the working class. Furthermore, employers in most countries seek to use labour more flexibly. Their aim is to provide both internal flexibility (shift in work organisation, working hours, the evaluation of job tasks and the like) and external flexibility (changes in number of employees, non-standard and a typical form of employment contract). Therefore, it seems safe to argue that there is a tendency for labour movement towards a greater self interest. This is probably due to creating a workforce marked through strong divergence of interests. This segmentation and the diversification of workers can undermine the solidarity between them which is necessary for any co-operation in order to pursue some common interests. (Baglioni 1990).

However, it can be wrong to believe that changes in the structure of employment bring about an end to unionism and union militancy. There is some evidence to suggest that service employees can replace manual groups in relation to union militancy (although this trend can be undermined by the privatisation of public services). In addition, in spite of the fact that the growth of private non-manual employment in the tertiary sector has not been able to bring a sufficient increase in unionism (yet, this not an universal
tendency), for example, Scandinavian private service employees have a high rate of union membership (Crouch 1990).

Another tendency focuses on the neo-liberal/Thatcherite solution. The exhaustion of both the corporatist and the liberal approaches to management of the Keynesian welfare state and the crisis of the political system can give rise to the neo-liberal politics. Basically, Thatcherism undermines the provision of the welfare state and the unions by privatisation, deregulation and so on. In fact, Thatcherism is associated with a degree of decisional autonomy. In this sense, Jessop (1990) also suggests a secondary tendency towards the development of a "strong state" where governments make a union-exclusion policy. This results from the weakening of the corporatist bodies involved in political representation and intervention. Jessop goes on to comment that this trend may become important if the international economic crisis is intensified and unless there is any possibility for liberal corporatist arrangement. Accordingly, it can be said that Jessop's secondary tendency seemed to become dominant in the U.K. case in the 1980s.

Another possible trend in the labour movement likely to occur in European labour relations is the emergence of more pragmatic and procedural forms of co-operative labour relations, known as "institutionally weak versions of the German model". This can be driven either from the reluctant acceptance of common imperatives by previously adversarial-bargaining actors such as in Italy and partly in the U.K. or from the creation of new forms of labour representation often under the impulse of management in situations of weak unionism as in France (Regini 1992). Again there is no guarantee that this has been a convergent trend for most countries.
However, it must be emphasised that these sorts of institutional developments may lead to labour relations actors abandoning ad-hoc arrangements and informality and becoming involved in negotiations of rules and institutions rather than engaging in neo-liberal policy. Under these circumstances there have been some examples of European trade unions explicitly reviewing their positions and directions. The strategies used by some unions for example UGT and CCOO in Spain, UGT-P in Portugal and GSEE in Greece, have adopted oppositional approaches to the governments' austerity measures and their attempts for legislative changes in favour of employers. This was evident during the one day general strikes in those countries. Unions like CCIL in Italy and DGB in Germany seem to have begun to discuss more co-ordinating and planing strategies, usually concerning the policies and including forming crucial links with other unions and redefining workers' interests as employees and citizens. On the other hand, it is also evident that some unions in different countries have pursued more integrative approaches in relations with employers at the micro level, as in the case of EETPU in England.

The final point to make is that there is always some scope for solidarity among workers. And also there is the possibility for labour organisations to exercise a redefinition of interest within workers in a solidaristic manner by unifying ideologies and trying to convince their members that trade unions can promote the long term general interests of the working class, as against the immediate interests of particular groups. As Hyman (1992a:166) said that "it is always necessary to campaign and struggle for (relative) unity among workers and their organisations". In short, what should be noted, though, is that unions in the past enjoyed the political and economic climate and they were able to develop their power and strength. Yet, now governments and employers are taking the initiative to respond effectively to the loss of initiative they suffered from the waves of militancy in the 1970s and to take full advantage of the current situation (recession,
unemployment and the weakness of trade unions), however, it must not be forgotten that the course of capital accumulation has always created new crises and capitalist arrangements in labour relations are usually unstable. It may be difficult to suggest any more stable and conflict-free alternative. Under these circumstances, it can also be argued that the class struggle combined with the new forms of solidarity among workers is likely to remain in modern capitalist societies as a cornerstone of the labour movement. In this sense, in the following chapters, an attempt will be made to show that in the Turkish case, unions still have the strength and capacity to respond to a hostile external environment.
CHAPTER 7

THE CHALLENGE OF THE 1980s AND AFTER AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKISH UNIONS

There has been serious discussion on the concept of "strategic choice" in industrial relations systems. It has been argued that the framework of industrial relations systems and their practices and outcomes are shaped or affected through the interconnection of environmental factors combined with "the strategic choices" of the state (public policy decision-makers), employers, managers, union leaders and workers (Kochan, Katz, Mckersie 1986). As opposed to these external pressure, the changing unions' role and identities have also been discussed among the European academics (Müller-Jentsch 1988, Regini 1992, Hyman 1994).

In this sense, it can be argued that in Turkey in the 1980s it became increasingly evident that substantial changes in the nature of the Turkish industrial relations system can be regarded as the sign of the new strategic choices of, first, the military government and then the conservative governments and employers. Most Turkish trade unionists and academics considered the restrictive labour legislations as the main cause of the deteriorating trade union situations in Turkey. However, it may be suggested that other parameters which seem to be an outcome of "strategic" options including the stabilisation programmes of governments involving in privatisation, contracting out, massive lay-offs efforts and the policies of employers' anti-unionism can also be seen in this light.
Hence, it is possible that Turkish unions under the increasing environmental pressures will either continue operating within the new situation or adopt new policies or strategies to affect the nature of their environments. It could also be argued that the type of unionism between "business" and "political economism" that has so far dominated the Turkish labour movement has made it appear that few significant strategic choices or ideologically driven decisions have been made at the top level of union leadership. In other words, Turkish unions seem to have reacted to changes in their environments in a more pragmatic way to influence day to day relations rather than acting as a result of strategic decisions made by unions themselves. In this context, the main purpose is to analyse the external conditions, constraints, institutions, policies and strategies which are likely to influence and reshape the role of unions under the changing circumstances of the 1980s and 90s.

One of the important tasks in part 2 is also to examine how trade unions in Turkey affect the extent and nature of current difficulties. Can trade unions produce effective responses to new external pressures? Do they have such capacities? What sort of opportunities and policies are available to unions and can Turkish unions possess an area of strategic choices in responding to the challenges and changes of the 1980s and 90s.

The military intervention of 1980 and, after that, the election of the conservative Ozal government in 1984 is widely accepted as marking a turning point in Turkish economic, social and political structure. The new economic situation in the light of free market principles has had a considerable impact on the Turkish industrial relations system. Therefore, the main argument to keep in mind is that the 1980s also registered a dramatic change in the Turkish trade union movement. Unions were influenced and reacted to such factors as: economic deregulation in the public sector, restrictive labour policies, anti-labour legislation, mass unemployment and more recently new employer strategies. Since 1980 Turkey has undergone a radical transformation of its political-
economy. Foreign-oriented economic policies have replaced the mixed economy and import substitution policies in Turkey. Although significant progress in the structural readjustment of the economy has been made during the past decade, there have been high levels of inflation, big budget deficits and production problems.

Considering increasing international competition, the adaptation of free market principles and foreign economic relations of Turkey have become more significant. The application for full membership to the European Community on 14 April 1987 has further increased these needs. In this context, an immediate concern is now to discuss the implication of these political and economic transformations for organised labour.

(i) The 1980 Military Intervention Period.

Before looking at significant changes in Turkish trade unions in the 1980s, some significant points should be made concerning the impact of the military intervention of 1980 on the country and the trade union movement as a whole. Like the other countries, Turkey experienced a relative period of growth through the 1960s until the first oil crises of 1973. As a matter of fact, before entering the 1980s, Turkey, particularly in the late 1970s, faced undesirable economic and political circumstances. For instance, inflation was accelerating and reached an alarming triple digit level, to over 100 percent; unemployment was increasing and fiscal problems of the 1970s tripled external debt, eventually resulting in the cancellation of external sources and comprehensive rescheduling agreements between 1978 and 1980 (1).

In fact, the problems which Turkey faced were not only economic but also political. As in England, in Turkey in the late 1970s an increasingly militant and organised working
class movement was said to be a main obstacle to the success of the government's crisis management policies. What is more, there was a great deal of violence in the streets between the left and the right groups. In other words, the increasing unrest in the political and social life of Turkey made the ruling class unable to rule.

The response of the ruling class to the crises of economy was to impose the stabilisation policies. In other words, the economic and political crisis of the 1970s forced the Demirel government, with IMF pressure to implement an export-led growth model. In connection with this, a package of economic measures was published in January 1980 just before the 12 September 1980 military intervention. Margulies and Yildizoglu (1989) argues that the 1980 austerity programme in Turkey in a way was distinctive from the first two austerity programmes implemented in 1958 and 1970. The first two had been designed to overcome the bottlenecks in the process of capital accumulation or the crises in Turkish capitalism, whereas the 1980 programme was not simply due to the consideration of economic problems but also it was designed to implement some necessary political and legislative changes. The stabilisation policies were likely to be resisted particularly by labour. These developments eventually led the military to intervene in 1980, this was the third intervention in 30 years.

The inability of the civilian government to implement these policies seemed to be one of the main reasons for the military take over of 12 September 1980. This can be clearly seen from the continuity of economic policy before and particularly after the coup. This is also clear from the statement of the president of the Turkish industrialist and Business' Men Association (TUSIAD), Ali Kocman, that for him the inevitability of a military intervention was due to the economic bankruptcy of Turkey in 1980, inflation and the shortage of commodities combined with the problems of terrorism and anarchy (The ILO mission report on Turkey, 1982) (2).
Unlike the military intervention of 1971, the 1980 action had economic objectives. In other words, it aimed at a closer integration with international capital by encouraging export-oriented monetarist policies as well as providing an order and stability for Turkish political life. In order to reach the economic targets the policy of a free market economy became a significant objective. By doing so, the main economic task was to reduce the size of the public sector, to open the economy to free trade and to reduce wage increases. That is to say that less state involvement in economic activities became significant. The deregulation policies such as privatization, contracting out and market orientation were as the primary priority in government strategies. Regulating the income distribution against labour in general was also one of the main purposes of the structural adjustment program of the 1980s. Moreover, combined with an identifiable economic program, the political system was restructured by setting up a new constitution. This constitution was designed to eliminate all the progressive institutions and movements which had been the legacy of the 1961 constitution.

During this period, while the Military government often stressed social peace and political consensus in the country, some factors including anti-democratic legislation, depoliticisation of public life and de-unionisation appeared to be the main framework of the political system. Shortly after the 12 September 1980 military take-over, the National Security Council abolished the 1961 constitution and closed down three union confederations DISK, HAK-IS and MISK. TURK-IS was not shut down but it could not engage in trade union activity, DISK was outlawed and its leaders were imprisoned and prosecuted with the death penalty. The reasons for TURK-IS not being suspended from the view point of the military was perhaps the conviction that TURK-IS unions' leadership had not been directly or indirectly involved in terrorist activities. Moreover, the ideological aims and objectives of these organisations were compatible with certain provisions of constitution of 1961 and the Turkish penal code. Yet, this explanation is
not sufficient to explain why TURK-IS was not closed down. For a more analytical answer it might be asked what sort of role did TURK-IS play in Turkish industrial relations system. Was TURK-IS "responsible" or "loyal" to the existing regime or the state? In the words of General Secretary of the Confederation of Turkish Employers' Organisations (TISK)

"According to Mr. Ibrahimoglu, one of the main problems was the penetration of the confederation of progressive trade unions (DISK) by persons whose political objectives overshadowed the trade union objectives of the organisations. DISK, he said, which was particularly active in the private sector, had been a well organised trade union which had become manipulated by subversive elements for whom exaggerated wage claims, wildcat strikes, boycotts and violence were common weapons to be used for the achievement of its political ends. TURK-IS, on the other hand, was, by and large, a more moderate, responsible organisation and devoid of the political motivations for which DISK had become known." (The ILO mission report on Turkey, 1982:4).

Wages were also immediately frozen. Until the new trade union legislation was passed, collective bargaining activities were undertaken by the Supreme Arbitration Council established by the National Security Council. The arbitration council agreed with the view that high rate of inflation in the 1970s was caused by wage increases. The government-controlled arbitration council kept nominal wage increases deliberately and consistently below annual inflation rates for about four years (1980-1984). And no strikes were recorded between 1980 and 1983 (Koc 1989). In this sense, it can be argued that changing and reshaping the structure of the economy and of Turkish industrial relations against labour in general was one of the key goals of the 1980 military regime.
(ii) Transition Period Towards Democracy.

The military government of 1980 gave Ozal, the architect of the stabilisation measures, the chance to be able to prepare the ground for export-oriented industrialisation without the struggle of interest groups like unions. Ozal was appointed in charge of the economy by the military after 1980 and then he won the general election and became prime minister by advocating Margaret Thatcher style economic policies.

In the light of the foregoing discussion it is convenient to argue that the Ozal government came to power in 1984, since then the explicit long term purposes of governments have been to adopt a more market-oriented strategy of resource allocation and an outward-oriented trade policy. In short, the economic model has shifted from import-substitution to export-oriented development. As a result, there has been a radical restructuring of the economy. The main aim announced by the government was the opening up of the Turkish economy to the outside business world. Therefore, since 1980 a great deal of attention has also been paid to the implementation of foreign capital or multinational companies in Turkey. The governments have made several attempts in order to make Turkey an attractive country for foreign capital. With the enactment of the foreign capital framework decree in 1986, designed to accelerate and encourage foreign capital flow, the Foreign capital department was set up to gather various decision-making organisations in one centre and to reduce bureaucratic obstacles and formalities, with the positive effect of all these measures, the foreign capital licensed granted from 1980 to 1989 has amounted to 4.9 billion US dollars (Buyukuslu 1991).

To this extent, the government's policy has been designed to encourage economic growth especially in view of the developing integration of Turkish and international markets and the country's application for full membership of the European communities.
A number of studies suggest that some progress with reasonable success in economic measures has already been made in this direction. A realistic exchange rate policy has been introduced and then exports have grown. For instance, in reviewing Turkey's foreign trade the growth of export in 1979 was well behind cross-country norms covering only 3.2 percent of GNP. However, export registered more or less a five-fold increase in just eight years rising from $2.3 billion in 1979 to $10.2 billion in 1987 accounting in 1985 for 14.9 percent of GNP. Moreover, the increasing competitiveness of Turkish industry is proved by the increase in the share of industrial goods in overall exports, from 35.9% in 1975 to 79.7 in 1990 (TUSIAD, 1990).

It is quite safe to suggest that the 12 September 1980 military intervention gave the Ozal conservative government the opportunity for the implementation of the monetarist economic programs by suppressing most organised social opposition and making them to be depoliticised within the democratic decision making process. Even Ozal himself admitted that "if not for the military intervention, we would never have reaped the rewards of our programmes" (Marqulies and Yildizoglu 1989).

In spite of the fact that the Ozal government was in favour of the principles of free market forces, in practice it was highly interventionist in labour relations. It aimed to limit the role of trade unions and the influence of collective bargaining so as to create a flexible labour market at every level. Therefore, it can be argued that Ozal's Motherland party's economic arguments challenged the whole economic history of Turkey. Taking the new process of capital accumulation into account, the economic policies of the 1980s succeeded in satisfying the interest of the ruling class, particularly through the lowering of real wages and restoration of labour discipline. The government attempted to limit working class activity for the success of the economy at the expense of substantial human and environmental costs. Combined with the restrictive provisions of
the 1983 laws, the governments pursued wage policies in accordance with its Friedman
type stabilisation programmes involving restraint especially in the public sector, where it
acts as employer.

The result was a radical decline in workers' real wages. As a report prepared by TURK-
IS (1989:23) indicated, the real wage index which was 100 in 1979 fell to 43.68 in 1988.
During the same period the drop in the real wages of civil servants was from 100 to
52.4. Also, according to the Research Department of Petroleum Chemical Rubber
workers union (Petrol-Is 1989:217), the share of wages within product value in
Manufacturing industry fell from 14.75 in 1979 to around 6% in 1987. Another union
publication (DERI-IS 1989) showed the workers were working 51 minutes for 1kg of
bread and 13.5 hours for just 1kg of beef in the leather industry in 1987.

There has been also dramatic changes in the structure of the labour force in the 1980s.
The total civilian employment was 16,771,000 in 1991. The employment status of labour
force in the 1980s with employees, self-employed and unpaid family workers categories
accounted in 1985, respectively for 33.9%, 22.7% and 42.4% of the total. The share of
agriculture in total employment was estimated in 1991 at 50.1 (it was 58.2 percent in
1985), while the share of industry was at 20.5 percent (it was 17 percent in 1985) and of
services was 29.5 percent (it was 25.8 percent in 1985). According to recent official
labour market statistics above, employment in agriculture is reported to have decreased.
On the other hand, employment in industry and services (Tourism, Transportation,
Commerce etc.) has demonstrated the most dynamic growth, although industrial
employment still only accounts for 20.5 percent of total employment compared with
27.5 percent in Greece, 35.3 percent in Portugal and 32.9 percent in Spain (OECD
In the last two decades, Turkey has faced a considerable unemployment problem, basically due to her economic transition. In these periods, this development has given rise to an estimated 500 to 800 thousand people entering the labour market annually. The increase in the labour force was mostly absorbed by industry, services and informal sectors. The Turkish economy is widely accepted to be in labour surplus. There are a number of reasons for this, including the high level of increase in the rate of population, the increasing participation of women in the labour force, a decrease in agriculture and handicraft employment and finally the relatively capital-intensive nature of new industries and, more importantly, considerable decrease in the share of the public sector in total employment in large manufacturing enterprises due to the government's deregulation policy. Therefore, the level of unemployment was estimated at more or less 3 million in the mid-1980s (Petrol-Is 1991).

It was on the basis of these economic and political framework that the gradual return to democracy took place. In 1983 a civilian government was elected, yet, returning to democracy did not bring significant changes for Turkish unions. Broadly speaking, the period of Ozal governments was witness essentially to a vital deterioration in the relative economic and political position of organised labour as opposed to capital in general.

Despite the hard time resulting from the 1980 military intervention, unions restructured themselves and total union membership reached its pre-1980 level of more or less 2 million. In terms of the total labour force, which is around 21 million, union density was at about 10 percent. On the other hand, OECD's figures show the union density around 18.7 in Turkey, which is higher than in Spain, 16 percent and France, 12 percent and lower than in Portugal, 30 percent and Greece, 25 percent (EIRR 212, September 1991:17). However, according to ministry of labour statistics (1993), considering the potentially unionisable work force of 3,573,426 wage earners, it reached 58 percent.
However, by looking at the official figures making a judgement about exact union density in Turkey can be misleading due to not only the unreliability of the figures of the ministry of labour, but also the instability of union density. In this sense, the main thing which has been ignored by Turkish academics and unionists is the impact of the significant decline in the size of the unionisable workforce and cultural and ideological changes of 1980s on the unionisation rate. Before 1980 the size of the unionisable workforce (Unionisable workforce in this context means that workers are legally able to join unions) was about 5 million, this figure dramatically dropped to around 3.5 million during the 1980s, mostly due to the government's attempt to deregulate the economic activities for a more flexible labour market. While labour legislation was designed mainly to weaken the power of the unions in relations with employers, various attempts were also made to reduce the institutional regulation of conflict so as to expose labour relations more directly to market forces, particularly in public sectors. Among other reasons for the decline in the unionisable workforce and union economic and political power at macro level, four significant themes will be discussed in the Turkish case below.


a) Anti-Union Legislation:

Combined with an identifiable economic program, the political system was restructured by setting up a new constitution in 1982. This constitution was basically designed to eliminate all the progressive institutions and movements which had been the legacy of the 1961 constitution. The new constitution was designed to limit further trade union
rights. It covered a great number of details concerning trade union activities. For example, according to this new constitution, trade unions are not allowed to take part in politics (Article 14) and are also prohibited from affiliating with political parties (Article 52). The right to strike was also limited in many ways, strike actions cannot be used to damage social peace and national wealth (Article 54) (Saglam 1987).

As discussed earlier, the industrial relations system in Turkey was formed and shaped by the Constitution of 1961, which entitled both employers and workers to the right to organise, the right to strike and the right to bargain collectively. Between them, the unions Act No.274 and collective agreements, strikes and lockouts Act No.275 of 1963, based on the guidelines of the constitution of 1961, developed a system of democratic industrial relations in Turkey. Like the Australian and German legal systems, the Turkish legal system was shaped with its high degree of legalistic intervention ("Juridification").

However, the constitution of 1982 (at present) seems to regulate the Turkish industrial relation system in a more detailed and less democratic manner than the former constitution. Trade unions and employers' organisations and their confederations are governed by the provisions of the trade unions Act of 1983 No.2821 and the collective Agreements, strikes and lockouts Act of 1983 No.2822 shaped by this new constitution. It can be argued that the new laws limit many trade union rights which the Turkish unions enjoyed before the military take-over.

(i) **The impact of the legislation of 1983.**

The new labour legislation was a continuation of the 1982 constitutional restrictions. In fact, the constitution of 1982 (set up after the military take-over of 1980) received full support from the business sides. Halit Narin, ex-president of TISK (the main employers'
organisation) and also a member of the constitutional drafting committee, argued that "it was a commendable work which brought justice and balance between the employers and workers" (TISK 1982:2). Many other major businessmen and industrialists welcomed the new constitution. The new labour legislation was also supported by TISK and was in line with its earlier proposals (Buyukuslu 1991).

While TISK was successful in convincing the military to enact the laws corresponding to its aims, TURK-IS failed to raise much opposition. The initial proposals of TURK-IS were not taken seriously by the military rulers (3). On the other hand, the imprisoned DISK leaders and those of its affiliates were neither in a position to propose amendments to the labour laws nor were they allowed to express their criticism. This legislation includes all manual and white collar employees in the public as well as the private sector; it does not, however, cover civil servants and certain public employee categories such as the newly created "Contract employees".

