CHARACTERIZATIONS OF OTHERNESS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY MORAL PLAYS AND THEIR MORALITY ANTECEDENTS

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Summary

Beginning with an analysis of the nature of the Morality play and its near relative, the moral play, this thesis finds both forms to be founded on an adversarial view of the world (Chapter One). The nature of the adversary is variable, and that variation is, in turn, revealing about the plays' philosophical position.

The theories of Jacques Lacan suggest a reading of Mundus & Infans, The Castle of Perseverance, and Youth as descriptions of selfhood via language-acquisition (Chapter Two). Psychoanalytic theory also suggests that otherness may involve both the rule-making Other of authority and a transgressive 'other', broadly analogous to repressed desire. The moral plays discuss the latter version of otherness through their construction of an increasingly elaborated 'vice figure'. A reading of Mankind demonstrates the interpretative power of this approach (Chapter Three).

In the 1560's and 70's, vice behaviour becomes more complex, and so more ambiguous. Deconstructive theories suggest that this change can usefully be read as equivalent to the tendency of linguistic terms towards meaninglessness. The Tyde Tarryeth No Man is an example. Otherness comes to be located in certain 'abjected' social groups. In addition, vice play radically alters the original structure of the moral play, tending to replace narrative with showmanship. Enough is as Good as a Feast and Like Will to Like demonstrate this point. All For Money, however, uses dramatic structures symbolically, restoring meaning to vice play (Chapter Four).

Feminist theory leads me to consider the place of woman as other in the moral plays. In The Play of the Wether, the endightement of mother messe and Lingua the 'female vice' figure is developed (Chapter Five). The social implications of that figure are considered through analyses of The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune and Lingua (Chapter Six). Finally, the figure of the 'good woman' is found to undergo increasing criticism, as the plays come to encode virtue as undesirable, and perhaps impossible (Chapter Seven).

A Conclusion summarizes the main arguments of the thesis.
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Conventions

I have followed the MHRA Style Book (third edition), for footnotes and references, with the following minor variations. When a text has been available to me as a reprint, a translation, or an edition other than the first, I have included the date and language of the first edition in the citation. With regard to early works, the edition cited in the bibliography is that to which line references are made in the text, in quotations and in footnotes. Where more than one edition is listed, an asterisk indicates the edition referred to. Where there is an early edition of the play, the date of that edition is given in brackets immediately after the title of the play. Where scholarship has suggested a date of composition earlier than that of the first printed edition, that date appears in italics within the same brackets. An italicized date with a question mark indicates a disputed or doubtful dating.

Abbreviations

EEDS  Early English Drama Society
EETS  Early English Text Society
ES    Extra Series
Manly Specimens of the Pre-Shakespearean Drama, ed. J.M. Manly, 2 vols (Boston and London, 1904)

Materialen Materialen zur Kunde des älteren Englischen Dramas

MED Middle English Dictionary, ed. Hans Kurath (1930-59); Sherman M. Kuhn (1963-83); Robert E. Lewis (1984-91), (Ann Arbor, Michigan)

MS manuscript

NS New Series

PMLA Proceedings of the Modern Language Association

OED Oxford English Dictionary

OS Original Series

PMLA Proceedings of the Modern Language Association

The Riverside Shakespeare


Schell and Schuchter


Tilley M.P. Tilley, A Dictionary of the Proverbs in English in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1950)

PREFACE

The human condition is characterised at once by the necessity to choose and by the impossibility of choice. Such is the thesis that the moral plays dramatize in the simplest form and for the widest audience. They purport to offer examples of virtuous choices, but in doing so supply a discussion of the nature of evil, and the nature of the threat that physicality carries for the spiritual well-being of humanity.

The human task, they insist, is to discover and follow godliness, while recognizing and rejecting evil. When evil is characterised as the physical, a perfect rejection of temptation is scarcely to be achieved by a creature which must eat, sleep, clothe itself and (increasingly) earn money in order to exist. Founded in paradox, functioning through the deceits of stagecraft, and teaching a subtle spiritual competence, the Morality and its derivative forms contain much more than the simple knockabout fun amongst vulgar 'vices' for which they are famous.¹

Recent scholars have focussed on these plays’ theatrical virtues, with considerable success.² Others find their connections with contemporary political events particularly illuminating.³ Their status as source material for Shakespeare and his contemporaries is frequently of interest.

I use modern critical methods, notably psychoanalysis, deconstruction and feminism, to approach the corpus of Moralities and related plays, aiming to demonstrate that their intellectual and psychological content amply explains the continued popularity of the form. It is, however, still unusual to apply post-modern perceptions to these texts, even though these are felt to be appropriate to texts by later Renaissance dramatists, and powerful productions have been based on such interpretations.

Each of the chapters that follows is to some degree self-contained, in that each focusses on a separate group of plays, and a historical progression governs the sequence in which the plays are discussed. There is, however, an over-arching theoretical scheme which connects the separate discussions.
In Chapter One, I consider what it is that constitutes the genre of the moral play. Descriptions of binarism, the nature of stage allegory, and the critical concept of 'otherness' follow. Illustrative examples are taken from *Mankind*.

In Chapter Two, I use Lacanian theory to examine the persuasion of the mankind figure in the earliest moral plays, concentrating on *Mundus & Infans*, with *Youth* and *The Castle of Perseverance* developing the discussion into further areas. Because persuasion involves a movement by two characters from a divided opinion to a shared, single opinion, its processes are of interest both from the point of view of theories about binarism, and also from that of theories about identification. Again, because the whole-life plays in particular display the mechanics of that moment when moral maturity is achieved by the individual, theories of psychological development are especially apt. In a number of plays the internalisation of the law-giving Other, as language, produces the mankind figure as socialized and transcendent. This chapter also considers the implication that maturity is, by its nature, linguistic: a theoretical position held both by the moral plays and by post-modern psychoanalysis.

In Chapter Three I use evidence from the body of moral plays in general to scrutinize how the plays characterize the concept 'enemy' or 'vice figure'. Given that the term is subject to enlargement into a multiplicity of forms, it is necessary to consider its constituent details, and then the significance of those details for the plays' view of 'otherness'. I then demonstrate how the classification thus established can be productive of critical insight, by applying it to *Mankind*.

Following from this, Chapter Four shows how the clearly oppositional relationship between self and other becomes unstable as the plays of the mid-century explore the theatrical possibilities of the vice figure. The principal play used here is
Wapull's *The Tyde Tarrieth No Man*. Ulpian Fulwell's *Like Will To Like*, W. Wager's *Enough is as Good as a Feast* and Thomas Lupton's *All For Money* then revise the picture of the 'other' that earlier plays established. The concept of 'otherness' as expressed by the vice figures tends to slide along the chain of signifiers. In so doing, the vice figure gathers seemingly endless extra details of stage-convention. Chapter Four documents that insatiability, through which the history of the moral play was permanently affected.

Chapter Four also observes the movement from discussion of the individual to discussion of society. Here the creation of 'abjected' classes out of the figures of otherness is located within the theatrical logic of the plays' discourse. This chapter concludes with a resumé of the major theoretical implications of the thesis up to that point.

The approaches developed in Chapters Three and Four are used in Chapter Five to consider the position of those female characters which function as 'other' in certain moral plays. I begin by considering William Punt's *endightment of mother messe*, continue with *The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune* and conclude with *Lingua*. In the course of the investigation, the existence of a 'female vice' character is detected, a convention whose existence has implications for many later plays which fall outside the scope of this thesis.

Chapter Six examines some results of the translation of the moral 'otherness' of the vice figure into the social 'otherness' of women.

In Chapter Seven I consider that female character which is a reversal of the 'female vice': the character of the 'virtuous woman'. Interesting examples of the 'virtuous woman' character are found in the Digby *Mary Magdalene*, Medwall's *Fulgens and Lucre*, Lewis Wager's *Mary Magdalene*, W. Wager's *Virtuous and Godly Susanna* and John Phillip's *Patient Grissel*. These plays chart a transition in
the representation of the 'virtuous woman' which echoes other transitions in the moral play, and hence in its representations of the moral world.

I conclude the thesis with an overview, summarizing the ways in which the moral plays use the concept of otherness.
NOTES TO PREFACE

1 I use lower case 'vice' and 'vice figure' in order to include the subordinate characters who typically abet the main vice figure, and who can share the attributes of the principal Vice among themselves. This convention is especially useful when describing characters who behave like vice figures at some times but not at others, and for plays where vice characteristics are distributed amongst several characters.

Upper case 'Vice' is reserved for those figures described as the Vice in the original text of the play. 'Principal Vice' also refers to a prominent vice figure, and is useful to distinguish such a figure from other members of the vice crew.


4 References to moral plays are always to the edition in the bibliography. Where more than one edition is mentioned, reference is to that marked with an asterisk. In addition, I footnote the full relevant reference at the beginning of each substantial discussion of a play.
CHAPTER ONE
THE MORAL PLAY: BINARISM AND ALLEGORY

"Youe the-crowe-is-white youe, youe the-swanne-is-blacke youe." 1

Proverbial accusations of lying mimic our main problem with the moral play, for everyone knows that a real liar does not exactly call the crow white - such a lie would be inefficiently obvious. Instead, a liar may delude one into believing some shade of grey. But the Moralities offer a world of black-versus-white morals. There, the mankind figure is a virtuous white until he errs, when he becomes wholly sinful (occasionally even literally 'blacked up'). 2 Repentance finally bleaches him again. And we, recognizing their implausibility, categorize the moral plays as naïve, unprofitable, incredible - any term that labels the archaic as defective.

An alternative reaction to the moral play is to probe more deeply into its overtly black-and-white world, trusting that a form that enjoyed durable popularity at all social and intellectual levels must have had something more to offer.

In this chapter, I begin by defining the group of moral plays. The 'black-versus-white' attribute suggests that they involve binary modes of thought. Next I discuss the issue of staged allegory, for this is the dominant mode of presentation of the plays. Finally, the binarist 'black-versus-white' suggests that modern theories of otherness will illuminate the plays' founding principle.

The moral play

No commonly-accepted description exists which defines the plays I wish to consider as a coherent group. It is therefore useful to begin by setting out the characteristics which they share. The period of the 'moral play', extending for my purposes from The Castle of Perseverance (c.1400) to Lingua (1607; written
c.1595-1600), contains numerous examples of the form. While recognizing that many plays are marginal cases, it is clearly necessary to determine as accurately as possible which texts belong to the class of 'moral plays'. I suggest that moral plays have one or more of four broad characteristics in common.

i) Moral plays are overtly concerned with philosophical matters, in particular, Christian morality and problems of ethical behaviour. They see the human being divided between spiritual and material goals, because that person cannot but enter into a relationship with the contaminated material world. From this they put forward discussions of what it means to be human, and of the processes of self-definition. Their discussion focusses particularly on the nature of language and considers the relation between language and truth. With humanity presented as self-constructing through a series of decisions taken in the course of life, it follows that essentially metaphysical discussions of cause and temporality are also implicit in many of the plays.

ii) The plays typically view the world as structured on an adversarial model. Within the idea of the adversarial I include a cluster of several interrelated concepts. A play constructed in the adversarial mode perceives a debate or battle as an appropriate description of the decision-making process. With a few exceptions,³ the opposed forces are most commonly seen by the moral play as 'good' and 'evil'. The two sides are seen as fundamentally opposed to each other by their very natures. They are, therefore, external to each other, and this feature of externality is an important implication of the adversarial mode.

iii) The use of allegory follows inevitably from the theatrical construction of the adversaries as abstract qualities of 'good' and 'evil'.⁴ With the refinements and choices available to the allegorist, allegorical representation readily feeds the plays' interest in both metaphysical and psychological analyses.⁵
The presence of allegory, however, is not a necessary condition for regarding a play as a 'moral play'. Plays may satisfy criteria one and two while containing no overtly allegorical characters. Again, a play could conceivably be allegorical without being a 'moral play'.

iv) Some scholars take the presence of a vice figure as an indicator of the genre of the morality play. The Vice has been the subject of numerous detailed studies. As an allegorical figure of wrongdoing, the Vice embodies the concept of evil as external. The presence of a Vice or vice figure in a play raises the image of an external moral threat to the individual. In so doing, it defines the protagonist as relatively ignorant and in need of moral knowledge. Thus, by the late sixteenth century, the inclusion of such a familiar character is sufficient on its own to re-structure the emphases of a play into the alignments of the moral play, even if only in passing. Further, the highly ramified nature of conventional vice-play means that the concept of the vice figure can be extremely easily alluded to by a detail of behaviour in another character.

Of these four characteristics, only the first two can be regarded as criteria for inclusion in the category: the third and fourth are useful as guidelines to the presence of a 'moral play', but also as indications of areas which need further analysis. Although the two criteria are conceptual, while the two guidelines are formal, these categories are inter-related when the presence of a formal structure reminds us, through long prior association, of one of the conceptual structures. The presence of a Vice, a vice figure, or behavioural allusions to these in a non-allegorical work may regularly be treated as indications that the play could usefully be read as a 'moral play'.

In summary, then, I apply the term 'moral play' to all those plays, whether allegorical or not, which debate the relationship between mankind and the virtuous life, while considering what it is that opposes the realisation of goodness.
Developing a new way of listing the features of the moral play re-focusses attention on the issue of categorization, and on its functions. Although these guidelines are derived from a preliminary analysis of the plays, they also, in turn, determine the kinds of remarks that seem to be appropriate to individual plays, and to the inter-relationships of texts within the moral play corpus. For example, far from being tired homilies on ethical truisms, the plays reveal themselves as a polyvocal debate, in which play addresses and answers play in an intricate set of statements of themes, responses, and variations on themes. Their discussion is conducted by means of allusions and direct quotations of one another, both verbal and visual.

The first criterion makes the suggestion that the plays may profitably be interrogated for their philosophical content. I see the moral plays as theorists, and quite probably influential ones, on various intellectual issues, which are not necessarily their overt subjects.

In exploring the plays' attitudes to 'otherness' I focus on one of their principal concerns: moral and emotional self-definition. I suggest that there is a formulation for the moral plays' field of investigation comparable to that described by Howard. How can a person reconcile a sense of the individual, choice-making self with the need to conform to normative moral dictates? Where is moral meaning to be found, when language is deeply implicated in theological uncertainty, and interpretation, though the responsibility of each individual, is conducted in the face of opposed sets of spiritual advice? It is suggestive of a concern about the self that the sin which permeates the plays is the sin of Pride: that assertion of individuality and of a right to choose.

In building up a picture of the intertextual debate, inclusive rather than exclusive guidelines are helpful. All four features enable many of the Romances and 'hybrid plays' of the mid- and late-sixteenth century, populated either largely or
totally by named characters, to be included in discussions of the moral play. The Digby *Mary Magdalene* (c.1500) and Lewis Wager's *Mary Magdalene* (1566); the Romance plays of *Clyomon and Clamydes* (c.1576) and *The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune* (1589), not to mention Othello, can all be fruitfully read as belonging to this particularized branch of the moral play. When a hybrid or a Romance manifests the adversarial and externalizing mode, its place in the moral play genre is clear. Using more generous structural criteria clarifies the situation of the many late examples in which 'evil' has been re-worked as 'chance' or 'fate' - that is, evil with no motive. By including later plays and tangential forms in the genre, we are able to build up a fuller picture of the ramifications through which the adversarial mode of discussion passed.

All the plays I would wish to include in the moral play genre explicitly assume that good and evil exist. They are concerned to establish exactly what both of these are, and how one may recognize them. The moral play form is thus a way of interpreting the world, but that interpretation is not a single one replicated identically, so much as a set of terms, which, in the variety of their constellations, construct a variety of pictures of the world. Such a structure sees human beings as divided but essentially moral decision-making creatures, located in a milieu whose physical condition constantly insists that choices be made.

**Binarism**

The concept of the 'adversarial' focusses attention on the moral play's inherent formulation of the moral world as a binary structure. Binarism itself opens several fruitful approaches to the plays.

One might regard the corpus of plays as itself a debate, or set of discourses. The plots, the theatrical conventions and the characterizations within the plays constitute in turn the language, the syntax and the vocabulary which carry the meaning. Thus any play which codes moral meaning as 'good' versus 'evil' functions within a binary linguistic theory, attempting to construct signification out
of oppositions. In the course of the play, the meaning of the term 'mankind figure', for example, is in part defined, detail by detail, in opposition to the details ebulliently thrust upon us as the meaning of the term 'vice figure'. As one analyses these terms more deeply, one finds Derridean effects of variation according to context. What seems from a distance like a set of clear and repeated stereotypes becomes in close-up much more fuzzy, much less definable, and much more interesting.

One linguistic manifestation of the adversarial world view is the dialogue, a form peculiarly suited to the philosophical analysis of abstract concepts. Dialogue works on several levels. The moral play contains a verbal debate in which both sides put forward arguments to influence the choice-making mankind figure. In addition to any verbal arguments that characters put forward, there is the 'argument' conducted by the meta-linguistic features of characterisation - the complex behaviour and the suggested motivations of the contending figures. These may even override their primary purpose: to put forward their contribution to the logical and narrative debates which are the plays' ostensible reason for existing. On the stage it is not merely impossible to ignore the human qualities of the presenter of the argument, those qualities become central to the presentation of the issues. Thus, when the plays represent an abstract quality such as 'evil' or 'otherness', the character to whom it is attributed, the behaviour of that person, and the results in plot terms are all relevant to the judgments that the play makes about that quality. This may be in harmony with the official assertions that occur as statements of fact within the play, or fruitfully in contrast to them.

The binarism of dialogue and of debate is focussed towards an eventual unity: that acceptance of truth and abolition of falsehood which ideally takes place with successful persuasion. For all that the vice figures may use worldly temptations, and play upon the mankind figure's physical frailties, it rapidly becomes clear that persuasive argument is always a key element in the dramatic construction. The vice characters' persuasions have the appearance of rational
argument, while functioning through other means, as will be made clearer in the next chapter. The mankind figure is persuaded to sin because the vice figures choose temptations which relate to the hero's immediate physical condition. Behind this instantaneous efficacy of simple temptation lies a popular belief in the semi-magical persuasive power of the Devil's language. The performance of a contradiction between language as morally dangerous and language as a method of seeking spiritual truth is the state of being of the moral play. It is because of this contradiction that the moral plays can be read as discussions of the relation between language and truth.

**Allegory**

Although allegory in poetry is widely discussed, the theory of theatrical allegory has received relatively little attention. Clearly the debate form does not necessitate allegorical representation, although that is already present in the earliest sources of the moral play. However, another strand which feeds the moral play - the view of life as a moral pilgrimage - does require allegory. When the allegorical mode is used to image the world as adversarial, it renders visible the externality implicit in the moral plays' model of reality. A large group of critics sees the use of allegory as the defining feature of the moral play, and although I would not go so far, it is certainly present at the foundation of the genre. On the stage, allegory gains extra complexity. In interpreting the sign offered by an actor playing Pride, for example, we enter into several separate signifying codes, all functioning at once.

Of these, the literary code is the initiator, and has been widely explored. By this I mean the code which conventionally reproduces the concept 'pride' as the name of a human figure in a text to be read rather than acted. Such a being must represent pride with all his attributes, and that representational need takes precedence over other considerations such as likelihood or consistency. This static Pride of poetry, art and civic tableaux is not an agent or a subject so much as an
opportunity for a visually aureate expansion on a term. It is this code of which Marion Jones says that allegorical characters are 'in the strictest sense inhuman'. Within any one allegorical figure numerous implicit attributes are available. In other words it is difficult to keep an allegorical figure pure. If spectators see simply the abstraction 'Pride' they see a thing to be reviled in all circumstances. If, however, this vision is transformed into one of 'a proud person', that must by definition be someone who is capable of salvation, though the symbolic needs of the play cannot allow such a move. By its very nature, then, stage allegory problematizes the moral plays' overt representation of the world as offering each individual a clear-cut choice between good and evil. It plays within a moral structure seen as fixed, in such a way as to de-stabilize it. Theatrical allegory, therefore, is peculiarly constructed to call into question any attempt to fix language and meaning. In this way it enters into the moral plays' debate on the nature of language.

A second, closely related code, develops when this object in human form enters into relationships based on aphorisms. Thus, because 'Pride goeth before a fall', for example, the figure may stumble. As a result of the figure's intensified symbolic qualities, any movement it makes may be read in these terms. In this way new statements may evolve, all the more impressive and convincing to the onlooker for being enacted allegorically. The symbol, then, when interacting with the real world, re-locates within its own structure of significations that aspect of reality which it encounters. However, in such a mixture of the compositional and the interpretive forms of allegory, interpretation is liberated. If, for example, the actor dressed as Pride kneels to the Queen, a significant but enigmatic tableau is created. The kneeling figure is open to numerous interpretations, each of which in turn re-symbolizes the figure of the Queen.

When Pride steps onto a stage as a character, he enters into a narrative framework whose purposes are wider and more varied than those of the aphoristic statement. In the course of the narrative, demands may well be made on Pride as a
character which are no longer coherent with any rational rhetorical expansion on the concept of 'pride'. If, for the sake of the entertainment, Pride must steal a horse or make silly puns, he will do so. If he must leave the stage in a hurry to allow the plot to proceed, or to double another rôle, that, too, will take precedence over the requirements of allegorical coherence.

An actor playing the abstract quality of Pride can only 'become' the ideal Pride up to a point. There is always an individual residue which exceeds the formal needs of the character. Words are to be spoken, and in some accent or other, which relates to a real world. All physical characteristics can be read as significant about Pride, in addition to being casual attributes of the actor. Before an audience, this residue undergoes a re-symbolizing process, tending with time and reiteration to add its features to the original Pride-signifiers, so creating a new, composite convention.

There is a similar code of the real that appears when the working, unregulatable human being is visible behind the rôle. Hints of that person's presence institute an actual, if highly formal, social relationship between audience and actor, which underwrites the theatrical character of Pride on a curious level: a provider of fun, a professional at work, above all a human being, and so someone with whom the audience might identify, and for whom they might reasonably have sympathy.

I contend that, on the stage, attributes which are initially incidental readily come to be stereotypically associated with the character. Accidents of casting or of humour, especially if repeated, regularly become appropriated to the abstraction. In this way, representation of the allegorical character is progressively elaborated, permitting increasing realism of characterisation. More dangerously, with the repetition on stage of these realistic qualities, it becomes very easy to attribute the moral defect, pride, to persons in real life who have the same, initially casual, attributes.

Within the code of theatrical behaviour, some kinds of gesture are perceived as more realistic than others, some kinds of motivation or narrative are seen as more
probable. This relates more to our beliefs about life than it does to life as it is lived. More importantly, it relates to our ways of coding our ideas about the world. Even so-called 'realistic' characters are inevitably stereotyped, poeticized, artificial to some degree. In the case of the longer and more elaborate allegorical roles, the 'abstract' quality is inclined to appear as a fall-back position, when the realistic action flags, or else as a kind of running-joke, satirizing behaviour seen as typical of a certain kind of person. The enacted abstraction is imbued with features which, if not strictly human in a naturalistic sense of the word, could at least be 'human' in the formal sense established by theatrical representation. Further, since audiences had (and have) considerable capacities for reading from the particular to the general even in the case of highly individuated, named characters, any attempted distinction between allegorical and literal drama on the basis of interpretation readily collapses into the much less radical distinction between compositional and interpretive allegory.

Though the moral plays' aim may be 'the correction of vice in the audience', their medium is the staged exemplary narrative. Like Robert Potter I see the analysis of the human experience as fundamental to the project of the plays. To this analysis must be added an idea which is a necessary consequence of the allegory form, namely the assumption that any articulated concept is external to the figure of the self, as represented by the mankind figure. One result of allegory, then, is that human experience is divided into the internal and the external in unfamiliar and challenging ways.

There is a contradiction between these two fundamental qualities of the moral play. The adversarial world view is grounded in binarism, but its expression through stage allegory leads towards multiple interpretations. Several modern theories of 'otherness' are helpful in considering this contradiction.
'Otherness'\textsuperscript{24}

We are inclined to refer to the concept of the 'other' as if it was single and recognisable, when in fact it relies on a cluster of theoretical positions, not all of them mutually compatible, from which it derives its intellectual force. While one wishes to treat 'the other' as a concept essential to semiotics within the plays' theories of language, one must not forget that the plays are also both social representations and cultural artefacts. For that reason it is useful to take into account the position of the concept of 'the other' within psychoanalytic and sociological discourses. I intend to analyse moral plays with certain modern theoretical structures in mind as an enabling vocabulary, in order to see what kinds of 'otherness' the plays themselves enlist in their discussions.

'Otherness' and 'the other' are terms in widespread, commonplace critical use, often functioning as apparently non-technical terms, or at least ones whose theoretical background is uniform and widely accepted. Joan Kelly can ask, without further explanation, 'What accounts for woman's situation as 'other', and what perpetuates it historically?'\textsuperscript{25} Exactly what we understand by 'other' here is rather variable, depending on whether we believe it to be an 'other' that is equal but opposite; the 'other' necessary for linguistic definition; the 'low other' of the Freudian unconscious; the Marxist 'other' of Bakhtinian carnival, and so on.

At its simplest, 'otherness' implies a binary structure, as of 0-1, identical with one of the most straightforward explanations of the construction of meaning in language. It is useful to begin here, for this is the structure dictated by two of the founding conceptions of the moral play: the adversarial and the allegorical. It is convenient and appropriate to designate the alternate term in that opposition as 'self'. Peter Stallybrass and Allon White describe an opposition between high and low which has much in common with the self/other distinction so useful in considering the moral play, since the plays also categorize the aspiring self in terms of a rise, and the opposition to this rise as a fall in both social and moral terms.\textsuperscript{26}
Equally, studies connecting the comic elements of the moral play with folk play and carnival call up the importance of Bakhtin's 'low'.

Greenblatt uses the concept of otherness in a way which is relevant to the moral plays. Most of his 'governing conditions common to most instances of self-fashioning' involve otherness: for example, 'Self-fashioning is achieved in relation to something perceived as alien, strange or hostile. This threatening Other - heretic, savage, witch, adultress, traitor, Antichrist - must be discovered or invented in order to be attacked and destroyed.' Where Greenblatt talks about the Renaissance 'self' by focussing on the intellectual orientations of the great, the moral plays offer a popularized version of otherness, providing a conceptual structure adapted to general use but comparable to those which he puts forward.

Clearly, differences in usage abound, several of which are useful in a discussion of the moral plays. Some of those issues can be best introduced through an examination of a section of text. Of course, not every issue is contained in one short passage, but it provides a springboard into further theoretical discussion.

At the beginning of Mankind, a speech by Mercy describes the spiritual condition of the human being. Mercy is interrupted by Mischief, who confronts him on several levels. The seeds of much that relates to 'otherness' and 'the other' in the moral play genre are embedded in Mercy's opening lines, in the fact of Mischief's confrontation, and in the content of their dialogue.

Mercy's opening speech sets up an orthodox spiritual system which contains a relationship between God and man.

Mercy: The very fownder and beginner of owr fyrst creacyon
Amonge ws synfull wrechys he oweth to be magnyfyede,

At first, sin (as disobedience) is an attribute of mankind, and located in a historic past, before the coming of Christ.
that for owr dysobedyenc he hade non indygnacyon
To sende hys own son to be torn and crucyfye.

(1.3-4)

Mediation between God and humanity is conducted by Mercy himself and by the Virgin Mary.

that ye may be partycypable of hys retribucyon.

I haue be ye very mene for yowr restytucyon
Mercy ys my name, that mornyth for yowr offence.

(1.16-18)

ye grett mercy of Gode, that ys of most preemynence,
Be medyacyon of Owr Lady that ys euer habundante
To ye synfull creature that wyll repent hys neclygence.

