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A pragmatic theory of truth and ontology

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Granger, Stewart Edward (1983) A pragmatic theory of truth and ontology. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

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Abstract

At the heart of my pragmatic theory of truth and ontology is a
view of the relation between language and reality which I term internal
justification: a way of explaining how sentences may have truth-values
which we cannot discover without invoking the need for the mystery of
a correspondence relation. The epistemology upon which the theory depend~
is fallibilist and holistic (chapter 2); places heavy reliance on
modal idioms (chapter 4); and leads to the conclusion that current
versions of realism and anti-realism are deficient (chapter 5). Just
as my theory avoids the need for an epistemic 'given', it avoids the
need for a metaphysical 'given' or 'joints'. I offer a view of the
nature of philosophy and what it can properly achieve with respect to
ontological questions (chapter 3); since those views lead me to believe
that philosophical discussion about what exists should be restricted to
'entities' discussed in non-philosophical contexts, my views on how
we should understand claims made about the existence of middle-sized
physical objects (chapters 2 and 6), theoretical entities in science
(chapter 6), and abstract entities in mathematics (chapter 7), give
the thesis a schematic completeness. My theory leads me to a conception
of inquiry which defends the cognitive status of moral statements whilst
being critical of Kantian and utilitarian approaches to morality
(chapter 8). Chapter 1 explores the views of my closest philosophical
allies: William James and Nelson Goodman.

Item Type: Thesis (PhD)
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Truth, Philosophy, Ontology
Official Date: November 1983
Dates:
DateEvent
November 1983Submitted
Institution: University of Warwick
Theses Department: Department of Philosophy
Thesis Type: PhD
Publication Status: Unpublished
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: Haack, Susan
Extent: 290 leaves
Language: eng

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