It can be argued that the characteristic of the 1983 legislation seem to be designed as part of political and economic choices made in the 1980s. Particularly in terms of trade union freedoms the legislation has various "negative motives" including imposing certain restrictions on union membership, excessive restrictions on the right to strike, problems related to collective bargaining, implementing heavier penalties for violators of the laws and expanding the scope of the compulsory arbitration mechanism and of "non-covered personnel" in collective bargaining and interference in the administration and activities of trade unions. The legislation is structured in a system where there are too many intertwined rules, entangled procedures and time intervals affecting the process of collective bargaining and strike. In short, the new labour laws aimed at marginalising trade union activities. It was a system designed to curb all trade union rights and
liberties, which was best described in a report of the Director-General of ILO following his visit to Turkey:

"... Laws Nos. 2821 and 2822 (respecting trade unions and collective agreements, strikes and lock-outs respectively) constituted a legal strait-jacket in which the trade unions found themselves, faced with interference in or control of practically every activity that unions should normally be able to carry out, free from any State intervention..." (ILO 1989:6).

The president of TURK-IS, Sevket Yilmaz at the time also described the legislation in these terms:

"It is a rare collection of irrational restrictions and prohibitions which make trade unionism and collective bargaining a bundle of impossibilities. There are even some cases, such as restriction of the venue of a union congress to a certain city, or restriction of international relations of unions, which show that some of these restrictions can not be explained rationally and that they have been invented only for the sake of restricting" (ILO 1990:17).

The restrictive and even repressive measures in the Turkish legislation in the 1980s seemed to hit the trade union movement in many ways. Trade unions were not only banned from involvement in political activities but also prohibited from receiving or giving support to political parties. The leadership of TURK-IS particularly opposed the provisions because:

"such provisions are, without any doubt, against the freedom of unions... being independent from politics does not mean non-political action" (TURK-IS 1983:172).
In fact, these restrictions also prevent unions from pursuing their socio-economic interests because it is not easy to distinguish where the industrial action is focused on either political causes or socio-economic interest of workers. Legal restrictions on union membership were also extended. For instance, civil servants, the employees of essential services and certain public employee personnel, such as public school teachers, postal employees and police, are not allowed to organise within unions. Similarly some 2 million public servants are denied the right to organise.

The government also created other non-union category in the public sector, termed the "contract employees". The category is believed by the unions as a special status devised to pave the way for privatization program more effectively. It might also be argued that the implementation of new employment practice in the public sector seems to have brought "contract employees" closer to the civil servants status, denying them the right to join unions and to strike and consequently causing interest division within the working class.

The government also created the concept of "coverage of collective agreements". According to the trade union Act No.2821, any persons with varying degrees of managerial authority who can legally join unions are excluded from the scope of collective agreements. Any workers authorised to have the right to manage are considered as the employer's representative. For instance, apart from the general managers and directors, supervisors and foremen are treated as workers who can join unions but not be covered by collective agreement.

As most union officials stressed in interviews, this practice is often used by employers to extend the scope of "non-covered employees". In practice highly skilled workers (e.g. engineers, technicians etc.) are chosen by employers for this category. Their wages are
usually kept above the other workers' wages who are covered by collective bargaining. And what is more, workers among "the non-covered employees" who are not members of a union are most likely to be promoted in the companies. Therefore, there is a considerable tendency among the "non-covered employees" not to join unions or to withdraw from union membership. Even if they stay in their unions, conflicts of interest arise within their workers. According to a research official in TURK-IS (4), the number of "the non-covered employees" for collective arrangements has recently reached around 25 percent of the total labour force. This figure clearly indicates the deunionisation efforts of employers.

In the field of collective bargaining, trade union rights are also restricted by the legal requirement that any union must have 10% of workers in a given branch of activity and 50% in any given establishment before it can enter into negotiations. This provision provided the platform for a "union-busting" campaign in August 1989 by the Yapi ve Kredi Bank against the BANKS union which represented about 11% of employees in the banking and finance sector. By engaging in a concerted campaign to coerce its employees into resigning their membership of BANKS, management was able to force union membership below the 10% threshold and thus end its status as a legal bargaining agent (TURK-IS 1989). These provisions were used in July 1990 to remove the bargaining rights of the independent steelworkers' union, Celik-is, at the Iskenderun and Karabuk enterprise where half of its membership was employed (Petrol-Is 1990).

By asserting a popular criticism that union policies do not often represent members' interests and unions violate democratic principles in their internal administration, the 1983 Act results in detailed provisions on election procedures. In other words, the 1983 legislation allows for considerable government interference in the internal affairs of trade unions and imposes detailed eligibility requirements on candidates for union office. For
example, in order to be elected to leadership posts of one of the national unions, a person must have had continuous employment experience as a worker for at least 10 years (Celik 1988). This provision was used in August 1989 when two trade unionists were not allowed to stand for election to the national executive committee of the glass, earth, and cement workers union KRISTAL-IS because they had not fulfilled the requirement of 10 years' continuous employment in the sector (5). A system of inspection was also set up in the 1983 labour legislation. This brings about a close, day-to-day supervision of the activities of trade unions. With respect to alleged misuse of funds and violation of union democracy principles, unions and confederations are also subjected to financial and administrative controls conducted by Ministries of Finance and Labour, acting jointly, at least once in an election period. A strike ballot is also required before strike action (Celik 1988).

In addition, unions may not be established at the enterprise level or on an occupational basis and require prior authorisation for international affiliation. Sanctions for violations of Turkish labour legislation are severe, and include the dissolution of unions and imprisonment of individual offenders. The provisions means that all individuals convicted on ideological or political grounds are disqualified from union office (Yol-Is 1986).

The most serious restrictions in the new labour legislation were those on the right to strike; while not making strikes completely illegal, the collective Agreements, strikes and lockouts Act of 1983 No. 2822 makes them extremely difficult. Strike action is further obstructed by the lengthy procedures that must precede the declaration of a legal stoppage and the possibility of imposing compulsory arbitration procedures.
The same Act imposes a compulsory arbitration mechanism for those establishments and activities where strikes are forbidden. These work fields where workers do not have the right are as follows: water, electricity and gas; funeral and mortuary; life and property insurance; fire fighting; banking and public notaries; petrochemical works starting from naphtha or natural gas; production, processing and distribution of natural gas and petroleum; urban public transportation by land and sea; any health institution such as a hospital, dispensary, sanatorium, clinic, chemist's shop or pharmacy; educational institution, (public or private sector teachers), day care centres and retirement homes; cemeteries and any establishment run directly by the Ministry of National Defence. It is reported that about one-fifth of the unionised workforce is involved in these fields subject to compulsory arbitration, which seems to be an high ratio for Western Countries that are committed to free collective bargaining and right to strike (Celik 1988).

The other restrictions of 1983 Act on strike can be summarised as follows: Clause 31 states numerous instances when strikes may be temporarily prohibited particularly in the case of war, fires, flood, avalanches and earthquakes and clause 33 allowed government to postpone strikes for up to 60 days where public health or national security are threatened (Taskent 1987). For example, the government implemented this measure once on 22 March 1989 when it decided to postpone the implementation of the decision of a strike by 24,000 steelworkers (Cumhuriyet, 23 Mart 1989). On 26 January 1991, the government intervened against the increasing wave of industrial unrest using the excuse of the supposed threat to the national security posed by the growing Gulf crises to decree a 60 days suspension of all strikes. The measure brought to an end some 160 strikes and existing collective negotiations and provided for the imposition of compulsory and binding arbitration through mechanism that were not impartial and did not enjoy the confidence of the workers concerned (TURK-IS 1991).
When a strike is postponed, the dispute has to be settled by a new body called the Supreme Board of Arbitration. A strike ballot is also required before strike action. In other words, according to the collective bargaining, strikes and lock-outs Act of 1983 No.2822, a strike vote must be taken in a enterprise or plant if one-fourth of the workers including union members, non-members and non-covered employees request a strike ballot within six working days after the union's strike announcement. Some restrictions on strike pickets are also imposed. For instance, there must be only four strikers at the entrance of company and they must not resort to the violence, force or threats. According to the same Act, work by those (members or non-members) in the workplace during a strike must not be impeded in any way by strikers. With the exception of a sign saying "strike in progress", other placards, banners or slogans must not be posted and no huts, sheds or shelters may be erected. Solidarity and general protest strikes as well as political activity by unions, beyond immediate social and economic issues, are forbidden (Koc 1991).

Associated with these developments, individual labour legislation also created a new framework in which redundancy, dismissal and retirement became easier (Celik 1988). The considerable body of legislation passed since 1980 seems unsympathetic to trade unionism. In general, a whole ensemble of legislative measures has been aimed at reducing "union rights" gradually narrowing the scope of union membership and the right to strike, interfering the union internal democracy and increasing the power of compulsory arbitrary system.

(ii) An assessment of the legislation in the light of international standards.

A detailed comparative analysis between international regulations on trade union rights and legal regulations currently in force in Turkey shows that the 1982 Constitution of
the Republic of Turkey, as well as the 1983 legislation, No 2821 (the trade union Act), No 2822 (the collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts), and their amendments introduced in 1986 No 3299 are in violation of the principles of ILO Conventions Nos 87, 98, 111 and 135 as well as in violation of the European Social Charter and the principles of ICFTU and ETUI, both in their spirit and application (6) (TURK-IS 1981).

As far as Convention No 87 is concerned, Turkey is the only country in Western Europe that has not yet ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No.87). As regards the right of civil servants to join trade unions, Turkey is the only European country which has banned civil servants from joining trade unions. However, in an interview, an official from the ministry of Labour (7) stated that both civil servant and contract employees are considered as engaged in the administration of the state and thus excluded from the scope of the convention.

Although Turkey has ratified ILO Convention 98, covering the protection of workers and organisations against attacks on trade union rights and interference and encouraging voluntary collective bargaining, serious restrictions are imposed by the daily practices of the employers and governments, such as the creation of "contract employee" category in the public sector and of "non-covered personnel" in collective bargaining. Workers are still deprived of the right of negotiating their working conditions. The numerous limitations on the right to strike in Turkey extend far beyond the essential public services where many other countries impose similar restrictions on strike activities. Furthermore, where this right is recognised, there exist a whole series of laws banning certain actions widely legitimate in other countries and circumstances, such as the right to collect money to assist strikers and the right to establish picket lines around an undertaking which is on strike. The same can be said about ILO Convention No 135 on the protection of workers' representatives and Convention No 111 on discrimination and the
European Social Charter are also international regulations which are flouted by Turkish legislation. A significant number of cases, related to unfair dismissal against shop-stewards and union members was reported in the 1980.

However, the legal approach which demonstrates the violations of international regulations article by article can run the risk of giving the idea that these violations resulted from isolated clauses. In fact, they make up a system which is aimed at containing the trade union movement, in order to reduce its possibilities to express itself, its field of action, its resources and influence. The important question might be: what are the formal approaches of the government and employers to trade unions' rights in Turkey? The government and employers' organisations (TISK) often state that although they have some regard for international regulations, the conditions should be adopted to "national circumstances" (8). Therefore, it is no longer a case of "adapting international regulations to national conditions", but rather the case of ignoring all international regulations. That is why, it can be argued that there is a need for more widespread attention to be given to attacks on trade union rights in Turkey.

b) The Cultural and Ideological Offensive:

Before 1980 the economic, political and social policies of the state, the generally limited scope of industrialisation and the relatively small size of the industrial working class meant that trade union development had certain advantages or disadvantages on the basis of collective identity and union attachment compared with the advanced European countries. In this context, the fundamental problem facing trade unions in the 1980s was their capacity to create the specific institutional and cultural structures that would allow
other strata or organisations to support the trade union movement, particularly during the economic and political crises.

In essence, trade unions in Turkey might elaborate an ideology of solidarity between industrial and other workers and the mass of small producers, small shopkeepers, mainly, self-employed. When the industries such as mining, steel and paper developed in the relatively large industrial cities, the broad section of the population in these cities became dependent on the industrial workers, because the consumer and seller relations between self-employed and workers helped to serve as a bridge toward broader sets of community relations.

Turkish unions until few years ago were not successful in developing ties with other strata and organisations (student unions, teacher associations, professional groups etc.) and therefore were not politically effective. Census results showed that there were 1,624,000 wage earners in 1955, but around 7,600,000 wage earners in 1992 (Aydinlik, 27 September 1993). These figures indicate that there has been a significant increase in the number of working class. Although there is not data available on this issue, the major increase has been observed in the white collar workers in service sector. Union membership was also affected by the increasing number of white-collar employees, mainly in the service sector, as these workers are usually reluctant to joint unions. Moreover, a decline in Agricultural employment also gave rise to the expansion of the informal sector in big cities. In the 1980s emigration continued from small towns to large cities. Emigrant labour without any skill was obtained by either the informal sector (as street sellers) or by the expansion of the service sector, tourism and construction (as casual, temporary or seasonal workers). Some were employed by small enterprises or artisans, where there is not effective trade unionisation. The urban informal sector has constituted a powerful constraint on trade unions as well as the development of a
working-class consciousness. Informal sector workers are difficult not only to be organised in unions but also to mobilise politically.

Since the working class and its organisational forms, including unions, can not be separated from the total environment in which they operate, the vital significance of the nature of the political economy and wider societal influences in shaping the salient features of the Turkish working class and its relation with the trade unions also appears to be an important factor.

One of the open and direct offensive policies of the governments against trade unions in the 1980s was to discredit them in relation with workers through claiming them as ineffective and useless organisations. The aim was to create a credibility gap between workers and unions. The attitude of the ruling class in this period was to undermine worker solidarity and weaken the confidence of the working class in the trade unions. Unions were scapegoated as the cause of the severe economic and political problems of 1970s. The government and employers' anti-union disposition can be best explained by the words of the President of the employers' organisation, Halit Narin, at the time: "We cried for about 20 years, now it is our turn to laugh" (Milliyet, 23 February 1983:1). Another example of the above-mentioned attitude towards trade unions was the statement of Prime Minister Ozal during his party's convention in November 1986: "Workers are our friends, but not trade unions" (BASISEN 1986:5). Latter, Ozal also declared that "My battle is against trade union leaders, not workers" (Cumhuriyet, 3 December 1989:3).

So, one of the new strategies of the government to attack trade unions was an ideological offensive by declaring them the cause of many problems in the country. Therefore, at the national level, the government no longer required the unions'
collaboration for the economic, political and cultural integration. In this respect, "populist disclosure" of the 1960s and 70s for the masses, particularly, the unions were replaced by "restrictive democracy" for the unions in the 1980s. The purpose of the ruling class was not only to create an anti-union environment through anti-union policies but also to undermine the working classes' organisational power and discredit them with regard to the workers.

It is worthwhile to stress that economic liberalism, supported by "restrictive democracy" (it is difficult to talk about political liberalism) in the 1980s gave rise to a cultural and ideological dilemma. A novelty which the Ozal government after mid-80s brought to Turkish public life was the gradual extension of the philosophy of "individualism". In fact, the popular wisdom was "turn the corner" and be rich under the expansion of liberal ideology. This means that material things are becoming more important and the rising importance of materials gains in the society, particularly among the younger generation, led corruption or cheating to be tolerable or acceptable. This of course affects ethical issues, collectivism and solidarity among workers. Due to political considerations the state deliberately let the new city emigrants build their shanty towns quite near city centres and even extended municipal services to these urban centres. Hence, the lower wages were likely to be balanced by providing capital gains, welfare benefits, to working class. Employers seemed to be also happy for this development, since the new urban centres caused the expansion of domestic production.

(i) The impact of the cultural and ideological offensive on unions.

The cultural and ideological results of these developments for trade unions are of importance. In the 1970s workers who lived in urban centres had a permanent job in the
factories and were generally members of a union. They were involved in unions and politically active in union activities and their political orientations were widely affected by left-wing ideologies. In contrast, in the 1980s workers who live in these places often do not have a regular job, mostly work in informal activities and are reluctant to organise within unions.

Compared with the coffee shops and mosques in the shanty towns, trade unions have become less important for workers. Let us not forget that the depolitization of masses as the deliberate policy of government during and after the military intervention of 1980 has resulted in a considerable shift towards the fundamentalist Islamic movement and the emergence of hooliganism in urban centres. This might have been as a consequences of the "ideological attack" of ruling class against the ideologies of socialism, social democracy and etatism in favour of liberal discourses. The social dimension of these ideological changes have also affected the unions' image as collective organisations. An additional ideological attack on unions and their leaders has been the blame for the disruption caused by prolonged strikes. Anti-union campaigns, centred on allegations of malpractice and corruption inside unions and the blame for displaying no respect for national economic interests and social stability was also launched by the media, mostly owned by large companies in Turkey. This of course affects the public image of unions. Employers and their leading organisations such as TUSIAD and TISK have powerfully been determining Turkey's political agenda. This effectiveness of course drives from their capacity of being owners of capital. The means of mass media, such as newspapers, magazines, television and radio stations are replaced under their direct influence. In Turkey union leaders consider this as "media war" against trade unions.

Recently, this fact has once again revealed itself very clearly, during the strikes in Istanbul in 1991 and 1993 led by the Municipal Workers Union, Belediye-İs. At this
strike no public support could be secured at the desired levels (Petrol-Is 1991). The disruptive consequences of this strike has damaged popular sympathy for unions, since the strike paralysed the public services. Particularly after the excessive escalation of unionised worker wages at the beginning of the 1990s, the media has began to proclaim its opposition to unions quite openly. While some journalist was saying that "I want to be a Municipal Worker", the others were raising the questions: "do the trade unions have a right to ask for the high wages, while the other working groups' wages such as doctors, teachers and civil servants are becoming less than those of workers...is it fair to pay very high wages only to organised workers? while there are millions of people seeking for employment, they are even ready to work below the minimum wage level" (9). While the attack of the media associated with the employers and government's official statements has carried a crucial weight in undermining the unions' public image, the unions could not achieve much success in convincing the public of the justice of their demands or in determining the political agenda on the basis of workers' interests.

As already noted, the 1980s witnessed a strategic and continual confrontation with trade unions, mostly in connection with the ongoing austerity economic programmes, increasing international competition and the specific problem of Turkish capitalism. It can safely be argued that one of the key purposes of the governments in the 1980s was to create the social and cultural conditions which seemed to be in line with the 1980s' economic and political choices of the ruling class.

The governments and employers have concentrated on more emphasis on the popular term "national needs" through stressing the fight against inflation, reducing budget deficit and improving the domestic economy's competitiveness abroad. The creation of the social and cultural conditions also required an "ideological control". Therefore, while
the image of the unions has been weakened in public eyes, the emphasis at an ideological level has been shifted toward "individualism".

Combined with this development, changes in the employment patterns has brought about interest differentiation in the working class. An increase, particularly in service and informal sectors in the last decade have had an impact on the pattern of labour relations developed in the 1960s and 70s. The emergence of a "social state" in the same period strengthened labour solidarity and indeed trade union power and also helped to develop the idea of "collectivism" among the workers. However, changes in the political and economic environment of unions in the 1980s has affected labour behaviour in relation to the unions. In short, decline in collectivism is associated not only with the changing patterns of employment but also the cultural and ideological offensive of the ruling class. In this respect, "restrictive democracy", with a new emphasis on market liberalism and individualism has resulted in the crisis of the attitude of the working class and of traditional trade union culture and ideologies.

c) **Trends in Collective Bargaining:**

Shortly after the military intervention of 1980, the military government enacted several measures concerning the activities of unions suspended. In relation to collective bargaining, the Act No.2364 was prepared and gave the authority to the Supreme Arbitration Board to renew the expired collective agreements in all sectors. During the interval 1980 to 1983, this Arbitration board remained in force until the new legislation of 1983 was enacted (Dereli 1984). In the course of these years, while free collective bargaining was absent, the main purpose of the Supreme arbitration board was to reduce the general wage level in line with the government's stabilisation and liberalisation
policies, designed to control the high inflation. In doing so, some general principles and rules in collective agreements were standardised to create similar wage and employment conditions in all sectors. Therefore, the natural outcome of the government's collective bargaining policies was a significant decline in workers' purchasing power.

The structure of collective bargaining in the 1980s was shaped by the collective agreement, strike and lock-out Act of 1983 No.2822 which can be summed up as follows: An agreement can be at the plant, covering one workplace or multi plant level. An agreement covering a few plants of the same company or a state-owned organisation in the same industry is called a company agreement. By the same Act, a union has to represent at least 10% of the workers in a particular industry and has more than half of the workers in the plant or enterprise level in membership to acquire bargaining status (Celik 1988).

At a time when union structure was centralised at industry level, the level of bargaining was reduced to local levels (single plant or company level) due to the government's pragmatic considerations. The double criteria has been a much-criticised issue in both ILO and TURK-IS on grounds of its allegedly curbing of unions' freedom to bargain without any hindrance. In fact, after the first collective agreement legislation in 1963, the nucleus of collective bargaining developed at the local level in Turkey. Industry-wide bargaining which was so prevalent in Western Europe did not become so important in Turkey for reasons such as the undeveloped state of employers' associations and the tendency of public economic enterprises to engage in bargaining separately.

During the course of interviews, it became apparent that unions in Turkey do not wish to give any authority concerning collective bargaining to the central confederation. Therefore, due to both legal obligation and the willingness of member unions, the major
bargaining activity of unions is carried out by the industrial associations. However, when TISK (as the only leading confederation of employers) and its employers' associations became more powerful, they began to develop multi-employer agreements commonly called "group agreements" in Turkish labour practices in which firms in every given branch of industry are divided in terms of their size and financial strength and they negotiate as a group. This type of bargaining has been widely used by employers, particularly in the Metal, Textile and Chemicals Industries. "Group Bargaining" became more common as a result of which a master agreement emerges usually covering the whole or greater portions of an industry. Moreover, some enterprise agreements, particularly, in the public sector tend to cover the whole industry (e.g. railways, mining, steel), thus creating the effect of an industry wide agreement.

