Performing Translation
Theatrical Theory and its Relevance to Textual Transfer

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for the degree of PhD in Translation Studies

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I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, and that it has not been submitted for a degree at another university.
Abstract

The fundamental similarity between translation and acting can be summarized by the words of translator Ralph Manheim: ‘translators are like actors: we speak lines by someone else’ (cited in Stavans 1998: 176). This common metaphor is a useful tool for translation practitioners and researchers. Although it cannot be fully exhausted, it can be further clarified, analysed and developed by looking into modern and pre-modern theories of theatrical performance, examining their compatibility and incompatibility with the world of translation practice and theory.

The first chapter of this thesis deals with mimetic representation in translation and in performance. The issue of disguising oneself as someone else while performing or translating raises practical problems. They are discussed here in relation to the opposite approaches to acting suggested by Denis Diderot and Constantin Stanislavski. The following chapter deals with radical goals of theatrical and textual representations, and discusses ethical and political strategies in relation to Bertolt Brecht and Lawrence Venuti. The next chapter deals with spiritual and metaphysical goals of theatrical and textual representations, and discusses them in relation to Jerzy Grotowski and Walter Benjamin. The final chapter explores the common ground between theatrical space and norms of translation, and shows that in many ways, the use of theatrical space, confining performers yet channelling their communication with their spectators, functions in similar fashion to translation norms.
1. Introduction

1.1. A noisy sort of translation

In 2002, I was working on one of my first literary translations: a satirical play called Reading Hebron, written in 1996 by Canadian playwright Jason Sherman. This dark yet hilarious work contained no less than sixty-four characters, each with his or her own fictional background, dramatic agenda and linguistic register. All the characters spoke, shouted, whispered or chattered using their unique “voices”. Translating those English voices into Hebrew became a very vocal process: I shouted, whispered and chattered, too, looking for the “best” way to pronounce source text lines and apply it to my target text drafts. Without giving it much thought, I happily carried on making a great deal of racket over a period of several weeks. After finishing my translation, I had some time to contemplate it in silence. Only then did I realise that I had not made all those noises in order to aid the actors with their work, but in order to aid myself with mine. I had used acting exercises for the sake of improving my textual translation (see Benshalom 2006: 3).

The elusive connection between theatrical acting and translation has long fascinated me. It inspired my MA dissertation, which dealt with the unique case of drama translation from a hermeneutical point of view. I examined the idea of approaching plays as actors do and suggested that dramatic dialogues be translated as if they were composed by the dramatis personae instead of by the playwright. As a result, I came up with several key ideas for workshops that I gave to undergraduate translation students in the Theatre Department at Tel Aviv University. Finally, this connection became the basis for this
work which seeks conceptual links between the two disciplines.

Several reasons stand behind this particular fascination of mine. The first reason is personal. My background in theatre studies and practical translation has quite naturally led me to search for common elements that bind the two fields together. The second reason is my discovery of striking similarities between key ideas in translation studies and those proposed in several acting theories. Some of these ideas are discussed in this thesis. The third, and perhaps most compelling reason for undertaking a comparative analysis of translating and acting, is my desire to affect the current status of translation practice. Some researchers use their work as means of bringing translation closer to exact sciences by emphasising the phenomena, problems and strategies in strict, hierarchical categories: the works of Gideon Toury (1995, 2006) are typical of this approach. Others would have us view translation and its surrounding phenomena as indicators of social and cultural processes and conflicts: Susan Bassnett’s findings (1998) exemplify this point of view. The world I wish to bring translation closer to, however, is the world of performing arts. As an amateur translator who admires the artistic quality in the work of great translators, I would like to show in detail how our task, which is often thought of as a craft, can be paralleled with the established and recognised art of acting. Such an approach embraces the scientific attention to small details and systematic strategies on the one hand, and the cultural attention to human and social behaviours on the other. In addition, it recognises the aesthetic value of translation and the creative capacity of individuals it requires.

I hope to show that this kind of motivation can lead to a discussion which is not only structured and scholarly but compatible with the rigorous norms of academic research.
1.2. On the metaphor of translating as acting

The concept of translation brings to mind the concept of theatrical acting because the two share many sub-elements, or “ingredients”. Theatrical performance is often (but not always) based on “source texts” such as plays or scenarios which are written in “source languages”, i.e. written words, and are composed by “authors”, or playwrights. These texts, mediated by “representation agents”, like actors and directors, create a “target text”, or performance, which is expressed using one or more of the many “target languages” of theatrical signification. Performances are then communicated to “addressees”, the theatre audience, and affect them and their surrounding environments in various ways.

The initial congruence between translation and acting allows us to link the two concepts with the bonds of conceptual metaphor. This tool, discussed in detail by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, is said to be more than ‘a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish’ (1980: 3). As Lakoff et al. have explained, ‘the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another’ (Ibid.: 4), and this process is essential for developing an understanding of any but the most basic and direct experiences. Conceptual metaphors, Lakoff affirms, govern all but the most concrete uses of natural language in everyday life (1979: 202-05). They also rule the realms of thoughts and cognition. In fact, as Lakoff et al. have stated, ‘most of our ordinary conceptual system is metaphoric in nature.’ (1980: 4). Thus, a conceptual metaphor such as “argument is war” not only dictates many linguistic formulations regarding arguments, such as “to win the argument”, “to defend a claim”, and so on; it governs the way we perceive arguments and the way we think and act when we participate in one. The assertion that ‘metaphors that are imaginative and creative […]
are capable of giving us a new understanding of our experience’ (Lakoff 1980: 139) is echoed by Max Black who states that ‘[instances of] metaphorical thought [...] sometimes embody insight expressible in no other fashion’ (1979: 34). It may be useful, therefore, to treat the phrase “translating as acting” as a conceptual metaphor, endowing it with the potential to play a basic role in the construction of various insights regarding translation. According to Thomas S. Kuhn, metaphors which are used in research can provide the context in which theories develop. Since the ‘secondary’ metaphorical signifiers are subject to scientific attention as much as the ‘primary’ researched phenomena which triggered them, they affect the direction of future research (1979: 415). Richard Boyd discussed the “computer” imagery which was used in cognitive psychology as an actual example for a metaphor affecting a whole field of study (1979: 368). My aim is that this work will have a similar effect by strengthening the link between translation and the world of fine arts. I hope to demonstrate that discussing translation in terms drawn from the world of theatre and performance is relevant not only to the theorists of translation but also to its practitioners. The development of the conceptual metaphor of translation as acting into many of its innumerable possible derivatives suggests new methodologies and strategies for the consideration of translators. In this sense, this work resembles a journey that has several possible destinations but relies on one, single metaphor for its point of departure.

1.2.1. Metaphors of translation

The use of metaphors for the discussion of translation is a common and well-developed tradition. As explained by Boyd, ‘the employment of metaphor serves as a nondefinitional mode of reference fixing which is exceptionally well suited to the
introduction of terms referring to kinds whose real essences consist of complex relational properties, rather than features of internal constitution’ (1979: 358). Simply put, when an object interacts in many different ways with many different objects and systems, it becomes easy and productive to describe it through the use of metaphors. The “kinds” of translation studies, that is, the basic ideas and concepts that describe the phenomena of linguistic transfer, are formed through interactions between cultures, languages, textual genres and individual transfer agents. This may be the reason behind an observation made by Lieven D’Hulst, according to whom ‘there is something about the translating experience that calls for metaphorical language’ (1992, cited in Round 2005: 50).

As noted by Theo Hermans, metaphors of translation have been put to many uses throughout history. They can be utilised to praise or criticise particular translations as well as to qualify the concept of translation itself, most notably in order to take a side in the conflict of translatability versus intranslatability (Hermans 1985: 106). The elusiveness of translation as a concept is proven by the lush richness of metaphors which are used to describe its many aspects. Nicholas Round, who has gathered and documented a plethora of translation metaphors, notes that throughout history the translator has been described as:

[A] truthful witness [...], a discoverer of buried treasure [...], a slave-labourer on another man’s plantation [...], a displaced and disadvantaged post-colonial figure [...] a restorer of historical music-scores, a specialist in animal anatomy [...] someone engaged with jigsaw puzzles (one each for SL and TL) [...] a fisherman working with differently-meshed nets (2005: 53).

While the metaphors used to describe the character of translators cover the ground from diplomats to cannibals, the work of translation itself has commonly been referred to
by any number of practices from alchemy to scientific research (Ibid.: 50, 57). Round chose to divide the vast corpus of translation metaphors into three main groups: ‘trans-’ metaphors, which view translation as a process of transferring an object through space and time, ‘re-’ metaphors, which view translation as a process of re-creating something anew, and ‘dialogue’ metaphors, which view translation as a process of constructive or destructive interaction (Ibid.: 58-59). This neat division is very compelling, although it may be a slight over-generalisation for translators and researchers who wish to draw insights and inspiration from translation metaphors. Indeed, Round has admitted that many thinkers who used such metaphors breached these boundaries and referred to more than one aspect of translation (Ibid.: 58). It seems that metaphors which aspire to a full description of translation need to be relevant to as many aspects of translation as possible, even when these aspects are in conflict with each other.

1.2.2. **How should the acting metaphor be classified?**

The general concept of “metaphor”, as defined earlier by Lakoff, comes in many different variants. One of these variants, in fact, is called “metaphor” in itself. In his *Handbook of Rhetorical Devices*, Robert A. Harris defined metaphor as a linguistic form, an utterance which ‘compares two different things by speaking of one in terms of the other’, and noted that ‘very frequently a metaphor is invoked by the to be verb’ (2010). Using this strict linguistic definition, the link between translation and acting – which can be formulated in many ways and indicate many degrees of similarity – should not be called a metaphorical link.

Alternatively, the conceptual links between translation and acting may be described as analogies, where ‘two things, which are alike in several respects, [are compared] for
the purpose of explaining or clarifying some unfamiliar or difficult idea or object by showing how the idea or object is similar to some familiar one’ (Harris 2010). This definition, however, is also problematic. Harris claimed that analogy traditionally ‘serves the [...] end of explaining a thought process or a line of reasoning’ (Ibid., my emphasis). Although I have made every attempt to thoroughly explain various links between translation and acting, the logical process of following an analogy to its destination leaves little place for individual inspiration, since it is aimed at students rather than artists.

The safest bet, according to strict rhetorical definitions, seems to be to classify the links between translation and acting as similes, ‘a comparison between two different things that resemble each other in at least one way [...] comparing an unfamiliar thing to some familiar thing (an object, event, process, etc.)’ (Harris 2010). According to Harris, ‘while simile and analogy often overlap, the simile is generally a more artistic likening, done briefly for effect and emphasis’ (Ibid.). My discussion here is not brief, and although it emphasises specific aspects of translation, I am hopeful that it might prove generally useful to translators and scholars of translation.

Following Lakoff and others, I prefer to use the term “metaphor” or “conceptual metaphor” in order to describe the links between translation and acting. In this work, the word “metaphor” serves as a conceptual umbrella which covers metaphors, similes, analogies and everything in between. The process of translating is not just like acting, it often is acting in that there are common elements to both practices. Moreover, unlike the term “simile”, the term “metaphor” serves my purposes well because it is both suggestive and widely recognised. Most importantly, the term “metaphor” suits my needs because it emphasises the connection between ideas rather than words. It refers to the cognitive
level rather than to the linguistic one. In the words of scholar, poet and translator Shimon Zandbank:

Traditional rhetoric distinguishes metaphor from simile in principle. It counted metaphor among the “tropes”, linguistic devices which introduce changes to the meaning of words and deviate from standard language […] and simile among “schemes”, which do not change the meaning. […] However, this distinction is undermined when one rejects metaphor’s linguistic definition and adopts its conceptual definition instead. If a metaphor is an interaction between two ideas rather than a deviate transfer of a denotation from a “correct” realm to a “borrowed” one, there is no significant difference between a metaphor and a simile (2002: 61, my translation).

1.2.3. Does the acting metaphor work?

Broadly speaking, the depiction of translation in terms of performance is metaphorical. What needs to be ascertained is whether this metaphor which links textual transfer with theatrical acting has the potential to become a worthy aid for practice and research. The most obvious criterion to be applied when answering this is the intentionality behind the creation of the metaphor’s various instances. Black distinguished between emphatic metaphors and non-emphatic metaphors: ‘Emphatic metaphors’, he wrote, ‘are intended to be dwelt upon for the sake of their unstated implications: their producers need the receiver’s cooperation in perceiving what lies behind the words used’ (1979: 26, author’s emphasis). Non-emphatic metaphors, on the other hand, are addressed as decorative, redundant ornaments, and are not much more than ‘musical grace notes’ (Ibid.). Although the “translation as acting” metaphor has been created and re-created several times, I am convinced that it has been mostly used for its ornamental value; typical examples (as well as some exceptions) are listed later on. The
usual intentionality behind this metaphor renders it currently, then, as a non-emphatic
one.

The level of a metaphor’s distribution among the community of researchers is
another clear, retrospectively determined criterion of its research value. Boyd claimed
that ‘theory-constitutive’ metaphors are marked by the fact that once conceived, they
re-appear in different forms and variants in the writings of various members of the
relevant community. He went on to write that such metaphors are irreplaceable and
necessary for the theory’s development (1979: 361). Re-appearing occurrences of the
“translating as acting” metaphor seem to be independent of each other, neither derived
from any central theme nor vital to any existing theoretical development in the field of
translation studies. One can assume that the status of theory-constitutive metaphor is a
“title” that the translating-acting link has yet to earn.

Other criteria relate to more intrinsic qualities of the metaphor in question. The
potential for open-ended interpretation, which, paradoxically, is the most subjective,
“non-scientific” property of metaphors, is one such quality. Boyd stated that all
metaphors, regardless of their importance for research, assist the listener in his mental
drives to foreign places. Regular metaphors, he said, do this by relying on supposed
familiarity of the implied hearer with the world of the metaphoric signifier.
Theory-constitutive metaphors are different. In their case, although some existing
knowledge of the metaphoric signifier is still being used by its receiver, ‘[...] the function
of metaphor is much broader. The reader is invited to explore the similarities and
analogies between features of the primary and secondary subjects, including features not
yet discovered, or not yet fully understood’ (Boyd 1979: 362-63). Such ensuing research
may verify, discredit or simply enrich the initial metaphor. According to Black,
theory-constitutive metaphors are ‘resonant’ in that they allow for a process of conjuring multiple interpretations and associations related to the original metaphoric signifiers or ‘implicative elaboration’ (1979: 27). In the words of Boyd, ‘the use of theory-constitutive metaphors encourages the discovery of new features of the primary and secondary subjects, and new understanding of theoretically relevant respects of similarity, or analogy, between them’ (1979: 364). Moreover, such metaphors ‘are used to introduce theoretical terminology where none previously existed’ (Ibid.: 257). Fortunately, the “translating as acting” metaphor proves to be very fruitful in this respect. As the following chapters of this work attempt to demonstrate, it is because acting can be compared to translation on many different levels that this metaphor becomes relevant to many different translation issues. Such comparisons, when executed in relatively fine resolution, may inspire the researcher to create new concepts and terminologies in order to bridge the conceptual gaps which exist between the two disciplines. The acting metaphor may not be strong enough to account for all of the issues posed by translation, but it is versatile enough to illuminate many of its facets. This makes it worthy of the title ‘metaphorical concept’ (Lakoff 1980: 6): it is not merely a conceptual object, but a whole conceptual world which may guide one’s ideas regarding translation.

Lakoff et al. noted that ‘If those things entailed by the metaphor are for us the most important aspects of our […] experiences, then the metaphor can acquire the status of truth’ (1980: 142). I believe that the acting metaphor for translation may live up to this criterion as it seems to hold great inspirational value. This has been reiterated by Douglas Robinson who compared the metaphor of translator as actor with several other metaphors:

The translator is more like an actor or a musician (a performer) than like a tape recorder. […]
It is merely to say that machine analogies may be counterproductive for the translator in her or his work, which to be enjoyable must be not mechanical but richly human. Machine analogies fuel formal, systematic thought; they do not succour the translator, alone in a room with a computer and a text, as do more vibrant and imaginative analogies from the world of artistic performance or other humanistic endeavors (2003a: 35).

1.2.4. Existing comparisons of translation to theatrical performance

When people claim that translation is similar to acting, what do they mean? The application of an acting metaphor in order to describe translation is not new. It has appeared on many occasions and served many different purposes. Variants of this metaphor can be found in the writings of contemporary translators and researchers. Simply stating that translation is similar to performance, however, says relatively little. There is no consensus over the proper use of this metaphor in the context of translation. The basic similarity between the two practices, namely, the fact that both acting and translating involve some degree of representation or imitation, can be summarized in the simple words of translator Ralph Manheim: ‘translators are like actors: we speak lines by someone else’ (cited in Stavans 1998: 176). This basic similarity, however, is usually developed further into more specific insights.

Some of the comparisons between translation and acting are negative in spirit and bring to mind the famous lines of Vladimir Nabokov who described his own translation of Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin as ‘A parrot’s screech, a monkey’s chatter | And profanation of the dead’ (Nabokov 2011). American translator Willard Trask commented on the similarity between translation and performance when he claimed that ‘when you translate you’re not expressing yourself. You’re performing a technical stunt. [...] I realized that the translator and the actor had to have the same kind of talent’ (cited in Honig 1985:}
Romy Heylen applied a similar connection in order to criticise a common misconception regarding the representation of source materials. She wrote that many people make the error of believing that ‘there can only be one definitive translation and/or performance of any text, a neutral, transparent translation and mise en scène that faithfully render the canonized “meaning” of a text’ (1993: 123). This belief, Heylen noted, was based on ‘a notion which in turn rests on an instrumentalist conception of translation and performance as signifying practices’ (Ibid.). The most radical employment of the acting metaphor against the ontology of translation was probably the assault which was launched by Alexander Gross, who wrote: ‘translation is ultimately a stage illusion, a conjuror’s trick, a shared mass hallucination without any true basis in acceptable reality at all. It is held together, and just barely at that, by the Will To Believe of the Duped’ (1991: 33). Gross followed the elaboration of this theatrical metaphor with his conclusion that ‘translation does not really exist’ (Ibid.: 34).

Other comparisons are more positive. Robert Wechsler titled his general, all-round translation guide *Performing without a stage: the Art of Literary Translation* (1998). Translator and poet Charles Simic used the translation-as-acting metaphor in order to explain his working methodology: ‘[T]ranslation’, he claimed, ‘is an actor’s medium. If I cannot make myself believe I am writing the poem I’m translating, no degree of aesthetic admiration for the work will help me’ (cited in Jackson 2008). The similarity between the disciplines of translation and acting helped German writer Hans Erich Nossack describe how best to choose an ideal translator. He wrote that translators, like actors, should be similar enough to their author-models as to enable translation, but different enough as to fascinate their audience with their efforts of assimilating into the role (1992: 229). This notion was shared by the poetry translator Christopher Middleton, who described his
favourite kind of translation as ‘a species of a mime’, where the act of representation is motivated by the passionate ‘need to become one with that which is not-self, that which is utterly beyond what self is or was’ (1998: 134). Patrick Primavesi approached the metaphor from the opposite direction and described the process of acting in terms of textual transfer, but noted that it was valid in the other direction as well: ‘the current idea of performance as kind of translation’, he wrote, ‘finds its counterpart in the notion of translation as performance’ (1999: 53). Primavesi linked performances with the concept of translational “afterlife” as described by Walter Benjamin, since the gestures on stage could preserve the source text’s ‘exchange of signs and meanings’ over different contexts, times and places (Ibid.: 54). Gayatri Spivak, who discusses translation from a feminist point of view, wrote that in order to produce a translation which is a proper ‘agent’ of representation, translators ‘must attempt to enter or direct […] its] staging, as one directs a play, as an actor interprets a script’ (1993: 181). James St André, in his turn, chose to link textual transfer to the meta-discipline of oppression studies, e.g. post-colonial studies, queer studies, and so on. He compared translation to various cross-identity performance practices, such as drag shows and masquerades (2010: 275).

On some occasions, the similarity between translators and actors has been elaborated even further, incorporating it into relatively comprehensive theories of translation. To some extent, this elaboration was attempted by Gross when he described the translator as a stage illusionist ‘who is responsible for the outward form of the deception’ (1991: 33). Gross linked several elements in the world of performance to parallels in the world of translation. Stage props became ‘dictionaries and other source books in the field together with the linguistic theories justifying the feasibility of translation to begin with’ (Ibid.), and the proscenium arch behind the actors became the
‘totality of shared cultural history between the two peoples and cultures being subjected
to such alleged acts of translation’ (Ibid.: 34). For Douglas Robinson, acting served as the
scaffolding for his general model of translation. He noted that ‘translators and
(especially) interpreters do all have something of the actor in them, the mimic, the
impersonator’ (2003a: 22-23). Robinson was the scholar who coined the term
‘Performative Linguistics’ in order to describe a field of linguistics which ‘thrives on […]
complex examples taken from joke-telling, story-telling, play-acting, pretending, and so
on, including translating’ (2003b: 10). Following the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin and
Jacques Derrida, Robinson maintained that the performative view, which regards
linguistic expressions as constant citations and variations of former expressions, is
especially relevant for translation. He asks: ‘What happens to our conceptions of
translation when we imagine it not as stable equivalence […] but […] as what Jacques
Derrida calls “iterations”, a repetition of the same that always alters the “same”,
translation as reperformed language?’ (Ibid.: 18). This question was partially answered in
Robinson’s practical guide for translators where the metaphor of acting is used in order to
explain the translator’s inherent playfulness, preparation process and subliminal work
flow (2003a: 34, 74, 115-16). As Robinson sees it, ‘the power of the performative
[concept] should be obvious. Behind the performative as a speech act lies performance,
drama, the entire rich world of the theater, acting, staging, pretending, histrionics. That
world offers copious methodological metaphors for the study of language’ (2003b: 39).

In November 2007, the University of London held a conference called Translation:
Process and Performance. It was an occasion that provided me with an opportunity to
note some of the more contemporary uses of the acting metaphor within the academic
community. One group of speakers used the metaphor as means of expressing general,
descriptive insights on the craft of translation. It was suggested that like actors, translators specialize in rule-breaching and real-time improvisations and forfeit geographical and cultural identities for a state of ‘placelessness’ (Johnston and Kelly: 2007). In another case, it was noted that translators, like actors, go through a long and intensive process of self-transformation and that they sometimes try to practically re-live the lives of their authors (Kritsis: 2007). It was also noted that the translation product, similar to performance, is a ‘supplement’ - a reproduction that replaces, in time, the original, as described by Derrida (Aaltonen: 2007). A second group of scholars used the comparison as a way of commenting on the status of translators. It was claimed that translators, like performers, enjoy a certain degree of freedom over their source text, and that this freedom is what qualifies them to act as cultural ambassadors (Cunniffe: 2007). The common belief that translators, like actors, are untrustworthy, as their vocation involves hiding an author from an audience, was also noted (Farrell: 2007). A third group used the similarity between translators and actors as a way of recommending concrete prescriptive translation strategies. It was claimed that translators, like actors, need to look into themselves while analysing the intended effects of their source texts (O’Thomas: 2007). It was also maintained that like actors, translators must understand the conditions and intentions of the speaking “characters” they represent (O’Neill: 2007) and divide their work into smaller, manageable scene-like units (Eaton: 2007).

The area which is covered by the current uses of the “translation as performance” metaphor is truly vast. Using the terms of Max Black, the application of the acting metaphor to translation can be described as one which is still ‘vital’ (1979: 26), that is, not yet a cliché or a dead phrase, because it forces its users to justify it by giving it various new interpretations. Although many researchers and scholars have applied the
metaphor in their work in order to make a point, the potential of the acting metaphor to benefit the field of translation is far from being fulfilled. In the words of Lakoff and Johnson, what has been offered has low potential: it can be described as ‘idiosyncratic metaphorical expressions that stand alone […] and] do not systematically interact with other metaphorical concepts because so little of them is used. […] They […] are not metaphors that we live by’ (1980: 54).

With the exception of Primavesi, who refers to a few secondary aspects of Brechtian acting in his discussion of translation, the metaphor has almost never been discussed with any direct reference to established performance theories. With the notable exception of Robinson, who integrated it into a wider conceptualisation of language and representation, neither has it been discussed in a comprehensive and systematic manner. This work aims to demonstrate the possibility of utilising theories of acting and performance in a logical and critical manner in order to introduce fresh and new perspectives to the study and practice of translation.

1.3. Methodology

The field of acting is as replete with mutually contradictory goals, models and practices as any other art. Hans Belting noted that nowadays, ‘there is no longer any integrative art theory. In its place are many limited-liability theories following each other, each dissolving art’s aesthetic unity and chopping it up into “aspects”’ (2003: 13). One can claim that this situation is not unique to our own times but rather is integral to the arts in general. An attempt to devise a unified and universal model for any art is probably doomed to fail. I do not wish, therefore, to create a model of translation based on any particular model or practice of performance (nor vice versa), since such a model would
only account for a few aspects of the practices which it wishes to connect. Another option would be to compare acting to translation in a general and philosophical sense, without committing myself to any particular model of acting or translation. Such an approach may serve what James S. Holmes believed was ‘the ultimate goal of the translation theorist in the broad sense’, which was ‘to develop a full, inclusive theory accommodating so many elements that it can serve to explain and predict all phenomena falling within the terrain of translating and translation, to the exclusion of all phenomena falling outside it’ (2006: 186). However, such an aspiration is also problematic. Holmes himself was aware that a comprehensive approach might yield results which are too abstract (Ibid.). Also, as Round noted:

The case for thinking […] playing a role to be] an important element, common to […acting] as well as to interpreting and translation, is indeed strong. But the limiting paradox remains: the more generally applicable such a claim is, the less in particular it can tell us about these two (2005: 49).

I chose to avoid the dilemma altogether by giving up the wish to draw a single, coherent model which would link the practice of translation to the practice of theatre. I agree with Lakoff et al., who said that ‘the very systemacity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another […] will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept’ and that ‘a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor’ (1980: 10). Therefore, I wish to point out many different instances of partial similarity between elements within the two practices rather than commit myself to a single, grand metaphor valid for all aspects of translation.

Black noted that ‘ambiguity is a necessary by-product of the metaphor’s
suggestiveness’ (Black 1979: 30). Round mentioned that metaphors of translation should be judged ‘in terms not of their absolute rightness or wrongness, but of their broader or more specific applicability, their central or peripheral relevance, their cognitive force or lack of it’ (Ibid.: 58). The set of metaphors which are presented in this work should be judged from a similar point of view. I am aware that the pursuit of such conceptual and metaphorical links between two separate fields may elicit a degree of wishful thinking and that my comparisons risk being artificially forced even in cases where little similarity actually exists. I tried to minimise this risk by acknowledging cases where acting and translation are prominently and profoundly different from one another.

When choosing metaphors based on their cognitive force and applicability, regardless of their mutual compatibility or absolute validity, one may end up with a wide range of metaphors indeed. It was necessary for the subsets of the “translation as acting” metaphor to be narrowed down. The methodology which took shape during my research attempts to both restrict the nature of the objects to be compared and to clarify the direction of the comparison. It also includes three basic models of interdisciplinary metaphor-making according to which the actual comparisons are being made. The general aim of this methodology is not to prove that performance is similar to translation, but rather that performance is relevant for translation.

1.3.1. Objects of comparison

The first step in the construction of a methodology for the exploration of a metaphoric connection between two artistic disciplines is to choose the objects that are to be compared. Metaphors in research, said Kuhn, are rooted in empirical observation as much as in the need to explain dry, scientific usage of language (1979: 416). This thesis,
which is centred around a metaphor, consists not only of conceptual thought but of an analytic and empirical review of existing entities. The choice of entities to be compared is not trivial. Many kinds of experienced phenomena can participate in a metaphor. As Lakoff and Johnson noted, there are various ‘experiential bases’ which dictate the basic metaphoric concepts which links groups of concepts together (1980: 19). The obvious phenomena which manifest the links between translation and performance are actual translations and performances. Needless to say, these two phenomena are difficult beasts to compare. We still lack theoretical models which declare what attribute of translation should be compared to which particular attribute of acting. More importantly, the final products of translation and performance represent only specific snapshots of complex and prolonged processes that occur not only on a page or on a stage. In his discussion of the research of translation, Gideon Toury noted, ‘the clear obstacle here is that cognitive processes cannot be observed directly, even if their textual products are observational facts’ (1999: 305, my translation). The processes of translation and performance are spread over time and space, and they include motivations, training, preparation, work processes, set goals and strategies, desired effects on addressees, and so on. The limited perspective which can be given by the final products may not be enough to track down connections between the complete phenomena of translation and acting. In Toury’s words, ‘one who wishes to reach [... cognitive processes of translation] must seek indirect routes’ (Ibid.).

Phenomena which do refer to many elements in the processes of theatrical and translational representation are theorisations which were created by practitioners and thinkers. These theorisations may consist of short and isolated insights or of elaborated and integrative theories; they may be formed by seasoned and experienced practitioners
or by starry-eyed philosophers. Most importantly, they tend to account for many aspects of the practices which they describe. For these reasons, this work is focused on comparisons between theories of acting and theories of translation.

1.3.2. Directionality of conceptual metaphor

Like other living disciplines of art, the fields of translation and performance benefit from research which will generate new ideas, observations and perspectives. This work, however, does not intend to answer this need with equal contributions to both fields. As the title implies, it is biased toward translation studies. Its focus lies in describing translators using terms taken from the world of acting, not the other way around. This choice is a result of the different types of theoretical activity which have been developed around the two arts. Prescriptive translation theory has tackled many issues, offered many strategies and described many phenomena of different scales. However, at least in the west, it has never evolved into a variety of distinct schools of practice nor gathered followers and practitioners the way acting theory has. This imbalance may stem from the fact that actors, unlike translators, have always worked in groups. The need to work harmoniously together may be one of the reasons for acting groups to develop distinct, clear and communicable guidelines, which in time mature into full-scale theories. Another reason may be acting’s inherent multi-mediality that forces the practitioner to recognise many different arts and import their discourses into his or her own. Whatever the reasons for this situation, it is my belief that acting theories are currently more diverse, more far-reaching and potentially more inspiring than many translation theories. Accepting this, the reasonable course of action for this work is to concentrate on the potential contribution of performance theory to translation theory. This work looks, then,
into acting, and tries to find out what it can tell us about translation, not vice versa.

Methodologically, this means that the array of acting theories covered in this work is significantly wider than the array of translation theories mentioned within it. Acting theory is presented whenever I believe it has the potential to contribute to translation, but issues which are discussed in translation theory are pointed out only when they are clearly parallel (or contradictory) to issues which are discussed in theories of performance. My decision to treat acting theories instrumentally, as aids for my research, rather than its aim, also means that their presentation is limited to familiar, well-established arguments and positions. My goal has not been to develop new insights regarding acting as such but to show that basic and common notions of performance are useful and relevant for translators. The decision to describe translation in terms of acting and not vice versa also explains the dominance of prescriptive thought throughout the thesis Unlike the study of translations, acting theory has never entered its fully descriptive phase.

1.3.3. Selection of participants

The models and the theories which are discussed in this work went through a very liberal selection process. They were not disqualified for being difficult to implement. Thus, for example, the relevance of Jerzi Grotowski’s unique histrionic techniques is considered in relation to the work of Walter Benjamin. Neither were they disqualified for being partial. I refer to the ideas of Antonin Artaud, for instance, even though, as Grotowski mentioned, the influential works of Artaud contain little more than metaphorical vision (1967: 189). The ideas which are compared here might be old, such as Diderot's concept of acting, or unpopular among contemporary critics, such as certain
interpretations to Benjamin’s cryptic writings about translation. Importantly, they do not adhere to strict contextual and historical cohesiveness. Old is compared to new, as in the case of Diderot and Stanislavski; East is compared to West, as in the case of the Natyashastra and George Steiner. Indeed, the comparison of theatre to translation in the first place is an unavoidable decontextualisation.

It is tempting to claim that this decision is “post-modern” in nature, in the spirit of Hans Belting, who wrote that ‘the age of art history as an academic discipline coincides with the age of the museum’ (2003: 8) and that the continuous progress of art practice and art theory has become little more than an illusion. One may present this a-historical view of ideas as an attempt to undermine old structures and narratives, a de-constructive action which would ‘[...]d to new and uncertain art discourse that transfer[...] itself onto art itself’ (Ibid.). However, this is not the case. The reason for the fact that this work is focused on the applicability of ideas rather than on their conception and their reception is that processes of acting and translating are generally treated here, more than anything else, as artistic activities. It is true that ‘art history [...] appeared [often] as a master narrative explaining history as well’ (Ibid.: 138), but in this work my main interest is not to explain or clarify history beyond what is necessary but to stimulate future practitioners. As noted by Belting, ‘artists [...] are performing art history as “remake” with a mixture of nostalgia and freedom that reject the historical authority of art’ (Ibid.: 10). His claim, which referred originally to contemporary artists who defy the role which was appointed to them by modernistic art critics, is valid, I believe, for artists of every generation and historical period who have allowed themselves to be inspired by the ideas of their predecessors, even when their combinations made little historical sense. Sections of acting theory which are discussed here are treated as guidelines for translation artists.
As such, they remain relevant regardless of their historical context or contemporary status. Rosa Rabadán has rightly noted that the field of applied translation studies is one where ‘usefulness and usability behave as procedural guidelines and inform all stages of research’ (2010: 9).

The main criterion for the inclusion of concepts, models and theories in this work is their distinctiveness, which enables me to apply them to translation in a meaningful way (admittedly, ideas which are discussed widely in the academic community have the advantage of being more accessible in that respect). Such pieces of performance theory can show best how acting is inherently similar, or dissimilar, to translation. Some well-known acting theories are omitted or marginalised here because they lacked clarity. The use of Constantin Stanislavski’s monumental work, one of the acting theories included here, is a good example. Stanislavski’s writings comprise one of the most influential sources in the world of contemporary acting. His “system”, which was developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, provides the foundation for many thriving schools of acting. It is worth noting, however, that his theory evolved over a lifetime and became quite impure in its later stages. Stanislavski was a director and an actor, not a philosopher; when put to continuous practical test, his ideas sometimes seem to have evolved to the point of incoherence. For this reason, I have chosen to put more emphasis on his early work and on one of the sub-systems developed by the master’s students, namely the American Method. Although it has been highly criticised in the contemporary world of theatre acting, the Method offers a clear, distinct and straight-forward rendering of early Staniskavski’s main ideas and is more useful as a basis for analogies of translation-related processes.
1.3.4. Three-way approach to interdisciplinarity

One of the reasons the link between translating and acting is so interesting is that it functions on several levels and in several orders of magnitude. It may be as tight as a definition in a dictionary or as loose and associative as a poetic metalepsis. As noted by Lakoff et al., ‘the various metaphorical structurings of a concept serve different purposes by highlighting different aspects of the concept’ (1980: 96). The link between the disciplines may be manifested in textbook “metaphors” which can describe translation poetically as if it were acting. However, in order to point out the relevance of one discipline to the other, it is most beneficial to manifest it in similes, which can refer to similarities between the fields in an explicit manner and encourage specificity. As explained by Harris in his discussion of similes as rhetorical devices:

Whenever it is not immediately clear to the reader, the point of similarity between the unlike objects must be specified to avoid confusion and vagueness. Rather than say, then, that “Money is like muck,” and “Fortune is like glass,” a writer will show clearly how these very different things are like each other (2010).

The main simile which underlies this work, i.e. that translating is like acting, is simple enough, but it can be divided into many sub-similes which are not necessarily compatible with each other. They may overlap each other by explaining different aspects of translation in terms of the same facet of acting, or they may contradict each other by offering different explanations to the same aspect. This is not necessarily a bad thing. As noted by Lakoff et al., it is possible to have ‘two metaphors [...that] are not consistent, (that is, they form no single image), [...but] nonetheless “fit together,” by virtue of being subcategories of a major category and therefore sharing a major common entailment’ (1980: 44).
My choice to incorporate many different metaphorical links into this work, regardless of their mutual consistency in terms of structure or argument, resulted in the development of three different methods of interdisciplinary discussion.

The first method, which I call *interdisciplinary projection*, is straightforward. It is also the method most commonly used in this work. Using this method, I consider the practical relevance of issues which are discussed by acting scholars, or even just common techniques which are used by practising performers, in the context of translation. A similar method was used by Robinson who designed some clever translation exercises which were inspired by acting drills (2003a). The conclusions of comparisons of this kind are, naturally, the most readily applicable for practising translators. Practical as they may be, they can still inspire interesting theoretical discussions about the fundamental properties of performance and translation. Chapter 2, which discusses a couple of theatrical modes of mimesis and their relevance to translation, features links which were formed by means of interdisciplinary projection.

The second method, which I call *interdisciplinary pairing*, is compatible with the spirit of Harris, who wrote that ‘[the] ways to create similes include the use of comparison’ (2010). It involves the matching of specific translation theoreticians with specific theatre theoreticians in an attempt to draw insights from the results. I have used this method in cases of striking similarity between ideas which had been conceived relatively separately in each of the disciplines. The discussions which are powered by this method do not usually result in practical advice for translators but they create fertile ground for comparative discussions. The most interesting cases are where the initial similarities between two thinkers, such as common goals or common strategies, hide profoundly different principles and views. Interdisciplinary pairing considers the
similarity between the compared ideas as a starting point. In this work it looks for new insights about translation which exceed the mere conclusion that translation is, indeed, comparable to acting. Chapter 3 discusses translating as an ethical tool by acknowledging the similarities between ideas that were discussed by a pair of thinkers, Bertolt Brecht and Lawrence Venuti. It is based mostly on an application of interdisciplinary pairing. It includes cases in which the difference proves to be no less interesting than the initial similarity.

The third method, which I call *interdisciplinary elaboration*, involves expanding the basic metaphor of translating as acting into new sub-metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson state that ‘because concepts are metaphorically structured in a systematic way […] it is possible for us to use expressions […] from one domain […] to talk about corresponding concepts in the metaphorically defined domain’ (1980: 52). According to them, this structural quality is essential in order for a basic metaphor such as ‘mind is a container’ (Ibid.: 148), which underlies expressions such as “you are in my mind”, to develop into a more elaborate metaphors such as ‘ideas are food’ (Ibid.), which underlies expressions such as “food for thought”. Using this method consciously, I suggest associative and sometimes far-fetched connections between established concepts within performance and translation. Such ad-hoc comparisons tend to be especially thought-provoking as they often suggest surprising perspectives and alternative categorisations. They also risk being intellectually irresponsible since they contain more conceptual speculation and less research into existing concepts. Nevertheless, this kind of metaphor elaboration can still be beneficial. Lakoff et al. maintain that metaphors which are based on less-used facets of common metaphors can be merely ‘figurative’ but they can also become ‘instances of novel metaphor’ which are ‘used […] as a new way of thinking about something’ (1980:...
A purposeful metaphor-making seems to be supported by Boyd as well, as ‘it is part of the task of scientific theory construction involving metaphors (or any other sort of theoretical terminology) to offer the best possible explication of the terminology employed’ (1979: 362). Even though this method is possibly the most interesting, it is also the one least used within the current work. The suggestion of a conceptual similarity which exists between the concept of theatrical space and the concept of translational norms, as it appears in Chapter 5, exemplifies an application of interdisciplinary elaboration.

1.3.5. Practical examples

The ultimate goal of the various methods which are used throughout this work is to show that comparing translation to performance can suggest fresh approaches to the art of textual transfer. In an attempt to show what such comparisons may inspire, I have attempted to demonstrate the application of their results to the discussion of translation. Some passages at the end of each chapter, then, are dedicated to discussions which extend beyond the metaphor of translation as acting. That is, they originate from the comparison between translation and performance rather than establishing it. This is the case, for example, with the discussion of immersing translation and sharing translation at the end of Chapter 5.