(1.21-23)

At this point an oppositional term enters Mercy's scheme: 'For yowr gostly enmy wyll make hys avaunte,' (1.27). The traditional term 'enemy', referring to the agents of evil as well as to the devil, is one which the moral play picks up and uses as a structural concept. So far, I have equated externality with otherness. Not every quality which is represented as external to mankind need be seen as other to him. In particular, the virtuous characters occupy a special position, identified with both the mankind figure's and the audience's presumed opinions. That this is the self which is presumed can be seen from the readiness with which the terms 'the enemy' and 'the antagonist' can be used to refer indiscriminately both to the vice figures and to the Devil as originator of their actions. 30 Thus the relationship between mankind, good and evil should not be viewed strictly as that between a self and two forms of otherness, nor should the mankind figure himself be seen as fully congruent with the self suggested by the play as a whole. There is an assumption of fallenness, of loss, of inadequate understanding in the mankind figure before he has achieved a concluding state of moral maturity. The presence of the good characters
is seen as pre-requisite to the mankind figure's acquisition of full selfhood, which he gains by taking on their fundamental qualities. The plays therefore contain a presumed self: the ideal but possible being whose moral position Mankind, (for example) occupies at the beginning and end of the play. The self is also the apparent point of origin of the moral plays' discourse, and its moral position is assumed to be the same as that of their addressee, the audience. The plays display a marvellous confidence that the audience subscribes to their homiletic content. Thus within a three-way system of God, man and devil, a binarism emerges, in which a stress on the forces of good collects them together, and includes the audience, as 'O e souerens at sytt and e brotherm at stonde ryght wppe' (1.29), into an alliance which faces ' e mortall enmye, at vemyrousse serpente' (1.40).

It is often suggested that the vice figure is a potent point of identification for the audience. He provides the fun, and interacts with the audience, often collusively. Such an approach implies a different location of the plays' presumed self from that suggested here. However, for an audience to find the vice figure entertaining is not necessarily to disrupt the virtuous self. Paula Neuss has shown that the vice figures in Mankind cause the audience to identify with 'naughty' behaviour by singing coarse songs and feeling bored with virtue.31 In so doing the members of the audience discover that such behaviour is shameful, and then share in Mankind's conversion. Neuss thus demonstrates the homiletic effect of an attractive vice figure.32 It follows that the play's presumed self is the virtuous self of the happy ending. In the earliest days at least, then, the self contains both the mankind figure and the representatives of virtue. The other to this self is simply the Devil and his assistants or descendants, the vice figures.

The pattern of mankind figure and oppositional tempter suggests a reading of the tempter as an aspect of the mankind figure himself. Mankind himself is most easily led away from pious frugality when he is tired or hungry, or else when he is bored and discouraged. That sequence is repeated with variations through many
plays. Because it is the human condition to be encased in a body, and thus to have material needs, the tempter is in a position to offer what the mankind figure desires, in the sense of supplying his bodily wants.\(^{33}\) In addition, the nature of those wants is frequently seen as connected to the particular age and stage of life that the mankind figure has reached. The familiar linkages between Avarice and old age; Lust and youth; Anger and middle age, and so on, are taken for granted in numerous plays. This model makes available a picture of 'evil' as inherently part of the psyche since the wanting or desiring that each of these deadly sins supplies is internal to the human psyche.\(^{34}\) At first glance this view is very different from the picture of the mankind figure as opposed by an external force full of malice. These two readings of the moral play can be reconciled by presuming complex systems of projection and paranoia. If susceptibility to worldliness is presented as depending more on the nature of the person tempted than on the external temptation, then the play is a macrocosm, displaying the divisions and contradictions within the individual.\(^{35}\) In this way, the allegorical mode demonstrates the Freudian process of projection, by which the effects of unwanted aspects of the self are allocated to external agencies.\(^{36}\)

In many ways the play's human protagonist is clearly representative of the spectators. Nevertheless, they are also more experienced than he is. They know the expected progress of the play; they understand the official descriptions of good and evil; and they are often kept informed, through the vice figures, of the deceits in the plot. The dynamic of the play is thus to reinforce the audience's splitting. While it asks the spectators to look within themselves and reject a certain area of their behaviour this is done by categorizing that desire as 'other'; by projecting it onto the vice figures, the fool or the tempter. As the hero comes to comprehend his narrative, inevitable moral decisions about his own 'self'-development involve a rejection of certain parts of the self. The audience is invited to identify with that 'knowing' aspect of mankind which develops towards the end of the play.
Similarly, as the mankind figure sees the error of his ways, he approaches more closely to the assumed position of the audience, which is constructed as fully aware. That the object of desire should be seen as 'evil', as deserving of punishment and in need of abolition, is coherent with the idea of repression and negative projection. Here, too, certain unacceptable urges are deemed either not to exist, or to exist elsewhere, that is, to be disowned. The price of this belief in the knowing self is that same repression. By scrutinizing the elements out of which the 'enemy' is constructed, we detect those aspects of the individual which are considered unacceptable. In psychoanalytic terms, the repressed, or perhaps more accurately, the unsuccessfully repressed, appears on stage as the enemy of the mankind figure. 37 The move to repudiate the wicked other by banishing the vices is not made on logical grounds, for as we have seen, the assumptions of the moral play form pre-judge the result of the pseudo-debate they offer.

It is possible to take this psychoanalytic view further, and consider how that model, in which the characters of the moral play represent divisions of the individual's psychological structure, can be related to society as a whole. The macrocosm of the social structure is then read psychoanalytically, as containing repressions, desire, and so on. As Greenblatt has indicated, such a reading is always available. 38 The translation of psychoanalysis into the social sphere is particularly appropriate to the plays of the mid-century, when they transform the logic of the established moral play form from discussion of the individual to discussion of society. Here otherness is writ large into social terms. The reasoning behind a psychoanalytic reading of social moralities is not that this pattern is analogous with the individual's repressions, but that it is structurally identical with it. The attribution of otherness to entire social groups fits neatly with the generalizing tone of the moral plays. The dilemma for a social reading is that otherness is a directional concept: it depends on establishing in the first place the viewpoint from which both control and submission are identified. Where the notion
of repression may be easily expounded for the individual, it is less clear how it relates, other than metaphorically, to a society consisting of many conscious individuals. This social theory of otherness, therefore, conflates power and consciousness, a symbolic rather than an actual identity.

Such a move is enabled by structuralist anthropology and taken up by New Historicist literary criticism. When the plays' model of the microcosmic individual soul can be expansively interpreted as a model of contemporary human society, the position of 'self' is occupied by certain empowered social groups, while 'other' involves the abjected groups of that historical period. In this move, individuals or groups representing evil allegorically, come to be treated as actually evil. On a naïve level, such a reading naturalizes the allegory: it de-allegorizes the play, by reading the 'evil' characters metonymically as images of real people. These characters come to be read as examples of the class of people they seem to be drawn from, and so as signs summarizing the moral qualities of that class.

The abjected groups represented in this way thus tend to lose their status as perfectible (and hence as fully human) in the eyes of those who deem themselves to be the perfectible if fallible selves of the plays. Those groups in turn infuse with their definitions the ideological/cultural artefacts which both mould and exemplify dominant opinions.

One witnesses a representation of a structure of empowering/abjection in the moral play, but although such a representation is highly suggestive, it is not reasonable to base conclusions about actual social relationships on this alone. For that reason, the present study is principally to revise our estimation of the plays, and only secondarily to be used as part of a social/historical argument being built elsewhere.

We have seen that the grouping of man/God/Devil can readily be treated as if conflated into good/evil or self/other. However, a contrary application of the self/other opposition can be observed when the plays focus on an opposition
between God and the mankind figure. Mercy raises this possibility when he refers to 'dysobedyenc' in 1.3 of Mankind. From the beginning of that play a system of laws is shown to exist, and the project of many of the plays is to explore the mankind figure's changing relationship with that system. In this case the self is the mankind figure, the struggling individual who exemplifies the condition of all human beings in the world. To this self, the other is a set of moral laws and contingencies which govern his condition by structuring it, and structure it by cutting into its pre-social urges. Such a social other, external to the individual, involves a wholly different category from the abjected sociological other described above. Impinging on the self, as an enforcing external structure, simultaneously linguistic and cultural, it resembles the paternal authority put forward by Lacanian theory, and is commonly described as the Other (capital O). That can be described as the location from which the Other speaks, announcing the structure into which the pre-verbal inchoate individual must accept its insertion, in order to become verbal, and thus a self, in the sense of becoming a speaking subject. This returns us, from another direction, to the idea already mentioned above that in many of the plays the mankind figure is somehow not a complete human being until the end of that learning process which is itself the plot.

Seeing the acceptance of language as a kind of apotheosis of the immature self leads one into a more strictly linguistic view of the plays' self/other schemes. The opening scene of Mankind suggests some of the subversions to which a binary system of interpreting the world is vulnerable. Towards the end of the long opening speech, Mercy moves to consider another kind of opposition: one between virtuous and wrong-doing people in the audience, and their fates at the Last Judgment:

For sekyrly þer xall be a streyt examynacyon,

The corn xall be sauyde, þe chaffe xall be brente.

(1.42–3)
In this opposition, an individual is no longer comfortably on the side of virtue in all circumstances. Moreover, the image that Mercy uses also suggests that there is a wholeness formed by the parts of the opposition. Corn and chaff together are derived from a single plant; good and evil together make up a whole society, and the whole of the options open to man. Here, then, the fact of division is essential to the very existence of the system, while at the same time the division is a hierarchical one: to be 'brente' is the undesirable fate. In any binary opposition one term is inferior.

Mischief's startling interruptive speech is more than the mere nonsense it seems to be. It responds directly to the system Mercy has described in ways which sometimes support, sometimes subvert it. In the first place, the arrival of a second figure appears to support Mercy's binarist view of the world as involving self and enemy, by presenting a visual figure of opposition. Through the vastly different, vigorous verse form, Mischief raises a sense of confrontation with Mercy, and rivals him for control of the stage. Rivalry is exactly what Mercy has predicted, so Mischief's presence and manner support the orthodoxy.41

Mischief, however, also raises fundamental problems posed by any signifying system. The first is that its binarities are arbitrary, and as such are open to re-interpretation. Binarism itself may be accosted in the process. Mischief demonstrates an alternative reading of the grain-harvesting metaphor. He discovers that chaff and corn may both be useful in different ways, and that in 'straw' there is yet a third term needed to complete the picture.

Ande þe sayde þe corn xulde be sauyde and þe chaffe xulde be feryde,
And he prouy whole nay, as yt schewth be þis verse:
'Corn seruit bredibus, chaffe horsibus, straw fyrybusque.'
Thys ys as moche to say, to yowr leude wndyrstondynge,
As þe corn xall serue to brede at þe nexte bakynge.
'Chaff horsybus, et reliqua,'
The chaff to horse xall be goode provente,

(1.55-61)

Again, he transforms the Hellish connotations of burning, set up by Mercy's 'the chaff shall be brent', into the practical need to keep out the cold with warm fires:

When a man ys forcolde þe straw may be brent

(1.62)

Mercy, of course, has claimed, in God, a transcendental source validating the system he has put forward. God will divide all humanity into corn (the virtuous) and chaff (the wicked). Mischief opposes a 'realistic' correlative as a touchstone for meaning. All things are equal since all are useful, and are distinguishable from one another by virtue of the context in which they are used: corn makes bread; chaff is useful as fodder for animals; straw can keep people warm. Even though we know that in these plays ultimately God's metaphoric definitions must win in preference to literalism, Mischief's re-reading is persuasive. As a further confrontation of Mercy's theory of language, Mischief alludes to a variety of alternative sources of language. Mercy's discourse may be a product of folly: 'your wit is little; your head is mickle' (1.47). Alternatively, language may be obscure, risking meaninglessness, as in the non-existent riddle he pretends to ask:

But, ser, I pray þis questyon to claryfye:

Mysse- masche, dryff-draff,

(1.48-9)

Language as naming may come from authority, as Mercy has asserted, but now an alternative source of that authority is mentioned: the female line. Mischief knows that: 'my dame said my name was Raff' (1.50). This formation with 'said' also raises the possibility of lying, and hence of language generally as deceitful. Finally, it seems that speech can be bought, if one accepts Wickham's reading of the stage business associated with 'Unshut your lock and take an halfpenny'.

The last issue highlighted by Mischief is the place of language as an important prize in the battle for supremacy within the moral plays. It is more than
just a weapon with which that battle is conducted. Meaning, especially the meaning of 'good' and 'evil', must be fixed if 'virtue' is to win; but if meaning can be dislodged, or fixed differently, then within the scheme of the plays, 'evil' has a hold.

Mankind, then, demonstrates that it is appropriate to consider the moral plays in terms of the binarisms of self versus other. One may consider them to express the psychology of an individual self, in the course of which the other appears both as an object of desire and as the controlling paternal rule-giver. One may also consider the plays to embody these self-versus-other divisions which rationalize the power-relationships between groups or classes in society. One may consider the plays' interest in binarism as a discussion of the nature of meaning, which carries forward in other terms their more overt discussion of moral meaning.

The moral plays' discourse is founded in structures which purport to be binary, and which are imaged by their stock characters: the mankind figure, the vice, the good adviser, and so on. However, each of these linguistic 'terms' when analysed, will reveal interesting ramifications as one traces its complex movement of construction and signification along the chain of signifiers. That meanings should move is inevitable; how they move generates a philosophical investigation into the arbitrariness of ethical behaviour. A further consequence of viewing the plays as a signifying system is that, like any other semiotic structure, they participate in the deconstructive move.

An analysis which sees the plays as uttering a varied code of oppositions between inside and outside can also see the plays as analogous to linguistic utterances, through their use of a group of conventional signs whose meaning is generated in relation to one another. The 'signs' themselves, which are the characters, are found to be multiple and flexible, and perpetually re-invented, always with new signifying effects. In addition to investigating the signs in this semiotic system, this study will observe how secure the system itself is. As with
psychoanalytic criticism, it is important to refrain from using deconstruction as a simple template to be laid over any text. Instead, I shall show how the moral play's self-deconstruction provides a plausible explanation for its historical transitions into a more worldly, individualized drama.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE


   'Here shall Wantonness sing this song to the tune of 'Attend thee, go play thee'--then let her set a fool's bauble on his head, and collar his face; and Idleness shall steal away his purse from him, and go his ways.' S.D. 1.202.

3. See my discussions of *The Play of the Wether* and *Love and Fortune* in Chapter Five.

4. Allegory is such an ancient form that one can equally easily read externality as a result of staging allegory.

5. Jon Whitman in *Allegory: The Dynamics of an Ancient and Medieval Technique* (Oxford, 1987), p. 168, sees allegory as 'the philosophic and literary articulation of the search for causes' and argues that particular allegorical representations are constructed according to philosophical principles.


7. Donald R. Howard considers human concern with the comparable areas of economics and morals, with regard to major medieval texts, in *The Three Temptations: Medieval Man in Search of the World* (Princeton, 1966). He sees Piers Plowman, for example as analysing the human condition in economic terms: 'How, he [the dreamer] asks, can men supply the primary needs of life if they will not submit to the toil of producing goods? How can they produce those goods without being lured by the lust of the eyes? How can the social order run smoothly
without becoming corrupt? "How shall the world be served?". p.166.


9 The kind of classificatory tangle that the romances can create is exemplified in the Introduction to a recent edition, by John Isaac Owen, of *The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune* (New York and London, 1979). Owen perceives that some relationship exists between *Love and Fortune* and the Moralities, but has difficulty pinning it down. He accepts that a moral contention is an important feature of the genre, and considers that the argument between Venus and Fortune might satisfy that requirement. He does not notice, however, that these two characters are structurally identical, since both function as external, controlling deities in relation to the human beings. The real moral contention of the play is between the self-determining individual and the arbitrariness of fate: in other words, a relationship identical to that between the mankind figure and the vice figure. Owen discards *Love and Fortune* from the moral play genre because 'it contains no moral, no conflict between the forces of good and evil, and teaches no significant lesson for the guidance of life', p.205. On the contrary, the play offers a very traditional piece of advice: the need for the virtue of constancy. Within the play, the virtuous decision of the loving human beings is repeatedly challenged by the inconstant effects of the gods' trial. Although the tone is secular, the moral content is manifest.

10 This leads me to put suggest an origin of the moral play other than the often-cited *Psychomachia* of Prudentius. For a discussion of *The Choice of Heracles* in this context, see Appendix A.

11 In this movement towards closure the moral plays do not usually fit into the
'open-ended debate' structure described by Joel Altman: 'an antithetical drama whose contrary elements reach a tentative equilibrium, but are always ready to settle out again.' The Tudor Play of Mind (Berkeley and London, 1978), p.129.


The most important source for this was de Guileville's poem, Le pèlerinage de la vie humaine and its influential translation by Lydgate as The Pilgrimage of the Lyfe of the Manhode, ed. Avril Henry, 2 vols, EETS, ES, 288 & 292 (London, 1985-89).

E.K. Chambers is wonderfully unequivocal: 'Far more important than this slight secular extension of miracle plays is another development in the direction of allegory, giving rise to the 'moral plays' or 'moralities' as they came indifferently to be called, in which the characters are no longer scriptural or legendary persons, but wholly or almost wholly, abstractions, and which, although still religious in intention, aim rather at ethical cultivation than the stablishing of faith'. The Medieval Stage, 2 vols (London, 1903), II, 151.

Similarly combining allegory with the homiletic purposes of the plays in a way which almost suggests that allegory is inevitably connected with ethics, W. Roy Mackenzie is equally dogmatic. 'A Morality is a play, allegorical in structure, which has for its main object the teaching of some lesson for the guidance of life, and in which the principal characters are personified abstractions or highly universalized types.' The English Moralities from the Point of View of Allegory


15 op. cit., p.248.
16 I have avoided using C.S. Lewis's distinction between the allegoric and the symbolic as both terms are useful to my argument here. *The Allegory of Love* (London, 1936), p.48

17 In this I agree with Marion Jones, 'once an abstract noun borrows flesh and blood from a player with full physical being, its actions appear to be those of a real person, and as such provoke associations and expectations which cannot be bounded by considerations of allegorical significance.' cit. in note 15 above, p.248. This differs from Bernard Spivack: 'His [the mankind figure's] life is a moral conflict and a moral choice among a multitude of contending impulses. But each of these impulses, as it is personified on the morality stage, expresses in its behaviour a very different dynamic. A personification, no matter how persuasive its human similitude and vital energy in play and story, is subject to none of the multiplicity which defines the moral condition of human life. It is an elemental force, constrained to its single activity by what C.S. Lewis called its esse. What it does is what it has to do by virtue of what it explicitly and indivisibly is . . . its behaviour and motivation are inherent in its name.' cit. in note 7 above, pp.126-7.

18 On the capacities of allegorical sins to be reformed, see Carolynn Van Dyke, cit. in note 12 above, p.109; Robert Potter, cit. in note 14 above, p.26.

19 One may notice how Courage's lament for the death of Greediness, in
Wapull's *The Tyde Tarrieth No Man*, comes close to being naturalistically moving.

20 Carolynn Van Dyke: 'Theater is not inherently realistic in any simple sense; actors are signs, as are the words of a text, and what they signify may be even less verisimilar or concrete than are parts of the *Psychomachia*.' op. cit., p.109.

21 The distinction is described by Jon Whitman, cit. in note 12, pp.1-13.


23 Robert Potter: 'In the ultimate sense it [the traditional morality play] provided the inherited mythic idea of a theatrical treatise on the human condition.' cit. in note 14 above, p.105.

24 In this discussion of usage and definition, it is appropriate to enclose such terms as 'otherness', the 'other', and the 'self' in quotation marks. In general, however, I shall assume that the reader understands that a specialized usage is intended, and omit the punctuation.


26 Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression* (London, 1986). They illuminate this concept with their argument that opposed extremes ("the symbolic extremities of the exalted and the base") are fundamental to the ways in which cultures 'think themselves'. See especially the Introduction, p.3.


32 Glynne Wickham follows her arguments: 'the author takes great care to involve his audience very directly in the play by making them participate in the very actions which are to undo Mankind'. *English Moral Interludes* (London, 1976), p.3.

33 I refer to the mankind figure as male throughout this discussion. Female mankind figures occur rarely, and are usually also atypical in other ways, too complex to discuss here. I consider images of women in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

34 E.N.S. Thompson takes this view: 'the motives and impulses of man's own heart were taken from him, and, clothed in flesh and blood, given him again for companions.' cit. in note 8, above, p.315. He derives this from the *Psychomachia* structure, in which 'the opening lines of the poem . . . make it plain that the combatants are the impulses that dwell in man's soul, and that the story is a soul's history.' p.333n. This view disputes Ramsay's view of these plays as a contest and of the vice figures as merely fools, in Skelton's *Magnyfycence*, ed. R.L. Ramsay, EETS, OS, 98 (London, 1908; reprinted 1925), p.xiii and pp.civ-cv.


36 J. Laplanche and J.B. Pontalis, in *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, tr. Donald Nicholson Smith (London, 1973), give the following definition of projection: 'II. In the properly psycho-analytic sense: operation whereby qualities, feelings, wishes or even 'objects', which the subject refuses to recognize or rejects in himself, are expelled from the self and located in another person or thing. Projection so understood is a defence of very primitive origin which may be seen at work especially in paranoia, but also in 'normal' modes of thought such as
superstition.' p.349.

37 Interestingly, the projection that I propose here is very like a converse of Greenblatt's sociological model: 'If both the authority and the alien are located outside the self, they are both at the same time experienced as inward necessities, so that both submission and destruction are always already internalized.' cit. in note 28 above, p.9.

38 cit. in note 28 above, pp.6-7.

39 This important term was coined by Julia Kristeva, and is the subject of her *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, tr. Leon S. Roudiez (New York, 1982). Its effects are described most concisely by Victor Burgin, in 'Geometry and Abjection', in *Abjection, Melancholia and Love: The Work of Julia Kristeva*, eds. John Fletcher and Andrew Benjamin (London, 1990), pp.104-123. 'The abject . . . is the means by which the subject is first impelled towards the possibility of constituting itself as such - in an act of revulsion, of expulsion of that which can no longer be contained . . . the first object of abjection is the pre-oedipal mother - prefiguring that positioning of the woman in society which Kristeva locates, in the patriarchal scheme, as perpetually at the boundary, the borderline, the edge, the 'outer limit' - the place where order shades into chaos, light into darkness.' pp.115-6. Kristeva refers to individuals, rather than society, but the term has been adopted by social theorists such as Jonathan Dollimore, Peter Stallybrass and Allon White.

40 See *Ecrits: A Selection*, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977; reprinted London, 1980), pp.65-68. From the domain of the Other comes the Law of the Father, that interruption to the primitive self which introduces the Symbolic order. Lacan also uses the term *Non/m du Père*, a typically multivalent mnemonic which simultaneously i) invokes the Freudian Father, who imposes social prohibitions, instituting the Oedipus complex, and thus the self; ii) indicates with 'non' that area that imposes prohibitions: the structuring conditions under which all must live; iii) implies that the father is not a reality but a name ('nom'), and so involves an
essentially linguistic order; iv) uses punning to imply the interlocking of psychic and linguistic structures.

41 Paula Neuss makes a similar point: 'Mischief's appearance provides a concrete example of the point that Mercy had been at pains to make, that, given the opportunity, their 'gostly enmy' will do his best to interrupt and interfere with their good behaviour." cit. in note 31 above, p.46.

42 'Big Head' can be a reference to both a folk-play fool and to a hydrocephalic case. E.K. Chambers describes the folk-play Big Head in The English Folk Play (New York, 1966), p.64. I disagree with his opinion that the parallel with Mankind is unconvincing (p.163).

43 Glynne Wickham, cit. in note 32 above, p.8n.

'Lock' for 'mouth' does not, however, appear amongst the proverbs listed by either Tilley or Whiting. More relevantly, Tilley gives 'H51. They will know by an halfpenny if a priest will take offering.' Perhaps Mischief is suggesting that the priestly Mercy is either avaricious or open to bribes.
CHAPTER TWO

MUNDUS & INFANS AND JACQUES LACAN.

Lacan is thus a metaphor - or a symptom - of psychoanalysis itself, insofar as psychoanalysis is re-enacting a constant revolution in the most basic human questions:

- What does it mean to be human?
- What does it mean to think? and consequently
- What does it mean to be contemporary?¹

One may view the morality play in its simplest form as a dialogue between virtue and vice, with the self generally beginning as virtuous but falling to the temptation of an evil other, frequently referred to as the 'enemy' or the 'foe'. Such a view offers us a two-term conflict, as opposed to the three-term structure implicit in the view of mankind as a reasoning agent, possessed of free will, who chooses between good and evil actions. It is the latter model which is generally represented as typical of the earlier moral plays: the Moralities.² I wish to suggest that many of these plays begin in the first mode and only gradually move into the second, when they do so at all.³

The discussion that follows analyzes a group of three early plays, using terminology derived from the work of Jacques Lacan, in an attempt to demonstrate that the two-term structure exists, to reveal how this movement from 'two-term' to 'three-term' structures operates, and then to consider what effect that structure has on the picture of the other that the plays develop. I set up an analogy between three complex processes. The first is the overt plot of the morality play: the familiar development of the mankind figure out of innocence and moral vulnerability into knowledge of right and wrong, and hence into an ability to choose a virtuous life. The second is the imaging of that process in linguistic terms as a development out of a literal mode of language use into an ability to use and understand language metaphorically. It is through metaphoric language that spiritual truths are conveyed.
and understood. The third is the process, put forward by Lacan, by which the non-linguistic human being is inserted into the Symbolic order through an acceptance of the 'Law of the Father'. Such an acceptance involves an appreciation of the complex intricacies of desire, lack and language. The Symbolic order is principally concerned with language, but also with other language-like structures, including moral and social structures. Parallels between linguistic structures and social structures will be discussed in Chapter Five.

I must stress that Lacanian terminology is intended as an elucidator here, not a strait-jacket. There are large areas where Lacan’s vision does not fit neatly with the situation that the plays describe. Thus psychoanalytic theories are useful as a template against which one can compare what the plays have to say about otherness. In particular, the state of the pre-Mirror Stage 'hommelette' cannot be comfortably reconciled with the moralities' representation of the pre-linguistic, pre-moral individual. It will become clear that pre-linguistic formlessness occurs in the plays as a chameleon-like, imperative adaptation to the environment by the mankind figure. That character is therefore in a condition which has much more in common with Freud’s infantile primary narcissism. However, as the mythical Narcissus is trapped by his own reflection, while Lacan’s Mirror Stage also involves a 'reflection', by the infant of a figure which is specifically not itself, there is a danger of confusion in trying to use both sets of terms at once. I have therefore striven to excise or qualify all references to mirrors and reflection as they relate to the pre-Mirror Stage. One has then to treat the pre-linguistic mankind figure on occasion as if it were a subject. Indeed, it is his bizarre behaviour as subject that indicates that this character can represent a condition of non-subjectivity. This explains the puzzle that has afflicted critics who find the early mankind figure mechanical and 'unmotivated' (in the narrative sense). He must be exactly that, for complex motivations stem from occupying a fully mature place in the linguistic order, and hence also in the social order.
The play **Mundus & Infans**, where there are apparently never more than two characters on stage at a time, may, through its simplicity of action, help to clarify the situation. Using the concepts of binarism and the Mirror Phase can also suggest interpretations leading beyond the usual critical assessment of the play, an assessment which amounts to the rather pragmatic discovery that it must have been written for a travelling troupe of two players. The very fact that only two (or three) players are needed can make crucial theological points.

When a plot is pared down, as this one is, its essential parts become more apparent. Lacan's theories may help towards explaining why this repetitious and, to the superficial glance, naïve dramatic form held a fascination for audiences seemingly for well over a century, and even continued to be revived and referred to on the stage as late as the early Jacobean period. It may be because the audience is observing an enactment of the nature of infant psychological maturation, a process they have all been through and subsequently repressed. Our fascination with our repressed history is at least as strong as our interest in future moral development and salvation.

One needs to be aware that otherness for Lacan is an aspect of the self. This, indeed, fits with the observation discussed in Chapter One that the moral play as Psychomachia involves the human being both as protagonist and as the scene of the action. In the second part of this chapter, I shall apply to two other early plays the perceptions derived from the investigation of **Mundus & Infans**. It will then be possible to assess the further applicability of the approach, and to formulate some general remarks about the characteristics of otherness in these plays.