The explanation given by most employer organisations' officials for the preference of the larger employers' organisation including, metal, textile, chemicals and food industries for multi-employer bargaining is that it saves time and effort. It also helps to regulate the market and prevents employers from competing from with each other in relation to wage increases especially under unchecked inflationary pressures and unstable political conditions. It should be mentioned that "group agreements" are not legally enforceable in Turkey (Buyukuslu 1991).

During the military intervention of 1980, collective bargaining activity was banned. After three years' suspension, unions renewed their collective bargaining relationship with employers in both public and private sector. While on the average 1775 collective agreements were made each year between 1964 and 1980, this figure increased to 2292 between 1984 and 1990. This increase was due to the predominance of local level bargaining in the 1980s (Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1991). It can be argued that in the 1960s and 70s the government adopted a relatively non-interventionist approach to
collective bargaining, there was, however, a dramatic change in the government's policy toward free collective bargaining in the 1980s. Combined with the 1983 anti-labour legislation, the government pursued wage policies in accordance with its monetarist type austerity programs involving wage restraints, particularly in the public sector where it acts as employer. In spite of the fact that unions made various attempts to receive more understanding and flexibility in collective bargaining through searching the channel for "dialogue", these efforts were usually in vain due to the employers' and, more particularly, the government's tough stance against union's wage demands. This also gave rise to an important deterioration of the traditional good relations of TURK-IS with the governments.

(i) Changing strategies in collective bargaining.

As has been mentioned earlier, in the 1960s and 70s most collective agreements were concluded at plant or company level. Also, in the mid-70s multi-employer bargaining called "Group Bargaining" became an important trend in collective arrangements particularly in the private sector. The important basics of bargaining structures of the 1960s and 70s tended to persist and remain relatively stable (after the return to democracy) until the mid-1980s.

However, due to the shifts in government and employers' policies, bargaining structure gradually modified. While the centralised and bureaucratic collective bargaining mechanism has been widespread in the public sector through multi-plant level agreements, the trend in the private sector has been towards more company or plant level bargaining. Broadly speaking, in the face of increasing national and international competition and considering Turkey's full membership application to the European
Community (10), employers' organisations began to employ new strategies so as to overcome the difficulties driving from labour-management relations. The key problems stressed by the officials of employers' organisations are improving productivity, the quality and labour cost factors in production. They are regarded as very important on the basis of competing with imported goods in the domestic market as well as increasing exports (TISK 1992). According to the survey carried out by TISK, average labour productivity in the manufacturing sector in Turkey is one-fourth of that in EC countries. For example, value added per employee in Turkey was $4,163 (1975-100) in 1987 whereas it was $21,994 in Belgium, $23,471 in Germany, $15,436 in UK, $15,553 in Spain, $19,892 in Italy and $5,426 in Portugal (Buyukuslu and Hyman 1992). For this reason, with the help of the ILO TISK developed a project in order to overcome the low productivity level of Turkey. The main aim of this project was to identify the factors which have a negative impact on productivity in undertakings, to offer solutions and to give training to both managers and workforce.

The main factors for the low level of productivity are given by the officials of TISK as follows: (1) the lack of tripartite co-operation between parties both at macro and micro level (2) long industrial disputes and their distracted effects on productivity (3) managers of undertakings are short of the knowledge of the modern management and organisation methods. Considering the last point, it can be argued that Turkish management has been able to exercise a much tighter system of control. Meanwhile, paternalism has always become very significant to enhance workers' motivation and promote effective work performance in labour-management relations. However, it is important to stress that the structural characteristic of industry, mainly, small family and medium size firms in which the employer regarded himself as having a right to exclusive control, led to authoritarian and paternalistic practices. In fact, similar managerial characteristics could be seen in larger, technologically-advanced firms. This is probably a
reflection of the historical development of social structures and the distinctive cultural orientations of Turkey.

On the basis of this background of employers' attitudes, collective bargaining developed a distributive character rather than an integrative character and it focused mainly on wage issues. The issues such as productivity, work allocation, job evaluation, job security, training and the introduction of new technology have never been discussed during the negotiations. Therefore, the content of collective agreements mainly includes detailed provisions related to wage and fringe benefit (11). This trend has also continued in the 1980s. In other words, major Turkish employers (although not always strategically) have taken a pragmatic stand in relation with collective bargaining. By systematically rejecting workers' participation in management the employers did not prefer to share their management authority with the workers or the trade unions.

In fact, there are few signs that Turkish employers have been pursuing different forms of decentralisation strategy evident in other European countries. Due to intensified national and international competition, large employers particularly were forced to decentralise the structure of bargaining. This has been usually done through divisionalising their organisation and contracting out some of their activities to the sub-contractors. As a result, there has been a crucial shift from multi-plant agreements to single-plant agreements. However, in the Turkish case although economic pressure has required a restructuring of the workplace, most employers have been reluctant to discuss issues like the active participation of employees at the workplace with union representatives at the bargaining table.

Provisions in the legislation related to workers' participation in management are not adequate. The provision which had encouraged unions to participate on the boards of
large public enterprises was abolished by the military government. Yet, there has been a slight development on this issue as a result of the attempts of some public sector unions. For instance, committees at the workplace have been called, for example, the High Council of Labour Peace at Caykur (the State Tea Corporation) and the committee of Collaboration at MKE (The Machinery Chemical Industries). The most common type of committees set up by collective bargaining agreements decide on matters such as discipline, the resolution of rights disputes, the duties of shop stewards and the implementation of the agreements (12). However, in general the collective agreements lack important provisions regulating workplace relations between workers and managers, since the collective agreements deal only with income issues.

It should be mentioned that the legal provisions of 1983 created a desirable outcome for TISK and as well as its affiliates. The 1983 Act limited the scope and coverage of collective bargaining by creating new employee categories such as "contract employees" and "non-covered personnel" for collective agreements. In this respect, decentralisation and changes in the nature of collective bargaining have been associated with the employers' deunionisation efforts (13).

As a matter of fact, in more recent years, the close relations with European countries and the United States, the need for a continuous re-organisation of production, the significance of product quality and finally flexibility for international competition have already given rise to some effects on managerial strategies in industrial relations. It can be argued that compared with the past, Turkish industry seems to be better equipped now with professional managers who are competent in devising methods including total quality management, quality circles and team briefing (14). Thus, strategies of individual employers were noted in 37 private companies, including Koc Holding A.S., Turyag A.S, Oyak-Renault, Simko, Eczacibasi, Sise-cam and Brisa (Kalite 1993, MPMY 1989).
However, new employment practices have not prevailed in Turkish Industry yet. Therefore, it seems safe to suggest that employers in Turkey have not yet adopted human resource management practices as a way to undermine trade unions. There is evidence to support this view that in most companies mentioned above before the implementation of these practices the management received full unions support (Kalite 1993). During the interviews, most union officials seem to regard HRM techniques as a tool to improve productivity, rather than undermine the union situation at companies. However, in one case, the Sise-cam factory in Cement, Ceramic and Glass industries wanted to implement quality circles at work place, the union members, Kristal-Is, rejected this practice on the ground that the company did not accept the union proposal concerning permanent employment for employees (Milliyet 13 December 1992). It has been also reported that Tofas-Fiat, the largest car company in Turkey has reached an agreement with the Metal workers' union (Turk-Metal) on redundancies, productivity and temporary wage freezes. This development has been considered as a sign of a productivity coalition at micro level by the company managers (15). It can safely be suggested that in the foreseeable future, management is likely to consider human resource management methods as an alternative way of dealing with employees, ignoring the collective representation channels of unions. The main reason for this is substantial increases in the number of multinational companies in Turkey in recent years (16).

In this sense, a great deal of attention has also been paid to the implementation of foreign capital or multinational companies on Turkish collective bargaining system. As is well known, the large (increasingly multinational) companies are usually reluctant to join employers' organisations. In fact, many of the large or multinational companies in Western countries in the last decade have been so willing to bring their own industrial relations "framework" rather than joining the central employer organisations.
Multinational or large companies in Turkey are not, however, reluctant to deal with either employers' organisations or trade unions. This may be because the larger employers are obliged to do so by Turkish labour legislation and they also used to enjoy engaging in multi-employer bargaining.

However, they have recently begun to engage in single-plant agreements. The increasing number of multinational companies might also explain the move from multi-employer agreements towards single-employer agreements. There is always a possibility for them to bring or create their own management strategies and then leave the relevant employers' organisation, as in the case of Brisa. In the rubber industries, Bridgeston (a Japanese Company) with domestic capital Sabanci (Lassa) came together in a joint venture called Brisa. The Japanese company did prefer to bring its own labour management practices and did not want to remain in the relevant employer organisation, Kiplas, the Chemical, Petroleum, Rubber and Plastics industry employers association of Turkey, and then Kiplas lost its members (mainly rubber companies). There was a reasonable dialogue between Brisa and Laspetkim-Is (the main trade union in the rubber industries). The top managers of Brisa took the leaders of Laspetkim-Is with four officials of this labour union to Japan so as to show how industrial relations practices work there.

Although this trend has not prevailed in other companies, there has been also clear developments away from centralised bargaining "grup toplu is sozlemeleri" over wages towards a new and different decentralised form of bargaining over the management of work practices in the employers' industrial relations strategies. On the other hand, in the same period public enterprises have been subject to direct government intervention in wage regulation. Although state managers have dealt with the process of collective bargaining, the final negotiations have been under the relevant minister's control. In
some cases, the prime minister has directly involved in negotiations (17). The interesting dilemma was that while the government advocated the principles of free market policies, it imposed a restrictive and interventionist wage policy on negotiations. However, things did not go in line with the expectations of the conservative Motherland Party (ANAP) particularly in the late 1980s.

Eventually, the general anti-labour attitude of the Motherland Party governments gave rise to the re-emergence of a militant union struggle. In other words, the response of labour unions to the tough bargaining approach by the government and employers was an increase in industrial action. This mass movement is widely described as "Spring Mobilisation". 600,000 public sector workers engaged in actions and mobilisation including street demonstrations with the purpose of tipping the scale in their own favour in the collective bargaining process. As a result, this development brought about a set of collective bargaining agreements which enabled workers to make up for the post-1980 losses. In 1990 the real wages of unionised workers increased above the pre-1980 level. Despite every obstacle put up by the government and employers, real wages rose considerably in 1989 compared with 1988. Taking 1983 as the base year, the index for real wages increased from 62,4% for 1988 to 81,7% for 1989. As a result of successive collective bargaining in 1990 and 1991, workers continued to fully compensate for the income losses of the post-1980 period.

In this period, multiplant bargaining with single enterprise agreements were widespread and collective bargaining tended to be more centralised in the public sector. One of the important reasons behind the successful conclusion of the 1989, 1990 and 1991 collective bargaining agreements was the collective action of trade unions affiliated to the TURK-IS confederation under TURK-IS's co-ordination and assistance (TURK-IS 1991). During this period, what was observed is that particularly in the case of public
workplaces, collective bargaining procedures were not conducted separately with different associations but undertaken at government level, encompassing the entire sector. During this process public employers' associations were responsible only for technical aspects. Therefore, it can be argued that unions this time particularly at the political level, through mass industrial action and renewal of the confrontation, were effective in discouraging the government's restrictive wage policy.

However, this achievement of the unions and unionised workers has resulted in a new antagonism towards labour unions and union members. The success of labour unions in winning back the wage losses of the previous decade, in turn, led to employers to adopt new strategies. The most widespread methods exercised by the government and employers particularly after the signing of collective bargaining agreements are as follows: (1) closing down their business permanently or temporarily (2) dismissing a large number of workers. For instance, 574 workers were dismissed after a collective agreement between the Turkish Metal Workers Union and Eregli Iron and Steel Company in May 1991. In some companies union members are sacked, and only re-employed if they agree to leave the union and sign up at the minimum wage. More than 300 workers were forced to accept such a procedure at the Sanko Plant in Edirne in October 1991: After being dismissed from their original jobs, they were given employment at an affiliated factory of the Sanko company (3) dividing the company into small units so as to reduce labour costs and making it difficult to unionise, to practice collective bargaining and organise strikes. Therefore, sub-contracting within the business has become a widespread practice, particularly in textiles, construction, metal, communications, cement and timber processing. Employment of temporary or seasonal workers and part-time employment, are becoming commonplace, although there are no reliable statistics available about these sort of workers (18) (4) speeding up the privatisation process in the public enterprises. The outcome of these developments for
workers and unions has usually been massive lay-offs and new replacement at prevailing minimum wages, resulting in unemployment, loss of membership and reduced average wages in the company despite the gains in collective agreements.

d) The Evolution of Privatization ("Ozellestirme") and its Impact on Turkish Trade Unions:

In many countries, irrespective of their regimes or stages of development, the policies of governments in the 1980s dramatically shifted in favour of market-based solutions as opposed to the previous dominant "Keynesian" approach to economic management. Their policies focused on improving public sector performance by several forms of "commercialisation", such as deregulation and privatization (Ferner 1988). Thus, the privatization of public enterprises has become a key strategy in governments' market-oriented approaches. Basically, the privatization programmes in general have been designed to reduce the size and scope of the public sector and strengthen the market. Turkey, like most other countries followed the privatisation trend. The "sell-off philosophy" has been a central pillar of governments economic policy since 1984, even if the results so far have been sometimes less than convincing. Here, the Turkish experience with privatization, and more importantly, its impact on trade unions will be examined.

(i) The State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and the privatization process in Turkey.

In the 1930s, the "etatist" period of the country, State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) provided the initial impetus for industrialisation in Turkey. In the post-war period, while
the SEEs continued to play a central or modified role in industrialisation, they also helped the development of private business, particularly through providing subsidised inputs to the private sector, a process facilitated by extensive price deregulation (19). As has been noted earlier, as a result of the structural adjustment programme in 1980, government shifted its economic policy from the import-substitution strategy to export-oriented growth. The general thrust of the strategy was to rely on market forces and reduce the scope for state intervention especially in economic activities. The SEEs were viewed as one of the causes of economic crises in the 1970s. The underlying problems of the SEEs, often stressed by the governments, were as follows: low productivity and efficiency; decline in the growth and profits of organisations, which in turn created financial problems for government budgets; lack of competitiveness in their market shares and the absence of autonomy and managerial incentives. The latter may be due to frequent interference from politicians and bureaucrats and considerable increase in militancy in public sector unions, particularly in the late 1970s.

In addition, labour hoarding was regarded as another problem of the public sector, because public sector employment in Turkey was expanded, mostly due to political concern with generating support for the government in power. After returning to a democratic regime, the pressures and proposals in favour of privatisation of the SEEs were intensified by the Ozal conservative government. Hence, privatization appeared one of the most significant parts of the policy agenda of the government for the first time in 1984.

For the government, privatisation would offer a way to make the economy more responsive to the market, so increasing industrial efficiency, and generating real growth. It would be also a tool to increase the liquidity of the capital markets, to reduce budget outlays to industry and provide a flow of badly needed revenues to the exchequer.
Two main strategies seemed crucial during the privatisation process. First, the government identified the key state companies, TURISAN (a tourism chain), THY (the Turkish National Airlines), and USAS (an airline catering company) which were given priority for privatisation. Controversially, all these companies were already very profitable and productive. This was somewhat against the government's thinking that through privatization these companies would become more productive and efficient. Second, the government also identified the major candidates (or customers) as ideal buyers for privatisation. Foreign investors rather than domestic ones were chosen as the principal candidates for taking over the companies. Three basic ways were used to implement privatization in Turkish case: first, direct sales of public sector companies. This is a complete transfer of ownership from public to the private sector. Second, transferring the management rights of the companies and finally selling of the stakes of the companies (Akguc 1991). However, in Turkey domestic companies were interested in obtaining the management rights of the highly profitable public enterprises rather than taking over them. This might have also been one of the reasons that the government encouraged multinational companies to buy off these enterprises.

The main thought here is that through considering international competition, the adaptation of free market principles and foreign economic relations of Turkey in the 1980s became more significant for the government's strategies. In the 1960s and 70s the public sector was considered as the most important element of the programme of national reconstruction and as the assistant of domestic private capitalist development. In contrast, since the 1980s, the public sector, through privatization, has been regarded as an aid to attract foreign capital. It is obvious that the government was concentrating on privatisation not only as a means of improving company competitiveness or efficiency but also as a crucial strategy for promoting the development of the capital market, mainly, international capital.
Although it seemed initially quite ambitious, the Turkish privatization programme has been problematic. Several reasons can be given for the failure of the privatization programme. Firstly, the legal base of privatization was not clear, therefore, the government was faced with the cancellation of three major sales by judicial decision. Second, there was considerable opposition from interest groups including employees, unions, shopkeepers, small producers, farmers as well as the established bureaucrats and some managers in the SEEs, who might have been affected by privatization. Within the parliament, the opposition parties such as SHP (left of centre) and RP (Islamic party) were also significant opposition circles. The parties opposed the privatization programme of the government on the ground that the programme was designed to solve the fiscal problems by regarding it as a budget-deficit financing technique. They were also concerned about selling off some of the SEEs which would be strategically crucial on economic and military grounds to foreigners.

Some academics in Turkish universities also began discussing the legal basis of privatization. The themes like "government choice" or "public choice" and "property rights" were debated (20) and for them political rationality would come progressively into conflict with market rationality. During the period between 1980-1990 opposition by unions was considerable even before the implementation of privatization, because the adverse impact of certain labour practises such as wage restraint in collective bargaining and creation of a new status for workers as "contract employees", contracting-out and massive lay-offs appeared as a preparation for privatization.

With the formation of the DYP (the Conservative True Path Party) and the SHP (the Social Democratic Populist Party) coalition government following the October 20, 1991 election the privatization programme has become more complicated, particularly after Mrs Ciller became prime minister. While she has wanted to speed up the privatisation
process, Mrs Ciller's junior partner, the social democratic populist party has tended to adopt an essentially cautious and pragmatic approach to privatization. As a result, the political constraints on privatization have become more considerable. For example, due to the attempts of some MPs like Mumtaz Soysal within the SHP, the privatization of PTT (Posta, telegraph and telecommunication) and TEK (Electricity) still remains blocked by the court.

(ii) The impact of the privatization process on unions.

It can be argued that government's strategies were also to fundamentally reshape the industrial relations system during the 1980s. In relations with privatised industries, and enterprises in preparation for privatization, there is evidence of new comprehensive industrial relations strategies in some cases including the reduction of labour forces, the exercise of new management practices, changes in the structure of collective bargaining and contracting-out of some economic activities to private firms. These developments amounted to a policy of labour exclusion particularly affecting public sector trade unions.

In the Turkish public sector a system of "tripartite political exchange" between public sector unions and governments had been developed. In other words, in the 1960s-70s the sector not only helped the consolidation of economic development for the country, but also ensured a margin of comparative stability for union organisations and created the conditions for union growth which reached a density of 80%-90%. However, this "tripartite political exchange" was diminished through the abolition of the "workers' participation scheme" in the SEEs in 1983. It can be assumed that exclusion from political exchange may reduce unions' effectiveness in this sector. In this respect, unions
may be forced to move into a more uncertain situation involving new labour practices from the previous, relatively stable framework of relations.

The SEEs cover around 750 thousand employees, with their family members this reaches an interest group of about 4 million people. There is no doubt that the privatization programme has already affected TURK-IS, since it is largely organised in the public sector. In reviewing the various publications of unions, Petrol-Is, Yol-Is, Kristal-Is, Harb-Is, Hava-Is, Deri-Is, Basisen, Turkiye denizciler, Demiryol-Is and Tekgida-Is, it can be argued that in general, they all consider the privatization efforts as a move which aims at undermining the trade union movement. The main concern is that a large number of workers in the public sector would be laid off before and after privatization. For example, the attempts of the ministry of transportation to contract certain activities to private companies to reduce the workforce can be seen as a step towards privatization.

Unions also criticised the policy on the ground that the government announced the sale of the most profitable companies to private capital, particularly, foreign companies. For them, "national interests" are in danger. The key question is why the government does not rehabilitate or sell off the inefficient SEEs. Therefore, their criticism also centres on the policy choices of government in the privatization programme (various publication of Yol-Is, Petrol-Is, Turkiye Belediye-Is, Agac-Is, Hava-Is, Saglik-Is and Deri-Is) (21).

Most unions regard the state owned companies as a symbol of Turkey's economic and political independence and "public property". They also stress the social function of these enterprises. Firstly, the SEEs have had a considerable function in correcting imbalances in the distribution of national income mainly through regulating and sometimes stabilising the prices of goods. Second, the enterprises have made an
important contribution to social stability by creating employment particularly in newly emerged cities such as Zonguldak, Karabuk etc. This also created further jobs for local shopkeepers in those areas and discouraged people from emigrating to large cities for jobs. Finally, the SEEs introduced most of social welfare programs and contributed to the education of workers as well as managers. For unions, the problems of productivity and efficiency derived from mismanagement.

However, widespread doubts among Turkish unionists centre on the possibility of layoffs and losing members following privatization. In fact, after the privatisation of five cement companies, USAS (airline catering concern) and ANSAN (the bottling company to cola) and later TELETAS (Telecommunication company), massive lay-offs were witnessed. For example, Swedish airlines SAS service partners took over USAS, and within one year 50% of the workers were laid-off (Cumhuriyet, 23 Nisan 1993). During 1987-1991 the five cement companies (CITOSAN) were bought by French SCF (Societe' des Ciments Francais), and since then 8,000 workers were dismissed. After buying major stakes in the Telephone company (TELETAS), Belgium Bell Telephone Manufacturing Co forced the company to dismiss 25% of its workforce (Hava-Is 1993).