Other passages attempt to demonstrate a more practical aspect of the comparison. Following Anthony Pym, I believe that comparing several target texts that were generated from the same source text may be more useful than analysing shifts which occurred between the source and the target. Indeed, as Pym noted, the comparison of several variants which were produced by the same translator is especially beneficial
(1998: 107). For this reason, I have translated several passages which were taken from the same literary work. These demonstrations are accompanied by brief discussions which point out notable decisions which were taken in accordance with acting-related ideas. The work I chose to translate is a chapter taken from the Hebrew book, *Family Cooking*, by Gil Hovav (see Appendix A for the source text). Comprised of short anecdotes from the author’s childhood in Jerusalem of the 1960s and the 1970s, each chapter is followed by a family recipe. Hovav became a celebrated television chef, much like his British peer Nigella Lawson, but *Family Cooking* does not resemble her popular cookbooks. Rather, it is more comparable to Gerald Durrell’s *My Family and Other Animals*. Like Durrell’s work, *Family Cooking* was written from the point of view of an adult who brings back his childhood as a means of portraying his quirky family. The Hebrew text, written by Hovav, a grandson of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda – the lexicographer who was the most prominent personality behind the revival of modern Hebrew – resembles Durrell’s text in its clarity, its richness and its warmth. The fact that this chosen text contains many diverse and unique speaking voices makes it an ideal example for my thesis.

1.4. Placement within translation studies

The explicitly interdisciplinary methodology of this work cannot be placed easily in any one of the major ‘moves’ of twentieth-century Translation Studies as noted by Jeremy Munday: ‘Linguistic translation theory’, ‘Polysystem theory and other system theories’ and ‘The “cultural turn”’ (2010: 424-25). What could be said is that in portraying the translator as a performer and an artist, this work is compatible with a contemporary trend of ‘increasing interest in the role of the translator rather than in the
translation product […] which] has manifested itself in the concern for translator ethics and identity’ (Ibid.: 425). However, in the interest of being more precise, this work should also be placed in its mother discipline according to a more basic categorisation. The most influential categorisation of Translation Studies was devised by James Holmes. Two of the categories suggested by Holmes are of special relevance to this work: applied translation studies and theoretical translation studies.

The initial division which was offered by Holmes lies between applied translation studies and pure translation studies. Applied translation studies refers to ‘translator training … teaching methods, testing techniques, and curriculum planning’, as well as to various translation aids and translation criticism (Holmes 2006: 189, see also Munday 2001: 10). As defined by Rabadán, ‘Applied Translation Studies [...] is concerned with translation activities that address a particular goal and a specific (group of) final user(s) and that imply doing something with, for or about translation according to some standard of quality’ (2010: 7). The second branch, pure translation studies, is sub-divided into descriptive and theoretical translation studies. The descriptive sub-branch attempts to document and explain existing translation products, processes and functions, while the theoretical sub-branch, which is divided further into general, comprehensive studies and partial studies with limited scope, focuses on ‘using the results of descriptive translation studies, in combination with the information available from related fields and disciplines, to evolve principles, theories, and models which will serve to explain and predict what translating and translations are and will be’ (Holmes 2006: 185).

Holmes’ categorisation has received plenty of criticism. Pym wrote that Holmes’ system was lacking, as it looked at translations and neglected the translators who produce them (1998: 4). Munday noted that it was trying to incorporate Interpreting Studies
which seemed to be a field of its own (2001: 13). The strongest criticism concerns the strict hierarchy which was imposed by Holmes upon the various fields which comprise Translation Studies. Pym, for example, noted that ‘whatever the reasons behind these categories, the field of history is strangely fragmented on both sides of the descriptive/theoretical divide’ (1998: 2). Rabadán wrote that ‘there is no applied consideration which is not informed by some theoretical model and dependent on some descriptive data, and the applied branch in its turn supplied materials for the other two’ (2010: 7). Nevertheless, despite the problematic nature of Holmes’ hierarchy, his categories remain relevant as independent points of focus.

The theoretical aspect of this work is compatible with the theoretical sub-branch of translation studies. Specifically, it is compatible with the concept of ‘theories […] which are in fact not general theories, but partial or specific in their scope’ (Holmes 2006: 186). The ideas which are discussed here can, at times, be limited to the translation of specific text types (see Ibid.: 187-88). Chapter 2, for example, is relevant mostly for literary translation. These discussions can also be restricted by the translation problems which they wish to address (Ibid.: 191). Sections of Chapter 5, for example, deal specifically with strategies which are used in order to overcome cultural distance between the source text and the target readership. Oftentimes, the discussions are equally compatible with the ‘field of the history of translation theory’ (Ibid.). Chapter 4, which discusses the work of Walter Benjamin regarding translation, demonstrates this aspect.

The applied aspect of this work, in turn, is mainly compatible with the applied branch of translation studies as explained by Holmes. It attempts to inspire translators by discussing methods and goals of translation from a performance point of view. It does not rely, however, on descriptive data from existing translations, and its goals are hopefully
wider than the narrow role which was appointed to applied translation studies by Rabadán, namely, ‘to account for the standard translation correctness prevalent in a given community’ (2010: 7). Like applied translation research, this work relies ‘on various procedures, generally borrowed from the corresponding associated discipline’ (Ibid.: 9), where the aforementioned discipline is acting.

In general, then, this work discusses the various conceptual relations between translation and acting by combining aspects from the applied branch and the theoretical sub-branch of translation studies in order to enrich the disciplines of translation and translation studies as a whole.

### 1.5. Structure

This introductory chapter is followed by four chapters and a conclusion. Each of the chapters highlights a specific facet of the comparison between textual translation and theatrical performance.

The second chapter, “Mimesis and Characters”, deals with questions which are related to identity conflicts common to translators and actors. It examines the question of the persona to be represented by translators and discusses the implications of theatre-like character-oriented translation, where the translators choose to represent not the authors of the source texts, but rather the speaking characters which are embedded within them. It is followed by a discussion of two rival schools of theatrical representation and questions the type and the amount of transformation that translators could or should go through. The chapter ends with a general discussion of the question of creativity in acting and in translation.

The third chapter, “Promoting Activism”, deals with questions which regard
ethically motivated translations and performances. These are considered by comparing the theatre of Bertolt Brecht and its use of “alienation” to the translation ideology of Lawrence Venuti which emphasises “foreignising translation”.

In the fourth chapter, “Approaching Ascension”, the question of representation as a means of spiritual progress is discussed by linking the works of director Jerzi Grotowski, who sought ascension through “holy acting”, with Walter Benjamin’s concept of translation as a stairway to an ideal “pure language”.

The fifth chapter, “Space and Norms”, compares the spatial construction of the theatre, which limits the actors but provides them with a medium through which they send messages, to translation norms, which restrict the translators but supply them with vital standardisation. It considers the inherent artificiality and constructibility of theatrical spaces, and suggests that translators may benefit by viewing translation norms in a similar light. The discussion then focuses on questions of real distance and metaphorical distance between the representational act and its spectators. It concludes with a comparison of two opposing approaches to the integration of spectators in the performing space and notes their striking relevance to types of textual translation.
2. Mimesis and Characters

Ideal-type actors, who operate under the convention of the fourth wall, do not showcase their talents to the audience in a direct, non-mediated manner, using only their personal identity. As described by Bernard Beckerman, drama ‘occurs when one or more human beings isolated in time and space present themselves in imagined acts to another or others’ (1979: 22). When actors take part in dramatic plays, presenting themselves engaged in imagined acts and imitating the words and actions of others, they are participants in Aristotelian mimesis (Aristotle 1996: 1-5). As defined by Patrice Pavis, mimesis ‘is the imitation or representation of something. […] Mimesis [in theatre] has to do with the representation of men and particularly their action’ (1998: 213-14). This unique situation, where one person tries to mimic the actions of another, is one of the core issues faced by translators and scholars of translation since translation usually involves the representation of texts which were not conceived by the translator.

Mimesis of this kind brings to mind a host of terms, among them: “mimicry”, “imitation”, “impersonation”, “transformation” and “playing a part”. Yet none of these terms fully grasps the meaning of mimesis. The term “mimicry” has derogative undertones and the term “imitation”, although commonly used, has a specific meaning in Translation Studies.1 “Impersonation” assumes a degree of conscious deception, “transformation” assumes a degree of actual metamorphosis, and the expression “playing a role” of a foreign persona seems to be too general. Sometimes an actor may play a part which is either too alien to be considered a persona, such as a tree or an abstract idea, or

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1 John Dryden wrote: ‘I take imitation of an author […] to be an endeavour of a later poet to write like one who has written before him, on the same subject; that is, not to translate his words, or to be confined to his sense, but only to set him as a pattern, and to write, as he supposes that author would have done, had he lived in our age, and in our country’ (1992: 19).
too domestic, such as himself or herself. For the purposes of this work, I will use the term “mimetic representation”. It implies an emphasis on the similarity between aspects of the source material and aspects of the target material, and, to my way of thinking, is the most suitable term.

Employing a plethora of terms, and throughout the history of the discipline from the days of Saint Jerome to modern day, scholars have discussed both practical and theoretical aspects of mimesis in translation. Pym, who approached the issue systematically and analytically, noted that ‘the discursive person who says “I am translating” cannot be actually translating at the moment of utterance’ (2004: 72). A translation, therefore, cannot be perceived as a regular utterance, as ‘the maxim of first-person displacement says that the translating translator cannot occupy an “I”, a first-person pronoun. This distinguishes translation from other forms of reported speech’ (Ibid.: 70). Declaring as he has that this maxim is inherent to translation, Pym adds that breaching it would create ‘implicatures [which] point to commentary rather than translation’ (Ibid.).

Since no action can take place without an acting agent, translators, like actors, face a nominal identity problem. Robinson grasped the scope of this problem when he noted that ‘by necessity translators [...] carry a wealth of different “selves” or “personalities” around inside them, ready to be reconstructed on the computer screen whenever a new text arrives’ (2003a: 23-24). This chapter is devoted to the most obvious issues which are common to translators and actors: issues of mimesis and self-alteration which are common to all who attempt to become a vessel for words which were conceived by others.

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2 Pym’s work assumes the point of view of the readers who wish to make linguistic and communicational sense of translations, ‘at the point where a translation is being received’ (2004: 71). This is not completely compatible with this chapter, which assumes the point of view of translators. However, Pym’s observations remain relevant.
Before delving into specific manifestations of this issue in existing theories and phenomena of linguistic and histrionic representation, one needs to acknowledge some basic, relevant questions. The first question concerns the degree of obligation that performers and translators should have regarding the source texts upon which they wish to build a mimetic representation. The acting profession has offered many answers to this question. Some acting traditions, like the Commedia dell’arte and stand-up comedy, for instance, rely heavily upon improvisation. In those traditions, most of the “target text” is the performer’s interpretation of a personality type or a scenario which the actor continually adjusts for her or his audience. Other traditions, like Opera or Noh theatre, commit the actor to exact frames of mimesis and dictate not only the texts to be spoken but also the manner of their presentation. Intuitively, one feels that the mimesis which is manifested through translation is of the strict kind, as the translators are required to adhere to ideals of fidelity and do not enjoy the same amount of artistic freedom that actors do. On the other hand, translators do not merely complement the source text using additional communication channels like voice, expression and movement in the manner of theatre actors. Rather, their mimetic activity involves a complete linguistic makeover and replacement of the texts that they translate. Thus, like actors who recite the lines of a play, translators are normatively bound to the mimesis of their source text. But like improvisational performers, who invent their wording during the show, translators are also liberated from the constraints of a prescribed text.

Deciding upon the degree of fidelity needed while “disguising” usually bothers translation scholars more than theatre scholars, possibly because acting, unlike translation, is no longer considered a vital tool for the transfer of information (compared to, say, its educational roles in the middle ages). The question of the amount of freedom
which is to be allowed in representation through mimesis leads to further questions about the ends for which this freedom can and should be utilised. Enlightenment philosopher Denis Diderot, in the eighteenth century, was quick to point out that in the medium of theatre, ‘truth for stage purposes’ is not an attempted replication of real life but a result of artificial mimetic means (1957: 23). Actors, he wrote, should not concentrate on copying actual behaviours but rather on ‘the conforming of action, diction, face, voice, movement, and gesture, to an ideal type invented by the poet, and frequently enhanced by the player’ (Ibid.). According to Diderot, actors should study the natural phenotypes of emotions but must refine them and present general archetypes of expression if they wish to move their audience (Ibid.). The aesthetic and mental tension between an exact replica of an original and the production of a pleasing representation, what Diderot described as ‘The Paradox of Acting’, is just one example of potential conflict that may cause the performer to deviate from faithful mimetic representation of his or her inspirational source. Like actors, translators sometimes deviate from their source texts and create unfaithful figures for a host of reasons. They may deviate from “exact” representation in order to adjust the target text to the habits and the capabilities of the addressees, to streamline it according to cultural manners and decencies, to obey external censorship and so on. They may even view fidelity as a mark of inferior work. Christopher Middleton, who saw similarities between translators and mimes insofar as they are both creators rather than imitators, wrote: ‘with mime, certain traces of the original may be implied in the act [of actors and translators], but the act itself is originative. If the act is powerfully originative, the traces may be reduced to a mere ghostly scaffolding’ (1998: 135). Generally, the theme of aims and goals which cause the mimicking agents to shift their mimetic representations away from their source material seem to be popular both in
translation studies and in theatre studies.

These basic issues, which relate to the goals of mimesis, are followed by more subtle issues which are related to its processes and methods. The nature and the level of personal change that the mimicking agents go through may vary greatly since they can engage in mimesis through study of their represented objects, through imitation of their features, through identification with their assumed personalities and even through amalgamation with their identities. The question of the proper method of successful mimesis, often linked to the former question of the goal of mimesis, is a subject of continuous debate among schools of performance, and is typically more often discussed in acting and performance theory than in translation studies. This may be due to the fact that processes involved in the practice of translation are more mental and emotional than physical and are therefore difficult to observe, document or teach. Even indirect means, such as think-aloud protocols or textual analysis, permit only limited access to the processes of translation. In comparison, acting processes are more multi-channelled and potentially, at least, more approachable and graspable.

The current chapter discusses two issues of mimesis which have been wrestled with by the discipline of acting, in my opinion, in ways which are relevant to practising translators. The first issue regards the question of who or what should be represented mimetically. The second issue regards the type and nature of personal transformation which may be required for the process of this mimetic representation. For the sake of this discussion, I will look at actors as the primary agents of theatrical mediation, as the work of other agents, such as directors, falls beyond the scope of this chapter. The discussion of mimesis in translation, in turn, is limited here to the scope of literary translation. This scope is still wide enough, as it has no defined borders. Indeed, as noted by Theo
Hermans, ‘the search for a definition of literary translation leads nowhere’ (2010: 78). However, literary translation’s relatively established and conventional separation between authors, translators, fictional characters and readers renders it especially susceptible to the acting metaphor.

2.1. Who should be the one represented?

As explained by Pym, one of the ways to deal with the fact that ‘the translating translator cannot say “I”’ (2004: 67) is to comprehend the act of translation using indirect speech, as in “the utterance of person X translates as ABC” (see Ibid.: 73). This approach, Pym noted, was evident in the writings of John Bigelow and Brian Mossop; it is clear, decisive and analytically sound. However, it may be of little use for translators, who need to account for the fact that the actual utterance they produce is just “ABC”. Pym warned against the loss of the first person in the act of translation:

The operator “...translates as...” […] makes third persons out of the discursive subjectivities involved in translation. […] The third person is the one who is absent; it is a non-person, a thing and not a subjectivity. Translation turns the world of persons into a world of things (2004: 80).

As a possible alternative, Pym considered turning to the second person. Using such an approach, ‘the second person [in translation is] a macrostructural position, functioning as a property of the entire text. This is what literary theorists would call an “implied” reader […] in relative independence of whatever flesh-and-blood receivers might come along’ (Ibid.: 74-75). However, merely facilitating communication with implied readers is not enough. As Pym pointed out, because the addressed person does not understand the source language, ‘every act of translation must be for a discursive second person in some
way excluded from the communication act’ (Ibid.: 75). Every translated utterance has, therefore, a purpose of its own which is separate from the purpose of the non-translated utterance. In that sense, ‘one could say that the utterance “I am translating” is no truer than its extended form “you are reading the translation I am now doing”’ (Ibid.); such formulations, Pym wrote, fail to acknowledge the full textual situation.

Addressing implied readers can become more meaningful for translators if it is complemented by a specific kind of translatorial mimetic representation. Translators can pretend, mentally, to be the implied author, and become a ‘combination of feeling, intelligence, knowledge and opinion [...] that “accounts” for the narrative’ (Abbott 2005: 77). This step, from addressing implied readers to representing implied authors mimaetically, can be done only because ‘reading intentionally [i.e. assuming authorial intention] is a very common activity’ (Ibid.: 79). It happens because, as noted by Radegundis Stolze, according to hermeneutic approaches ‘the translator does not analyse linguistic objects, he or she is confronted with the voice of an author – in a culture – in a discourse field – as texts – with words – carrying sense’ (2010: 144, emphasis in the original). It is true that the author is only one of the many agents who are involved in the processes of translational decision-making (see Munday 2001: 77-78); recognising this understanding, however, does not change the common assumption that the personage with whom translators try to link themselves is that of the author. Robinson, who compared translators to actors, shared this assumption:

“[A]cting out” is essential training for actors, comedians, clowns, mimes – and translators and interpreters, who are also in the business of pretending to be someone they’re not. What else is a legal translator doing, after all, but pretending to be a lawyer, writing as if s/he were a lawyer? What is a medical translator doing but pretending to be a doctor or a nurse?
Technical translators pretend to be (and in some sense thereby become) technical writers (2003a: 116).

In his comparison of translation to acting, Robinson omits one further step. Translators do assume a foreign voice, but, as Abbot stated, ‘voice in narration is a question of who it is we “hear” doing the narrating’ (2005: 64). Actual actors who perform a play text do not to pretend to be its author. Nor do they typically address its implied receiver in an authorial capacity. Usually, they pretend to be fictional characters who live in fictional worlds. According to Peter Szondi and Michael Hays, ideal, “absolute” drama is one where characters are actually unaware of author and audience alike; they ‘act’ as if they did not exist. In the words of Szondi et al., ‘drama […] can be conscious of nothing outside itself […]. The lines in a play are as little an address to the spectator as they are a declaration by the author.’ (1983: 195). Dramatic characters live in the diegesis, ‘that “reality” in which the events [portrayed in the narrative] are presumed to take place’ (Abott 2005: 68). In the words of the literary scholar Binyamin Harshav, dramatic actors refer to an ‘internal field of reference’ (2000: 16-17, my translation). Using the multi-layered model which was coined by Manfred Pfister (1988: 3-4, 58-60), the emphasis in dramatic dialogue is not on the external communication system which governs the correspondence between the author and the audience, but on the internal communication system which governs the correspondence between the dramatis personae. An actor playing Oedipus is not playing Sophocles, neither is an actress who is playing Desdemona playing Shakespeare. Furthermore, the actors are addressing Jocaste and Othello, respectively, rather than the theatre-goers. In an ideal-type, absolute and pure drama, the author never addresses his audience: the characters, and the actors with them, address each other, unaware of anything outside their own world. When applied to
actual performance, this is the principle which stands behind “the fourth wall”, an imaginary barrier which separates the fictional characters from the actual audience.

Translators, then, can pretend, if only for a moment, that they are the person who creates and utters the text they translate. But, like actors, they do not have to pretend to be writers and address these utterances to readers. Rather, they can pretend to be explicit or implied characters and focus their communicative effort on the level of the fictional world which is portrayed inside the text.

2.1.1. The relevance of a character-based approach to translators

The consideration of theatrical objects of mimetic representation can become, in my opinion, highly relevant for literary translators. Literary texts, both dramatic and narrative, contain many distinctive voices which are meaningful primarily in the context of an internal communication system. It goes without saying that dialogues are comprised of speech acts between characters. At the same time, all narrative descriptions suggest the personality of a narrator who is not necessarily identical to the personality of the actual writer, and, more importantly, is a fictional creation.

Translating a passage as if it were created by and for fictional characters and narrators, thus replacing the reliance upon the interaction between authors and their audiences with one between acting characters and their interlocutors, produces several interesting results. Translators, like actors, can speak to and for characters. In doing so, they may discover several positive implications for their work. Firstly, trying to decipher the functions of an expression directed from a fictional character to another can be

3 Interestingly, Robinson parallels the situation of translators themselves to the situation of characters on theatrical stage, as translators and dramatic characters are ‘denied access of the first person’ and encounter difficulties when they try to address their audiences directly (2003b: 52).
significantly simpler than trying to decipher the functions of a piece of text directed from an author to his or her readers. As noted by H. Porter Abbott, ‘the real author is a complex, continually changing individual of whom we may never have any secure knowledge’ (2005: 77). An implied author, then, is not always easy to reconstruct. On the other hand, the events in the fictional world, which surround the characters in a literary or quasi-literary piece, provide translators with immediate and useful feedback. The reaction of target readers is not available to translators, but the reaction of characters who are acted upon within the text is usually available (see Benshalom 2006: 10-11). Secondly, character-oriented translation can help translators bypass an explicitating and flattening interpretation of the text’s message which may result from seeking a single authorial intention. A similar thought informs Phyllis Bird’s recommendation to bible translators to let the modern generation ‘overhear an ancient conversation, rather than [...] hear itself addressed directly’ (1988: 91, cited in Bound 2005: 54). By thinking for characters and focusing on their various intentions, translators can enjoy the benefit of having multiple personas to mimic without forcing a homogeneous and coherent interpretation of a single, authorial mind upon the reader. Finally, representing characters while translating may prove to be more fascinating than representing an author, and therefore more inspiring as well. Translating a piece with the author in mind involves, in the poetic words of Vladimir Nabokov, ‘a poet’s patience | And scholastic passion blent’ (2011); but the lives of literary characters often involve a wide gallery of non-scholastic passions and life events. More importantly, the range of action of fictional characters is generally wider than that of their author. Characters do not just sit and address their ideas to a readership. Rather, they fight, woo, plot, betray and save each other, to name a few common fictional actions. This intensity of fictional life may appeal to translators and
increase their motivation. Using Pym’s terminology, this may help them approach the speech within the text as a ‘participative person’ rather than as an ‘observational person’ (2004: 77).

2.1.2. The emotional attitudes to objects of mimetic representation

2.1.2.1. The hermeneutic motion of author-oriented translation

One of the more delicate implications of character-oriented translation is the change it brings to the traditional power scheme of literary translation by affecting the translators' emotional attitude toward the source text.

The traditional view, according to which translators should try to represent the authors of the source texts, involves a complex range of emotions, both conscious and subconscious. A translator may come to identify him- or herself with the writer. However, the dedication of translators to their authors can extend far beyond camaraderie. John Dryden has noted that translators should take care of the authors' image as they take care of their own, as if their fates were one: ‘after all,’ he wrote, ‘a translator is to make his author appear as charming as possibly he can, provided he maintains his character, and makes him not unlike himself’ (1992: 23). Following this line of thought, translators may be asked to become more than friends, admirers, representatives and even servants of their authors; they might be asked to become their doubles, and to offer portions of their own experiences and personalities as a sacrifice for the masters. Middleton, who compared translation to mime, wrote that ‘the need formalized in mime is the need to become one with that which is not-self, that which is utterly beyond what self is or was’ (1998: 135). Translators cannot be expected to adjust
to such demands without an intense emotional reaction. George Steiner described a possible submissive reaction, where translators who dedicate themselves to the source text are awe-inspired by it to a point where they decide that no translation can do justice to the work of the author (1975: 380). José Ortega y Gasset has suggested an opposite, insurgent reaction. Good authors, he said, ‘make continual incursions into grammar, into established usage, and into linguistic norms. It is an act of permanent rebellion’ (1992: 94). Translators, on the other hand, have ‘a shy character’ and they do not dare to rebel in a similar way. Therefore, said Gassett, they rebel against the source texts instead, as they ‘place the translated author in the prison of normal expression’ (Ibid.).

Changing a source text into a target text and being changed by it involves, then, a complex emotional process. Steiner offered a comprehensive description of such a process. According to him, the emotional attitude of translators toward the source and target texts can be viewed as a continuous, ever-changing motion – a ‘hermeneutic motion’ (1975: 296). This motion is a repeating cycle of four emotional phases the translators go through during their work. The first stage, Trust, is when the translators choose to believe that translation is possible and that a source text is meaningful, comprehensible and coherent enough to be initially translatable and worthy of translation. The second stage, Penetration, is an aggressive and de-constructive stage, when the translators learn to know the inner mechanisms of the source text in a violent manner while looking for meaning: ‘decipherment is dissective, leaving the shell smashed and the vital layers stripped’ (ibid.: 298). This stage is also traumatic: it harms the unity and the wholeness of the text in the mind of its translators, similarly to an ‘open-cast mine [which has] left an empty scar in the landscape’, and it causes them to feel the ‘sadness after success, the Augustinian tristitia which follows on the cognate acts
of erotic and of intellectual possession’ (Ibid.). The third stage, Embodiment, is where the translators themselves go through a change; they commit ‘sacramental intake’ (Ibid.: 299) and assimilate the foreign material; they start thinking and feeling using the external forms and ideas to which they have been exposed. This can make them stronger, but it can also infect them like a disease, changing and harming their own voice and sense of identity. Steiner linked this individual process to a wider cultural context, where a weak or immature language-culture is risking eradication when facing translations made from a stronger, more mature ones (see Even Zohar 1990 on polysystem theory for a comprehensive formulation of similar ideas). The fourth and final stage, Restitution, takes place when the wrongs are made right and the tensions are calmed by ‘enactment of reciprocity in order to restore balance’ (Steiner 1975: 300). The translators understand that they were enriched by translating the source text, and the source text 'understands' that it was glorified, eternalised and illuminated by the act of translation. The translators forgive the text for altering them and are forgiven in return for invading it.

Steiner's model is not the only possible formulation of the emotional relationship between translators and texts. It is, however, detailed and comprehensive. Even if one disagrees with its strict notion of 'cause and effect' which connects the phases of the hermeneutic motion to each other, each of the phases remains a valid description of a translational situation.

2.1.2.2. The hermeneutic motion of character-oriented translation

The emotional phases of the translation process described by Steiner refer to the unique relationship between translator and text. Their formulation, however, remains valid even when the term “text” is replaced with the term “author”. An author of a source
text may be perceived as its personified embodiment by the translator, and he or she may become the object of similar emotional stages. This intense, emotional reaction is grounded in a tradition which considers authors to be creative artists who are judged for their scope, vision and imagination. Conversely, translators are often treated like mere technicians, judged mainly for their ability to produce a communicative, but faithful, target text.

When translators pretend to be characters instead of writers, however, the situation changes. They become more interested in the internal communication system of fictional communicating voices and less interested in authors (and readers). This brings about important changes to Steiner’s hermeneutic motion.

Accordingly, the first hermeneutic stage, Trust, becomes less trivial than in the case of author-oriented translation. While translators can feel relatively certain that the text segments they work on will be comprehensible to their source and target readers, they cannot assume the same certainty when considering the relevance of these segments to the internal communication system which contains only fictional characters. The author, the narrator, and even a character, may address the reader directly, using textual expressions which hold little or no meaning to the other fictional personas inhabiting the text. Choosing to translate a text to and for the characters participating in it is not always a viable option. Translators who wish to do so must scrutinise the text before it gains their trust.

The second stage, Penetration, is a process that affects translators more directly. When translators cease to produce the target texts thinking of their authors, and focus instead on serving fictional characters, they become less threatened by the initial inappropriateness of disguising themselves as someone other than who they are. No
fictional characters, as marvellous as they may be, can intimidate a translator’s ego and inspire awe the way real authors do. Thus, when translators decide to take a character-oriented approach, they experience a less traumatic stage of penetration. Exposing and imitating the textual mechanisms used by a great writer may be considered blasphemy, but doing the same to fictional characters is nothing more than the task of every competent reader. The less tense and traumatic nature of the penetration stage in these circumstances may result in a smoother, swifter and more fluent translation, unhindered by the fear and emotional discomfort which may accompany an act of aggressive interpretation.

Unlike Penetration, the third stage, Embodiment, remains undiluted. Fictional characters can be just as foreign to translators as real authors are and translators must find a way to internalise their unfamiliar ways of thinking and modes of expression. While regular readers may criticise characters or enjoy their superiority over them, translators who go through the Steiner’s hermeneutic motion must find a way to make them part of themselves. In character-oriented translation, Embodiment becomes more difficult to achieve for a prosaic reason: many texts include more than one voice, multiplying the efforts the translators have to go through in order to incorporate them into their own. Like actors, they must become multi-faced.

The fourth stage, Restitution, is the one affected most seriously by the change of attitude involved in a character-oriented view. When the penetration is not traumatic and does not involve the intensity of a subordinating relationship due to the lack of an authoritative figure in the translation process, there is less need to restore its effects to balance. The menacing presence of authors may terrify translators but it can also push them to their limits. When real-world writers of source texts are less present in the
translator’s mind, the translator usually feels a less urgent need to recognise and compensate for the re-shaping of their work. Practically, it means that the experience of character-oriented translation may be more casual and less personally meaningful than the experience of a traditional, author-oriented translation. Translations that are character-oriented should exhibit a high degree of creativity, playfulness and “flow”. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise they may also lack some of the polish and accuracy which result from a sense of awe and responsibility (see Benshalom 2006: 48-51).

2.1.3. Problems of the character-based approach

As appealing as it might be, the character-oriented approach to translation is a strategy that cannot be adopted blindly. More specifically, if it is applied to incompatible texts it may cause more harm than good. For texts which feature ‘heterodiegetic narration’ (Abbot 2005: 68), narrated by a voice which is outside the action, for instance, it is definitely not ideal. Even when the narrator is situated inside the action, or when the personalities of the characters behind the text are vague or unapproachable, attempts to represent their persons mimetically may prove futile. As is generally the case, when characters are too foreign for the translator to identify with, he or she will not have the motivation to make these attempts in the first place.

Perhaps the dominant stumbling block to shifting the translator’s concentration to the level of a fictional, internal communication system is the fact that this shift ignores the inevitable gaps between the source culture, which generated the text, and the target culture, which is about to receive it. A translator who is working for the speaking characters in the source text’s fictional world is interested in making their words affect
other characters, not in making them affect addressees who observe them from the outside. This might produce a translation which is inappropriate, only partially accessible to the readers or even downright unintelligible. This problem is less severe when the readership is more tolerant of foreign and unfamiliar elements in translated texts and does not insist that such texts are smoothed or adjusted to local needs. Many times, however, cultural adjustments (i.e. adjustments which are guided first and foremost by local norms of expression and representation, norms that may contradict some ideals of fidelity) are inescapable and must be administered from a point of view which is external to the text and its characters.

It can be seen, then, that the common mode of mimetic representation used by theatrical actors has the potential of altering the way translators treat their source texts. A shift of focus, placing the speaking voices in the centre of translational attention and marginalising the importance of the real-world author, may help translators face existing challenges, but it also presents them with new ones.

2.2. *Adopting a role: strategies of mimetic representation*

Choosing the object of representation is only a preliminary first step on a much longer road. The assumption that acting and translating involve a certain degree of mimetic representation raises a whole new set of practical questions. These questions concern, among others: the nature of the changes introduced to actors’ and translators’ forms of expression; the nature of the changes introduced to their mental functioning; the conscious and sub-conscious interaction between new material and pre-existing contents; the types of persons who are compatible with the changes brought about by translational or histrionic identification; and the motivation to encourage people to go through such a
process of self-transformation.

Here I wish to examine the skeletal archetypes of two theatrical approaches to the aforementioned questions. The first archetype is “external”; the second one, “internal”. These opposing approaches, which have developed in the western theatrical tradition, appear to be highly relevant for translating texts, literary and other, which feature distinct textual voices. These two approaches are relevant to all kinds of mimetic translation, whether they focus on “pretending” to be authors or fictional characters.

2.2.1. Standing behind a role: acting and translating as a puppeteer

If one can say that good craftsmen are aware of everything they are doing, then translators are no exception to this basic truism. As noted by Gregory M. Shreve (2006), who discussed translation from the point of view of expertise studies, ‘with practice, declarative knowledge (i.e., what is known about the task) is converted into production rules which lead to proceduralization and, therefore, to less effortful processing and to greater automaticity’ (paraphrased in Albir 2009: 63). What appears to be a basic insight is actually a newcomer to the world of acting. Shakespeare’s advice for actors, mediated through Hamlet, to control their passions and to express them moderately so that their acting does not lose its temperance in ‘the whirlwind of passion’ and ‘out-herods Herod’ (1968: 908, see also chapter 5), was grounded in a medieval physiognomy that was ruled by passions, phlegms and spirits (Roach 1985: 33) rather than on a controlling, erudite mind. The great actors of the Renaissance were not usually renowned for moderating their passions. On the contrary, they were admired for their heightened sensibility which enabled them to experience intense passion on stage. Theatre scholars, like the actor trainer Aaron Hill (1685-1750), based their acting theories on the adoption and utilisation
of such passions. They believed that more than mere emotions, passions were violent forces with a potential to altogether alter the passionate person (Cole 1949: 116-19). The significant change to this attitude came during the Age of Enlightenment, when an approach that emphasises the value of rational, calculated acting was suggested as an alternative to the harnessing of emotions of ardour and rage.

2.2.1.1. Against sensibility in acting

The main advocate of the claim that actors should not be swept away by their passions was French philosopher, writer and encyclopaedist, Denis Diderot (1713-84). It was Diderot who penned the short but highly influential essay, The Paradox of Acting, and criticized the existing concept of sensibility in actors as inefficient and inappropriate. Actors who depend on unpredictable passions, Diderot claimed (1957: 14), produce uneven results, achieving grand successes on some nights and abysmal failures on others. To his way of thinking, the presence of sensibility was detrimental to actor training because it interfered with the impersonal observation required for acquiring proper acting models (Ibid.: 21-22, 56). Sensibility could actually damage an actual performance since being possessed by a passion would commit actors to a single state of mind and not allow them to switch between many (Ibid.: 63). Diderot insisted that actors who rely on passions limit their possible repertoire by using themselves, not nature, as a model for their work, and that yielding to sensibility, as opposed to using judgement, is in general rude and uncivilized behaviour (Ibid.: 15, 39, 25). These observations led Diderot to believe that the need to find a different approach to acting was imperative.

The alternative, suggested by Diderot with great enthusiasm and wit, is simple yet powerful. Actors must always be in complete, conscious control over their performance,
thus leaving nothing to be ruled by passion or intuition. They should become puppeteers, using their own bodies as puppets. He encouraged actors (Ibid.: 16) to remain intact behind their stage figures, following the renowned actress Mademoiselle Clairon (1723-1803), who ‘repeats her efforts without emotion [... as] the informing figure of a huge figure, which is her outward casing’. They should be people of judgement, not sensibility, and their ideal type in real life should be that of a cold-hearted, proud cynic. Separating the emotional lives of actors from their stage personae would not only help actors maintain a calm and uniform level of acting, it would also allow them to look at their own work with a critical eye towards gradually improving their performances (Ibid.: 14-15). Following his advice, Diderot maintained, would also help actors increase their performative repertoire as was demonstrated by the famous David Garrick who entertained friends by exhibiting the full range of emotion from ecstatic delight to utter despair in seconds without feeling a thing (Ibid.: 26-27, 32-33). It is most interesting to note that for Diderot, impersonal acting was crucial for actors who wanted to create a performance that would meet the strict norms of the stage and theatre-going audience. Intuition and passion, he explained (Ibid.: 19), stand in the way of the ultimate precision which is required for every gesture and tone of voice. For Diderot (Ibid.: 68), fidelity to stage convention was in fact much more important than an accurate rendering of nature itself. Moreover, not sharing passions with characters allowed actors to maintain and repair communication with the audience. This, claimed Diderot (Ibid.: 38), is how in Voltaire’s *Sémiramis*, the tragedian Lekain (1728-78) was able to portray the shock and horror of Ninias who has just slaughtered his own mother at the same time as he gently kicked off-stage a fake diamond that had been accidentally dropped by an actress so that it would not be noticed by the spectators. Diderot’s demand for complete control over
one’s performance was not, of course, limited to his time and place: Zeami Motokyo, the father of Noh theatre who lived in Japan in the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries, has noted that in order to reach “Kokoro”, the spirit or soul of acting, actors must learn how to control their emotion and develop a critical mind toward performances (see Meyer-Dinkgräfe 2001: 125-26).

According to Diderot’s theory, actor training may not include any sort of role identification, but it is far from mechanical (Roach 1985: 142-45). It includes a great deal of solitary observation and experimentation, and requires a rich imagination and a sharp memory (Diderot 1957: 15, 56). Diderot’s top-down approach to acting, emphasising the perfection of external imitation, was shared by others. In the 1760s, German dramaturg Gotthold Lessing developed a system of acting based on bodily actions alone, denying the need for feeling, imagination or even understanding on the actor’s part. Thus, for example, the mere gnashing of teeth could be used as a way to affect all other body parts, making them effectively express anger on stage (Roach 1985: 82-84).

The ideas of Diderot, or at least ideas conceived in his spirit, were followed in many acting schools. Françoise Delsarte (1811-71), ‘a Parisian elocutionist’, produced ‘prescriptive, formulaic descriptions of actorly poses’ (Naremore 1988: 52). Edward Gordon Craig, in his famous ‘The Actor and the Übermarionette’ (1908), spoke about ‘the power and the mysterious joyousness which is in all passionless works of art’ (1956: 85) and expressed his wish for actors to become ‘wise […] and moderate’ by obeying external rules and never manifesting their own personalities in their act (Ibid.: 85-87).

Brecht, too, appreciated Diderot and promoted the idea of ‘an international “Diderot society” which would circulate papers on theatrical science’ (1964h: 106). In the spirit of

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4 Brecht’s concept of Gestus (see Chapter 3) reflected Lessing’s notion.
Diderot, Brecht claimed that actors must be observant and treat everyone around them as acting guides, adding the demand that actors postpone the fixation of their character interpretation as much as possible in order to achieve an educated acting which would stimulate the audience (1964c: 196-97). Patrice Pavis has noted that a Brechtian actor who successfully masters such practices ‘constantly controls his gesturalities’ (1982: 41), using a turn of phrase reminiscent of Diderot himself. During the 1970s and the 1980s, Susana Bloch experimented with passionless acting (Bloch 1995: 198-218), imitating emotion based on facial, postural and respiratory patterns alone, and even trained a group of students who, according to the audience, were more convincing than Stanislavski based actors.

2.2.1.2. Top-down approach in translation

It is important to note the limits of Diderot’s top-down approach in western-staged drama. It is not just difficult for actors to control consciously and simultaneously each and every nuance of their multi-channelled performance, but possibly futile to try to recreate it exactly the same way each and every evening. Other strategies may be preferable as an instrument to a successful performance.

The top-down approach can, however, be a preferred strategy in the training of modern day translators. Translators are required to be keen observers and swift learners who understand the desires which motivate every textual unit they transfer but are not required to experience them themselves. Accepting Steiner’s distinction, they differ from native language speakers as they have to understand denotations, connotations, implications, intentions and associations of texts they deal with consciously, rather than intuitively (1975: 276). This is why translators are often encouraged to remain unmoved
and unbiased throughout their work. They are expected to learn and grow through analysis and imitation, not through adoption and self-change. This concept of translation as an outcome of conscious decision-making, ideally not involving the translator’s sub-conscious, is an assumption which stands behind many functionalist translation strategies (see Nord 1997).

Diderot’s method can be applied to translation in a relatively straight-forward manner. Translators can observe the work of other translators and note their use of linguistic style and form, their choice of content to include in the piece or in the translation, the way they solve translational and authorial dilemmas and so forth, and then try to follow in their footsteps. They are not limited to the work of translators alone but can utilise the works of actual authors in their search for archetypal linguistic “voices”. There are many avenues to explore: non-literary day to day sources, whether they are written (i.e. blogs, newspapers, advertisements) or spoken (i.e. film, television, and even the personal linguistic style of acquaintances). In this respect, one of Robinson’s passages brings Diderot’s demands to mind:

Translators and interpreters are voracious and omnivorous readers [...] They are hungry for real-world experience as well, through travel, living abroad for extended periods, learning foreign languages and cultures, and above all paying attention to how people use language all around them (2003a: 23).

Such a learning process is likely to happen naturally, with no external guidance involved, and this is true for actors as well.

