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The contingent value of corporate political ties
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Sun, P., Mellahi, Kamel and Wright, M. (2012) The contingent value of corporate political ties. Academy of Management Perspectives, Volume 26 (Number 3). pp. 68-82. doi:10.5465/amp.2011.0164 ISSN 1558-9080.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amp.2011.0164
Abstract
Developing and nurturing links with political actors and institutions constitutes an important component of a firm's overall nonmarket strategy. This paper focuses on corporate political ties, which are boundary-spanning personal and institutional linkages between firms and the constituent parts of public authorities. To help address the inconsistency of past research findings on the value of corporate political ties, we offer a contingency perspective by developing an integrative framework incorporating market environment, nonmarket environment, and interorganizational and intraorganizational factors that condition the value of corporate political ties, and identify potential operating mechanisms that may erode their value for a focal firm. We conclude by developing suggestions for a future research agenda.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Marketing & Strategic Management Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School |
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Journal or Publication Title: | Academy of Management Perspectives | ||||
Publisher: | Academy of Management | ||||
ISSN: | 1558-9080 | ||||
Official Date: | 2012 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Volume 26 | ||||
Number: | Number 3 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 68-82 | ||||
DOI: | 10.5465/amp.2011.0164 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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