In the petroleum, chemical and rubber industries, according to Petrol-Is' officials (22), the Akdeniz Fertilizer Factory was sold off to a private Turkish company TEKFEN HOLDING in 1989. Before the privatization process Tekfen Holding employed 740 workers and among those 668 belonged to Petrol-is; however, three years later in 1992, these were 398 and 306 respectively. The rate of unionisation in this company dropped from 90.2% to 76.8%. What is more, after massive lay-offs the jobs done by previous workers were given to subcontractors. In the same industries, IPRAGAZ was sold off to a French-owned company, Primagaz, and within five years workers who belonged to the union were all dismissed, the company became union-free in the end.
The president of Hava-IS (23), Attila Aycin, in an interview claims that there have been serious changes reported in the status of unions and collective bargaining arrangements after the privatization of most companies. There have also been observable moves in management practices including more restrictions imposed on recruitment of new employees, increases in unfair dismissals and flexibility demands in working hours. Management also sought to introduce various individualist methods of employee participation and reward. For example, performance-related pay was introduced in most cases. Mr Aycin pointed out that after privatization in most companies unionised workers were the first target to be dismissed.

The implication of privatization for trade unions in Turkey seem to be very complicated for two crucial reasons. First, there has not been any serious ownership changes in large and important SEEs where unions would be badly damaged (24). After negotiating with IMF and the World Bank the Ciller government announced that around 25%-40% of the workforce in the public sector is likely to be laid off (Petrol-is 1993). Second, in spite of the fact that it is too early to draw a general conclusion about the implementation of privatization on unions in general, it is, however, possible to examine the effect of the preparation periods for the privatization process on unions. In other words, remarkable changes taking place before privatization might be regarded as prerequisites for privatization. The companies were restructured in preparation for privatization.

(iii) The effect of preparation periods for the privatization process on unions.

In this context, it is quite safe to argue that, particularly after 1984, the conservative governments' deliberately imposed new labour practices on the state owned companies, which have undermined union's power in the public sector. These practices include:
(a) The creation of a category of "contract employees". As part of its market orientation philosophy and privatization programme, the Ozal government imposed new policies on the public sector. According to the new personnel regime, there would be three categories employed by the SEEs; namely "civil servants", "workers" who are employed under a labour contract, and "contract employees". The last category aimed at curbing union power by denying unionisation rights, collective bargaining rights and job security against lay-offs. In 1992 this category covered 190,356 employees in the public sector. This means that out of 620,282 total employees in the sector, 30.68% of employees were employed as "contract employees" and thus became unionised between 1985-1992 (KIT raporu 1993).

(b) Contracting-out: In the late 1980s the contracting-out of certain work to outside firms also became significant as part of government deregulation policies. Contracting-out has been used to allow private companies to enter the market. Essentially, the government has made use of it to hand over to private companies certain public services; including postal services, municipal services, distribution of electricity and auxiliary services in the SEEs. The other types of work, including public works, construction or repair of highways, dams, auxiliary facilities for SEEs' plants were also undertaken on a subcontracting basis. According to research carried out by Petrol-Is in the petroleum, chemical and rubber industries, in 1990 11.8% of the total workforce worked for subcontractors without any union affiliation (Petrol-Is 1992). Another more recent development is also the crucial tendency of municipal authorities to contract out some of the local public services such as sanitation, meter-reading, refuse collection and maintenance of parks to outside companies in response to the budget problems of large cities, in particular, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. The Municipal Employees' union (Belediye-Is 1993) reported that after contracting-out these activities, 1789 workers
were dismissed, and all of them were union members. Contracting-out was regarded by most unions within the privatization sphere as the cause of the deunionisation process.

(c) **Lay-offs in the public sector:** The increase in reported lay-off cases before and during the privatization process is also noteworthy. This, indeed, gave rise to loss of membership and of unions' bargaining status and their power at some plants. For instance, dismissals reported by TURK-IS affiliated unions in 1992 were 39,609 workers in all sectors, and out of this total around 28,000 workers were laid off in the public enterprises alone, sometimes through "compulsory retirement". The unions also noted that dismissals in the public sector were mostly due to the privatization process. In fact, the figures not only show the number of dismissals but also the loss of union membership, since unionised workers were the primary target during the redundancy cases (Petrol-Is 1993). In short, these anti-union practices can be attributed to the attempts of the government's privatization programme. There is a phrase in Turkish: "a rose garden without thorns". This means in this context that the government would sort out all labour problems before selling off the companies to domestic and foreign capital.

The first important government strategy was to stop the expansion of employment and to initiate large scale lay offs in the SEEs. Two significant factors seems to lie behind these reductions: (a) restructuring of working practices to increase labour productivity: (b) termination of uneconomic activities. Second, contracting out of some economic activities of these companies to outsiders was implemented with considerable effectiveness. The hiring of contract workers also became significant. These policies helped to reduce potential membership and diminish union power. Third, in order to make these enterprises more attractive for buyers the aim of the government was also to turn them into profitable companies. As a result, the increase in wages was limited and real wages subsequently fell.
This was made possible by the creation of the so-called "public sector collective bargaining co-ordination board" in 1984 and further the establishment of the public sector employers' associations in 1986. These organisations pursued a bargaining policy much tougher than in the 1960s and 70s. The reason for this is, probably, that in the 1960s and 70s, government approaches towards labour relations in the public sector were more pragmatic. State enterprises were used for political objectives. Compared with the private sector, public sector managers were more tolerant in their relations with unions. One additional reason is that, particularly in the late 1970s, the public sector witnessed the emergence of politicisation within workers. Therefore, during the 1980s the emphasis also shifted towards depoliticising public sector labour relations.

Fourth, an important factor that caused the undermining of public sector unions was the artificially-created "contract employee" category by the government. This is a category in which workers are denied the right to join unions. This has, no doubt, brought about a potential as well as actual membership of loss for unions.

(iv) **The possible future effects of privatization on unions.**

A crucial question which can be raised here is what is possible impact of privatization in the future on the role of Turkish trade unions? In other words, how will this development affect the traditional pattern of labour relations and the role of unions in general? A pessimistic scenario can be, first, suggested. As part of the government's deregulation and privatization efforts, a legislative change was made in 1986. According to Article 3 of the 1986 amendment (Act No.3299) "in the public sector, a single enterprise-level collective agreement should be made when enterprises or plants have independent legal corporate status as a result of separation". This is to say that when
the enterprises or plants are broken up and sold piecemeal, the privatised plant will have separate bargaining with independent legal corporate status. This means that the existing collective bargaining and labour relations might be disrupted. And different unions are likely to claim bargaining rights for the same companies.

Thus, the disruption of the bargaining relationship can further give rise to inter-union rivalry. Privatised enterprises may tend to diversify their economic activities into new branches and this can have profound implications for unions. While the traditional pattern of labour relations with established unions in the core business will continue at least in the foreseeable future, the new branches of privatised companies may choose union-free environments. The removal of political control by governments and ministers will encourage the autonomy of management to make direct industrial relations decisions and implement new workplace practices at workshop level. While this can reduce the influence of government or ministers, the capacity of management to exercise strategic choices at plant level is likely to be increased. In addition, in the new deregulated environment, a desire to reduce labour costs and to strengthen management control by slashing the size of the workforce and restructuring the companies’ labour relations practices will probably prevail.

On the other hand, it is also possible to draw a relatively optimistic picture of the implementation of privatization on the future of unions in Turkey. First, privatization will, probably, result in the replacement of the "political orientation of management" by "market orientation of management". This means that privatised enterprises will be released from direct ministerial control. Therefore, government intervention in collective arrangements will be eliminated and the chances of establishing "free collective bargaining" will be increased. This will also change the domination of right-wing unions in the public sector (these unions traditionally established good relations with the
ministries of conservative parties). Hence, there would be substantial opportunities for unions as well as their confederations to set up new balances within the privatised enterprises to discuss new dimensions or strategies as against their traditional way of dealing with labour relations. Second, some management of privatised companies are also likely to prefer to carry on the institutionalised trade union relations, since they do not know how to deal with conflict with workers and the grievances etc. In this case, unions can be considered an important element for management to take into account while preparing its strategic innovations. Third, assuming the whole company is sold off, this means merely a change of ownership; the status of unions can remain unchanged within the same industry. And as a result, employees who have been under the "contract employees" status in the public sector are likely to regain the "worker" status. As "contract employees" some civil servants may move into "worker" status, since they are no longer considered public sector employees. Therefore, they will begin to enjoy the same union freedoms and the right to strike and this can help unions extend their membership. Fourth, if one analyses Turkish legislation on strike activities, it can be realised that some strike restrictions are imposed only if these activities such as land, sea and rail transportation are performed by public agencies. Therefore, after privatization these workers will be entitled to the right to strike, if the system of compulsory arbitration is not imposed on these activities.

Some recent developments on this issue make it even more difficult to write a general conclusion. One thing, however, is becoming more obvious; irrespective of pessimistic or optimistic predictions, it can be argued that uncontrolled workers' action against privatisation is likely to determine future developments. In fact, after the government announced a new austerity programme on 5 April 1994, including extensive privatization and programmes of closure, the responses of unions have been very striking. Most unions have started organising marches and demonstrations against government policies.
(iv) Conclusion.

In this chapter the economic and political changes and institutional changes and constraints and, more importantly, their impact on Turkish unions have been discussed. It can be argued that Turkish unions have faced a great number of challenges, not only because of changes in internal developments in economic and political structures, but also due to international economic pressure and the growth of competition in world markets.

Therefore, Turkish unions have become a problem for the state and employers. However, unions have also been regarded as democratic elements to display to European partners in consideration of the application to the EC. That is why, legal and institutional rules prevented the complete erosion of the union movement in Turkey. This is also because the purpose of the Turkish governments was not only to stabilise its problematic democracy, which is under heavy international pressure, but also to control inflation and the budget deficits through wide public sector agreements with unions.

As regards anti-union legislation, the 1983 legislation presents the government and employers with all the resources and all the necessary excuse for containing trade union movement. On the other hand, the absence of all effective sanctions against those who attack trade union freedoms makes it very dangerous for the workers to exercise the remaining freedoms because of the economic situation in Turkey and the lack of any protection against redundancies and unemployment. What type of trade union freedoms can there be when there is no real protection for the workers, and as long as there is mass unemployment and no unemployment benefits? It is becoming more and more obvious that the full exercise of trade union freedoms can only be achieved by completely changing the legislation, and the 1982 constitution, not only the chapter on
trade union rights but also the more general clauses, and the very spirit of the constitution itself.

After a coalition government was formed by the centre right True Path Party (DYP) and the left-of-centre Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) on 20 October 1991, the minister of labour (25), who is an SHP deputy, proposed amendments including a job security system, unemployment insurance and civil servants' unions. However, the government has made no progress in bringing labour legislation into line with the principles of freedom of association. There is no doubt that the absence of basic freedoms for trade unions and workers reflects badly on a government which claims to have brought Turkey into the ranks of democratic nations and which is currently seeking to join the European Community.

It is worth mentioning that by only concentrating on the government anti-union legislations, TURK-IS is missing the key fact that Turkish trade unions were attacked in several ways, especially by the governments' "Thatcherite" monetarist policies. In fact, in real terms, anti-labour legislation, as it has been seen in other European countries, has been part of anti-union policies of the governments. In short, to achieve the deunionisation of workers, the government and employers, apart from the vast resources provided by the legislation, do not miss any opportunity to undermine Turkish trade unionism, which is now linked to the efforts of privatisation, cultural and ideological offensives and new collective bargaining and employers' practices.

As far as the changing nature of collective bargaining is concerned, it seems very complicated to suggest a general trend in collective bargaining and the new role of unions within this system. It can be argued that due to worsening economic and political conditions, the institutionalisation of conflict through collective bargaining is still valid.
and a national consensus might be urged by the governments and employers. The centralisation trend in collective arrangements in the public sector in the 1980s presents a good example for this development. However, more recent developments through a different form of decentralisation at micro level in the private sector seems a major obstacle for the centralisation trend.

The attempts at privatization in Turkey also resemble some general trends in Europe, where it has been widely discussed with reference to the UK case with its focus on neoliberalism or Thatcherism and the association of an ideological and political campaign against the public sector, mainly concentrated on radical anti-unionism. However, in the Turkish case it would be wrong to talk about an explicit fundamental anti-unionism strategy. Government strategy was, initially, to focus on the question of the "inefficiency", "uncompetitiveness" or "unprofitability" of public sector companies so as to defend privatization as the only way out of the structural crisis of the Turkish economy. The privatization process in recent years can also be regarded as part of the ideological offensive of Turkish capital and government to weaken the trade unions.

In short, the main question is whether the unions can strategically organise resistance against these changes or collaborate in the modification of industrial relations patterns. In this sense, the other critical questions are whether the government seeks "compromise" for a more productive environment or tries to adopt a strategy of "labour exclusion" policies. After responding to these questions, the next questions might be whether trade unions can respond to the pressure for change by mobilising workers' resistance or can they participate to influence the nature of the new strategies?
NOTES:

1) According to Central Bank publications (1982), the foreign debt stood at 13 billion Dollars in 1978.

2) Ian Lagergren, Chief of the International Labour Standards Departments in ILO, went to Turkey to prepare a report for the examination of the complaints of alleged infringement of trade union rights submitted by the World Confederation of Labour, the World Federation of Labour, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and a number of other trade union organisations against the government of Turkey (Report on direct contacts mission to Turkey, Geneva, August 1982).

3) A personal interview with Mustafa Basoglu, the president of the health workers' union and the general secretary of TURK-IS at the time of the interview (29 March 1993).

4) A personal interview with Bulent Kupeli, a research assistant for TURK-IS (1 April 1993).


6) Various reports of the committee on freedom and association and of the committee of experts on the application of conventions and recommendations of the ILO concerning Turkey since 1980.

7) This information was received as a result of a visit to the Ministry of Labour in Ankara. A number of officials were interviewed at the Ministry of Labour and Social Security's research, planning and co-ordination section and the section on trade union affairs.

8) A personal interview with the president of employers' confederation (TISK), Refik Baydur. He said that although no legislative change is necessary, if it
happens, it should be done in consideration of "national conditions" (11 November 1993).

9) A personal interview with Yildirim Koc, the consultant of the president in TURK-IS, and responsible of workers' education in the Construction and Building workers' union (Yol-Is) (30 April 1993).

10) After 20 years important progress between Turkey and the EC, Turkey will join a customs union. The trade barriers are scheduled to be lifted in 1995 which is likely to mark the most important change in Turkey's business environment. Those sectors of industry which are most vulnerable to import competition are under strong pressure.

11) A personal interview with Nilgun Kaner, a research assistant and also responsible for the women's section in the Petroleum, Chemical and Rubber workers' union (Petrol-Is) (1 November 1993).

12) Various collective agreements examples signed in different industries such as textile, paper, cement, ceramic and glass, metal, shipbuilding and construction show that this sort of committee has been recently included in negotiation.


14) A personal interview with Tugrul Kutatkudobilik, the director of industrial relations KOC Holding A.S (22 October 1993).

15) A personal interview with Vefik Evin, the vice president of the Metal Employers' organisation (MESS) (8 September 1993).

16) In 1991 the share of the EC in OECD foreign investment in Turkey accounted for half of total foreign investment in Turkey: U.K., 15,4%; Germany, 8,8%; Netherlands 9%; France 8%; Italy 7%. The major investing countries of the EC with respects to the numbers of firms are Germany (343) firms, the UK (156)
firms and the Netherlands (80) firms. The number of firms of EC origin increased more than twelvefold (from 58 firms to 722 firms) in the 1980s, while the number of non-EC firms increased over fifteen times (from 69 firms to 1,090). The service sector have attracted the most investors, accounting for 67% of all foreign capital companies, followed by manufacturing with 28%. However, where investment is concerned, manufacturing leads with 49.3%, services follow with 43.6%, agriculture at 4.7% and mining at 2.4% a long way behind. The leading sub-sectors within these categories are iron and steel, automotive and chemicals in manufacturing and, in services, tourism, banking, and trade.

17) This was particularly evident during the 1991 miners strike between the president of the General Mine workers' union (Genel Maden-Is), Semsi Denizer and prime minister, Yildirim Akbulut (Karakas 1992).

18) A personal interview with Sukran Ketenci, the most famous journalist in labour relations in Turkey (21 October 1993).

19) For more detailed information about the role of SEEs in the development of Turkish economy see Korkut Boratav and Ergun Turkcan (1993), Turkiye de sanayilesmenin yeni boyutlari ve KIT ler, Iktisat politikasi secenekleri 1, Turk Tarihi Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, Ikinci baski, Istanbul.

20) This information is based on a seminar organised by DISK/BANK-SEN on 9 October 1993. Academics like Prof. Mumtaz Soysal (who is currently appointed as foreign minister), Prof. Izettin Onder, Prof. Yakup Kepenek and Journalist, Sukran Ketenci expressed their opinion on the government's privatization programs.

21) In general there is a lack of union publications on union responses against the privatization programmes. However, among few most useful publications see (Petrol-Is 1989) "Ozellikirmenin Uzerine", Aralik, Istanbul and (Hava-Is 1993) "Kuresellesme ve Ozellestirme" 15 Eylul Istanbul and also see Tek Gida-Is

22) A personal interview with Halil Yedibela, a lawyer in the Petroleum, Chemical and Rubber workers' union (Petrol-Is) (19 October 1993).

23) A personal interview with Attila Aycin, the president of the Airways workers' union, (29 September 1993).

24) A total of 115 companies will be privatized in the next few years (Iktisat 1994) Iktisat Dergisi sayı 348 Nisan. The government has announced that 44 and 71 companies will be sold in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Out of these, the Ciller government has declared urgent privatization of ten large companies, Sumer Holding, Petkim, Petlas, Turban, Testas, Halic Tersanesi, Et-balik, TZDK, DMO, Tekel in 1994 and thirteen other large companies, Yem Sanayi, Erdemir, Tupras, Petrol ofisi, THY, Turban, Havas, Deniz nakliyat, Ditas, Sumerbank, Etibank, TEK and PTT in 1995 (Petrol-Is 1994) Petrol-Is dergisi Nisan.

25) A personal interview with the Minister of Labour, Mehmet Mogultay, during the interview, he stressed the need for changes in labour legislation particularly in the issues like the right to organise for civil servants, job security and unemployment insurance. For him, the major obstacles for legislative changes come from his party's coalition partner (DYP) and other conservative parties in the parliament. Mr. Mogultay's proposed amendments on the legislation have been often criticised both by employers and unions (10 November 1993).
CHAPTER 8

TURKISH TRADE UNIONS' RESPONSES IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF TURK-IS

In comparison with the 1960s and 70s, in the 1980s and 90s the unions have been operating in a more hostile environment since the military intervention of 1980. The changing economic, political and social climate combined with the more restrictive legislative framework and the hostile attitudes of the governments and employers in the past and current decade has undermined the Turkish trade union movement. All these developments have eroded the role of Turkish trade unions in industrial relations due to the decline in their industrial and political influence.

However, these adverse strategic attacks against unions seem to be important in shaping unions' policies and strategies. Therefore, attention here will be paid to the analysis of changes in union objectives, means and struggles against the hostile external environment. Also, in this part it will be argued that in the Turkish case the strategies or policies adopted by the unions have been influenced through the impact of external forces (due to the hostile attitudes of the government and employers) and changing behaviour of union leadership (due to their political orientations, international support and pressures from below). In this context, the responses of Turkish unions to the external environment in the 1980s and 90s have not systematically developed as a consistent, cohesive and integrated set of strategies. It is rather that union leaders at national level, mainly due to the intensified pressure from the rank and file, have adopted policies to meet the challenges of the critical periods and to carry out day-to-day relations with management. As this study attempts to demonstrate, the decisions of the
national leadership of Turkish unions have been subject to a restricted range of choices, mainly affected through both the impact of external forces and their own unions and workers' behaviour. Therefore, the options available for Turkish unions can differ from those of unions in other countries. That is why unions' policies in Turkey have been widely shaped as a result of inter-action between the external environment and unions own internal rationality.

(i) **The 1980 Military Intervention Period.**

It can be argued that in the 1960s and 70s the ruling class sought the incorporation of trade unions in order to implement this economic and political policies. However, during the period of military government between 1980 and 1983, trade unions were openly attacked by declaring them the cause of economic and political crises. Until the general elections on 6 November 1983 the three years of military intervention gave rise to a substantial shift in the balance of class forces against the Turkish working class.

During this period the working class lost its organisations and remained passive because of the repression and political restrictions imposed by the military government. Although some resistance, including the slowdowns and lunch boycotts, were reported at the large factories, Arcelik, Cevizli Tekel, Phillips, Nasas and Profilo in Istanbul in mid-1982, in general the Turkish working class and their organisations had to stay silent (1).

In a interview, a shop steward at the factory of Arcelik said that "during the military dictatorship, things were changed... it was difficult for us to direct industrial action... we and workers were under close inspection...imagine employers also employed some ex-military officials as managers..."(2).
It is obvious that the military made it extremely difficult for workers and trade unions to raise their grievances against management at the workplace. This meant that at both national and workplace level the labour movement was under repression and the resistance of workers was limited. In this context, the anti-labour constitution and labour legislation were prepared to limit trade union power, particularly in order to implement the stabilisation policies prepared by International Monetary Fund (IMF). This can be clearly seen from the continuation of the economic policy pursued by the civilian government after the coup. Therefore, in the 1980s the ruling class has not needed cooperation with unions; it has chosen the way in which trade unions have been undermined by several legal restrictions and monetarist economic policies. It is now necessary to raise the questions of the reaction of TURK-IS against the military government of 1980 and the nature of the strategic option TURK-IS applied to counteract these economic, political and social developments.