Although this rational mixture of self-control, observation and imitation may be popular, even obvious, amongst translators, it has not been fully accepted by actors. In my opinion, Diderot’s system is more suitable for translators than it is for performers due
to the intrinsic differences between linguistic and theatrical representation tools. Applying intersemiotic translation to a given text, transforming it from one written language into another, has a limited number of possible results, given that a certain degree of adequacy needs to be maintained. There is a limited number, albeit very large, of achievable word combinations which can be accepted as translations of a textual unit within a given system of translation norms. This is why translation problems are often treated as “dilemmas” which have several distinct, possible solutions. Applying a theatrical transmutation to a given “text” and putting it on stage, on the other hand, is different. Even when obeying strict norms of adequacy, actors always have an undefined and therefore infinite range of possible physical actions. Movement, gesture, voice and other acting tools cannot be discretely measured; they can always be further fine-tuned. Nuances in performance, then, are restricted only by the capabilities of the actors and the perception of their audiences. Using a metaphor borrowed from technology, the signals which performers emit are analogue, while the signals which translators emit are digital. Simply put, there is a finite number of ways to phrase a sentence, but an infinite number of ways to act it. Diderot’s method, suggesting rational and conscious control over the process of handling representation, is not always suitable for situations of acting, as it might produce easily recognisable and predictable patterns, clichés and mannerisms. It can, however, be very useful for translation.

2.2.1.3. An example of a Diderot-inspired translation

Approaching translation in a Diderotian manner requires the translator to list the external characteristics of the speaking “voices” which are contained within it and to link them to archetypical “voice models” in the target language, literary or otherwise. This can be accompanied by noting typical figures of speech, grammatical structures and other
useful linguistic phenomena which originate from the models. Then the translator can make his or her best attempt to create a linguistic match between the model and the actual target text.

The three major voices which appear in section [A] of the chapter I selected from Gil Hovav’s *Family Cooking* are: Hovav himself, who functions as the narrator, Leah Abushdid, his maternal grandmother (also known as Mooma), and Drora Ben Avi, his mother. As noted earlier, a good model upon which one may start constructing Hovav’s narrating voice in English translation can be found in the writings of Gerald Durrell. Like Durrell, the narrator in *My Family and Other Animals, Beasts, Birds and Relatives,* and *The Garden of the Gods,* Hovav describes his own exotic childhood in a humorous manner, warmly depicting the shortcomings of his family. Hovav’s use of language, like Durrell’s, is rich and fluent. Finding a specific linguistic model for Mooma is more difficult. Being a cosmopolitan, lively, arrogant, hot-tempered and fearless elderly woman, she is defined by her rather unique character. Her idiosyncratic use of language—a funny mixture of Biblical Hebrew, highbrow early modern Hebrew, Ladino and French—distinguishes her linguistic voice even further. In order to portray her, I chose to use some general attributes of early modern English grammar, together with some of the hot-tempered style of Spiro Hakiaopoulos, Durrell’s belligerent and tongue-tied family driver in *The Corfu Trilogy.* A better knowledge of English literature would surely have helped me find more concrete and adequate models for her. Finally, Drora is depicted as a sharp-tongued woman, as energetic as her mother but not as confident, who admires her children and fears irrationally for their lives. Apparently, however, she has no problem threatening them with horrible deaths now and then. One could say that she has honed complaining to an art form. She has been characterised by Hovav as manifesting ‘amused
malice’ (1996: 35, my translation). I chose to link the voice of Drora with the depiction of Durrell’s elder brother, Larry (the writer and poet Lawrence Durrell), who is characterised in the books as an educated, witty whiner who expects his family to do everything for him and is genuinely surprised each time they refuse. Larry exudes an air of decadent calmness, and his utter laziness contradicts Drora’s constant buzzing and frequent changes of mood. For this reason, I ‘seasoned’ my translation with the erratic and amusing epistolary style of a personal friend of mine in order to add the “zest” that is lacking in Larry’s linguistic portrayal.

(Hovav 1996, my translation)
[See Appendix, section A]
A Yemeni Yidishe Chicken Soup

Every year, in the month of July, with its rising temperatures and falling humidity, my mother would go through a nervous breakdown. The heat waves, her children, her job, her life in general and my father in particular would get on her nerves. At this stage she used to summon me and list the praises of a horseback riding and English grammar summer camp somewhere around the outskirts of Gedera, remind me that my favourite cousins are about to go there, lie shamelessly about me looking like a born rider, and even insinuate kindly that any refusal would be unthinkable, or, if thinkable, would lead to my immediate deportation to a military boarding school or a kibbutz. ‘So have it your way,’ my mother would conclude, ‘you can choose. And don’t forget that all the kibbutzim are riddled with spiders. You haven’t been there, but take my word for it.’

I actually did take her word for it, but still I refused to be sent to a summer camp. For as far as I was concerned, two months away from school were a golden opportunity to spy after Mooma and finally find out how she makes marzipan. ‘Thou shall not let your precious into my kitchen!’, startled Mooma when her daughter informed her that summer vacation had broken out, and that everyone
should share the effort and entertain the boy. ‘This is not a boy, this is an Amalekite! All day long roaming the streets, then strays into my kitchen, dressed as I know not what, hungry as un aborigène and as rude as a coachman. I can bear him not. Thus I swear, Dror, if you do not send him far away I shall go myself and move into a guest house.’

‘I just entered the kitchen for a moment,’ I dared, ‘to see how you cook marzipan.’

‘See how you cook marzipan,’ imitated Mooma in considerable disgust. ‘Do you know what this crazy child did? Three days ago he spilled a potful of marzipan into the meshikela, I thought I would perish and die.’

‘But you asked me to wash that pot,’ I tried to protest.

‘Yes, but without the marzipan, you jackass! No, no, I shall not hear half a word about this vacation. I shall not set a foot in this kitchen until I see you send him to this place or the other. And better make haste, or I throw myself upon the railway.’

So we all drove to aunt Reuma in Wingate.

‘I really hope they installed their kitchen by now,’ said my mother on our way to Wingate. She sat in the car’s front seat, next to my father, chain smoking, one eye watching the speedometer and the other looking at me through the mirror. ‘I really don’t understand how they live a full year with no kitchen. When I merely think of what you, Moshe, would have done to me had I told you to go and fetch soup from some central kitchen, and do slow down, you make me feel sick. Soup! Imagine that. And all the shame for this too, because Reuma can make surprisingly good soup. She really can. Unlike your other relatives, she knows the proper amount of spices to use. And Moshe, I swear that if you don’t slow down now I turn you over to the police at the next junction. But Reuma clearly doesn’t like to cook, and David lets her get away with it. What does he care, home made soup or soup from a central kitchen. He probably haven’t even heard that last year when the children stayed with them they went to fetch food at eight at night and there were frogs outside. Frogs! By all that is holy. Frogs are venomous, aren’t they? And who knows what other beasts live there, and do stop the car right now and let me down. Gili, you are getting down with me. We take a taxi from here. Your father can die by himself.’

Yes, my mother was submerged deeply in what my father coined as mood of fruit.
picking machine. ‘When your mother is having this mood,’ he explained to me once, ‘I consider renting her out to the kibbutzim for a daily fee. They could use her there as an instrument for picking fruit off the trees. She would walk in the orchards along the lines and shout, and the fruit would fall off by itself, untouched, driven by fear.’

The translation of this passage owes a lot to strategies which were inspired by Diderot’s theory of acting. I consciously avoided delving into the passions which drive the speaking characters, attempted to adopt archetypical literary models and observed my linguistic surrounding in order to fine-tune the outcome.

2.2.2. Standing inside a role: acting and translating as the object of mimesis

The process of translation exceeds rational decision-making. The idea that translation may be dependent on subconscious processes is supported by thinkers such as Don Kiraly, who maintained that a major part of the cognitive process involved in translation occurs through an ‘interaction of intuitive and controlled processes’ where the controlled processes come to answer for problems which the intuitive processes were unable to solve (1995: 102, cited in Albir 2009: 58-59). Robinson, who would clearly resent Diderot’s approach to acting, used the very metaphor of translation as performance when he claimed that ‘bad actors [like bad translators] say words without feelings, or without feelings that audiences find “persuasive” or appropriate for the words they are saying in the context they are saying them in’ (2003b: 81). The conclusion that acting theory contribute to the practice of translation largely by recommending translators to work impartially, analyse the linguistic behaviour of selected models like keen scientists
and reproduce it like intelligent and reliable machines, can be unexciting for translators who, like Robinson, look to theatre as a source of artistic inspiration. But an approach which is compatible with Diderot’s cold and systematic model is not the bottom line.

In theatre theory and practice, the most prominent opposition to Diderot’s argument can be traced to the twentieth-century school of Method acting. This school of acting, which was initiated by the work of Constantin Stanislavski (1863-1938), an influential actor, director and teacher, promoted a view that stands in contradistinction to Diderot’s. To cite Stanislavski: ‘If you [the actor] want me [the spectator] to sense the general meaning of your feelings, you must be experiencing what you are trying to transmit to me’ (2006: 215). This view, which emphasises feelings, intuition and a honing of unconscious skills, is no less applicable to translation than Diderot’s. As noted in the introductory chapter, the full system of Stanislavski, which was developed over a lifetime of actual work on theatrical productions, is complex, multi-faced and, at times, inconsistent. For that reason, I have chosen to focus on Stanislavski’s early work and the somewhat simplified American school of Method Acting that emerged from it, in order to note several points of specific relevance to issues of translation.

2.2.2.1. The early Stanislavskian models and his followers

The opposite to Diderot’s top-down model to acting is a bottom-up approach which reverses the direction of training and performance process that was suggested in The Paradox of Acting. Practitioners who follow such an approach attempt to modify their inner nature in order to become more like the persons they wish to imitate and to produce an intuitive, more effective performance. Such ideas are not new to acting theory history. They appear, for example, in the writings of the formerly mentioned Aaron Hill, who
described a system of ‘plastic imagination’. According to Hill, actors who wish to portray a passion must imagine it first, thus altering their facial expressions, leading eventually to changes in their whole body (paraphrased in Roach 1985: 79-82).

The theory which was conceived by Stanislavski, the champion of the modern bottom-up approach to acting, has undergone many changes and modifications throughout the years. The early stages of Stanislavskian thought, which emphasised inner, psychological work, were introduced to the west by two of his former students, Maria Ouspenskaya and Richard Boleslavski. As a result of their teaching in New York in the 1920s, Stanislavskian notions gained notoriety and were adopted by American followers such as Lee Strasberg, Stella Adler and others (Krause 1995: 266). This was followed by the first of Stanislavski’s famous books, *An Actor Prepares*, published in English in 1936. Method acting, the result of these efforts, became the leading acting system in the United States in the 1950s-1960s (Zarrilli, ‘Acting as a Revolt’, 1995: 221-23), and is still a major element in actor training around the world.

The newly-established, early Stanislavskian acting principles objected to mannerist theatrical concepts, claiming that they tended to produce clichés. Stanislavski stated that the construction of a role without an inner process at its core produces ‘mechanical acting’ (2006: 23); although temptingly easy to reproduce, it results in theatrical stereotypes. Actors who try to utilise external, physiological reactions in order to arouse feelings and emotions within themselves were condemned by the early Stanislavski for ‘artificially screwing up their nerves’ and for a concomitant ‘theatrical hysteria’ (Ibid.: 26). According to the early Stanislavski, ‘all external production is formal, cold and pointless if it is not motivated from within’ (Ibid.: 164).

The change of focus which was introduced by this bottom-up approach resulted in
several new methods and strategies. First and foremost, it brought about a change in priorities. Actors who concentrate on the inner life of their characters put the people they play before their actual audience. In the tradition of romantic literary criticism (see Roach 1985: 172), this involved the development of elaborate biographies for the characters, sometimes far beyond the necessities of the production. The early Stanislavskian school tried to create and maintain ‘kinship between the actor and the person he is portraying’ (Stanislavski 2006: 49), and treated this kinship as the ultimate artistic goal of the actor. Such a process, as described by Stanislavski (Ibid.: 52), requires thespians to merge their own mental life with that of their character, consciously filtering their roles through their actual self.

2.2.2.2. Means of preparation and their relevance to translation

The basic demand to recognise the bond between artists and their represented objects and to use it as the nucleus for a final product is not unknown to translators. This idea of a profound internal transformation that allows translators to personally identify with their sources appears in an oft-cited poem from 1684 by the Earl of Roscommon:

[...]

Chuse an Author as you chuse a Friend:
United by this Sympathetick Bond,
You grow Familiar, Intimate and Fond;
Your thoughts, your Words, your Stiles, your Souls agree,
No longer his interpreter, but he (cited in Steiner 1975: 77).

Many other translators have noted the importance of self-transformation during translation, with varying degrees of emphasis on the importance of the author’s personality for the process. Poet Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822) compared translation
to the planting of a seed, where a source text is sown in a translator’s mind before growing into a complete target text (Hanne 2006: 213). A similar metaphor stands behind Nabokov’s famous poem, *On Translating ‘Eugene Onegin’* (2011), where translation is compared to the practice of grafting a rose stem in order to grow a new, but poorer, thornier stalk from its base. Translator and poet Paul Valéry referred to the extensive process of biographical and psychological research that he went through while translating Virgil in his attempt to get under the author’s skin (1992: 123). The translator Yves Bonnefoy claimed that a translator who works on a poem should re-live the motivation behind its original creation, treating the source text as an intimate friend rather than as a master or an adversary (1992: 188). Translating “from within”, searching for the author’s or the character’s point of view, gives translators the opportunity to re-live and participate in the characters’ stories, developing greater levels of intimacy and even empathy toward those whom they wish to represent. The eventual bond, which is indeed similar to the one which can be formed between actors and their characters, can become an important source of translational creativity and spontaneity (see Benshalom 2006: 39-40).

The relevance of early Stanislavskian thought and modern Method acting to literary translation does not, then, lie in the mere emphasis on self-transformation and internalisation of foreign material, as this emphasis can be found in abundance in many ruminations about translation. The unique contribution of Stanislavskian thought to translation studies concerns, instead, the unique way in which it blends the external or foreign material, taken from the source text, with the internal or domestic material, taken from the performer’s own personality. Two key elements of this blended “recipe”, created by Stanislavski and promoted by his followers, are of specific value to translators:
dramatic actions and emotion memory.

. Dramatic actions and speech acts

Attempting to “become the character” in a general way while acting is not only a vague and general goal, but also a futile one. Faithful to a strategy of representation from the inside out, contemporary Method actors attempt to create compelling, lifelike representations by incorporating the seeds of transformation. These seeds, which originate in the source play text and are meant to affect the actor’s behaviour on stage naturally but comprehensively, are the characters’ dramatic actions.

Dramatic actions are neither identical to, nor inextricably linked with, physical movements. Rather, they are teleological concepts that refer to actions which serve a specific goal in the mind of the acting character. These goals can either relate to other characters or be directed toward one’s own self, but, in the words of Stanislavski, ‘whatever happens on the stage must be for a purpose’ (2006: 35). Actors must not, then, try to be or feel something, but rather to do or cause something (Ibid.: 41). Instead of trying to change themselves artificially, actors need only execute the given action in a given situation to the best of their abilities. Executing an action drawn from a foreign text while remaining, in many other respects, the same person, is enough to create a strong stage impact: the physical aspects of the actions will be naturally rich and convincing. As explained by teacher and director Sonia Moore, one of Stanislavski’s prominent followers in the United States, ‘if you find and perform truthful actions […] you will begin to believe it yourself because you are doing it as you would in life’ (1991: 25). In other words, if an actor believes in his or her actions, the audience will be equally convinced.
Drama, which traditionally forms the majority of theatrically performed texts, is not only rich with actions, it is practically built on actions. As maintained since the days of Aristotle’s Poetics, drama is ‘a mimesis not of people but of action and life […]’ It is not the function of the agents’ actions to allow the portrayal of their characters; it is, rather, for the sake of their actions that character is included’ (Halliwell 1986: 138). Using Roman Jakobson’s twentieth-century terminology, dramatic texts can function in a variety of linguistic manners - expressive, referential, poetic and so forth - but the dominant function they come to fill is a conative one. Specifically, the text characters say is first and foremost meant to manipulate the surrounding reality (see Jakobson 1987: 67-68, 70). Stanislavskian actors, in turn, mine their texts, dramatic or otherwise, for actions. Analysing the texts they are to perform by segmenting them and extracting action-oriented interpretations for each segment (See Rozik 1992: 204), they assign action labels to each of the segments, such as “encouraging”, “threatening”, “wooing”, “repelling” and so on. Early-Stanislavskian actors consciously try to complicate their chosen dramatic actions, analysing the play text rigorously and treating each action as a struggle which involves the overcoming of many obstacles (see Stanislavski 2006: 22). This emphasis on elaborate yet well-reasoned dramatic actions may help the actors avoid mannerisms and generalities.

Early-Stanislavskian acting insists not only on identifying actions but on identifying with them. It outlines a way in which a performer, whether an actor or translator, can acquire such thoughts or feelings. This is done in two stages. Firstly, it is done by having the performers analyse source material segments (on both micro and macro scales) and isolate the purposes of the actions they conceal. Secondly, it is done by letting the performers look for the best ways to serve these purposes using the various means at
their disposal, such as physical and vocal ability.

The concept of dramatic actions is relevant to translators because distinct deeds which are aimed at intended goals can be committed using many different channels, including the one which governs the translators’ medium – language. The various ways in which actions are incarnated in written and spoken words are theorised extensively in the linguistic research on speech acts. John L. Austin’s ground-breaking work during the early 1960s concentrated on the categorisation and sub-categorisation of linguistic utterances. Austin distinguished, for example, constative utterances, which are used to indicate the state of things, from performative utterances, which change the state of things by being uttered (as “I pronounce you husband and wife” or “I declare war”) (1975: 5-6). Eventually, Austin enhanced this strict formulation which did not allow for a single speech act to carry multiple functions (for discussion see Robinson 2003b: 44). He introduced a more flexible model which allowed for speech acts to carry several functions, taking into account their locutionary aspect (the surface meaning of an utterance), their illocutionary aspect (the name of the action which is embodied within it) and their perlocutionary aspect (the consequences it bears) (Austin 1975: 94-108).

Austin’s model has influenced many other works, some of which recognise the fact that all utterances can be used as speech acts in specific discursive contexts regardless of their lexical denotations and grammatical structures (as in “It’s chilly in here”, uttered and interpreted as a request to close a window). John R. Searle, for example, has categorised the different functions, goals and other qualities of speech acts (1979: 2-8). Similarly, Robinson linked Austinian speech acts to the concept of conversational implicatures, introduced by linguist Paul Grice, thereby suggesting a model which accounts for implied speech acts (2003b: 144-59). Thus, the scope of speech acts has
been broadened from a limited circle of explicit commands and declarations to an extensive area surrounding most, if not all, natural uses of language.

The Austinian model of speech acts, in all of its incarnations, emphasises the importance of goals, purposes and actions as a condition for successful linguistic communication. This emphasis, in turn, is of great interest to translators. Translation scholar, Werner Koller, claimed that translators who wish to produce worthy and equivalent translations must put the source text through a series of examinations. The first examination involves looking for a source text’s linguistic function. It should precede examining textual attributes which are seemingly more important, like content and style, and help the translators set their equivalence priorities, i.e. decide which elements of the text to preserve (see in Munday, 2001: 49). The general Functionalist approach to translation focuses on analysing the source text looking for the purpose which it serves, and using that information in order to improve translation processes and products (Nord 1997: 15-26). Such approaches imply that on many occasions, translators can view speech acts as the basic unit to be transferred between languages. As noted by Peter Fawcett, ‘speech acts are probably independent of the actual languages’ (1997: 80, cited in Robinson 2003b: 41). Basil Hatim and Ian Mason used Austinian terms when they maintained that ‘the translator will seek to relay the illocutionary force of each speech act in turn’ and took a Searlean approach when they added that translators should ‘identify speech acts by type’ (1990: 61, cited in Ibid.).

An approach which is inspired by early-Stanislavskian thought and Method acting, which emphasises dramatic actions, is, thus, highly relevant for translators. The practice of segmenting the source texts into nested “action units” of various scales, each defined as a speech act with a specific goal, is relatively straightforward to implement in
translation. The process of identifying a valid guiding speech act is not a simple one, though. It often involves a serious interpretative effort. Translators have to decide upon the general aim of each speech act the way that actors must decide upon the nature of their characters’ actions (e.g., Should the prince use his text to impress the countess? To frighten her? To entertain her?). They also have to decide how far to aim each speech act in the same way that actors must decide upon the scope of their characters’ actions (e.g., Should the prince try to entertain the countess? To marry her? To preserve his dynasty?). The process of identification can be systematic, matching labels and titles to each speech act, or intuitive, linking it (for example) to communicative gestures and tones of speech. After identifying a textual action, translators are able to choose to identify with it: they can harness themselves and their linguistic prowess to the action’s success.

Identifying with a textual action can help the process of translation in many ways. First, it involves an inevitable analysis of the functions of the source texts, without which the translators would not be able to identify with the actions which serve them. Second, treating the translated target text as their own means of expression and communication may help translators invoke linguistic assets which are not as accessible when merely performing the job of handling the representation of words and sentences. Lastly, even when a conscious analysis of each and every speech act in the source text would be crude, laborious or otherwise implausible, translators may benefit from a general action-oriented approach, which aims not to represent the characters or the authors but rather to help them achieve their goals. The intimate connection which is formed this way encourages both creativity and a sense of personal responsibility toward the linguistic or

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5 Robinson referred to such uncertainties when he discussed the fuzziness of the Austinian division, which makes it hard to separate the illocutionary force of an utterance, i.e. the action it performs, from its perlocutionary force, i.e. the effects it causes (see 2003b: 95-99).
I had the opportunity to appreciate the effect of such a connection on translation during a translation course I gave at Tel Aviv University in 2004. Students had to analyse and translate into Hebrew a dialogue taken from Mark Twain’s *Huckleberry Finn*. Specifically, students were asked to translate the section where Tom Sawyer, establishing a gang of robbers with his friends, argues with one of the more rebellious boys:

Don’t you reckon that the people that made the books knows what’s the correct thing to do? Do you reckon you can learn ’em anything? Not by a good deal. No, sir. (Twain 1912: 12)

One of the students had special difficulties with the concluding ‘No, sir’. Although she recognized a contextual, derogatory purpose behind the expression, she could not think of a natural, native Hebrew equivalent and ended up resorting to literal, non-equivalent “Translationese”. Asking her directly to try to match a phrase to the purpose that she recognized yielded nothing. As a last resort, I suggested that she link herself to the text by pronouncing the source phrase in English loudly several times, using her own, personal tone of voice and physical gestures and adjusting them to the function of the text as she intuitively understood it. When her tones and gestures were decided upon, I asked her to suggest a translation which would suit them. To our mutual surprise, she immediately came up with not one, but five or six suggestions, all of which were far more convincing and natural to Hebrew than her original proposal.

. Imagination, emotion memory and word memory

Actors who follow the early work of Stanislavski, such as Method actors, often root their actions in specific fictional situations which are portrayed in the dramatic text. They must be able to picture these situations vividly in their mind in order to convince
themselves to perform their allocated actions. This is why Method actors are highly
dependent on imagination. Stanislavski encouraged his students to utilise the tool he
named “magic if”, suggesting that actors, unable to convince themselves that they were
different persons, need to imagine the circumstances surrounding their characters and ask
themselves what they would personally do if they were in the same situation. This
practice, interestingly called ‘adaptation’ by Sonia Moore (1991: 94-97), helps to not
only create a natural, unforced performance, but also to emotionally align the actors with
the text, making them more playful, creative and willing to take action (see Stanislavski
2006: 44, 47-48, 56-58, 63).

Actors who follow the early Stanislavski teachings play actions rather than feelings.
More often than not, however, they do have to tinker with their own emotions on stage.
This happens when the characters’ circumstances, that form their basis for actions, are
emotional in themselves. In order to help actors to remain themselves but still experience
pre-dictated emotions on stage, Stanislavski recommended that his followers use emotion
memory. Emotion memory, probably the most well-known and controversial concept
used by Method actors, is rooted in, among others, the writings of actor and theoretician
Jean-Françoise Talma (1763-1826). It was Talma who encouraged the use of personal
memories as a tool for arousing emotion, movement and so on in actors (Roach 1985:
171, 173). According to Stanislavski, day to day emotions are built up on the basis of the
memory of previous emotions experienced earlier in life (2006: 172-75). This means that
the invocation of emotion memory, which involves the restoration and utilisation of
emotions that were felt in one’s own personal past, becomes useful for the actor (Ibid.:
165-68). Actors, then, should bring their own emotional history to the stage and use it.
These memories should be used even when they are painful or personal. The remarks
which were made by Stanislavski (Ibid.: 172-73) regarding the creative value of traumatic memories from the distant past, once purified and aestheticised, are probably responsible for the stereotypic image of a modern actors who constantly indulge themselves with self-analysis and are not interested in the actual impression that their performance is making. This necessity to invoke emotions on demand compelled Stanislavski to believe that an actor should be cast for a certain role based on his personal emotional capabilities and inclinations (Ibid.: 77).

The concept of emotion memory may also be relevant to translation. As noted by Austin, the linguistic performance of speech acts may require the utterers’ personal intent. In Austin’s words, ‘where, as often, the procedure [of uttering a certain speech act] is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings […] then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings’ (1975: 15). The focus on actions may indeed help translators to interpret foreign source materials. But these foreign and external materials still need to be combined with their own internal, local materials, so that they can be represented with full intent in the target text. Emotion memory can become the flip side of the coin, a complementary tool which helps translators invoke emotional material in their work.

Douglas Robinson suggested a similar conceptual approach in his discussion of “word memory” and its usage. Robinson’s approach was based on Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism according to which every linguistic utterance made by a speaker is a modified echo of an earlier utterance encountered previously in a dialogic context, such as a conversation or reading (2003b: 105). Robinson linked Bakhtin’s dialogism to Antonio Damasio’s hypothesis of somatic markers, that is, ‘body responses that the autonomic nervous system learns from our experience to send us in order to guide our
rational thought process’ (2003b: 19). According to Damasio, human decision-making is aided by physiological, pre-cognitive stimuli which classify each option as positive or negative. It is important to recognise, as Robinson reminds us, that every word or phrase that translators use is a decision:

[W]hat is stored for each word and each group of words in each language user’s memory is a cluster of somatic markers inherited from past usages, past experiences of the word’s use, experiences that are by definition saturated with both the regulatory tonalizations of the community and the idiosyncratic tonalizations of individual users. (2003b: 106).

Robinson thus came to describe ‘word memory’ (Ibid.: 105) as something more than merely a means of qualifying connotations. Word memory, he explained, stands at the very heart of each and every language unit which exists in the mind of the language user, and it makes a positive or negative emotional value an inseparable component of every utterance, alongside its form and its meaning. Word memories can be formed personally or socially, thus being made out of ‘idiosomatic’ or ‘ideosomatic’ markers respectively (Ibid.: 72-73). Word memories are never isolated from social context and feedback. Nor, it’s important to note, are they ever truly collective and homogeneous.

Like Stanislavski, Robinson noted the importance of recognising the personal bond between the “performers” and their “performed material”. In his practical guide for translators, he noted the importance of emotional memories which are attached to linguistic activities. Since the task of translation may often appear to be tiresome and under appreciated, linking it with enjoyable memories may sweeten the pill (2003a: 52-55). However, it seems that Stanislavski’s emotion memory does more than that. For actors, emotion memory is not just a system of motivators and de-motivators

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6 Robinson’s recommendation brings to mind the old Jewish tradition of helping young children learn how to read by letting them lick honey-smeared letters.
manipulated at will in order to energise specific actions. It is the reason behind all actions to begin with, the raw material from which all acts of mimetic representation should be carved, and the only means actors have to ‘influence inspiration’ and make an impact (Stanislavski 2006: 176). Translators, like actors, may benefit greatly from honing their emotion memory skills using various internal and external stimuli, as described by both Stanislavski (Ibid.: 182-86) and Robinson (2003a: 51-54). The arguments in favour of utilising personal memories for representation are not only practical, but also ethical. As Stanislavski instructed his fictive addressee:

Never lose yourself on stage […] you should never allow yourself any exception of the rule of using your own feelings. To break that rule is the equivalent of killing the person you are portraying, because you deprive him of a palpitating, living human soul (2006: 177).

The utilisation of “magic if” and emotion memories, then, can be an invaluable asset for translators, not only as a basis on which to build target language speech acts, but also as a way of committing themselves to the service of the source texts. Translators can imagine themselves in the shoes of the “voice” they choose to translate (for example, the author of the text or a fictional character within it) and try to imagine what they would choose to do. When the speech acts they face involve emotional motives, such as rage or desire, they can use their own personal history in order to invoke the memory of occasions when they had to express themselves, verbally or in writing, based on similar emotions.

As a teacher of translation students, I have never dared to use techniques which involve emotion memory. I did, however, get a sense of the effect that one’s personal emotional structure has on one’s choice of words in translation. In 2005, two of my male students translated an internet chat protocol featuring a guy pulling a prank on a girl. The
first line in this short yet imaginative electronic dialogue was:


The two students translating the protocol had very different personalities. One was confident, direct and surrounded by girls; the other was insecure, sarcastic and generally avoided by female students. The first student, experienced with approaching women, unconsciously chose to help “J-dogg” and improve his technique by suggesting the Hebrew equivalent of the phrase ‘You’re really funny’ as a translation. To my amazement, the second student, unconsciously incorporating his own defensive emotional patterns into the translated speech act, suggested the Hebrew equivalent of a safer phrase: ‘You’re relatively funny’.

2.2.2.3. An example of a Stanislavski-inspired translation

Approaching translation in a manner influenced by early Stanislavskian thought and Method acting requires the translator to recognise each speaking voice in the source text and to determine a super objective, or a general goal, which it may be set to achieve. The goal should define the queue of actions that are performed by its “voice” so it has to be limited to the level in which the voice operates. The super objective of a narrator will be relevant to the world of authors and/or readers, while the super objective of a fictional character will be relevant to its own fictional world. Once the super objectives are set, the translator can dissect the passage into compatible and more specific small scale actions. This should enable the translator to put him or herself in the place of the various “voices” he wishes to represent. Using aids such as “magic if”, emotion memory and word memory, the translator can then decide on the best way to commit these actions in the target text. It is important to note that the interpretative aspect of this process is not
intended to fixate any “correct meaning” of the source text in the target text. It is rather intended to motivate the translator into effective linguistic performance. Ideally, the target text should remain open to various interpretations by its readers, independent of the interpretation which was used by the translator as scaffolding.

The major voices which appear in section [C] of the chapter that I selected from Hovav’s *Family Cooking* (see Appendix) are Hovav himself, in his capacity as the narrator, his mother Drora, his uncle David and his father Moshe. Drora is depicted in this section as a woman who is haunted by many fears – of being left alone, of speedy driving, of her child getting hurt, of her child being considered ill-educated, and, eventually, of snakes. A good super objective for her would be to calm herself down. Uncle David’s mischievous behaviour is explained by Drora herself as an attempt to show his love for his wife. For the sake of translation, however, I found it easier to assume that his acts are the result of a wish to impress his wife with imaginative pranks. Moshe has only one sentence but it is very meaningful in the context of the text. His super objective is to calm young Gil and make sure he knows that everything is going to turn out fine. Finally, Gil’s super objective as a narrator may seem to be simply to amuse or entertain his readers; but for the sake of translation I believe that a better choice, more emotionally charged and richer in possibilities, is to persuade himself that he indeed had a beautiful, colourful childhood, surrounded with caring, funny adults who made his early youth joyful and secure.

Applying the “magic if” should be relatively easy for me because my childhood in Jerusalem was not dissimilar to Hovav’s, even though 15 years separate us. I can imagine vividly many of the specific tastes, locations and situations that he describes. However, as I am not a native English speaker, I cannot bring word memory to my aid. English
words do not bear an emotional meaning for me the way that Hebrew words do.

In the following section, I have added the labels of the actions which I allocated to the various textual units in brackets and in bold text. These actions guided me in my decisions throughout the translation.

(Hovav 1996, my translation)
[See Appendix, section E]

[**Gil: framing a comic story**] And so we found ourselves racing along the coast highway toward Wingate village, my mother lighting her sixth cigarette since Motza’ and informing me that [**Droro: calming herself through wittiness**] ‘Had Einstein been correct, considering your daddy’s driving speed we would all be energy by now. [**Droro: calling for company**] For heaven’s sake, Gili, don’t fall asleep! Don’t leave me alone with your dad. Look, a cow!’

[**Gil: invoking himself as a cute and eccentric member of his family**] I did not fall asleep. I just closed my eyes and tried to recall the rich, wonderful taste of Reuma’s chicken soup, and decide if it was the result of extra hilba paste, extra hawaij Yemenite spice, or extra massive amount of beef. [**Droro: calling for company**] ‘What are you dreaming about, for heaven’s sake,’ my mother was alarmed, [**Droro: imposing responsibility**] ‘Moshe, I tell you, the kid fainted. This is because of your speed, so help me. [**Droro: gaining control over the situation**] When we reach Wingate, that is if we reach there at all, first thing I do is calling the cops. [**Droro: making sure her son will be appreciated**] Oh, he woke up, you be a good boy in Reuma’s house, do you hear me? David is already making her life miserable as it is. Just sit there with your math exercises and ask politely if anyone can help you out. [**Droro: making sure she gets soup**]’ And for heaven’s sake, don’t disturb Reuma when she cooks and don’t forget to hint that when we come back for you in two weeks, it would be best if she makes her soup. [**Droro: protecting her child from danger**] And be careful of spiders, will you? [**Droro: protecting her child from danger**] 7  In this case I was not able to allocate a convincing action which would still be compatible with Droro’s super objective, to calm herself down.
gathering her wits] Oh, here comes Wingate. Moshe, turn on the landing lights.’

[Gil: recalling family intimacy] As it was found out, Reuma remembered we liked her soup and cooked a whole cauldron just for us. [Gil: sparkling the story with a sense of adventure] But during this visit, my mother did not get a chance to taste it. She came over to make sure I unpacked my luggage neatly in the room designated for me by Reuma, and as she opened the door, a snake dropped on her from the lintel. That’s right: a snake. [Gil: softening a scary situation] Probably one of those who refused to vacate themselves to the Poleg reserve when Wingate was built. My mother, no doubt, would prefer by far to be surprised by a tiger.

[Drora: calling for protection] ‘Mosheeee!’ [Gil: softening the situation] my mother roared, with such force that all the elderly snakes in Poleg reserve were driven into the sea. [Drora: calling for protection] ‘Moshe! There are tarantulas in here!!!’ [Gil: softening a dire situation] It was a snake, true, but tarantulas was the codename my mother allocated for all worldly vermin and anxieties, and besides, no one in their right mind would expect a woman in the mood of a fruit picking machine, with a nicotine overdose in her blood and a snake on her arm, to differentiate reptiles from arthropods.

The snake, of course, fainted on the spot and then escaped, but my mother already announced that [Drora: demanding support] ‘Moshe, we cannot leave the kid in this house, he will be finished. This is worse than a kibbutz, can you hear me?’

[Gil: invoking the regularity of family power relations] My father was about to re-pack me but then my mother recalled all the cotangents I had in my suitcase, calculated the situation and added, [Drora: calming herself through gaining control] ‘Unless you and David catch it and kill it right now. The snake, I mean.’

[Gil: romanticising the situation by framing it as a comic tale] And so, one dark and humid July evening, armed with a flash light and a jar, one news anchor, one sports doctor and one hungry kid embarked on a journey to hunt down a snake on the dunes. [Gil: softening the situation using comical hyperbole and unlikely props]8 We left Reuma and my mother inside the house, my mother curled on the tallest chair in the house, hugging her knees, holding a locked and loaded broomstick, and ordering Reuma to fetch her some whiskey, fetch her some aspirin,

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8 In this case I chose to include Drora’s reported speech in Gil’s action.
fetch her a cigarette, fetch her a glass of water and fetch her the phone. [Gil: reinforcing himself by glorifying his mother] Needless to say, they were both quite gloomy, each for her own reasons (Reuma had no fear of snakes, but she did fear my mother a little). [Gil: invoking the charming mischief of the family] David, on the other hand, was delighted. He was filled with great joy by every opportunity he had to pull pranks on Reuma (‘He adores his wife,’ my mother explained it to me once, ‘and this is how he shows it. I feel very sorry for her.’) [Gil: invoking himself as a cute and eccentric member of his family] After five minutes of idle searches, when we realised that locating black snakes in the darkness is not a piece of cake, I suggested that we come back inside and have some soup. [Gil: sparkling the story with a sense of adventure] But David had other plans. [David: preparing the ground for a prank] ‘We got him, we got him!’ [Gil: applying comical contrast] he rejoiced, waving the empty jar with one hand and indicating with the other that if anybody denies it there will be violence. [David: preparing the ground for a prank] ‘Reuma! Moshe caught the snake. [David: scaring Drora] Tell Drora that she doesn’t know how lucky she was. It’s a cobra! A huge cobra! Here, we come with the jar so you can see.’ [Gil: softening the situation with a comic relief] Faint chirps of ‘no, no’ were heard from inside the house, but David already barged in and threw the empty jar dexterously on the floor. [David: frightening Drora] ‘Oops,’ [Gil: emphasising the funny side] he said joyfully, [David: scaring Drora] ‘it fell over. The cobra is free again. [David: impressing Reuma] Drora, I thing it is attracted by your perfume. I suggest you go to the roof, it will find it difficult to reach you there. Make a camp fire there and wave to make plenty of smoke. Cobras are afraid of fire. And don’t worry, here we go looking for it again.’ [Gil: comically contrasting his mother and his aunt] At this stage Reuma got tired of the whole charade, and, as my mother was making her way to the roof using a ladder, she retired to her room, stating that David is giving her migraine again. [Gil: emphasising the family bond] David suggested that me and my father take a short walk with him to the central kitchen. ‘Their soup is not bad,’ he said, ‘nothing like Reuma’s, but it’s fine.’ I was slightly annoyed because of the
disappointing change, but my father decided it was an excellent idea. [Moshe: soothing Gil’s fears] ‘Why do you worry?’ he said, ‘they will wait here for you, all of them, Nothing is going to run away. Not the soup, not your mother, not the cotangents and not Reuma.’ [David: showing off] ‘And not the snake,’ said David with satisfaction.

In conclusion, the translation of this passage owes a lot to strategies which were inspired by the work of early Stanislavski and his followers. I attempted to dissect the text into units and to allocate a concrete goal to each unit. Then, using personal memories of similar situations and imagining how I would act under similar circumstances in order to achieve each goal, I produced the target text.

2.3. Mimetic representation and creativity

A general definition of creativity supplied by the Merriam-Webster dictionary states that a creative process is characterised as ‘having the quality of something created rather than imitated’. The question whether, and to what extent, the practice of translation should be considered creative in that general sense has received plenty of theoretical attention. The practice of translation is traditionally outlined and defined in contrast to the practice of authoring, and while the creativity involved in writing is usually beyond doubt, the creativity of translation is often the topic of heated debates.

Typically, researchers of translation defend the creative status of translation. G. Gui asserted that translation was a ‘creative process’, firstly because ‘translation is not merely a transformation of an original text into a literal equivalent, but must successfully convey the overall meaning of the original, including that text’s surrounding cultural significance’ and secondly because ‘the process of searching out a target-language counterpart to a difficult source-language word or phrase is often creative’ (1995, cited in
El Zawawy 2008). Albrecht Neubert expanded this last point when he noted that ‘in the course of achieving something new, mediators [translators …] are forced to creativity because the means of the TL are not identical with those of the SL […]. To arrive at an adequate TL version, new resources have to be tapped’. He explained that ‘creative uses of the target language are the result of the various problem-solving strategies applied to any piece of SL text’ (1997: 19).

Such scholarly views are not prominent among the general readers. Translation is not perceived by the public as a creative activity (I once encountered a person who marveled at the idea that two translators working separately on the same text may produce non-identical translations). Some researchers take this approach as well. Dagmar Knittlova asked: ‘how extensive may be the tolerance limits [for creativity] with respect to the pragmatic view of the translation?’ (2000: 11). She reminded her readers that ‘translation is a sort of reproductive art […]. However, it must not surpass the intention of the author of the source text […] a translator’s creativity must have its limits’ (Ibid.: 9).

This kind of debate has never been common in the discourse about acting. Western theatrical performance is widely perceived as a creative art, and its practitioners are generally credited for their originality and novelty in their endless pursuit of successful representation. The main reason for this discrepancy is probably the different functions that the two disciplines fulfil. Translation is still a vital tool for facilitating communication and transferring information while acting drifted into the realms of entertainment and art long ago.