**SECTION A: MUNDUS & INFANS**

Published by Wynkyn de Worde in 1522, this early moral play shares numerous features with its fourteenth and fifteenth century antecedents, in particular with *The Castle of Perseverance*, and may have been written considerably earlier
than that publication date. The plot is a simple one, although it covers a lifetime and presents a version of the ages of man. The main character represents humanity at several stages of his life: as an infant; as a child (called Wanton); as a young man (Lust-and-Liking); as an adult (Manhood); and as an old man (Age, subsequently renamed Repentance). This character remains on stage throughout the 974-line play, with the possible exception of the scene at lines 716 to 761. His encounters are restricted to the following simple list: first, an opening passage with the World, who names him and introduces him to the Seven Deadly Sins; second, a passage with Conscience, who warns him against the Sins and against Folly; third, a passage in which Folly tempts him to lead an evil life and renames him Shame; fourth, a passage in which Conscience tries to reform Manhood/Shame, but fails; and finally, a passage in which Perseverance succeeds in reforming him, largely because time has passed and the main character, now called Age, possesses characteristics which enable him to heed the threat of death. Age reforms and is renamed Repentance. As a consequence Perseverance teaches him the articles of the Faith, and bids the audience farewell. The habit of renaming the main character is significant in ways which will be demonstrated below.

*Mundus & Infans* offers a sparse version of the traditional morality plot sequence of innocence, then sinfulness and lastly redemption. It is also curiously static: one actually sees none of the much-discussed evil life, which is very sketchily represented by Folly's coarse language. In general, the speeches offer little obvious scope for action: even the semi-obligatory fight amongst the vices is reduced to a brief scuffle between Manhood and Folly.

The moral transitions of the plot are represented not by behaviour and actions, but by self advertisement and changes of dress. Costume changes are designed to be quick and easy: Conscience need only throw off his friar's garment in order to enter as Folly, dressed in a breechcloth (1.640-41). Other changes take place on stage, as part of the action: the Infant is given the clothes of a child (1.67), and Manhood is also dressed and knighted on stage (1.195-6). The audience is
faced with a series of visually significant tableaux, suggestive of a production on a 'stage' consisting of two or three static mansions and a minimal acting space.\textsuperscript{14}

The overt project of the play is to bring Christ to the forefront, and relegate Mundus to his proper, inferior position. Similarly, when read with a Lacanian perspective, the play enacts the creation of the subject through its insertion in the Symbolic order. It would, however, be inappropriate to describe the relationship between the Imaginary and the Symbolic orders as inferior/superior. In Lacan's theory, the Imaginary is not so much subordinated as located in relation to the other orders.\textsuperscript{15} That relativity is formed through loss in the subject, and hence generates pain. Morality plays, by contrast, put forward a theory that maturation, as the acquisition of a metaphoric or symbolic capacity, is a gain, and is necessary for perfect happiness.

In its original condition, the unformed self gazes on what it takes to be its own representation, locked in a dyad of subject and mother. The Symbolic order contains language as a result of the entry of the third term: the structuring authority of the 'Law of the Father'. To see how this process is represented, let us look more closely at what takes place within the simple four-stage plot of Mundus & Infans.

The opening speech is uttered by Mundus, the World, who thereby claims reality as his, and identifies himself with all that exists. He is king of the whole surroundings, of all peoples, and of all pleasure.\textsuperscript{16} It is thus the world of the senses which he represents, and which he describes as the totality of all there is. ('I am a king in every case' 1.19.) One might tentatively, therefore, begin by locating Mundus as representative of the Real - the 'ineffable, stupid existence' of the Subject (S).\textsuperscript{17} Already, however, two hints suggest that there is more to be considered than Mundus is aware of. He mentions 'free will' (1.24), which, as a theological concept, is out of place in his world. Again, 'methinketh I am a god of grace' (1.20) can only be ironic or ignorant. 'Methinketh' casts doubt on the
accuracy of his perception, while 'grace' reminds the audience of an attribute of the Christian God, which is exactly what Mundus is not. Infans enters. Literally his name means 'language-less', and we shall see shortly that in a special sense this is an accurate description, even though dramatic necessity means that he must express his condition in speech. He too reminds us of the category unspoken by Mundus, that of Christ, mentioning him twice in his opening three lines:

Christ our King grant you clearly to know ye case,
To move of this matter that is in my mind.
Clearly to declare it Christ grant me grace

(1.25-7)

Infans describes his earlier state of total dependence on his mother: 'Forty weeks I was freely fed/ Within my mother's possession' (1.40-1); and his present deprived condition: 'Poor and naked as ye may see/ I am not worthily wrapt nor went,/ But poorly pricked in poverty' (1.45-7). He has been sent 'into the world', but also uses that phrase for going to talk to the character Mundus: 'Now into the world will I wend,/ Some comfort of him for to crave.' (1.489).

Mundus, still secure in his claims to totality, takes over the mother's place, granting the child's request for 'meat and clothes my life to save'. We shall see that Infans accepts his instructions unquestioningly, a response which has been appropriately called the 'sudden conversion', and which is typical of the moral play in general. In addition Mundus renames the child Wanton. It seems at first that Mundus has here initiated the child into language, and so in Lacan's terms has introduced the Name of the Father into Infans' life. However this is not the case: it is a deceit structured into the apparently unbreakable dyad of self-contemplation, the condition of the pre-Mirror Stage. Infans, it may be noted, does not know his true name, but does know what his mother called him. Mundus' naming of the child repeats the mother's action, and is similarly temporizing as it will only last until he is fourteen. What appears to be a naming is in fact a labelling of those attributes of the human being which are linked to his age. It is appropriate that Mundus
perceives and labels the condition of the senses which is dominant for each age.\textsuperscript{19} Mundus had claimed to be everything. Now we see, through his repeated use of 'I can' and 'I will' (lines 76-120), that Wanton shares the delusion of omnipotence. Wanton's relationships all take place within a power structure in which might is the whole basis of control. He assaults family ties and authority, friendship, the property of his neighbours, and the hierarchy of knowledge. This last he sees, characteristically, solely in terms of physical punishment. The only uses of language he reports are verbal abuse (1.91) and lying (1.97-8). In other words, language is a tool with which Wanton furthers the aggressive power-play that is his life. The play offers us a single explanation of his behaviour: it is his nature. 'All recklessness is kind for thee' (1.75) and 'this cunning came me of kind' (1.99).

We are therefore observing in Infans' aging process nothing more than an emphasis on the senses varied over time. There is no hint of progress or maturation in the changes from one age to the next. Lust-Liking even repeats Mundus' words. 'Game and glee' recur (lines 127 and 140) as does 'love-longing' (lines 128 and 136). Lust-and-Liking also demonstrates the imposition of the subject's desires on the environment. All that Lust finds in the world is his own desire, which is obsessive and therefore excludes alternative possibilities.

At the age of nineteen, Lust returns to Mundus, who renames him Manhood Mighty. Once he is knighted, Manhood takes on Mundus' boastful tone:

\begin{quote}
Mundus: As a lord in each land I am beloved \\
\hspace{2cm} (1.217)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Manhood: For I am a lord both stalworthy and stout \\
\hspace{2cm} (1.238)
\end{quote}

and:

\begin{quote}
For I have might and main over countries far \\
\hspace{2cm} (1.242)
\end{quote}

Both assert a domination, based on physical power, over the noble hierarchy.
Mundus: Who that stirreth with any strife or
weighteth me with wrong
I shall mightily make him to stammer and
stoop

(1.229-30)

And:

Emperors and kings they kneel to my knee

(1.220)

Manhood: There is no emperor so keen
That dare me lightly teen
And many a king's crown have I cracked

(1.249-50)

Thus, Manhood Mighty presents an assimilation of Mundus' description of him through his naming. Two voices sing the same tune: Mundus announces the theme, and the mankind figure elaborates on it in each of his incarnations. Although there are two voices, there is no sense of exchange or dialogue. As Infans and his successors uncritically assume the labels offered by Mundus, and clothe themselves in the garments he brings, we find that the name is the means by which they are constituted as a series of transformations of the sensual, visible aspect of the self. The figure of humanity is thus still truly infants, for language is not available to him, only a structurally undifferentiable sensual experience. Even the older, re-named figure has not yet entered into a system of linguistic relationships.20

In summary then, the mankind figure has only two kinds of relationship: firstly, one of identification (with Mundus) and secondly one of sensual gratification, heedless of external controls (beating up his friends, 1.81; indulging in 'love-longing', 1.138; and spilling blood, 1.253.). He significantly lacks any perception of metaphoric or metonymic connections, meeting the 'Kings' who are the Seven Deadly Sins as if they operate on the same plane of allegorical reality as
himself. In his ignorance, Manhood does not recognize that the 'Kings' represent abstract ideas, while he is a representative of all members of the human race. Their royalty is a metaphor for the power that wrong-doing can have over people, a power that is generated only by people's belief in it. It is significant that they do not appear 'in the flesh' on stage, and Manhood, therefore, is at least one degree closer to reality than they are. Ignorant of levels of linguistic abstraction, Manhood cannot perceive the Kings' true nature. Thus, for all his obedience to the senses, Manhood retains an innocence which makes his easy obedience to Mundus seem less than culpable.

This is the stage that the play has reached when it pauses for breath at line 287. Manhood has seated himself, self-satisfied and ignorant, yet somehow not blameworthy, and his static position suggests the hollowness of his achievement.

Here in this seat sit I
For no loves let I
Here for to sit.

(1.285-7)

The mere occupation of physical space is the whole product of his efforts up to this point. In this position, he mutually invites the audience to see themselves represented in him - seated, passive, and waiting for the next event. Clearly the knowledge that he claims ('as a wight witty', 1.284) is without much spiritual meaning. It is based on a list of countries visited and limbs hacked off. As his boastful long lines dwindle into shorter and shorter ones, and then into silence, expectation builds up in the audience for the next move.

With this preparation, Conscience now enters, and speaks of 'light' and of 'spirituality'. Manhood is uncomprehending, taking 'light' literally: 'light fain would I see' (1.335). In addition he rejects Conscience's teaching because it conflicts with the physical hierarchy implied by 'To me men lout full low' (1.346). To Conscience's metaphoric 'Sir, there is no king but God above' (1.355) is opposed Manhood's literal, worldly reading of the word 'king' - for this is how he
sees Pride and the other Sins. 'Think, Manhood, on substance' (1.379) appeals
Conscience, and substance here means what is real in Aristotelian terms, that is, the
spiritual, and so that which has real importance. Manhood has been dwelling on the
wrong kind of reality: that of tangible existence. He is as yet incapable of seeing
the metaphoric truth that Conscience brings. Here the Christian project of the play
intersects with the theoretical projects of Lacan and linguistics, for, in order to
know about Christianity, Manhood has to comprehend the abstract, substituting the
linguistic structure of metaphor for the primitive, sense-based structure of
literalism. That substitution is also the process that initiates him into genuine
linguistic competence.

Conscience begins Manhood's education by suggesting that he retain his
allegiance to Covetous, glossing this as 'Covetous in good doing' (1.413). Manhood happily swears to adhere to this programme, only to be informed of the
contents of the Ten Commandments, which he finds very little to his liking. With
his question 'What, Conscience, is this thy Covetous' (1.439), he identifies the
possibility that a word may contain a second meaning. Conscience is demonstrating
how language, of itself, can generate the Symbolic through its inherent duplicity. A
person who can enter a relationship with the alternatives offered by language will
have achieved a three-term pattern: self, literal meaning, metaphoric meaning. The
succeeding exchange finds Manhood determined to pin down the meanings of
words: he queries the ideas of 'measure', 'folly', 'mercy' and 'discretion'.
Finally, though, he acknowledges Conscience's superior understanding:

Ah, Conscience, now I know and see,
Thy cunning is much more than mine

(1.476-7)

Because Manhood is still at a primitive phase of development, he believes himself to
be accurately represented in any description that is made of him. Even so, perhaps
because Conscience has begun to break through that primitive phase, we now find
elements of resistance in Manhood's attitude towards him. Once Conscience has
departed, it appears that Manhood's acquiescence, reluctant even at the time, was insincere. He is still in the same state as Wanton, prepared to lie to secure his advantage. There follows a very curious passage of vacillating emotions.21 Four lines abuse Conscience with comic vigour before the turning point:

Ah ah now I have bethought me if I shall heaven win

(l.493)

This introduces a section of sixteen lines in which Manhood dedicates himself to virtue. But another *volte face* follows:

But yet I will him not forsake
For Mankind he doth merry make.

(l.509-10)

'Him' here is Mundus, and eleven lines bring Manhood back onto Mundus' side, in time for Folly's entrance.

Even so, Manhood offers some resistance to Folly's approaches. Though unable to originate resistance, he can put forward Conscience's instructions, if only briefly.

Manhood: Yea sir, but yet Conscience biddeth me
nay
Folly: No sir, thou darest not, in good fay,
For truly thou failest now, false heart.
Manhood: What, sayest thou I have a false heart?
Folly: Yea sir, in good fay

(l.549-53)

Manhood predictably lacks the sophistication to argue for an honourable interpretation of his doubts, but falls to the demeaning position of fighting with Folly.22 He is thus returned to the world of physicality through his reliance on the simple interpretation of language.
As his next move, Manhood rejects Folly and Mundus in order to retain knowledge ('cunning', 1.622). When Folly scorns Conscience, he once again opposes the world of action to that of language.

A cuckoo for Conscience, he is but a daw
He can not else but preach.

(1.623-4)

Conscience's knowledge of words is perceived as empty and useless, a shadow of reality rather than a reality in its own right. Manhood's brief understanding of the basis of language vanishes, for he is easily tricked into accepting Folly as his servant, through a confusion between the idea and the concrete.

Sir, here in this clout I knit Shame
And clep me but proper Folly.

(1.640-1)

Folly claims that shame can be hidden in a breechcloth, and Manhood fails to comprehend that the avoidance of nakedness is not the same thing as avoiding moral disgrace. When Manhood, with Folly now as his servant, hears of the stews, he puts forward a series of objections to going there which reveal his moral immaturity. He first objects not because he believes it to be wrong, but because he fears that Conscience would find him.

For, by Christ, I would not that Conscience should me here find.

(1.660)

Folly reassures him that Conscience never comes that way. Next Manhood seems to feel that recognition is what matters:

Peace Folly, there is no man that knoweth me

(1.663)

This line makes best sense as an objection to Folly that no-one will recognize him at the stews. He does not wish to go to a strange place where his status is unknown. Folly's reassuring answer accepts these terms, and explains that he need not worry about going unrecognized.
An thou wilt go with me
For knowledge have thou no care.

(1.665-6)
He also suggests the irony that anyone can recognize a fool, which is what Manhood will be when he goes to the stews in Folly's company.

Once again, the world that Manhood inhabits is manifestly one in which physical externals are of prime importance: the gaze of others defines his own condition. It seems that Manhood can only feel happy if he is continually noticed, so that his status is constantly re-created by recognition. His last objection to going to the stews is trivial: he fears that they may be too far away. Folly, of course, knows that evil is always near at hand, and goes on to promise him a warm welcome to dinner in East Cheap, and sweet wine at the Pope's Head. Manhood is still quite incapable of judgement, referring yet again to Folly's opinions.

What sayest thou Folly is this the best?

(1.674)
The term 'best' suggests that he has some perception that he needs to make moral distinctions. Folly's response is very interesting:

Sir, all this is manhood, well thou knowest

(1.675)
He thus implies that Manhood's level of knowledge is complete, or at least adequate. He also equates 'the best' with a realisation of Manhood's physical stage of life. Folly identifies the name Manhood as sufficient prescription of the behaviour appropriate to him, although both we and Manhood himself know this name to be merely a temporary description of the human being. Manhood is still afraid of Conscience's anger:

For well I wot if Conscience meet me in this tide
Right well I wot he would me chide.

(1.678-9)
One may notice the repetition of 'well I wot', with which Manhood stresses his knowledge. However, that knowledge is a minimal awareness of Conscience's behaviour, not of his ideals. Folly names him Shame, so that Conscience will not look at him, and Manhood now accepts willingly the very name he once refused to employ as his servant.

When Manhood eventually re-enters as Age, he is still focussed on his own physical state, in accordance with the conventional view of old age.  

I cough and rough, my body will brast,  
Age doth follow me so  
I stare and stagger as I stand  
I groan grisly upon the ground  

(1.795-8)  

He is in despair, and still lacks any but the most simple spiritual knowledge. He knows that he has sinned, but appears not to comprehend that suicide is a further sin.  

For I have done ill  
Now wend I will  
Myself to spill  
I care not whither or where  

(1.802-5)  

These short lines, with their sinewy, rhythmic movement have a powerful falling tone which enacts the despair that Age feels. They prepare the next entrance, in a repetition of the rhythm of silence and hope which coloured Manhood's encounter with Conscience. Perseverance now enters, cutting through the gloomy atmosphere with a cheerful greeting which is as welcome to the audience as it is to Age. 'well i-met, sir, well i-met'. With the bonhomous repetition and the 'sir' of social equality, he proffers a sense of communitas as supportive and pleasurable. Perseverance picks up Age's fruitless 'whither' to re-form it into a purposive idea. Age once again narrates his history so far, in a speech which becomes a summary of
the instability of his identity through time, and a detailed account of how his every act has been determined by his passivity in the face of Mundus. He has been indistinguishable from his worldly circumstances even to the extent of being named by them. Finally he has remained with the name Shame, which has been dinned into him by Folly and his own weakness, and which he believes to be irreversible. In contradiction to this position, Perseverance offers him optimism and yet another chance of grace, conditional on his repentance. Perseverance calls this 'shrift of mouth'. In naming Age Repentance, Perseverance causes him to take personal responsibility for all the previous ages he has lived through. At the same time, the name 'Repentance' defers to a use of language to take control of circumstances, thus appropriating language for Age's needs. This name is not temporizing as the earlier ones were, for it comprehends them, supersedes them, and so can cancel them.

Age/Repentance must now come to understand this point, that language may be used to take the place of physical acts in confession. 'Repentance' is potentially a speaking subject, whereas Infans, Wanton, Lust, Manhood and Age/Shame had been merely bundles of pre-determined behaviours, constituted by their worldly status and condition.

The list of Saints that follows is intended to show Age an example that he must contemplate. In them he is to see a figure for himself as a sinner, and also a figure for his own possible future.

And yet these to Christ are darlings dear

(1.874)

In order that these examples can be credible, and even comprehensible to him, Age must begin to understand metaphor. Perseverance next argues to lead him away from his physical obsessions, moving by small steps from a list of the senses (calling them the 'five wits') to a list of mental and spiritual strengths. It is only this preliminary knowledge of the relation between the physical and the abstract that will enable Age to make sense of the Articles of the Faith, which Perseverance now
recites to him. Age accepts his teaching, and in so doing accepts a new interpretation of knowledge:

That it is necessary to all mankind

Truly for to know

(1.959-60)

Age, now Repentance, demonstrates his full understanding of linguistic relationships by offering himself to the audience as a metaphor for their own condition:

Now sirs, take all example by me

(1.961)

At this point, where true knowledge begins, the play's action ceases, and the briefest of blessings by Perseverance concludes the piece.

The play's representation of a dawning Christian consciousness is paralleled by its representation of the maturation of the individual subject out of its infantile belief in its own omnipotence, into a full capacity to use and understand language. Language use is accompanied by socialisation into a world governed by outside influences. The key to this position appears when Conscience and Manhood discuss the duplicity of language. Conscience calls worldliness 'folly' (1.460), to which Manhood offers the alternative: 'may I not go arrayed honestly?' (1.466). Conscience demonstrates that the two apparent alternatives can co-exist, provided they are governed by 'discretion', which is a gift from God.26 Thus a binary system of 'either a/or b' becomes a ternary 'either a, or b, or a and b', in the presence of an external legislation, similar to Lacan's Law of the Father.

Lacan's 'Schema L' describes the relationships between the subject (S), the other (o),27 the object of desire (or objet petit a) (o'),28 and that Other (O) which is external social necessity, and which contains the Law of the Father.29 It is striking how closely the structures of Mundus & Infans can be related to Schema L. This Schema is useful because it offers a graphic way of seeing what kinds of 'otherness'
occur in the plays, and how they interact. It stresses the importance of both the Other of the Nom/n du Père and that of the object of desire. Both are manifested in the moral plays.

Conscience, on the line between o' and O, separates the senses from the spirit, until 'measure' can mediate between them. All the other lines are dynamic: that is, they are lines of connection rather than of separation.

As the symbols imply, o and o' are subdivisions of one category. Thus as long as S, o and o' are all that is perceived to exist, the model is of a dyad. Conscience attempts to impose the Non du Père, by casting out the flesh, thus teaching the separation of S and O. He imposes the Nom du Père by teaching metaphor, and hence language.

Perhaps one should not feel too surprised that the parallel can be so easily and closely worked out. Lacan is, for all his radicalism, the great expositor of Freud, whose theories in turn are profoundly embedded in the Judaic tradition and in its paternalistic authority structures. A resemblance between the orthodoxies of Christianity and Freudianism is therefore only reasonable, though Lacan himself would probably have rejected such a comparison.
In numerous places in the foregoing discussion, I have mentioned the introduction of a third term as constituting the breakthrough into language of Lacan's Mirror Stage. In addition, Manhood's theological education clearly includes a knowledge of God as that third term which divides man from worldliness, interpreting it as sin. Even a superficial examination shows that *Mundus & Infans* contains an advertisement for the important numbers one, three and zero.

Upon one God and persons three

That made all thing of nought

(1.499-500)

It is obvious that there is an unspoken prime in this series, the number two. Major heresies, such as those influenced by Manichaeism, involved transforming the focus on a trinity within God into one on a duality of God and the Devil. With this in mind, it is reasonable that 'two' should be implicitly excluded from the system of 'all the mysteries of man/ That be as simple as they can' (1.307-8) (my italics).\(^{31}\) Two, however, is also the number of man in a state of temptation by the World, and the number which represents man rapt in narcissistic contemplation of his own image. As I have suggested in connection with the discussion of Age's initiation into language, two is the number involved in the concept of language as labelling reality - that is, of word in relation to thing. This is to be contrasted with a picture of meaning as dependant on linguistic relationships, thus on ambiguity, and thus on a system that is at least ternary, and possibly not to be numbered at all.\(^{32}\) Two, however, involves the illusion of the unitary, for the infantile gaze on the object involves an identification with it, comparable to the way in which the labelling theory of language involves a perceived identification between the world and the thing referred to.

If further evidence for this striking interest in numbers can be found within the play, it would act as evidence that the play works on fundamental human
psychological experience. Through this it rivets the audience's attention and makes the overt theological message both more fascinating and more convincing.

One method through which Manhood escapes from the oppositions of the binary into the mediation of the ternary is the imagery generated within the staging of the play. It has frequently been noticed that Mundus & Infans requires only two players. Throughout the time of his early ignorance, the mankind figure is on stage with nobody but Mundus. This image of the pair constructs man's total obsession with the world, for there is no visual sense that anywhere else exists. Conversation can only bounce to and fro between the two of them. Hence, as we have seen, an impression arises of total agreement. When Conscience arrives, a similar process continues, for these two can still only interact with each other. The dramatic effect is one of obsession, for there is nowhere else to which utterances can be directed. In its iconography the play images the binary system out of which Manhood must eventually break. A sense of 'somewhere else' begins in the passage with Folly, for Manhood is now able to hold the memory of Conscience in his mind and refer to it. Conscience is off stage somewhere, balancing that other locale that Folly has introduced - the stews. It is interesting that at first that area of corruption seems to be located on stage ('For, by Christ, I would not that Folly should me here find' 1.660) but it soon becomes a distant place to which Folly and Manhood must travel ('Pardee sir, we may be there on a day' 1.668) (my italics). In this way, Folly offers an evil place to balance the good place that Conscience inhabits, capturing it in another two-term opposition.

For a moment now the forces of evil outnumber the forces of good, and this could be a reason why Conscience is next supported by Perseverance: again there is a numerical balance, with Conscience and Perseverance opposing Mundus and Folly. Of course these four cannot appear on stage at the same time. Commentators have felt that this was solely because the play was written to be performed by two people, and indeed such a scheme seems most natural, given that there are never more than two speaking parts on stage at a time. I wish to put
forward an alternative view: that the play would be more effectively performed with three players.

A practical problem with using two players arises at line 739, when Conscience departs:

Farewell lordings and have good day
To seek Perseverance will I wend

(1.738-9)

Perseverance's entrance follows immediately. There seems little point in the change of name if the same actor is to play both rôles. Unusually, no covering speech has been inserted to allow for a change of costume. Other name changes in the play have been rationally motivated, either by the 'ages of man' topos, or by the vast differences in character between Mundus and Folly, who presumably will be doubled. However, if Perseverance is played by the second actor, the rôle must be doubled with that of Manhood. This leaves the first actor changing from Conscience to re-enter as Manhood/Age - that is, the rôle of mankind figure is split between the two actors, which seems at least undesirable and at worst very confusing, though not, of course, unheard of. Circumstances rationalizing such a split here are either the use of masks, or performance by a company where there was a very noticeable age difference between the two actors. The older would then take the rôles of World, Folly, Conscience and Age, while the younger took on Infans, Wanton, Lust-and-Liking, Manhood and Perseverance. Even so, there is something a little suspect about the grey-bearded Folly that this scheme postulates.

A company of three actors would solve the difficulty of Conscience/Perseverance's lightning change, and could also add variety to the forces of worldliness: player A could take Mundus and Conscience; player B, Folly and Perseverance; and player C all the versions of the mankind figure. At the point where Perseverance enters, he could then be accompanied by Conscience. Age's repentance, involving a knowledge of the complexity of language and a knowledge
of the Trinity could then be symbolically echoed by the deployment of three people on stage, where previously there had been only two.

So far, I have considered the difference between a view of the human as double (the self and its purely physical aspect) compared with a more complex view which includes the spiritual. This transition from a double view to a three-cornered one is detectable through much more of the play.

In Lacanian theory, the third term's function is to locate the other two, so that they are no longer seen as a binary opposition, but as co-existing. In this sense, the Name of the Father resembles a catalyst, rather than being a term comparable in kind to the original two. What simplifications and dualities, then, does one find in *Mundus & Infans*? By his behaviour, the character Mundus insists that a human being cannot be complex, and will only allow Infans to be one kind of thing at a time. We see a total commitment at each age to the single, named characteristics of that age. Again, only one vision of time is permitted: linear time. This in turn imposes an impression that the present is of sole importance. One notices the many occurrences of 'now', and of its correlative, 'here', which also contains a strong impression of immediacy and of the moment. Each segment of seven years leaves the human being exactly where he started, waiting to be directed by Mundus. There is no sense of maturation or of building on past experience, and no memory of past life, until we reach the lengthy summaries that Repentance produces in conversation with Perseverance.

In addition, the human's view of relationships is also based on an opposition, usually a fight, in which one side triumphs and so has power over the other. In Wanton's behaviour we have seen this view of reality as structured by dominance. For Manhood, the Master/Servant opposition defines the world. His attempt to alter his position in that relationship involves appropriating the Master rôle from Mundus (signified by 'here in this seat sit I', when it is likely that he occupies Mundus' 'mansion'). The Servant rôle is then given to Mundus and to the Seven Kings (or Sins), whom Manhood now believes himself to control. ('They
When Manhood makes an active choice to be informed by Conscience, he is moving towards a sense of self that can operate independently of Mundus.

Light, yea but hark fellow, yet light fain would I see

A genuine interchange of opinions takes place between them, and it seems that Manhood will no longer automatically be a disciple. However, he is still committed to Pride, who embodies for him the attraction of the binary - of up/down; high/low; master/servant.

For the World and Pride hath advanced me

To me men lout full low

As the exchange continues, Manhood asks Conscience about the meanings of words. The rhythm of question and answer has grown beyond Manhood's rough challenge: 'Say thou harlot, whither in haste', into a curiosity about the significance of 'conscience', 'spirituality' and 'covetous'. Eventually an explanation of 'measure' leads Conscience to his definition of its opposite, Folly, as equivalent to the Seven Deadly Sins. Within the discussion, Manhood resists the idea of interpretation by habitually returning to the two-term structure of truth/falsehood. He regards Conscience's evaluation of the Seven Sins as a lie:

Conscience: These Seven Sins I call Folly

Manhood: What thou liest! To this Seven the

World delivered me

And said they were kings of great beauty

And most of main and mights

If one term is false, Manhood can return to the security of a world based on binaries. It has already been remarked that Conscience can demonstrate how the
two apparent alternatives of pleasure and virtue can be made to co-exist, provided they are governed by 'measure'.

