Dutta, Bhaskar, Jackson, M. O. and Le Breton, Michel (2005) The Banks Set and the Undercovered Set in budget allocation problems. In: Austen-Smith, David and Duggan, John, (eds.) Social choice and strategic decisions : essays in honor of Jeffrey S. Banks. Studies in choice and welfare . Berlin ; London: Springer. ISBN 3540220534

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Abstract

This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilisitc voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing.

Item Type:	Book Item
Subjects:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Series Name:	Studies in choice and welfare
Publisher:	Springer
Place of Publication:	Berlin ; London
ISBN:	3540220534
Book Title:	Social choice and strategic decisions : essays in honor of Jeffrey S. Banks
Editor:	Austen-Smith, David and Duggan, John
Official Date:	2005
Dates:	Date Event 2005 Published
Number of Pages:	319
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published

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