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Corporate visibility and executive pay
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Rayton, Bruce A., Brammer, Stephen and Cheng, Suwina (2012) Corporate visibility and executive pay. Economics Letters, Volume 117 (Number 1). pp. 337-339. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044
Abstract
This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Strategy & International Business Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School |
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| Journal or Publication Title: | Economics Letters | ||||
| Publisher: | Elsevier | ||||
| ISSN: | 0165-1765 | ||||
| Official Date: | 2012 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | Volume 117 | ||||
| Number: | Number 1 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 337-339 | ||||
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044 | ||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published |
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