There are also inherent differences between the processes of translation and acting which have encouraged the view that translation is less “artistic” and creative than acting.
Broadly speaking, the ways in which acting and translation facilitate the communication of messages from the authors to the addressees differ along two lines. Firstly, translation engages a single, pre-existing communication channel, i.e. the channel of language, and manipulates its contents. In that, it can be viewed as a Jakobsonian intra-lingual transformation. Theatre, on the other hand, is free to pour the messages which were included in a play text into many new communication channels, such as body language, facial expressions, voice, lighting and so on, thus becoming more visibly creative. This difference between translation and acting “leaks” from the level of the communication channels into the level of the transferred content as well. Translators are not commonly expected to add any new messages to the ones which were included in their source texts. Additions, when introduced, are offered mostly to help bridge communication gaps between the source culture and the target culture. Actors, on the other hand, are traditionally given partial play texts which can be supplemented with their own deduced or interpreted contents as part of their working process, if not as part of their actual, performed product.\(^9\) As Stanislavski put it: ‘the playwright gives us only a few minutes out of the whole life of his characters. He omits much of what happens off stage. […] We have to fill out what he leaves unsaid’ (2006: 257).

Secondly, the degree of creativity associated with translation and acting is affected by the traditional location of the representing agents in relation to their addressees. Pym noted that translators are not really invisible. In his words, ‘we know a translator has passed this way; we do not consider the fact worth the investment of mind or muscle’

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\(^9\) It is true that according to a dominant contemporary theatrical tradition, directors and other agents, rather than actors, are the main practitioners of “creativity” in productions. Still, stage performers are responsible for filling at least part of the mediumal gap between the source of the production (be it a play, a scenario, sheet music, etc.) and its actual manifestation.
Translators stand “behind” their target texts. Consequently, their readers view them at best as agents who take foreign, strange and exciting materials and make them local and comprehensible, and therefore more ordinary. Actors, on the other hand, stand “in front” of their target performance sharing space with their audience. Spectators can view actors as comrades, allies in an ‘other’ space who turn their local and ordinary selves more foreign and exciting. Hiding behind his translation, a translator may be the exotic merchant coming from abroad with fascinating wares for sale, but an actor, presenting himself throughout his performance, is more like a brave local lad who travels abroad and recounts fascinating adventures in front of our eyes. All in all, then, acting seems more “creative” than translation not only because of its stronger affiliation with the realm of art but also because of the public ways in which it produces and presents its mimetic representations.

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10 Pym also noted that this invisibility is not unique to translators: ‘the complaint about “invisibility”’, he wrote, ‘could be a complaint about most of the texts that surround us [such as signs, news reports, instruction manuals etc.]. To demand that translators now be “seen”, as if leaving a closet, appears heroically spurious’ (2004.: 70).

11 When Robinson described the situation of the language learner he used terms which were almost drawn from Stanislavski’s guidelines for actors. In the case of an adventurous study of a new language, the creative theme of going away from home seems to be more apparent than in the case of translation. In Robinson’s words:

‘In a sense, the foreign-language learner has to be at once a playwright, a director, and an actor, in the foreign language: he or she must generate out of fleeting impressions living, breathing images of native speakers inside his or her own body, create them as vehicles for identification – and then become them, grow into them, body them forth’ (1991: 16-17).

12 Interestingly, the academic discipline of translation studies seems to have steadily moved away from viewing translation as a creative practice shaped by individuals and towards viewing it as a result of general linguistic, social, cultural, political and technological forces (see Chapter 5). This can be seen in the descriptive shift which was mobilised by Itamar Even Zohar and Gideon Toury in the 1980s, the “cultural turn” which was led by Susan Bassnett et al. in the 1990s (see Snell-Hornby 2010: 366-67), and in the contemporary trend of media-oriented translation research which can be located in the works of Karin Littau, among others. However, I believe that the young discipline of Translation Studies has little effect on the world of commission, execution and consumption of translations, and, therefore, that
Any discussion about degrees of creativity in translation and in acting must first define a notion of “creativity”. The common definition, which refers to the quality of creating new things, may seem problematic from the point of view of acting and translation. In my opinion, translation practitioners and theorists stand to gain by at least considering, if not wholly accepting, a discussion on creativity that informs theories of acting. An interesting comparison, which demonstrates two different approaches to the subject, can be made between the views of the translation scholar Douglas Robinson, on the one hand, and the views of Constantin Stanislavski on the other.

Robinson wants to restore the status of the translator as a creative, independent agent. He stated that the belief ‘that the communicative situation in translation is still about the original Sender sending a Message to a Receptor’ is just one of the ‘constative pretenses’ (2003b: 9) that fails to recognise the performative validity of the act of translation. What is needed, Robinson insists, is a radical fortification of the concept of ‘translatorial speech act’ (Ibid.: 42), a concept which has been discredited by linguists who believe that translation consists merely in the channelling of pre-existing messages. In his criticism of Basil Hatim, Ian Mason and others, Robinson complained that for them, ‘the translator is never to be thought of as an independent pragmatic agent […] s/he remains a kind of amateur pragmatician who studies the source text for implicature and seeks to replicate it as effectively as possible in the target language’ (Ibid.: 134). This can be negated, he said, by emphasising the specific role that individual translatorial decisions play in creating the target text. Robinson’s efforts were strengthened by the work of others who promoted the idea that translators can, or should, satisfy their passion for creativity by embedding their own implicit or explicit messages – ideological, poetic or other – in their target texts. Ideas of this sort imply that “being creative” is equivalent it does not play a significant part in shaping the public views regarding translation.
to “having your say”; that the artistic independence of translators is embodied in the “pieces of their minds” which are expressed throughout their textual products and are addressed to their readers.

To my way of thinking, this concept of creativity, however valid, limits the creative potential of translators to very specific situations. It allows them to ascend to the level of creative artists only when they have the opportunity, the ability and the motivation to communicate their personal thoughts and ideas to the translation’s addressees. As Knittlova mentioned somewhat harshly, the usual situation dictates that ‘creativity should not make the text sound better [...] than its original version, even if the translator is [...] talented, gifted and inventive. After all, he is a reproducing artist and that he should bear in mind’ (2000: 11). Translators, then, may find the concept of creativity as described by Robinson and others appealing, but inapplicable.

In his discussions of acting, Constantin Stanislavski suggested a different initial definition for the concepts of art and creativity. Instead of focusing on the communicating of ideas, he focused on the committing of actions. The art of the actor, as he saw it, is ‘the art of living a part’ (2006: 13), and he maintained that ‘living your role is […] the chief moment of creation’ (Ibid.: 18). Artistic delight is drawn, he implied, from the process of representation rather than from its product: ‘Imagine something’, he instructed an imaginary actor, ‘and let me see your creative apparatus in motion’ (Ibid.: 244). The raw material which the performer should render into an artistic object throughout this process is not the play text or the theatrical role, but the performer himself. In Stanislavski’s words, ‘an artist is not speaking in the person of an imaginary Hamlet. He speaks in his own right as one placed in the circumstances created by the play. The thoughts, feelings, conceptions, reasoning of the author are transformed into his
own’ (Ibid.: 248). Stanislavski’s emphasis on self-transformation is supported by Margaret Boden’s research on creativity. Boden distinguishes ‘historical […] h-creative […] ideas […] which] are novel with respect to the whole of human history’ from ‘psychological […] p-creative […] ideas (whether in science, needle-work, music, painting, literature...) that are fundamentally novel with respect to the individual mind which had the idea’ (1991: 32). Clearly, Stanislavski focused on ‘the blossoming of the subconscious, which is inspiration’ (2006: 14), but even completely conscious approaches to mimetic representation, like that suggested by Diderot, seem to share the view that a performer’s creativity is expressed in their ability to mould themselves into different shapes.

When applied to translation, this concept of creativity becomes quite relevant. If the origin of the translation “performance” is less important than its execution, it matters less what ideas are being conveyed through the translation or who it was that conceived them. Translators do make decisions, and through their art they demonstrate their abilities. What is critical, however, from a Stanislavskian point of view, is that they present us with what they have become. In such a situation, the demands of source text and translation norms do not hinder creativity. On the contrary, rather like having a demanding role to play, constraint is often the beginning of a creative process (see Chapter 5). Discussing translation with regards to creative writing, Jean Boase-Beier has noted that: ‘the notion of constraint is not, for creative writing, to be seen as negative: something akin to compulsion, coercion or denial of individuality. […] constraint in terms of measure, balance or pattern empowers the creative art because it is in the interplay between given extra- and intertextual constraint and individual freedom that creativity develops’ (2006: 47). This is especially true in the case of translation, since ‘the constraints imposed by the
presence of a source text empower and enhance the creativity of the translation act by placing the translator in a position of striving to overcome them’ (Ibid.).

Viewing creativity in translation in such a light does not free it from the problems which were mentioned earlier. First, it may fail to recognise the importance of the communication between the translators and their readers. The ‘artistic truth’ of Stanislavski ‘embraces the whole being of an artist, and [only then] of his spectators as well’ (2006: 29). Stanislavski noted that good acting is not easily distinguished on the stage from bad acting, and quoted the drama teacher Schepkin, who said: ‘you may play well or you may play badly; the important thing is that you should play truly’ (Stanislavski 2006: 14). This also means that a great artistic effort of translational representation may go unnoticed and unappreciated by the translation readers. Second, a Stanislavskian mode of translation may be inefficient and over-demanding in its requirement that translators go through complex transformation processes for the sake of authentically “living the target text” even where a technical, uninvolved translation would suffice. However, this view of creativity as self-transformation seems to me not only more artistic than its characterisation as opinion expression but also better suited for situations of real world translation. Since translation is still needed for the sake of transparent communication, translators may not have the creative freedom of publicists; but they do, however, have the creative freedom of actors.
3. Promoting Activism

Disciplines of representation, like performance and translation, often list among their concerns the creation of valid representations, that is, representations which are faithful to their source materials and communicative toward their target audiences. Some sub-systems within these disciplines, however, forego the concerns of how best to create an “ideal” representation for others that they consider to be more important. Such systems of representation provide strategies aimed toward goals which are deemed superior to merely “effective” representation. These ideological goals play an important part in shaping their mother disciplines. Pym has noted that “‘Why?’ might seem a very small question for a project that should properly encompass all the other parts of translation history. Yet it is by far the most important question’ (1998: 6).

The response to the “why” of translation has often been linked to ethics. This link has been gaining new meanings in the 20th century. As noted by Ben van Wyke, ‘for much of the history of translation discourse, the word “ethics” is absent because a certain ethical position for translators has generally been taken for granted. […] Ethical behavior has been simply posited as fidelity toward the original’ (2010: 111). More recently, as Siobhan Brownlie points out, ‘particular translation practices were advocated in order to contribute to redressing geo-political and social injustices’ (2010: 45). Andrew Chesterman and Emma Wagner’s discussion of some of the ethical issues which are central to translation includes ‘the problem of conflicting loyalties, the translator visibility argument, how to cope with errors in the original, and the best way of representing “the Other”’ (2001: 105). To these one might add another list of partially-overlapping topics such as the positive or negative effects of translations on the
source and/or target cultures, the choice of materials to translate, the intentionality of the translator, the struggle between professional and general moral values and so on. Most of these issues are relevant to the world of acting and performance as well.

Since the late 1980s, translation studies has been going through a process that has been referred to as “the cultural shift”. This shift involved scholars moving from the analytical approach of linguistics and the quantitative approach of corpus-based studies toward research which is integrated with comprehensive theories regarding power relations in the colonial and post-colonial eras. Advocates of this cultural shift view translation as an indicator of a broader network of inter-cultural formations and transactions. Accompanying this shift, one that has been mobilised by figures such as Susan Bassnett and Edwin Gentzler, was a renewed awareness of the ethical significance of translation across cultural boundaries. American literary scholar and translator, Lawrence Venuti, is one of the major participants in the cultural shift in translation studies. His work is key to this shift not only because of his vocal support of cultural justice in translation but also because of the practical and unique prescriptive strategies he has suggested in order to promote it. Venuti’s suggestions become particularly resonant when compared to some of the ideas of German director, playwright and poet Bertolt Brecht. Even today, more than half a century after his theoretical writings were written, Brecht’s influence on political activism in theatre and performance remains unmatched.

In this chapter, I compare Brecht’s concepts of gestus and alienated acting with Lawrence Venuti’s concepts of translator foregrounding and foreignisation in translation.

As this chapter suggests, the mechanisms and strategies suggested by the two scholars are surprisingly similar. I also explore the possibility of applying a Brechtian approach to Venuti-inspired translation.

### 3.1.1. The beneficiaries of activism

Erika Fischer-Lichte, who has studied the practice of global, inter-cultural performance throughout much of the twentieth century, noted that the common motivation behind the introduction of foreign themes and techniques to performances is ‘not primarily interest in the foreign, the foreign theatre form or foreign culture from which it derives, but rather a wholly specific situation within one’s own culture’ (1990: 283). Brecht’s work exemplifies her point. Basing his developing ideology on Marxism since the 1920s, Brecht focused his thematic attention in many of his plays on protagonists who belonged to the lower and often productive working classes and demonstrated how their lives, actions and eventually personalities were affected by harsh and unjust social realities. Unique and innovative, Brecht attempted to revolutionize the way in which an audience viewed theatre. For Brecht, spectators ought not to view characters as “heroes” nor, in fact, identify with them at all. Rather, characters – and the play itself – were an initial invitation for spectators to participate in an objective social analysis and draw conclusions from it.

Thus, Brechtian actors, faithful to Erwin Piscator’s ideas (see Meyer-Dinkgräfe 2001: 63), represented historical issues more than the characteristics of individuals. Their purpose was to represent general phenomena in a way that would appeal to critical and analytical theatre goers in a scientific age (see Brecht 1964a: 27-28). One of Brecht’s techniques involved setting dramatic plots in remote lands or ancient times so that the
judgement of the local and contemporary audience would not be easily prejudiced, either for or against his fictional characters. This practice of depicting a foreign society, Brecht insisted, must be strictly implemented:

We must drop our habit of taking the different social structures of past periods, then stripping them of everything that makes them different, so that they all look more or less like our own […]. Instead we must leave them their distinguishing marks and keep their impermanence always before our eyes, so that our own period can be seen to be impermanent, too (Brecht 1964c: 190).

As Brecht noted, an inaccurate depiction could lead to an (undesired) fulfilment of audience desires. ‘Pleasure given by representations’, he wrote, ‘hardly ever depended on the representation’s likeness to the thing portrayed. Incorrectness, or considerable improbability even, was hardly or not at all disturbing, so long as the representation had a certain consistency and the improbability remained of a constant kind’ (Ibid.: 182). An inaccurate representation, however, risks missing the point of Brecht’s theatre, which is to hand the audience an image which would be authentic enough to encourage serious political thought, and distant enough to allow for the consideration of alternatives to the current society. Some accuracy in representation was needed for the Brechtian practice of historicising the portrayed events, i.e., setting them in a clear and distinct historical context which would define the mechanisms that drive them forth (see Brecht 1964d: 96-98). Such accuracy, then, was not pursued for the sake of the portrayed foreign cultures but rather as an instrument for the benefit of the target culture.

It is interesting to compare Brecht’s utilisation of foreign cultures in performance with Venuti’s view of foreign cultures and ideas in translation.2 A major similarity lies in

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2 Interestingly, Fischer-Lichte believed that this aspect of Brecht’s ideology renders it antithetic to ideologies of translation. She noted that ‘it seems useless to refer to the theoretical concepts and
the two thinkers’ initial motivation. Venuti, like Brecht, fights against social wrongdoings through the act of representation of fictional texts (Venuti 1998: 24). In spite of this similarity, the historical and political contexts of Venuti’s and Brecht’s work are very different, as is the impetus of their social activism. Brecht lived and wrote in an era which was greatly influenced by Marxist notions of ameliorating the lives of the working classes. Venuti, on the other hand, focuses on some of the ideological concerns of the contemporary world: globalisation and post-colonial conflicts, for example, replace the concerns regarding class struggle and ownership of the means of production. Venuti’s work, then, aims at benefiting the non Anglo-American world, and it is doing so by suggesting modes of translation which ‘can be a form of resistance against ethnocentrism and racism, cultural narcissism and imperialism, in the interest of democratic geopolitical relations’ (Venuti 1995: 20). Indeed, Venuti has sometimes been criticised for being too vague about the kind of oppression he is resisting (see Tymoczko 2000: 37); inspired by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Venuti saw language as ‘a collective force, an assemblage of forms that constitute a semiotic regime’ (1998: 9). A dominant language such as English, according to Venuti, is an oppressive regime that erases minority languages and the minority ideas they represent. As a translator who wishes to rebel against that force, Venuti prefers to deal with texts that ‘possess minority status’, not only in the target culture, but also in the source culture. (1998: 10). Venuti saw himself as ‘a nomad in [… one’s] own language, a runaway from the mother tongue’ (1995: 291), a vocabularies of translation to describe and assess inter-cultural performances’ (1990: 284). Fischer-Lichte maintained that the fact that inter-cultural elements were introduced to performances in order to promote goals which are inherent to the local culture means that ‘it makes little sense […] to speak of the source-text and the target-text, even less of a source-culture and target-culture’ (Ibid.). This claim seems to ignore the research which was done in the field of translation studies which suggests otherwise: that translations, just like performances, are always derived and commissioned for the sake of local purposes and needs (see Vermeer, 2006; especially the notion of skopos theory).
wanderer who can never feel at home as long as he is living under a hegemonic power structure which dictates the way he speaks. Being a member of a minority, he asserts, is a value in itself. Given that Venuti’s ‘ethical stance […] urges that translations be written, read, and evaluated with greater respect for linguistic and cultural differences’ (1998: 6), it follows that his basis for a practical translation model is one which ‘recognizes and seeks to remedy the asymmetries in translating’ (Ibid.) and will, eventually, ‘shake the regime of English’ (Ibid.: 10).

3.1.2. Enhancing the visibility of performers and translators

The relevance of the comparison of Brecht’s and Venuti’s ideas becomes salient when one regards their approaches to the visibility of performers (Brecht) and of translators (Venuti). Brechtian actors and Venutian translators are similar in that they are not required to conceal their personal selves from their addressees but rather to make their presence more noticeable. Both Brecht and Venuti aspire to indicate their own intermediary role within their representation products.

Brechtian actors, though playing characters, do not hide their role as performers from their spectators. More specifically, they are fulfilling a double role in that they represent the actions of two different persons: the fictional dramatic persona, who tries to survive his or her social circumstances, and a contemporary, real witness, who demonstrates these efforts in front of the audience with ‘mistrust and astonishment’ (Rouse 1995: 240). These two parallel functions are brought together by the Brechtian concept of gestus, a sign which serves to clarify its own materiality or social character (Pavis 1982: 41). Although the actor should become a gestic sign for the character, the
character should not become a sign of an individual, psychological entity. Rather, it should, become a gestic sign for an entire society or class. Such a sign would inevitably raise the awareness of its addressees not only to the nature of its signified subject matter but to the nature of its performative creation as well. Externally, gestic theatrical content manifests itself through all of the actor’s non-spoken actions, although it is sometimes identified only with distinct theatrical moments of an exceptionally expressive nature which function as “‘illustrations” of the social body’ (Ibid.: 40). Internally, gestus is the result of an actor’s in-depth analysis of the character’s motivations that considers many possibilities and scenarios. It involves, but is not limited to, ethical criticism of the character by the actor (1964c: 198-201); this can be linked to the ideas of Diderot who deemed acting which favoured sensibility over judgement to be uncivilised (1957: 25). The internal process which makes gestus achievable allowed Brechtian actors to ‘[demonstrate] their knowledge […] of human relations, of human behaviour, of human capacities […] consciously, suggestively, descriptively’ (Brecht, 1964a: 26). On stage, Brechtian actors use a plethora of histrionic and narrative means in order to apply their knowledge while exposing and signalling their “actor-ness” to the audience.

However, as pointed out by Duane Krause, gestus was not intended to be a mechanism which would allow actors to make their own opinions heard, nor to let them interpret characters independently (1995: 265). Indeed, as Pavis has explained, the interpretation of a Brechtian work is a matter between the director and the text addressee

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3 Even as abstract entity as music can become gestic: Brecht described the ideal music for his Epic Opera, which should be ‘music which takes the text for granted […] music] which takes up a position [regarding it]’ rather than ‘music which heightens the text […] proclaims […] and illustrates [it.]’ (1964: 38). Brecht noted that ‘gestic music is that music which allows the actor to exhibit certain basic gestic on the stage’ (1964: 87), but he mentioned that the musical items which were used, for example, in The Threepenny Opera ‘were of a reflective and moralizing nature’ by themselves (Ibid.: 85).
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(1982: 46). Foregrounding the presence of the performer through gestic acting is a tool that encourages the audience to critique the dominant political system. An actor, Brecht insisted, should be ‘aiming not to put his audience into a trance’, and that ‘[…he] must not go into a trance himself […] his feelings must not at bottom be those of the character, so that the audience’s may not at bottom be those of the character either’ (1964c: 193).

In the same way that Brecht encouraged his actors to reveal themselves, Venuti did not want translators to conceal their role. His aim, ‘to make the translator more visible’ (1995: 17) so that he or she could represent foreign cultures in an anti-hegemonic way, suggested a solution for a problematic situation. As noted by Antoine Berman, to whom Venuti often referred, ‘translation appears either as the modest transmission of meaning, or as the suspect activity of injecting the language with “strangeness.” In both cases, translation is denied and obscured. One of the fundamental tasks of traductology is to fight this obscuring’ (1992: 188). When the act of translation is explicit, there is a lower risk of mistaking the translated text to be a local, original text. This would serve to protect its perceived foreignness from being harmed or compromised.

This calls to mind Brecht’s concept of visible actors who foreground their capacity as performers. To the notion of explicit visibility, Venuti added a unique theme which cannot be paralleled by Brecht’s epic theatre. More specifically, Venuti was committed to improving his fellow translators’ status and to defending them from their adversaries. These adversaries, he wrote, are people who find the concept of literary translation threatening. Some, according to Venuti, think translation is an ‘offense against the

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4 John Rouse noted that as a practising director, Brecht encouraged actors to use various acting techniques and did not limit them to Brechtian acting alone (1995: 238). This may suggest that the concept of gestus is more effective in supplying actors with play material than it is in supplying them with methods of playing it; as phrased by Pavis, gestic qualities exist at the level of the signified, not the level of the signifier (1982: 48).
prevailing concept of authorship’ (1998: 31), while ‘foreign language academics’ fear it as it may threaten conservative academic views according to which foreign literature should be accessed in its original language (Ibid.: 32). This leads not only to an under-recognition of translation in the academy and to disproportionate harshness toward translation errors in literary criticism (Ibid.: 32-33), but also to unfair working conditions, as reflected in British and American copyright law which ‘places strict limitations on the translator’s control of the translated text’ (Ibid.: 47). The undervaluing of a translator’s work is inextricably linked, in Venuti’s opinion, to their deplorable economic and social status. ‘Without a greater recognition of the collective nature of authorship’, he said, ‘translators will continue to be squeezed by unfavourable, if not simply exploitative, contracts’ (Ibid.: 66).

Both Brecht and Venuti, then, aspire to ideals of self-declaring, “gestic” performance and translation, where the process of representation is foregrounded by foregrounding the representing agents. However, different sub-goals are attached to this main function. While Brechtian gestic theatrical content is intended to become a thought-provoking representation of a collective, the Venutian emphasis on the translator’s presence in the text is intended to improve the conditions of the social class of professional translators.

3.1.3. Theatrical alienation and translational foreignisation

The resemblance between the ideas of Brecht and Venuti reaches its epitome in a comparison of the practical techniques employed in order to attain their goals. That is, the strategies used to enhance the visibility of the representation process in order to avoid the illusion of an unmediated contact with the represented materials. I am referring here
to Brecht’s renowned *Verfremdung*, also known as “alienation” and “estrangement”, and to Venuti’s trademark notion of “foreignisation”. Epic Theatre, as devised by Piscator and Brecht, is an attempt to reject a dominant theatrical mechanism of their time: theatrical illusion. According to this principle, spectators should believe (or at least suspend their disbelief in) the fictional realities which are depicted by the actors in front of them. Performers who aim at achieving an effective theatrical illusion, said Brecht, are ethically similar to conmen who sell satisfying lies: they prevent their viewers from thinking, as ‘by means of hypnosis […] they go into trance and take the audience with them’ (1964a: 26). The audience, in return, is only too happy to cooperate with this conventional though regressive and primitive force: ‘their eyes are open, but they stare rather than see […] they wear] an expression which comes from the Middle Ages, the days of witches and priests’ (Brecht 1964c: 187).

In order to eliminate the ‘detached state’ of an uncritical audience (Ibid.), Brecht suggested utilising an alienation effect, one which would extend the concept of gestus from the realm of acting to the entire theatrical experience. In his words, ‘a representation that alienates is one which allows us to recognize its subject, but at the same time makes it seem unfamiliar’ (Ibid.: 192). This principle, which can be linked to formalist notions of de-familiarisation, may be applied to theatre on many levels. One of these levels is the unveiling of the real-world actors who stand behind the characters they play, ‘stressing […] the actor’s effort in the production and ostension of the text’ (Pavis 1982: 45).

Even though Brecht encouraged his actors to avoid sharing the passions of their portrayed characters, thus avoiding the supposedly difficult and unreliable Stanislavskian transformation methods (1964d: 93), he still assumed that an actor can and should radiate
his emotions to the spectators in an ‘epidemic’ manner (Ibid.: 94). For this reason, Brecht suggested that actors should use physical gestures which result from the emotion of critical amazement. These gestures would interrupt the continuity of the portrayed fictional events in order to encourage the audience to do the same mentally (Ibid.: 93, 94).

Alienation through acting is a sub-type of a more general alienation, namely, exposing the true nature of theatrical signifiers and stripping them of their fictional value in order to let the audience peek behind the curtains (see Rouse 1995: 234). The presentation of bare stage machinery and functional areas, as suggested and utilised by various avant-garde artists, also belongs to this sub-type of alienation. These applications of the alienation principle are joined by an array of other techniques for creating theatrical alienation where ‘the artist’s object is to appear strange and surprising to the audience’ (Brecht 1964d: 92). Some of these techniques are stylistic in nature, such as letting the actors ‘play works dealing with our own time as though they were historical’ in order to make the spectators interpret the performance with a historically critical approach (Brecht 1964c: 190). Other types of alienation involve radical shifts from the source play text: Brecht suggested that some roles should be played not by one man but by a chorus, as a means of avoiding identification on the part of the audience (1964e: 32). Applying alienation involves various degrees of de-contextualisation, disrupting or subverting the conventions of contemporary theatrical narration and replacing them with disharmony and coarseness. Some of the techniques used to heighten theatrical alienation are: projecting surtitles alongside the delivered play text (Brecht 1964k: 44), bursting into song in the middle of dramatic action, inserting a play-within-a-play, lighting effects (Brecht 1964c: 203-04) and even using language alone in an odd way which attracts
attention (Pavis 1982: 46-47).

At its core, alienation is ‘a technique of disturbance and alteration’, an opposition to ‘boring and oily smoothness’ (Primavesi 1999: 55). As such, it can be interpreted as a general mode of criticism on representation (see Primavesi 1999: 56). As Brecht repeatedly reminded his readers, it must also refer to specific socio-political and ethical contexts, carry an opinion or an agenda (1964c: 203-04) and ‘free socially conditioned phenomena from that stamp of familiarity which protects them against our grasp today’ (Ibid.: 192).

The Brechtian concept of alienation is a broad one, and this renders it quite applicable to translation in its capacity as a representational practice. In fact, the de-constructive dimension of alienation, where theatrical representation turns against the immediate communicability of the text upon which it was based, allowed Primavesi to make the claim that Brechtian acting is a valid model for describing translation in general. He maintained that ‘the [Brechtian] technique of interruption indicates the violence and the politics of translation’ (1999: 56) and that the success of translations and theatrical productions ‘emerges not from a continuous transition but from the gap and the tension between the [source and target] languages and between performance and text’ (Ibid.: 58). Such statements may describe a possible link between theatre and translation, but I believe they are not sufficiently accurate. This is so because the de-constructive element in Brecht’s work is linked to a distinct system of goals and methods and cannot account for all the myriad number of ways in which translations shift from their sources.

Here I wish to suggest a more limited comparison by pointing out the specific resemblance between Brecht’s and Venuti’s ideas, namely the outstanding similarity between Brechtian alienation and Venutian foreignisation. Venuti, like Brecht, called for
an end to what he believed to be an undesired illusionistic effect in his school of representation, and battled against the conventions of fluency and transparency in translation. When a text is translated in a fluent manner it may become transparent, thus making readers forget that it was not composed in their own language. ‘The effect of transparency’, wrote Venuti, ‘masks the mediations between and within copy and original’ (1995: 290). This effect, according to Venuti, is sought after not only by literary publishers but also by modern industries, like science and entertainment, that employ translators and promote intelligible translations (Ibid.: 5). But fluent and transparent translation, which often involves a degree of identification between translator and author, is not always plausible according to Venuti, especially in cases of ‘resistant material’ (Ibid.: 286) which is not harmonious or coherent enough to enable identification.

Venuti’s main argument against fluency is an ethical one. A fluent translation not only domesticates the foreign content but also hides the evidence of that domestication (1995: 6). This inflicts injustice not only on the source culture, as it ‘rewrites the foreign texts’ (Ibid.), but also on the translators themselves, as it is ‘eclipsing the translator’s labor with an illusion of authorial presence, reproducing the cultural marginality and economic exploitation which translation suffers today’ (Ibid.: 290).

The alternative which was suggested by Venuti was ‘a theory and practice of translation that resists dominant target-language cultural values so as to signify the linguistic and cultural difference of the foreign text’ (1995: 23). This strategy of ‘resistancy’ (Ibid.: 24) was described using semi-Brechtian terminology and reasoning. Venuti claimed that ‘good translation is demystifying [...] its most decisive occurrence depends on introducing variations that alienate the domestic language and, since they are domestic, reveal the translation to be in fact a translation, distinct from the text it
replaces’ (1998: 11). This strategy of resistancy ‘must not be viewed as making the translation more faithful to the source-language text’ (Venuti 1995: 291), as ‘otherness […] in translation] can never be manifested in its own terms, only in those of the target language’ (1995: 20). Therefore, said Venuti, ‘foreignizing translation signifies the difference of the foreign text, yet only by disrupting the cultural codes that prevail in the target language’ (Ibid.), even when the original source text is fluent and harmonious (Ibid.: 295). This should not only fight against the dominance of the local linguistic regime but also make the translator more visible. As noted by Pym, ‘we might […] say that translators are only potentially known when the receiver’s belief in equivalence breaks down; that is, when the translator’s language is received as being somehow non-translational’ (2004: 69).

The disruptions which are suggested by Venuti may take many forms and use tools which are taken from translators’ vast arsenal of ‘phonological, syntactical and discursive structures’ (Ibid.: 24). They may include ‘anachronisms’ (Ibid.: 35), ‘awkward phrasings, unidiomatic constructions or confused meanings’ (Ibid.: 286-87) – all of which are common in Brechtian epic theatre – and even the initial choice of texts to translate, since ‘texts that possess minority status in their cultures […] can be useful in minoritizing the standard dialect and dominant cultural forms in American English’ (Venuti 1998: 10). One of Venuti’s examples is Ezra Pound’s translation from 1912 of The Seafarer, an Old English poem found in the Exeter Book. Pound used archaisms, such as imitating the ‘compound words, alliteration, and accentual meter’, and sometimes based his translation on phonological similarity more than on meaning.⁵ Not all of these foreign textual features are linked to the original poem. Venuti clarifies that ‘Pound’s departures from’

⁵ ‘Bitre breostceare’, for instance, is translated by Pound as ‘bitter breast-cares’ and ‘corna cladast’ is translated as ‘corn of the coldest’ (Venuti 1995, 34).
modern English also include archaisms drawn from later periods of English literature’, using words such as ‘aye’, Middle English for “always”, ‘burghers’, which originated in the Elizabethan period, and “mid”, which appeared in the nineteenth century (Ibid.: 35). These disharmonious features, or, perhaps more appropriately, translational gestures, assisted Venuti in the demolition of a single authorial figure and the negation of translation’s transparency. When Venuti’s resistance is considered alongside his inclination ‘to translate foreign texts that possess minority status in their cultures, a marginal position in their native canons—or that, in translation, can be useful in minoritizing the standard dialect and dominant cultural forms’ (1998: 10), it resembles Brecht’s work to such an extent that one might even describe it as “gestic translation”.

The two strategies of de-familiarisation aspire to a similar initial effect upon the receiver: both reader and spectator should become aware of the hidden mechanisms which control their respective media of representation and their own role within these mechanisms. Like actors, translators have many technical possibilities of interrupting fluent reception by drawing attention to their medium, despite the difficulties. Thus to the options suggested by Venuti, one might add changing the order of the passages in the target text, using confusing and incoherent typography, and so on.

Translational foreignisation and resistant translation have never enjoyed the same influence that Brechtian ideas have in acting. Literary translators, to whom the system of foreignising translation was aimed (see Venuti 1998: 23-24), seldom try to make their presence known within the texture of the translated text and, more importantly, they rarely attempt to render the target text obscure. One may imagine an aesthetics of translation which suggests a certain amount of linguistic oddity, but Venuti, in his early writings, explicitly dismissed intelligibility as a symptom of domesticating translation. In
his words, modern industries which use translation are ‘valorizing a purely instrumental use of language and other means of representation and thus emphasizing immediate intelligibility and the appearance of factuality’ (1995: 5), and ‘transparency occurs only when the translation reads fluently, when [...] clear syntactical connections and consistent pronouns create intelligibility for the reader’ (Ibid.: 286-87). Dirk Delabastita noted that a dismissal of intelligibility would render resistant translation problematic: ‘in a wide range of situations and for a wide range of texts [...] intelligibility and fluency in translation] fulfil important psychological, relational, cognitive, aesthetic, social, legal or other functions in addition to the ideological ones highlighted and denounced by Venuti’ (2010: 133). Maria Tymoczko asked, ‘how do we distinguish resistant translations from translations that are unreadable? Where in language does ideological tyranny end and grammar begin?’ (2000: 37). However, the relative rarity of foreignising translations may also result from the fact that translators are separated from their readers and have little direct interaction with them. James Naremore followed a similar line of thought when he said that cinematic acting had more in common with Stanislavski than Brecht declaring that ‘the impenetrable barrier of the screen favors representational playing styles [over presentational ones]’ (1988: 30).

3.1.4. The different ethoses of Brecht and Venuti

The true value of a comparison between Brecht and Venuti, I believe, lies not in the prescriptive possibilities it may open but rather in the descriptive insights it may evoke. It is important, then, to also recognise the core dissimilarities between the ideas of the two thinkers.

Venuti’s writings resemble Brecht’s on many levels, even to the point of his use of a
similar vocabulary: Venuti writes, for example, that ‘in its effort to do right abroad, this translation method must do wrong at home, deviating enough from native norms to stage an alien reading experience’ (1995: 20, my emphasis). Brecht’s ethical attitude was formed through a dialogue with various Marxist and Marxism-related thinkers: Rodney Livingstone noted that Brecht’s Me-ti, a book of aphorisms rich in ethical discussions, ‘reads like a symposium of voices: Hegel, Marx and Engels, Lenin, Plekhanov, Stalin and Trotsky, Karl Korsch and Rosa Luxemburg’ (1998: 63). Venuti, in turn, stated in a recent interview that he was ‘left wing’ and that his thought was ‘informed by post-structuralism, […] philosophical the theoretical discourses […] psychoanalysis, Marxism, feminism and so forth’ (2011). Despite the 50 years that separate their works and the different foci of the ideologies which nurtured them, Brecht and Venuti seem to share, at least partially, a socially-enlightened discourse. Both protest against uncritical reception and consumption of misleading representations and both have applied similar, radical tactics to combat it. To some extent, both of them have also relied on a modicum of wishful thinking regarding the desired reception of their clever strategies.

So far, any apparent differences between the two appear to be secondary. For example, while Venuti campaigned to improve the social status of the representation mediators (in his case, translators), Brecht is known for his efforts to uncover the negative implications of social mechanisms. However, there are additional and more profound differences between the ethics of the two. These differences lie in the implied assumptions, terminologies and goals which are embedded in their works.

3.1.4.1. Assumptions and expectations

In order to understand the ethical infrastructure which underlies the representational
systems suggested by Brecht and Venuti, one should first examine their desired effects. A discussion of the intended reception among the ideal, implied spectators of epic theatre, as well as the anticipated reactions among implied readers of foreignising translation, should help shed light on the principles which are compatible with the two models.

Epic theatre assumes open-minded spectators who receive its performances like intelligent, knowledge-thirsty students. Given the proper education through theatre, society should be able to use the viewing experience as an opportunity to learn and to change. This kind of theatre, wrote Brecht, is intended for an audience who prefers judging reason provoking real world facts over being immersed in emotion (Brecht 1964l: 37). A respect for reason, logic and empiricism lay at the basis of Brecht’s claim that ‘the production has got to bring out the material incidents in a perfectly sober and matter-of-fact way’ (1964f: 14). Alienated acting, in Brecht’s mind, was ‘less unworthy of a thinking being’ (1964d: 95). The trust Brecht had in the capacity of his audience to reason made him write and direct many plays which did not explicitly reveal their ideological agenda (Bernard, 1964: 14). On one occasion, he added extra-textual explanations to a radio drama in order to make sure that his audience reached the desired interpretation (Brecht 1964b: 18-19). Believing that pedagogic activity should not in any way be boring or tiresome, Brecht noted that:

From the first it has been the theatre’s business to entertain people. [...] We should not by any means be giving it a higher status if we were to turn in e.g. into a purveyor of morality; it would on the contrary run the risk of being debased, and this would occur at once if it failed to make its moral lesson enjoyable (1964c: 180).

The utopian and humanistic vision of reception that is implied by epic theatre was aided by ideas and terminologies which were drawn from the field of science. In this,
said Joseph Roach, Brecht followed Diderot, who likewise linked scientific materialism to theatre practice (1985: 157). In that sense, Brecht was a man of his time. In the first half of the twentieth century, the interest in science and technology increased exponentially: they were viewed as ever-developing fields which could make the impossible possible. Consequently, scienticism became a good founding myth for models of social and cultural improvement. Brechtian actors should act like scientists, and, indeed, like professional translators, when they prepare themselves for performance. As Brecht put it, actors needed to abandon their intuition and consciously and empirically scrutinise their representations against the conduct of the people they wished to imitate (Brecht 1964d: 95). Other Brechtian ideals which owed their provenance to the world of experimental science were the wish to present all events in their correct historical contexts (not to be mistaken for linear or continuous presentation of them), and the wish to use every line of enacted dialogue as a source of ever-widening questions regarding its social, cultural, historical and political background (Ibid.: 97-98). In epic theatre, Brecht claimed, ‘the spectator stands outside, learning’ (1964l: 37), like an objective scientist; he expressed his confidence that his theatre will suit the children of the scientific age (1964c: 186). The non-epic theatrical concepts of relationship between actors and spectators were described by Brecht using terminology as far from scientific discourse as possible: that of hypnotic illusion and of erotic stimulation (1964a: 26).

Reception in epic theatre, said Brecht, ‘turns the spectator into an observer, but arouses his capacity for action’, as it ‘forces him to take decisions’ (1964l: 37). The spectator should become more able, and more willing, to act. In Brecht’s words: ‘The epic theatre’s spectator says: […] That’s extraordinary, hardly believable – It’s got to stop – The sufferings of this man appal me, because they are unnecessary’ (1964n: 71). When
the time arrives for ‘choosing sides’ in the class struggle, Brecht believed that the power of reason would lead his spectators to adopt the ideas that were morally correct and aid the oppressed against their oppressors (Brecht 1964c: 186-87).

The eventual outcome of attending the epic theatre should be quite noticeable: The goals of Brecht’s alienated acting were ‘to make nature’s course intelligible, controllable and down to earth […] to try, by its own means of course, to further the great social task of mastering life’ (Brecht 1964d: 96). Referring to the play Die Mutter, Brecht wrote that the text was ‘anxious to teach the spectator a quite definite practical attitude, directed toward changing the world, it must begin by making him adopt in the theatre a quite different attitude from what he is used to’ (1964g: 57).