When the military came to power, the president of TURK-IS at the time, Ibrahim Denizcier, sent a message to the leader of the coup, Kenan Evren stating that

"TURK-IS believes that the Turkish military forces intervened in the country for the peace and safety of Turkish people...the Turkish labour movement welcomes your statement about changes in the constitution returning democracy again and protecting the rights of workers..." (TURK-IS 1980:1).

Thus, it is quite clear that TURK-IS openly gave its support to the 1980 military intervention. This support was more obvious as the general secretary of the confederation, Sadik Side, took office as minister of social security in the military government. The first reaction to this situation was external. In November 1981, the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) suspended TURK-IS membership. On the other hand, the member unions in general did not seem to be uneasy that the general secretary was holding two positions both in the confederation and in the military government.

Orhan Balta, the president of TEKGIDA-IS and one of the ex-general secretaries of the confederation, explained the silence of members:

"TURK-IS and its members hoped that once democracy was re-established, various restrictions on trade unions would be lifted... in this process we thought that our general secretary could play an important role..." (3).

However, on September 27, 1980 the military government declared that "unions, mainly, members of TURK-IS are to continue their activities in compliance with democratic principles. Yet, those who exploit the workers, who wish to direct the workers their own ways and misuse trade union rights, will not be given any chance" (Cumhuriyet:7, 27 September 1980).

Shortly after this statement, TURK-IS warned its affiliates to direct their organisational activities in accordance with the military government's declaration. In fact, in those days any union meetings had not only to be approved but also closely supervised by the government's officials (4). Furthermore, the degree of freedom TURK-IS's members facing varied in different parts of the country. For example, while the congress of unions were banned for more than a year in Istanbul, the key industry centre, in Ankara only three union congresses were allowed (Financial Times 1981).
The restrictive policies of the military government on trade unions continued as the time passed. In February 1982, the government further forbade unions and all professional organisations from setting up any link with their international affiliates unless they received prior permission from the martial law commanders (TURK-IS 1983). As a result of these developments, the leadership of TURK-IS seemed to lose hope in what could be obtained from the military government. The president of TURK-IS at the time, Ibrahim Denizcier, made several visits to the prime minister, Bulent Ulusu, to stress workers' and unions' concern over restrictions placed on the rights of trade unions. Particularly when the first draft of new labour legislation was published, most members of the confederation began to raise their voice. Eventually, the Presidents' Council (an informal organ composed of the presidents of all the affiliated national unions) decided to take up an action plan including organising a number of summit meetings with government and collaboration with International Democratic Organisations particularly, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (TURK-IS 1983). TURK-IS began to make several complaints against the government concerning allegations of violations of trade union rights in Turkey to the ILO and European trade union organisations against the government (5).

Interviews with the top leaders of TURK-IS unions, and some leaders of local unions and a number of workers' representatives who also experienced the military years in Turkey, demonstrated that as the military government came to power on 12 September 1980, most of the union leaders at national and local levels welcomed this intervention on the grounds that like the 1971 military intervention the coup would destroy the rival unions and TURK-IS would be only labour confederation in the country. However, this dream did not become true when the 1982 constitution was declared. The constitution included anti-democratic principles as far as the rights of trade unions were concerned. It was evident in the speech of the ex president of TURK-IS, Sevket Yilmaz (who
became president in the 12th general congress 24-28 May 1982, after the military intervention); "I should admit that I could not guess how much democracy and the freedom of and rights of workers would be demolished" (TURK-IS, on ucuncu genel kurul tutanagi:7).

During the 13th general of congress TURK-IS on 21-25 December 1983, some representatives of member unions, such as Behzat Akdogan from Yol-Is and Ali Ekber Guvenc from Basin-Is, condemned the 1982 constitution and the new labour legislation (TURK-IS 1983). It is a fact that particularly after this congress, TURK-IS's leadership concentrated on putting pressure on the government to provide some changes in the labour legislation. But, without any serious actions at the workplace, these attempts had to fail. On the other hand, the leaders of TURK-IS and of its member unions also did not tend to produce or organise any protest against the attitudes of the government.

(ii) Changing Strategies in TURK-IS Unions Traditional Stand.

After three years of military government, the option available for TURK-IS was the traditional one which has always encouraged it reliance on good relations with government. In this context, the leadership of TURK-IS tried to have good relations with the new civilian government, particularly by lobbying government ministers. In other words, while a new industrial relations system was being established in Turkey in 1983, there was no change witnessed in the policies and strategies of trade unions and of TURK-IS. The confederation carried on the same policies. Particularly, the "above-party" policy of the confederation remained unchanged. This is also to say that it kept its traditional policy of "dialogue" with government.
On the other hand, the general economic and political policies of the government against labour organisations were not the same. Unlike the labour policies of the governments in the 1960s and 70s, in the 1980s the attitude of government in relations with unions was no longer a tolerant one. This was mainly due to the significant shift in the economic and political approaches of the government. The reluctance of the government to respond to crucial calls by TURK-IS for a "dialogue" was particularly evident during the conservative Ozal government. At the same time, there were significant discontents within the working class, especially concerning the issues of wages and working conditions.

Broadly speaking, the government's legislation particularly in the 1980s, resulted in a more hostile environment and the loss of influence for unionism. Legislation dispensed with the ways in which unions could act more like social partners. They were no longer consulted by government, nor were their agreements or co-operation on economic and political policies sought. Within TURK-IS there was a more general confusion and uncertainty about how to respond to the problems of a radical challenge from above by the government combined with the apparent ambivalence of the membership below. Individual unions within TURK-IS agreed with the need for "unity" to oppose the government's policies.

There was, however, no common agreement about how to fight it, why to resist it or the material means to commit unions to a common strategy to oppose it. This was mainly due to different political outlooks of union leadership and the different interest of unions organising different types of workers. The problem for TURK-IS was how to challenge the external pressure and on what basis it could be challenged. Like in Germany, in Turkey the policies and strategies of trade unions can be understood by "etatism", a willingness to rely on the state for the solution of general problems in industrial
relations. In this respect, traditionally Turkish unions have usually been willing to maintain co-operative and orderly relations with governments.

However, particularly in the mid-1980s TURK-IS began to re-examine its stance after several talks with government about the legislation ended up without any concession. In other words, TURK-IS came to the view that it should reconsider its previous dependence on government co-operation, and seek instead to produce new tactics against the government's policies. In fact, the government's anti-union practices further made it clear that the government strategies would offer few concessions, even to right-wing and moderate unionists in TURK-IS, which would allow them to argue that establishing good relations with government worked.

Eventually, union leaders felt they had to do something about it. Therefore, small ineffective meetings organised by TURK-IS in various part of the country, Istanbul, Izmir and Bursa took place (TURK-IS 1985). It can be argued that TURK-IS pursued a cautious strategy in relation to the government to carry out union activities within the bound of "legality". During the period between 1984-1988, TURK-IS and its member unions employed more moderate action strategies against the hostile environment which were as follows: (a) carrying out various lobbying activities against anti-labour legislation by demanding changes in the 1983 legislation; (b) seeking collaboration with international bodies such as ILO, ETUC and ICFTU; and (c) making efforts to organise a series of summit meetings with the government as well as the ministers. However, as part of TURK-IS's "soft" attitude against government there was no attempt to encourage the unions and workers to take industrial action. In this climate, three summit meetings in 1984 and 1985 were held between the government and TURK-IS officials (TURK-IS 1993).
The attempts at "dialogue" with the government did not produce any significant result for unions. While the reluctance of the government to enter into a dialogue with TURK-IS continued, this policy resulted in the largely acceptable assumption, particularly among social democratic factions of the confederation, that TURK-IS had pursued the line of least resistance against the anti-union policies of the government. Therefore, during the 14th general congress of the confederation, inter-union opposition against the leadership of TURK-IS was witnessed. The social democrat faction accused the executive committee of the confederation of following the traditional policies which were no longer successful. The opposition circles including Petrol-Is, Yol-Is, Deri-Is, Hava-Is and Maden-Is urged more militant strategies such as co-ordination in public sector collective bargaining arrangements, resorting to the strikes-weapon when it is necessary and creating a grass-roots movement at the workplace. Moreover, the delegates of 17 regions belonging to different unions asked for more radical responses to the general attitudes of the government.

However, the opposition movement against TURK-IS administration failed at the end of the congress. Sevket Yilmaz backed by the right-wing and moderate faction of the confederation was reelected (TURK-IS 1986). Although TURK-IS organised the six open-air meetings in 1986 to protest against the government policies, there were no serious changes observed in TURK-IS strategies until 1987. The government's strict stabilisation policies, particularly on wage issues, combined with its labour exclusion policies at national level forced TURK-IS, despite its traditional policy of "above-politics", to oppose the Motherland Party (ANAP) during the 1987 general election. Before the election the president of TURK-IS, Sevket Yilmaz said that "Workers would not vote for the party which destroyed all workers' rights" (Cumhuriyet, 8 August 1986). This was the first sign of a change in the confederation's stand with regard to politics.
Therefore, it might be suggested that the confederation and its member unions began to use their "political power" as an important weapon. This policy was strengthened by also extending the confederation's international relations, because Turkish unions became aware of the new reality that since Turkey had made an application for full membership to the EC, the Turkish government had become vulnerable on issues like democracy and human rights. Therefore, by establishing new communication channels with international bodies the confederation and individual unions aimed at putting "international political pressure" on Turkish governments. This strategy worked for unions and forced the government to give promises for necessary changes in the labour legislation in order to bring workers and union rights to the level of International standards, mainly, those of the ILO. Therefore, the key policy after mid-1980 seemed to abandon the soft attitudes and adopt new tactics based on the use of "political pressure" at both national and international platforms.

In this period, TURK-IS made several complaints concerning allegations of violations of trade union rights in Turkey to the ILO and European trade union organisation against the government (TURK-IS 1989). The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) also urged the European Institutions and governments to exert some pressure on the Turkish government in order to have trade unionists released from prison, establish without delay a democratic system in Turkey and restore normal trade union rights.

The Turkish government was also condemned by the ILO many times. According to various ILO reports, the committee on Freedom of association examined the substance of similar complaints 17 times between 1981 and 1990. As a result of national as well as international pressure, in 1986 the government amended some provisions of the 1983 legislation with the stated aim of bringing them into line with the principles of freedom of association. However, the amendments in the legislation were regarded as cosmetic.
changes without any significant impact on real practices. On the other hand, workers' discontent began to grow as a result of the austerity policy pursued by the government. The government continued to turn a deaf ear to all trade union protest and did not seem to be prepared to remove soon the restrictive labour provisions from Turkey's 1982 Constitution and amend labour legislation to bring them into line with ILO standards.

The strategy which had been followed by the TURK-IS and its members against the government tended to undergo a crucial transformation due to the spontaneous resurgence of the rank and file movement as a reaction to the rapid decline in the purchasing power of the workers salaries. The spontaneous industrial actions and protests took place at the workplace level without union control. In some cases, there were sit-ins at the companies to protest against the managers as well as union officials (Petrol-Is 1993). An increase in the discontents of workers urged unions to reconsider their position in relation to government and employers policies. This development also caused the leadership of TURK-IS to change the confederation's stand against the government. This is evident in a statement of the president of TURK-IS, Sevket Yilmaz that

"for about two years we have pursued the policy of "dialogue", that is why we have been accused of being ineffective...the government miscalculate our silence, while we are asking for "dialogue", they thought that we do not have power anymore due to the legal restrictions...in 35 years of TURK-IS's history we did not go to the streets, now we are forced to go out and fight for our democratic rights..." (TURK-IS 1987:1).

In this sense, the leaders of TURK-IS were under heavy rank and file pressure. Basically, they faced two crucial problems. First, there were still disagreements among different functions about the way in which TURK-IS should act. The question was that
TURK-IS was traditionally based on "economic" or "bread-and-butter issues usually in line with "Business type of unionism" within the legal framework. Therefore, right-wing unions within the confederation such as Dokgemi-Is, Teksif and Tekgida-Is warned TURK-IS leadership against slipping into a dangerous area between "legality" and "illegality", and urged them on more moderate policies. On the other hand, the social democratic faction went further in its claim that "the general strike" may be needed in response to the anti-union policies of the government and to prevent the erosion of the confidence of workers and to maintain the cohesion and unity of the union intact (6).

In fact, there was a growing anger among other interest groups such as civil servants, some professional organisations (Doctors, Architects and Academics), human rights organisations, student unions, farmers, small shopkeepers and, more importantly, opposition parties against the economic and social policies of the government. This meant that conditions outside the labour movement were also favourable. Although there was a widely-shared view about the need for a change in the strategies of the confederation among all factions, the significant question was still whether the wage-struggle should be combined with an anti-government political struggle. However, further developments between the government and TURK-IS associated with a growing pressure from "below" forced the confederation to change its traditional stand in favour of more radical policies. On the other hand, the question of "legality" in the face of "illegal actions" (most unions were cautious about it) was secured by a strategic manoeuvre by creating a new slogan: "We are fighting for Western pluralist democracy with full rights for the unions" (Tercuman, 22 May 1987).

This vital slogan was often used by union leaders, particularly when they were threatened by government officials for breaking the legal procedures by being actively involved in "politics". It was on the basis of this particular question that the year proved
to be a turning point for Turkish unions. The wage struggle of unions combined with the new line of political activity under the new title of "demand for democracy" continued after 1987. These developments not only demonstrated considerable changes in the traditional corporatist image of TURK-IS but also proved its political strength while taking independent political action in relation with the ruling class. This was more evident when TURK-IS's unions stood up against the conservative party during the referendum for the political freedom of the pre-1980 political leaders in 1988 and local elections in 1989.

In short, the new emphasis on "democracy" can be regarded as a move from "pure business unionism" or "bread and butter unionism" towards more "political unionism". In other words, there were considerable changes in the unions' commitment to business unionism over the period. It might be argued that there were some recent significant changes in the style of bargaining. In terms of the time and process of collective bargaining, a successful co-ordination for collective bargaining arrangements in the public sector was achieved under TURK-IS's supervision. Collective bargaining for 600,000 public sector workers was conducted between TURK-IS leadership and the ministers and prime ministers in the last decade (TURK-IS 1989). This development towards the "centralisation" of the collective bargaining process might allow us to talk about "political economism" in the public sector. In this context, it is possible to suggest that while the unions still acted as Business unions or as a Turkish type of "American unionism", in as much as they proceeded to defend and improve their members' economic interests through collective bargaining they also searched for "social partnership" and "co-operation" with the government, at least in the public sector. There have been clear signs in unions demands for the new agenda, particularly, for more non-pay issues such as demands for more employee involvement, health and safety committees etc. (Petrol-Is 1993).
Generally the bargaining agenda has not been widened in practice. On the other hand, some unions, such as Laspetkim-Is, Kristal-Is and Metal-Is, which usually deal with the multinational companies, have recently agreed with their employers to improve industrial efficiency and to implement the new technologies (7). This also reflects the growing emphasis on "the social partnership" at workplace level. Therefore, the unions' agenda seem to have varied union to union, mostly, in terms of the sectors (public or private), industries and the nature of companies (small, large or multinational).

In general it is unsafe to argue that TURK-IS and its members underwent an equally far-reaching shift in their political stance. In fact, their political composition was relatively stable in the last decade, although the social democratic factions succeeded in gaining more seats in the executive committees of most unions. In the last general congress of TURK-IS for the first time in the confederation's history, unions with different political affiliations came together and changed the long-standing executive committee. As a result the group called themselves "reformist" was elected on 13-12-1992 (TURK-IS 1993).

This can be regarded as an important move towards a "common agreement" or "solidarity" among unions for the emergence of the most moderate or radical solutions to the anti-labour policies of the governments and employers have appeared as the product of the existing leadership's realisation that "something has to be done" if they want to secure their unions economic and political influence in the future.

According to some academics like Toker Dereli, Nusret Ekin and Gulten Kutal in Turkey (8), this changes in the attitudes of the confederation was most probably due to the successful inter-group opposition from the social democratic faction within TURK-IS. However, in addition to this view, one subsidiary reason can also be given for the
explanation of changes in unions' attitudes, that there has been substantial development in the internal democracy within the individual unions in the 1980s. According to the general consultant for the president of TURK-IS and education official for Yol-Is, Yildirim Koc, there have been 48 percent changes in the leadership of branches on local level, 49 percent changes in the leadership of unions on national level and 32 percent changes in the president of national unions in the 1980s. Regarding the last point, it also shows that 32 percent of the council of the presidents within TURK-IS has changed in the same year. In most cases during the elections the social democrat candidates were able to come to power in unions' executive committees. For example, in the two largest unions, Harb-Is and Deniz-Is, all executive committees were changed in favour of social democrats. The same development was observed during the elections of local branch officials and of delegates (9).

While workers and individual unions have intensified the conflict against the government, TURK-IS has not only publicly supported them but also made efforts to plan and co-ordinate the activities. In connection with this, another major development within the confederation has been a move from "decentralisation" to "centralisation" particularly in decision-making processes. In other words, with regard to union government, the decision-making process, particularly in general and collective bargaining policies, has taken place at national level. A shift towards much more formalised and centrally structured systems of decision-making was partly due to the 1983 legislation, because the 1983 Act introduced detailed and formal regulations concerning both the calling and authorising of collective bargaining arrangements and industrial action.
However, the impact of legislation varied union to union and union responses were sometimes dissimilar in a manner consistent with their democratic and political orientation and rationalities. This can be clearly seen from the major strikes as well as collective bargaining arrangements. For example, in some cases, particularly during the strikes, some unions gave greater authority and more resources at the regional level of organisation. This was evident in the 1988 strike in the leather industry in Kazlicesme and the 1991 strike in mining in Zonguldak (10). It is worthwhile mentioning that in dealing with the restrictive legislation itself unions tried, as far as was possible to act within "the legal framework".

Although TURK-IS's unions displayed a "uniformity" in their response to external pressure, it does not mean that they always shared the same opinion about the major issues. For example, unions' statements and policies did not demonstrate one single trend in their reaction to the privatisation process. Right-wing unions within TURK-IS, like Turk-Metal, Teksif, Dok Gemi-Is, saw the privatization programmes as a form of economic rationality, whereas social democrats and moderate factions of TURK-IS, such as Hava-Is, Deri-Is, Petrol-Is, Basisen, Turk Harb-Is, Turkiye Belediye-Is, regard this move as a politically motivated phenomenon. Yol-Is (1988) stated that the SEEs would be sold off in favour of domestic and foreign capitals. Harb-Is was against privatization on the ground that this is a strategic choice of government to undermine wages and social rights. Belediye-Is argued that the SEEs should not be privatised but reformed or rehabilitated. Tek Gida-Is also suggested that workers can buy the shares of the SEEs through "employee stock ownership plans". In contrast, Petrol-Is's reaction is one of the strongest: while the union calls for a "general strike" against the privatisation process, its leader, Munir Ceylan stated that "privatization is a democracy problem in Turkey because, if a few monopolist capitalists control economic activities, they would also control the social and democratic developments" (Petrol-Is 1989:13).
Finally, TURK-IS's reaction against privatization is rather puzzling. While the general consultant of TURK-IS's president, Yildirim Koc, argues that "not only unions but also the welfare state is the target" (Aydinlik, 27 Temmuz 1993), the council of TURK-IS presidents declares that "we should not hurry to fall in a position to indicate whether we are completely against privatization or not" (Cumhuriyet, 9 Kasim 1993). In the 15th general congress of TURK-IS, the executive committee stated that they would accept privatization, if workers were not affected (TURK-IS 1989, TURK-IS 1994).

It seemed that some members of TURK-IS were concerned about the need for unions to focus their attempts on influencing the form of privatization, rather than, opposing it. While TURK-IS does not seem to have made any strategic decision against the process, among member unions, however, the unity was provided in consideration of the possibility of lay-offs and losing members following privatization.

It should also be mentioned that the methods of choosing industrial action were subject to the democratic processes and political considerations of the particular unions and their leaders involved. Some of TURK-IS leaders have been interrogated by the general prosecutor and subjected to occasional harassment for these activities.

In the context of Turkey, the determinants of union tactics and policies have had as much to do with ideological and political orientations of the individual unions. In addition, in terms of the sectors (public or private), the unions can pose different responses. For example, regardless of their political motives, most Turkish unions in the public sector have adopted more militant policies against the government's restructuring and privatisation programme. In short, the question is: how can ideological and political motives influence unions' policies and tactics and how can sectoral and enterprise realities also condition the responses of different unions? It should be mentioned that
TURK-IS's ideologies and policies have been shaped in a situation of trade union pluralism. In other words, different industrial unions with the ideological differences belong to the same central.

The Turkish case shows that while unions maintain their political and ideological positions, they can also pose practical positions and responses to the external pressures. Political differences can be minimised within the central organisation sphere of action. Yet, there can still be tendencies of continuity/discontinuity and convergence/divergence in policies and tactics in response to the government and employers' strategies. In this context, we can briefly focus on the situation of four members of TURK-IS, Petrol-Is, Genel Maden-Is, Turk Metal-Is and Teg Gida-Is (although all of which operate both in the public and private sectors, their political motives are distinguished in terms of conservative and social democrat discourses).

a) The Alcoholic Beverages, Tobacco, and Food Processing Industries Workers' Union (TEK GIDA-IS).

Tek Gida-Is is one of the significant conservative unions within TURK-IS in particular in terms of size and superior financial resources. The union's leadership has traditionally relied on the governments and employers' sponsorship of the union development. Union leaders have focused on establishing a more unitary and vertical apparatus around the state economic enterprises. The vast majority of its member were employed in the public sector. In other words, the union's organising efforts until very recently largely included the public sector rather than the private sector. In fact, union's leadership has been dominated by few leaders in the last thirty years, who have been willing to moderate demands and to cooperate in policy implementation in the public sector in exchange for
grants of representational exclusiveness and formal consultation. Tek Gida-Is is also of importance in that until the 1980s the union's leadership influenced TURK-IS' general congress and leadership selection. Therefore, it also had a significant impact on the general policies of the confederation. In other words, the conservative and collaborative policies of Tek Gida-Is played a main role in delaying and containing TURK-IS' s radicalisation until recently.