All mirth in measure is good for thee

But sir, measure is in all thing

(1.449-50)

Measure's alternative form, 'discretion', is described as a gift from God (1.473).

When Conscience leaves the stage, there follows the intriguing passage of vacillation mentioned above. Manhood is alone, which is significant as he now has no external mould available to govern his actions, falsely defining who he is. The only other occasion when he has been alone on stage witnessed an intense, vaunting monologue of his soldierly exploits, followed by an appropriation of Mundus' 'throne'. In this scene something very interesting occurs, for Manhood, of his own accord, is in two minds about what he should do. The scene just prior to this has imaged Manhood's introduction to the idea of the third term through the arrival of an alternative mentor. The same possibility has also been presented to him in the form of an inner, spiritual meaning to language, but he has proved incapable of assimilating that. Nevertheless, he has made some progress, for he is now able to consider the merits of both Mundus and Conscience, however inadequately, in their absence. On Conscience's departure, Manhood's first remark is a comic reversal of the agreement he has just struck. For a moment his hypocritical tone has the true ring of the Vice.

yes, yes, ye come wind and rain

God let him never come here again

Now he is forward I am right fain

(1.489-91)

However, once Manhood has achieved the laugh that surprise tactics and barefaced iconoclasm can always raise from an audience, he remembers the reason behind his promise of virtue. It yields another abrupt reversal, contained simply in the startled exclamation:
Ah, ah now I have bethought me if I shall heaven win
Conscience teaching I must begin

(1.493-4)

In spite of his minimal abstracting ability, Manhood is in such a primitive phase that he need only think of either one of the two in order to be wholly devoted to that one. We can see that a chink has been found in his egotism through which perception of a three-term structure can enter, for one line contains both alternatives:

Though the World and Conscience be at debate

(1.511)

Another line contains a statement of the understanding he must attain:

And believe, as he hath taught me
Upon one God and Persons three

(1.498-9)

It seems for the space of twelve lines that Manhood will accept Conscience's instruction. He vows to forsake Mundus, and to follow Conscience's beliefs. He decides to call Conscience his king and to show his own loyalty through good deeds. Indeed, he now goes so far as to try to apply that teaching himself, by considering how it locates Mundus. He can manage to do this for only four lines before the danger of even thinking about Mundus overcomes him:

But yet will I him not forsake
For mankind he doth merry make

(1.509-10)

Manhood finally is not yet ready to abandon or to re-interpret worldly pleasures, and needs little persuasion to join the newly arrived Folly in his dissolute ways. It is even Manhood who first offers to fight, while it is characteristic that the qualms he then feels at wasting time in brawling are easily overcome by Folly's appeal to the binary system of true/false:
Manhood: Yea sir, but yet Conscience biddeth me
   nay
Folly: No sir, thou darest not, in good fay
   For truly thou failest no false heart
Manhood: What, sayest thou I have a false heart?
Folly: Yea sir, in good fay

(1.549-53)

The story of Manhood's eventual initiation into virtue after suffering shame and despair has been told above. One may note in passing that these conditions involve a separation from the reflecting security that Manhood has always needed from the world around him. Shame implies a rejection by society at large; while despair, involving an assault on life itself in the moral play convention, is a peculiarly isolating, antisocial state.

In conclusion, then, it seems that we can see a cluster of interlocking processes at work in Mundus & Infans. In the first, an individual's passage through the Mirror Stage into full participation in the Symbolic order is demonstrated by his initiation into the metaphorical use of language (co-incidentally with his education in basic theology). In the second, the passage from a 'dual' to a 'triple' way of thinking (necessary to the first process) is symbolized both by the play's language forms and by the stage images which it creates. The second process acts as a reinforcement of the first.

Is there any practical point in putting forward a Lacanian reading of Mundus & Infans? In the first place, such a reading suggests an approach to production which mobilizes stage images of 'two' and 'three'. This is particularly relevant to the final scene, when the recitation of the Articles of Faith beats down Age. Out of the chrysalis of Age's despair emerges a concept of trinity, for a concept of zero, or nothingness, constructs a third term. Secondly, a Lacanian reading offers a more complex interpretation of a play which has previously been seen as interesting
because of its simplicity. Its primary interest for scholars in the past has been as a
clever rendering of the Morality form for a minimal cast of two. The more
complex reading creates the potential for a thought-provoking modern production.
Finally, a Lacanian reading provides a tool with which to analyze the theory that an
early moral play presents a primitive, undifferentiated self. The simplest
'psychological' view of the moral plays in general is that they enact an internal
conflict: the good and ill that we see are allegorizations of internal desires. In this
view, the moral plays are direct descendants of the idea of the 'Microcosmos'. A
good case can be made for this view, but one strong objection to it is that it is
peculiarly difficult to render recognizably in a production. In Mundus & Infans, as
I have argued, humanity graduates beyond the binary situation into one that takes
account of the externally located power of language.

One may ask, finally, what advantages this kind of highly specialised
theorizing might have for performance. The abstract differences between two and
three could become iconographic and visually powerful. Differences between levels
of reality could be rendered atmospherically. Lastly, the significance of the clash
between slavish obedience and independence could appear on stage with interest and
effectiveness. That these perceptions stem from a complex theoretical structure
makes them all the more interesting for the reader of a play, who inevitably has
more leisure to ponder such matters than an audience.

SECTION B: YOUTH AND THE CASTLE OF PERSEVERANCE

Before analysing the otherness established in Mundus & Infans, it will be
useful to look at two comparable early moral plays. These are The Interlude of
Youth39 (1530; 1514) and The Castle of Perseveraunce40 (c. 1400). Two features
are crucial to the Mundus & Infans pattern: the 'sudden conversion' mode and
'linguistic learning'. In the first of these, the protagonist must be instantly
persuaded to change from a good way of life to an evil one, or vice versa, merely
by the announcement of the existence of that mode of being by its advocate. This is possible because the mankind figure does not have the ability (whether moral, linguistic or rational) to oppose the Vice's arguments, even though it is obvious, at least to the audience, that he is thereby falling into sin. The alteration of his opinion about the nature of virtue takes place often with unrealistic or even farcical haste.

In 'linguistic learning', the kind of learning process which the mankind figure undergoes can be interpreted as an insertion into language. This occurs in those plays where the mankind figure transcends his solipsistic identification with what is observed.

The Interlude of Youth, though not a 'whole of life' play, resembles Mundus & Infans in the presence of both 'sudden conversion' and 'linguistic learning' features. The protagonist, Youth, begins without an ability to comprehend the spiritual significance of language, but acquires this in the course of the play. The play also contains the 'sudden conversion' feature, and its direct descendant, a tendency to subscribe to the opinion most recently uttered.

In the opening argument with Charity, Youth, like Infans, takes his own name to be a full and adequate description of himself. Youth resists every mention of virtue, his literal-mindedness resulting in an inability to understand Charity's meaning. He copes with the idea of Hell by offering to beat Charity up, and with the idea of Heaven by finding literal objections to it.

What sirs, above the sky?
I had need of a ladder to climb so high.

(1.96-97)

Charity's attempt to describe an intangible quality, God's mercy, is expressed in spiritual terms. As supporting evidence he offers a Latin Biblical quotation:

The mercy of God passeth all works
That witnesseth holy scripture, saying thus
Miserationes domini super omnia opera eius

Therefore doubt not God's grace

Thereof is plenty in every place.

(l.107-111)

The metaphoric relationship between word and thing is too tenuous for Youth, who exclaims:

What! methink ye be clerkish

For ye speak good gibb'rish

(l.112-113)

To Youth it is gibberish firstly because he does not understand Latin, but in addition he does not understand the spiritual, or accept God's law. Turning the idea of the location of heaven into a joke based on a concrete interpretation of 'height', he believes that it will be physically dangerous to go there. Because Youth sees himself merely as a body, Charity's answer seems off the point, since it assumes physical death to be irrelevant to spiritual well-being. Youth offers Charity a meaningless riddle of his own, based on the very physical function of eating: 'Why do men eat mustard with salt fish?' (l.119) The question contains a glancing reference to the rigours of fast days, which is all that religion can mean to Youth at this stage of his development.

These two are not talking to each other: as they continue to answer a mistaken sense in each other's words, they generate a strong sense of incomprehension and of failed communication. True dialogue involves hearing what the other party has said, and responding to it meaningfully. It often involves adjustment to accommodate the other speaker's approach, and a resulting sense of compromise. There is no dialogue here, as each party responds to the other with a kind of blankness: a reiteration of his own position.

When Charity and Humility first attempt to reason with Youth it is to no avail. What they say is systematically buffered from Youth by interpolations from Riot and Pride. As we have seen, pre-linguistic competence involves lack of 'self',
and so the individual is inhabited by any discourse that passes by. In this condition, Youth follows the counsel of the last speaker, through a sequence of speakers beginning with Youth's entrance at 1.580 and extending to 1.684. In this scene Youth follows the opinion of the preceding speaker in five of his seven speeches. On the two occasions when there is no interpolation by Riot or Pride, Youth is handicapped from understanding the language of piety by his own immature commitment to interpreting all discourse in a material sense. For example, when Humility offers to reason with him and change his mind, Youth thinks a fight is in the offing.

Humility: Ye be welcome to this place here  
We think ye labour all in vain  
Wherefore your brains we sill stir  
And kele you a little again.
Youth: Sayest thou my brains thou wilt stir?  
I shall lay thee on the ear
(1.588-93)

On the single occasion when Youth answers a direct remark (from Humility), that remark contains a simple statement of his present condition, and offers nothing reformatory or inspiring.

Humility: Sir, it is a pitiful case  
That ye would forsake grace  
And to vice apply.
Youth: Why, knave, doth it grieve thee?  
Thou shalt not answer for me.
(1.615-19)

It begins to seem almost impossible that Youth's defenses can be breached.

Finally, however, Charity approaches Youth in exactly those material terms that he understands best: the use of money and goods has been characteristic of
Youth from the beginning. Thus when Charity advises him to 'save that God hath bought', the word 'bought' catches his attention.

Charity: And amend that thou hast miswrought
That thou mayest save that God hath bought
Youth: What say ye, Master Charity?
What hath God bought?

(1.686-89)

Youth points out that he has never met God and therefore God cannot have bought anything for him.

He came never at the stews
Nor at any place that I do use
I wis he bought not my cap
Nor yet my jolly hat
I wot not what he hath bought for me.

(1.692-6)

Charity embarks on an explanation of the scriptural significance of the term 'bought'. Youth quite sincerely seeks further information, which Charity supplies with a simple historical narrative of the Fall and the Crucifixion. When Charity explains the term 'bond', Youth understands at last, and resolves to save his soul by following Charity's further advice.

How should I save it? Tell me now
And I will be ruled after you my soul to save

(1.718-9)

Nevertheless, Youth's understanding is really most secure when spiritual terms are reified. He is still very close to the literal world of concrete action. Charity's further teaching responds to this need to express meaning in significant action:

Kneel down and ask God mercy
For that you have offended

(1.723-4)
When Riot and Pride address him, Youth is now deaf to them, apparently hearing only the virtues' speeches. He is provided with a new name, Good Contrition, as well as with new, sober clothes, and with a rosary. He is to conduct his relations with God and with his fellow man through the medium of language.

Here is a new array
For you to walk by the way
your prayer for to say

(1.757-9)

He is to try to give others good counsel about their misdeeds, and is thus now not merely virtuous, but also an agent of virtue. Where Repentance in Mundus & Infans was to be an example to others, Youth is to become a counsellor, instructing them verbally in the spiritual life.

When ye see misdoing men
Good counsel give them
And teach them to amend

(1.763-5)

The language that he uses for both these purposes will, of course, be the new metaphorical language of the spirit that he has just learned.

For my sin I will mourn
All creatures I will turn
And when I see misdoing men
Good counsel I shall give them
And exhort them to amend.

(1.766-770)

Like Mundus & Infans and Youth, The Castle of Perseveraunce contains a protagonist who is capable of leaving the chaos of physicality and vice-play to enter the Symbolic order, though in this case that takes place only at the last moment.
The Castle of Perseverance is a long and interesting play, and an exhaustive consideration of it is out of place here. Instead, it is appropriate to glance at the ways in which its handling of the moral play situation differs from that of Mundus & Infans. The plays are comparable insofar as both narrate man's moral dilemma over the whole of his life, adopting the traditional view that the ages of man define which vice is specific to any individual. The two plays differ most obviously in terms of scale: The Castle of Perseverance is much longer and its generous cast list of thirty-five characters requires almost as many actors, as there is little opportunity for doubling. Finally, it is apparently designed for a large-scale open-air production. Mundus & Infans is a miniature by comparison. However, as we shall see, The Castle of Perseverance treats man's moral development as an inherently simpler process than that which has been observed in Mundus & Infans.

First the audience is introduced to two systems, one of good and one of evil, broadly characterized by feminine and masculine stereotypes, respectively. Once the self-introductions are over, wrongdoing is represented by male heartiness and good-fellowship. The group of vices is an adolescent gang of macho males: their idea of pleasure is to cause Humanum Genus to join them in their loose living, and to accept the consequence of going to hell with a swaggering bonhomie. This devil-may-care masculinity is imaged through the large space of the platae where they move vigorously and freely. In addition to the Bad Angel, the evil characters here include the World, the Flesh and the Devil, three all-purpose vices called Pleasure, Folly and Backbiter, and the full complement of seven Deadly Sins. Of these only Lechery is female, and unlike the others she is manifestly not suggested as a rôle model for Humanum Genus. They offer him the usual temptations: money, power and fashionable clothes are assumed to be the most interesting, with assorted fleshly indulgences also available.

By contrast, the place of moral safety in which the virtuous life is conducted is a Castle containing the seven Moral Virtues, who are female: 'ladys in lond, louely & lyt,' (1.1670). In holding a fortress against male attack they put forward a
powerful symbol of the female. The virtuous life is safe, enclosed and peaceful. One might expect Humanum Genus to move between these two areas one or more times, on each occasion learning more about the true nature of spirituality, and perhaps developing some independence of judgment or clarity of vision, contributory to freeing himself from the vices. This pattern, the pattern of Mundus & Infans, of Mankind and of Everyman, is not realized. Instead, his education is postponed till the end of the play, as we shall see, and Humanum Genus spends the bulk of the play suffering from 'sudden conversion' symptoms of a peculiarly linguistic kind.

To begin with, Humanum Genus embodies a curious split personality, containing a knowing self and an ignorant self. The first appears to be aware of good and evil:

To aungels bene asynyd to me:
\[e\] ton techyth me to goode;
on my ryth syde \[e\] may hym se;
He cam fro Criste \[at\] deyed on rode.
Anolhyr is ordeynyd her to be,
\[at\] is my foo, be fen and flode;

(l.301-6)

That knowing self, however, is also aware that it may be easily submerged, and prays that he will be able to continue virtuous:

Lord Jhesu! to \[ou\] I bydde a bone
\[at\] I may folwe, be strete and stalle,
\[e\] aungyl \[at\] cam fro heuene trone.

(l.315-17)

When the two angels argue, Humanum Genus' confidence is immediately shaken. Even the 'knowing' self cannot hold itself independent of the alternative point of view, for the Bad Angel accosts the truth of the Good Angel's arguments. The two use similar verse forms, and even similar phrases:
Malus Angelus: Pes, aungel, þi wordys are not wyse.

Bonus Angelus: A, pes, aungel, þou spekyst folye.

(l.340)

(l.349)

Humanum Genus is totally confused:

Whom to folwe wetyne I ne may:
I stonde and stodye and gynne to raue.

(l.375-6)

The confusion is not because he is torn between good and evil, but because he does not know how much of each he is permitted. He wants both, but is unable to make judgements about them. While he tries to hold both ideas in his mind, he fears madness (l.376, quoted above), and a return to primal chaos:

As wynde in watyr I wave (l.379)

This inability to operate as a separate agent is an unmistakable stage indication of the struggle of the unformed self, and Humanum Genus' solution, predictably, is to follow whoever spoke last. His decisions, therefore, are only superficially made on rational grounds. Arguments are offered to him, but he can only echo the opinion of the last speaker. Thus for anyone who wants to keep Humanum Genus' allegiance, the trick is to buffer him from other speakers in the same way that Youth was buffered. This can be seen taking place as long as the Good Angel is on stage and outnumbered by the wicked characters (that is, as far as line 1298, when Confession enters). Whenever the Good Angel addresses Humanum Genus directly, the Bad Angel or one of the other evil characters interposes a speech which returns Humanum Genus to their side.

In this way, without having made any moral progress, Humanum Genus has accepted the wicked alternative. However he has not opted for chaos or freedom as opposed to order. Instead, he has submitted to a system bound by rules and conventions, where disobedience brings punishment. The Bad Angel may control him: 'but þou muste be at myn acord' (l.431) and he has no option but obedience:
And bere þe manly euere among,
Whanne þou comyst out or inne.

Humanum Genus, þys, and ellys haue þou my necke,

(1.436-38)

Coueýtse instructs Humanum Genus in correct behaviour:

þou muste þyfe þe to symonye,
Extorsion, and false asyse,
Helpe no man but þou haue why;
Pay not þi serwauntys here serwyse
þi neyborys loke þou dystroye.

(1.841-45)

The passage continues for a further twenty lines with the same imperative verb forms. Clearly Coueýtse is not giving advice, but a series of commands in 'þou muste'; 'pay not'; 'loke þou' (= be sure to), and so on.

Thus when Shrift, Penance and the Good Angel attempt to win Humanum Genus away from evil, he uses both rules and reference to authority to defend his way of life.

A, Schryfte þou art wel be note
Here to Slawthe þat syttyth here-inne.
He seyth þou mytyst a com to mannys cote
On Palme Sunday al betyme.
þou art com al to sone,
þerfore, Schryfte, be þi fay,
Goo forthe tyl on Good Fryday!
Tente to þe þanne wel I may;
I haue now ellys to done.

(1.1346-54)

Humanum Genus' conversion back to good is not effected through words, but through the touch of Repentance's lance, instilling sorrow into his composition
as a human being. Thus he has not so much learned something, as had his nature altered to include an emotion. This, which he lacked previously, is something personal and individual on which he can base judgements. An external third term has reached Humanum Genus. Only now can he devote himself wholly to repentance, and describe his sinful life as a madness: 'I was þanne wood, and gan to raue:' (l.1483). However a repentance which does not allow for a successful confrontation with the Bad Angel is not a particularly secure one. When the Bad Angel remonstrates with Humanum Genus, the Good Angel steps in to prevent Humanum Genus from answering him directly. And Humanum Genus' choice is still not an individual statement, but an echo: 'Goode Aungyl, I wyl do as þou wylt,' (l.1598). What the Good Angel has to offer as an alternative to the rules of macho society is now revealed to be the Castle of Perseverance. The virtues are attractive, but the price that Humanum Genus must pay for their protection is a high one - he must lose not just sin, but all vestiges of the active life.

We schul þe fend frô þi fon
If þou kepe þe in þis castel stylle.
Cum sancto sanctus eris, et cetera.

*Tunc intrabit*

Stonde hereinne as stylle as ston;
þanne schal no dedly synne þe spylle:

(1.1695-1699)

Thus virtue, imaged as female, is static to the point of moribundity, and Humanum Genus has exchanged one strait jacket for another. The alternative to the active life is usually the contemplative life, but Humanum Genus must go further, and become 'as stylle as ston'.

The forces of evil meanwhile are in disarray, cursing, scrapping, and accusing one another of letting Humanum Genus escape. 'A, Lechery, þou skallyd mare!' (l.1814) begins a nine line stanza of diatribe.
The villains launch an assault on the Castle, each Sin addressing the corresponding virtue, only to be defeated by reason. In this way, Humanum Genus continues to be protected from entering into verbal dispute - a combat which he would inevitably lose, as only someone who has entered the Symbolic order has the competence which allows him to hold his own in argument.

All are aware of Humanum Genus' weakness in debate, and it seems that the Virtues have protectively denied the Sins an audience with him. When Coueytysse approaches the Castle, he is answered by Generosity, but refuses to accept her remarks, insisting on speaking directly to Humanum Genus.

What eylyth þe, Lady Largyte,
Damysel dyngne upon þi des?
And I spak ryth not to þe,
þerfore I prey þe holde þi pes.
How, Mankynde! cum speke wyth me,

(1.2466-70)

By questioning Coueytysse, Humanum Genus invites him to hold the floor further. Humanum Genus has apparently learned a little during his sojourn in the Castle, and is not immediately persuaded. In putting forward the idea of 'my best frendys' as a description of the ladies (1.2517) he makes use of a moral term. However, he cannot sustain this notion against Coueytysse's re-definition of the phrase to assert that his purse is his best friend because money can buy him comfort in his old age (1.2520-2526). Even at this late stage of the action, Humanum Genus is still in an infantile condition, both linguistically and in terms of moral knowledge. The Virtues' mourning must be buffered from him by the World, lest he be affected.

Death now enters and promises to complete Humanum Genus' education: 'A newe lessun I wyl hym teche' (1.2832). Like Repentance in Youth, he does this extra-linguistically, by a blow on the heart. Again, the Real has intruded on Humanum Genus's Imaginary state. Though Humanum Genus recognizes what has
happened, he has not learned the lesson: like Everyman he turns to the World for assistance, basing his appeal on the friendship theme that has run through the play. 'Werlde, for olde aqweyntawns,/ Helpe me fro his sory chawns!' (1.2865-6). World, unable to help him, can now be recognized for what he is, as can the other false friend, Coueautyse:

Ow, Werld, Werld, euere worthe wo!

And tou, synful Coveutyse!

(1.2882-83)

and: the wytte of his werld is sorwe and wo: (1.2886). Humanum Genus curses them and begins the virtuous process of teaching others what he now knows: 'Be ware, good men, of his gysel!' (1.2887). Significantly, he achieves this point independently of any instruction by the Good Angel or the Virtues. Humanum Genus has one more lesson to learn: that he must abandon all connection with the world, even the emotional one of leaving his goods to his chosen heirs. The World, thinking to turn the screw on his anguish, unwittingly releases him to focus on God by assimilating the language of prayer and repentance. The World's name for his heir, 'I wot neuere who', stimulates in Humanum Genus' mind the memory of a verse from the Psalms: 'Tesaurijat, et ignorat cui congregabit ea.' (l. 2986). 49

For much of the play, Humanum Genus has failed to learn the nature of language. All he could do was to take on the form of whatever aspect of existence stood before him. Like the Manhood character in *Mundus & Infans*, Humanum Genus can now both understand the language of spirituality and hold himself up as an exemplary figure to educate others. Without further
instruction he comprehends fundamental tenets of the faith:

God kepe me fro dyspayr! (1.2990)

and:

To helle I schal bothe fare and fle
But God me graunte of hys grace.

(l.3001-2)

With his final breath he asks for mercy.

For a time, however, it seems that this may not be enough: his eternal fate will rest on his behaviour through life rather than his spiritual condition at the end of it. Is his repentance genuine? Has Humanum Genus really learned anything, or is he playing for his own best advantage? The four daughters of God debate the ambivalent quality of his life and death. Rytwysnes and Truthe hold to a hard line on punishment.

Ouyrlate he callyd Confescion;
Ouyrlyt was hys contricioun;

(l.3427-8)

God does not weigh their arguments. He resolves them with a simple unreasoned statement of his own nature:

I menge wyth my most myth
Alle pes, sum treuthe, and sum ryth,
And most of my mercy.

(l.3571-73)

God's decision, therefore, validates the learning process that Humanum Genus has gone through, and the understanding that he has achieved. In *The Castle of Perseverance* we see the 'sudden conversion' in parallel with its prevention by buffering speeches. A hint of the 'linguistic learning' process can also be detected when Humanum Genus begins to comprehend the application of Biblical language to his own life. However, one must note in conclusion that the play's main interest is not in the progress that man's understanding makes, so much as in a rich, detailed
presentation of the moral options open to the vacillating self. To that extent, this kind of drama glorifies and thrives on the self in its undifferentiated, formless state, as a vehicle for spectacle.

These early moral plays present us with a picture of the human being, almost invariably male, set about by enemies to whom he is most susceptible. This figure, from whom good and evil have been partly removed through the allegorizing process, tends to become a neutral ground whose principal attribute is to pass through an inevitable sequence of ages. He is peculiarly innocent. Thus any form of moral knowledge is alien to the human as he exists at the beginning of each of the plays discussed above. However, there is also a strong impression that such a person is not fully himself: that moral awareness is necessary in order to be properly human and to make meaningful choices between the available lifestyles. Both good and evil are externalized, but to use those terms 'good' and 'evil' is to subscribe to the value system of the plays. It is more revealing to consider how this external 'good' and 'evil' are constituted.

Virtue in most forms is represented as external to the mankind figure. It is a goal to be achieved, and involves the acquisition of knowledge, in terms of an acquired skill with metaphoric language. Otherness here is associated with the passage of time. However, the mankind figure's acquisition of virtue also involves submission to a set of rules. Thus the virtuous Other is equated with social expectation, and the mankind figure's internalisation of it with a change in social status. It brings a sense of maturity and confidence to the mankind figure, but for the plays this involves the denial of the otherness that the World and the later vice figures represent. With the vices constructed as they are, the mankind figure can interpret his repudiation of them as involving no harmful loss at all. That Other
defined by the plays as virtuous, then, involves: a) a set of imposed rules which allow some behaviours but exclude others; b) a passport to immediate social respectability; c) an apparent gain in the prospect of prosperity; d) an acquired linguistic system. Frequently, but not inevitably, there are also: e) a change in clothing or other props; and f) the use of verse instead of prose; or of longer lines and a stately rhyme scheme instead of more abrupt forms. It will be readily seen how relevant a Lacanian perspective is to this picture. The virtuous other has much in common with the Other with a capital 'O': the locus from which the Law of the Father imposes itself, and which is located in the Symbolic. An ideological move to locate this 'rule-making Other' as the self, and to construct the subject as happily contained by that position is really what these early plays encode. Indeed, some of the tone of that position creeps into even the most disinterested plot-summary.

Also implicated in the generation of the Symbolic order is the discovery of death - the radical other of life - which is used by the plays as the enabling factor from which metaphor is derived. It is here that one must locate Lacan's Real, as well as the zero that Age discovers in *Mundus & Infans*.

The second important other is equivalent in some of its characteristics to Lacan's *objet petit a*, the object of desire which language transcends and incorporates. In the plays it occurs as the Manichean other, namely the Devil and his agents, but also as the senses, physicality, and literality in language. It must be stressed that these summary equivalences are intended as no more than preliminary to the investigation which is to follow in Chapters Three and Four.
One movement of the early plays is to obscure the desired quality of this other further, through a social move which defines its area as foolish and unattractive, not to mention imprudent in its carelessness of time. Notoriously, that attempt yields in many instances to the attractions of that which it wishes to denigrate. Defined within the plays as evil, this version of otherness actively attempts to obstruct the development of a fuller awareness in the mankind figure. He is to be prevented from making informed or mature choices, for self-realization always leads to piety within the scheme of the plays. Thus the forces of evil are so defined because they are 'enemies' of the human in a most profound way. It is in its derivation from this concept of opposition that the term 'other' makes sense for the moral plays, and the conclusions that follow are in many ways as much conclusions about the vice figures as about the other.