Epic theatre, then, ambitiously set out to inspire its audience to master their own lives and fates by participating in concrete, social actions. In Brecht’s words, ‘it is precisely theatre, art and literature which have to form the “ideological superstructure” for a solid, practical rearrangement of our age’s way of life’ (1964j: 23).

Compared to epic theatre, foreignising translation does not seem to aim at generating social change, at least not directly. Instead, it aims at generating a special kind of respect. As noted by Venuti:

Translation clearly raises ethical questions […] the power of translation to form identities and qualify agents […] should be] examined. The ethical stance I advocate urges that translations be written, read and evaluated with greater respect for linguistic and cultural differences (1998: 6).

Respect, then, should be aimed at the very concept of “the foreign”, rather than at any actual foreign text, foreign language, foreign culture or foreign people, because these cannot be accessed through the translated text. Even an original literary text, Venuti
wrote, ‘can never simply express the author’s intended meaning in a personal style. It rather puts to work collective forms in which the author may indeed have a psychological investment, but which by their very nature depersonalize and destabilize meaning’ (1998: 10). Meaning, already once lost, is even further lost in translation since, according to Venuti, ‘the foreign text […] is not so much communicated as inscribed with domestic intelligibilities and interests’ (2006b: 482). As Venuti explained in a less radical tone, translation can ‘communicate to its readers the understanding of the foreign text that foreign readers have […] but this communication will always be partial, both incomplete and inevitably slanted toward the domestic scene’ (Ibid.: 487).

Venuti noted that all translations are aggressive by nature as they force a source text to obey rules which were set by a different language (1995: 18) and are therefore a ‘violent rewriting’ (Ibid.: 25). He wrote in favour of ‘an ethical stance that recognises the asymmetrical relations in any translation project’ adding that ‘translation can never simply be communication between equals because it is fundamentally ethnocentric’ (1998: 11). Venuti’s view of translation echoes the words of Antoine Berman: ‘every society wants to be a pure and unadulterated whole. There is a tinge of the violence of cross-breeding in translation’ (1992: 4). It is also compatible with the words of Jacques Derrida, who said that ‘the first effect or first destination of [having to communicate using another] language […] involves depriving me of […] my singularity’ (1996: 60, cited in Westmoreland 2008: 5). According to Derrida, all linguistic hosting of foreign texts, including translation, is bound to involve a violent deprivation of identity: ‘a cultural or linguistic community […] always] betray this principle of […] hospitality; so as to protect “home”, presumably, by guaranteeing property and “one’s own” against the unrestricted arrival of the other’ (Derrida 2005: 66). Accordingly, Venuti believed that
there is no escape from aggression as means of negating the already unjust situation. Whether attacking the source culture or the target culture, he noted, ‘the [...] literary translator always exercises a choice concerning the degree and direction of the violence at work in any translating’ (1995: 19).

One way to fight the violence that translators commit against source texts, according to the concept of foreignising translation, involves committing counter-violence. Venuti expressed the need ‘to force translators and their readers to reflect on the ethnocentric violence of translation’ (Ibid.: 41, my emphasis). In a similar spirit, he cited Deleuze and Guattari, who suggested that authors who seek the desired status of minority in their own major language should ‘conquer the major language in order to delineate it as yet unknown minor languages’ (1987: 105, cited in Venuti 1998: 11).

Epic theatre and foreignising translation presuppose different modes of reception. Inspired by a Marxist perspective, which involves the belief that the world could be changed once its political and social mechanisms are understood and criticised, epic theatre expects its spectators to be willing listeners who think rationally and have a desire to act in order to change and improve the world. Foreignising translation, on the other hand, a product of its less optimistic cultural and historical climate in which networks of power relations are perceived to be more intransigent, expects its readers to be less willing. It assumes they must be taught (whether or not they wish to be) to recognise and respect the impossibilities of inter-cultural communication. If the motivation behind epic theatre is positive and aims at the communication of ideas, the motivation behind foreignising translation is less positive and aims to avoid miscommunication. Epic theatre involves a degree of wishful thinking on the part of the spectator, one who, like Czesław Miłosz’s depiction of the Marxist intellectual, is ‘warm-hearted […] a friend of
mankind [...] not mankind as it is, but as it should be’ (1981: 11, emphasis in the original). Foreignising translation takes the opposite attitude and requires a more sober, less hopeful approach. While epic theatre hopes to achieve comprehensive social change, resistant translation has the less daunting goal: of ‘a momentary liberation from the target-language culture, perhaps before it is reterritorialized with the reader’s articulation of a voice – recognizable, transparent – or of some reading amenable to the dominant aesthetic’ (Venuti 1995: 306).

3.1.4.2. Foreignising translation: Critiques

Venuti described the motivation behind foreignising translation as one which is ‘prepared to be disloyal to the domestic cultural norms that govern the identity-forming process of translation by calling attention to what they enable and limit, admit and exclude, in the encounter with foreign texts’, as ‘an ethics of difference’ (1998: 83). This kind of ethics, which concentrates on the gaps between cultures more than on the attempts to bridge them, is meant, eventually, to undermine the regime of English. Several critics have expressed doubt that foreignising translation and its agenda to defy domestic cultural norms can achieve such a goal.

Pym doubted that foreignising translation would ever be able to become a dominant practice. Rhetorically speaking, he asked: ‘Am I right to suspect that Venuti wants one almighty “intervention” that will change translators’ strategies and suddenly overturn the whole lot?’ Translators who followed Venuti’s system of thought, Pym concluded, became akin to cultural pariahs: ‘[E]verywhere I found Venuti’s few resistant translators “banished to the fringes” of not just Anglo-American culture but of whatever culture they were involved with’ (1996: 167). Delabastita’s doubts concerned the actual effectiveness
of foreignising translation. Given the assumption that such translations are often based on complex works of literature, he surmised that they would fail to gain popularity among the crowds. ‘Venuti overestimates what foreignizing literary translators can realistically hope to achieve’, Delabastita argued, because ‘the politics of the disruptive workings of [...]highbrow poetry translation’s] signifiers dwindles into total insignificance when compared with the ethnocultural effects of, say, the media and the entertainment industry’ (2010: 133). Pym noted that the choices which are made for the sake of foreignising translation may become too scholarly, and be missed by the average translation readers. As an example he referred to specific words which Venuti used in his translation of a poem by Milo De Angelis which were intended to elicit Heideger and Nietzsche (Pym 1996: 172-73, see Venuti 1995: 293-94).

Even if foreignising translation has gathered a significant share of supporters, it still has other criticisms to face. Maria Tymoczko wrote that the struggle against fluency is reductionistic and simplistic. In her words:

[C]ultural dominance results in translations with deformed textual and cultural representation that serves the interests of the dominant receptor culture. Such deformation is not necessarily to be associated with a single type of translation method, such as fluency. Rather, any translation procedure can become a tool of cultural colonization, even foreignizing translation (2000: 37).

Delabastita noted that foreignising translation is based on an exaggerated estimation of the power that literary translations enjoy over inter-cultural aggression: ‘Venuti evokes racism, imperialism and destruction; assisted by a subtle but very dubious semantic shift he somehow blames much of this real violence on the “ethnocentric violence” that is “wreaked” by fluent translation’ (2010: 132). Indeed, one could suggest that recognising
the difference between one’s own culture and a foreign one may not be enough to avert inter-cultural violence, hatred and misunderstanding. All of this may mean that foreignising translation is less than perfect means of introducing actual changes to the world, a tool which is unable to reach the goals that it set out to achieve. This is supported by Pym’s observation that ‘translational resistance has not brought more democracy, has not changed domestic values’ (1996: 167).

Venuti himself was aware of the actual and potential criticism against foreignising translation and proceeded to confront it on several levels. Confident in the possibility of bringing an actual change through foreignising translation, he described the choice of translators ‘to redirect the ethnocentric movement of translation so as to decenter the domestic terms that a translation project must inescapably utilize’ as an act of the ‘ethics of difference that can change the domestic culture’ (Venuti 1998: 82). Recently, Venuti spoke in favour of communicability in translation as means of introducing foreignising notions in order to gain popularity: ‘If [readers …] achieve this kind of self-consciousness, in a pleasurable way, a way which would not inhibit them from reading, which is one of the problems, I think that more books will be sold’ (2011). He also stated his belief in the possibility of intelligible, accessible foreignising translation:

[T]ranslation concerned with limiting its ethnocentrism does not necessarily risk unintelligibility and cultural marginality. A translation project can deviate from domestic norms to signal the foreignness of the foreign text and create a readership that is more open to linguistic and cultural difference yet without resorting to linguistic experiments that are so estranging as to be self-defeating (1998: 87).

In certain cases, foreignising translation may even “cooperate” with existing norms. As an example, Venuti brought to light the case of translations of contemporary Japanese
literature, which were produced in the USA under the rule of exoticising translation norms. In these translations, a specific image of Japanese culture was foregrounded and Japanese works which were incompatible with that image were marginalised. Venuti noted:

A translation project following an ethics of difference will [...] be] representing the diversity of the Japanese narrative tradition by restoring the [familiar and non-exotic] segments of it that were formerly neglected. The restoration may indeed be a domestic reconstruction [...] but it nonetheless seeks to compensate for a previous exclusion (Ibid.: 82).

Finally, Venuti was aware of the need to consider the actual complexities of each inter-cultural situation before choosing a translation strategy. Regarding a translation of Homer into Twi (Ghana), mediated through English, he wrote: ‘for a translation ethics grounded in such differences, the key issue is not simply a discursive strategy (fluent or resistant), but always its intention and effect as well – i.e., whether the translating realizes an aim to promote cultural innovation and change’ (Ibid.: 188).

The concept of foreignising translation has modified through the years, becoming more flexible and more willing to accommodate the wishes and the needs of its addressees. Nevertheless, the tension at its core remains valid: foreignising translation recognises the oppressive and ethnocentric notions which are reflected in domesticating norms and strategies, but does not fully recognise their important function in streamlining and enabling communication. Marking these norms and strategies as the main targets of assault may not be an efficient way of introducing actual changes into unjust inter-cultural situations.
3.1.5. Brecht in the service of foreignising translation

3.1.5.1. Brechtian emphases applied on Venutian techniques

A link between Brecht’s overall view of theatre and Venuti’s view of translation may help pave the way toward negating some of criticism directed at foreignising translation. This link focuses on Brecht’s concepts of communication and education through pleasure.

One of the moral lessons which were brought in Brecht’s Stories of Mr Keuner was that ‘If injustice is done to you, make sure you are heard; otherwise you don’t deserve to complain’ (cited in Arribas 2010: 15). An epic work of art, according to Brecht, must make itself popular in order to be meaningful. In a discussion of literature, Brecht explained what he meant by the term popular: ‘“Popular” means intelligible to the broad masses, taking over their own forms of expression and enriching them / adopting and consolidating their standpoint / representing the most progressive section of the people in such a way that it can take over the leadership’ (1964m: 108). In order to be popular, one must address audiences who may not view the arts as an exalted thing: Brecht stated that he wrote ‘for the sort of people who just come for fun and don’t hesitate to keep their hats on in the theatre’ (1964f: 14).

In order to be popular, hence effective, Brecht emphasised the need for theatre to be fun. Indeed, he considered this to be a definitive attribute of the theatrical stage: in his words, ‘from the first it has been the theatre’s business to entertain people, as it also has of all the other arts. It is this business which always gives it its particular dignity; it needs no other passport than fun, but this it has got to have’ (1964c: 180). In other words, there is nothing unworthy in pleasure in itself: ‘(N)othing,’ Brecht claimed, ‘needs less
justification than pleasure’ (Ibid.: 181). The sensual and aesthetic pleasures which are satisfied by epic theatre (using a plethora of theatrical devices, like music and choreography) should not contradict their corollary, the pleasure of learning. As noted earlier, Venuti came to recognise the need to consider the tastes and the needs of translation readers. Might Brecht’s emphases placed on satisfying the needs of theatre spectators be “translated” into the realm of Venutian translation? From a Brechtian perspective, foreignising translation must be attractive in order to be effective. This means that notably resistant elements within it, which can be thought of as instances of translational “gestus”, must be attractive too, or, at least, not repelling. Although these elements may interrupt the reading, they should not disrupt it. A translation may not be “fun”, entertaining or amusing in the way epic theatre should be; but, like epic theatre, it should satisfy the desires of its readers if it wishes to educate them. These desires can be various, as they depend upon the socio-cultural context. They may even include the desire for intelligibility, fluency, various kinds of translational equivalence, and so on. Satisfying these initial needs should not stop the foreignising translators from pointing out the inherent problems that these needs hide, using all the tools and means which have been described by Venuti and others.

3.1.5.2. An example for a translation inspired by Brecht and Venuti

The techniques which are described by Brecht and Venuti are similar. It follows, then, that a demonstration of “Brechtian” translation should be similar to a demonstration of foreignising translation. In my translation of three more sections of Hovav’s text I will demonstrate techniques which draw their inspiration from both systems.

My first attempt to make the readers aware of the translational nature of the target
text is based on one of Brecht’s most well-known alienation techniques: specifically, the introduction of a narrator who serves to frame the play as a theatrical event, rather than as a ‘real’ one. For purposes of this demonstration, I have chosen to use a simple mode of narration which resides outside the fictional world and functions almost like scenic captions, similar to those used in Brecht’s *Mother Courage and her Children* and *Life of Galileo*. In my translation, narration does not criticise social and representational mechanisms because such mechanisms are not a prominent theme of my source text. It does, however, attempt to draw attention to the translational and trans-cultural nature of the target text.

(Hovav 1996: 32-33, my translation)

[See Appendix, section B]

*And now let me tell you, in your lovely mother tongue, why the young Hovav was taken to his aunt in the Kibbutz.*

It is only fair to stop here and explain why my mother was in the mood of a fruit picking machine, and incidentally introduce an unexpected antagonist who had been hidden from sight until now – my maths teacher.

Every summer vacation, when my mother and Rina would be given their children back for keepsake, alongside with their report cards, it became apparent that members of our family were no great mathematicians. Not only not great, as our school specified, but also prone to repeat the school year. Rina and Avi, being far wealthier than my parents, used to call the schoolmaster and converse with him about issues of progress and development. On one occasion they donated a library, on another – a new floor for the young children’s wing, and so it happened that Itamar and Sponsor Girl made their way through twelve classes.

Unlike our rich aunt and uncle, my parents could resort only to promising that the child would perform better. One week after the beginning of summer vacation, I used to be sent to school in disgrace and hop along back home with a bag packed
with a huge bundle of exercises. ‘If you can solve all of these,’ said the math teacher, ‘and I’m sure you can, you will be promoted to the next year.’ So he said, praying silently for his prophecy to be refuted so I could finally drop from his class and rid him of the burden of dealing with a dumb-ass kid, whose multiplication table is riddled with enormous black holes.

Using a different tactic of estrangement, I attempted to “shake” the very materiality of the words in the target text, making them appear odd and out-of-place yet causing only minimal harm to the process of reading and understanding. I did this simply by painting random sections of the text light blue. My decision was largely based on a consideration of balance. A more subtle approach, such as introducing changes to the font typeface, might be missed by readers, or dismissed as unworthy of attention. Conversely, a less subtle approach, such as introducing changes to the layout or the directionality, might be regarded as “concrete prose” or another kind of familiar typographical art, and fail to raise a sense of amazement.

(Hovav 1996: 32-33, my translation)

[See Appendix, section C]

I, on my part, used to drag my bag of sorrows back home, position it on the yellow formica table in the kitchen, and watch in horror as the tangents and differentials burst out of it and gambolled around the house, chased by all these dreadful trains which can never leave Tel Aviv and Haifa on time, but for me still insist on crashing into each other in Hadera.

‘This year I’ve got eighty exercises in arithmetics and forty in geometry,’ I informed my family glumly. My father promptly escaped the house (only years later I discovered that the Radio manager had had an “E” in his math finals), and Mooma withdrew to her room and announced that in the following days she would be occupied in the making of marzipan and ‘if this gazpacho but dares to approach
me with his algebraic inquisitions I shall throw myself in the river. All day long he runs under my feet and pesters me with construction workers and triangles and air-planes and I know not what, and lo, the marzipan turns out crooked.’

Finally, I attempted to follow Venuti and “minoritise” the target text (see Venuti 1998: 10). Hovav’s *Family Cooking* cannot be said to possess any minority status in Hebrew literature since it belongs to the world of popular light reading. However, its translation may still be linked to other relevant texts that do enjoy minority status. The text I chose to use was the poetry of the widely known but little read Israeli poet, Avoth Yeshurun (1904-92).

Even though he has published poetry since the 1930s, ‘only at old age did Avoth Yeshurun […] find his own unique style.’ (Oppenheimer 2001, my translation). He became known in the 1970s, co-incidentally, the period when the stories of *Family Cooking* take place. However, Yeshurun’s poetry was still shadowed by that of his more famous contemporaries. Influential scholar and literary editor, Menachem Perry, who published many of Yeshurun’s poems, wrote of Yeshurun’s relative obscurity: ‘my opinion is that Yeshurun is a forsaken poet to this day’ (2009, my translation). This lack of recognition may be a result of Yeshurun’s refusal to obey the socio-poetic norms of his period. Yohai Oppenheimer explains:

Yeshurun […] refrained consistently from adopting the role which was undertaken by the majority of the poets of his time: to establish an Israeli identity through the experience of military heroism on the one hand and bereavement on the other. His poetry chose to point out the other, unofficial memory, which is related to guilt and responsibility for the fate of the vanquished (2001, my translation).

Yeshurun became a minor poet not only because of his avoidance of conventional
themes but also because of his avoidance of the conventional use of language. According to Oppenheimer, Yeshurun ‘broke down almost every customary linguistic norm, grammatically and syntactically but also lexically – [considering] the vast usage of Yiddish, Arabic and slang’ (2001, my translation). Zandbank commented about Yeshurun’s effect on his readers: ‘reading the poetry of Yeshurun can draw you in two very different directions; [one is …] the mimetic side […], the way in which it reflects Yiddish and follows it; […] the other is] its invented side, the modernistic enclave it creates within the Hebrew language and Hebrew poetry’ (2009, my translation).

I chose Yeshurun’s poetry specifically for the task of introducing a “minoritisng” element into the translation of *Family Cooking* because it has one typical stylistic element that can be transferred into English quite effectively. This element can be called ultra-deficient spelling, and it requires some explanation. Hebrew includes a system of vowel signs (*nikkud*) which is used in biblical texts, texts intended for children and poetry. When this system is used, some (but not all) of the letters which normally represent vowels are omitted, because they are no longer necessary. This is called deficient spelling. What Yeshurun introduced was an ultra-deficient spelling. His poems used *nikkud*, but in some of the lines he omitted all the instances of vowel letters – even vowel letters that would not be normally omitted under such circumstances.

Oppenheimer’s description of the effect of this unique spelling brings to mind Brecht and Venuti: ‘he who is familiar with the ultra deficient spelling, which was used by Yeshurun since the end of the seventies, will recognise […] the attempt to leave an impression on language by making it strange’ (2001, my translation). This was corroborated by Zandbank, who noted that ‘spelling words as Ym [instead of Yom, meaning day] or Dfk [instead of Dofek, meaning knocking] necessarily interrupts fluent reading and draws
attention not toward the signified but toward the very sign, the opaque, and thus poetic, materiality of the words’ (2009, my translation).

Yeshurun’s ultra-deficient spelling can be mirrored by an English text without some of its vowels, as in, ‘it is cmprhnsbl, bt vry wrd.’ I chose to plant this effect here and there in the translated text, as a last demonstration of the possibilities of translational Verfremdungseffect.

(Hovav 1996: 33-34, my translation)
[See Appendix, section D]

In short, my mthr undrstd she was left alone again with me and the cosines. To sink into a mood of a frt pckng mchn, then, was the only remaining altrntve.

But this year, aunt Reuma shone in the skies of mth. Reuma was always cnsdrd to be the intllctl aunt, and my mthr, in her despair, decided that the fct that Reuma had read all those deathly brng bks by Brenner surely means that she can hndl these annoying pools with their leaky tps.

In conclusion, the translations of these passages attempt to exemplify techniques borrowed from Venuti and Brecht in an effort to draw attention to the translational nature of the text and to minoritise it within the context of domestic English texts. I did this by framing the narration, by including an example of resistant modification in the texture of the text (in this case, colour) and by introducing a stylistic link with a foreign, minoritised author.
4. Approaching Ascension

Modernistic thought flourished in the western arts during the twentieth century, and found its way into the world of theatre in many different guises. One of these might be described as modernist mysticism. Evelyn Underhill described mysticism as ‘the expression of the innate tendency of the human spirit towards complete harmony with the transcendental order; whatever be the theological formula under which that order is understood’ (1955: xiv).

In theatre practice, modernistic mysticism sought to uncover hidden, transcendental truths and emphasised the capacity of performance and representation to spiritually elevate the performers and their audiences through notions of dedication, purity and totality. The importance of such themes in the theatre was suggested in the work of Antonin Artaud in the 1920s and 1930s (see Artaud, 1993), whose ideas were re-approached, explored and applied by the Polish actor and director, Jerzy Grotowski, during the 1960s.

In translation studies, mysticist notions of modernism ascribed a similar spiritual significance to the act of translation. This approach is most clearly represented in the early work of the modernist philosopher, Walter Benjamin. In The Task of the Translator, his renowned essay written in 1923, Benjamin claimed that translations flourish only when they emerge out of ‘a special, high purposiveness’ which ‘is sought not in its own sphere but in a higher one’ (1999: 72-73).\footnote{The existence of a spiritual element in Benjamin’s concept of language is not consensual. Paul De Man, one of Benjamin’s notable commentators, wrote: ‘that [... language] is divine or not makes little difference, and the more you take the sacred out of this picture, the better’ (1986: 101). This complete rejection seems to be related to De Man’s opposition to those who link Benjamin to messianic ideas (see Ibid.: 77-79). As noted by Loan Davies, though, ‘the significance of Benjamin’s ideas as well as...}
be reached only through means of linguistic representation as ‘this representation of hidden significance through an embryonic attempt at making it visible [which is manifested in translation and criticism] is of so singular a nature that it is rarely met in the sphere of nonlinguistic life’ (Ibid.: 73). One may claim that the personal transformation process involved in performance and in acting represents a similarly embryonic attempt which is aimed at, quite literally, making a hidden significance visible.

The modernist mysticist attitudes in performance and in translation, as represented by Benjamin and Grotowski, are esoteric in the literal sense of the word. Firstly, both of them are related to foreign, non-rationalist and non-mainstream traditions of thought and practice. Grotowski, who travelled through central Asia and studied traditional beliefs (Meyer-Dinkgräfe 2001: 78-79), praised the oriental theatre performers he encountered for their work ethic and for their dedication (Kumiega 1985: 115-16). His predecessor, Artaud, was known to have been inspired by Balinese theatre-dance (1993: 36-49). The work of Benjamin, in turn, did not refer to such traditions explicitly but was linked by others to Jewish mysticism and the Kabbalah (see Handelman 1991). Secondly, the ideas of Grotowski and Benjamin can be considered esoteric insofar as they have both attracted more interest than actual followers. According to Jennifer Kumiega, ‘many practitioners, actors in particular, were repelled by Grotowski’s dogmatically purist and dedicated approach’ (1985: 13); the actual shows he directed were sometimes staged in front of an audience of two or three spectators (1985: 13-14). Likewise, Benjamin’s ideas about translation have never achieved widespread popularity among actual practitioners. His contextual metaphors have been read in quite discrepant ways, that the task of translating has been bounded not so much by the perspectives of interpretation, but by the frameworks of ideology’ (1980: 69, cited in Ingram 1997: 209).
Considering their complexity and abstract nature, one can assume that they were probably not intended for the masses.

An essential connection between the ideas of Benjamin and Grotowski exists, though, not in their scholarly conception or in their public reception but in their similar spiritual goals and the means (though different) that they have suggested in order to achieve them. Underhill wrote that ‘worship, in all its grades and kinds, is the response of the creature to the eternal’ (1957, 3). In this sense, Both Benjamin’s and Grotowski’s approaches to representation can be viewed as a practice which resembles worship.

4.1.1. The goals of soaring

A translator who would like to translate according to the ideas of Benjamin, or a performer who would like to act following the thought of Grotowski, would resist the traditional semiotic and communicative roles of their respective media and seek higher spheres of significance in their stead. Such uncommon uses of representational media have been discussed by Gerald Bruns who differentiated between ‘orpheic’ and ‘hermetic’ emphases in language (1974: 1-10). Susan A. Handelman noted that a hermetic approach, which was apparent in the French symbolism of the nineteenth century and in twentieth-century variants of formalism, ‘turns language away from the world and back upon itself into a pure realm of forms [...manifesting] structural relations analogous to music’ (1991: 33). The orphic approach, on the other hand, was linked to the work of Heidegger and other twentieth-century phenomenologists. An orphic usage of language, according to Handelman, ‘exalts poetic speech as a creative power based on an ideal unity of word and being that establishes the human and natural world’ (Ibid.: 34). Handelman summarised the difference between the two approaches with the words: ‘the world of
human and inanimate nature can be seen as either an obstacle to and fall from that higher reality [according to the hermetic approach], or its very matrix and goal [according to the orphic one]’ (Ibid.).

While Handelman maintained that the work of Benjamin relates him to the two sides equally (1991: 22-23), Christian Kohlross felt that Benjamin strived for ‘a [kind of] translation [...] which ultimately aims at an isomorphism between meaning and what is meant’ (2009: 104), suggesting an inclination toward the orphic side of sacred language. Paul De Man’s opinion may be more accurate. He related Benjamin’s ideas to the hermetic side, reluctant as he was toward interpreting them in any transcendental context. Compared to authoring, translating is, according to De Man, a mode of text production in which the link between meaning and its linguistic form is relatively fragile. In his words, Benjamin was interested in ‘a language completely devoid of any kind of meaning function [, …] a purely technical linguistic language – and it would be purely limited […]. You can call that divine or sacred if you want, but it is not mysterious in that sense’ (De Man 1986: 96-97). Grotowski’s approach, by comparison, seems more orphic in nature, and may thus complement Benjamin’s hermetic view on translation.

Both Benjamin and Grotowski have discarded important communicative functions usually associated with their disciplines. Benjamin, for example, stated that translation should not aim at ‘resembling the meaning of the original’ (1999: 78); Grotowski mentioned how he had ‘abandoned the idea of conscious manipulation of the audience’ (1969a: 70, cited in Kumiega 1985: 131). Before delving into the intricacies of these two visionaries’ viewpoints, it is important to note a major difference in their final goals. Handelman noted that Walter Benjamin aimed at bringing ‘the art of quoting without quotation marks to the highest level’ and that ‘Benjamin found in literary criticism, in
commentary [...] modes which embodied the linguistic density of all knowledge’ (1991: 23-24). Benjamin, then, aimed at honing a mode of representation as an entity unto itself, independent of its users. Grotowski, on the other hand, focused his efforts on the practitioners of representation and described his mission as ‘an exploration of the creative possibilities of the actor’ (1969a: 70, cited in Kumiega 1985: 131). Benjamin concentrated, in a hermetic manner, on language itself; Grotowski concentrated on the real-world performers who embody the orphic link between the sublime mode of representation and the material world. This difference is reflected in their “holy grails”, or the ideal condition for which they were striving. According to Walter Benjamin, translators should reach for “pure language”. According to Jerzy Grotowski, performers should reach for “total act”.

“Pure language” in translation is an elusive concept. It refers to features of language which go beyond its pedestrian, everyday functions. As explained by Handelman, Benjamin insisted that ‘language was not merely a conventional instrument of communication or an arbitrary system of signs’, and that it formed a kind of knowledge all by itself (1991: 22). De Man wrote that ‘Reine Sprache, the sacred language, has nothing in common with poetic language […]. It is within this negative knowledge of its relation to the language of the sacred that poetic language initiates’ (1986: 92).² As all such definitions are negative in nature, they explain mostly what a pure language is not. The mystery which shrouds the knowledge which Benjamin desired and its relation to

² De Man believed that Benjamin’s pure language was simply a means of drawing attention to the drawbacks of language as: in his words, ‘a pure language […] does not exist except as a permanent disjunction which inhabits all languages as such’ (1986: 192). This brings to mind Richard Wolin’s critical review of the 1982 Frankfurt Congress: ‘Does this mean that Benjamin’s brilliance is one which blinds rather than illuminates? Does it mean that the tragic aura of Benjamin’s historical persona fascinates, but repels a deeper understanding?’ (1982: 184, cited in Ingram 1997: 221)
translation is obscured by general statements like ‘[the] language of truth [...] whose divination and description is the only perfection a philosopher can hope for, is concealed in concentrated fashion in translation’ (Benjamin 1999: 77). The mystery that surrounds Grotowski’s concept of ‘total act’ (Kumiega 1985: 54) is similarly elusive.

What features, then, should define a universal, perfect and non-desecrated language from the days before the Tower of Babylon, assuming that such an entity can even be conceptualised? This question has more than one answer. Umberto Eco mentioned an inclusive approach, which was introduced by the tenth-century philosopher Ibn Hazm, according to whom the perfect, pre-Babylonian language was the sum of all existing languages and was naturally rich with synonyms for every word (2004: 173-74). Benjamin’s approach, on the other hand, is exclusive, as he believed that pure language is a nucleus which is not wholly manifested in any one language. In his words, ‘suprahistorical kinship of languages rests in the intention underlying each language as a whole – an intention, however, which no single language can attain by itself but which is realized only by the totality of their intentions supplementing each other: pure language’ (1999: 74).

Interestingly, hints of both the inclusive and the exclusive approach can be found in the theatrical work of Grotowski. Some of his early work, which was possibly inspired by Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty (see 1993: 64-87), pursued an all-inclusive experience, using a plethora of theatrical tools. One critic, who attended a performance in 1960, noted the variety of visual and vocal mechanisms and called it ‘A general tower of Babel and confusion of tongues’ (Kudliński 1960, cited in Kumiega 1985: 24). However, Grotowski’s work can be described as exclusive, too. Grotowski was perhaps most famous for his exclusive concept of “poor theatre”: a theatre that strives to eliminate all
unnecessary elements in an effort to achieve maximum proximity to the ideal, bare essence of theatrical art.

Goals as grand and elusive as “pure language” and “total act” are so difficult to put into practice that one might call them utopian. It follows that their advocates must be highly motivated. Benjamin’s commentators worked hard to find a meaning and a goal behind his interest in pure language. Kohlross, for instance, concluded that Benjamin attempted to promote ‘a new understanding of theory’ (2009: 100), tying the idea of translation between languages to the idea of translation between theoretical paradigms. His conclusion allies Kohlross with other thinkers who use translation ‘as a metaphor for the work of the academy’ (Bannet 1993: 578, cited in Ingram 1997: 215). Kohlross noted that the interaction which is involved in translation and in theorisation led to a ‘fusion [...] in which one may see] a certain self-supplementing or even a synthesis of sorts’ (2009: 101). This supported his claim that literary theory and criticism, which were considered to be ‘secondary actions (secondary because derived from the phenomena that precede them [i.e. works of literature])’, should be treated ‘as originary ones, as a kind of revolt against being relegated into a secondary world’ (Ibid.: 102). De Man suggested a different goal for pure language when he suggested that it was a key to understanding the arbitrariness of human history. In his words, ‘[sacred language] is, if you want, a necessarily nihilistic moment that is necessary in any understanding of history’ (1986: 92). De Man linked this to translation by maintaining that:

[W]e are to understand natural changes from the perspective of history, rather than understand history from the perspective of natural changes. [...] In the same way, the relationship between the translation and the original is not to be understood by analogy with natural processes such as resemblance or derivation by formal analogy; rather, we are to
understand the original from the perspective of the translation (Ibid.: 83).

In my opinion, Benjamin’s text suggests goals which are less rational than the ones depicted by Kohlross and De Man. In fact, Benjamin’s aims seem almost religious. Indeed, as Handelman has mentioned, the idea of language as something pure, abstract and omnipresent, may, for modernists like Benjamin, substitute for a deity (1991: 36). From this perspective, pure language is being sought not as a means to an end but rather as an end to itself, as unachievable and yet desirable as God is to his believers. Clearly, this view supports the description of Benjamin’s approach as hermetic.

This is also the point where the ideas of Benjamin and Grotowski separate most discernibly. Unlike hermetic Benjamin, orphic Grotowski seems to use his total act as means of improving the person of the living representation agent. For Grotowski, acting is a tool designed to free the body and the soul directly, not by means of insight, but by means of practice. Interestingly, in Grotowski’s later years, he abandoned this practical tool in favour of other, non-theatrical tools for spiritual advancement (see Kumiega 1985: 157-238).

4.1.2. The means of soaring

4.1.2.1. Making sacrifices

The mystic type, according to Underhill, ‘is inclined, in the words of its enemies, to “deny the world in order that it may find reality”’ (1955, 3). This denial often comes at a cost. The pilgrimage for a transcendental mode of representation, whether it be pure language or total act, requires its practitioners to make substantial sacrifices since the onus is on the purifier to dispose of any “impurities”. Both Benjamin and Grotowski
willingly sacrificed elements which they considered to be foreign to the essence of their craft. One of the elements, viewed as impure by Benjamin and Grotowski, was communicability, as they both agreed it suppressed the true potential of representation. Generally, communicative acts require an addresser, an addressee and a message carrier which mediates between them. Benjamin-oriented translators, like Grotowski-oriented actors, were asked to make specific sacrifices which were relevant to all of these functions.

One apparent similarity between Benjamin and Grotowski is their common willingness to sacrifice fidelity to their source or play texts, respectively. Benjamin noted that ‘the task of the translator consists in finding that intended effect […] upon the language into which he is translating which produces in it the echo of the original’ (1999: 76). He was interested less in the link between source and target texts and more in the link between source and target languages. He also stated that ‘a translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the original […] should be] making both the original and translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language’ (Ibid.: 78). De Man has emphasised the negative aspect of this recognition on the source material:

> Critical philosophy, literary theory, history [and translation …] relate to what in the original belongs to language, and not to meaning as an extralinguistic correlate susceptible of paraphrase and imitation. They disarticulate, they undo the original […]. They reveal that their failure […] reveals an essential failure, an essential disarticulation which was already there in the original. They kill the original, by discovering that the original was already dead (1986: 84).

3 De Man seems to have viewed this sacrificing of the original not as a means, but as an end of linguistic representation. In his words, ‘translation […] can only be free if it reveals the instability of the original, and if it reveals that instability as the linguistic tension between trope and meaning’ (1986: 91-92).
Richard Sieburth, a translator of Hölderlin’s poetry, wrote that ‘Benjamin insists that the original is in no way fixed […] and the same holds true of translations’ (1989: 241). It is interesting to link this to a famous citation from the Jewish Mishnah (Nezikin, Aboth, 2: 13): ‘R[abbi] Simeon said: […] when thou prayest make not thy prayer a fixed form […] and be not wicked in thine own sight’ (Danby 1974: 449). Sieburth shared his own experience as a translator regarding the subject:

Hölderlin’s text […] was] silenced or occluded by my translation. […] Only by having watched my own translations fall apart and fade in the face of the original, could I now begin to read (or reread) Hölderlin’s German afresh. […] I suppose the model of translation I am describing here is closely linked to the metaphors of sacrifice that inform so much of Hölderlin’s own work: the original is sacrificed (or cancelled or “sublated”) in the translation, just as the translation is in turn sacrificed back to the original […]. Not only does translation reveal the death (or deconstruction) of the original, but it also watches over its own inevitable demise (1989: 240-41).

The sacrifices made, described by Benjamin and others as the inevitable fate of almost all translations, were viewed by Grotowski as voluntary, willing acts of dedication to a cause. He stated that as a theatre director, he had no obligation to the source text to be played. In the name of his group, Grotowski said that ‘we undertake this search [in the realm of acting] in our own name, and not that of the author, which by no means implies a disrespect of playwrights’ (1959: 248, cited in Kumiega 1985: 21). In later years, Grotowski’s productions contained an increasing number of texts which were conceived and composed during the rehearsals and moved away from the concept of a firm, defined source text altogether.

The shared understanding of the status of source material was echoed in Benjamin’s
and Grotowski’s attitudes toward their implied addressees: the two thinkers were unwilling to cater to the desires of target readers or theatre audiences. Benjamin stated that to begin with, the artistic use of language was not intended for addressees (1999: 69). As Handelman noted, ‘whereas for [Franz] Rosenzweig translation was redemptive because it enabled communication […] for Benjamin, the ultimate aim of translation is not human communicability but that “pure language” of ultimate meaning which is finally incommunicable’ (1991: 26). Like Benjamin, Grotowski regarded the addressees of performance as no more than secondary. His initial functional approach, according to which actors should not act with spectators in mind so that they can concentrate on their authenticity (see Grotowski 1967: 193), evolved into a more ideological one. Recalling the work on a production that took place in 1968, Grotowski said: ‘Gradually we abandoned a manipulation of the audience and all the struggle to provoke a reaction in the spectator, or to use him as a guinea pig. We preferred to forget the spectator, forget his existence. We began to concentrate […] on […] the art of the actor’ (1969a: 70, cited in Kumiega 1985: 54).

Lastly, sacrifices required for the sake of representation can also require harming the message carrier’s own personality. This aspect of representation is not immediately apparent in Benjamin’s writings. Generally speaking, when self-destruction was discussed in translation studies it was linked to the changes which translators go through as a result of coming into contact with the foreignness of a source text. George Steiner, for example, has noted:

[The translator] brings his native tongue into the charged field of force of another language. He invades and seeks to break open the core of alien meaning. He annihilates his own ego in an attempt, both peremptory and utterly humble, to fuse with another presence. Having done
so he cannot return intact to home ground (1975: 331).

De Man expanded the scope of sacrifice to include one’s very linguistic identity in his comments on Benjamin:

We think we are at ease in our own language, we feel a coziness, a familiarity, a shelter in the language we call our own, in which we think that we are not alienated. What the translation reveals is that this alienation is at its strongest in our relation to our own original language, that the original language within which we are engaged is disarticulated in a way which imposes upon us a particular alienation, a particular suffering (1986: 84).

Historically, theories of acting have often linked the act of representation to self-undoing. The Natyashastra, a sacred Sanskrit manual for performers dating from the period between 200 BC and 200 AD, purportedly aims for a mystic, oceanic effect, to be experienced by actors and spectators alike, during which no personal thoughts interrupt the perception of the environment and the self (Meyer-Dinkgräfe 2001: 120). Likewise, the highest levels of Kokoro (Japanese for “heart”, “soul”, “mind” and more), an actor’s prowess, as described by Zeami Motokyo, the fifteenth century founder of Noh theatre, are marked by emptiness, self-loss and recognition of the cosmic nature of acting (Ibid.: 125-26). Artaud demanded that actors be neutral and ‘vigorously denied any individual initiative’ (Ibid.: 68). More recently method acting has also emphasised the importance of shedding one’s layers in order to reach a blank, natural starting point (Moore 1991: 82-83).

Grotowski’s preferred performance type seems to emphasise this act of self-sacrifice. Drawing from occidental notions, the Grotowskian performer is a ‘holy actor’ who sacrifices himself (Meyer-Dinkgräfe 2001: 75). In order to access the total act, actors should develop the mindset of a warrior or a martyr, willing to sacrifice everything
at any single moment as a result of their actions on stage (Kumiega 1985: 140-41). Grotowski’s recurrent theme of master and student, where actors learn to submit their will to that of their master’s and attain a creative state through dialogue with the great teacher (Ibid.: 51-52), may suggest that the self-sacrificial element required by a Grotowskian performer may have also been inspired by an Asian approach to the arts. All these aspects of self-eradication in performance are compatible with the orphic ideal of merging pure language with the real world. It is only by emptying himself that the performer is able to make corporeal room for the revered total act.  