The state has become less interested in investing in the tobacco and food-processing industries in the 1980s. Multi national companies have begun to operate. Therefore, Tek Gida-Is had to revise its position and role with regard to labour relations in the state economic enterprises and the government's restructuring program. The key dilemma for the Tekgida-Is, as for the other public sector unions, was: with the restructuring of the public sector (with liberalisation and privatisation programmes), how to respond and organise the pursuit of centrally planned and organised campaigns against the government "commercialisation" efforts in the public sector. Although the union's stance in relation to political rationalities has remained the same, its policies and influence within TURK-IS appears to have changed. The key policies have been pursued which focus on the maintenance of organisational stability through expanding membership recruitment towards private sector and new education programmes for workers (11).

In addition to these developments, Tek Gida-Is continued to defend and improve their members' sectional interests, particularly, pay and conditions, through collective bargaining; however, there have been some recent notable changes in the bargaining agenda. In terms of the bargaining agenda, collective bargaining has been widened to cover more non-pay issues including: job security, working hours, workers participation in management and some general workplace committees (worker's health and industrial
safety committees, committees for examining cases of job description changes, committees for organising workers' paid leave of absences, etc.) (12).

In the 1980s and 90s the political composition of Tek Gida-Is has remained remarkably stable, it has continued to represent the right of TURK-IS. Although the union's ideological stance did not change, its general approach to industrial relations shifted in favour of more radical policies. The challenge for the union has been not only to improve the current conditions of existing members within its union but also to work to extend the struggle to those currently affected by the crises of the 1980s. Therefore, for the first time in TURK-IS' history Tekgida-Is' leaders did not try to exercise their influence and status to affect the leadership selection during the last congress of TURK-IS, which would have allowed them to exclude social democrat rivals from top positions in the country's leading confederation.

b) General Mine Workers' Union (GENEL MADEN-IS).

The closing down of some mining industries has emerged as one of the major policies of the government in the general liberalisation of the framework of economic regulation in the public sector. The miners' unions have historically had a strong political and ideological attachment to the state enterprise sector. The nucleus of the mine workers' union was the Turkish miners' federation, which was also known as a strong conservative union. The union also had a reputation for union bossism, corruption and wildcat strikes. Union officials used to seek for representational exclusiveness through forming collaborative relations with the state managers.
The union's headquarters is located in the biggest coal fields in Zonguldak. The key problem for the union has always been the tension between skilled ground workers and unskilled underground workers. Compared with underground workers, skilled workers had competitive advantage in pay and employment conditions in the 1960s and 70s. While underground workers recruited seasonally from the villages were suffering one of the highest rates of work-related accidents and fatalities in the world, they seemed to get a little benefit from the collective bargaining arrangements. These workers were kept isolated from the union's activities because of the leadership's common practice of appointing union representatives (shop stewards) among skilled workers instead of allowing their elections. Therefore, wildcat strikes witnessed in the 1960s and early 70s were caused by underground workers' discontent with both the state managers and union officials.

However, in the hostile economic and political environment of the 1980s, combined with the government's factory closure down and privatisation programmes, the policy choices for the mine worker's union (Genel Maden-Is) seem to have posed a more direct challenge to government policies and strategies rather than accommodating them. Thus, the preoccupation displayed by Genel Maden-Is was the maintenance of organisational stability. It is significant to mention that Genel Maden-Is is one of the first unions which changed its political and democratic rationality through improving its internal democracy. The conservative outlook of the union was changed due to social democrat unionists' successes during the union's congress in the same period.

The government's hostile attitude towards miners has marked a new orientation and role for the trade unions. As a result, Genel Maden-Is has defended the nationalised enterprises as significant resources for unions. It has considered unions positions in general in the state enterprise sector as strategic to their general well-being. The leaders
of Genel Maden-Is have questioned the character, practice and objectives of their organisations as policy options available during the 1960s and 70s have become inoperable during the 1980s and 90s. Genel Maden-Is has, therefore, addressed the need to adjust to new perspectives. In this regard, the national centre of the union and its branches have agreed on the key issues, including an affirmation of a democratic political agenda of individual and collective rights for workers and centrally controlled campaigns around political issues.

Centrally determined policies, particularly, on the issues of closure of the mining industries and privatisation of SEE's have been effective. This was evident during the famous 1991 miners' strike and after. This was basically achieved through establishing successful communication channels between local branches and the union's centre and solidaristic projects between skilled workers and underground workers. It is also convenient to talk about the decentralisation of decision-making processes, particularly during the major industrial actions in the same period (13).

By bringing the key political issues on the agenda the successful leadership of Genel Maden-Is has become a good example for the other unions in the sense that they have set up a crucial link between the union and a whole community. They have also brought the lessons of the miners' struggle to the attention of workers in other sectors and industries. Therefore, during the "spring mobilisation" in late 1980, their struggle rapidly broadened, with other workers joining it. In short, the mine worker's union has responded to the pressure for change with more resistance, since the government has offered to the workers nothing in exchange for the economic and political "sacrifices". Genel Maden-Is has recently played a significant role in the reshaping the policies of TURK-IS. Its successful leader, Semsi Denizer, was elected as the general secretary of
TURK-IS at the last congress of the confederation. His influence on the radicalisation of TURK-IS is said to be important.

c) Metal Industry and Allied Workers' Union (TURK-METAL).

Turk Metal is one of the strongest conservative union within TURK-IS. Unlike the other conservative unions, it has undertaken a major expansion beyond the state economic enterprises. Turk Metal's executive committee has insisted on maintaining strict control over the local branches. This is probably because they want to preserve the hegemony of conservative unionists. The union's leaders consider their centralised organisation and bargaining practices as a ideal model of the Turkish unions. These leaders have been ideologically very close to the governments' national development project and they have been the most willing to compromise with the governments and employers.

Turk Metal has succeeded in establishing a representative cartel in its industry. The main reasons for this can be given: firstly, union leaders have relied on assistance from public and private sector managers to secure their bargaining status. Second, centrally determined wage policies for the collective arrangements have produced relatively high wages and steady increase, particularly for automotive and manufacturing industries workers. These privileged workers group have helped to maintain low labour costs and conflict free relations in these industries. And, finally, they have also contributed to promote the development of private industry.

On the other hand, Turk Metal has attempted to influence the ideological and political development of smaller unions like Saglik-Is, Seker-Is and Tez-Is by providing financial assistance and emergency strike funds. By doing this, the union's main concern has been
to strength their position and influence within TURK-IS in order to affect the confederation's general policies. They have also wanted to secure the right-wing positions in the confederation's executive committee.

The changes due to the pressure of international competition and an increase in the number of multinational firms in the metal and manufacturing industries in the 1980s let Turk Metal revise its traditional policy towards labour-management relations. Particularly, the attempt of foreign firms and some large private companies to establish "union free employee relations" has forced the union to reconsider its policy and role in industrial relations. However, the union's response to the pressure for change seems to have been to adopt more moderate tactics. The union leaders in most of the union's publications have begun to use the terms like "modernisation" or "rationalisation" of their policies (Turk Metal 1993).

The union's leaders believed that managers in the private sector are searching for "labour consensus" as a reaction to a productivity drive. In other words, workplace developments introduced by management have been regarded by them as an attempt to improve the productivity and competitiveness of the sector rather than to bypass union organisation. Therefore, such policies, the adaptation of team working, quality circles and the extensive use of direct management-employee committees are welcomed by the leadership of Turk Metal. The new tactics and strategies of the union seem to have been responses pragmatically to management initiatives and they make accommodations in order to protect established representative cartel of the union in the metal and manufacturing industries. In short, unlike the other unions within the confederation, Turk Metal has adopted business-oriented policies with regards to the external pressure. This new direction has also allowed the union to introduce new individual services. According to the union officials in Turk Metal, the union has extended its large
professional and research staff in the 1980s. It has worked closely with European and American advisers to strengthen the union's special service bureaus of organisation, training and public information. There has been a great deal of increase in the workers' education activities. The union has also organised several training trips for the workers' representatives to the European countries. It has recently open various private hospital and resting houses for both the current and retired members (14).

As a matter of fact, the growing emphasis on the extend of individual services and working with employers to improve industrial efficiency through "company level compromises" have become the key policies of the unions. In this context, Turk Metal's collective bargaining strategies have also been altered. The union has traditionally pursued centrally determined bargaining policy. However, more recently, the union has moved to place a greater authority and more resources at the regional level of organisation in the wage and non-pay issues. It is interesting to note that during the workers' mobilisation in the late 1980s Turk Metal has also supported the other unions' politically motivated policies. The union's central committee gradually has agreed on various compromises at micro level involving wage stability for greater job security and fringe benefits, however, it has also supported workers' solidarity within TURK-IS as pressures to strength its position within the confederation, which was weakened in the last decade. In short, while TURK-IS's member unions have been searching for new identities and solutions to the internal and external crises, Turk Metal has felt to adopt more pragmatical and tactical approach to the undergoing changes both within the confederation and outside of the confederation.
d) *Petroleum, Chemical and Rubber Workers' Union (PETROL-IS)*.

Petrol-Is is the most powerful social democratic faction of TURK-IS, which organised some major work branches in petroleum, chemical and rubber industries in both public and private sectors. In the 1960s and 70s Petrol-Is seemed to represent an intermediate ideological position between their conservative and socialist rivals. They mainly pursued some moderate social reforms. In fact, in these years Petrol-Is also engaged in long struggles with the employers in the private sector. On the other hand, the union encouraged more moderate tactics to influence grievance procedures and to lift constraints on collective bargaining in the public sector, in particular, when the Republican People's Party (RPP) was in power.

The military government in 1980 closed DISK. So, some of ex-DISK members joined Petrol-Is. This, later, played a significant role for the radicalisation of Petrol-Is, particularly within TURK-IS. After 1980 the local branches of Petrol-Is have struggled to organise workers in various workplaces especially in the petroleum and rubber industries. The unionisation effort of the union has confronted particularly strong and persistent challenges from the state managers and employers. The main question for Petrol-Is to redefine its policies was: what do the government and employers offer to the workers in exchange for the "sacrifices" demanded by flexibilisation, rationalisation and privatisation? The respond of Petrol-Is to the external pressure was to pose a more direct challenge to the government and employers' policies and strategies.

Petrol-Is has been one of the first unions within TURK-IS which has initiated a democratic political agenda as a major policy of the confederation in the late 1980s. It should be mentioned that Petrol-Is has attempted to generate a new "consensus" among the other social democrat unions, because although the social democrat faction of
TURK-IS are distinguished from the conservative faction by their insistence on political unionism, there has been a significant disagreement among the social democrat unions concerning the appropriate objectives of political action and its importance relative to collective bargaining. Petrol-Is has pursued the policies as a basis for unity. This has given opportunities for solidaristic trade union activity. This was especially evident during the major strikes in the late 1980s. The union has also responded to the pressure for workplace developments such as human resource management policies with more resistance.

Petrol-Is has also claimed more militant strategies for TURK-IS. Basically, the union has long advocated an alternative strategy of developing political means to win the struggle against the hostile attitudes of the government and employers. Rule books and the direction of union publication and union education programmes have been modified on the basis of new agendas such as the government's taxation policies, minimum wages, females in production and their problems and workers health and safety and environmental problems. Petrol-Is has attempted to develop its internal and external relations through a greater use of outside consultants and advisers and establishing clear lines of communication with particularly their European colleagues. More recently, the union has also tried to bring some new negotiating issues to the bargaining table, which include vocational training, reskilling, participation and autonomy at work (Petrol-Is 1993).

The union has recently faced the problem of a decline in its membership, in particular in the public sector. The union leaders have reacted to these challenges with a series of tactics which combined reunionisation efforts and political mobilisation of members. It is a fact that the union's leaders have been successful in constructing a strong organisational network between other members in other branches and other unions. In
short, the main strategy of Petrol-Is in the 1980s and 90s seem to have preferred to exercise political actions to remove persistent legal hindrances to unionisation, collective bargaining and lay-offs in the public sector and to direct broader terms of class wide mass mobilisation as means to develop reactive policies against the hostile attitude of the ruling class towards labour. In this respect, one of the key effort of Petrol-Is was to radicalise TURK-IS to enforce new solidaristic projects for all Turkish working class (15).

(iii) The Major Strikes, the Mobilisation of Workers and TURK-IS.

The Turkish industrial relations system has posed a number of problems which have culminated in a high propensity to strike in recent years. The recent increase in strike activity is noteworthy even when compared to the late 1970s which were known as strike-prone years. As can be seen from Table 4 below, the work days lost due to strikes were 2,911,407 in 1989 with 39,435 participating workers, in contrast to 1,147,721 work days lost in 1979 with 21,011 strikers. The average length of time a worker was on strike rose sharply; it was 74 days in 1989 as opposed to 55 days in 1979. This is an extremely high ratio by international standards and if we look at the years 1990 and 1991, it can be said that the trend reached the peak level (Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1993).
Table 4: Strikes 1963-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Strikes</th>
<th>Strikers</th>
<th>Lost work days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,514</td>
<td>19,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>6,640</td>
<td>238,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6,593</td>
<td>336,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11,414</td>
<td>430,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>9,499</td>
<td>350,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5,289</td>
<td>174,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>12,601</td>
<td>235,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>21,156</td>
<td>220,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10,916</td>
<td>476,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14,879</td>
<td>659,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12,286</td>
<td>671,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>25,546</td>
<td>1,109,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>13,708</td>
<td>668,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>7,240</td>
<td>325,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>15,682</td>
<td>1,397,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>9,748</td>
<td>426,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>21,011</td>
<td>1,1247,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>84,832</td>
<td>1,303,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>4,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>194,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7,926</td>
<td>234,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>29,734</td>
<td>1,961,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>30,057</td>
<td>1,892,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>39,434</td>
<td>2,911,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>166,306</td>
<td>3,466,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>164,968</td>
<td>3,809,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>62,189</td>
<td>1,153,578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Strikes were banned after the military coup of 1980. Strikes were allowed again in 1984.

Source: Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1993.

It is hardly surprising then that in recent years considerable attention has been focused on explaining the causes of increasing strike activity. They can be summed up as follows.
first, one of the most important factors is the decline in workers' real wages since the year 1980. According to the calculations of the state institute of statistics, state planning organisation and the office of the under-secretary of treasury and trade, the real wage index which was 100 in 1979 has dropped to 43.63 in 1988 (TURK-IS 1989). However, in more recent years, compared to the years 1985, 86, 87, the drop has slowed, probably because of more effective collective bargaining activity. Unions tried to make up for the losses with sudden leaps, being tempted to bring up high demands to boost wages.

Second, in the 1980s employers, both public and private, achieved a much stronger unionisation ratio, making collective bargaining much harder than in the past. This is due to the legal provisions encouraging employers to organise more effectively than in the past. Moreover, the new legislation of 1983 created a centralised structure with a single national affiliate in each industry. Therefore, the present outcome seems to be desirable for TISK as well as its affiliates. In other words, the last decade has witnessed the growth of bigger and more active employers' unions, such as Mess in metal working, Kiplas in petroleum, chemicals and rubber, as well as those in the food and textile industries.

Third, the expansion of the scope of labour agreements — although resisted by unions — from multi-plant to large enterprise and multi employer bargaining tended to increase the number of work days lost, if and when strikes occur in conjunction with them. In other words, the response of trade unions in Turkey to the tough bargaining approach by employers' organisations has been increased strike activity and where strikes are unlawful, new concerted protest techniques they have devised such as work slowdowns, calling in sick, massive absenteeism and mass demonstrations.
Fourth, inter-union rivalry, basically prompted by unions concerned to protect their 10% representativity status encourages high and often unrealistic wage demands (extremely high wage demands sometimes involving 400 to 600% wage rises, the result of which was usually a high cost agreement for the employer).

Finally, in Turkey comparative wages have always served as the main criterion in wage negotiations. The high wage levels achieved first in glass and steel industries in 1989 and then in the Istanbul Municipal Authority recently have served as a stepping stone for other unions to follow suit and surpass them. The main debates in negotiations seemed to derive from wage-related issues, therefore, the managerial issues - discipline, grievance committees and more job security etc. - did not appeared as the major causes of industrial disputes.

However, 1989 was registered as a year of an increase in the curve of workers' and other labourers' struggles; it was, mainly, the beginning of deepening conflict with the ruling class. For the first time in Turkish working class history, workers of different political affiliation, different religious and ethnic roots and various geographical regions, raised a legal and independent mass movement in order to pursue more broad economic and political interests of the working class. This mass movement, which first emerged outside unions among the rank and file, ultimately forced the unions towards a tough position in relation to the government and employers. Workers particularly in the public sector carried out widespread action in the same year and the period is now well known as "Spring Mobilisation" in Turkish trade union history. 600,000 public sector workers engaged in actions and mobilisations including street demonstrations with the purpose of tipping the scale in their own favour in the collective bargaining process. Workers saw the real value of their wages decline steadily since 1980 in the face of the government's strict stabilisation programmes. Therefore, the unions united around demands for wages
to be readjusted to compensate for the losses of the 1980s. But the public sector employers' organisations and the Turkish government rejected these demands. The unions responded by a disciplined display of unity under TURK-IS's directive. All public sector unions agreed to enter the negotiations as one unit promising that no union would sign an individual agreement. A special four member co-ordinating committee was established, and unions agreed not to sign agreements without the prior approval of this committee (16).

In response to the denial of their right to take strike actions, the different unions in the public sector adopted a series of new tactics for "collective action" that fell within the law such as slowing down the work, lunch boycotts, false requests for medical examinations, boycotting works transport, not working for over-time, sit-ins and even refusals to shave! For example, all workers at the Yenisan company in Istanbul let their beards grow for about 64 days as a sign of protest against the pay and conditions (Basisen 1988).

Shortly after such effective action, Turkish workers were celebrating a victory in achieving a 142 per cent wage increase in the 1989 public sector collective agreement (TURK-IS 1990). The achievement of the new contract, which covered 600 thousand workers was won by a united trade union campaign that also included many innovative forms of industrial action by workers banned by law from striking. In a interview, a shop steward said that "the "spring mobilisation" had a very crucial role among the workers. They were able to see what they could do while they were struggling unified" (17).

This mobilisation of public sector workers was supported by actions taken by private sector workers. It can be argued that the demands of workers not only tended to concentrate on the wage issues but also centred on the issues like lifting restrictions of
trade union rights, an end to the government austerity policy, to all forms of repression and exploitation of workers, and speeding up processes towards true democracy (TURK-IS 1992). This is more evident during the 1990 Zonguldak miners' strike and one day general strike on 3 January 1991 (TURK-IS 1991). The grass-roots mass movements called "Spring Mobilisation" or "Spring Actions" raised and separated spontaneously in 1990 and 1991 all over the country.

Among the most important events was the miners' strike in Zonguldak in November 1990. More extensive mass mobilisation took place during the growing unrest at the end of 1990 and beginning of 1991 (Kristal-Is 1992). In the biggest stoppage seen in Turkey for 30 years, 48,000 members of the miners' union, Genel Maden-Is at Zonguldak struck on 30 November against the state operated Mine Research Institute and Coal Mines Enterprise and in support of claims for improved pay and conditions. However, it should be mentioned that the Zonguldak miners' strike of 1990 seemed to be far more than just a strike. At the beginning the strike began with a demand for more pay and eventually it took up political demands under the famous phrase "Bread, Peace and Democracy". The miners' union, Genel Maden-Is before the strike called a meeting in Zonguldak of all trade union, social and community organisations to ask for support. In fact, it brought into action not just the strikers but a whole city. The daily marches involved most strikers, their families and local people. In addition, Artists, member of human rights association, writers, opposition political parties and others came to Zonguldak and joined the daily demonstrations. The Zonguldak Chamber of Commerce (mostly consisting of the local shopkeepers) declared its backing for the strike and also joined the rally.

The day after the strike announced, the striking miners began a march from Zonguldak to Ankara. Even the most downtrodden people in Turkish society, the women, were
marching in the front line. The march, with around 80,000 people involved, was blocked by security forces and 201 strikers were arrested (Karakas 1992). At the same time, 85,000 metal workers at 230 private and public sector companies went on strike. However, the president of the TURK-IS at the time and the leader of the textile workers' union, Sevket Yilmaz asked the union leaders not to sign any agreement unless the miners’ dispute was resolved (18). In addition to this, on 3 January, TURK-IS called a 24-hour general strike in protest against continuing denials of human and trade union rights and to support the ongoing industrial actions. Despite being declared illegal, the strike was supported by 1.5 million workers (TURK-IS 1991).

The radicalisation in the attitudes of the confederation over this period was most clearly seen in the firmness displayed by the workers, in terms of strike action and mobilisation, often in direct opposition to the union's passive attitude and even obstruction sometimes put forward by certain trade union officials. This factor caused trade union democracy and disrupted the complacency of certain trade union officials who carried out their tasks in a orderly manner with the government and employers. In other words, the rising struggles of workers against the ruling class made a significant contribution to the improvement of a new conception of trade unionism and the efficiency of trade unions.