The subject is blind to otherness. The first basic characteristic of the inimical other is that it goes undetected as such, at least by the main character. In all the plays examined in this chapter, the subject believes that the vicious life will not harm him, and further, he cannot even be properly aware that the dissipated lifestyle is vicious, because he does not understand the meaning of that term. We have seen that this blindness results from his own immature linguistic development and consequent inability to manipulate moral concepts. The mankind figure adopts habits of luxury and lavish dress with a kind of innocent vigour which is incapable of detecting the existence of moral dubiety beneath the glittering surface. In these early plays, the subject's innocence is such that the vices do not even need to conceal their true natures in order to go unrecognized as evil. There is an appealing frankness about their approaches to the mankind figure, and about his immediate identification with what they have to offer. This and the resulting fast pace are the
immediate dramatic benefits of constructing a protagonist who is subject to 'sudden conversions'. What is concealed from the subject is that the vice figures are actively opposed to his development as a complete human being. They obstruct his education in Christian morality, and are frequently active in plotting his damnation through an emphasis on the pleasures of the senses. On another level, their opposition to the mankind figure's progress means that the vices must oppose his insertion into language. Their preferred method for doing this is to exercise the comic, mocking effects of literalism to debase the spiritual remarks of the virtuous. It is the status of otherness as opposed to his best interests that the mankind figure is unaware of, even though the detailed description of evil is public. 53

The concealment of the other is facilitated by its basic characteristic as an object of desire. The specific nature of the desire itself is seen as constructed by the age of the subject: it is inevitable that the child will be wilful, the youth lecherous, and so on, as detailed over and over again by the many versions of the Ages of Man topos. In these early plays, the existence of physical desires coupled with moral innocence lead to the protagonist's immediate submission to anyone who offers him the appropriate reflection of his physical state, by making the Imaginary and the Real seem undivided. The subject does not differentiate between a desiring self and an object of desire, and so cannot operate any mechanism of choice. Thus the focus on physicality by the human enables him to interpret desire and its satisfaction as the same thing. He does not yet contain the idea of 'desire as loss', an inherent attribute of language. 54 It is because of its generation in lack, contingent on the fragmented nature of the individual, that this other is complementary to the individual, and so it, or more accurately, the image of its absence, can be said to be part of the self. The allegorical figures of the plays render concrete the projection of desire and so support the illusion that desire is external, and the self unitary. 55
Its relation to desire makes it all the easier for the plays' other to sustain a further characteristic: deceitfulness. The human figure wants to believe what the other has to say, however incredible it may seem, for the self wants to believe that desire can be satisfied, and so that the sense of lack is temporary. The feature of the other's lying becomes much more important in later morality plays, reaching its height in Cambyses, with Ambidexter, but even in the early plays the other can be deceitful about its true relationship with man. It represents itself as being his 'best friend' (Castle) and as loyal (Youth). Lying is essentially a manipulation, perhaps even a misuse, of language. Deceitfulness is interestingly implicated in the vice figures' own level of self-knowledge, and this is something to which each play has a unique approach. One may well ask how much the vices themselves know about time and the future. A key to this is in their fear of hanging, which they reduce to a joke in several plays. The vice figures sometimes show awareness that their function is against the mankind figure's 'best' interests. Such an awareness is problematic for discussions of subjectivity and otherness, for it gestures towards a construction of some kind of subjectivity in the vice figures. Each play copes with this situation in its own way.

Stemming from its physical nature as an object of desire is the penultimate characteristic of the other in this discussion, its literality. We have seen how the vice habitually takes remarks literally. Such an inability to comprehend metaphoric relationships leads the vices to their characteristic mockery of the virtuous as babblers. It also means that they are on occasion genuinely incapable of perceiving spiritual truths. Related to the literal approach is the characteristic belief that a name is a full description of what a person is, and indeed, should be. From this, one may say that both the vices and the immature self use only the most simple model of language: as a labelling system of signifiers, validated by and indissolubly linked with an objectively existing system of referents. Paradoxically, then, a deceit particularly characteristic of the vices is their tendency to glamorize the world
with attractive verbal descriptions and tempting lists. Similarly they turn the risks of the gallows into stock jokes while overlaying the realities of their dissipated lifestyle with verbal wit and racy monologues. The final deceit, then, is that what is promised cannot be delivered, for the literal world cannot live up to the charm of the word. It is within a deep-seated ambivalence about language that vices are excluded from that model of language as a cross-referencing system of signifiers, whose relationships are multiple and shifting. This latter is, of course, the model in which the good characters' spiritual discourse can have meaning.

It is only by recognizing the other that the protagonist can locate himself in that three-term relationship which constitutes both moral and linguistic maturity. Recognizing the other is not usually something that the subject can achieve on his own: he needs the assistance of the virtuous characters.

This brings us to the final important feature of the other. Although it is concealed and deceitful, as we have seen, its function is to be found out. In the first place, its status as enemy is always public to the audience. Thus, from the audience's point of view it is not an occluded other, but a carefully defined one, situated and detailed by the pressures of the dominant order. How this meticulous constraint can break down will be seen in the course of the next two chapters. The other must, however, be gradually discovered by the protagonist if he is to achieve the complete selfhood of moral maturity. The overt message is that this will be achieved by a subject who can exercise free will to make the correct decisions. Fundamental to that is a vision of a subject who cannot make choices until he is inserted into language by a discovery of the separation of self, object/other, and a third term, namely the constraints under which the relations between the first two may operate. To achieve salvation, the subject represented on stage must move to a condition of knowledge more nearly approximating that of the audience. In some cases this results in his perception of his own condition: he is a dramatic character,
a hollow man, an 'example' to others, but this condition fills him with satisfaction. He is not merely fully competent in language, but occupies a new location in it, as a linguistic term himself.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO


   See also E.K. Chambers, *The Medieval Stage*, 2 vols (London, 1903), II, p.155: 'the representative of humanity . . . is beset by the compulsion or swayed this way and that by the persuasion of allegorized good or bad qualities.'


4  See note 40, Chapter One.

5  Shoshana Felman's position on this seems admirable: 'Far from claiming that this frame of reference stands for the only valid or the most legitimate conception, my empathic stance - my intellectual adherence to this frame - is one of searching for the usefulness, the productivity, the creativity inherent in it: it seeks to derive and to explore the utmost inspiration that this frame of reference might be capable of yielding.' cit in note 1, p.8

6  J. Laplanche and J.B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (London, 1973), pp.250-251, define the Mirror Phase (or Stage): 'Though still in a state of powerlessness and motor incoordination, the infant anticipates on an imaginary plane the apprehension and mastery of its bodily unity. This imaginary unification comes about by means of identification with the image of the counterpart as total Gestalt; it is exemplified concretely by the experience in which the child perceives its own reflection in a mirror.'


7  The pre-Mirror Stage condition is discussed by Julia Kristeva in 'Freud and


9 Laura Mulvey puts this point with regard to cinema. One may 'use psychoanalysis to discover where and how the fascination of film is re-inforced by pre-existing patterns of fascination already at work within the individual subject and the social formations that have moulded him.' 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', in *Visual and Other Pleasures* (London, 1989), pp. 14-26, (p. 14).

10 References are to the edition in Schell and Schuchter.

11 Opinions about the date of composition of *Mundus & Infans* tend to fall into two camps: those who place it close to its date of publication by Wynkyn de Worde in 1522, and those who argue from stylistic evidence for an earlier date, around 1500 or even earlier. The first group finds its rationale first in de Worde’s own description of the play as 'a newe interlude’, and second in the opinion of Alois Brandl that 'the use of the *Narrenmotiv* points to a date of composition not long before that of publication': Introduction to *Quellen des Weltlichen Dramas in England vor Shakespeare*, 80 (Strasburg, 1898), p. xlii. Quoted by E.K. Chambers, this opinion has had considerable influence. One finds it subscribed to by Glynne Wickham in *Early English Stages*, 3 vols (London and New York, 1959-81), III, p. 163, where he locates the play c. 1510.

Curiously, Glynne Wickham is also to be found in the alternative camp of scholars who believe the play to be earlier. In *The Medieval Theatre*, third edition (Cambridge, 1987), p. 118, he describes the play as 'of fifteenth century provenance', here following Chambers' own opinion that it is 'one of the half dozen English moralities that can with any plausibility be assigned to the fifteenth century', *The Medieval Stage*, 2 vols (London, 1903), II, p. 440. This was also the
view of J. Payne Collier, in *The History of English Dramatic Poetry to the Time of Shakespeare and Annals of the Stage to the Restoration* (London, 1831), II, p.307, who gives the play more detailed consideration than most, and finally has 'little hesitation in assigning a date to the piece anterior to 1506.' Doubtless it is this opinion that the editor of the Tudor Facsimile Texts has assimilated in his note: 'Written (it is supposed) ... c.1500-6.' A.W. Pollard also feels that it 'cannot be assigned to a later reign than that of Henry VII', in the Introduction to *English Miracle Plays and Moral Interludes* (Oxford, 1923), p.li. One may notice that he leaves the earliest possible date open to question. For illumination one must turn to H.N. MacCracken's 'A Source of *Mundus & Infans*', *PMLA*, 23 (1908), pp.486-496, a most persuasive article ignored by all except D.M. Bevington. MacCracken locates parallels between *Mundus & Infans* and a poem of c.1430, the 'Mirror of the Periods of Man's Life; or, Bids of the Virtues and Vices for the Soul of Man'. He seriously, and correctly, questions Brandl's *Narrenmotiv* evidence, the only substantial point in favour of a date post-1500. MacCracken's linguistic evidence implicitly opens up the whole latter half of the fifteenth century for a possible composition date. For example, 'the continual rhyming of words in -y, -ye with words in -e goes to show that the play must have been written later than 1450.' p.486n.

Not only is MacCracken's discussion persuasive, it provides objective substantiation of the feeling that one has when reading the play, that it has close affinities with the older plays. It would be a pity if the unthinking repetition of Brandl's opinion by modern writers on the drama left us with an over-rigid view which is at best only a good guess.

12 Philippa Tristram offers a relevant detailed examination of the topos of Age as 'the spectacle of personified decrepitude.' *Figures of Life and Death in Medieval English Literature* (London, 1976), p.62.

convention. He also lists 'quarrels and brawls' among the characteristic activities of the Vice, p.394. See also F.P. Wilson, cit. in note 2, p.65.

14 This staging convention involving 'mansions and platea' is discussed in Glynne Wickham, cit. in note 7, I, pp.158-9, and p.243.


16 'over all fodes I am king' 1.4. Schell and Schuchter gloss 'fodes' here as dwellings. However, MED gives 'races' as a possible meaning, which seems to fit as a logical expansion of Mundus' claim to exercise comprehensive rule. If the 'realms' are places and the 'fodes' are the peoples in them, this is more coherent than a claim to rule over all places and, redundantly, all dwellings.


19 Wanton, for example, is involved with movement and with physicality. He sees himself as aggressively controlling the physical world: this is apparent in his active vocabulary: 'drive', 'hit', 'make', 'bleer', 'scratch', 'bite', 'cry', and 'kick'.

20 Because it occurs in a play, the condition of the unformed subject is, of necessity, rendered to the readers or audience analogically, through language. What that language describes is the pre-linguistic immersion in the senses.


22 Fighting is a reliable indication of the presence of the vices, who habitually
scuffle amongst themselves. Manhood is in danger of becoming one of them.

23 Although both Manhood and Folly use the word 'here' as well as 'there' to refer to their destination, it seems to make more sense to read both as 'there' since they are clearly talking about going somewhere else.

24 Philippa Tristram, cit. in note 12: Age is 'an outward spectacle, sometimes macabre, sometimes comic', p.63.


26 Interestingly, knowledge of the Symbolic at this point carries with it an understanding of a time-structure:

Alway, ere ye begin, think on the ending

For blame

(1.484-5)

27 Malcolm Bowie, in Lacan, Fontana Modern Masters (London, 1991), offers convenient definitions, which may help to point up the relevance of these terms to Mundus & Infans. He explains that this first other 'stood in for the world at large', p.165.

28 Bowie, 'it is anything and everything that desire touches, and cannot exist where desire is not', ibid., p.166.

29 Versions of this diagram appear in several places:


30 Professor Malcolm Bowie suggested Lacan's probable rejection of such an idea, personal communication, October 1991.

31 Bernard Spivack, Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil (New York and London, 1958): 'Among the early and medieval heresies that distracted Christianity none was more stubbornly rooted and recrudescent than the belief in a universe ultimately dualistic, with Evil a second, and competing godhead. Against the sects that held it, or seemed to hold it, the Church fought bitterly', p.75.

32 Anthony Wilden, System and Structure (London, 1972) is concerned with this difference in terms of 'analog' and 'digital' systems of communication, pp.155-200.

33 Or from the Imaginary order to the Symbolic. There is a problem with this terminology of 'escape' from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, in that it subscribes to the plays' own theory that literalism/worldliness is inferior.


35 All other costume changes in the play are covered by monologues from the remaining actor, a practise which is to be found throughout these plays for small companies.

36 Glynne Wickham has noted this difficulty, deciding that the rôle swap could be best effected 'given two actors of similar build and height': Early English Stages 1300-1660, 3 vols (London and New York, 1959-81), III, p.164n.

37 Now fair child I grant thee thine asking

(l.64)

For now I purpose me to play (l.73)
Now Manhood I will array thee new (l.195)
And here I dub thee a knight (l.198)
Now I will wend to the world, that Worthy Emperor

(l.119)
Now welcome Wanton my darling dear
A new name will I give thee here (1.123-4)
Aha, now Lust-and-liking is my name (1.131)

This list is far from exhaustive, but it gives an idea of the pervasiveness of the form of speech.

38 Lydgate's *Assembly of the Gods* is a fundamental example of the working through of the Microcosm image. The late morality *Lingua* is another, and is discussed at length in Chapter 5.

39 I use the edition by Ian Lancashire, in *Two Tudor Interludes* (Manchester, 1980), pp.101-152.


41 One finds an example of a mankind figure succumbing over-easily to a specious argument in Henry Medwall's *Nature II*, when pity for his old friend's sorrow returns Man to his friendship with Pryde. A variant example occurs in *Mankind*, when Mankind believes Tityillus' appearance in his sleep to be a dream revelation of the truth.

42 Lest it seem that this category must include all moral plays, one should notice the large group of plays, such as *Respublica*, in which the main figure is tricked into following evil disguised as good. The conversion there is not 'sudden', but has been effected instrumentally.

43 In a small number of plays, for example the fragmentary *Pride of Life*, the mankind figure remains in a pre-linguistic state, as no real learning process takes place. In plays such as *Respublica* and *Nature*, that particular learning process cannot be observed because the play opens with the protagonist already fully aware of good and evil, and so inserted into the linguistic order.

44 This is the first occurrence in the moral plays of a common joke, which could be read as a reference to Jacob's Ladder, and perhaps also to the 'ladder' on the gown of Philosophia, in Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, tr. H.R.
James (London, 1897). Of course, felons had to climb a ladder to be hanged, which may be one reason why Youth finds the idea of using a ladder unappealing.

45 D.M. Bevington in From Mankind to Marlowe (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p.72, suggests that twenty-five actors would be required to supply all the parts.

46 To avoid confusion with the better-known hero of Mankind, I shall refer to the protagonist in The Castle of Perseverance as Humanum Genus throughout, but retain the names of the other characters in English, as they appear in the speeches in the play.

47 This structure is repeated at the end of the play when the soul appears, separated from the body.

48 Youth, lines 580-684, discussed above.

49 That this change is a matter of knowledge can be seen from Folly's much earlier description of Humanum Genus' sinful condition:

\[
\text{Trewly Mankynde nowth nen can} \\
\text{ynke on God \textbf{\textit{at hathe hym bowth}}}
\]

(1.714-15)


52 This point will be developed in Chapter Five in relation to hierarchical control, especially that of the patriarchal order.

53 In later plays, with a more integrated subject, the vices must conceal the details of evil behind a cloud of lies and assumed names. Respublica, for example, in the play of the same name, is not morally undeveloped so much as rather dim and very gullible.

54 It is noticeable that these plays frequently refer to the satisfaction of physical desires without representing the scenes necessary to that satisfaction. The taverns,
brothels, and banquets do not appear on stage. A fuller discussion of the implications of this is contained in my work on *Hicks corner* in 'Four Tudor Morality Plays in the Light of Recent Critical Theory', (unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of Warwick, 1987).

It is interesting to see how closely Anthony Wilden's reading of Lacan fits this theory: 'the subject's profoundest desire to be 'One' again (to control the Other to whom he becomes subjected) is totally and absolutely irreducible. It is this desire for what is really annihilation (non-difference) that makes human beings human. And if we employ the insights of the mathematical metaphor as Lacan does in the later works, we realize that this primordial 'One' cannot be one at all, since one requires two. What it can be is *zero* . . . . . Zero makes a lack (but not a 'nothing') visible, and thus it provides for the linear movement of integers in the same way as *absence* constitutes the subject of the *Fort! Da!* who has previously known only the asubjectivity of total presence. The subject *is* the binary opposition of presence and absence, and the discovery of the One - the discovery of difference - is to be condemned to an eternal desire for the non-relationship of zero, where identity is meaningless.' Anthony Wilden, 'Lacan and the Discourse of the Other', in Jacques Lacan, *The Language of the Self*, tr. Anthony Wilden (Baltimore, 1975), pp.159-311, (p.191).

Some, however, would see its greatest exponent in Iago.

The satisfaction of observing that process is akin to the satisfaction of seeing an initiation ceremony successfully undertaken. The failed initiate, of course, becomes a sacrifice, in a pattern highlighted by René Girard in *Violence and the Sacred*, tr. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore, 1977; first published in French 1972).
CHAPTER THREE

THE VICE-Figure AND SEMIOTIC SYSTEMS

Evil is nothing but the absence of God; matter is nothing but the absence of spirituality in the world
John Scotus Eriugena

SECTION A: CONSTRUCTION OF THE OTHER

When the early moral plays establish the object of desire as other and then as adversarial and wicked, they balance that other against a conservative and restricted subject. Polarisation in turn feeds an impression of the self as unified, literally, as an 'individual'. From this the mankind figure becomes the humanist individual who can be represented as capable of self-determination.

The previous chapter demonstrated how the primitive, undifferentiated subject is transformed by a complex process in which the assimilation of language interacts with the discovery of otherness to produce a subject which can perceive itself in relation to morals and metaphor. The subject participates in the established order both by using this knowledge and by submitting to it.

A need not just to recognize the other but to reject it was presented by Mundus & Infans as inherent in these operations, for a view of the other as evil is implicit in the moral play's perception of the world as adversarial.\(^1\)

This chapter explores the nature of the transgressive other, who can conveniently be equated with the vice characters. For the moment, the Other of the Non/m du Père can be aligned with the self, in its polarization as a censorious, law-abiding citizen. It is important to bear in mind that a vice figure is a sign pointing towards otherness. It does not in itself constitute the other, but is an umbrella term for much but not all of the ramified characterization of otherness that the moral plays present. The link is so close that social abjection can be achieved by attaching
to the victim of abjection some of the casual features of a vice figure. This is a point which will be developed in later chapters.

The apparent success that comes to the mankind figure with the finding of metaphor is achieved at the cost of repressing the physical, the punning, and a particular kind of excess. When, in *Mundus & Infans*, Age is renamed Repentance and thus saved, his salvation is represented as part of a process which involves his dedication to a metaphoric language of the spiritual, and a related exclusion of the physical and literal.

Gramercy Perseverance for your true teaching

For in the spirit of my soul well I find

That it is necessary to all mankind

Truly for to know.

(1.957-60)

Because the metaphor that is discovered is presented as a total, exclusive truth, while literality is seen as a deception, the duplicity of language is recognized only as something to be conquered. The act of confession masters the mankind figure's own naughty past by covering it with language, and so appropriating it to virtuous purposes, but the allegorical representatives of evil are treated differently. A few simply vanish from the plot, most are dismissed with contumely, often to Hell, but sometimes to be hanged. Some are declared to roam the world, through a sinister eternity of corruption and temptation. In general, though, audiences who earlier in the performance relished the vice figures' subversive antics end by taking delight in their humiliation. This point suggests that one must not push too hard any notion of the audience's identification with the vice figure. He has more the character of a sacrificial victim, who is licensed to commit outrageous acts before being gleefully destroyed - in this case, in effigy. Humiliations, because they include both visual spectacle and intensity of emotion are particularly appropriate theatrical events. However, the rejection of the vice figure serves a subtler end than that of inserting the subject into language, and one which is most significant for the points that this
chapter will take up. It can be seen as a move in the construction of the subject as unitary.

So far it has seemed that the other must be repudiated for full selfhood to be achieved. We have seen that a vice figure, as an object of desire, is part of the self. In banishing that figure, the moral play offers the illusion that the individual’s past experience can be rejected. In covering past wickedness with language it also offers a related illusion of successful repression. The ejection of the vice figures therefore represents the repression of disreputable urges in the subject. Actually, then, a mutilation is involved in repression, for the other must effectively be cut out of the self in order to create an acceptable ‘good self’. Such a mutilation is intolerable to the subject, so its existence must be obscured, together with its occasion. The plays cope with this unbearable psychic dilemma by externalizing these unacceptable urges, characterizing the other as the vice figure, and then as grotesque and extreme. Further incidental characteristics may then be developed within these figures. It is impossible in this chicken-and-egg cycle to say whether vice figures are defined as alienated and so act as a convenient vehicle for additional features of otherness, or whether a mild form of otherness is unconsciously repudiated in abstract and then characterized in an exaggerated or repulsive way in the vice figures, thus rationalizing its rejection. The process as it is conducted within the plays is more than one of simple projection, it involves the creation of a character, followed by projection onto it of undesired additional features. The search for the self that the mankind figure pursues is therefore a search for an undivided self. The self is newly differentiated from the ‘outside’ - the World - in the process we have observed exemplarily in Mundus & Infans. Next it naively craves to establish itself as unitary. One might object that the moral plays assume the self to be complex, through their grounding in the allegorical tradition, for allegory represents numerous discrete aspects of the self as separate named individuals. From this it seems that allegory as a dramatic form begins by articulating a complex representation of a multiple self. However, as soon as one of the allegorical figures
represents humanity, allegory also conduces to a picture of the self as unitary, and of psychic conflict as external. The position in this case becomes one of simple paranoiac projection. The 'true' self that can cope with the spiritual through the language of metaphor suffers from the delusion that evil can be abolished. This it effects by projecting all evil onto the vice figures.

In exploring the content of that category of the repressed manifested in the vice figure, one can also assess the price which the mankind figure pays in order to sustain a sense of personal indivisibility. To do this it is essential to rehearse here some familiar material.

Peter Happé establishes a comprehensive list of the Vice's characteristic behaviours. Happé's list is extremely lengthy and detailed, and simply bursting with exemplifications. That in itself poses problems of emphasis and direction. His solutions are, either to direct his discussion towards a search for the homiletic point of each of the Vice's typical activities, or else to see them as designed to entertain a relatively inattentive audience. In the context of the present analysis, his list is a useful foundation from which certain of the more important attributes which he mentions, as well as some that he does not, can be discussed in terms of their significance for the self as areas of repression. For the sake of clarity and coherence, it seems preferable to begin by listing these features in fairly general terms, before moving on, in Section B, to examine how a large number of them are exemplified in operation in a single play, Mankind. Those characteristics which involve ways of using language are particularly interesting, as it is in the realm of language that the individual crucially attempts to find itself. As we have seen, the self which it is the play's project to define is designated partly by labelling certain linguistic practices as belonging to the other, and hence as unacceptable. Most critics agree that the plays offer a rich enjoyment of those aspects of language they wish eventually to decry. The dominating tendency of vice figures is towards excess in all things, related to that branch of their ancestry which goes back to the Deadly Sin of Pride. It is marked by an express opposition to moderation or the
mean, whereas the mean is often advocated by the virtuous characters. There are various reasons, foreshadowed above, why physicality and language use are difficult to separate completely. One example is when abrupt verse forms image the vice figures' vigour as well as asserting it. However, for the sake of comprehensibility I shall consider these traits in several categories, namely i) Physicality, ii) Verbal features, iii) Controlling moves, iv) Lying and double-dealing, v) Relations with Women, and vi) Music, Singing and Noise. I shall label separate characteristics P1, P2 etc., V1, V2 etc., to enable ease of reference in the discussions of individual plays. There is considerable cross-referencing among these categories, and the closing sections in which I discuss Transgression, and The Vice Figure as Supplement in many ways act as a summary of the others. I hope that the cross-referencing to Peter Happe's thesis, though it extends the discussion somewhat, may also be of use in helping readers to find their way around that important reference work. These cross-references appear as: (H, page number).

i) Physicality of the vice figure. A concentration on the physical life is the most immediately obvious attribute of vice figures. Vice figures operate in crews, typically of one chief and either two or three subordinates (P1) (H, 398). Happe sees a greater distinction between the Vice and his associates. However, in many cases the vice-crew's behaviour and diction is very much of a piece with that of the principal Vice. One is led astray if one considers rustics and lower-class victims to be members of the vice-crew. The Vice and his crew are inordinately vigorous (P2), bursting into activities such as dancing, wrestling and brawling (H, 385) at the least provocation. They eat and drink to excess and offer the mankind figure journeys to the stews and to taverns full of meat and drink (P3). Gluttonous excess is their response to the often moderate wishes of the virtuously tired or hungry mankind figure. Such excess is represented by lists of wines (as in The Four Elements) and by proto-Rabelaisian bragging. Their frankness about bodily
matters may appear as a lack of inhibition about defecation, and what Bakhtin calls the 'lower parts' generally (P4).

The vice figures' easy access to sex (P5) (H, 378) is often connected with that to food and drink through their common location in the tavern. Vice figures are typically on familiar terms with a selection of whores all endowed with 'smattering' faces. They occasionally offer the mankind figure introductions to these women, just as they offer food and drink.¹³

Another offshoot of the physical life is the fighting and brawling that vice figures typically go in for (P6) (H, 375; 391-4). Connected with their fighting is the famous vice's dagger, with which they may fight with others or alone (P7). This latter curious habit occurs as a stage direction,¹⁴ which I take to indicate flailing around, opponent-less, in a manner which could appear to be either comic or sinisterly deranged. Some fights appear as a mock tourney, involving the use of kitchen utensils as armour (P8).

Vices show clear indications of ubiquity, which one might reasonably regard as the ultimate physical excess (P9). This is suggested by their tendency to appear whenever the pious figures leave the stage, and to be called up readily by the merest mention of their names. In this they resemble the Devil, from whom they in part derive.¹⁵ Dramatically it is convenient and somewhat sinister that they can arrive very much pat on cue.¹⁶ Further evidence of their omnipresence can be seen in the 'marvellous voyage' through many lands, of which numerous principal Vices boast, usually to the point of incredibility.¹⁷ Parallel to the vice figures' ubiquity in space is an imperviousness to time (P10) (H, 384, refers to their 'prophetic power and knowledge of events'). Again resembling the Devil, vice figures may leave the stage, but they are not killed. Even when they are ultimately punished by banishment, often to Hell (P11), one has a sense that they can easily return, for the quality of an abstraction such as Greed or Mischief is to be resurrected in every human being. They can thus continue as long as the human race does. This perennial quality sorts awkwardly with the anxieties about hanging, to which these
same figures habitually return in their conversations and their abuse.\textsuperscript{18}

The next attribute of vice figures that must be mentioned here is their class, since that is constitutive of and constituted by their material condition (P13) (H, 356, 'Vice taken on as servant'; H, 377, 'Vice and associates as thieves'). They are most commonly 'masterless men': tinkers or horse thieves, or in later plays, cony catchers. In the sixteenth century a 'masterless man' was seen as outside the proper social structure, in which one either owned property or was employed by (and so tied to) someone who did. Other modes of existence were seen as dangerous, and probably criminal.\textsuperscript{19} In addition, vice figures sometimes claim to be ex-sailors or ex-soldiers. Genuine ex-sailors and ex-soldiers were licensed to beg by Henry VIII, as a means of controlling those sturdy beggars who operated illicitly. By purporting to have returned from the wars, vice figures claim a position within the social order, albeit a lowly one, to which they are not entitled. Occasionally leaving their extra-social position, vice figures may become servants for a time, but there is no feeling of permanence or sincerity about such arrangements.\textsuperscript{20} Although they are generally poor, these low characters evince a love of fine clothing and a strong wish to sport the latest fashions, particularly if these are extreme and hence ridiculous or impractical in some way (P12) (H, 429, 'bizarre appearance').\textsuperscript{21} This, needless to say, is another characteristic they share with Pride. It seems to be a natural extension of their relation to the Deadly Sin of Avarice, as well as coherent generally with their close relationship with material goods, that vice figures are often usurers (P14) (H, 377). It is probably a perceived link between that and a traditional stage characteristic of Devils that also gives them large or 'bottle' noses, and sometimes large heads, as more specific versions of their generalized physical grotesquerie (P15).\textsuperscript{22} I have mentioned several times that vice figures are connected with the Devil. This feature is occasionally foregrounded as lineal descent (P16).\textsuperscript{23} Thus, though the principal Vice is generally represented as external to human systems of organisation, it is possible to locate him, and in part to contain him, in that very social structure, the family.
ii) **Verbal features of the vice figure.** Parallel to and often linked with these physical features are the vice figures' verbal characteristics. Quite simply, they are inordinately garrulous (V1), which is of course another area of excess. This linguistic excess is inextricably bound up with physical excess as I suggested above. Indeed, excessive behaviour is often presented purely in linguistic terms: the 'lemans', the food and the wine are described, not shown, and so exist in the moral play primarily as language.\(^{24}\) The things referred to collapse into the 'idle language' in which they are represented.\(^{25}\) Another verbal feature is the vice figures' interest in one another's exploits (V2). They question one another about their lives in the elsewhere of off-stage and before-now. The atmosphere thus generated creates a warm feeling of a loose informal society, and is connected with the physical intimacy of brawling. (Vice figures always forgive one another their brawls.) They typically converse on these matters in a way which is sometimes, but not always, dramatically useful in furthering the plot. Their questions and the often digressive responses feed an impression of camaraderie, and even of a very human concern for one another.\(^{26}\) The vice figures tease one another about the possible consequences of their lifestyle: it is they, far more than the virtuous characters, who habitually refer to the dangers of hanging and going to Hell (V3). It is natural in connection with their thieving habits that vice figures are very conscious of hanging (H, 372, 'Either he is punished, usually by hanging, or he is threatened with such a punishment and escapes. The number of escapes is small. The effect of an escape is to show that the Vice is irrepressible and will live to fight another day'.) In fact, Happé is mistaken here, for the commonest fate of the vice figure is banishment.