**4.1.2.2. Utilising holy texts**

The spiritual goals that Benjamin and Grotowski set encouraged both men to explore supposedly “holy” texts, that is, texts that are so revered that they have been transferred through the ages in an intact, unchanging form. Benjamin maintained that translators should prefer distinct texts which are rich in quality rather than in information. Source texts that fail to meet this standard manifest an ‘utter preponderance of content’ which impedes translation, but ‘the higher the level of a work, the more does it remain translatable’ (1999: 81). Benjamin was worried that translators who seek the realm of pure language may find that even with source texts that are of a sufficient quality, ‘meaning plunges from abyss to abyss until it threatens to become lost in the bottomless depths of language’ causing them to stop translating altogether. He noted that a remedy to this situation ‘is vouchsafed to Holy Writ alone, in which meaning has ceased to be the watershed for the flow of language and the flow of revelation. […]. The interlinear

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4 Like all forms of self-deletion, the erasure of personality for the sake of performance has a disturbing side. Roach compared the status of Tabula Rasa which was aspired by some acting theoreticians to the state of Castrati, wilfully and literally removing parts of themselves for the sake of their pure performance (1985, 136).
version of the Scriptures is the prototype or ideal for all translation’ (Ibid.: 82). When representing holy texts in translation, then, a translator can concentrate on the text’s embedded linguistic essence, or mode of intention, and does not have to fight the meaning.

Grotowski, like Benjamin, viewed sacred texts as unique source material for representation, albeit in a different way. In his early productions (most notably in *Orpheus*, which was produced in 1959), he had his actors represent global and local religious myths but in surprising and often demeaning contexts. This was done in order to maximise the energy which could be drawn from the friction between the initial holiness of the texts and their subsequent staged mistreatment (Kumiega 1985: 17-38). However, this path of parody was gradually abandoned. From 1962-68, in productions like *Dr Faustus*, it was replaced with thorough research on a single, mythic theme: that of the martyr, an excommunicated individual who sacrifices himself for his principles (Ibid.: 54).

One might conclude that even though Benjamin and Grotowski clearly preferred the medium over the message, they inclined toward source texts which contained specific kinds of messages. Translating or performing holy or revered texts enhanced and supported their aspiration toward holiness in the process of representation.

### 4.1.2.3. Linking the eternal with the ephemeral

Handelman has noted that the central reason why Benjamin’s view of pure language is not fully hermetic and transcendental is its link to real-world time and history, through which it must be projected (1991: 35, 37). One of the reasons why actual languages are impure, said Benjamin, is their ‘constant state of flux’ (1999: 75). The continual changes
that characterise all languages mean that language is never static and can never be approached like a ‘snapshot’ which portrays a moment frozen in time. Translation, he suggested, could bypass this problem and get in touch with a fuller, more continuous linguistic experience: ‘it is translation’, wrote Benjamin, ‘which catches fire on the eternal life of the works and the perpetual renewal of language’ (Ibid.: 75). Kohlross explains:

Traditional hermeneutic theories considered the endless nature of interpretation to be a symptom of the imperfection of the methods of literary analysis. In Benjamin’s writings, by contrast, it is rather a symptom of an infinite process of perfection, in which an increasing amount of the work’s potential will be updated (2009: 106).

Translators, then, may use their mediation between languages and historical periods in order to get a glimpse of that hidden, unformed process of temporal change which constitutes an integral part of pure language.

Benjamin’s outlook on the relation of time to pure language can be opposed to Grotowski’s concept of time as embedded in a total act. Performances exist first and foremost as entities which are bound by time. When a translator puts down her pen and stops writing, language does not disappear, but when a performer end his act, his performance, quite visibly, ceases to be. This may partially explain why Grotowski’s actors were counselled to reach inside themselves and modify their perception of the passing moment rather than trying to view the exterior flow of history “from above”.

Daniel Meyer-Dinkgräfe has noted a similar thrust in the performance aesthetics inspired by the Natyashastra, where ‘for the enlightened actor, gestures and words […] will proceed spontaneously from his pure consciousness, transforming themselves without time-lapse into objective expression’ (2001: 120). This goes well with the state of mind
which was desired by Grotowski. Albeit through different means, Grotowski, like Stanislavski before him, believed in “living the moment” on the stage. During one such Grotowskian moment, the performer’s “self” should merge with his experienced world which would allow him to simultaneously view both the internal and external flow of time (Kumiega 1985: 138-39). This kind of temporal perception may help actors reduce their reliance on time-consuming decision-making. It would allow them to initiate instant and precise executions of performance (Ibid.: 120) and to achieve an undisturbed, Zen-like ‘passive readiness to realize an active role, a state in which one does not want to do that but rather resigns from not doing it’ (Grotowski 1969b: 17).

The relevance of the concept of worship to the efforts which were made by Benjamin and Grotowski is brought to mind by the words of Underhill: ‘[the] contrast between the successive and the Eternal lies at the root of all worship, whichever looks away from the transitory and created to the Abiding and Increate’ (1957: 8). Metaphorically put, Benjamin attempted to make translation spread over the fabric of time, while Grotowski attempted to fold this fabric of time into a moment of performance. Here Benjamin’s approach may seem more Orphic than usual, as it acknowledges the real, historical world as a participatory element in the forming of a desired pure language. Compared to Grotowski’s oceanic, border-less time experience, however, Benjamin’s approach still inclines toward the hermetic pole.

### 4.1.2.4. Enforcing rigid templates of transformation

The pure essence of language, said Benjamin, lies beyond the layers of meaning and denotation. This was the reasoning behind his clearest and most comprehensible prescription for translators, which was to translate texts literally, without trying to
transfer the original meaning during the process. In his words:

A literal rendering of the syntax completely demolishes the theory of reproduction of meaning and is a direct threat to comprehensibility. […] no case for literalness can be based on a desire to retain meaning. Meaning is served far better – and literature and language far worse – by the unrestricted license of bad translators. Of necessity, therefore, [is] the demand for literalness (Benjamin 1999: 78).

This literal translation dismantles the source language, disposes of its unnecessary layers of meaning and provides the means to get in touch with the desired pure language. Small building blocks were easier to handle, Benjamin thought, so translators were encouraged to use the smallest translation units possible i.e., words. As he noted:

A real translation […] does not cover the original, does not block its light, but allows the pure language […] to shine upon the original more fully. This may be achieved, above all, by a literal rendering of the syntax which proves words rather than sentences to be the primary element of the translator (Ibid.: 79).

The results of such translations may be esoteric, but not futile. As Handelman has stated: ‘Benjamin […] supported a] technique of writing and representation, in which the discontinuous arrangements of sentences and quotations produce a “shock” effect and different contextual resonances’ (1991: 36). A ‘Benjaminian translation’ seems to emphasise the inherent impossibility of translation in order to draw attention to the very core of language.

It is important to note here that besides being incompatible with the commonly accepted concept of ‘useful’ translation, word-to-word translation appears to be highly mechanistic and restrictive. Paradoxically, the road that Benjamin envisioned toward a pure, liberated concept of language is paved with rigid, non-creative templates. This
paradoxically rigid aspect of Benjamin’s view of translation again allies it with Grotowski’s view of acting.

Rigid templates in actor training and performance were not, of course, introduced to acting by Grotowski. Many performative traditions, from classical ballet to Chinese opera, are built on elaborate sets of restrictive and demanding rules. Nevertheless, Grotowski’s take on the role of restrictions is quite unique as it is related to his search for a universal theatrical language. As Kumiega has explained, Grotowski was looking for a system of ‘natural signs’ which would function as ‘symptoms’ of various human states (1985: 117). In no way were they intended to reduce creativity. ‘The more we become absorbed in what is hidden inside us’, wrote Grotowski, ‘the more rigid must be the external discipline; that is to say, the form, the artificiality, the ideogram, the sign. Here lies the whole principle of expressiveness’ (1969b: 39). These “signs” were not intended to mark emotions or personalities. Rather, they were pre-conditioned physical reactions to mental impulses (Kumiega 1985: 136) to be automatically executed by the performers and intuitively articulated by the audience (Meyer-Dinkgräfe 2001: 74-75). For the sake of actual theatrical productions, signs were organised in a music-like score (Grotowski 1967: 192), ‘a line of fixed elements’ that performers had to go through (Grotowski 1968: 45, cited in Kumiega 1985: 135-36). Using a set of demanding physical and mental exercises called ‘exercises plastiques’, the score was developed and fine-tuned to the needs of individual actors (Kumiega 1985: 111-12, 118-19, 136-38). This framework of signs was likely one of the reasons behind the much-lauded control of their faces and their voices that Grotowskian actors were able to maintain (Kumiega 1985: 68-69). It

5 Interestingly, Sieburth described translation in similar terms when he noted that ‘[According to Benjamin] a translation is an effect whose cause is the original or, in slightly different terms, a translation exists as a contiguous extension of or supplement […] to the original’ (1989: 242).
also functioned, however, as a means of purifying a performance from unnecessary elements which stood between an actor and the total act, i.e., that desired state where no body interferes in the transformation of stimuli to reactions because ‘an impulse is already an outer reaction [...] the body vanishes, burns, and the spectator sees only a series of visible impulses’ (Grotowski 1969b: 16).

Rigid templates, like those described by Benjamin and Grotowski, may help translators approach the sublime essence of their art. Their utilisation might also decrease the amount of their professional freedom. It needs to be said, however, that like good actors, good translators can often follow strict guidelines without compromising the effectiveness of their work. Grotowski’s specific brand of templates, i.e., his “signs”, seem difficult to apply to the context of translation. Trying to create an individual set of automatic linguistic responses to textual stimuli is a daunting task comparable, perhaps, to the composition, memorising and enforcement of a personal, associative, bi-lingual dictionary. Nevertheless, the example set by Grotowski shows that the principle of rigid templates may be followed in more than one way.

4.1.2.5. Removing obstacles

Benjamin and Grotowski both believed that their sublime modes of representation should be incorporated into actual practice but that certain obstacles prevent them from being fully manifested. Benjamin wrote:

It is the task of the translator to release in his own language that pure language which is under the spell of another, to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in his re-creation of that work. For the sake of pure language he breaks through decayed barriers of his own language (1999: 80).
These ‘decayed barriers’ to pure language, as Benjamin puts it, are the concept of meaning. ‘As regards the meaning’, he noted, ‘the language of translation can – in fact, must – let itself go, so that it gives voice to the intentio of the original not as reproduction but as harmony […] as its own kind of intentio’ (1999: 79).

Grotowski, however, locates the obstacle not in the content but in the mediator, i.e. the performer. Mental and physical inhibitions, he wrote, block the way to proper acting. ‘He who hesitates before making a powerful somersault, one which carries a certain risk in acrobatics’, warned Grotowski, ‘will hesitate before the culminating point of his role’ (1979: 127-37, cited in Kumiega 1985: 113). Grotowski’s celebrated “Via Negativa” suggested more than the elimination of unnecessary elements from the stage in order to create the poor theatre (see Ibid.: 122-23). It also proposed a special set of exercises, or ‘exercises corporeals’ (Kumiega 1985: 122) that could ‘steal from the actor all that disturbs him’ (Grotowski 1967: 191) and bring about a spontaneous, trance-like state that would improve a performer’s self-awareness (Lendra 1995: 140). Grotowski noted: ‘All of the exercises undertaken by us were without exception directed towards the annihilation of resistances, blocks, individual and professional stereotypes […] There was never any concept of exercises as being important in their own right’ (1980: 115, cited in Kumiega 1985: 113).

Recognising and actively removing blocks and inhibitions may be helpful for translators even if they do not follow the extreme set of goals proposed by Benjamin. Clearly, inhibitions might negatively affect a translator’s work. In some cases, inhibitions might result in linguistic ‘habitual routines’ causing a translator to ‘stagnate, become dull and stupefied’ (Robinson 2003a: 85). In others, they might paralyse translators to the point of their feeling overwhelmed by their translation problems ‘not knowing how to
proceed, being confused, feeling intimidated by the magnitude of the task’ (Ibid.: 88). Robinson’s sage advice to translators, that is, to seek new and startling experiences that would shock their systems and break their routines, is not unlike the goal of Grotowski’s training principles. (Ibid.: 85). That resemblance is heightened in Robinson’s use of a terminology that recalls Grotowski, particularly when he notes that translators must ‘somehow [be] making the leap, making the blind stab at understanding or reformulating an utterance’ (Ibid.: 88).

4.1.3. Representation as a spiritual practice

As Kohlross has pointed out, ‘Benjamin’s essay claims to discuss translation, yet certainly not translation in the generally accepted meaning of the word. It is exceedingly difficult to imagine what gain a professional translator [...] might secure from Benjamin’s theses’ (2009: 98). Grotowski’s theatrical theses may be more useful, as they may empower impressive histrionic achievements, but they, too, are difficult to implement and require an unusually strong level of commitment. To what extent, then, might one view Grotowski’s and Benjamin’s utopian ideas and radical practices of representation as spiritual practices? I would suggest that while the approach taken by Benjamin resembles the concept of religious worship as defined by Underhill, ‘an acknowledgement of transcendence [...] independent of the worshipper, which is always more or less deeply colored by mystery, and which is there first’ (1957: 3), the approach taken by Grotowski comes closer to the concept of magical transformation.

Pure language, the final destination of the linguistic journey proposed by Benjamin, was inspired by monotheistic ideas of revelation and redemption (Handelman 1991: 24). One might question, however, whether this ideal is fully achievable. Kohlross noted, that
‘the intention behind Benjamin’s doctrine of translation [...] (in my opinion) is [...] focused on [...] supplementing language’ (2009: 99), and this is true, but Benjamin himself recognised that the principle of historical change in language and in the “life” of literary works of art, which can be expressed through translation, is more important than any actual changes (Ibid.: 73).

Benjamin wrote that ‘translation issues from the original – not so much from its life as from its [historical] afterlife’ (1999: 71). This disjunction between “life” and “afterlife” joins a whole set of others which, according to De Man, come to light in the act of translation. De Man noted that ‘we have, first, a disjunction in language between the hermeneutic and the poetic, we have a second one between grammar and meaning, and, finally, we will have a disjunction, says Benjamin, between the symbol and what is being symbolized [...] on the level of tropes’ (1986: 89). Even if all of these gaps and disjunctions can be pointed out by what Benjamin called ‘the knowledge of [...] remoteness’ (1999: 74-75), it is difficult to think of them as the only guiding principles of a concrete linguistic project.

Handelman referred to pure language as a ‘realm’ (1991: 26), and this hermetic realm, like a platonic world of idea(l)s, could contain translations of all texts ‘even if men should prove to be unable to translate them’ (Benjamin 1999: 71). In The Task of the Translator, Benjamin’s conception of pure language as a remote, unattainable and even spiritual goal is not easily comprehensible. It is difficult to imagine the practice of translation as an act of acknowledgement of a higher sphere, similar to worship. If, like Kohlross seems to view Benjaminian pure language, manifested through translation, in a more orphic light. According to him, translation was not a demonstration of the futility of “meaning”, but rather its birthplace. In his words, ‘translation is thus not a derivative of the original, and certainly not a copy of the original in another medium, language, or terminology; rather it is its realization or potentiation. Translations are, to use Benjamin’s words, “manifestations of life”’ (2009: 105).
Underhill, one assumes that the role of the worshipper should include ‘praise, adoration and manifestation of God’ (1957: 5), it becomes even more difficult since none of these attributes are readily evident in Benjamin’s insights. Furthermore, as noted by Steven Rendall’s comments on Zohn’s English translation of *The Task*, the original German text referred to the future of pure language as a ‘messianic’ age (2006: 84) – a term which implies the possibility of actual occurrence. Benjamin’s note mentioned earlier, that translation is a ‘representation of hidden significance through an embryonic attempt at making it visible’ (1999: 72) is not incompatible with the idea of worship. De Man, however, who opposed mystical interpretations of pure language, insisted that Benjamin’s messianic theme was a-historic (1986: 93) and that those elements which are brought together during translation ‘remain essentially fragmentary […] and they will never constitute a totality’ (Ibid.: 91). In the words of Benjamin, ‘in translation the original rises into a higher and purer linguistic air, as it were. It cannot live there permanently, to be sure, and it certainly does not reach it in its entirety. Yet […] at least it points the way to this region’ (1999: 75). To De Man’s belief that recognising the inevitable manifestation of disjunctions in representation should help us understand history (1986: 87-89) Benjamin would possibly add that the goal of translation is not solely educational.

The kind of interaction which is described by Benjamin brings to mind the interaction which takes place during monotheistic worship or prayer: a ritual that is practised for the sake of mere contact with the deity more than for the sake of summoning its powers. To my way of thinking, Benjamin’s notion of contact through translation is like a game of ball catching. The first player (source language) throws the ball (text), and the second player (target language) is catching it; but only exactly in
between them, at the peak of the ballistic trajectory and well beyond the reach of human hands, can the “thrown” text touch the high heavens of pure language.

Similarly, Grotowski’s total act, accessed through performing the way pure language is accessed through translating, is difficult to achieve and exists only for a moment in time. Importantly, however, Grotowski’s approach does not infer the notion of worship. In his words:

If the act takes place, then the actor [...] transcends the state of incompleteness [...] The division between thought and feeling, body and soul, consciousness and the unconscious, seeing and instinct, sex and brain then disappears; having fulfilled this, the actor achieves totality [...] he is far less tired than before, because he had renewed himself, recovered his primitive indivisibility; and then begin to act in him new sources of energy (1969a: 73, cited in Kumiega 1985: 128-29).

Grotowski’s actors were not required to worship any sort of deity. Rather, he encouraged them to deify themselves in their striving for extra-human senses and abilities. This enabled the actors to handle seemingly impossible performance tasks. The theme of actor-as-superhuman, who learns to overcome his physical and sensory limits, is not a new one. In an essay written in 1754, theatre historian Luigi Riccoboni discussed how actors might attain ‘divine madness’: ‘in order to succeed in [emotional expression] in some measure, we must first deliver the Soul from the encumbrance of the senses; an operation which, tho’ violent, is by no means impracticable’ (cited in Roach, 1985: 101-02). Grotowski seems to have assumed the mantle of one of this theme’s most well-known advocates.

Both Benjamin and Grotowski described how an act of representation might attain

7 In later years Grotowski’s focus has changed, and he stopped seeing performance as a goal for itself. It became one means, among others, for spiritual development.
higher spheres, but they differed in the means of its attainment. More specifically, Benjamin’s hermetic, pure language differs from Grotowski’s orphic, total act; so, too, the methods used to achieve them. The theatre of Grotowski aims at intensive, personal transformation of its practitioners through theatrical mediation. Translation in the spirit of Benjamin aims at allowing its practitioners to contact the “untouchable” layers of language, even if only momentarily. Acting, according to Grotowski, resembles a spiritual journey during which one changes one’s very essence. Translating, according to Benjamin, is more like a pilgrimage in which the pilgrim returns to his starting point with a renewed sense of humility.

The ideas which were conceived by Benjamin and Grotowski may help us learn more about the metaphysical aspect in the modernistic movement in all artistic disciplines. Differences in focus between the two sets of ideas, one can come to appreciate, are not necessarily the outcome of inherent differences in the arts of translation and performance. A Grotowskian, orphic approach applied to translation, one which is translator-oriented and attempts to reach “total translation” may also be possible. A Grotowskian acting strategy as a practical guideline for translators may be less so but it may encourage translators to reconsider some aspects of the translation process.
5. **Space and Norms**

The former chapters, in their essence, might depict translators as care-free individuals, whose fine art is limited only by their own capacity and free will. Such a depiction is, of course, incomplete, as it fails to recognise and confront the various external, real-world elements which are involved in the production of translations and which affect their creation and their reception. The field of translation studies does not ignore these external elements. Rather, it offers elaborate models which deal with them, most notably through the concept of translation norms. Carefully put, translation norms are ‘regularities of translation behaviour within a specific sociocultural situation’ (Baker 1998: 163). They are not limited to the domain of translators alone, as they ‘extend far beyond the source text, systemic differences between the languages and textual traditions involved in the act, or even the possibilities and limitations of the cognitive apparatus of the translator as a necessary mediator’ (Toury 1995: 54). Here I wish to avoid the purist empirical approach which bestows the status of norm upon every statistically consistent phenomenon which can be observed in translations of a given context. For the sake of this section, norms represent the translational conventions which function as translators’ working environment. Jan Mukařovský, a Czech scholar who inspired the early research of translation norms (see Weissbrod 1998: 35-37), wrote that ‘stabilizing the aesthetic function is a matter for the collective […] and is] tied to a particular social entity’ (1979: 18). Similarly, one may note that the translational function is stabilised by norms which are linked to specific social and political realities.

This chapter uses theatre and performance in order to discuss the ways such translation norms are perceived. However, in order to examine the possibility of further
elaborating the initial metaphor of translation as performance, I chose not to compare norms of translation with conventions of theatre and performance, even though they might be their natural counterparts. Instead, I chose to discuss the concept of norms using a different focus: the concept of performing space. The formation, function and reception of spaces which are used for performance are obviously dependent upon cultural conventions and social norms themselves. I argue, though, that some issues of translation norms can be linked, metaphorically, to some corporeal aspects of space in general and to spaces which are used for performance in particular.

5.1. **Space as a metaphor for translation norms**

The concept of space is a strong, versatile and popular vessel of metaphors. The usage of spatial metaphors in order to describe possibilities and prohibitions is so common, in fact, that some of the phrases which manifest it – in English as in other languages - have reached the status of idioms, often without their users being aware of their original metaphoric mode of signification. Such is the case for words like “border”, “field”, “area” and even the ordinary word, “place”.

Modern scholars of translation studies use many spatial metaphors. More specifically, they describe normative and linguistic considerations as physical boundaries and translation as a movement which takes place within these boundaries. Gideon Toury, for instance, asserts that practitioners who decide on their translational behaviour must succeed in ‘the acquisition of a set of norms suitable for such behaviour, and […]in manoeuvring between all factors which may constrain it’, and that one can think of norms as ‘directing translation activity in socio-culturally relevant settings’ (1995: 53, my emphases). Similarly, Susan Bassnett writes that translators for the theatre, who face
multiple and often contradictory requirements, are ‘trapped in a labyrinth’ (1998: 90). What Bassnett’s use of the spatial metaphor adds to Toury’s is the sense of being lost, desperate even, while considering translational solutions and rejecting them over and over again. Robinson’s usage of this metaphor is typically rich and creative. Explaining the unique emotion experienced by translators who transfer foreign texts, he equates the source language to a foreign yet familiar city. If the foreign language functions as a home for its native speakers, it remains an alien place for the translator. It contains many familiar “places”, some of which are better liked than others, but it still offers its oddities and surprises (2003a: 99). Dirk De Geest listed four norm-oriented reactions to translations – prescribing, forbidding, tolerating and permitting – and stated they form ‘the famous “square” of normativity’ (1992: 38-40, cited in Toury 1995: 55). All translational behaviours whose reception falls outside this square are considered non-normative.

One of the most intriguing uses of spatial metaphors in translation studies can be found in the writings of Mona Baker, who used Erving Goffman’s notion of ‘a group’s framework or frameworks […] meaning] its belief system, its “cosmology”’ (Goffman 1974: 27, cited in Baker 2006: 106).1 Baker discusses the possibility of ‘active and conscious intervention to frame an event for others’, and suggests that ‘frames are defined as structures of anticipation, strategic moves that are consciously initiated in

1 The work of Goffman is relevant to this work in more than one way. The Canadian-born sociologist has introduced a detailed, comprehensive model, paralleling social interaction with dramatic and theatrical terminology. Through his “dramaturgy”, Goffman analysed the masquerading techniques which were used by individuals for communicating with members of their own groups and other groups. He differentiated between the demanding façade of their “front stage” and the relieving comfort of their “back stage”, and even compared their social roles with those of traditional melodramatic stock characters. For a detailed account of Goffman’s application of the performance metaphor to the field of sociology, see his influential essay ‘The presentation of self in everyday life’ (1969).
order to present a movement or a particular position within a certain perspective’ (2006: 106). Noting that when an agency chooses to employ active framing it is always limited by Goffman’s ‘frame space’, which is defined by various context-related constraints (Ibid.: 109), Baker suggests that translators, who form such an agency, ‘act within a frame space which encourages others to scrutinize every aspect of their […] behaviour […] although as with any type of constraint it is almost always possible to evade or challenge these limits’ (Ibid.: 110). As stated by Goffman, the dimensions of such frame space – meaning, the given amount of freedom to redirect interpretation – are ‘normatively allocated’ (1981: 230, cited in Baker 2006: 112); the liberty which is given to agents of representation, in any given cultural context, is governed by social norms, both written and unwritten. Baker’s space metaphor is innovative in the sense that it treats space, and the norms it represents with it, as a positive basis for action.

Social norms of translational behaviour have been likened several times to such boundaries and barriers. André Lefevere suggested the concept of translation constraints, which limit the possibilities that are open to translators (1992: 15-41, cited in Chesterman 1997: 78-79). Likewise Toury wrote: ‘Every model [of translational norms which is] supplying performance instructions may be said to act as a restricting factor: it opens up certain options while closing others’ (1995: 60). Translation norms come in many shapes, as emphasised by Toury (2006: 215) and Chesterman (2001: 91); there are many degrees of severity, and various degrees of punishment for breaking them. The offending translator may be reprimanded by an editor, denounced by a critic or fired by the publishing house. Similarly, some spatial constraints which apply to people are more limiting than others: a stop sign, a border fence or the wall in a room form very different types of boundaries.
It is important to note here that for the sake of clarity, I do not link norms to already metaphorical conceptions of space – conceptions which view it as a realm of assumptions, expectations, ideas and discourses. Instead, I link sets of translation norms to various physical elements and to a concrete realm of walls, streets, seats and barriers. I have chosen not to use space as a metonymical device, an excuse to discuss issues such as sites of multicultural interaction, fields of power, and so on which affect the formation of space directly and indirectly. I have instead chosen to discuss it as a metaphoric signifier and to use it to demonstrate the possibilities of linking relatively unrelated kinds by means of inter-disciplinary metaphorical elaboration (see Chapter 1). Comparing social and political translation norms to physical and corporeal aspects of space may be more challenging than comparing them to its social and political aspects, but it is also more likely to demonstrate the interdisciplinary usefulness of bold metaphors which can provide the link between two distinctive and separate realms.

5.2. The special case of performing space

As Lakoff and Johnson noted, ‘[M]erely viewing a nonphysical thing as an entity or substance does not allow us to comprehend very much about it. But ontological metaphors may be further elaborated’ (1980: 27). In order to benefit from the metaphorical link between translation norms and space, I chose to elaborate it by discussing aspects of translation norms using terms and points of view inspired by a specific kind of space: spaces which are used for performance. The existence of a defined performing space is integral to influential definitions of theatre like Beckerman’s, for instance, that states that drama ‘occurs when one or more human beings isolated in time and space present themselves in imagined acts to another or others’ (1979: 20).
For Marvin Carlson, a performing space is a ‘permanently or temporarily created ludic space, a ground for the encounter of spectator and performer, […] a phenomenon found in a wide variety of societies and historical periods’ (1992: 6). As Carlson has noted, different types of performing spaces influence actors and spectators in more than one way. He emphasised the fact that ‘places of performance generate social and cultural meaning of their own which in turn help to structure the meaning of the entire theatre experience’ (Ibid.: 2). Carlson goes on to note that the definition of performing space should be broad. In his words, ‘the entire theatre, its audience arrangements, its other public spaces, its physical appearance, even its location […], are all important elements’ (Ibid.). Performing spaces, then, can become rich and fertile metaphoric signifiers.

My intention to link performing spaces to translation norms is based on two functional similarities. The first similarity, noted earlier, regards the setting of boundaries. Performing spaces, like translation norms, impose limitations upon possible interactions: they limit the addressers, i.e. translators and performers, as well as the addressees, i.e. readers and spectators. The second similarity regards the regularisation of communication. Performing spaces and translation norms are essential to the very existence of the interactions which they delimit: all different sets of translation norms can be viewed as standardised communication protocols, without which readers could not expect anything from any translation. The arrangement of performing spaces is a major factor, albeit not the only one, in the formation of relationships between the performers and the audience. These functional similarities enable one to view each set of translational norms as a specific performing space, which regulates, directs and mediates the acts of representation which take place under its influence. As I intend to explain in the following sections, some of the unique attributes of performing spaces make their
linking to translational norms especially interesting.

It needs to be said, however, that the correlation between theatrical space and norms of translations is not a perfect one. Theatrical space cannot become a complete metaphoric signifier for translational norms as there are too many ways in which the two entities are inherently incompatible with each other. More pointedly, there are basic properties of theatrical space which are not comprehensible as features of translational norms. Among these are strictly material stage features, like the colours and textures of stage and props, and functional and conceptual features, such as the theatrical distinction between mimetic space (which is signified directly in the performing space) and diegetic space (which is supposedly located outside of it). Some spatial qualities are too corporeal and physical and are not easily bent into the abstract role of a signifier. Others are too culture-specific and cannot easily produce a universally common and valid interpretation. One can, however, still draw insights which I will discuss in the sections that follow.

5.3. Space and norms as raw materials

5.3.1. The Tel Aviv School and deterministic norms

Norms in translation were of special interest to a group of researchers in Tel Aviv in the 1970s and the 1980s. Influenced by Russian formalism and by scholars from the Prague school of Linguistics, like Mukařovský, they put norms at the centre of their view of descriptive translation studies (DTS). Led by Itamar Even Zohar and Gideon Toury, the researchers who formed the “Tel Aviv School” maintained that ‘the [translation] norms […] are social in nature and in that they differ from both personal factors which affect the behavior of people in society and universal behavior patterns’ (Weissbrod
Toury and his colleagues ‘have opened a view of translation as socially contexted behaviour’ (Schäffner 2010: 236), and have applied it to all aspects of translation. They claimed that ‘all decisions in the translation process are primarily governed by norms, and it is norms which determine the relationship between source text and target text’ (Ibid.: 237-38). Eventually, this view helped to shift the focus of research toward the cultures which generate translation norms. In the words of Christina Schäffner, ‘the aim of studying norms for Toury is not primarily to find norms as such, but rather to account for translators’ choices and thus to explore translation in terms of cultural expectations’ (2010: 240).

The research of translation norms undertaken by Toury and his peers was aimed at the purely descriptive side of translation studies. As Rachel Weissbrod maintains, ‘the concepts and distinctions [of the Tel Aviv school ...] combine to form a theory of translation, whose main justification is in that it does not force itself on reality’ (1988: 39). This wish not to bend reality to the will of researchers or practitioners was often accompanied by a deterministic view which held that the norms of translation cannot bend to the will of translators. Chesterman, for example, separates the concept of translational expectancy norms from the concept of translation strategies on such a basis. According to him, norms differ from strategies not only because the former emphasise the qualities of a desired product rather than of a desired process, but also because norms are initiated, formed and enforced by external cultural agents rather than by actual translators (1997: 64, see also Schäffner 2010: 241).

External norm-forming agents can sometimes refer to a concrete group of people, like teachers, employers, sponsors and critics (Ben Ari 1999: 294), but more often than not, they remain nameless. In his discussion of aesthetic conventions, Mukařovský
described the source of norms as a ‘collective awareness […] which] can be defined as the locus of existence of individual systems such as language, religion, science, politics, etc.’ (1979: 20). Norms of translation are also often described as collective, cloud-like and impersonal entities such as ‘translation traditions’ or ‘parallel texts’ (Chesterman 1997: 64). This inherent anonymity of norm sources may lead to the assumption that translation norms operate in a similar manner to natural phenomena, like tides and rainstorms. They can change frequently and drastically, and may be explained and even predicted, but they cannot be controlled, modified and directed. This notion was hinted at by Michael Hanne, who claimed that ‘a major deficiency of metaphors of translation based on transporting, demolition and reconstruction is that they fail to acknowledge the living or organic nature of cultural texts and their interaction with the environment within which they exist’ (2006: 213). This notion of a “natural” ecosystem was fortified by Chesterman, who claimed that stable norms develop from shaky trends of translation in a process of natural selection (1997: 51). A set of norms in any given situation, as implied by such notions, may thus be taken into account by translators to a varying degree, resulting in varying degrees of reward or punishment (Toury 1995: 62, 67-68). They may not, however, be modified, created or eradicated according to a translator’s will.

The separation of norm formation from individual processes of decision making, promoted by the “Tel Aviv School”, suggests that translation norms, especially ones which dictate the reception of translation readers, are deterministic in nature. I would suggest that this deterministic approach to translational norms is a major contributor to the popularity of the norm concept within the descriptive branch of translation studies. When dealing with what are conceived to be inalterable entities, there is little sense in prescriptive attempts to influence them. Descriptive researchers, however, can
concentrate on the monitoring of such entities in a scientific manner. There are, of course, exceptions to this generalisation. Nitza Ben Ari, for example, claimed that the mere awareness of surrounding translation norms is prescriptively useful, as it may save a translator from producing stylistically incoherent target texts which she names ‘Translationese’ (1999: 294-95). Usually, however, the discussion of translation norms is descriptive, and unaccompanied by practical advice for the translator who needs to deal with them.

As several scholars have noted, this situation is not ideal. Pym wrote that analysing translation through norms might limit the grasp of translational phenomena. In his words:

Translation scholars are [...] invited to see their object primarily in terms of regular patterns, repetitions, stability, meaningfulness and social order. Implicitly, they are not invited to see their object in terms of more primal change processes. [...] Change becomes an affair of pathology (1998: 110).

To Pym’s concern regarding translation scholars, Schäffner adds her concern about actual translators. She maintains that ‘the norms concept has seen translation predominantly as a social space which restricts action and not as a space which allows creative (inter)action of translators’ (2010: 241). Robinson concurs when he states that ‘Toury’s norm theory lacks [...] the notion that people who internalise norms thus become carriers of norms, passing them on to other members of the group, and invariably in slightly transformed or “personalized” ways’ (2003b: 86). As the norm-oriented translation scholar Rakefet Sela-Sheffy admits, ‘a major weakness […] of common notions of norms] is the deterministic view of human action it may convey. […] translators, in this view […] are never in a position to play the role of inventors and revolutionaries’ (2005: 3).
Determinism is not inherent to the concept of norms per se. In fact, Mukařovský’s initial analysis suggested that the degree of actual obedience to norms (in his case, aesthetic norms) may vary greatly. In his words, ‘the disagreement between the requirement that the norm have overall validity [...] and its actual limitation and variability are not contradictory [...] if we see them as forming a dialectical antinomy which promotes development in the entire area’ (1979: 24). Mukařovský recognised the possibility of regarding norms as “laws of nature”, and rejected it. He wrote that ‘although the norm strives to achieve universal validity, it can never achieve the force of a natural law – otherwise it would become one itself, and cease to be a norm’ (Ibid.: 26). Instead, he recognised the ever-changing nature of norms and wrote that ‘a living work of art always oscillates between the past and future status of an aesthetic norm’ (1979: 36). The same thing may be said about norms of translation.

5.3.2. Performing space as an alternative model

5.3.2.1. Artificiality of performing spaces and translation norms

Paralleling the norms of translation to the physical space of performance may challenge the traditional usage of the norms’ concept within translation studies. Performance is often involved with the deletion, modification and invention of rules. Robinson, who applied Derrida’s idea of reiteration to linguistics, described the use of language as a constant, playful performance which changes the rules of the language as it creates and vitalises them (2003b: 61). In Robinson’s words: ‘Iterability is the repeat-performability of all speech […]. It is the mutability of language in repetition, difference in the repetition of the same. It is a fact that whenever we repeat something, we change it; whenever we restate something, we reperform it’ (Ibid.: 63).
In a more particular sense, the deterministic view of translation norms is undermined by describing them in terms of theatrical space. This is so because space, in theatre, is not treated like a purely wild and hostile environment, imposed on its inhabitants by distant, abstract forces. The location of a theatre, its architecture and its fixed elements are often determined by large, institutionalised groups of people and may often be a direct reflection of the social reality that surrounds it. However, the stage setting – which sometimes includes the specific allocation of space for performers and spectators – is chosen, designed and/or constructed for each and every production. This aspect of performing spaces is more prone to the preferences of individual agents, such as directors and stage designers. It can reflect the dominant cultural climate, but it does not have to. In the terms of Henri Lefebvre, I believe that performing space – meaning here the spatial arrangements made for specific performative events, not the general spatial properties of a venue – leans heavily toward the concept of a ‘representation of space’, a space which is designed consciously for a cause, typically planned by ‘a certain type of artist[s] with a scientific bent – all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived’ (2002: 38-39).

Bertolt Brecht once mourned the ‘theatrical situation’ where people step into a theatrical space, like an opera house, and become different for a moment: they dress nicely, act politely, and, for a period of time, forsake their regular social behaviour, problems and identities. He preferred that they keep their hats on and ‘get out their cigars’ (1964l: 39), remaining in their own world rather than escaping into an illusory one. By expressing this wish, Brecht tried to defy a fundamental, and in my opinion inescapable, aspect of the theatrical space: its difference, for better and for worse, from everyday life. Performing spaces emerge from the surrounding environments and are
usually involved in a dialogue with them, but they are also independent from them, if only because they are expected to be independent.

Performing spaces are not magically immune to the influence of external agents, such as communities and governments. Like every other space touched by humans, their forms and their contents reflect elaborate histories and complex networks of interests. It is my opinion, though, that performers of all kinds have the option to treat their performing spaces not like laws of nature, but rather like pieces of raw material, which can be shaped at will and still fulfil their function. To some extent, this is possible because of the theatrical convention of “suspension of disbelief”. This convention, which allows spectators to experience theatrical signifiers, for a short period of time, as if they were the actual people and objects that they signify, allows the agents of performance to create theatrical spaces whose link to social reality is flexible, if not implicit.

The unique quality of the spaces which are used for performance is partly a result of their distinctly limited scope. Like other functional spaces, performing spaces are restricted by various borders such as walls, fences and marks. But unlike most of the functional spaces, performing spaces are continuously re-created for the sake of each individual performance, using ephemeral tools such as decorations, props, lighting utilities and even music. In other words, areas which serve performers cover not only defined portions of space, but also defined periods of time. This inherently limited scale, both geographically and temporally, renders the theatrical spaces quite controllable. A performing space includes many elements which are not designed to last, and its various users feel free to shape, and re-shape, them. This quality of performing spaces made Richard Schechner claim that ‘the fullness of space, the endless ways space can be transformed, articulated, animated – that is the basis for environmental theater design’
Translated literary texts can also be thought of as performances. The normative expectations of readers who approach them can then be thought of as a performing space, which regulates the ways a translator sends messages and the ways readers receive them. Translation norms, like theatrical spaces, can be viewed as artificial sets of rules, which can be shaped and influenced by the agents who operate within them. This includes not only operational norms, which ‘may be conceived of as directing the decisions made during the act of translation itself’ (Toury 1995: 58), but also expectancy norms, which govern the reaction range of translation addressees. As Chesterman succinctly puts it: ‘translators […] manipulate both texts and audiences’ (2001: 106). This idea may be confusing, as it blurs the supposedly solid line which separates translation norms from translation strategies, but it provides a useful path of thought. As Sela-Sheffy noted, ‘instead of a “tyranny of norms” in translation we had […] better talk about the “sway of certain norms”, that is, of certain models, in the work of translators’ (2005: 7).

An attempted creation or modification of basic rules which govern the relationships between translations and their readers is made possible because the experience of reading any particular translated text is essentially limited in time. Using the spatial analogy, one may not be able to modify the entire world which surrounds the spectators wherever they go, but one may still be able to make them experience the stage settings of a particular performance for a short period of time. Translators cannot educate their readers to abandon their expectancy norms altogether but still may be able to persuade their readers to put them aside, if only for a little while, for the sake of a particular translated text. The distinction between fixed and semi-fixed features of space becomes, this way, relevant to translators who wish to suggest translation norms of their own. It may be impractical to
expect readers to treat newly introduced consistencies as if they were permanent, fixed walls which bind all translations; it may nevertheless be possible to expect them to view them as semi-fixed stage sets or props, which exist on the stage of translation only for the scope of one book, one author or even one translator. The analogy with performing space may show literary translators that when dealing with normative expectations, they are not limited to the binary options of either obeying the reigning norms or rebelling against them. Instead, they may modify them, and shape the very expectations of their addressees.

5.3.2.2. Reasons for shaping spaces and norms

Every acting space allows a certain amount of freedom to its users, and in that respect translational normative systems are no different. Every system of norms has a range of flexibility, which allows it a varying number of translations to any given source text (Chesterman 1997: 64-65). However, all performing spaces, no matter how liberal, are, by nature, limiting. As stated by the director John Whitmore, ‘the ground plan determines the movement possibilities for the performers as well as the potential spatial relationships possible [between them]’ (1994: 121). Every active set of translational norms brings about a similar “ground plan”, which controls many of the possibilities that are available to translators. Performers and translators, however, may wish to meddle with pre-existing boundaries and limitations that are imposed on their work by their environment. This wish can have several reasons.