Under this circumstances, TURK-IS leadership had not much alternative in their strategies and supported the increasing labour struggle. In a interview, Atillay Aycin, the president of the airways' workers union, Hava-IS and well known as the most radical member of TURK-IS presidential council argued that "TURK-IS wanted to lead the movement rather than to stay behind it" (19). In mid-January 135,000 textile and paper workers went on strike. The political unrest reached the highest level in the country since 1980.
When we look at the nature of the process of dispute and resistance between the government and the workers in this period, the question arises whether the strike actions and the mobilisation of the masses in this period were a step in the direction of a working-class movement threatening the existing capitalist order. It is, perhaps, difficult to consider the action as a revolt in every sense, but it is quite possible to see it as a political as well as an economic process. This was partly due to a decline in the significance of the political contingency which had dominated public sector labour relations for so long in the past. Although unions, particularly TURK-IS, often bypassed public employers' associations and made efforts to reach the final agreement with ministers and even prime ministers especially during the major strikes in the last decade, it seemed that Turkish unions were, in a sense in the process of taking revenge in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The nature of Industrial action over the period in question is as following: (1) it was spontaneous and independent from any top level organisation (2) it had massive participation (3) it was legal (4) it involved new forms of resistance. It is a fact that the stance of unionised workers towards Ozal's conservative party brought about the sympathy of other interest groups towards the unions, particularly during non-strike industrial action. In other words, after 1980 the unions in Turkey was able to secure support from unemployed, non-unionised workers, farmers, small traders, pensioners and other democratic organisations.

In addition to these developments, efforts by civil servants to unionise further increased in 1991 and 1992. The achievement of the labour movement resulted in new inspiration for other working groups to organise in unions. Turkish public servants' unions at the beginning of the 1990s began to demand unionisation. The movement towards and struggle for unionisation, led by teachers, has continued with the organisation of public
servants in health, municipal and agriculture services. The number of existing unions of civil servants was estimated as 28 in 1991 and the approximate number of members they had as 150,000 in the same year (Petrol-Is 1991). Since it is not legally recognised, the process of unionisation of public servants has slowed. The negative attitude of the government and judicial bodies has been a significant obstacle for mass recruitment. The public prosecutors opposed the struggle of public servants for registration and brought actions to close Egit-Sen, Teachers' Union, Tum Bel-Sen, Municipal Officers' Union and Tum Saglik Sen, Health Civil Servants' Union (MBVY 1989, Gulmez 1992).

However, before the 1991 general election, the political parties, particularly, the True Path Party (DYP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) made explicit promises on union rights for public servants. Therefore, the union rights of Turkish public servants, covering around one and a half million, remained as one of the most significant issues on the industrial relations agenda. Successful labour union struggles combined with the emergence of public servant unions and increasing labour costs, particularly, after the signing of the collective bargaining in 1990 and 1991 have created intense pressure against labour unions and unionisation efforts at the company level. The government and business circles have initiated a counter-offensive against the unions. One of the main counter attack on labour unions was the massive lay-offs. According to the estimation of a union, Petrol-Is (1991), 300,000 union members at a minimum within TURK-IS unions were laid off in a period of between 1990 and the first half of 1992 just after the collective contract was signed. The officials of most unions agreed that lay-offs were not so much a result of technological progress as they were advocated by the employers. Rather, They were economically and politically motivated. In fact, the constant attempts seemed to be made to deunionise the unionised workplace.
A coalition government formed between the centre right, True Path Party (DYP) and the left-of-centre, Social democratic Populist party (SHP) (the current government) was welcomed by the labour circles in the hope that the new government would bring the vital solutions for the labour problems. At the beginning of 1992, the government proposed some legislative amendments and a top level labour council to discuss the main problems in industrial relations. In this context, TURK-IS prepared amendments designed to change the legal framework related to trade union and collective bargaining rights, and a new draft law on job security, unemployment insurance and civil servants' unions. The minister of labour, Mehmet Mogultay (a SHP MP) began to prepare some reform bills initially but met with serious opposition from employers' organisations like TUSIAD and TISK.

These developments were regarded as signs of softening government attitudes to the unions. However, as time passed there has not been any major changes observed in the attitude of the new government with regards to labour relations. While the unions have still been under attack from legal restrictions and the anti-democratic practices of employers, the policies of the government through privatisation, lay-offs and the use of subcontracting have continued to undermine the union movement. Although there are no official figures available, it is not impossible to expect a decline in the number of unionised workers. Particularly, more recent developments in labour-management relations in Turkey prove that the Turkish trade union movement is entering a more uncertain and equivocal era.
(iv) More Recent Developments and Growing Unrest Once Again Among the Workers.

The prime minister, Tansu Ciller, unveiled on 5 April 1994 the country's most radical reform and stabilisation package since 1980. The new stabilisation program includes extensive privatisation, the sale or closure of dozens of public companies and a freeze on wages. When the government announced major redundancies and closures of plants and mines, trade unions threatened "all-out war". The first protest against the government policies was staged by the Public sector workers' platform, which represented most public sector workers belonging to different unions. The most immediate large-scale action was to call demonstrations around the country. For example, after the Ciller government announced its austerity package, workers at the Petlas Tyre company in Kirsehir, about 110 miles from Ankara, marched towards the capital in a convoy of 100 vehicles to protest the government decisions that one thousand Petlas workers would lose their jobs (Petrol-IS 1994). In addition, thousands of mine workers staged a mass demonstration in Zonguldak to protest a decision to close several coal mines in their city which would leave about 11,000 people jobless (TURK-IS 1994).

At the same time, the Turkish lira has fallen more than 30 per cent against the US dollar since January 1994, while the budget deficit stands at more than $6 billion, the highest level in Turkish history (Sabah, 14 April 1994). Meanwhile, industrial production has been slowing. 3500 workers have just been laid-off in the automotive industry since the announcement of new austerity measures, while the major car manufacturers have sent workers home on compulsory leave until the crisis passes. The biggest white-goods maker, Arcelik, has also announced that it is suspending production (Milliyet, 31 April 1994). Employers are saying that "it is the time to sacrifice something in order for the economy to straighten itself out". Mainly, the government and employers have been
asking for "the national consensus". When the government requested a big sacrifice from the interest groups, the labour union leaders and the workers were waiting in silence for their reaction. Nobody knew how much sacrifice was expected from the working class.

However, the answer became more obvious when the state minister was quoted as saying that only 33,000 workers would be laid-off as result of plant or factory closures and privatisation in 1994. The other estimates are that the closures of the state companies will make about 150,000 people jobless (Deri-IS 1994). Most unions have immediately shown their determination to go forward with their protest action. Even on the day of the announcement the labour unions were in action, such as a spontaneous demonstration by the shipbuilding workers at one of the Golden Horn works. Other walkouts were soon staged at Sumerbank, Petkim, Kirsehir Petlas and Karabuk. The Petlas workers, who tried to march on the capital, Ankara, were blocked by police forces. Even the workers at Istanbul Water and Sewage Administration (ISKI) walked out to protest against the announcement that it, too, would be privatised. The union leaders involved in these marches made it clear that they expected the tempo to pick up in the coming months until they achieved their goals (Petrol-Is, 1994).

While slogans appeared to be calling for a general strike, although this is still legally impossible, it is now one of the goals of the social democratic factions of TURK-IS like Petrol-Is, Hava-Is, Belediye-Is, Deri-Is and Maden-Is (Deri-Is 1994). Following the austerity policies announcement, it appears that there has been intense discussion among union leaders within TURK-IS, the unions and with workers, as to what to do (TURK-IS 1994).
The crucial question in this critical period for the role of TURK-IS is whether TURK-IS will compromise with the government austerity programmes or will it direct the mobilisation of workers for the defence of broad economic and political interests? It can be argued that the spontaneous protests of workers have already gone beyond any collaborative intermediary role of TURK-IS. Therefore, the only role TURK-IS can play is to exercise its capacity for mobilising workers' resistance against the government's policies. In fact, there are signs to support this view that the president of TURK-IS, Bayram Meral stated that "trade unions are going to continue a series of actions until the government softens its new economic measures...the government at the moment is taking the bread out of the hands of workers, and businessmen brought the country to the current situation not the workers..." (TURK-IS 1994:2). This statement shows that TURK-IS was forced to pursue a tough line in its relation with the government at this time most probably due to the pressure from below. TURK-IS has also established a general action committee which will co-ordinate further labour action. In addition, the confederation called the other relevant Turkish labour unions, HAK-IS, DISK to organise joint protest action against the austerity programmes.

At this time the response of TURK-IS seems to be more clear. Bayram Meral, the current president of TURK-IS, urged the unions to continue a series of actions until the government rescinded its new economic measures. He accused the government and businessmen of putting the blame for the crisis on the workers. For him, the employers and government industrial policies have brought the country to the current situation. Therefore, TURK-IS seems to have taken the leading role in bringing together the unions, as the members of TURK-IS executive committee have demonstrated by visiting union leaders and persuading them to act in concert. Although there are frequent calls from the government for the workers to sacrifice for the economic and political health of the country, labour unions are willing to fight to the bitter end, by which they seem to
mean that a "general strike" might be implemented. In fact, The council of TURK-IS presidents has already voted in favour of a "general strike" (although it is illegal) (Cumhuriyet, 29 June 1994).

(v) CONCLUSION: A Rediscovery of the New Political Solutions?

In this study, the question concerning the type of unionism that Turkish unions represent can be addressed by examining the concepts of "Business unionism" or "economism" and "political economism". In this sense, the main argument is that Turkish unions demonstrated neither "pure economism" or "pure political economism" from the 1960s to the mid-80s. Rather, it seemed to be a combination of these. It is also argued that union policies and means may take different paths depending on the economic, political and social change that confront the workers. Therefore, the key question is here: does a broader social movement, possibly erode "bread and butter unionism"? In other words, does the Turkish case demonstrate that there might be the possibilities in some countries to work out political solutions against the challenges of external pressures in more recent years?

In contrast with the trend in European trade unions, where some unions tend to adopt more business-oriented policies in order to respond to external pressures, Turkish unions seem to have been more prone to broad political actions. Although Turkish unions have traditionally organised at Industry level, industrial unionism has recently made important steps into the collective behaviour of workers. By renewing the traditional position of Industrial unionism, for the first time in Turkish labour history, industrial unions particularly in the public sector have formed important pressure groups towards "politics". The key policies adopted by Turkish unions in the late 1980s and beginning of
the 1990s have been the use of "political pressure" at both national and international levels under the popular slogan of 1980s "fight for Western pluralist democracy".

However, this response of the unions to the political and economic environment of the 1980s and 90s has not systematically developed as a consistent, cohesive and integrated set of strategies. Rather, it seems to have been product of a "common agreement" among the unions against the challenges of the critical periods in question, mostly, because of the threat of losing their economic and political influence. In reviewing the pattern of different unions' behaviour within TURK-IS over the period, the unions policies appear to have been shaped on the basis of their democratic and political positions. Yet, in respect of new solutions, there have been common elements of continuity and change, particularly in their demands towards more political practices with more moderate tactics. Although they have continued being concerned almost exclusively with economic issues, there have been significant moves to broaden the union agenda, emphasising broader political ambitions such as the issue of democracy. It is widely accepted that trade unions frequently try to adjust to external pressures by changing their policies and strategies.

There is little doubt that the external and internal pressures have forced the Turkish unions to make some crucial changes in their policies as well as their democratic and political rationalities. This has, eventually, resulted in the unions reviewing the traditional positions of their role in industrial relations in favour of more confrontational relations with the government and employers as opposed to the their traditional corporatist image. However, the crucial question in this context might be the extent to which they will be strong enough to continue in this role. The answer still seems to be uncertain.
Undoubtedly, there may be some noteworthy differences in the unions' policies in the coming years in terms of the sector in which they operate and the company they work for. Some unions, particularly those in the private sector dealing with multinational companies, may tend to reach "micro corporatist type of agreement" at company level, while the others, the majority, can try to obtain economic favours for their members in return for "political restraint". A new intermediary "political mediation" role, especially for the public sector unions, might become important. Turkish unions' ability to meet the challenges arising from the changing external environment is determined by their endowment with the new reactive strategies of the confederation. The necessary strategies and policies are closely interrelated with the external and internal opportunities, and any conclusions regarding the future of Turkish unions need a careful elaboration of recommendations.

NOTES:

1) This information was provided with a group of workers' representatives from various companies in metal industries during an education seminar organised by the Metal Workers' Union in Istanbul (30 October 1993).

2) A personal interview with a shop steward at Arcelik company in metal industry in Istanbul (22 October 1993).

3) A personal interview with Orhan Balta, the president of the Food and Tobacco Workers' Union in Istanbul (9 October 1993).

4) A personal interview with Yener Kaya, the president of the Leather Workers' Union in Istanbul (29 March 1993).

5) According to various ILO reports of the Committee on Freedom of association, the committee has examined the substance of similar complaints 17 times between 1981 and 1990.
6) See various publications of Dok-Gemi Is, Teksif, Tek-Gida-Is, Yol-Is, Petrol-Is, Deri-Is, Hava-Is and Maden-Is and Demiryol-is for various years.

7) A personal interview with Ersan Cicek, The education secretary of the Metal Workers' Union in Ankara (14 October 1993).

8) A number of Turkish academics, Nusret Ekin, Toker Dereli, Gulden Kutal, Metin Kutal in Industrial relations field were consulted throughout the study to exchange information and share their experience about trade unions. Most of these academics are involved in unions' education seminars.

9) A personal interview with Alaatin Karahan, the general secretary of Defence Industry Workers' Union (Harb-Is) in Ankara (13 October 1993).

10) A personal interview with Ibrahim Kiziltan, the general secretary of the Leather Workers' Union (Deri-Is) in Istanbul (29 March 1993).

11) A personal interview with Huseyin Karakoc, the general secretary of the Food, Tobacco and Drink Workers' Union (Teg Gida-Is) in Istanbul (25 October 1993).


13) A personal interview with Mehmet Ozer, the leader of Ankara branch for the General Mine Workers' Union (Genel Maden-Is) in Ankara and various publications of the union (13 October 1993).

14) A personal interview with Ozbek Karakus, the general organising secretary of the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (Turk Metal) in Ankara (14 October 1993) and various publications of the union.

15) Various publications of Petrol-Is.

16) A personal Interview with Salih Kilic, the general secretary of TURK-IS in Ankara (14 October 1993).
17) A personal interview with a shop steward at the Siemens company in Istanbul (13 September 1994).

18) A personal interview with Zeki Polat, the general secretary of the Textile Workers' Union in Ankara (15 October 1993).

19) A personal interview with Attilay Aycin, the president of the Civil Aviation Workers' Union in Istanbul (29 September 1993). (Currently charged with organising illegal meetings).
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

This research is the first work done on the contemporary Turkish union movement in the English language. It attempts to explain the Turkish unions with respect to Turkey's complex and uncertain economic, political and social conditions. The empirical part of the study was carried out by establishing direct contact with the state institutions, employers' organisations and unions. This was important because most of the significant strategies and policies were made by these social partners. It should be mentioned that the lack of research tradition in Turkey caused serious problems particularly during the interviews. For example, it was not possible to conduct an interview with shop stewards or the workers at their workplaces.

On the theoretical side, in the absence of any conceptual and analytical framework for the role and model of the Turkish unions, the thesis has been constructed through relating it to the theoretical debates in the European literature. In this respect, some of the weaknesses in the discussion of the Turkish unions should be understood on the basis of not only the economic and political uncertainty or complexity of Turkey but also the lack of academic research interest in the area. Therefore, the study makes crucial attempts to contribute to our understanding about trade unionism in general by relating Turkish experience to the European context. The purpose of the study is to inform not only Turkish industrial relation students but also European scholars, who tend to neglect the Turkish trade union movement in their work.
Despite these problems, an attempt is made to interpret the nature and the process of trade unions within Turkey. In this context both the past and present theoretical debates and empirical findings have contributed to an understanding of the contemporary Turkish unions.

(i) General View: Defining a New Role for Turkish Unions and "Political Mediation" in an Era of Uncertainty.

As in the case of some European countries such as Germany, France, Greece, Spain and Portugal, Turkey has had a state tradition through the civil bureaucracy or the military. What makes the Turkish case interesting is that the state in Turkey has been even stronger than its counterparts in many cases. In the 1930s the Ataturk government formulated a new national development programme that gave the state a dominant role in Turkey's economic and political development. Kerr et al (1964) argue that the general strategies of industrialisation adopted by an ideal type of elite have significant consequences for workers and managers and their interrelations. In this regard, in Turkey a nationalist leader, Ataturk, with a mixture of the revolutionary and nationalist approaches, encouraged economic and political development within a comprehensive behavioural framework. He demolished the political and temporal power of the organised religion and traditional values through making institutional changes towards modernisation. In the case of the nationalist economy Ataturk insisted on industrial modernisation, as can be seen in the case of Japan and Germany after the second world war.

The power of the state was regarded as a catalyst for peaceful transition to an industrial society. "Etatism" in this context was a powerful political and ideological concept. While
this concept prevailed, the state intervened actively in the labour-management relationship, first to protect industrial labour with all kind of social benefits in a sort of state paternalism and then, as industrialisation developed and industrial workers became organised, the labour movement was contained, channelled or moderated through some legal reforms. In this context, the modernisation approach is helpful to explain the background of the development of Turkish unions.

In the 1960s and 70s the principal goals of economic and development policies were the adaptation of the idea of a "social welfare state". While the economic model was based on the expansion of the internal markets, on the political level, in order to maintain the stability of this model of capital accumulation the state established an institutional and political framework in which the ruling class united as a powerful social partner and the collaboration of labour was provided. State-centred development and populist incorporation provided a safety net for unions. During the entire import substitution industrialisation period the dominant ideology still remained within the confines of nationalist development and national solidarity. This model somewhat contradicted the strict rules of capitalist rationality. In this model, various groups such as agricultural producers and industrial workers were protected sufficiently to provide state planning economic and political developments on the pattern of the West. Particularly after 1960, taking the popular concept of populism into consideration, the role of the state was to include the masses (urban workers, commercialised farmers, shanty town marginals and the like) in economic, political and social practices in order to gain "social consensus" among different classes for economic growth. For the state, the significance of control over the labour market and labour discipline was one of the key elements of capitalist development in Turkey. Hence, through establishing an industrial relations framework, the state tended to exercise control over the political and democratic process which can
contribute to the rise of labour opposition and to the subjective development of the working class.

The ideology of national development borrowed from a certain development of social democracy discourses in the West, particularly in its statist developmentalism and populism. In this regard Turkish unions gained a certain legitimacy due to their being accepted as an important interlocutor. The external environment of unions strengthened the position of labour and the role of trade unions in the Turkish industrial relations system. Moreover, the interests and demands of the Turkish working class in relations with the state and employers were significantly mediated in the economic, political and institutional arena by the unions. On the other hand, the project of the ruling class for the new institutionalised industrial relations system also conformed with the expectation of Turkish unions. Because the rights to unionisation, collective bargaining and strikes as well as some social reforms were granted from above in accordance with the requirement of the economic and political model of 1960s. In other words, the economic and political policies were not only designed to meet the need of private business but also prepared to create a relatively favourable attitude to the workers' unions.

In short, in part 1 it is argued that the state policy towards labour was to seek a broad corporatisation of unions. TURK-IS and its member unions became better established, and took on the role of "mediating agency". Under this political and economic framework, the collective bargaining function became more important on the industrial relations agenda for Turkish unions. The nature of collective bargaining was also shaped by detailed legislative regulation of employment relations. Therefore, Turkish unions could not develop political identities in this period and the Turkish style of trade unionism which can be best described between "Business unionism" and "Political economism" was a serious option.
It might be argued that under this relatively favourable political and economic environment the policies of Turkish unions were heavily affected by external developments rather than the internal environment. As a result, the leadership of TURK-IS and of its member unions tended to adjust their behaviour predictably and manageably for their external environment, that is, mainly, the state and employers. They, therefore, tried to rely on collective agreement as a main function of all unions for the regulation of wages and working conditions and were particularly dependent on the goodwill of governments to maintain co-operative and orderly relations in return for obtaining a representative cartel at macro level. Meanwhile, internal influence, mainly, from the rank and file on union strategies and policies was limited. Most of the union function was shaped and controlled by national leadership and focused on a narrow range of employment issues, especially wages, rather than the social and political interests of the working class. For instance, many other issues such as employee involvement at the workplace, health and safety, job security and the implementation of new technologies were ignored by the union leaders in order to compromise on economic items in negotiations with employers. Although the conceptual and analytical perspectives for trade unions in the European literature are not quite adequate to explain the whole nature of the Turkish trade union movements, they might help to understand the Turkish unions in the context of "intermediary unionism".

However, the 1980s saw a remarkable change in the government and employers' policies towards trade unions. It is hardly a paradox to argue that the new economic strategies have concentrated on the world market through export based economic development policies rather than domestic ones, mostly due to the crises of the previous accumulation model. This trend, then, has further required a fundamental change in the relationship between employer, labour and state policies and between these and the changing policies in the world economy.
The military intervened the country in the 1980 and suppressed most organised social opposition including trade unions. Anti-labour legislation was further shaped to curb trade union power. The masses were also depoliticised. Therefore, the 1980 military intervention prepared necessary economic, political, legal and social conditions in which the new project of the ruling class was easily implemented. In this context, export based economic development policies pursued by the Ozal government brought about the political exclusion of labour. In other words, the government policies were designed to deregulate the economic activities for a more flexible labour market. In this respect, several attempts were made to reduce the institutional regulation of conflict so as to expose labour relations more directly to market forces particularly in the public sector. This development caused a decline in union economic and political power at macro level. Thus, the mediating role of TURK-IS and of its member unions was weakened in the 1980s.

The study demonstrates that patterns in Turkey obtain some correspondence with general trends, albeit somewhat in a different form from those in Europe that have been discussed with reference to the deregulation, anti-union legislation, decline in the mediating role of the labour confederations, privatisation and the like. The national development project, etatism and populism were diminished in the 1980s in favour of economic liberalism. In the economy the strategy of import-substitution was replaced by that of export-orientation and in politics a gradual weakening of the official ideology "Etatism", which in the past had been used by the governments to achieve social and political integration.