Vices are braggarts (V4), a characteristic they share, once again, with the Deadly Sin of Pride (H, 374, also draws the connection with the Miles Gloriosus. H, 375 and 376 refers to their cowardice.) Their more protracted flights of narrative are extremely self-centred.\(^{27}\) Individual vice figures may command a wide variety of styles from repartee to argument to narrative monologue. This
versatility (V5) (H, 404) is noticeable in their love of parody. Principal Vices are particularly skilled at persuasive argument (V6) (H, 357), and in this lies their threat to a mankind figure accustomed to debate.

The vice figures abuse conventional language forms by blaspheming and using foul language (V7) (H, 400, 'oaths and obscenities'; H, 402, 'a sort of know-all naughtiness'), a habit which seems contradictory in the light of their linguistic and casuistic skills. The habit results from the fact that vice figures, even principal Vices, are generally responsive rather than initiatory in conversation with the virtuous characters. Only after a pious character has made some remark can the vice figures exercise their disruptive skill upon it. The characteristic diction of the pious characters is one of logical argument. Their reasonable tone is mocked through parodic nonsense phrases (V8), while aureation and Latinity are mimicked in abusive dog-Latin (H, 403 mentions the Vice's similar, but not identical, 'logic-chopping and . . . use of Latin tags'). We have seen in the previous chapter that the over-arching structure of holy metaphor is attacked by the vice figures' ludicrous literalisms, with which they manipulate opportunities for double-meaning (V9). The insistence on literalism seems like stupidity, but it also works transgressively. In that way it is like 'Carnivalesque discourse' which 'breaks through the laws of a language censored by grammar and semantics'. 28 The vice figures' moronic misunderstandings carry shock value on several levels. The first comes from the cheek with which they confront authority. The second comes from their stunning stupidity: the audience can easily see that the vice figures' readings involve a lesser understanding rather than a greater. Yet there is a sense in which these literal readings put themselves forward as having considered and rejected the elaborate form, in favour of 'common sense'. What they offer is a refusal to be involved in the spiralling play of meaning of metaphoric language. In this context, then, the small-scale coarseness and knowing sniggers of V7 have the overt function of distracting language from more serious purposes.

The vice figures' jokes take the form of puns or wilful mishearings (V10).
On other occasions vice figures expose the gullibility of the mankind figure to ridicule by accidentally-on-purpose uttering a true opinion, then quickly retracting it and offering a similar-sounding honourable remark instead (V11) (H, 405). A variant on this trait occurs in a very few plays where a vice figure says 'well, 'tis well', when in fact dissatisfied.

Principal Vices are addicted to discursive and often digressive monologues (V12) (H, 369 - 'passages of self-explanation which may be in the form of a soliloquy'). Many opportunities for these occur, but the autobiographical monologues already mentioned in connection with ubiquity about impossibly protracted journeyings through many countries, and adventures in many towns, usually within England and France are especially popular (H, 395-97). Happé treats these narratives as if they described real occurrences, but sees that 'there is something other-worldly about such journeyings which suggests that the Vice represents a perennial evil.' Another aspect of their responsiveness to the spoken word has been mentioned in connection with ubiquity: they can hear and be conjured up, like any devil (V13).

The vice figures are particularly addicted to proverbs and sententiae (V14) (H, 411): though other characters use these from time to time, they are most consistently used by vice figures. Contrary to first impressions, proverbs are a mode of ambiguity and of language play, as will be made clear in the analysis of The Tyde Tarryeth No Man. Happé draws attention to a further quality of otherness occasionally present in the vice figure's speech, namely a tendency to be distinguished from the speakers around him by the use of contrasting verse forms (V15) (H, 412).

iii) controlling moves. Before proceeding to list the principal Vice's methods of control and the areas which he attempts to dominate, it is important to establish why control is important to this character.

The principal Vice wishes to control the mankind figure in order to engineer
his spiritual destruction. This seems a simple and obvious enough aim at first blush, and is clearly linked with the principal Vice's own close relationship with the Devil. However, it often appears that it is the Devil as Pride who is the principal Vice's nearest relative (H, 40). Understanding this point is crucial to an understanding of the underlying coherence which structures the principal Vice's apparently wild and random disruptions. It is as Pride that this character is egocentric and boastful; as Pride that he wishes to fill the stage with his own voice and presence, and as Pride that he is addicted to the first person, and to repetitions of his own name. His self-assertiveness can be detected to extend even so far as other people's identities, on those occasions when he insists on re-naming his followers. From this point of view, it seems equally true to recast my initial proposition that the vice figures take the forms they do in order to destroy the mankind figure, by saying that the vice figure wishes to engineer the mankind figure's spiritual destruction in order to assert his own existence and power. Because the moral high ground is already occupied, those intent on asserting themselves in opposition have little choice but to occupy a position of viciousness, and make that seem as attractive as they can. Seen in this way, some of the oddly obscure motivations of famous vice figures become more explicable. It is this desire for self-assertion that leads vices and vice-like figures such as Ambidexter and Iago to operate at times in defiance of their own best interest as credible human beings, (H, 160, 'recklessness and self-seeking'.

Joining a battle for control is the principal Vice's fundamental response to any situation. Further, he can be seen to make controlling moves in several clearly definable areas. He wishes to control the other characters: firstly his unruly crew (C1) (H, 285), through beatings and orders; and secondly the mankind figure (C2), through argument and appeals to his physical needs. He adopts a tutelary relationship towards both the vice-crew and the mankind figure (C3). He also attempts to control the audience. A vice figure's virtuosity with language allows him to overstep the bounds of the stage and enter into colloquy with the audience
(C4) (H, 120 and 282ff.), both through his use of knowing asides and of monologue. Each of these techniques can generate a collusive atmosphere quite different from the response invited by other characters.\(^36\) (H, 368-370, notices the use of asides, but sees the practice either as a device for communicating the intrigue to the audience or as a means of uttering moral truths.) Vice figures attempt to control the overt plot by re-defining the good characters as mockable, impractical, boring, and incomprehensible (C5). At a deeper level the principal Vice's frequent formation of schemes, and their working through, locate him as an alternative author (C6),\(^37\) and this creative streak is recognized by that freedom to improvise (C7) which stage directions on occasion specifically give to the Vice and other low characters. He is thus to a large extent in control of the audience's enjoyment of the play.

The vice figure's wish to control occurs in opposition to the control already exercised by the pious figures through their sermonizing claims to possess understanding of total truth. The pious speeches carry considerable authority and the respectability of being the received opinions of the class of government. It is against this extra-textual background that a vice figure's attempts at control appear rebellious, rather than simply part of the ordinary machinery of the plot. The text thus subscribes to a high/low opposition in which the virtuous sermon is proper, even authorial, and the vice figures come from elsewhere, from 'another stage', to pull down established authority.\(^38\) The urge to control, taken in conjunction with the later Vice's notorious unreliability, leads to a significant development in those later plays where vice figures enter a Romance plot: the so-called 'hybrid plays', of which the principal examples are Common Conditions, Clyomon and Clamydes, and Cambyses.\(^39\) Here, the principal Vice's opposition to human good is subtly altered into the quality of ambidextrousness - the ability or even the compulsion to 'play on both sides'.\(^40\) In other words, this kind of vice figure may alternately serve the hero's needs and operate against him, with equal sincerity. Serving the hero in this case is no longer always a mask. At this point, the vice figure has
ceased to function as an agent of the Devil, and is regarded as a representative of that randomness, or ill luck, which the Romance plot requires to initiate the wanderings of its courtly subjects. In this way the character of allegorized evil survived the move into 'realistic' secular plots, when the 'Vice comes to represent the uncanny destructive forces in the human environment' (H, 305).

iv) Lying and Double-Dealing. The vice figure's penchant for lying and double-dealing arises in part from his function as alternate author, for it is in order to re-direct the plot, or to disrupt a stable situation that a vice figure deliberately perverts the truth. His lying takes various forms, most of which are essentially verbal traits. In addition to the simple utterance of falsehood (L1) (H, 261), he may re-interpret the virtuous character's counsel in order to lure the mankind figure into dissolute ways (L2). He may appeal to literality disguised as common sense in order to re-direct the mankind figure's good intentions (L3). Both of these modes involve alternative interpretations of an accepted remark. Deceitfulness came to be so widely recognised as central to the character that it is often specifically referred to, and is combined with the concept of infidelity in some cases. Originally an allegorical figure from religious polemic, infidelity could also be used to refer to social or personal betrayal. 'Ambidexter' is the name of the vice figure in Cambyses (1569/70), and the idea of helping or hindering both parties in the play recurs in several later vice-plays (L4). In addition to betraying their masters, vice figures also betray one another (H, 302). Lying is often intensified when the lie involves the conveying of a false message, or a false letter (L5). Deceit of this kind is not the alternative meaning embodied in cynical or worldly remarks, for these act to question the idea of unitary truth by suggesting that the world might be subject to alternative interpretations. Instead, this variety of the vice figures' deceit, like L1, is manifest falsification of verifiable fact. As such, it shores up the concept of 'truth' by opposing falsehood to it. Hence it is a conservative move, in the sense that it preserves the framework of belief in a real world, in which
concepts of truth and falsehood are valid. To this extent, the vice figures' practice of lying subscribes to the established structure, rather than subverting it.

One only partly incidental function of the lies is to promote plot, for they create an area of misunderstanding or muddle. From those misconceptions come further actions, frequently those in which the mankind figure goes wrong in some way. Thus, Common Condition's connivings in *Common Conditions* (1576) are a direct cause of the troubles that follow for Sedmond and Clarisia. In this way, the vice figures' lying puts the moral play in a position to go beyond the old-style Ages-of-Man plot which we have seen functioning with a rather deterministic effect in *Mundus & Infans* and *Youth*. That plot form can be amplified, through the vice figures' lies, with detailed remarks and events, sometimes of an almost random nature, and with the naturalistic responses to those situations which the mankind figure and the virtuous figures must then make. Lies which have affected the plot in this way mean that the conclusion can - even must - involve some unravelling of events, in addition to the conventional exposure of the vice figure for what he is. This development of techniques of intrigue and dénouement in moral plays feeds directly into the plot techniques of the Romance tradition, as the example from *Common Conditions* implies. Such a perception suggests that the so-called 'hybrid' plays - the moral play/Romances - have a more logical genealogy than is commonly supposed.45

The name-changing which is so significant to many vice plays (L6) (H, 364; 366; 368)46 also falls into the category of alternative interpretation mentioned above. Although the intention of name-changing is to deceive the virtuous character into accepting the company of the evil ones, the false names are themselves always alternative interpretations of the original name.47 In *Respublica*, for example, Adulation is renamed Honesty, and in that way the kind of flattery that turns a prince's head claims that it is merely a frank statement of the truth. It is exactly that question of where the line lies between honest description and invented, excessive praise that is morally problematic. Oppression in the same play is re-
named Reformation, and certainly there is a grey area where the same political acts may be interpreted as tending towards the former or as a necessary, stringent version of the latter. For this reason, the name Reformation is the perfect disguise when Oppression sets out to mulct the populace under Respublica's very eyes. Interestingly, Avarice, the chief vice in that play, takes for himself the still profoundly ambiguous name of Policy. Although 'Policy' may be read as 'good political counsel', it also has familiar overtones of the deceitful, the Machiavellian. At this point, Avarice is perhaps indulging in a condensed version of V11, above (saying the truth aloud and then retracting it by offering an innocuous, similar-sounding phrase).

It seems, then, that the name-changing convention involves satiric tendencies. This capacity also enables the character of the vice figure to generate a serious discussion of established orders, and how they operate to establish themselves through language. He can act as an Orwellian de-bunker of the practice of re-writing language for political purposes. At the same time, the convention of name-changing points up the malleability of language: the susceptibility of meaning, particularly of moral terms, to slide. Thus name-changing creates an area where meaning is overtly 'solicited'. (This subject is investigated further in Chapter Four.)

Anne Ferry discusses the use of names, and specifically the form adjective-noun as a single name. This is a form used by many vice-characters. Given that a name is seen as ontologically linked with the thing it belongs to, then in changing their names the vice figures could, in the sixteenth century, be perceived as stealing the possession of another. They are, in that case, operating as thieves on a linguistic level, as well as in the material world.

v) Relations with Women. Among the vice figures' identifying features are details which connect them with women. Such connections can take the form of simple association, but they can on occasion be relationships of similarity. Similarity can
construct structural identity in some plays.\textsuperscript{50}

We have seen that vice figures have access to illicit sex as part of their location in and near taverns (W1) (H, 378). In connection with this, they are given to knowing remarks about women, and their coarse language frequently tends towards sexual innuendo (W2) (H, 401). That relationship looks like one in which women are dominated, offered as commodities like food and drink. However, in relation to women a vice figure can himself take on the aspect of a victim (W3). Within marriage, vice figures are often battered husbands, reversing their usual physical ebullience. They report or take part in comic rows, denigrating their wives as shrews (W4) and claiming to live in fear of both their sexual demands and their physical violence. It might be objected that this attitude is not particularly remarkable, being a conventionally cynical view of marriage. However, it is a consistent trend that marriage is associated with the vice figures. By contrast the pious 'happy endings' of the moral plays rarely allow the hero any emotional or sexual life outside his dedication to holiness. The 'Wit' plays stand alone in permitting him even so much as a highly formal version of matrimony, until the hybrid Romance/Moral plays become popular in the 1570's. To take the contrast further, the newly pious mankind figure generally concludes the play by ceasing to be associated with social or physical life at all. He becomes an object lesson to the rest of society, and thus alienated from his peers.

It is appropriate at this point to describe how the vice figures' linguistic habits usurp categories conventionally, and pejoratively, applied to women.\textsuperscript{51} Women, too, were and are reckoned to be excessive talkers (W5). In addition, their discourse is deemed to be empty (W6) or illogical (W7), the first because concerned with detail and personality ('gossip') rather than abstractions; the second because of an assumption of female mental incapacity. All of these attributes are assumed by vice figures time after time. The female and the principal Vice are again conflated when both are seen as dangerously persuasive, often to an almost mystical extent (W8). Psychoanalytic theory has shown how the process of infantile
identification makes the mankind figure amazingly easily persuaded into accepting the principal Vice's propositions. The picture of the female as temptress substitutes very naturally in that relationship. Uncontrolled sexuality is attributed to both women and vice figures. Politicke Perswasion, the Vice in Patient Grissil claims: 'I am kyn to a woman in all poynts ile haue my will.' (1.1230), while Ill Report in Susanna actually declares that he is a woman, in the course of the conventional refusal to reveal his name (1.504-5). Finally, one can refer the vice figures' interest in the vanities of fashion to a conventional view of women, in addition to its more usual moral play application to young men and to nobles. The two come together in the entrance of Mary Magdalene in the Digby play, trifling with her garments, and in the dandy Nichol Newfangle's comments in his first monologue in Like Will to Like, expecting a special relationship with women:

How say you woman? You that stand in the angle

Were you never acquainted with Nichol Newfangle

(1.47-8).

vi) Music, Singing and Noise. A potentially intriguing side of vice-activity is a predilection for music-making in general and singing in particular (M1) (H, 386;397). It may be perceived immediately that singing involves a combination of the physical, the verbal and the artistic. It also necessitates discipline and a cooperative attitude in order to create an object of art. Fools who 'sing the foot of many songs' in a silly, disjointed kind of way do occur, but are rarer. Moros in The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art is the clearest instance. Even in that case considerable skill was needed to make such a performance effective. The moment when the vice figures sing is a moment when the skill of these apparently clownish actors becomes very obvious to the spectator. At that moment, in fact, they must step out of rôle as idiots and thugs. One ground for denigrating actors was that they were only playing, that is, they were doing for profit that which ordinary people did for recreation. The unaccompanied rounds and partsongs which
form the musical diet of the moralities require both talent and training. In its demand for ensemble playing, partsong may be regarded as an image of playmaking itself, and so as a public assertion of the professionalism of the players.

Song acts as another of the vice figure's controlling devices. It occupies the auditory space, precluding other dialogue (M2). It is like monologue in that it can slow the plot down: improvised action may go on during a song, but the plot is unlikely to be furthered until the song is over. In this, singing is a controlling move, which, like the garrulity of V1, takes control of the audience's attention by occupying the stage, often with quite mindless nonsense. Secondly, a song often signals the arrival or (more frequently) the departure of characters, adding to a sense of climax or completion. In this way, controlling the pace and articulating scenes, the vice figures' songs structure a play (M3). It is also relevant to notice here that the sixteenth century still perceived a relation between carmina (songs) and the charm that kept away the Devil. The possibility that a song might be incantatory links singing with the vice figures' habits of conjuring up the Devil, and with their capacity to be unnaturally persuasive.

Other areas where the vice figures' noise-making capacities are significant are their habit of loud, insincere weeping (M4) (H, 387-8); and their equally loud, demonic laughter (M5) (H, 389-90). Both of these activities share the feature of seeming to be wildly or even hysterically out of control, and hence contain the possibility of being frightening. Whether fighting, laughing, weeping or singing, vice figures fill the auditory space. Their noise functions as a controlling move, preventing virtuous characters from speaking, but it also acts as a coded indication that a particular character should be read as a vice figure.

It can be seen from this material that much vice activity can be subsumed under the concept of excess. Their out-of-bounds behaviour is an apparent challenge to the constituted order of society - most obviously in the vice figures' thieving and lying, but also in their self-assertive grasping for a socially
unacceptable proportion of license. In their manifest wish to usurp authority over the direction of the plot they overstep the bounds of a representational drama, an overstepping which was so popular and so widely used as to re-define the fundamental qualities of the moral play genre itself.

There is a real issue here about the nature of transgression. The low characters are clear manifestations of carnival in their grotesqueness, their physical excesses and their coarse language. In the moral plays transgression can be either radical or conservative on different occasions. The more outrageous the transgression, the more conservative the final effect, for then the audience is invited to locate otherness and transgression as alien with respect to itself. In that case, the audience is aligned in the course of the play with the existing forces of censoriousness.

The magnitude of this feat of audience alignment can only be appreciated when one considers the positions which individual members of theatre audiences occupied in society. Attacks on the theatre suggest that playhouses were filled with thieves, whores and drunkards. In addition, it seems that they were frequented by variously idle and violent apprentices, and simple gulls. Even after making allowances for the highly partisan qualities of these tracts, and for their relatively late date, we must accept that many members of the audiences for public performances were likely to be on the low side of a high/low opposition. The carnival aspect of vice-play offered them the chance to participate in ritualized attacks on the social structure, while simultaneously offering the comforting thought that there were many people nastier, more vicious, and more stupid than themselves in the world. The latter locates the audience on the high side of that same high/low opposition.

In his rôle as alternative author, and also in his relationship to the audience, a vice figure may be seen as a Derridean supplement to the line which the moral play must take. In plays where he operates as an extra author, he creates an excess of authors, and so is supplementary to the requirements for constructing a
play. Through that function, a tension between the authentic author and the rival is generated outside the narrative at the level of abstract plot, which is additional to the intramural tension between good and evil. As a performer who relates to the audience directly, a vice figure adds a supplementary activity to the simple plot in which he tempts mankind from virtue. Once again, it would be sufficient to the moral play's didactic purposes to present the action of the narrative. The virtuous characters address the audience directly, in the formal relationship of a preacher to a congregation. To this the principal Vices add that special kind of collusive, subversive relationship, imitating the rapport of more personal social interactions amongst friends. They specifically appeal to a sense that they are enacting the audience's true feelings, and hence that the audience can readily identify with their attitudes and motives.

In addition, the vice figures are supplementary in the moral play in the sense that they are a necessary part of it, without which it would not be complete. They are the other which is needed if man is to exercise free will. Nevertheless, they are the other which needs to be obliterated, in order to realize happiness. The mankind figure who concludes a moral play is doomed to be one thing or another - the plays permit no synthetic, inclusive resolution. One might say that the Aufhebung offered by 'know thyself' is denied by the totalizing negative that can be read in 'nothing in excess'. Constructing decisions as simplistically binary allows the plays to constitute man as a self-determining individual in the humanist mode.
SECTION B: THE VICE FIGURES IN MANKIND

We can see many of these typical vice-features operating together in Mankind, though one might turn to any of the moral plays at random and find numerous vice characteristics exemplified. As Peter Happé points out, any one vice figure need only manifest a few features from the total available in order to identify himself to an audience. In this again we observe how different each moral play is from its fellows, and how far contrary to the evidence it is to see these plays as repetitious and therefore inevitably boring. One must view the theoretical analysis given above as a kind of supermarket from which the ingredients to make up individual vice figures are selected. Of course, there is no 'typical' vice figure or 'typical' moral play. The types are always realised in different ways, but the realisation depends on the type. For this reason, it is a simple process for vice-characteristics to proliferate in number and ramify in detail over time. Like other early moralities, Mankind contains a large number of 'evil' figures, and they occupy a relatively large portion of the play. It offers, therefore, many opportunities for observing vice behaviour. In addition, the play's popularity in modern times can be seen from the several editions and performances it has stimulated. Insofar as any moral play verges on the canonical, Mankind does. For that reason, too, it seems a worthwhile area in which to test the benefits of a new approach. It will help to reveal what kinds of otherness the hero, Mankind, is called on to reject, the terms of that rejection, and the kind of self that is finally constructed.

In contrast with the 'whole life' plays analysed in the previous chapter, Mankind dramatises a small number of crisis points, concentrated around one episode in the life of the main character. Unlike Youth, The Castle of Perseveraunce, and other 'whole life' plays, it does not set out to discuss the full course of the life of a human being. After an opening speech of pious prayer by Mercy, the vice-characters of the piece are immediately introduced: the chief Vice,
Mischief, and his followers, New Guise, Nought and Nowadays. Their interest at this point is in mocking Mercy, and they leave before Mankind enters. Mankind's opening speech locates him as an adult, with a good grasp on his faith's fundamental beliefs about the relationship between the body and the soul. Mercy counsels him, and warns him against his enemies, New Guise, Nought and Nowadays. Mankind, in response, writes down a reminder of his own mortality, and turns to dig his land. When the three sub-heroes attempt to waylay the audience with a crude song (and, incidentally, to tempt Mankind away from virtuous prayer and agricultural tasks) he lays about him with his spade and drives them off. Mankind, now overconfident from this success, departs to fetch seed-corn. Mischief comforts his beaten henchmen, and these three call up the devil, Titivillus, by playing the flute and taking a collection from the audience. Titivillus takes on Mischief's function, instructing New Guise, Nought and Nowadays in an anti-mission to corrupt the neighbourhood. Now invisible, Titivillus gradually discourages the newly returned Mankind from his labour by making the earth unworkable and stealing his tools. Mankind falls asleep, weary from fruitless toil and a lengthy church service. Titivillus then whispers a lie in his ear, to the effect that Mercy has been caught stealing a horse and so has been hanged. It is this that finally decides Mankind to repair to the ale-house, and to the company of New Guise, Nowadays and Nought. Clearly there is something irrational in this decision, for New Guise, Nowadays and Nought, soon joined by Mischief, narrate crimes very similar to that of which Mercy was accused. Mankind, however, remains with them. Mischief sets up a mock court, in which Mankind is deprived of his coat, and instructed in the arts of villainy by means of a catechistic ritual. Next, Mercy mourns Mankind's defection, and searches for him. Mischief and the rest of the vice-crew are afraid that Mercy will find Mankind and save him, so they hurry off to frighten Mankind into killing himself, with the threat that Mercy is searching for him. This plan almost works, but Mercy drives the villains off with a whip. Mankind, after some discussion, asks for forgiveness, and is told to 'go and
syn no more'. With Mercy's help, Mankind reviews his past behaviour and its interpretation. He then exits, blessed by Mercy, and leaving Mercy to farewell the audience with another blessing.

The enormous ebullience of the evil characters is demonstrated from Mischief's first, abrupt entrance, when his chopped-up lines accost Mercy's more ponderous formulations (V5). There is an impression that Mischief can 'dance like a butterfly, sting like a bee' in his darting attack:

leue yowr chaffe, leue yowr corn, leue yowr dalyacyon.

Yowr wytt ys lytyll yowr hede ys mekyll, 3e are full of predycacyon.

(1.46-7)

The feeling of vigorous physicality is continued when the three sub-vides soon take over the stage with a dance (P2 & M2). They have arrived in haste, impelled, it seems (there is a leaf missing in the MS) by hearing Mercy utter the words that form their names (V13). Apparently they are duty-bound to be always and everywhere available when called on (P9).

Nought: But, ser, I trow of ws thre I herde yow speke

New Guise: Crystys curse hade þerfor, for I was in slepe.

Nowadays: And I hade þe cuppe in my honde, redy to goo to met.

(1.98-100)

Titivillus is similarly omnipresently available at a command (P9), in this case a musical interlude (M2) which also covers the collection of money.

Mischief: Blow apase & þou xall brynge hym in wyth a flewte.

(1.453)
They have established a social world alternative to that which Mercy inhabits (P1). Mercy has included himself with 'ye souerens pat sytt and ye brothern pat stonde ryght wppe' (l.29). The audience is the group with which he wishes to be involved. The others live in a shared world of Bakhtinian excess, where musicians can 'Ley on wyth hi ballys tyll hys bely breste!' (l.73) (P2, P6), and Nought believes or affects to believe that his neck can be broken in a dance (V3). The concern for one's neck re-appears when Nought decides to avoid tempting two local notables for fear of hanging (V3), which he demonstrates with comic realism: 'For drede of in manus tuas -- qweke' (l.516). New Guise suggests that they all learn their 'neck verse', which will save them from being hanged. Again, Titivillus chooses to discredit Mercy by claiming that he has been hanged for stealing a horse (V3). Finally, New Guise, in obscure circumstances, evaded death when the hangman's rope broke:

I was twychyde by the neke; the game was be-gunne
A grace was, the halter brast asonder: ecce signum!

(l.615-16)

Their social class is carefully outlined at the earliest possible moment (P11). Mischief, as a winter corn thresher, is an itinerant labourer. The phrase 'I haue hyryde' (l.54) makes the point that he takes his own decisions regarding whom he works for and for how long, an assumption of power which defies the accepted social order (P11). In spite of their low social position, New Guise, Nought and Nowadays are committed to following the most modern fashions (P11). In this they are descendants both of the allegorical figures of Pride as a dandy, and of those satires on the times which bewail the loss of traditional values. Their concern with clothes is typical of vice figures (P12), and in Mankind is a functional stage symbol. The depth of Mankind's fall is represented by his willing adoption of an impractically short jacket in place of his useful coat. He is persuaded into this folly on the pretext that it is high fashion.64

A major strand in the construction of the vice figures' class is that they are
all petty thieves. New Guise casually refers to having stolen a leg of mutton as if it were the most natural behaviour in the world. Titivillus advertises himself as a horse thief: '怎Hat haue goode hors, to yow I sey, caueatis!' (1.476). At another point they plan to rob a church to pay for food. Robbery is thus seen as a way in which the possession-less can make a living: it is directed towards gaining the physical necessities of life. Eating and drinking recur, together with sleep, as a steady theme of potentially immoral excess (P3). The three sub-vice figures were variously sleeping and eating just before their entrance. Nought brags of his drinking prowess: 'I haue be sethen wyth pe comyn tapster of Bury/ And pleye do lange pe foll Dat I am ewyn wery./ Jyt xall I be yer ageyn to-mom.' (1.274-276).