Some of the reasons behind the conscious spatial design of performances are related to the intended reception of the performance by its addressees. An obvious example, especially in naturalistic theatre, is the wish to render the space mimetic and iconic, and
to make it resemble the fictional spaces it signifies. More interesting for translators, perhaps, is the case of performances which take place in public spaces, as ‘theatre is not always, of course, produced in buildings designed particularly for that purpose’ (Carlson 1992: 13). Such performances must form spaces which challenge their surrounding environment. As noted by Iana Stefanova, ‘performance art in public space possesses [a] great potential of inciting moments of antagonism, of situations where different views and positions clash and thus create truly public space’ (2007: 8). Such spatial clashes can become a framework for discussion and result in events in which ‘performers, creating in the public realm […] by putting a frame of artistic gesture [in place], […] explore the world: they question our manner of living together, reflect on conditions, define new practices and produce new knowledge’ (Ibid.: 6).  

Moreover, according to Jan Cohen-Cruz, performances which take place in public space ‘question or re-envision ingrained social arrangement of power’ (1998: 3). This wish to encourage social discussion through the spatial clash between a performance and its surroundings can be highly relevant to translators who wish to encourage a similar discussion through the clash between the currently reigning set of norms and the ones reflected in their translation. According to Sela-Sheffy, the construction of translation norms can be desired by translators who wish to make a more general cultural impact, very much the way artists do. In her words, some translators ‘see themselves not as servants of norm-dictating authorities, but rather as culture makers who set those norms’ (2005: 7). Comparing translators to buskers, say, whose performance space might be in the middle of the street, lets us view them as potential rebels who may suggest their own sets of

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2 According to Stefanova, a discursive potential was reflected in the recent history of performances in public places. She noted that in the 1980s and in the 1990s such performances were discussed ‘issues related to personal identity and multiculturalism’ and that discussions of globalisation were added in the following decade (2007: 14)
translation norms as an alternative to the surrounding environment of pre-existing norms.

Another factor which contributes to the shaping of theatrical spaces and which is also relevant for translators is the need to adjust the working environment to the possibilities of the performers. In Greek tragedy, for example, a specific stage mechanism, called the *mechane*, was used to elevate actors who portrayed gods speaking from above. This accessory compensated for the (obvious) fact that the actors could not fly. Some performing spaces are even formed with the comfort of performers in mind: the placement of an armchair for a storyteller, which allows listeners to huddle intimately around it, is an example for such considerations. The norms of translation, too, are influenced by the abilities and needs of translators. The most obvious example is the norm of translating via a third language when there are no translators of a desired language pair. Translators who use pseudonyms instead of their real names in order to avoid undesired attention or high expectations are an example of a norm (or, at least, accepted behaviour) which is influenced by the personal needs of the translator.

Yet another performance-oriented reason behind the wish to craft acting spaces is the need to present the performers with specific challenges. This is obviously true for performance genres which emphasise the extraordinary environment-defying capabilities of the performers, like circus events, which challenge the laws of gravity, or puppetry, which animates inanimate matter, along with many other demanding genres and traditions. To be sure, the value of challenging environments exists in other performance genres as well. Theatrical techniques develop not only in spite of space-related difficulties, such as stage size, but also because of them. This was recognised by the early Russian director Vsevolod Meyerhold, whose conditioning exercises aimed ‘to teach the actor maximum movement in space through exact coordinates’ (Gordon 1995: 92).
The active seeking of artificial constraints and boundaries is not recommended by most translation theorists but it is less foreign to the literary world. Many composers of artistic texts have developed and used restrictive textual forms, such as the sonnet or the haiku, in order to reach peaks of expression. This notion reached a new height with the founding of Oulipo (*ouvroir de littérature potentielle*), a 1960s French group who set out ‘to invent (or reinvent) restrictions of a formal nature (constraints) and propose them to enthusiasts interested in composing literature’ (Roubaud 1998: 38). The members of this group utilised arbitrary and odd constraints such as the *lipogram* (avoiding specific letters of the alphabet) or the *N+7* (replacing every noun with the noun located 7 entries after in a dictionary). The relevance of such conscious norm-fabrication to physical border-setting was recognised, indeed, by one of Oulipo’s founding members: ‘An Oulipian writer’, he explained, ‘is a rat who himself builds the maze from which he sets out to escape’ (Roubaud 1998: 41). Principles and techniques in the spirit of the Oulipo movement might well be applied, knowingly or unknowingly, to translation. The extent to which translators of poetry choose to preserve various formal properties of the source text, such as prosodic patterns, even when the task is daunting, is related to the belief in the importance of constraints in translation. Such demonstrations of the will to meet a formal challenge can be noted, for example, in translations of classical Chinese verse to English. The practice of phonetic translation, which renders the sounds of a text in language A meaningful in language B, is an example of a translation technique which can be linked to the Oulipian principle of adopting original constraints as a means of refreshing literature. Ezra Pound used a similar technique when he translated the Anglo-Saxon poem ‘The Seafarer’ into English (see Chapter 3). Translations which utilise Oulipian techniques risk being received as parodies of their source texts. Even so,
they may gain energy and potency from the innovative efforts invested in their creation.

5.3.3. Influencing performing spaces

As stated by Stefanova, ‘the distinctive relative autonomy of art diverges from the distinctly non-autonomous demands of the public’ (2007: 20). This distinction is made possible by the fact that performing agents, such as actors, directors and stage designers, have several ways of controlling and manipulating their performing space. Some of these can be linked, in one way or the other, to the capacity of individual translators to influence the normative environment in which they operate.

One way of controlling a performing space is, of course, by constructing it. This construction exists on both macro and micro-levels. Using terminology drawn from the sociologist Edward T. Hall, theatres demonstrate conscious manipulation of ‘fixed-feature’ space and of ‘semifixed-feature space’, as they utilise movable and immovable objects alike for their advantage (1966: 97-104). As explained by Whitmore, fixed-feature elements in theatrical space include ‘parameters of the acting area; the location of the permanent walls, columns, doorways, fireplaces, windows, platforms, and so forth’, while semifixed-feature elements include ‘those objects in the stage environment that have size, shape, and substance but can be moved during the performance: furniture, props, and scenery pieces’ (1994: 121).

Another way of controlling a space is to choose it. Even where the features of performing spaces are dictated by strict and formal rules, as in the majority of established theatre houses, performance agents often still have the freedom to pick their own preferred venues. Such choices are meaningful not only because they enable the performers to fine-tune their working environment, thus having a say about the ways it
influences their performance, but also because they enable them to direct the expectations of their spectators. As Marvin Carlson has noted: ‘Because every physical element of the production can and often is used over and over again in subsequent productions, the opportunities for an audience to bring memories of previous uses to new productions are enormous’ (2001: 8). When this principle of ‘ghosting’ applies to theatrical spaces, their past memories ‘“bleed [...] through” the process of reception’ (Ibid.: 133). Theatre houses with rich histories are susceptible to a very significant ghosting. For Carlson, ‘spaces that have been utilized for centuries for theatrical events [...] are almost invariably public, social places already layered with associations’ (Ibid.). The utilised space inside the theatre house is also a matter of choice. Richard Schechner believes that performers should ‘start with all the space there is and then decide what to use, what not to use, and how to use’ (1973: 25). This process sometimes results in an unconventional usage of space, such as the audience’s seats, utility corridors and even the surrounding streets (Ibid.: 4), since ‘the living space includes all the space in the theater, not just what is called the stage’ (Ibid.: 2). Choosing a space to perform in is not limited to the world of established theatre companies and professional venues. Buskers and street performers also have this freedom to select their own spaces, picking the “best” corner or piazza. Modern site-specific performances add another variation to this: performers may choose spaces which are not necessarily theatrical by tradition or design, but nevertheless carry with them profound associations which are utilised for the sake of the performance (see Carlson 2001: 134).

At times, performance groups have no say concerning the actual, physical elements of the space which has been allocated for their use. Even then, performance agents can nevertheless define an environment of their own using their bodies alone. As Edward T.
Hall wrote, ‘the territory is in every sense of the word an extension of the organism, which is marked by visual, vocal and olfactory signs’ (1966: 97). That is, by merely moving about people create an ‘informal space’ (Ibid.: 105) of specific qualities. This, in turn, enables performers to treat performing spaces to some extent as a blank canvas or as a neutral zone. As director Peter Brook famously concluded: ‘[One] can take any empty space and call it a bare stage’ (1971: 9). Carlson refined this observation by mentioning that ‘[One] does not create a theatre out of a void but makes a theatre out of a space that previously was thought of as something else’ (2001: 133). The tension between the original environment and its re-incarnation as a space for performance is further explained by Stefanova:

Performance (or intervention) creates concrete situations in which it can be encountered. It creates its own spatio-temporal set, which often tries to disorient the usual processes of recognition. Spontaneous and ephemeral interventions in public space [...] have created temporary autonomous zones in which utopia can be lived for a brief moment (2007: 5).

Acting can influence the space in which it takes place by various means. It can be accomplished by positioning, when actors enact their proxemic relations with their virtual surroundings and describe these surroundings using appropriate gestures of distancing, or by other means of spatial signalling, where construction of perceived space on stage includes the full range of human observable interactions with the environment. Using a variety of tools, such as gestures, mime, movement and body language, actors can signal specific environmental elements and can convince the spectators that the personae they play are located in a specific physical and emotional spatial context. By doing so, they enter into a dialogue with pre-existing environmental elements.
It can be seen, then, that a performing space is rarely treated like a given arena which is surrounded by an external, hard-coded, unalterable and impassable set of borders and restrictions which limit its inhabitants. A performing space can be chosen, built and shaped in several ways and on several scales and levels for the sake of each and every performance. In that sense, the metaphor of performing space challenges a common concept of translation norms. This is so because it stands for an entity that is treated as raw material which can be shaped and modified by deliberate individual actions and decisions, rather than as a given set of constraints which can only be followed or ignored.

5.3.4. Influencing translational norms

The link between the actions of individual translators and the formation and stabilisation of translation norms is not new to translation studies. A key idea in the discourse surrounding this issue is the concept of habitus. As described by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, The habitus is the sum of learned working habits and day-to-day tendencies. Bourdieu explains that ‘objects of knowledge are constructed […], and. […] the principle of this construction is the system of structured, structuring dispositions, the habitus, which is constituted in practice and is always oriented toward practical functions’ (1980: 52). Like norms, the habitus is social in origin: it is an ‘embodied history, internalized as second nature and so forgotten as history’ (Ibid.: 56). However, it also acknowledges the role of the individual agent who is subjected to a specific habitus in shaping it and distributing it. As Schäffner has noted, ‘a habitus is both structured, i.e. unavoidably reflecting the social conditions within which it was acquired, and structuring, contributing directly to the elaboration of norms and conventions’ (2010:
The concept of habitus has been mentioned on several occasions in relation to translation. Robinson, for example, identified a compatibility between Bourdieu’s term and his own somatic markers which qualify various linguistic patterns as pleasant or unpleasant (2003b: 91-94); Sela-Sheffy wrote that ‘Bourdiesuan concepts of field and habitus [can be used] for explaining the tension between the constrained and the versatile nature of translators’ action’ (2005: 1). One of the most significant contributions belongs to Daniel Simeoni who linked the concept of habitus with the concept of translation norms. Simeoni described the professionalisation of translators as a process of internalisation of external constraints (1998: 6, also see Tsirkin-Sadan, 2007: 15).

As explained by Schäffner, ‘Bourdieu’s concept of habitus has been employed to move away from seeing translators as being subjected to norms’ (2010: 242). This is because this concept recognises the ‘extent to which translators themselves play a role in the maintenance and perhaps the creation of norms’ (Simeoni 1998: 26). However, it is still difficult to think of this conceptual extension of norms as liberating. Sela-Sheffy wrote that the notion of habitus promotes a deterministic view of translatorial action (2005: 3), and Bourdieu himself wrote that ‘the habitus is a spontaneity without consciousness or will’ (1980: 56). Viewing sets of translation norms as spaces which are used for performance may encourage us to form a conceptual alternative. It can help us accept the idea of consciously creating or modifying them for a purpose.

If translators try to consciously modify a set of expectancy norms, the way in which a performing group modifies a pre-existing space, they must modify their own practices first. As noted by Bourdieu, practices which are set in a habitus gain ‘an objective meaning that is at once unitary and systematic’ (1980: 58). If translators are able to make
their new working habits similarly unitary and systematic, they may be able to convince their readers that such habits, whether product-oriented or process-oriented, can form a valid set of translation norms. Thus, expectancy norms would be modified, even if only in a limited scope. A very similar process is described by Venuti: ‘The domestic inscription in translating constitutes a unique communicative act, however indirect or wayward. It creates a domestic community of interest around the translated text, an audience to whom it is intelligible and who put it to various uses’ (2006: 491).

Treating translation norms as a constructible set of constraints which is to be accepted, internalised and expected by addressees, translators must make sure that their translation decisions do not appear strange or extraordinary. On the contrary, they should appear to be ordinary and even obvious. Using a term borrowed from semiotics, such a decision should be unmarked. As defined by Daniel Chandler, who used plenty of synonyms in order to clarify and perhaps exemplify his definition, ‘the marked form is foregrounded – presented as “different”; it is “out of the ordinary” – an extraordinary deviational “special case” which is something other than the standard default form of the unmarked term. Unmarked-marked may be thus read as norm-deviation’ (2006: 112). Translators who wish to alter the expectancy norms of their target environment in order to gain acceptance should try to modify the audience’s boundaries of unmarkedness, and make their own translational choices a “non-issue”.

Translators who wish to render their deviant set of norms unmarked must ensure that it is applied to the majority of their target text. This should be done coherently and comprehensively, as only ‘conventional [...] text (which follows a fairly predictable formula) is unmarked’ (Ibid.: 117). A translated text should obey the expectancy norms it wishes to instil consistently, so that its addressees may internalise them with minimal
difficulty. It should also be long enough so that they may get used to the manifestations of these deviant norms and make them unmarked. This applies to all kinds of translation expectancy norms: matricial and textual, style-related and content-related. Returning to the space analogy, this practice is the parallel to the practice of keeping the spectators bound to a specific performing space for a defined period, and not letting them wander off in the middle of the show.

The mission of changing norms can, perhaps, be assisted by sending the addressees messages using channels which are parallel and peripheral to the main channel of translation. This practice belongs to the realm of “thick translation”, which is produced using prefaces, introductions, commentaries, interviews in the media and so on. Tactics such as these, however, present a double-edged sword. That is, although they may explain and clarify the norm-breaching choices that the translators make, but they might interfere with their assimilation in the existing set of translation norms in the process. Calling to mind the spatial metaphor again, extra-textual notes which justify and explain the choices made within the body of the translation resemble explanatory labels which are attached to elements in the space, or a scholarly article in a show’s programme. They may help us understand the newly suggested conventions, but not to accept and internalise them as norms. Using explicit translation notes may increase the “markedness” of translation choices which challenge existing norms and rules.

A performing space for the sake of a specific performance does not have to be built out of thin air; a pre-existing space can be chosen. Similarly, translators can choose a pre-existing set of translation norms to follow. The majority of languages offers plenty of translation norm sets from which to choose. These sets can be drawn from historic translations as well as from specific types of contemporary translations, such as
highbrow literary translations, technical translation, subtitles translation, and so on. They can even be combined. As Mukařovský pointed out in reference to aesthetic norms: ‘not only can a norm be violated, but it is possible [...] to have a parallelism of two or more norms which apply to a single concrete instance, measure the same value and are in mutual competition’ (1979: 26). Choices between some sets of norms are made, according to Toury, at the beginning of each translation work, when the translators choose their ‘initial norm’ which determines whether the translation should be judged for ‘being a text in a certain language’ or for ‘constituting a representation [...] of another, pre-existing text in another language’ (1995: 96). Other, more specific sets of norms, are chosen in later stages. As noted by Chesterman, every translation is, in fact, the result of a choice between multiple, co-existing and sometimes competing norm sets (2001: 97). Translators, then, can sometimes divert their readers to interpret the target texts according to an existing set of norms of their choice, or even according to a hybrid set, collected from the translation norms which govern several text types or historical periods. This diversion of the expectations of the addressees can be achieved by making the target text adhere to basic key dictations of the desired set of norms. In that respect, translators can be like buskers who may choose a street corner and a time of day for their performance. Toury, himself, demonstrated this in one of his translations by signifying a set of historic translation norms using a simple linguistic method:

In my own translation of Mark Twain’s *Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court*, I made rather frequent use of conjoint phrases of near-synonyms, in an attempt to create a parodistic

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3 The concept of norm choosing is not dissimilar to the concept of active framing in translation, as suggested by Mona Baker. Frames, which are ‘normatively allocated’ (Goffman 1981: 230, cited in Baker 2006: 109), are conventional contexts which dictate the way representations are being interpreted; active framing is the practice of directing the addressees to choose a specific, desired interpretation by surrounding the text in a specific context (Baker 2006: 105-06).
air of “stylistic archaism”. […] this translation was made in 1983, that is, when the use of the device had become quite obsolete in translation into Hebrew too […] it was meant first and foremost as a step back into the history of Hebrew translation (1995: 112).

Translation norms are not static. In fact, they are recognised by critics as ever-changing entities which are sensitive to the activity of translators. As Toury stated, ‘it is not as if all translators are passive in the face of […] changes [to norms through time]. Rather, many of them, through their very activity, help in shaping the process’ (1995: 62). Nevertheless, the conscious act of forming or modifying norms is often described negatively, as an act of breaking or undermining old norms (Chesterman 1997: 66), rather than positively, as an act of conceiving and forming new ones.

Looking at norms through the theatrical space metaphor may change this negative approach. Expectancy norms and translation constraints, like physical platforms and walls, may actually be chosen, collected, constructed or moulded by translators. Like a stage designer who constructs the settings of a performance, a producer who chooses the performance venue or an actor who marks an invisible environment using physical movements and reactions, translators might consider viewing view their new norms as a sound basis for work rather than as an innovative novelty added to a product. In order to render the marked deviation unmarked, a new set of norms should be less like a sculpture to wonder at and more like a room to stay in. Perhaps when the unmarkedness of the target text is set, both for translators and their addressees, one may declare the birth of a new expectancy norm. Like theatre-goers, the readers of such translations can adapt to new systems of codification. All that is needed is a willing suspension of disbelief (see Tidworth 1973: 212).
5.4.  **Space and norms as communication media**

Norms of translation, which define the relationship between translators and their readers, cannot be described without referring to the translation’s relation to its target culture. For Toury, “‘translatorship’ [as described by norms] amounts first and foremost to being able to play a social role, i.e. to fulfil a function allotted by a community’ (1995: 53). Theatrical space, too, refers first and foremost to a function which performers fulfil with regard to their surrounding “community”, namely their audience. As theatre stage designers well know, the most important spatial borders in any performative situation do not consist of architectonic details, such as planks, walls, doors and curtains, but rather of living people. The defining feature of every theatrical space is the spatial relationship it establishes between viewers and performers. Successful communication with the spectators has different requirements depending on the spatial division that is in use. Actors perform differently depending on whether their spectators surround them or view them from a single direction, whether they are located above them or on the same level, whether they are seated comfortably or standing up (or even walking), isolated from one another or aware of each other’s presence and so on.

Similarly, norms of translation, like spatial boundaries, are more than a mere limiting frame. Norms and space become a medium through which translators and performers communicate in order to reach the addressees who surround them. Both translation readers and theatre-goers are, in that respect, similar to a radio receiver which is tuned to a channel carried only by a standard normative frequency. The metaphor of transmitting a translation to its destination through a channel made of norms can be easily adapted to a theatrical context where every message transmitted by the performers to the audience must pass through space. One might even think of the use of theatrical
space, that is, the definition of the relationship between performer and audience, as a means of marking the differences between theatre schools and periods more clearly than the various types of acting techniques.

Alex Gross elucidates the metaphorical capacity of theatrical space as a medium through which to convey a translated message, by describing translators as conjurers who work miracles on a stage, and likening their dictionaries to theatre props (1991: 33, also see in Chapter 1). He writes:

The proscenium arch, along with the entire theatrical architecture underlying the conjuror’s tricks, can readily be likened to the totality of shared cultural history between the two peoples and cultures being subjected to such alleged acts of translation. And the audience for this stage illusion, those desperately ready and willing to witness the fulfilment of this fraudulent wonder, are none other than those (often ourselves) already convinced that such a miracle can and must take place (Ibid.).

Gross used his analogy in order to show that translation is as alluring and as illusory as a magic trick. I use a similar analogy, but with a different intent: to draw insights from the relations between stage settings and spectators and to apply them to translation. The following sub-sections view some translation communication issues in light of this analogy. In these sub-sections, the discussion is limited to the realm of literary translation, where the texts which are communicated to readers are culturally varied and where translation norms are not as strict and univocal as in other types of translation, such as technical or legal translations.
5.4.1. Physical distance and simplification

5.4.1.1. Distance as a transmission hindrance

One of the most recognisable features of every performing space is the physical distance between performers and spectators. Western theatres show great variety in that respect. The viewing distance between the spectators and the actors can be almost non-existent, as in Swedish playwright August Strindberg’s ideal room-sized theatre (Tidworth 1973: 7), but it can also be as vast and immense as an opera house or a rock concert stadium. Viewing distance in any performing space is determined by a complex outcome of many cultural traditions and it is influenced by many considerations social, political, stylistic, aesthetic, financial and others. It goes without saying that if one wishes to maximise the number of spectators attending the show, for whatever reason, long-range viewing becomes a matter of technical necessity.

The number of viewers that may be accommodated in a theatrical space can be very large. The well-preserved Greek theatre of Epidauros, which was built in the fourth century BCE, was able to hold 40,000 spectators, and, according to Pliny, a wooden Roman theatre which was constructed in 58 BCE included seats for 80,000 (Tidworth 1973: 10-11, 25) – more than most modern football stadiums. Such an immense seating capacity requires an equally immense area. The Epidaurian theatre, by no means the greatest theatre of its time, was 400 meters wide in diameter, and it forced some of the playgoers to watch the dramatic action from a distance of over 200 meters.

The need to cater to large audiences in a large space has an obvious effect on communication between performers and their audience. When the stage is located far away, one cannot see the actors well, nor hear them properly. Therefore, the viewer may
miss a part of the experience, or worse, lose interest and shift his or her attention to something else. Many theatrical conventions can be related to an attempt to compensate, by various means, for the distance-related loss of signal. Some of these conventions are purely structural or technical. While the spatial condensation of action into a small, central and often elevated acting area is aimed at helping the viewers maintain their visual focus, the manipulation of acoustic reflection, utilising architectonic elements, is aimed at enhancing and channelling sound and voice. The shell-shaped theatre at Epidaurus is famous for the fact that a coin dropped in the middle of its stone orchestra can be heard clearly from its most outer row of seats. Modern theatre houses install artificial mechanisms for light projection and sound amplification hoping for a similar effect. Nevertheless, the basic problem of distant perception still challenges actors and makes them search for solutions of their own.

Many problems that translators face when they seek to establish communication with their readership can be portrayed by using the metaphor of a physical gap, theatrical or otherwise, which separates the text transmitters from their receivers. The most obvious relevance of this concept to translation seems to be in describing the relationship between source and target. When faced with a source text from a markedly foreign context, translators must “bridge the gap” and attempt to transfer the text across that distance. Gross used this metaphor when he remarked:

If the shared cultural history between the two peoples (the proscenium arch and/or theatre architecture) is slight or not of long duration (as is the case, say, between the US & most Asian peoples) […] the act of translation and/or the conjuror’s trick, stage illusion, mass hallucination, etc., will simply fail to take place or will be demonstrably less effective, so unsuccessful in fact that people will not understand what is happening and leave the theatre

Such distance can represent geographic remoteness, temporal gap or any other difference between the source and the target cultures. All of these differences might render translated texts less plausible to the eyes of addressees. On other occasions, the source text can be incompatible with the needs of the target audience in its own right: it may be incoherent, erroneous, over-simplistic, over-complicated, etc. This, too, can move the translation “farther away” from its target audiences and inhibit their willingness to communicate with it. Other distance-related transfer problems may be more target-oriented, and result from the translation’s surrounding reception context. Some translational situations bring to mind those theatrical environments that are rich with local, peripheral stimuli that are unrelated to the actual show, such as architectural pomp, social interactions among the audience members or background noise, all of which tend to grab the attention of the spectators. In such cases, readers of a translation may in a sense “sit far away” from the translation arena by focusing their attention on local, domestic literary works, thus restricting its access to foreign works in translated form (see the related discussion of Venuti in Chapter 3). An interesting link can be drawn between the phenomenon of a large crowd seated around the stage, forcing the performers to adjust their acting to a multitude of viewing distances and perspectives, and a heterogeneous readership receiving a translation, which forces the translators to adjust their product to a less predictable mode of reception and interpretation.

5.4.1.2. Performing across a distance

Issues of distance and clarity appear frequently in performance theory. Even devoted disciples of Stanislavski, who usually emphasise the performer’s inner process, admit
that actors must perform in an externally clear, decipherable way for the sake of their viewers (Moore 1991: 22, 24, 60). Film theoretician Vsevolod Pudovkin believed that the issue of distance is a major problem in theatrical performance since ‘in the theatre, the widening of its network is in direct contradiction with the quality of its performance’ because large theatre halls trade acting quality for acting clarity (‘Film Acting’, 1949: 14). Whether the practice of performing across a distance is considered to be a problem or a challenge, there is no single set of applicable principles. Those that are applied are often complex and tailored to specific situations, contexts and traditions. In fact, a performance tradition is often defined and recognised by the histrionic solutions it has suggested for this very issue, taking into account the fact that no solution is perfect. In general, however, actors who wish to send their signals across a distance resort to at least one of two distinct tactics: amplification of the performance volume, and formalisation of the performance vocabulary.

The first tactic is clear enough: performers face their audience, amplify their speech, flail their limbs vigorously, move sharply and generally exaggerate every perceptible aspect of their performance. As explained by Meyer-Dinkgräfe in his discussion of the theatre in ancient Greece, ‘the size of the theatre had an important impact on acting: the buildings seated more than 10,000 spectators, with the front row positioned about 60 feet (18 m) from the stage [...] Gestures had to be broad to be intelligible’ (2001: 10). A similar method of compensation had influential supporters like Denis Diderot, who claimed that ‘expanded surroundings require amplified gestures and heightened expressions, a requirement demanding calculated technique from the actor as it did from the sculptor’ (Roach 1985: 134), and mid-nineteenth century critic George Henry Lewes, who maintained that actors should be able to ‘enlarge’ their authentic emotions in order
to fit theatrical situations (Ibid.: 184). This method is also one of the reasons why the popular term “dramatic behaviour” has become synonymous with an exaggerated, “over the top” manner of expression.

In spite of, or maybe because of its popularity across historical, aesthetic and cultural contexts, the compensatory strategy of amplification has had its share of critics throughout the history of theatre. Actor and teacher Thomas Betterton (1635-1710), for example, whole-heartedly denounced his colleagues for screaming at the top of their lungs for the sake of applause (Cole 1949: 97-98). In so doing, he was merely echoing the demands of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, who complained about actors who raised their voices for the sake of the common people watching from the pit below the stage:

O, it offends me to the soul to hear a robustious periwig-pated fellow tear a passion to tatters, to very rags, to split the ears of the groundlings, who for the most part are capable of nothing but inexplicable dumbshows and noise: I would have such a fellow whipped for o’erdoing Termagant; it out-herods Herod: pray you, avoid it. (1968: 908)

A second tactic, more intricate and more extensive than the first one, attempts to clarify the messages sent to the audience over a large distance not by amplifying them, but rather by standardising them. This is done through the use of stock conventions which set limits to the range of what may be interpreted as theatrical behaviour. These conventions reduce the infinite number of performance variations to a more finite one. The limits which are set upon the players can be very strict and formal, as in the case of historical Japanese Noh and Kyōgen theatre, or very loose, as in the case of some of the experimental ‘Happenings’ that took place in the US in the 1960s (see Karpow 2003). In all cases, limits tend to be comprehensive and are applied to vocal tones and rhythms, facial expressions, physical gestures, manners and types of movement, costumes and
props, and generally most aspects of performative expression. The resulting “molecules” of acting, which are consistent throughout the performances in every given tradition, become in time more than mere restrictions. They start to function as codes or signs, which eventually form a complete, clear and distinct “theatrical language”. Thus, as Meyer-Dinkgräfe noted (2001: 10), the distance between performing area and viewing area in Greek theatre was the main reason behind the development of stock conventions which were used to signify a character’s emotions and actions. Kneeling and touching one’s beard came to mean begging for assistance, hiding the face in a cloak – grief, joining of the hands – taking an oath, and so on. To this day, it is common to encounter theatrical and otherwise performative content codification which is achieved through formal stock conventions. Such conventions are more visible where the distance between the audience and the performance plays a significant role, as in circus shows and concerts, and less so where it is not as much of a problem, as in TV shows and in films.

Like amplification, the practice of codification through conventions can be criticised. Such conventions can be claimed to stand in the way of many artistic goals, such as the faithful depiction of nature and reality, the successful arousal of emotions among the audience, the encouragement of originality and creativity in performance and so on. Conventions were denounced by Stanislavsky for ruining theatrical immersion (2006:27-28), and by Brecht for preserving it (1964a: 26); they are criticised by modernists for being traditional and by de-constructivists for being constructs. Even those who generally lean toward codified performances would probably agree that stock theatre conventions are reductive. Using stock conventions as a filter between the performers and the spectators in order to improve the deciphering of messages by the audience involves a concomitant simplification and loss of subtlety.
5.4.1.3. Translating across a distance

Translational norms are often aimed at maintaining and improving the communication between translators and their various target readers. According to Chesterman, ‘ultimately, norms have an evolutionary function: they make life easier […] by regulating behaviour in such a way that is optimally beneficial to all parties […]. In brief, norms save both time and effort’ (1997: 55-56).

Norms of amplification and codified marking are common not only in theatrical performance, but also in translation. Such norms serve a similar function: they bridge the virtual distance which exists between the translation event and its intended addressees. Just like theatrical situations where performers compensate for the viewing distance by amplifying the acting and reducing the level of detail, norms of translation often promote clarity at the expense of the potential complexity of the target text. Such norms are among the causes for the phenomenon of “explicitation” in translation target texts, which, according to Toury, is inevitable, universal (Toury 1995: 187, cited in Chesterman 1997: 71-72), and one of the most recognisable signs of “Translationese”.

Translational amplification should occur whenever a clear foregrounding of an element in the target text can help make it more attractive to its readers. The process of amplification in translation, as termed by Eugene Nida (Klaudy 1998: 81), can, and often does, include explicitation of the information which is offered implicitly by the text, but it is not limited to that. Textual features to be amplified can be formative or thematic, source-oriented or target-oriented; the process of amplification can involve stylistic changes, matricial re-construction and generally every other shift-producing process which exists in the arsenal of translation taken to the extreme. Translators can amplify their target text by emphasising any distinct or attractive element which exists in the
source text, but doing so has its downside. Emphasising a limited set of textual features and layers in an effort to gain and maintain attention is likely to leave some of the other textual features and layers unnoticed. Thus, amplification renders the target text less heterogeneous than its source and compromises its potential complexity.

Translational codified marking, which should be more common and less avoidable than amplification, appears when elements which are contained in the source text are culturally distant from target readers, or are, at least, very different from what the target readers are willing to accept or used to accept in translations. This can happen for numerous reasons: the source text may deal with unfamiliar or archaic concepts making it difficult to decipher; it may refer to “indecent” ideology, making it difficult to digest; it may rely on rhythmic, phonetic or other stylistic mechanisms less relevant to the target linguistic context, making it difficult to appreciate, and so on. This is where codification offers a convenient solution. When the members of Lord Chamberlaine’s Men played Macbeth in the open air Globe Theatre, they performed during the day, as the sun was the only lighting provided. In order to represent night, they brought in lighted torches. Similarly, translators who face distant properties of source texts often resort to “signalling” them by using agreed-upon codes which act as an icon, or even an index, of the original textual feature. Thus, the antiquity of a source text can be signalled in translation by using an occasional archaic word or obsolete syntactic structure while keeping the rest of the target text fairly modern; the general obscenity of a source text can be signalled by throwing in the target text an obscenity or two while keeping the rest of it generally respectable, and so on. Such signals, on page as well as on stage, comprise a repertoire of stock conventions which readers recognise. It is reasonable to believe that the formation of such signal repositories is the same process which was observed by
Toury, according to whom ‘textemes tend to be converted into repertoremes’ during translation, (1991: 187, cited in Chesterman, 1997: 72), where “repertoremes” are institutionalised replacements for textual items. Codification, like amplification, can be criticised, as it is, too, a double-edged sword. It contributes to the safety of the transfer channel while taming, streamlining and reducing the message it was supposed to deliver. However, it remains an important function of translation norms.

5.4.2. Moving spectators and allocating spaces

So far, the discussion of space as a medium of transmission emphasised one particular aspect of the interaction between translators and their addressees: that of transferring messages. However, the discipline of performance, which is hard-linked to the world of art, usually strives for a more profound impact on its addressees, and it goes beyond the mere transfer of a message or construction of a meaning. The types of desired theatrical impact on spectators have been the subject of debates which were conducted from the days of Aristotle’s poetics to our own age. The audience is sometimes required to enjoy the show, and sometimes to suffer because of it; sometimes to learn new things, and sometimes to re-affirm the old; sometimes to be critical, and sometimes to be convinced; sometimes to analyse an experience, and sometimes to immerse itself in it.

Nevertheless, there is at least one common denominator which unites the desired types of performance reception, and it functions as an underlying assumption which stands behind its many different aspects. This denominator is the requirement from the audience to pay active attention to the happenings on the stage. This kind of attention was described, for example, by Stanislavsky as he touched the elusive concept of communion. This term, used in theatrical context, should not be confused with the
Christian denotation which refers to shared sacraments or faiths. In performance, said Stanislavski, communion is the natural awareness, or ‘lively interest’ (2006: 195), which is experienced by the performers upon communicating with other persons, objects, or even inner, mental entities. As expanded by Wallace Fowlie, ‘good theatre is characterized by the importance of a community, by the establishment of a communion which it propagates. It is the means of creating an incomparable spiritual bond between people’ (1954: 24).

The strategies which were devised for the sake of maintaining an atmosphere of live interest between performers and their audience have much to do with the design of theatrical space. The basic question which performers face, in that respect, is that of the relation between the performing space and the space occupied by spectators. Actors and spectators are often restricted to defined and separate territories within the performance venue. It is needless to say, perhaps, that translators and readers, being clearly separated from each other, are subject to metaphorically similar conditions. This situation can be roughly described, using Bourdieu’s terminology, as a case of ‘social topology […] constructed on the basis of principles of differentiation or distribution constituted by the set of properties active within the social universe in question’ (1985: 723-24). The arenas of performance can be viewed as one of Bourdieu’s social fields, where addressers and addressees populate its separate ‘relative positions’ (Ibid.: 724). This point, though, is also the point where the performing space model deviates from the Neo-Marxist model which was introduced by Bourdieu. The sociological “field”, in its traditional definition, represents a zero-sum game, where one player’s gain depends on the other player’s loss. Communion, on the other hand, is mutual, and it can be won only in a non zero-sum game, where the gain of one player depends upon the success of the other.
A similar structure is applicable in the case of translation. Translators usually desire to establish communication with their readers, although, unlike authors, they seldom address them directly; they also desire to grasp their readers’ continuous attention. The communication with the reader is a general desire which is central to the field of translation. The fulfilment of this wish, however, is not assured, since the basic structure of the field in which translators and readers operate sets a wide gap between the two roles; it dictates a limited and delayed one-way interaction between the former and the latter.

Some kinds of space layouts which are aimed at enabling, establishing and enhancing a sense of communion between the audience’s seats and the actors’ stage can, at times, be compared with translational decisions and policies which are aimed at maintaining active attention and fascination among the readers. Of these performative space layouts I wish to discuss specifically two distinct poles, which represent opposite approaches regarding the relationship between the performers and their viewers. These poles are the strategy of separating the audience from the performers for the sake of unhindered viewing experience, and the strategy of letting the audience share the performing space for the sake of a common acting experience.

5.4.2.1. **Immersing the audience**

The historical evolution of theatrical space is generally tied to many different cultural and historical factors: architectonic technologies, building traditions, status of the theatre within the community, urban (or rural) locations and so on. It is quite rare, then, for the design of a performance area to trace its provenance to a single, coherent and comprehensive poetic theory. This was the case with the design of the Festspielhaus, an
opera house which was devised, and to a great extent implemented, by the renowned composer, librettist and designer, Richard Wagner (1813-83). Wagner, who was a paradoxical herald of modernism and romanticism alike, has contributed greatly to the aesthetics of performance through his vision of “art of the future”. His most famous contribution is the ideal of Gesamtkunstwerk, a multi-disciplinary work of art, harnessing different artistic schools for the sake of a unified, complete experience. Other trademarks of his philosophy include the preference for an emotional experience over an intellectual one and the tendency toward mythological themes (Magee 1968: 7-28). However, for the purposes of this work I will focus on specific, less-recognised principles which are manifested best through Wagner’s stage design. While criticising the design of a Viennese opera house, Wagner stated that it was ‘a piebald medley of the most diverse products from the most contrasted realms of style […] each [performance] appears to take the reason for its existence, by no means from anything within itself, but from a fatal outer necessitation’ (1970b: 43). The alternative, his self-designed performance venue, was all but arbitrary. Wagner’s stage reflected the ideal of an immersive environment. As noted by Susan Kattwinkel, ‘practitioners and theorists such as Wagner were responsible for the fact that ‘the passive audience really only came into being in the nineteenth century’ (2003: ix).

The construction of Wagner’s opera house, the Festspielhaus, was completed in 1876 in the small German town of Bayreuth with the aid of the architect Gottfried Semper (Wagner 1970c: 366). As Geoffrey Skelton has noted, the relatively unattractive location was chosen over larger cities and cultural hubs so that Wagner would ‘have a stage on which he could himself produce his own work in his own way’ (1976: 21). Wagner considered the issue of communion between players and the audience to be
essential for the success of any dramatic performance (see 1970a: 78-79). In order to encourage the possibility of communion, he came up with a complete architectonic reform which aimed for the complete immersion of the spectator in the fictional world represented on stage (Tidworth 1973: 170-72).

One of the notable spatial features of the Bayreuth interior was the distinctive border which separated the audience from the stage. No less than three nested proscenium arches framed the stage and delimited it from above and from the sides (Wagner 1970c: 367). A wide gap, or a ‘mystical gulf’, was opened between the front row of seats and the stage in order ‘to part reality from ideality’ (Ibid.: 366). Historically, this separation continued a trend which was introduced by theatre designers, among them, interestingly, Voltaire, who had the spectators’ seating removed from the stage of his private “Little Theatre” that was built in 1735 in the Château de Cirey (Cole 1949: 148). Such separation regulated and preserved the definition of roles in the performative situation, and served as a vivid and concrete manifestation of Bourdieu’s social metaphor, in which ‘agents are […] defined by their relative positions within […] space. Each of them is assigned to a position or a precise class of neighboring positions […] and one cannot really - even if one can in thought - occupy two opposite regions of the space’ (1985: 724).

The separation between actors and viewers, however, was in no way supposed to harm the communication with the spectators or to alienate them from the theatrical production. On the contrary, another notable feature of the Bayreuth opera house design was the emphasis on maintaining a direct and uninterrupted channel between viewer and stage through the practice of pre-dictating the viewer’s perspective. The stage box was extremely high and was used for holding elaborate sceneries which might attract a
spectator’s wandering gaze. Instead of the popular layout of multi-storey booths and galleries, Wagner placed the seats in an amphitheatre-like acoustic shell, turning every member of the audience toward the happenings on stage (Wagner 1970c: 368; also Tidworth 1973: 170-73). The space used by the spectators was darkened, like the dark seating space used by Wagner’s contemporary, actor-manager Henry Irving (see Kattwinkel 2003: ix). These modifications were the result of Wagner’s belief that ‘a dramatic representation […] is a matter of focusing the eye itself upon a picture’ (1970c: 365). Encouraging the viewer to not deviate from a particular line of vision can be problematic, though, especially when other images come in the way: Wagner has stated that capturing the eye of the spectator ‘can be done only by leading it away from any sight of bodies lying in between’ (Ibid.: 365). Later, Stanislavski himself noted that one cannot have communion with multiple objects or persons simultaneously (2006: 194). More than likely, this was the reason behind the innovative ‘total absence of embellishment’ (1970c: 358) inside Wagner’s opera house.