However, important consequences of the state tradition have been also witnessed in the 1980s. While the state has shown indications of deregulation in its relations with organised labour in many countries in the 1980s, the conservative party in Turkey
(despite all efforts to roll back the role of the state in economic arena through liberalisation, deregulation, public sector reform and privatisation) has not totally decomposed its relations with the unions, mainly because of the extraordinarily strong state tradition and a significant need for the restructuring of its unstable democracy in the new decade. It is clear that the development and role of trade unions in Turkey cannot be fully understood without a careful consideration of the long tradition of a strong and dominant state. Trade unions still expect the state to intervene directly and solve a wide variety of problems.

The military intervention of 1980 and, after that, economic development and the process of political democratisation demonstrate the similar trends between Turkey and the Southern European countries and some Latin American countries. In comparison to Latin American countries it can be argued that the implementation of the economic stabilisation programmes could be merely achieved under the political and social conditions of a military regime or "restricted democracy". In this respect, like Latin American experiences, particularly during the military interventions, "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes are evident in Turkey. This is a similarity which has continued into the subsequent period of cautious and halting democratisation processes.

In also suggesting that some European countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece are also dominated by one given trend, this view is of course not disregarding the numerous national variations. But, when a cross national check is made from country to country in both the countries above and in Turkey, certain developments can be observed. All countries first faced the problems of productivity, private investment, unemployment, the payment of deficits and political instability and then these countries began to implement successful liberalisation programmes and the process of integration in the international economy. For instance, in the Turkish case the transition to democracy has
brought the governments, the employers and the workers' organisations to seek a closer relationship with Europe, and in particular with the European community. For employers the integration into Europe means more economic benefits whereas for trade unions the democratic institutions of Europe are expected to help the current democratisation process in Turkey. In this sense Turkey's democratisation process shows a certain similarity to the Southern European countries emerging out of dictatorships.

The current analysis of the practice of Turkish unions needs to emphasise that the determinants of union strategy and tactics have had as much to do with the process of democratisation and ideological and political developments of the country. The political and economic changes have brought Turkey closer to the political mainstream in Europe. The changes in both international and domestic economic and political situations have forced Turkish governments to look for new policy alternatives abroad. Turkey's application for full EC membership may be seen in the context of her long journey towards modernisation.

The conceptual framework employed in this study tries to understand trade unions and their role as institutions and processes of mediation. This study also attempts to show that although the mediating role of unions may take different directions (from "macro" to "micro" or from "economic" to "political" mediation) under the increased external pressures, the margin for union mediation can always reappear. This is mostly based on their capacity for both planning and co-ordinating new strategies and policies and mobilising their members against the government and employers' strategies. Thus, the Turkish case shows that unions might be forced to rebuild their structures, strategies and perspectives in relation to changing economic, political and institutional environments. It
also shows that by pursuing reactive responses to the external pressures, unions can affect the nature of external and internal elements.

Broadly speaking, the Ozal government's "labour exclusive" policies led to a general conflict against the previous labour relations. These were a partial integration of labour in the process of restructuring the institutions regulating the process of economic and political development of Turkey and Turkish capitalism. In short, until the late 1980s, unions were forced to move into a more uncertain situation involving new labour practices from the previous, relatively stable framework of relations.

During this period, the responses of unions against the government's anti-union policies were defensive. However, as has been argued before, unions' policies and strategies may take different paths depending on the economic, political and institutional changes that confront the workers. Therefore, the external and, particularly, the internal pressures from rank-and-file, have forced the Turkish unions to make some crucial changes in their policies as well as their democratic and political rationalities. As a result, union leaders have adopted more reactive responses against the external pressures through mass industrial action and renewal of confrontation. The emergence of working class militancy was effective in discouraging the government's "labour exclusive" policies. Despite a restrictive legal framework for strikes, new forms of industrial action and the struggle adopted by Turkish unions have achieved crucial success.

In the 1960s and 70s Turkish industrial relations was gradually developed by the state-led arrangements in the name of establishing the balance between class forces. However, the 1980s challenges seem to have been a crucial element of a shift unfavourable to labour. An important shift in the traditional cultural and political attitudes of the ruling class towards labour has also brought about some considerable changes in the union
leaders and workers' attitudes. They have had the chance of exercising their capacity to influence the government's decisions through mobilising workers resistance rather than expecting the changes from above.

It should be mentioned that the responses of the unions to the hostile attitude of the ruling class have not taken place merely through generalised class conflict. The struggle over anti-labour legislations, lay-offs and privatisation was an indication of conflict which has caused polarisation between capital and the working class. However, several agreements achieved in "social concertation" or "neo-corporatist" form of macro level wage-price bargaining, although involving only the public sector workers, lead to partial integration of labour in the process of restructuring of institutions regulating Turkish industrial relations. Privatisation has already provoked a struggle at the level of the public sector enterprises, since it tends to undermine the resources of most unions. At macro-level the government has sought some integration of unions in implementation of new austerity economic measures and restructuring of the political and social structure. In general, although the role of Turkish unions in industrial relations has been substantially reduced, the political mediating role has been maintained, as well as their capacity for mobilising workers' resistance against the government's unilateral downward adjustment policies.

Therefore, as in the case of Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal, the governments and employers in Turkey at the beginning of the 1990s have come to give strong support to establishing a centralised "social and economic council" in the hope that this quasi-concertative mechanism could be devised to generate sustained peace and considerable solutions within the systems. This was mainly due to increased industrial conflict and labour costs.
In addition, the Turkish government has become vulnerable to a new social environment since its own freedom of action has been increasingly subject to international developments. Thus, it was not so easy for the government to exercise complete "labour exclusive" policies without taking "political contingency" into account. On the other hand, Turkish unions displayed a great deal of strength and the capacity to utilise the external opportunities and pursued significant solidaristic policies in shaping a broader social and political agenda. In this respect, compared with the past, rank and file pressure, and other organisational developments (e.g. union democracy) have played a crucial role in reshaping the unions' policies and strategies. In other words, for the first time in Turkish trade union history Turkish unions have begun to influence the nature of their external environment. They have displayed substantial strength and unity in reacting against the government and employers' anti-union practices.

The Europeanisation trend also presents considerable opportunities for unions to improve their situation. The key requirement seems to be reactive rather than defensive. In fact, Turkish unions are one of the few union movements in Europe to possess a solidarity between various unions, adopting policies and tactics which are uniform and centralised in many respects. The centralisation is secured by the existence of unified unions arranged through industrial base-unionism and the accumulation of power at the top level. There are no serious indications of union cohesion being eroded by fragmentation into unions with political or religious links, company-based unions or occupational unions.

It can be argued that some more recent developments demonstrate that in the Turkish case, the margin for union mediation is still possible. In other words, due to worsening economic and political conditions and the important issue of national competitiveness, a national consensus is probably urged by the government and employers. In this context,
a need for "dual bargaining" to provide multi-dimensional relations among social partners can emerge. While different form of decentralisation in collective bargaining at company level is still likely to be witnessed, particularly on the issues such as employee involvement programmes and financial motivation (performance-related pay), tripartite negotiations can be taken place at national level over the issues like wages and industrial peace.

In this respect, the unions' confederation, TURK-IS, may be required to play a "political mediation" role at the national level. TURK-IS is more likely to be expected to play this role mainly to exercise sufficient authority to protect the institutional integrity and its political influence in labour-management relations. The question here is how fundamentally can these changes alter the traditional patterns of Turkish unions? Can they continue to develop counter-strategies? What are the serious options available for Turkish unions? These questions lead us to understand the changing role of Turkish unions in the light of more recent theoretical debates on the new roles and identities of the European unions.

(ii) A discussion concerning alternative model of trade union actions in the 1990s for Turkish unions.

It can be argued that unions are trying to survive in a period of transition with profound changes in economic, social, political and cultural conditions. Therefore, they tend to adjust to external pressure by changing or redefining union identities, objectives and roles. The objectives and policies of the unions differ from each other, depending largely on the economic, political and social challenges threatening them. The key question here concerns what models or patterns will prevail in the 1990s in Europe and the extent to
which they also offer alternative models for Turkish unions. Although the elements of
the present challenge are similar in most countries, unions can pursue divergent
strategies. Therefore, it might be argued that unions can yield different models of
struggle and of responses in terms of the countries' specific economic, social and
political dynamics.

With regards to question of trade union responses and identities, there has been more
recent debate amongst academics, (e.g., Bassett 1986, Regini 1992, Valenzuela 1992
and Hyman 1994) about the question of new union patterns or changing union identities.
Hyman (1994b) has recently suggested five alternative trade union identities, namely:
guild, friendly society, company union, social partner and social movement. He argues
that when unions face serious crises, they may be driven to choices as an alternative to
traditional institutions and arrangements. This depends on redefinition of interests, new
patterns of internal democracy, broadening or narrowing of agenda and altered power
tactics. He argues that "Trade union identity relates dialectically to the intersecting
dynamics of interests, democracy, agenda and power" (Hyman 1994b:11).

The aim here is to try to understand Turkish unions in the light of alternative trade union
models in the European context. In this sense, the question of what is distinctive or
exceptional about the experience of Turkish unions will be examined taking Hyman's
ideal models as a starting-point. Careful analysis of the present position of trade unions'
role and influence and alternative trade union models in Turkey may bring about a more
cautious examination. Crouch (1993) argues that the dominant identities resulted from
particular national trade union movements that reflect the specific context in which
national organisations historically emerged. In this context, the character, role,
objectives and identity of Turkish unions have reflected the circumstances of their
formation.
Throughout this study, it has been argued that Turkish unions in the 1960s and 70s emerged between two models, business unionism and political economism. Union character was shaped by state actions or regulations as part of its industrialisation attempts. Hyman also talks about the other two models, anti-capitalist opposition (pursuing class interests) and social integration (pursuing social interests). However, in the Turkish context these two models can be ignored, because, the former has never become a significant union identity in Turkey. Unlike the case in many other European countries, Turkish unions have not been influenced by a great deal of left-wing movements such as radical social-democracy, syndicalism and communism. Turkish governments, historically, did not put much emphasis on enduring political associative action. Since unions have not been allowed to set up any direct and organic relations with politics and political parties, union action has concentrated significantly on wages and employment conditions. In short, the Turkish working class has not had parliamentary representation, which would have added a dimension of parliamentary politics. In addition, unlike the situation in other Southern European countries, Spain, Portugal and Greece, the Turkish labour movement did not develop any underground action combined with the socialist or communist organisations against the state repression, particularly during the dictatorships. Thus, anti-capitalist or state opposition labour movements did not emerge in Turkey.

The model of social integration has also failed to develop clearly in Turkey. Several reasons can be given for this. Firstly, unionism with an Islamic identity has not been historically important (if we ignore the emergence of the new confederation, HAK-IS in the 1980s, because the objectives and structure of this confederation looks like more the business type and its role and influence are marginal in the Turkish labour movement). Second, there were attempts towards social-democratic unionism within the TURK-IS in the late-1970s in order to benefit from the ideology of the social welfare state. It did
not however become the dominant trend. Although this reformist approach within TURK-IS unions has never disappeared, it may be better understood in the context of the Turkish style of business unionism. This is, perhaps, because unions in Turkey have not totally become organisations for the representation of either social or occupational interests. Rather, we may safely talk about sectional interest representation reflecting the German style of industrial unionism.

As has been pointed out elsewhere in this study, the economic and political strategies of Turkish governments in the 1960s and 70s required the recognition of unions as intermediary organisations in the consideration of social stability and economic development policies through "integration" or "collaboration" and sometimes "social contract". The characteristic of Turkish unions in the same period seemed to be as following: (1) they were less committed to the pursuit of political unionism or a political agenda, (2) there was an absence of formally established links with a single political party, (3) there was more concentration on "Bread and Butter" functions of unionism at the cost of the broad-social and political interests of the working class. This sort of unionism can be defined as "pure and simple unionism" (Hyman 1994a). However, when we look at the development of Turkish unions, especially in the late 1970s, in terms of ideological developments and the attempts for centralisation of union structure and "social contract", it might be an oversimplification to define Turkish unions as being of the Business type. Turkish unions in these periods were neither purely business nor "social contract" types but they may be identified between them.

However, the established patterns of trade unionism have also been also challenged in Turkey in the last 15 years because of the profound changes in its external environment. Therefore, a search for new identities has become a significant issue for Turkish unions. It has been claimed that the problems currently facing European unions derive from a
Hyman (1994b) suggests that trade unions should reconstruct the interests and agenda of trade unionism by focusing on two significant areas which are the issue of work and employment and broader social concerns. In addition, a redefinition of trade union representation will allow unions to concentrate on different strategic orientations considering the members as producers, citizens, human capital and consumers. This, finally, leads to alternative trade union identities or ideal types grouped by Hyman as guild, friendly society, company union, social partner and social movement.

Among Hyman’s five ideal models, the models, company union, social partner and social movement will be discussed in the Turkish case. Firstly, the implementation of the company union in Turkey is difficult for political, economic, cultural and legal reasons. In fact, Turkey, as some other southern countries, Spain, Portugal and Greece, for example, has a different model of anti-labour, sometime authoritarian (mostly through military governments), pragmatic and procapitalist motivation of labour-management relations. In this sense, trade unions operate in the industrial relation systems confined by a detailed, complex and extensive employment regulation.

The main obstacle to company unionism in Turkey stems from the trade union legislation of 1983. According to this Act, unions can only organise on an industrial basis. Company unionism is not permitted by law. In addition, unlike the situation in most countries, the company level mechanisms of employee participation, team briefing, quality circles or consultative committees have not developed at a sufficient level in Turkey. It is a fact that apart from some large and multinational companies such as Koc Holding, Brisa and Siemens, the applications of the new organisational techniques including JIT, TQM are not even being considered by the majority of firms in Turkey. The limited introduction of new managerial organisational practices also displays one of
the key barriers to the implementation of Japanese style company unionism. Particularly, in the manufacturing industry, changes in product market, production systems and management methods have been relatively stable. This means that Fordism "a pattern of capital accumulation" is still a significant model for the Turkish economic expansion. It can be argued that Turkey can also be regarded within a category of nation states which are considered to share a heritage of incomplete Keynesianism and regulation (Martinez Lucio and Blyton 1994). However, it is still likely that some developments towards "micro concertation" or "company level productivity coalitions" will be seen in return for job protection in the foreseeable future. If it happens, this kind of "micro concertation" is likely to be established in large, multinational and non-union firms in the private sector. Then we will be able to talk about "company unionism" or "company level employee relations" in Turkey.

Therefore, it is safer to discuss political economism, social partnership and social movement. Turkey's responses to the international economic developments of the last and new decades have represented a continuation of its efforts to increase industrial development and to broaden her exports base. In this context, the nature of and the scope of trade union action have given rise to serious problems for Turkish governments. The rise of the trade union question confronts Turkey as she seeks industrial export-led development under increasing international competition. Under these circumstances, Turkish unions have faced great challenges, not only because of changes in internal developments in economic and political structures but also the world economic recession and the growth of competition in world markets. Therefore, Turkish unions have become intolerable for the state and employers in the 1980s. On the other hand, unions have also been regarded as a sign of democratic elements to display to European partners in consideration of the application to join the EC. Thus, legal and institutional rules have discouraged government from complete erosion of the union
movement in Turkey. This is also, probably, because the purpose of Turkish governments has not only been to stabilise its problematic democracy, which is under heavy international pressure, but also to control inflation and the budget deficits through wide public sector agreements with unions.

The Turkish trade union movement has been through a difficult period of economic and political unrest combined with high levels of unemployment existing side-by-side with high levels of inflation and balance of payments difficulties. Under these conditions, the hostility of the governments and employers has encouraged unions to take militant and oppositional stands against the ruling class. So there have been real and substantial shifts in actions and directions of Turkish unions, particularly in the late 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s. However, radicalisation of TURK-IS' members seems to have been an outcome of tactical policy concerning both external and internal pressures, not a strategy. Intensified competition, technological change, transnationalisation of capital and fiscal crises of the state have not yet eroded the material basis of political economism in Turkey.

The important wave of strikes, particularly in the public sector, in the late 1980s has forced the Turkish government to adopt a more positive attitude to collective bargaining. Therefore, the margin for concession bargaining, at least in public sector, has not disappeared in the same period. As with the Spanish, Irish and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese and Greek governments, the new government in Turkey at the beginning of the 1990s has tried to encourage a national system of concertation through a "new tripartite economic council" almost as much in order to stabilise political uncertainty, mainly, the issue of democracy and industrial conflict as to implement the IMF austerity economic programs for controlling inflation and the country's growing foreign debt problem. However, this attempt has failed, mostly because of rejection by trade unions.
What was encouraged was the possibility that the government, trade unions and employers' organisations could share responsibility for ensuring not only overall economic development, but also social and political stability. In this context, TURK-IS and its member unions were still considered as valued interlocutors by the government. The basis of national union authority undermined in the 1980s may have reversed at the beginning of the new decade.

At this stage, we should raise the key questions again: How can trade unions in Turkey affect the extent and nature of current difficulties? Can trade unions produce effective responses to new external pressures? Do they have such capacities? What sort of opportunities and policies are available to unions and can Turkish unions possess an area of strategic choice in responding to the challenges and changes of the 1990s? It can be argued that unions do have such capacities and they can affect or influence the changing features of their environment. This can also lead us to Hyman's question: can models be combined in a form which is both effective and progressive?

Turkish unions can possess an area of strategic choice in responding to the changes and challenges of external pressure. There are external and internal opportunities for the new policies which Turkish unions can pursue. Since the mid-1980s, the more Turkey has become open to the world and dependent on world trade and other international links, the harder it has become for the Turkish government to use direct political repression or explicit prohibitions. There has been increasing international pressure around the issues of linking EC membership access to respect for democracy and labour rights. In this sense, the future developments of trade unions might be related to the development of Turkish democracy and the increasing interdependence of Turkey with European countries. In fact, Turkish unions have been campaigning for bringing trade union rights to the level of international standards. Although future developments in the Turkish
trade union movement will depend widely on internal political and economic change. they can be influenced and supported by external factors. In this case, European-linked labour movements and even transnational trade union links might become part of the significant agenda of Turkish unions.

This also leads us to Hyman's final model, social movement. If trade unions in Turkey claim to be part of a process of building a wider and deeper civil democratic society within a European context, the issue of democracy is likely to be pushed to the centre of political discussion by the action of unions and of workers themselves. Therefore, new democratic trade unionism can be established by demanding the objectives of both improving the material conditions of workers and their broad political and social interests under a slogan of democratisation. By gaining mass support trade unions as populist campaigning organisations can centre on a "Democracy movement".

It may be suggested that bringing broader political questions and raising demands about the issue of democracy, Turkish unions can be successful in defending more effectively and progressively the workers' broad interests in the economic and political fields. Waterman (1993:247) argues that "the major international movement of the present day is not so much a labour or socialist one as a broad, varied and complex democratic movement (of which labour is one part)". For him, in this new process, trade unions are to play a significant role in relation to new forms of subordination and oppression. Thus, the important emphasis should be given to new forms of struggle and democracy.

It is a fact that unlike most other European countries, the old socialist-egalitarian ideologies have not had a significant influence on the Turkish working class. Therefore, it would be much easier to develop new identities resulting from collectivist or solidaristic labour movements. The new unifying ideology, mainly centred on
"democracy" may bring about "co-operation" or "solidarity" among individuals in formal and informal sectors, unemployed, different working groups etc. For example, in the Turkish case, the emergence of the recent civil servants' movements is a crucial opportunity for central confederations. The most important issue for TURK-IS becomes the unionisation of civil servants as well as the unionisation of expanding sectors, in particular, service sector workers or white-collar trade unions. A separate confederation for these working groups would damage the solidaristic trade union movement.

Therefore, the task for TURK-IS is to create new objectives and policies in which the possible diversification in the demand of new working groups and the old ones can be reduced. This seems an important issue. Because, in contrast with many other countries, in some traditional industries such as steel, docks and coal-mining trade unions have still maintained their members (although they have recently been losing significant numbers of members due more recent developments in privatisation, closure of plants and massive lay-offs). Nevertheless, their role and influence within TURK-IS is still significant. This is also, indeed, important to sustain some solidaristic policies within the confederation. TURK-IS's recent attempts to strengthen its relations with other confederations, HAK-IS, DISK and to defend the civil servants' movement against the government can be regarded as a sign of a new direction and orientation and role for the Turkish labour movement (TURK-IS 1994).

In short, TURK-IS and its members might redefine their policies and objectives to pursue the material interest of their members as well as a broader and more generalising social and political agenda. This also requires new forms of struggle, of demands in collective bargaining and internal democracy within unions themselves. All these developments might lead the government to have different degrees of toleration for workers' organisation. The government and employers' organisations may require trade
union mediation once more, again through social partnership since the government's economic and political stability has been insecure due to external and internal pressure and problems. Therefore, there is a possibility of some developments towards political exchange or concession bargaining at macro level by a "centralised political negotiation" in the coming years.

It can be argued that in parallel with the developments in Turkish democracy, Turkish unions have been marked by periods of instability. Their strategies, policies and choices seem to have been as products of specific economic, social, political, cultural conditions and the contradiction of Turkish capitalism. In fact, different trade unions in different industries have displayed similar responses to changes in the economic and political environment. These unifying responses have been recently combined with the "democracy movement" and "solidaristic policies" within the labour movement.

It is a serious challenge for Turkish unions to pursue effective and progressive forms of trade unionism which not only defend the economic and broad political and social interests of workers, but also help to contribute to a country which claims that it is moving democratically, socially and culturally in the direction of European countries as a whole. However, the question of which alternative model of trade unionism can take shape in Turkey will be determined by the actions of trade unions and workers themselves in the future. It seems that the rise of new identities for Turkish unions opens a crucial new era in the history of trade unionism in Turkey.
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