Another aspect of their concern with the physical occurs in the greeting 'The wether ys colde, Gode sende ws goode ferys!' (1.323). It is doubtless a little ironic that these damned characters should pray thus artlessly for good fires. When Mankind finally falls from his devotion to virtue, it is initially through the physical inevitability of sleep. Once awake, he knows by instinct that New Guise, Nought and Nowadays are to be found at the ale-house, together with a 'lemman wyth a smattrynge face' (1.611). In general, their sins in this area seem relatively mild, though they do rob a church in order to pay for 'ale, brede, and wyn' (1.633), a modest-sounding feast. The cross-referencing of churches and ale-houses occurs again when dining at the ale-house on Sunday instead of going to church becomes one of the dictates imposed on Mankind by Nowadays (1.710-712).

The vice figures' idiosyncratic use of language is highlighted in this play not just as a sign of their presence, but as a possible threat in itself. Mercy, indeed, warns Mankind that he is to be particularly wary of these people's linguistic behaviour. It seems from 'Nyse in per a-ray, in language lei be large' (1.288) that they use language excessively (V1), leading to exaggerations and probably lies (L1). Their easy lying is demonstrated in Titivillus' whisper to the sleeping Mankind that Mercy is corrupted and dead.

Mischief shows both skill and confidence in speech (V5). He can play with
Mercy's scriptural metaphors by applying a witty literalism to them (V9). At his first appearance he controls Mercy's discourse with a nonsense interruption, distracting him and the audience from pious thoughts (V8). Where Mercy has used aureate English, Mischief lays competitive claim to linguistic authority by using Latin grammatical forms, but still mocks such knowledge through macaronic constructions (V5).

Corn seruit bredibus, chaffe horsibus, straw fyrybusque

(1.57)

While contradicting Mercy's remark that 'The corn xall be sauyde, e chaffe xall be brente' (1.43), Mischief appears to be more aware of practicalities (related to V9), and to support them with the authoritative status of Latin, mockingly pre-empting a style that one might normally attribute to Mercy (V5).

We have noticed the vice figures' love of high fashion in clothes (P12). Mercy has seen the resemblance between this and their use of language (1.288, quoted above). Adherence to fashion is also destructive of Mischief's ideas about language. Mercy advocates 'Few wordys, few and well sett!' - the suggestion is that pious truth can be best expressed pithily. New Guise recommends linguistic excess: 'many wordys and schortely sett.' (V1).

It is as an aspect of both abusiveness (V7) and physicality (P4) that the group of vice figures mobilizes its ideas about women. Immediately following Now-a-Days' thoughts about excretion come his thoughts about his wife, Rachel, (W3). The link is a close one, formed by 'Also'. Rachel is constituted as an opponent (W3):

Betuyx her and me was a gret batell;               (1.136)

The image of matrimony as a battleground is a common one. It recurs with New Guise's 'I haue fede my wyff so well tyll sche ys my master.' (1.246). By stressing this conflict, the villains advertise themselves as victims, and so as images of the reversal of the patriarchal order. Presented as ludicrous weaklings, they are also examples of the dangers of failing to dominate women. The latter are described as
unpredictable, threatening and wild creatures, not unlike horses ('Ande my wyf were yowr hors, sche wolde yow all to-banne', 1.249). There is a danger of actual violence, for New Guise's wife has wounded him on the head, as well as 'Þer I pysse my peson.' (1.248). How she has achieved the latter remains subject to speculation, but the possibility exists that she has trumped his excesses with excessive sexual demands. Clearly, associating with women is seen as an unsavoury experience, in addition to creating the opportunity for forcing further obscenities on Mercy (V7). The female is used as a specific affront to religion: the interesting obscenity 'Pope Pokett' (1.144) stems, it would seem, from a desire to abuse the Pope added to a feeling that the most denigratory possible appellation is a salacious metonymy for female genitals (W2). Marriage is presented by New Guise as both an unlikely and obscene combination when he offers: 'I xall tell yow of a maryage:/ I wolde yowr mowth and hys ars þat þís made/ Wer maryede junctly together' (1.345-347). 'This' in the speech just quoted refers to the low characters' preceding coarse song, and constitutes just one instance of the obsession with excreta in Mankind (P4; V7). It also suggests an identification between excreta and words, an issue which is taken up at greater length below.

The vice figures' desire to take control by forging a special relationship with the audience can be observed in the quantities of pantomimic playing to the gallery which Mankind contains (C4). Vice figures use both language and sound manipulatively, and the most important audience involvements are engineered when the vice figures are in sole control of the stage. The scene which introduces Titivillus opens with vociferous wailing (M2; M4): Mischief's traditional hypocritical self-pity is combined with tenderness towards his equally noisy crew. Mischief acts as a Master of Ceremonies, summarizing the plot for the audience's sake (C5) at lines 415 to 423, and asking them to listen to the noise that the beaten New Guise, Nought and Nowadays are making off stage (M2; M4).

Wyll þe lyst? I here þem crye. Clamant

(1.424)
After comforting them, however, he offers to salve the injured parts by chopping them off, which silences the three sufferers. Their cries are scarcely finished when the 'Walsyngham wystyll' is struck up (M2), to accompany the collection of money from the audience. The action of the play must now be held up for as long as the vice figures wish, while they clamorously collect money and conjure up Titivillus, the great-headed devil. On various occasions, loud weeping, Titivillus' roars, and the music of the whistle all fill the auditory space, supplanting any possibility of that reasoned, syntactically complex discourse to which one can give analytic attention. From these events it can be seen that control of the audience and control of the play operate especially through noise. Sound in the moral plays, then, can put itself forward as the self-presence of speech: as the sheer existence of the thing itself. As such, it is opposed to language as writing: the écriture of the written and of crafted speech (the writing that one can contemplate). In thus excluding contemplatable speech from the stage, the vice figures are very overtly asserting a primacy of things over language: money, magical cures, music and spectacle are more desirable to them than discourse. This is, of course, their theme throughout, in one form or another.

An earlier moment exists which shows a subtle level of collusion with the audience. New Guise picks up Mercy's remarks about controlling excess, and applies them to his own lewd concerns (lines 245-246.). One must assume him to be 'on stage' from the audience's point of view, but concealed from Mercy and Mankind. The audience is thus in possession of knowledge which exceeds that of the good characters, and parallels that of the wicked. New Guise's remarks are superficially directed towards Mercy and Mankind:

\[\text{Je say trew, ser, je are no faytour} \quad (1.244)\]

It is clear that he is primarily speaking for the audience's benefit, since he is not visible to the other two, nor even perfectly audible to them.

Mankind, then, exemplifies numerous, though not all, features of vice behaviour. Most noticeably, it makes use of the conventions that vice figures are
physically vigorous and noisy; that they are obscene in word and deed; and that they are obsessed with power structures. To a lesser degree, Mankind's vice figures manipulate the audience through their special relationship of collusion. The kind of adversary that Mankind faces and must reject is thus a very particular one. The 'wrongdoing' takes place in the area of language, and of writing. Clamour is opposed to silence, and fun is opposed to work. Property is important, for the mankind figure owns land, however little, while the adversary can only steal. What land he owns is his patrimony in Hell. The vice figures as manipulators, whether of Mankind or of the audience, are socially interactive, and are opposed by the play to a quietist, prayerful ideal, which is individualist, even self-interested. Otherness, therefore, directly confronts the individual as such, accosting barriers to do with the ownership of property, and secondly by offering a public, social life as a substitute for prayer and solitary labour. Mankind becomes a self that can distinguish between two kinds of language: spiritual truth and 'fables delusory'. He can also use language himself to ask for mercy. Thus, the individual is created as freely judging, exclusive, and willingly functioning within the laws laid down by the spiritual orthodoxy.

Those features that the play finds most interesting are also those which repay closer study. Areas where individual vice-characteristics are cross-referenced are especially productive: for example language and excreta; song and audience involvement; writing and obscenity; 'authority' and improvisation. I now consider in turn the effects that result from this play's interest in language, in coarseness, and in ownership. The individual has been constructed as one side of a binary opposition. As a credible and coherent statement, the play thus supports a binarist interpretation of the world and of the nature of meaning.

Crudity of language (V7) is used with a persistence that invites closer attention. Physical concerns and linguistic aggression come together in coarse language, which occurs particularly often and with particular crudity in Mankind. The low-life characters are fascinated by excreta (P4). What is noteworthy is
something amounting to an interchangeability of speech and excretion. Titivillus, for example, causes Mankind to leave his prayers by provoking in him a need to move his bowels. The flow of pious language from the mouth has been restructured in 'low' terms. Again, the ordinary rural custom of fertilizing fields with human excreta is described as 'blessing' by the three sub-vides. The most familiar example of an identification of words with excreta takes place in the song which New Guise, Nought and Nowadays lead the audience into singing. This is normally seen as an exercise in involving the audience in the process of Mankind's corruption. Their ultimate shock of revulsion against the vice figures will then be the greater because they have actually taken part in and enjoyed their degraded games. I find such a reading dubious because it involves several unproven assumptions about the nature of audiences. What is clear is that the song refers to two systems of signs. The first is writing, for it tells us that something has been 'written with a coal'. Because something written in charcoal or coal is easily erased, the song takes on the quality of crudely-chalked graffiti. Coal has a devilish connection in the moral plays, perhaps because it is black, perhaps from an association with the fires of hell. Thus the crude song is one which has been handed down in writing, but a devilish writing, the obverse of scripture. It confronts as other the writing which is still on the stage at that moment: Mankind's 'paper' which asserts 'Memento homo quod cinis es, et in cinerem reuerteris.' (1.321). At the same time, however, the contrast between virtue and vice is threatened by that repetition of 'coal'. On both sides of the opposition 'coal' is crucial to memory: to the past, to language, to the nature of what it is to be human. The 'individual' is thus accosted, not by an adversary, but by the very substance out of which he is constituted.

The second sign system establishes excrement as an alternative discourse, for the fouling of the breeches is a publicly visible sign. As an indication of unhygienic behaviour it implies shame as a consequence.
But he wype his ers clen
On hys breche yt xall be sen

(1.341-2)

It is also the public statement of the presence of that which is normally kept hidden. In this way the song canvasses the inscription of the other. The fouled breeches are also a sign of man's physical self and so the option exists to read them as a reminder of dust, death and the need for piety - in other words, as Mankind's holy inscription. The play cannot of course pursue that option without deconstructing the analogy that vice : virtue :: material : spiritual. Instead, the breeches are used as a re-interpretation of the theme of physicality in terms of coarse merry-making. Thus to the vice figures writing is crudity and excrement is writing.

On another occasion, evacuation is seen as speech by Titivillus, when he transfers the idea of lying, which really belongs to himself, onto Mankind's activity:

I haue sent hym forth to schyte lesynges

(1.561)

[I have sent him forth to shit lies.]

This connection makes the point of various other alarming remarks clearer. In an early conversation with Mercy, Nowadays challenges him to translate a couplet into Latin:

I haue etun a dysch full of curdis
Ande I haue schetun yowur mowth full of turdis

(1.126-7)

It is a trick on the same lines as the song trick, an attempt to make a virtuous character sully his mouth with coarse language. In this play, the vice figures' coarseness is insistently scatological, in preference to any other form. One ever-popular abusive phrase brings high and low together: 'osculare fundamentum' (1.140), says Nowadays to Nought. The intensity of vice-play and in particular the grossness of vice discourse function to sustain the opposition of vice to virtue,
and obscure their interrelationship, while playing riskily with the very terms that could reveal it.

To a large extent this intriguing connection between language and various kinds of soil degrades speech. Certainly there is a carnival quality in the low characters' joyous assaults on received ideas of the utterable. However there is another effect which stems from the association of speech and excreta. Developmental psychology reveals the deeply personal, intimate status of bowel movements. They are the only real possession of the poor and powerless, to be offered or withheld as gestures of giving or of defensiveness. It is impossible in a short space to do justice to the ramifications of this concept, but for the purposes of discussing Mankind it is important to notice this ambivalent quality. It is captured most effectively in Nought's use of the word 'ouer-blysse' in his remark about Mankind's land:

Ande yf he wyll haue compass[t]e he may ouer-blysse yt
A lytyll with hys ers lyke (1.374-5)

To manure the land is to bless it and to foul it at the same time. What implications does this have for language? By asserting its identity with the most personal of possessions, the vice figures are claiming language for themselves. Language can thus appear as an important aspect of otherness. It can also be a gift to the group, as a joke, an act of social largesse. As such it acts as a communal force, through which groups can share laughter. If excreta are the possession of the individual in his opposition to regulative society, by extension coarse words appropriate language to the joking, subversive social group as opposed to the authoritative. It is thus that language can be used as a weapon against authority's pressures to conform to norms and regulations. In Mankind, the vice figures have profoundly problematized the link between language and authority in exactly this way. The kind of connection made in Mundus & Infans, and plays like it, between spiritual knowledge and linguistic competence can be sustained in Mankind by constructing and stressing otherness as distasteful.
The ownership of language and of excreta are contested by the vice figures. Other, more conventional possessions are also fought over for their structural significance. It is scarcely surprising that Mischief, uncommitted to social structures, has neither horse nor saddle: the freedom to construct one's life implies poverty, and a hand-to-mouth existence. It is almost like a monastic decision that freedom from worldly constraints is also freedom from the domination of possessions. By contrast Mankind owns his own land, and is tied to what is apparently a very small area. Enslavement to the soil as a possession goes hand in hand with social respectability. Clothes, however, are also possessions with an identical capacity to construct identity. Mercy is teased by Nought at an early stage of the play: 'Anon of wyth yowr clothes, yf ye wyll play' (1.88). As we have seen, Mankind's initiation into the company of vice figures involves the well-known episode in which his coat is gradually cut down into a brief garment like a fencing jacket. One might say that Mischief stands outside ordinary life as the author stands outside his play. That state is only one of several possible positions: at other points we find a slavish devotion to the norms of high fashion, and the vice figures' love of clothes. In later plays, such as Enough is as Good as a Feast, where the mankind figure is less clearly distinguished from the vice figure, avarice attracts particular attention as the principal deadly sin. A reading which resolves this contradiction between worldly negligence and pleasure in possessions develops when one relates the fashion for display in dress to the fashion for display in language. Linguistic excess offers an opportunity for confusion: the more words are used, the more opportunities for interpretation proliferate. Thus, excess of language generates multiple meanings and in so doing puts forward an alternative to the univocal message insisted on by the virtuous characters. Mercy warns Mankind against the low characters' 'large' language because it will lead Mankind away from the path of religious doctrine, now seen as single. In a limited way, fashion - the new guise - operates similarly, for it offers a subversive alternative to sober practicality of
dress, an alternative which threatens one of the signifying codes of class. Fashion, changing rapidly with time, sets up a diachronic signifying structure in opposition to the traditional synchronic structure in which people dress according to their station in life. Fashion involves the adoption of a code - an alternative code, but one equally as strictly regulated as the original.

Nevertheless the play itself has an over-riding attitude to its own problematization of the link between language and authority, for by the penultimate scene the vice figures are shown to have reached a state of gibbering confusion. Their speech is no longer under their control, but threatens to become sheer sound. Nought loses control of himself, accidentally fouling his own foot (1.784-786). The repetitions habitual to the vice figure begin to dominate their speech: line 775 consists of 'hic' repeated seven times, and repetitions also occur at lines 776, 777, 779, 784, 787, 789 and 802. Their attempt to persuade Mankind to hang himself is prevented when Mercy drives them off with a whip. In the course of the chase New Gyse comes close to hanging himself by accident.

Qweke, qweke, qweke! Alass, my thrott! I beschrew yow, mary! (1.808-810)

His imitation of a death rattle has the same quality of repetition. Vice play and vice language, then, peter out in meaninglessness and choking.

The play ends, as always, with the re-possession of language as public property, and as the medium of control. Mercy asserts a division between a linguistic world of the spirit and a separate, physical arena in which 'your body ys your enmy; let hym not haue hys wyll.' (1.897) In this view language is not problematic: quite simply, excessive language, like the bodily functions, is to be scourged from the scene so that Mankind's controlled confession and repentance can take place. In this way he is re-created as an individual with an individual's free will: 'libere welle, libere nolle God may not deny iwys.' (1.894)

In general, for all their power, skill and appeal, there is no question that the vice figures are set up to be mocked and reviled. New Guise, Nowadays and
Nought are very stupid, and are also weaklings. In choosing to associate with
these, Mischief can only be lowered in our eyes.

In the course of appropriating the physical pleasures, the low characters have
made them despicable by contagion. They have also made physicality repulsive to
us through sheer exaggeration and an obsessive tendency to see it only in its most
sordid aspects. In order to merit salvation Mankind must achieve a selfhood which,
repudiating the vice figures, is defined as genuine and complete. To attain this
'fortress-self' he must control his physicality by repressing the joyous aspects of
song and dance, of sex, of defecation and of extravagant language.

Mankind concludes with admonitions by Mercy that reveal the status of the
self. Mankind is to be sent back into his former life, and will attempt to do better.
At one moment it seems that the self even without the evil ones is still permitted to
be complex, for he can:

Aske mercy and hawe, whyll pe body wyth pe/owlle hath hys
annexion;

(1.863)

However, it soon becomes clear that the person being addressed is indivisible, and
does not include the body or its temptations.

Your body ys your enmy; let hym not haue hys wyll.

(1.897)

Not only is the body as enemy of the spirit separate from the self, being spoken of
in the third person, it has a will of its own. The 'will' of the body is balanced in
the next line by the 'will' which Mercy allows the self. This is the capacity to
exercise judgment, by moving away from Mercy when the self sees fit.

Take your lewe whan je wyll. God send you good perseuerans!

(1.898)

The ability to judge when to move away is necessary if Mankind is also to be able
to judge when he needs to return, that is, to ask for mercy again.
The subject constructed by *Mankind* is therefore solely a spiritual subject, who is single and whose every act is interpreted in one dimension. That dimension is one of movement towards or away from grace.

This view of the hero-subject as sanitized by the voluntary repudiation of external evil forces is clearly a very different picture from that examined in the previous chapter, where through much of the play the primitive pre-Mirror Stage figure locates himself in relation to figures of otherness through identification, and can assimilate his past through confession. In this *Mankind* exemplifies the process in a large number of the moral plays, namely a decisive move towards the alienation of otherness.

Members of the audience for an early moral play resemble carnival participants by virtue of their intense involvement, especially with the vice characters. Peter Happé recognizes that 'the Vice must to some extent embody impulses present in the minds of his audience', (H, 83). Following Bakhtin, too, we must observe that the grotesque and foul, necessary aspects of the carnival participants' feelings about life and about themselves, are ambivalently also joyous and assertive. The danger for the homilist is that the vice figures will seem too attractive, too interesting, and the play's function be lost. There are pressures, then, to play with both aspects of the vice character: to make it increasingly both more exciting and more disgusting. In the long term this is a losing battle as a vice figure is always and only an area onto which unconscious urges are projected. The pressure is first to focus on a particular structural character and revile him, then to develop the vice figure thus achieved in such a way that it merits further reviling. This is of course a pressure to disavow those aspects in oneself by externalizing them and mocking them. It seems, then, that the creation of the vice figure is a foolproof method for establishing the 'self' as unified. Not only can the problematic areas of the 'self' be projected onto him, and so repudiated, but the condition of division itself can be located as external to the individual, and repudiated in exactly the same manner.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1 A good example of the distinction between recognition and rejection occurs in Skelton's *Magnyfycence*, ed. Robert Lee Ramsay, EETS, ES, 98 (London, 1908). Even when Magnyfycence has discovered the truth about Cloked Collusyon and Crafty Conveyance, they remain powerful (l.2238-2276). Indeed, it is at the very point of discovery that Magnyfycence begins to give way to despair. Only when the first two have fled in terror is the stage freed for the presence of Good Hope. The way of salvation is assured when Magnyfycence can assert his rejection of evil, and a resulting wholeness.

2 In this the plays subscribe to the idea of a higher truth, a fundamental theme of transcendental religions, and an area of considerable interest to post-modern criticism. Derrida sees binary structures as misleading, even pernicious. See, for example, 'The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing', in Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London, 1976; first published in French, 1967), pp.6-26, where Derrida discusses the conventional relationship between signification and 'meaning', (pp.10-11).

3 Banished from the plot are Titivillus and Hickscorner, who are 'suppressed', to use Bevington's term, because of doubling requirements. The Bad Angel in *The Castle of Perseverance* retires to Hell. In *Ane Satyre of the Thre Estaitis*, Flattery is banished to France. Avarice in *Respública* and Courage in *Tyde Tarrieth No Man* are humbled and delivered over to the law to be punished with torture and death, respectively. In *Enough is as Good as a Feast*, a play with numerous evil characters, Satan himself carries Worldly Man off to Hell.

4 In *The Tyde Tarrieth No Man*, Courage greets the report of the sub-vice Greediness' death by asserting that Greediness cannot die, for he always lives in the hearts of men.

5 Distinguishing between 'mortal' vices and personifications in the period 1495-1535, Mark Pilkinton in *The Antagonists of English Drama, 1370-1576*
(unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Bristol, 1974) sees 'no attempt on the part of the playwrights to bring the personified vices to justice', p.313. It seems to me, however, that the kind of 'life' that vice figures possess is represented as degraded to such an extent that this counts as a punishment in itself.

6 René Girard's discussion of sacrificial victims in Violence and the Sacred, tr. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore and London, 1977; first published in French, 1972) offers a structural parallel in social terms for the effects that I locate here in the individual. Referring to human sacrifice among the Tupinamba, Girard observes: 'the prisoner was "permitted during this period to lay about him with his fists, to steal fowl and geese and other things, and to do his utmost to avenge his coming death." In short, the future victim was encouraged to violate the laws. Most modern observers agree that the purpose of these indulgences was to transform the prisoner into a 'scapegoat'. p.275. Girard recognizes that this explanation is alternative to a surface rationale - which is also the overt cause and effect sequence offered by the plays: 'It is true that the more misdeeds the prisoner commits, the more legitimate the sanctions imposed on him might appear.' Also relevant is Girard's The Scapegoat, tr. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore and London, 1986; first published in French, 1982). See especially Chapter Two, 'Stereotypes of Persecution'.

7 One example of humiliation is the representation of Dalilah in Nice Wanton as revoltingly pox-ridden and aged: a savage stage revenge for her earlier joyous sexuality. Again, in John Heywood's A Play of Love the Vice, No-lover-nor-loved 'cometh in, ronnyng sodenly aboute the place among the audyens with a hye copyn tank on his hed full of squybs fyred, cryeng water! water! fyre! fyre! fyre! water! water! fyre! tyll the fyre in the squybs be spent.' S.D., 1.1309. More startling still is the stage direction on the famous sketch for The Castle of Perseveraunce 'He that shall play Belial, look that he have gunpowder burning in his hands and in his ears and in his arse when he goeth to battle.' One scarcely knows whether to focus on the actor's showmanship, or his willingness to undergo public degradation.
Since Happé refers to the Vice (capitalized), it is clearer to adopt his style for the moment, though this style overstates the distinction between major and minor vices. Happé explains his position in the Introduction to Tudor Interludes (London, 1972): 'In discussing this character it is necessary to speak of the Vice to distinguish him from other characters who represent moral evils. He appears to have originated from among this number and he almost always retains a homiletic function as the character who focusses the evil impulse in the plot and schemes for the downfall of the hero. The rôle develops gradually during the first half of the sixteenth century, and is not certainly identified by name until Avarice in Respublica (1553).'

The wit and punning of the moral play vice figures proved so popular that it endured as a byword long after the play form itself was passé.

A summary list of this information is attached at Appendix B.

This temptation derives from their connection with the Flesh element of the triad of threats to salvation, the World, the Flesh and the Devil.

This pattern occurs in The Four Elements, Nature, and Wit and Science, for example.

Margery at the tavern is mentioned in Nature.

Vice figures in Magnyfycence suggestively offer 'fresh meat' and 'raw mutton' (I.2264-5).

Youth:

Yet thou shalt have a wenche to kiss

Whensoever thou wilt

(1.285-6)

Four Elements:

Than we wyll have lytell Nell,

A proper wenche, she daunsith well,

And Jane with the blacke lace;

We wyll have bounsynge Besse also,
And two or thre proper wenchis mo,
Ryght feyr and smotter of face

(1.637-642)

14 Nichol Newfangle in *Like Will to Like* and Moros in *The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art*.

15 L.W. Cushman, in *The Devil and the Vice in the Dramatic Literature Before Shakespeare* (London, 1900), pp.61-2, lists plays in which the Vice is described as the son of the Devil. It is this hereditary strain that I wish to notice here. Cushman's conclusion is less relevant, 'The devil and Vice are, indeed, related in so far as all evil in society originates with the devil, but, as dramatic figures, they are distinct.' He contrasts the Devil as a 'theological-mythological being' with the Vice as 'an allegorical representation of human weaknesses and vices', p.63. This is debated by Happé.

16 Ben Jonson, describing the stage practices of the 1550's in *The Devil is an Asse* (1616) attributed ubiquity to the vice figure:

\[
\text{Iniquity: Ere his words be half spoken I am with him in a trice;} \\
\text{Here, there and everywhere, as the Cat is with the Mice.}
\]

(1.45-46)

17 In Lindsay's *Ane Satyre of the Thre Estaitis*, the vice has arrived from a voyage:

\[
\text{And am cum heir now at the last} \\
\text{Tostit on the sea ay sen quill day}
\]

(1.608-9)

Other instances include Experience in *The Four Elements*; Inclination in *The Trial of Treasure*; Haphazard in *Appius and Virginia*; Politicke Perswasion in Phillip's *Patient Grissell*; Evil Counsel in Bale's *St John the Evangelist*; and the merchant in *Englishmen for My Money* (1601) (a late play, only loosely related to the moral play). Hickscorner has been to many countries, including 'the land of Rumbelow/Three mile out of hell;' (1.317-8). The practice is to be found as early as *The
Castle of Perseverance, while the opening speech of Machiavel, in Marlowe's The Jew of Malta provides a concentrated late example of the same boast.

The satirical poem, Cocke Lorell's Bote which involves a similar impossible voyage through England by a crew of villains, is also noteworthy here. The poem is in Tudor Verse Satire, ed. K.W. Gransden (London, 1970), pp.31-35.

18 References to hanging are listed as a verbal quality, below.

19 The most informative clarifications of these attitudes are to be found in the cony-catching pamphlets, whose ostensible function was to warn citizens against the tricks of rogues, but which simultaneously offer readers excitement and a vision of a fascinatingly disreputable sub-culture: John Awdeley's Fraternitye of Vacabondes (1560-1); Harman's Caveat (c.1567); and Parson Haben's Sermon in Praise of Thieves and Thievery. All three pieces are published in Fraternitye of Vacabondes, ed. Edward Viles and F.J. Furnivall, EETS, ES, 9 (London, 1889).


20 Fulgens and Lucre's, Magnyfycence and Respublica contain prominent examples.

21 The impracticality of the traditional fool's costume is stressed in Magnyfycence, where the dangling parts of the fool's hat obscure Foly's vision: 'Fansy: Tusshe! thy lyppes hange in thyne eye;' (l.1050). Similarly, in The Longer Thou Livest The More Fool Thou Art, Moros stumbles because he is distracted by the fine feather in his hat.