These two features of the Bayreuth Festspielhaus, i.e., separating the viewers from the stage and pre-dictating their perspective architecturally, were logically complemented by a third one which was aimed at maximising the theatrical illusion: the concealment of evidence for any theatrical process which was taking place. ‘Constant visibility of the mechanism’, said Wagner, was an ‘aggressive nuisance’ and was the reason behind his ‘need […] of rendering invisible the mechanical source of […] opera’s] music, to wit the orchestra’ (1970c: 365). In the Bayreuth opera house, the orchestra is hidden from sight, playing from a deep, open pit between the seats and the stage. The elimination of high booths helped to conceal the musicians, while the extra nesting frames surrounding the stage helped to conceal the entrances of the actors (Ibid., also Tidworth 1973: 170-72).
All in all, then, it can be claimed that Wagnerian or Wagnerian-like performing spaces promote a distinct type of communion between the spectator and the performer, one where there is a strict relationship in which the first is passive, yet immersed, and the second is active, yet invisible in his or her person. In such a relationship, as described much earlier by the actor and playwright Colley Cibber (1671-1757), actors should not strive for applause, whether fake or real, but rather for ‘attentive silence’ (Cole 1949: 104-05). ‘The spectator’, said Wagner, ‘finds himself in an actual “theatron,”’ that is, a room made ready for no purpose other than his looking in, and [...] is situated] straight in front of him’ (1970c: 366). As such, the epitome of viewer activity takes place when ‘the fantasy of [...] audience [...] turns] with active sympathy to greet the inspiration of the poet’s comrades’ (1970a: 79) – not a very active position by any standard. A similar relationship can be found in today’s cinema and television, where passive spectators are assured of a comfortable, immersive viewing experience, and can easily suspend any disbelief they may feel toward the fictional worlds and characters that are portrayed in front of them. The ideal settings for performance, according to Wagner and his followers, approximate the concept of virtual reality: a surrounding, masking artificial environment which appears to be real to the point of illusion, even when its contents are clearly foreign.

I would argue that the spatial layout which is designed to immerse spectators in the viewing experience describes, metaphorically, a situation which is common in literary translation. The three aforementioned principles are regularly applied to translation. Target texts are usually adjusted for the sake of convenient consumption by their readers; a strict line separates the role of the translators from the role of the readers; and the

4 An interesting side note: one of the common criticisms against Wagner’s themes was that his operatic heroes were too passive, always pondering and never taking action (Magee 1968, 26-28).
translators themselves remain, most of the time, transparent. The comparison between the interior design of a nineteenth-century minor city opera house and a global set of inter-linguistic communication norms may thus bring a new translational concept to mind: the concept of an immersive translation strategy. Immersive translation is conservative and target-oriented at its core. It fits both Friedrich Schleiermacher’s portrayal of ‘[a] translator [who] leaves the reader in peace, as much as possible, and moves the author towards him’ (1977: 74) and Lawrence Venuti’s concept of domesticating the target text according to local standards (1998: 5). Unlike the followers of such strategies, however, the immersive translators do not necessarily try to mimic the features of local texts in their work. Instead, they concentrate their efforts on rendering the consumption of the target text as direct and unhindered as possible, keeping the reader as far as possible from any personal translation activity. Immersive translation tries to appear to be a complete work, not leaving any space for further translation or linguistic interpretation by its readers. This does not necessarily contradict a source-oriented approach which tries to incorporate the maximal amount of source-originated features into the target text. As long as these features, however unfamiliar, are easily accessible and decipherable, they are compatible with an immersive translation. It is worth noting that Wagner’s own operas, produced and performed in Bayreuth, serve as a fine example for this nuance. Being musically innovative and thematically fantastic, Wagner’s operas were not related to the audience’s local, daily lives, nor even to their immediate cultural circle of connotations and associations. Yet this did not stop his operas from completely immersing their audiences, sometimes to the verge of ecstasy or hypnosis. An immersive translation makes the readers feel comfortable, though not necessarily at home.
5.4.2.2. Moving the audience

In many cultures and historical periods, spectators of performances are expected to be active and to react vocally and physically to the events which take place on the stage (see, for example, Fisher 2003). As noted by Kattwinkel:

Performers include audiences by having them shout out answers to questions, they bring them on stage to become a character, they encourage vocal response and engage in dialog of sorts, they choose audiences carefully and then engage them as creators, they individualize spectators and react to them personally (2003: x).

The concept of blurring the borders between viewing and the performing area in theatrical situations, too, is not new to the Western performance tradition. Kattwinkel stated that ‘[performers] leave space for audiences to provide text for the performance, they move into public spaces and create an atmosphere of “community project” rather than performance’ (Ibid.). An early example of such practice dates back to the fifth century BCE, where the entrances to the ancient Greek theatres – the 
parodoi – were used by actors and spectators alike. European medieval theatre introduced a different kind of space sharing: some of its miracle and morality plays took place on large wagons which were drawn into the public domain of the town square, while others were performed on temporary stages with no architectonic separation between the audience and the actors (Tidworth 1973: 36-40). Variants of such layouts, where the space which is allocated for performers overlaps with the space which is allocated for their viewers, have many kinds of justifications. As noted by Kattwinkel: ‘The reasons why artists have chosen to adapt immediately to audience response or to make their performances interactive are as varied as the styles of performance they encompass’ (2003: x).

Some of the reasons behind the wish to let the performers and the spectators
intermingle, share a space and share a role, are related to the notion of empowerment. As explained by Kattwinkel, audience participation often has ‘a goal of active spectatorship, with the belief that physical engagement may strengthen mental engagement’ (Ibid.: x-xi). This empowerment is often political in nature and can be linked to the wish to challenge a social order. This is precisely what happens in carnivals, where spatial locations – in their literal sense as well as in their social sense – become blurred. In the words of Mikhail Bakhtin, in carnival situations ‘the participants in the celebration are not gloomy guests. […] They are the hosts and are only hosts, for there are no guests, no spectators, only participants’ (1984: 249). This means that ‘differences between superiors and inferiors disappear for a short time, and all draw close to each other’ (Ibid.: 246).

Contemporary incarnations of empowerment-based audience participation share the discontentment of Jacques Rancière who paralleled the situation of spectators who sit passively before performers to that of students who sit in front of a teacher. This situation, wrote Rancière, is offensive as it reaffirms the ignorance and the inferiority of the spectators (2011: 8-9). Rancière’s own solution was not to change the situation, but to change its interpretation. He wrote that ‘spectators see, feel and understand something in as much as they compose their own poem, as, in their way, do actors or playwrights, directors, dancers or performers’ (Ibid.: 13), and that ‘we do not have to transform spectators into actors […]. We have to recognize […] the activity peculiar to the spectator. Every spectator is already an actor in her story’ (2011: 17).

Others, however, have chosen to empower spectators by altering the actual way in which they act in a theatrical situation. The work of Augusto Boal, who was inspired by Brecht and began to develop his unique acting models in Brazil and in Argentina during the 1970s, is a good example. The early work of Boal emphasised particular arenas of the
social conflict: the struggle for freedom of speech and expression and for the freedom of political association. This emphasis, which was influenced by Boal’s own experience in practising ‘activist theatre under an increasingly repressive regime’ in Brazil and Argentina while being persecuted (Schutzman 1994: 3), was reflected in Boal’s call to the people to ‘reassume their protagonistic function in the theater and in society’ (1979: 119), and thus start ‘rehearsing for social change’ (Schutzman 1994: 2). He claimed that spectators should ‘control the means of theatrical production’ (1979: 125), and his theatre group, like other groups inspired by it, gave its spectators varying degrees of power over the direction that the shows took. This kind of show was, according to him, ‘not revolutionary in itself, but […] surely a rehearsal for the revolution’ (Ibid.: 122).

Boal’s starting point was that ‘theatrical experience should begin not with something alien to the people (theatrical techniques that are taught or imposed) but with the bodies of those who agree to participate in the experiment’ (1979: 127). He used ‘dramatic techniques […] which are] based on transitive learning and collective empowerment’ (Schutzman 1994: 1), and which blur the traditional boundaries between spectators and actors. Many of his various techniques involved ‘simultaneous dramaturgy’ (1979: 132), where the spectators dictate and sometimes participate in the staged events. This is the case with forum theatre, in which the theatrical enactment of politically and socially charged situations is stopped mid-scene and spectators are asked to intervene and solve the situation, sometimes by replacing the actors (see Boal 1995). Invisible theatre, in which performers “make a scene” in public spaces and draw in the crowd to argue about it, unaware of the fact that they are witnessing a theatrical event, also breaches the functional and spatial lines which separate spectators from performers (see Boal 1979: 143-47). Boal-devised and Boal-inspired techniques remain vital to all
forms of contemporary community theatre.

Theatrical methods of empowerment through participation are also used in more personal contexts in drama therapy and psychodrama, a method of psychological treatment which was developed by Jacob Levy Moreno at the beginning of the 20th century (see Feldhendler 1994). It is difficult, however, to separate the social and political aspects of issues which are engaged in such practices from their personal and psychological ones. Such is the case of the Living Stage, an American company founded in 1966, which focused on producing community theatre with special populations, such as deprived children or prison inmates. The Living Stage’s mandate was to encourage ‘an increase in a participant’s self-esteem, self-determination, and practical skills’ (Haedicke 2003: 72); its corollary was to galvanize ‘social transformation’ (Ibid.). As explained by Susan Haedicke: ‘By demystifying the production of art (culture), Living Stage helps participants to recognize the constructed nature […] of social, political, and economic structures […]. This knowledge, in turn, encourages participants to resist these structures’ (Ibid.: 73).

Other modern justifications for eliminating the separation between the performers and the spectators are more artistic and aesthetic in nature. Antonin Artaud, who wished to draw the theatrical event closer to the realm of ritual, lamented the ‘great gulf’ which ‘separated the world of the actor from that of the audience, sitting passively in the dark, accidentally observed’ (Tidworth 1973: 205-06). Similarly, Peter Brook has emphasised the importance of actors and spectators sharing a space, grandly describing it as a ‘fluctuating territory of manifestation and existence’ (1971: 17). Other theatre theorists, especially those associated with avant-garde performance styles, rebelled in the name of art against the strict regulation of the performer-audience relationship. One of these
theorists was Richard Schechner, a director and designer who became a key figure in the academic discipline of performance studies. As noted by Kattwinkel, ‘theorists investigating groups such as The Living Theatre, which blossomed in the 1960s and 1970s […] have been led by Richard Schechner. A practitioner and scholar, he reconceptualized audience experience through participation in his company The Performance Group’ (2003: xi). Schechner, who founded his group in New York in 1967 and remained director of it until 1980, suggested an approach which was, in many ways, the negative image of the immersive model. His vision of “Environmental Theatre” emphasises a design in which viewers and actors share the same space, functions and roles.

The principle behind Schechner’s concept of environmental theatre, specifically, the commitment to full utilisation of all available space for the sake of theatrical interaction, is a relatively simple one. In order for all space to be used, the traditional territorial separation between performers and viewers should be removed and the functional service areas should not be separated from the representative performance areas. This should expand the possibilities for acting and viewing by gaining access to additional spaces (Schechner 1973: 2). This principle is expanded to include not only space but also time: spectators of environmental theatre are to be present at all stages of the production, including the rehearsals and the warm-up exercises (Ibid.: 35). The most notable feature of environmental theatre, though, is the fact that, like Boal’s “theatre of the oppressed”, it blurs the line which traditionally divides performers and spectators. In a space that is used fully for the sake of theatrical performance, where every platform, podium or seat may be used by both actors and spectators, a degree of mixing and swapping of roles is unavoidable. Actors get to watch the happenings, and thus become more like spectators.
Spectators become more like actors as they find themselves in the midst of theatrical action, being watched by the audience, interacting with the performers and moving through the performance space. The minimisation of distance between the traditional positions in theatrical space leads to blending and amalgamation, and consequently, the mechanism behind such performances becomes not only visible, but shareable.

The reception of a shared theatrical experience, in which the spectators become actors themselves, is very different from the reception of an immersive theatrical experience. The freedom of movement which is bestowed upon the spectators means that they can change their position in relation to other spectators and performers. It also means that ‘the spectator can choose his own mode of involving himself within the performance, or remaining detached from it’ (Schechner 1973: 6). This renewed range of possibilities which becomes available to the members of the audience alters their traditional role.

The initial reaction may be one of confusion and even detachment. As Schechner explains: ‘This less sharply delineated division of roles, actions and spaces leads not to deeper involvement [among the audience], not to a feeling of being swept away by the action’, but rather to ‘a kind of in-and-out experience; a sometimes dizzyingly rapid alternation of empathy and distance’ (Ibid.: 18). The tension which is involved in such situations, where actors and audience share spaces and roles, is not necessarily a bad thing: it may hold certain value which goes beyond the mere making of a meta-theatrical or avant-garde thematic exclamation point. When spectators become active during a performance, using their physical and mental resources in order to affect their environment, the way they perceive the world around them changes. Simon Tidworth, for example, believed that ‘a […] slightly uncomfortable audience is more responsive than a
pampered one’ (1973: 211). Making the spectators uncomfortable, however, may not be the best way to empower them. Community theatre groups focus on providing an environment which would be as comfortable and inviting as possible, in order to minimise shyness and performance anxiety and encourage personal expression and theatrical creativity. This can be achieved in many ways. As noted by Haedicke, external observers were not allowed into the performances of the Living Stage, in order that spectators not be distressed (see 2003: 76-78). The physical environment of the theatre was adapted in order to smooth the transition between performers and audience:

[In the Living Stage] no separation between stage and auditorium exists; the entire room is a performance space, and no chairs for observers are available. [...] The building also has a large kitchen [...] where actors and audiences can share a meal or talk, thus developing a personal connection that undermines the hierarchical divisions between artist and spectator (Ibid.: 77).

Whether shaking up and confusing or supporting and empowering, the bond that experiences of audience participation can establish between the viewers and the performers is a remarkable one. As Schechner noted, in the environmental theatre ‘performers are seen not as the magic people of the story but as the people who play the story’ (1973: 36); the sharing of spaces and roles replaces the theatrical illusion with concrete relationships between spectators and actors and between spectators and fellow spectators. All of these elements within the reception of a shared theatrical event – the enhanced sensitivity, the lasting impact and the sense of community – bring to mind the concept of theatrical ritual or ceremony that theoreticians like Jerzi Grotowski sought (see Kumiega 1985: 130 and Lendra 1995: 137-40; also see Chapter 4).

The concept of audience participation cannot be fully applied to translation without
modifications. Some basic elements of acting, which enable the audience to take part, do not exist in situations of linguistic translation. Firstly, viewers of acting performances have more potential motivation to join the performers in their task than readers of translations. Unlike the act of theatrical performance, which can be perceived as an exciting manifestation of self-expression and social action, the act of translation is often perceived as a mundane, technical, lonely and unexciting, if not menial, chore, rather like proofreading. Readers may feel the urge to interfere in translation because they find the product lacking, erroneous or otherwise disturbing, but seldom because they find the possibility intriguing or tempting. Secondly, the initial skill requirements for a spectator who wishes to participate in a performance are less strict than those required by a reader who wishes to become a participant of a translation. Anyone can join a performance merely by getting up and stepping into the performing area, but in order to participate in a translation one requires several types of linguistic knowledge and skill. Thirdly, and most obviously, common situations of translation lack an immediate contact between the addressers and their addressees. Readers cannot reach translators and affect the process or the product of their work, because they are exposed to the text only after this process has ended. Neither can they interact with other readers while reading because they consume the translated text in their own time and place. One might imagine that an invitation for the reader to take part in translation could take the form of a game where the reader is directly asked to take part in translational activities (see Adamenko 2003: 18-22 for a discussion of guided, warm-up theatre games to goad passive audience members into active participation). However, this type of activity is commonly associated with language learning textbooks where various linguistic exercises hone the linguistic skills of students, rather than with literary translations.
There are, nevertheless, some real-world translational situations which bring to mind the theatrical idea of shared spaces and diffused roles. In such situations, readers are not only reminded of the fact that the text they are facing is a translation, separate from its origin; they are encouraged to step into the shoes of the translators and share their actions and experiences. This can happen in a variety of ways and on various levels of magnitude.

First, some translated texts include a detailed commentary which describes the translation process: the dilemmas and problems which were faced by the translators and editors who worked on the text, the decisions which were taken in order to solve them, the steps and the actions which were taken through the course of the work in order to apply the aforementioned decisions, and so on. This kind of commentary can appear in various forms: as a preface, as endnotes, or as a different text altogether. The practice of “thick translation”, which was described by Appiah as a ‘translation that seeks with its annotations and its accompanying glosses to locate the text in a rich cultural and linguistic context’ (1993: 817), is an example of an approach which may decrease the distance between the readers and the translators through the use of supplementary texts. Such texts, especially when phrased in a personal manner, have the potential to stir the interest of the reader to the point of identification, but they still do not offer the readers an actual opportunity to embark on translation by themselves.

Second, some translated texts force their readers to act as translators, although not always intentionally. This is the case with partially-translated texts, i.e., texts which contain untranslated segments. This situation is usually the result of a conscious decision on the part of translators or agents who are involved in the translation work. In literary texts, it may be due to the wish to make the target text more source-oriented by leaving
certain terms or phrases in their original form; in non-literary texts, it may be due to other reasons. This phenomenon is particularly likely to appear when the source text contains segments in additional languages. These segments are often kept intact in the target text, with or without a translation in footnotes, brackets and so on. In all of these cases, the readers are not expected to decipher the untranslated segments by themselves, but may, nevertheless, be tempted to do so.

Third and lastly, there is a type of text which combines qualities from the first two groups, as it attempts to make the readers share the dilemmas and considerations of the translators as well as to supply them with the actual source text which is needed to attempt actual translation. I am referring here to bilingual texts. This form is quite rare in literary prose. It exists mostly in bilingual editions of translated poetry, where texts are segmented in such a way to enable the reader to comfortably compare the source and the target texts. Beyond the literary form, though, the bilingual text type is actually very common. It is incarnated in subtitled films and television shows, where viewers are presented with two parallel linguistic channels, one which contains the source text in a vocal and visual form and another one which contains the target text in a written form. In such bilingual texts, where the segments of source and target are displayed against each other, readers are invited to compare the original text units to the translated ones, ponder the considerations which led their translators from the source to the target, criticise them and suggest alternatives, even if only to amuse themselves on a minor and partial scale.

All in all, as long as the dichotomy between reader and translator (or viewer and actor) prevails, the space-sharing and role-sharing approach will not become mainstream.  

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5 The common case of leaving technical terms, intended for the eyes of experts, untranslated, is less relevant here. This is because for experts, such terms are actually a familiar language and do not require any translational effort.
in translation nor in performance. It is nevertheless still worthwhile to recognise the 
polarity between the theatrical concepts of immersing the audience in a fictional world 
on the one hand, and making it move and act in a real one on the other, and to note its 
relevance for translation.

5.4.2.3. An example for a translation inspired by audience participation

In my attempt to demonstrate the effect of a translation which invites the reader to 
take part in the translation work, I have used the tactic of partial translation. This means 
that some words are left in the original Hebrew. In order to minimise the obstruction to 
the flow of reading, I chose words and phrases which were not vital to the understanding 
of the passage. Likewise, in order to tempt the readers into translational activity, I made 
sure that the meaning of these words could be deciphered, at least partially, through their 
context. The natural speech parts that satisfy these conditions are nouns. Finally, in order 
to avoid immediate rejection but still give the readers a fair chance in looking up the 
denotations of the foreign words, I presented the untranslated words using English 
transcription, followed by the original Hebrew script in parentheses. My choices attempt 
to create an empowering environment where readers are encouraged to act as translators, 
even if only momentarily.

(Hovav 1996: 34-35, my translation) 
[See Appendix, section F]

My father came for me two weeks later. My mother did not join him, claiming that 
her lev (לֵב) would not make it through another cross country trip with him. ‘Come 
on, Drora, why are you making such a fuss?’ said my father, ‘it’s only forty minutes 
from Yerushalayim (ירושלים) to Wingate.’
‘That’s my whole point,’ she told him. But the truth was that my mother was simply afraid of the cobra.

I kept silent all the way home. On the one hand I was happy, because I finally succeeded, due to remarkable detective work, in figuring out the secret of Reuma’s merak ha’of (קרק העולם). I hid the recipe deep inside the suitcase, next to that shed skin of a nakhash (נחש) that I found near the house. On the other hand, I did not do a single exercise. Reuma did not help me in that department. She said I should solve the problems myself, and that this is the entire point because it is the only way to learn, although to this day I suspect that with due respect to Brenner, cotangents are not her strongest point.

My mother waited for me on the stairs with dma’ot (דעם) in her eyes. ‘I missed you,’ she told me, and gave her little non-mathematician child, who returned from his travels in the land of tarantulas, a big, big hug.

‘Mom, I couldn’t solve any of the problems,’ I told her. ‘What is going to happen now?’

‘Everything will beseder (בעד),’ she said, and stroked me with such a tender and beautiful hand, more beautiful than any other mother’s.

‘But mom,’ I told her, ‘what will I say to the math mor’eh (מורה) at the beginning of the year?’

‘You know, Gili,’ said my mother, ‘I also didn’t get along too well with sines and cosines. And one day, when I was in the ninth grade, my math teacher yelled at me in front of the entire kitah (כיתה), and I spoke back and told him that I couldn’t figure out why I should be racking my brains over this nonsense. “The point, young geveret (גברת), is to make sure that when you make it to high society and sit in a fancy saloon, and someone who actually learned something mentions cosines, you will not be thinking that he speaks of cows that have wings.” This was what he told me, my math teacher, and you know what, Gili? He was right.’

I looked at her with great disappointment. It was not like my mother. It was not like her, she who always told me that my teachers should thank elohim ( אלהים) for the privilege of teaching me, to be suddenly taking sides with the teacher. But then her eye sparkled with an amused malice, the same one that I so sorely miss, the same one that I regrettably lack myself, and my mother took my face in her hands, kissed
my metzakh (מדך) and said: ‘And now listen carefully to your mother. On the first day of school, in the first class with that annoying teacher, you approach him and tell him that your mother already told you that cosines are not parot (פרות) that have wings, and that now he may leave you alone.’
6. Conclusion

6.1. Covered and uncovered aspects

Throughout this work, translation has been compared to acting in several ways. All of the comparisons were focused on the various ways in which theatre and translation are brought into being, and, to a lesser extent, on the various functions and goals which they serve. Chapter 2 looked at histrionic approaches to mimetic representation: it suggested that translators may follow actors by focusing on representing the fictional voices within a source text instead of the actual voice of its author, and compared two opposing performative approaches to the embodiment of a fictional character in the context of translation. It also discussed the question whether mimetic representation, on the stage and on the page, can be said to be creative. Chapter 3 discussed the question of spreading social and political justice through representation. It examined core similarities and dissimilarities between the ideas of two central thinkers from the two disciplines in order to better understand the principles which underlie the modes of practice they recommend. Chapter 4 discussed the question of spiritual advancement through representation using similar methods. It considered the manifestations of “orphic” and “hermetic” modes of “pure” representation in the work of two prominent thinkers from the two realms. Chapter 5 made perhaps the boldest leap of faith by comparing translation norms to performing space. It suggested that the approach of the theatre, which views space as raw material to be shaped, may benefit translators who view norms as given laws of nature, and that some spatial models which organise the communication between performers and spectators may fit, or else inspire, models of communication between translators and their readers. The combination of all these chapters is still, in my opinion, far from
exhausting the full potential of the performance metaphor for translation.

One potential expansion for the metaphor of translation as performance is the case of process temporalities, which opens a door to questions which belong to the emerging field of interpreting studies. Interpreting can be regarded ‘as translational activity, as a special form of “Translation”’ (Pöchhacker 2004: 9), but it is quite different from written translation, to the point that its research became an area ‘whose volume and degree of specialization demand separate coverage’ (Venuti 2006a: 2). Interpreting was defined by Otto Kade as a form of translation where ‘the source-language text is presented only once and thus cannot be reviewed or replayed, and the target-language text is produced under time pressure, with little time for correction and revision’ (cited and translated in Pöchhacker 2004: 10). This means that theatrical acting of plays can be viewed as a mode of representation which stands in between translation and interpreting: the source material of acting, the play, is available for review and rehearsal, but its target material, the performance, is produced under time pressure and cannot be revised. Various temporal modes of interpreting, such as consecutive and simultaneous (see Pöchhacker 2004: 18), as well as some aspects of the written translation process (see Lörshcer 1993, also Robinson 2003a), can be linked to theories of acting which emphasise ideals of theatrical spontaneity and “flow” of performance.

Another potential expansion for the metaphor of translation as performance lies in the functional similarities between a translator’s language and a performer’s physical body. Linguistic skills, like the features and abilities of the body, include congenital and acquired elements. Similarly, their manifestations are partly conscious, partly subconscious. This metaphor may be developed further. One may link hereditary and acquired bodily features of a person, such as stature and flexibility, to Ferdinand De
Saussure’s ‘langue’ (or at least its manifestation in the abilities of an individual), a system of linguistic codes which is “inherited” from society. Bodily actions, such as gesticulation and movement in space, can be linked to De Saussure’s “parole”, the individual utterances that are formed by language users (see De Saussure 1966: 14-15). When such metaphorical links are applied to the cases of performance and translation, they offer new perspective over issues of linguistic representation. Specific views of the performing body, its social formation, its roles and its abilities may become relevant to translation.

These suggestions for further study are no more than examples. I believe that the interdisciplinary link between performance and translation is rich enough to enable insightful discussion in many other subjects: it is relevant to issues of culture and gender, community and globalisation, identity and oppression, politics and activism, and much more.

6.2. Potential contribution

My discussion of translation in terms of a different discipline is aimed at benefiting the practice of translation, whether by suggesting prescriptive modes of work or by offering descriptive insights. The tool of metaphor was used in order to harness the diversity and the liveliness of performance studies for the good of translation. As noted by Piotr Kuhiwczack, ‘translation studies is […] informed by a Babel of theories’ (2010: 4). I believe that the comparisons and discussions throughout this work have shown that insights which are taken from theories of theatre and performance are relevant to translators and translation scholars. The initial similarities between the disciplines can be used as a point of departure for discussions which have the potential to enrich translation
studies: they can suggest new strategies as well as new perspectives for practitioners. The openness and receptiveness to such interdisciplinary enrichments, as Kuhiwczack writes, is indeed one of the strong points of Translation Studies:

The transfer ("translatio") of theories from different disciplines into the arena of translation has hastened the development of the field of translation studies. It has also made it far richer than many [...] other new disciplines that in defining their boundaries as disciplines have adopted a much more circumscribed body of theories (2010: 4).

Nevertheless, I chose to promote the metaphor of theatrical performance not only because of its general potential for enrichment for translation. Many other metaphors are rich and full of potential. I chose this particular one because I believe that viewing translation as an art form is positive and constructive. Considering the current decrease in global linguistic diversity and the increase in the efficiency of machine translation, human translation may eventually become marginalised as a profession. However, learning from the past and the present of theatrical performance, it may still thrive as a form of art. Moreover, looking at translation as a tool of oppression, rebellion and conflict, using metaphors such as "slavery" and "cannibalism", emphasises its capacity as a cultural weapon used in various social and political wars. Naïve as it may sound, I believe that looking at translation as a performing art is less likely to encourage such uses. Performance is a peaceful kind of expression, if only because it requires a certain degree of willing cooperation from its audience. Lakoff et al. recognised the potential power of metaphors from the realm of performance over our reality when he discussed common metaphors for disputes and arguments:

The ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor [...] structures the actions we perform in arguing. [...] imagine a culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are seen as
performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way (1980: 4-5).

Besides suggesting specific links between theatre and translation, this work suggests a general methodology which should be applicable to other interdisciplinary metaphors. The three basic methods I used were interdisciplinary projection, where the issues and solutions that typically characterise discipline A are discussed in the context of discipline B; interdisciplinary pairing, where the ideas of a central thinker from discipline A are compared to the ideas of a central thinker from discipline B; and interdisciplinary elaboration, where the initial metaphorical link between discipline A and discipline B is developed further to form new sub-links. All of these methods are demonstrated here against the case of textual transfer as theatrical performance, but they are relevant for other metaphorical links as well. Not all interdisciplinary metaphors would be equally inspiring or fertile, but many still form a ground which can be explored. The methodology used here is relevant not only for metaphors for translation, such as, say, “translation as architecture” or “translation as legal representation”, but also to interdisciplinary metaphors which do not involve it, such as, say, “poetry as sculpting”, or “cultural criticism as mental treatment”. It is my hope, then, that the case of translation and performance can contribute to all who wish to employ metaphors and analogies as a central tool of interdisciplinary thinking.
Appendix: Exemplary source text

[A] This page is a continuation of the text from the main body. It contains a narrative in Hebrew, detailing a personal experience involving the author's family and their time spent at a military hospital. The text describes events, conversations, and the emotions felt during this time. The narrative is rich in detail, capturing the essence of the author's perspective on the events that unfolded.
דופי חוסר גודל, כשאמנו שלわり הקובל את ילדיינו למשמרת, היא לא לקחנה את דגלו, הבחרה ימי הספה, ויתרנו על חיות ההרMING, ונתנו שלוחים לכסף, בלי הנפש ובהם שינה של הפרדים, אשר חזרו לעולכם את פר🇩אר, ועלו לעד ממון מחוזי הששון, ללא מגע יד אד התifestyles.

גלות בהם הפחד. לעצמו VARL, ואלה מצאנו את עוצמנו דוהרוים בכבר הים, ולהброור כפרו וינגייט, כשאמא שלי מדליק הرفضה השישית מאז מוצא ומתחילה,/she "מאירה אתGY הואSEN-1, מתחילה, בצי ארבעים ושניים בפלס, ואף על פיoge בשני הישירים והנפרדים שלהן.

"אני, מצידי, היית הצלחת את הילק וט ואת ק ופת השרוצים שבתוכו, מציב עותי או הטבחים, פותח את אחד פלוס, בכול הטנגנסים והדיפרנציאלים,老虎 מפרץ את הבווז, בספו עולם סולם, שה navigationController הקים עצמו, והדבר חסר לי, והאإيمון של הפחד לא ירה עותי או הטבחים של המרוציפני. בהודעה שמונים ירוגו, בстоль דרך פרד אובן או קר או חור Wolves, "אם תדעו לפני], אמרו המורוה למתי מותי, "ואני בטוח שתדעו, תעבだろうaira, בער פקודת עולם וה indoors, שומשם המרוציפני. מתג". אני לא נרודמתי. פשוט עוצמתי את העויניים, ניסיתי לדמיין שוב את הטעום הדשן והנפלא של המרוציפני העווף של רואומה, ולהחליט אם הוא מושג כתוצאת נוספת חילב, או NOSF, בדוקת ושק והאימונים שלהן.
“uję, ואת היא, דוד, אני ממלצתי לך את החיים החדשים גדולים יותר. לא יהיה יותר עוני או בושה. שתחוף את אמתה כיпанפה, ול-webpackは何 יופי ולא יינמיש, ויש כולם יושב וירז מקנה.”

“הרבה מהشفייהacketת של ברזים וקרמיקה, עם מבט שmalink ושם, למעון השם, "נבה באה אמא שלי," אני אומר לך,不锈 the childDifficulty. This is מהירה ואתה נוהג, שכה אני אחיה. כשאנחנו מגיעים לוינגייט, tứcו אם אנחנו מגיעים לשם בכול, דברו רואים אני מצלצלת למשטרות. או, הוא התעורר, אתיה תיה ילד טוב אצל רואים, אתיה שומעו אותי? מספיק דויד עוושה לה את המותו. תשב שם עום התerosis ותשאל בנימוס אם מישהו יכול לעזרו לך. ולמעון השם, אל פריעו לרואים כשהיא מבשלת ואל תשכח לรมוז לה שכשאנחנו באים לאיתם, לקח אותך בעווד שבועים, כדאי שהיא תכין את המרוק שלה. ויתزهرו מעוכבים, כן? או, הנה וינגייט. משה,"></td></tr>
<tr><td>תדליק את אוריות הנחית.</td></tr>
<tr><td>תבְּרורו שרואים זכרוה שאנחנו אוהבים את המרוק שלה והכינה דויד מלא לכבודנו. אלא שבאותו בים רואים לא זכתה לטעום ממנה. היא ניגשה לוודא שאני פוגע יפה את המזוודה בחדרו שרואים ייעודה לי, וכשהיא פתחה את הדלת, נפל עוליה נחש מהמשק וף. כן, נחש. כנרואה אחד מאלה שסירב להתפנות לשמורות פולג כשהקיוו את וינגייט. אין ספק שאמא שלי היתה מעודיפה ברוב שייפול עוליה טיגרויס.

“משההההה!" שאגה אמא שלי בעוצמה כזו שגרומה לכל הנחשים המפאין ים משמורות פולג לפקז לים, "משה! יש כאן טרונטולות!!" נטו שמדוברו היה בנחש, אם טרונטולות היה שם הקוד שהעוניך האמא שלי לכל הזוחלים והחרודות שבعالم, וחוץ מזה, מי שדורש מאשה עול סף התיק פת ניק וטין, במצב רוח של מכונת ק טיף וה�� נחש היד, להביא בעת זוחלים לפרווק ירוגליים לא יודעו מה הוא עוושה.

הנחש כמובן התעולף עול המק ום ואחרי כך ברוח, דוד אמא שלי כברו הודיעוה ש”משה, אנחנו לא יכולים להשאירו את הילד בבירת הזה, הוא ייגמר כאן. זה יותרו גרועו מק יבוץ, אתיה שומעו אותי?" אמא שלי כברו התכוון לארוז אותי מחדש אלא אז אמא שלי זיכרה בכול הקנאותים היו לי במזוודה, עושתם מהרו חושבים ואזהסה, "אלא אם כן אתיה ודויד תتفسז אותיו ואזהזו מיד. את הנחש, אני מתכוונת.”

וכך, באורוב תמוז חשוך ולח, חוסמים בפנס וצנצנת יצאו קרויין חדשות אחד, דוק טורו לספורוט אחד ודוד רועוב אחד לצוד נחש בחולות. את אמא了我的 ורואום השארון בתוך הבית, כשאמא שלי מצטנפת עול הכיסא הכי גבוה בבירת, אוספת את רגליה אל חיקיה, אוחזת בידה מטאטא דרווך ונצורו, ופקז עול רואים להביא לה ויסיק, להביא להאסיאלגון, להביא לה כוס מים, ולהביא לה את הטלפון. מיותרו важно שהן היו עוצבות מאוד, כל אחת מסיבותיה של רואים לא פחדה מנחשים בכול, דוד לדויד היו תכוניות אחרות.

"תפסנו אותיו, תפסנו אותיו!" הוא צחצח, מנופף ביד אחת את הצנצנת הרויקו ואזן לנו בשנייה שאני שיכחיש, יחטוף מכות. "רואים! משה תפס את הנחש. תגידי לדרוורוה שהיא לא יודעת מה מזל היה לה. זאת ק ובורה עונק ית! עונק ית! הנה, אנחנו מביאים לכן את הצנצנת לרואות.”

郤עוריהם говорו, "הם( יחכו לך כאן, כולם(. אף( אחד לא יב(רוח. לא המרוק , לא האמא שלך, לא הק וסינוסי ואלא רואומה."

"וגם( לא הנחש," ציין דויד ב(סיפוק .

ב(שב(ועויים( מאוחרו יות(רו הגיעו אב(א שלי לק חת( אות(י. אמא שלי לא הצטרפת אליו, ב(טעונה שהלשה לא יעומד ב(עווד נסיעוה ב(ין־עוירוונית( משות(פת(. "ב(חייך, דרוורוה, מה העוניין?" אמרו אב(א שלי, "מירוושלים( לוינגייט זה ב(سكو כל ארוב(עוים( דק ות(.

"זה ב(דיוק  העוניין," היא אמרוה לו. אב(ל האמת( היא שאמא שלי פשוט פחדה מהק וב(רוה. החוד הב(ית(ה שת(ק ת(י. מצד אחד היית(י מאושרו, כי ב(עוב(ודת( איסוף( מודיעון( רואויה לשב(ח

Failure in Methodology, Even If a New Year’s Celebration Can Be in His Hand, and Even If a New Year’s Celebration Can Be in His Hand, חיכות עומר,ômואים וק וסינוסים( , את( המת(כון הטמנת(י ב(מעומק י המזוודה, יחד

עם( נשל נחש שמצאת(י ליד הב(ית(. מצד שני, לא פת(רות(י אפילו ת(רוגיל אחד. רואומה לא עוזרוה לי

(ת(חום( הזה. היא אמרוה שאני צרויך לפת(ורו את( הת(רוגילים( ב(עוצמי, ושזה כל הרועויון כי רוק  ככה

לומדים(, אם( כי עוד היום( אני חושד ב(ה שב(רונרו או לא ב(רונרו – ב(ק וטנגנסים( היא די חלשה.

אמא שלי חיכת(ה לי עול המדרוגות( עום( דמעוות( ב(עויניה. "הת(געוגעות(י אליך," היא אמרוה לי וחיב(ק ה

חזק  חזק  את( הילד הק טן והלא־מת(מטיק איolah שחזרו מהמסעו לארוץ הטרונטולות(. "אמא, לא הצלחת(י לפת(ורו אף( ת(רוגיל," אמרות(י לה. "מה יהיה?"

יהיה ב(סדרו," היא אמרוה, וליטפה אות(י ב(יד כל כך רוכה וכל כך יפה, הכי יפה משל כל האמהות(ב(עוולם.

"אב(ל אמא," אמרות(י לה, "מה אני אגיד למורוה למת(מטיק ה ב(יום( הרואשון של השנה?"

"את(ה יודעו גילי," אמרוה אמא שלי, "גם( אני לא הסת(דרות(י מי יודעו מה עום( סינוסים( וק וסינוסים(.

ויום( אחד, כשהיית(י ב(כית(ה ט', המורוה למת(מטיק ה צעוק  עולי לפני כל הכית(ה, ואני עונית(י לו

שאני לא מב(ינה למה אני צרויכה לשב(ורו את( הרואש עול השטויות( האלה. 'הרועויון הוא, גב(רות(צעוירוה, לוודא שכשת(גיעוי לחב(רוה הגב(והה ת(שב(י ב(איזה סלון מפוארו, ומישהו صلى ידב(רו שם(.

עול ק וסינוסים(, את( לא ת(חשב(י שאלה פרוות( מעוועפות( ב(אווירו.' כך הוא אמרו לי, המורוה שלי

למת(מטיק ה ואאת(ה יודעו מה, גילי? הוא צדק ."

הב(טת(י ב(ה ב(אכזב(ה עוצםיה. זה לא הת(אים( לאמא שלי. לא הת(אים( לאמא שת(מיד אמרוה לי

שהמורוים( צרויכים( להודות( לאלוהים( עול זה הם( זכו למד אות(י, להיות( פת(אום( לצדו של המורוה

למת(מטיק ה. אלא אז ניצת( שוב( הזדון המשועשעו ב(עויניה, זה שאני כל כך מת(געוגעו אליו, זה

שלצעורוי לא ירושת(י אפילו רוב(עו ממנו, ואמא שלי חפנה את( פני ב(ידיה, נישק ה אות(י עול המצח

ואמרוה: "ועוכשיו ת(ק שיב( טוב( לאמא שלך. ב(יום( הרואשון ללימודים(, ב(שיעוורו הרואשון עום( המורוה

המעוצב(ן הזה, את(ה ת(יגש אליו ות(גיד לו שהאמא שלך כב(רו סיפרוה לך שק וסינוסים( זה לא פרוות(

מעוועפות( ב(אווירו, ושיעוזוב( אות(ך ב(מנוחה."
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