Elsewhere, voluminous garments recall the verse satires of the Fifteenth Century, in which the nobility is perceived as wasteful for using too much cloth. In Medwall's Nature I, Pryde boasts:
Than have I suche a short gown
Wyth wyde sleues that hang adown-
They wold make some lad in thys town
A doublet and a cote

(1.767-770)

In Fulgens and Lucres, the serving man describes excess cloth in the nobles' coats as 'like a lie', 1.742, while in Magnyfycence such comments are numerous. Fansy (ironically) refers to the excessive amount of cloth in Cloked Collusyon's priestly disguise 'Here was to little cloth' (1.607), to which Cloked Collusyon answers 'A, Fansy, Fansy, God send the brayne' (1.608). Later, Cloked Collusyon criticizes Courtly Abusyon's clothes: 'By God, Syr, What nede all this waste?' (1.754).

22 The obvious case is of Titivillus in Mankind 'a man wyth a hede at ys of grett omnipotens' (1.461). The Conflict of Conscience gives us: 'Tyranny: With a head of brass I will not be outfaced' (1.759); and 'Hypocrisy: And you are one of his [the Devil's] sons, methink, by your head.' (1.785)

23 The most extreme case of this lineality occurs in Thomas Lupton's All For Money, which I discuss below, in Chapter Four.

24 The assumption of self-presence in language is analysed in relation to The Play of the Four Elements in my unpublished M.A. dissertation (University of Warwick, 1987). Happé recuperates this absence, seeing it as justified by the familiarity that convention creates.


26 One must, however, allow for the shallowness in which their natures are constructed to supersede that state on occasion, as well as for occurrences of insincerity.

27 Both Pride and the principal Vices often speak in a manner which recalls the vaunting Herod of the Mystery Cycles, as do early mankind figures when in a state
of sinful ignorance. *Youth* contains an excellent example, in the person of the hero, Youth.


29 One may choose to interpret this aspect of vice behaviour as covering an error or as taunting the mankind figure. Again one may see the mankind figure as easily conned or as deaf, in such a scene.

30 The texts in question, the enlightenment of mother messe and *Lingua*, are discussed in detail in Chapter Five. Perhaps this also casts a new light on Shylock's 'I am content', (IV, i, 394), which is followed almost immediately by his parting, 'I am not well', (IV, i, 396). *The Merchant of Venice*, in *The Riverside Shakespeare*, pp. 254-283.

31 One might feel that such a monologue echoes in large the experiences of a travelling group of players. There is considerable self-ironizing effect in traditionally giving such a discourse to the evil character.

32 In *The Conflict of Conscience*, Hypocrisy refers to this aspect of his own abilities:

   Sooner named, sooner come, as common proverbs say.

   *(1.752)*

33 This is not only true in the obvious case of Titivillus in *Mankind*, but also in those of New Guise, Nought and Nowadays, and of the Taverner in *The Four Elements*, to name just two other instances.

34 Pride is of course the single, fundamental flaw in the character of Lucifer, and so the main cause of the existence of the Devil.

35 The problem of Iago's excessive self-justification is discussed in connection with the Vice by Bernard Spivack, in *Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil* (London, 1958). He finds a broad source for Iago's behaviour in his Vice ancestry. This is too general, as the proliferation of vice-characteristics observed so far bears witness. Returning to Iago's guiding dynamic, one finds in his behaviour the urge
to control - to re-write a heroic narrative - in parallel with an urge to assert himself in opposition to Othello's virtues. Where other aspects of Iago are contradictory, this force remains constant.

In *Cambyses*, Ambidexter's betrayal of people for whom he apparently has some affection is particularly baffling. Once again, however, the tendency of his action is to force the plot to follow one line rather than another. In the closing scenes he insists on asserting his involvement, to his own detriment. The price he pays for thus drawing attention to himself is high, so high that one must accept that ego is more important to him than life itself.

Both versions of *Patient Grissil* also contain a vice figure, whose destructive advice to Duke Gwalter is quite unmotivated.

36 Anne Righter (Barton), in *Shakespeare and the Idea of the Play* (New York, 1977), pp. 54-57, sees this as a method of keeping contact with the audience.

37 One clear instance of this occurs with A and B in Medwall's *Fulgens and Lucre*, for in that play one plot is related, and then A and B, at different times, explicitly set out to alter its progress. Though not strictly speaking vice characters, A and B share many features with that later development. To list the most obvious features: A wishes Lucre to make the wrong choice; they both interfere in the action; they are 'low' characters, who make lewd jokes, including misunderstandings and *double entendres*; they function as explicators of the plot; and their entrance implies a familiar relationship with the audience.

38 An interesting example occurs of a play which uses a vice-like figure, but establishes her in a framework which authorizes anarchy. *The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune* bases its plot on a contest of strength between Venus and Fortuna. This develops as a struggle between the consistency of true love and the unmotivated random attacks of chance to establish which is the stronger structuring principle in human life. This play will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five.

39 The term 'hybrid plays' is used by Anne Righter, describing 'those experimental plays of the second half of the sixteenth century, both courtly and
popular, in which comedy and tragedy, classical, Italian, morality and folk elements appear wildly jumbled together.' op. cit., p.53. She sees that style beginning with Cambyses (1569-1570) and Horestes (1567-68).

40 In Ralph Roister Doister, Merrygreeke works on both sides, as does Subtle Shift in Clyomon and Clamydes (c.1576?) In Common Conditions (1576), the eponymous Vice presents himself as both good and evil circumstances, and serves both sides apparently without conscious decision.

41 Disguising, and loud, false weeping are exceptions.

42 In Republica, the lesser vice figures blame Avarice for their wrongdoing (l.1832-1836).

In Ane Satyre of the Thre Estaitis, Flattery tries to escape by helping to have his friends hanged (l.3679-80).


43 The vice figures send a forged letter in both Republica and in Skelton's Magnyfycence.

44 An instance is Titivillus' fabrication that Mercy was hanged as a horse thief, in Mankind.

45 Lois Potter, for example, has argued for a separation between the moral play and the Romance-play, in 'The PLays and the Playwrights', The 'Revels' History of Drama in English, vol 2, 1500-1576, ed. Norman Sanders and others (London, 1980), pp.141-257, (pp.209-210). Her grounds are, firstly, that the heroes of Romances give way to despair, occasionally becoming suicidal. This objection appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the emotional variety available to the mankind figure. Secondly, the secularization of the vice figure into a figure of chance seems to her to involve a loss of free will. However, the oppositional figure in the earlier moral play, though creative, was never free to do anything but oppose. The points where the vice figure, as Chance, betrays his master, are points where
the compulsion placed on all vice figures is revealed particularly nakedly before us.

46 (H, 366, 'The use of the alias is closely associated with the whole question of establishing the Vice's name and identity. The homiletic tradition attached considerable importance to the identification of the Vice, and this leads to the frequency of episodes in which the Vice gives his name or is reluctant to give it, or arranges an alias in such a way that the audience is aware of his true and false names.'

H, 368, 'considerable emphasis is given to this frequent device by means of the length of the episode in which the alias is assumed.'

47 This is clearly a different activity from the process of name-changes that takes place in Mundus et Infans. In that play, the sequence of changes from Infans to Age represents genuine physical alterations in the person named. The changes are a part of the staging of allegory as a formal device. They are misleading only in a very restricted sense, for they do focus attention on only one aspect of what it is to be human.

48 MED lists both negative and positive connotations available for 'policy' from 1455. OED gives both readings lasting into the eighteenth century.

49 Anne Ferry, The Art of Naming (Chicago and London, 1988). In particular, 'two grammatical forms were thought of as fundamentally bound together in the same way as accidents cleave to substances: the adjective unable to stand alone, the substance unknowable without it.' p.60.

50 Plays in which a female rôle is structurally identical with that of the vice figure include Heywood's Play of The Wether; Redford's Wit and Science (the character of Luxury); and Lingua. This matter is discussed at length in Chapter Five.

51 Linda Woodbridge analyses the literary debate about the nature of woman in Women and the English Renaissance: Literature and the Nature of Womankind (Brighton, 1984)

52 Anne Ferry examines the magical function of language, cit. in note 49,
The conventionality of the principal Vice's laughter is pointed up in the description of Vice in the masque scene in Dekker's *Old Fortunatus*:

*Enter Vice with a gilded face, and horned on her head: -- her garments painted behind with foolish faces and devils heads: and underneath it in the midst this written, Ha, Ha, He.*

Allon White, in 'Pigs and Pierrots: The Politics of Transgression in Modern Fiction', *Raritan Review*, 2, (1982), pp.35-51, finds the question unresolved whether transgression generally is radical or conservative.

cf. Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, tr. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1981), p.11: 'even in aggressions or transgressions we are consorting with a code to which metaphysics is tied irreducibly, such that every transgressive gesture re-encloses us.'


The Castle of Perseverance was publicly cried abroad, while internal evidence suggests a socially mixed audience for most of the moral plays. R. Willis, writing in 1639 about a performance of *The Cradle of Security* in Gloucester some fifty or more years earlier, describes what appears to be standard practice. When players arrived in the city the mayor financed a free performance of one play, attended by all who cared to attend. Subsequently, further performances, probably including novel material, would be put on for a broad public, restricted only by preparedness to pay. (This information is based on an extract from Willis's

59 For a discussion of the *supplement* as excess, see Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London, 1976), p.144. With regard to Rousseau and writing, Derrida explains: 'It is the addition of a technique, a sort of artificial and artful ruse to make speech present when it is actually absent. It is a violence done to the natural destiny of the language.' However, 'It adds only to replace. . . . if it fills, it is as if one fills a void.' p.145.

60 H, 393, 'the convention embraced such a large selection of devices and characteristics that it would be necessary for an author to include only a moderate number in order to set in motion the audience's normal responses to a vice.'

61 Rosemond Tuve puts the point with regard to Christian imagery that the representing character contains the condition of the character represented, without any necessity for us to transform the former into the latter. *Allegorical Imagery: Some Medieval Books and their Posterity* (Princeton, 1966), p.37. The allegorical quality of the moral play works in the same way.


Specimens of the Pre-Shakespearean Drama, ed J.M. Manly, 2 vols, (Boston and London, 1904), I.


63 A detailed consideration of the play is assisted by reference to the vice-characteristics described in the first section of this chapter. A summary list of these and their codes is attached at Appendix B, for ease of reference.

64 In Skelton's Magnyfycence, too, the prince is persuaded to wear the height of ridiculous fashion as a sign of his moral deterioration.

65 The persistent cross-referencing suggests an original production based on 'mansions': one for the tavern and the devil's exits and entrances on the left; a second for the church and Mercy's appearances on the right. Mankind must use both at different stages of the plot.

66 'large' here is related to 'largesse', a morally problematic quality as both Magnyfycence and Liberality and Prodigality show.

67 This links with an ancient anxiety about the truth or falsehood of premonitions seen in dreams. The doubt is always about the source of the message, as here.

68 William Tydeman in English Medieval Theatre, 1400-1500 (London and Boston, 1986) shows that this reading has now passed into general acceptance: 'the author's tactic appears to be to lure the audience into a false position, trading on their preference for 'mery chere' and high spirits to involve them in the process of sneering at goodness, and becoming parties to scurrility, riot and evil', p.44.

69 In Merbury's The Marriage Between Wit and Wisdom (c.1570), the lady Idleness 'coals' (i.e. blackens') Wit's face while he is asleep, as a sign of his fall from virtue.

The Devil in Like Will to Like is matched with a collier - one assumption is that they look alike, both having black faces.

In the late Devil-play, Grim the Collier of Croydon, the collier has an important
Mammon, Eq, II, 7, iii, has a face tanned with smoke, head and beard covered with soot, and 'cole-black' hands.

This coaly convention may go some way towards explaining sundry mysterious references in other plays. Courage in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man calls Profite 'Cole profite'; Covetous in Enough is as Good as a Feast also mentions 'cole'; 'Cole hazard' appears as a gamester in Impatient Poverty. Finally, J.P. Collier, Annals of The Stage, 3 vols (London, 1831), I, pp.130-132, quotes a letter from the Lord Mayor of London to Thomas Cromwell about a play by Thomas Wylley, Vicar of Yoxford which included the character 'Colle Clogger of Conseyens'. (Cited by Glynne Wickham, Early English Stages, vol I, 1300-1576, (London, 1959; 1980), p.239.)

The connection between 'cole' and the French 'col' = 'neck' does not so much contradict this reading as add to it, for the vice figure, in his sinful blackness, finds his neck in constant danger.

Mark Pilkinton associates this suggestion, when it occurs in Ane Satyre of the Thre Estaitis, with the vice figures' 'demonic' connections ('The Antagonists of English Drama, 1370-1576', unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Bristol, 1974). See also Robert Hughes, Heaven and Hell in Western Art (London, 1968), p.257, who refers to 'the witch's practice of the anal 'devil's kiss' '.


CHAPTER FOUR

STRUCTURES AND MEANING IN THE PROVERB PLAYS

'nothing . . . in excess'

SECTION A: SUBVERSION OF THE UNITARY SUBJECT

This chapter contains first an examination of the ways in which the polarization of subject and other, discussed in Chapter Three, is subverted by the nature of language, from which it has necessarily been constructed. The Tyde Tarrieth No Man (1576) is an extended example of the moral play's attempt to establish truth as single and absolute. From the subversion of the idea of truth as single, the diversity, the indeterminacy of the language-constituted subject reveals itself. Secondly, it becomes clear that there is a plurality both of mankind figures and of vice figures in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man, and that this is related to multiplicity of meaning. The proliferation of the mankind figures in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man appears to be symptomatic of a development in the moral plays of the 1560's and 70's, which critics have usually discussed as a secularization of the moral theories under discussion by the moral play. Certainly the candidates for the now diversified rôle of mankind figure are often representative of various social orders. In comparison with earlier moral plays, it is as if the concept of allegory has wavered: mankind/the subject is no longer perceived as universal and therefore as being properly represented by a single figure. When people are perceived as deeply different in this world, that means that worldly differences are so apparent and profound that it becomes dramatically worthwhile, even witty, to observe those areas where people share a common fate. The pleasure developed in the plays is the ironic enjoyment of playing off similarities against differences. The project of the proverb plays, of which The Tyde Tarrieth No Man is one, is to demonstrate the
universality of application of the proverb, that is, to expound the idea that individuals share common truths of experience. This universality, however, had been taken for granted in the very construction of the earlier allegorical figure of mankind in Mankind, in Mundus & Infans and even in Magnyfycence. Thus the appearance of several mankind figures in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man is symptomatic of an altered theory about the nature of the world, but also stems from the multifarious nature of language. I will link it with the play's attempt to sustain a single interpretation of the proverb by attributing falsehood to otherness, as multiplicity. The escalating process of multiple characterization generates a fundamental attack on the unity of the subject.

The repressive self is constituted as excluding some language skills in order to privilege others. So far the former have been represented in the plays as literalism, and therefore primitive. The latter have been represented as adding a single spiritual truth to literal meaning, and so as operating on a more abstract plane. The unitary self is therefore held together by its ability to insist on the 'correct' linguistic interpretation of a given phrase. In this picture, 'true' meaning, whether good or bad, is single, whereas language is double. The metaphoric meaning is seen as the 'right' reading, that is, as having a single, true interpretation. (This is a novel way of seeing metaphoric language, since we are accustomed to reading metaphor as containing both of its available meanings simultaneously.) In the plays, the successful self must control language by choosing to privilege metaphoric and spiritual readings. Any suggestion that language might be multiple is therefore a threat to the newly-achieved self. When the vice figures' linguistic practices are scrutinized more closely, we find the fissive effects of language laid out. We shall see later that it is language that undermines the attempt to achieve a unitary self, for while the individual is constituted in language, it is also the case that, language being polysemic and shifting, the 'individual' so constituted cannot be unitary.

This analysis therefore perceives the plays to contain an area of conflict
beyond the simple battle between good and evil. That is to say, the plays reveal a fundamental tension between the unifying tendency to fixed meaning and the fissive tendency to multiple meaning. Both are inherent effects of language use; both are, to put it another way, objects of language's desire, since neither goal is ultimately achievable, but always worked towards. The existence of the idea of these goals is what makes language possible. To call this relationship a 'tension' is perhaps to succumb to the polarizing concerns of the Imaginary, for the two are not necessarily in opposition. The two processes are necessary to each other as symbiotes, for multiple meaning is not indeterminacy: in fact, multiple meaning consists of meaning, together with both that meaning's subversion and the penumbra of meaning-effects generated by metaphoric and metonymic connections. (By metonymic connections in this case I mean relationships based on linguistic derivation, ambiguities, homonymies, and the like.)

It is only when meaning is seen as fixed that the subject can be put forward as an indivisible unit. It follows that recognition of the tendency of language towards multiple meaning implies an undermining of that notion of the fortress-subject, a notion which the polarizing mode of the moral play feeds, as we have seen.

The following analysis considers a group of mid-century plays in which the fissive properties of language are foregrounded, an effect of the necessary repetitions of the proverb on which they are based. The proverb play is, however, a variety of the moral play, and we find that these plays must make judgments about the proverbial truths they assert. Where a psychomachia-morality focusses on the battle between good and evil figures, a proverb-morality conducts the same battle by locating it around a particular statement. Its brief is to show that the statement has moral implications. Thus, Like Will to Like asserts at one point that the congregation of the wicked is a good thing, because they can be more readily punished. Again, The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art condemns the wickedness involved in persevering in the follies of a simpleton. Moros, a kind of
village idiot, is whisked off to the devil at the end of the play.

Assessing the moral quality of the originating proverb is not the only approach that the proverb play takes. Some reconstruct the assertion 'x is true, and that is good (or bad)' to read 'If x is true, then that is good (or bad)'. In other words, they allow for the possibility that the proverb on which the play is based may not be a statement of a universal truth. In the late romance The Weakest Goeth to the Wall (1600), much of the action shows the virtuous weak suffering many tribulations, to the accompaniment of a moral overtone of hand-wringing. The play concludes, however, with a happy ending and a reversal of fortunes, suggesting that proverbial truth may be modified by circumstances.

The fissive process mentioned above occurs in spite of the overt project of the plays: to establish a single truth based on a proverb. They attempt this primary project by one of two methods. In the first method, it is assumed that the proverb offers a true comment on the world, and the play then follows a rondo form: a) a statement of the proverb; b) an enacted demonstration of a circumstance in which the proverb can be seen to apply; c) a restatement of the proverb with enhanced credibility. Steps b) and c) are then repeated with variations for as long as the author wishes the play to proceed. The second method, recognizing that a proverb may be interpreted in conflicting ways, opposes a virtuous interpretation to a vicious one and presents scenes which show the two possibilities in operation. The climax then demonstrates that only the virtuous interpretation is 'worthwhile'. (That word is appropriate, as in some plays the soul's ultimate fate is the standard by which worthwhile-ness is judged, but in others the standard appears to be material well-being.)

It can readily be seen that the polarisation of the interpretations of a statement into a simple opposition of virtuous versus vicious is structurally identical with that very familiar opposition of good/evil, out of which the successful mankind figure has been constructed as good in opposition to the projected evil 'otherness' of the vice figures. Closer reading of The Tyde Tarrieth No Man will show that
neither of the opposed terms remains stable. Thus language subverts its own claims to be able to speak unambiguously and hence to offer 'the truth'. In so doing, I argue, language also subverts the character of the subject as a fortress-like individual. Crucially, then, the characterisation of the other as a linguistic other, equated to a verbally competent vice figure, acts in the end to subvert the notion of the self. Such a subverted self can no longer claim autonomy, self-determination or extra-linguistic transcendental existence. This proposition becomes more readily demonstrable in those situations where the 'truth' of language has been institutionalized in the form of a proverb. Before discussing The Tyde Tarrieth No Man, therefore, it is necessary to consider the kinds of truth that proverbs put forward.

It is because proverbs, and so proverb plays, claim a special relationship with the truth that The Tyde Tarrieth No Man is appropriate for analysis. A tendency to use proverbs can be found not just in the mid- to late-sixteenth century group of plays called proverb plays, but throughout the moral play tradition. As a traditional weapon of argument, the proverb is an obvious mode for a vice figure to appropriate, given his renowned persuasive skills. The use of proverbs is also very much in keeping with the fashion of the times, evidence for which may be found in John Heywood's collections of proverbs, and epigrams on proverbs. In general, Heywood's punning wit is aimed at overturning the statement that the proverb makes, or the advice that it gives. In moral plays, however, one finds a rather more straightforward approach to proverbs: they are used to justify arguments, or to emphasize conclusions in an authoritative way.

The proverb appears to embody wisdom based on reliable observations of the way of the world. Its overtone of trustworthiness is derived in part from frequent repetition, in part from its witty, concise form. In the sense that proverbs appeared to be true, they were and are used seriously by 'dramatists and pamphleteers, politicians, orators and preachers'.

A proverb, then, is not necessarily always true. John Heywood knew this, and presumably so did his many readers. Not only can circumstances alter cases, but proverbs themselves are by nature ambiguous. Because of the pithy form - often gnomic and usually metaphoric - the proverb's meaning is matter for interpretation and hence also for debate. The inherent ambiguities of semantics and syntax make it possible to reverse a proverb's meaning completely.9

It seems that a proverb is an attempt to enunciate a truth about the world. The disruptive forces at work in language, however, shake the reliability of this putative relationship between words and experience. There is a remarkable similarity between this condition and the belief held by Derridean criticism that any attempt to construct truth is subverted by refusals within language itself to be held to a unitary meaning. The slipperiness of language is a function of the 'play of signification'.10 Because a proverb can be perceived as applying in a wide variety of cases, even quite contradictory ones, the possibility of a 'play of signification' can be detected from the proverb's wide applicability. Proverbs, therefore, mark a craving for interpretation, and hence a node of hesitancy within apparent certitude. Highly conscious of the moral dangers of ambiguity, the proverb plays constitute attempts to locate the 'meaning' of the proverb in question - in other words, to fix its interpretation. These points will become clearer in the course of my discussion of The Tyde Tarrieth No Man.

The action is very largely taken up with a series of short plots, in which Courage, the principal Vice, uses the proverb 'the tyde tarrieth no man' (the tide waits for nobody) to stampede various victims into taking panicky immoral decisions. Wapull's skill avoids the danger of a fragmented effect by involving the concluding scenes of one episode in the opening ones of the next. The insertion of one plot in another adds a kaleidoscopic quality, for the audience can never be quite sure which plot will take place next. Part of the enjoyment of watching such a play lies in observing the technical skill of the actors in doubling parts, for of course
there are simply the same four people on and off the stage all the time, but in a
dazzling variety of sequences, combinations and costumed rôles.

The play begins with a speech by the Prologue, who suggests that there is a
virtuous interpretation of the proverb, and that problems arise for the many people
who misinterpret it.

How greedinesse at such times, doth get what he can,
and therefore still cryeth, Tyde tarieth no man.

Which proverbe right well might be applyed,
To a better fence then it is used:
There is a time to ask grace, this may not be denied,
Of thy full life so greatly abused.
Let not that time then be refused,
For that tyde most certaine will tarry no man,
Thus taking the proverbe we rightly do scan

(A ii v)

He implies a dual system of interpretation: either his truth, or worldly falsehood is
all that is available. He leaves the stage, and the opposition immediately arrives in
the form of the vice figure. Courage begins by listing all the categories of sinful
human beings he intends to load onto his barge, which sounds like a cross between
the Ship of Fools and Charon's ferry to Hell. Courage is joined by the minor vice
figures, Hurting Help, Painted Profit and Fained Furtherance. They boast of their
opportunism in the materialistic world: Help is a broker; Profit is the servant of a
gentleman; and Furtherance serves the merchant. They discuss their names, then
the four of them indulge in traditional vice-play activities of fighting and singing.

Next, Courage persuades the merchant, Greediness, to put financial gain
ahead of religious scruples. No Good Neighbourhood enlists the assistance of Help
and Courage to have an elderly tenant put out of his lodgings so that he
(Neighbourhood) can inherit the lease. Coincidentally the house is owned by
Greediness, who can be swayed by a quick bribe. Furtherance, who makes a living as Greediness' servant, provides the information that Greediness is particularly in need of money at that time, to buy some land. They leave, and the next to appear is an impoverished Courtier, named Willing-to-Win-Worship, who is planning to return to his property in the country. Courage persuades him to change his mind, offering to help him to borrow money in order to afford clothes for the imminent royal triumph. Furtherance and Help take him to find Greediness, from whom he will borrow at an extortionate rate of interest. Greediness now appears on stage, reporting that an old tenant is to be evicted, and rejoicing that he has successfully applied the proverb 'the tyde tarrieth for no man'. Greediness is packed off in a hurry to meet the Courtier.

The haste and plotting abate for a time, for the Tenant arrives, to deliver a monologue of complaint about his misfortunes, and about the grasping nature of the world.

Courage next uses his guiding motto to encourage a fourteen-year-old girl, Wilful Wantonness, to marry against her parents' wishes. The tone of the play continues to become more sombre, with Help regretting the Courtier's losses. The prevailing mood lifts briefly when all the vice figures gloat over their profits and their knavishness, and sing together. The Courtier now takes his turn at a monologue of regret and sorrow, adding to the sense of sadness which the Tenant's monologue has begun. He attributes worldly viciousness to the popular misapplication of the play's governing proverb:

But what is their aunswer, when they are blamed
Say they, we haue here but a little space,
Therefore we haue neede to be getting a pace,
Wherefore should we gayning lays away,
The Tyde taryeth no Man, this is all they can say

(E i v)

For a time the scene becomes light-hearted, with the advent of Wantonness
and her new husband, Wastefulness. They entertain with a married couple’s version of vice-play: railing, making up again, and singing. Wastefulness is encouraged to spend ruinously, on a carpe diem interpretation of the proverb. The final plot that belongs with this section of the play is scarcely substantial enough to merit the term: it is a short scene in which a Debtor is arrested while listening to a sermon. With this, the mood darkens once more. Three-quarters of the play has passed thus in vice-play, songs, fights, and the deterioration of moral standards. Only now do Christianity and Faithful Few enter.

Christianity has been much weakened by the evil in the world. Faithful attempts to revive his spirits, and succeeds in countering Greediness’s arguments for money-making, re-defining riches by citing the durability of Christ’s word. He also saves the now indigent Wastefulness from suicide, driving away the inarticulate monster, Dispayre. Meanwhile, however, Courage reports that Greediness has killed himself off-stage. Correction and Authority are then mobilized to see Courage chastised: he struggles ignominiously with the gaoler, Correction, before being taken away to be hanged. Christianity can now be restored to the people, properly armed with the sword of ‘god’s word’ and the shield of ‘faith’.

Written for a small troupe of four, The Tyde Tarrieth No Man involves numerous monologues and considerable doubling of parts. Performing an elaborate plot including numerous roles with a small troupe in this way necessitates a large number of exits and entrances.

Typically of vice-play, the tone is one of rumbustious fun of a rather savage kind. The scrambling, scuttling crew of minor vice figures is both various and numerous, creating an effect of dynamism and of excitement. The alternation of virtuous victims and vicious exploiters points up the moral tone, and does so the more movingly because the victims speak for themselves. This, and the debate between Faithful and Courage add an intellectual dimension to what might otherwise be seen as a simple psychomachia-morality.

Closer analysis of the play demonstrates how it explicitly confronts that
intriguing conflict within proverbs, that they purport to state truths about the world on which one might reasonably base decisions, while at the same time being so open to interpretation that they are treacherous as an unthought basis for morality. The play also exploits the result that a proverb is the ideal dramatic resource for that master of deceit, word-play and misinterpretation, the principal Vice. Courage, through this facility, releases that incompletely repressed ambiguity which lies behind language and makes itself apparent whenever language is permitted to play. Thus it is over-determined that otherness must manifest itself through the vice figures' playful and excessive speech.

To put that point another way, once the totalizing system of the virtuous is specifically confronted by worldly behaviour and worldly words, two possibilities arise. The first is that an alternative totalizing system attempts to establish itself: one version of 'truth' confronts another. This is the overt scheme of the plays. The second, and more complex, possibility arises because that 'alternative truth' which forms the confrontation has rather special origins. Mobilizing the physical to confront the spiritual, and the linguistically free to confront the rigid, this alternative system taps the energies of the Kristevan chora. The second possibility, then, is that a deconstructive play of meaning can arise within each system, due to the dialogue between them. I have argued above, in Chapter Three, that the vice figures exist as pure opposition. This is the reason why a vice figure doesn't care what weapons he uses in order to oppose. It is this flexibility that can eventually be used to call his alternative totalization into question, and from that all pretensions to totality.

When we consider the conventional 'emptiness' of the vice figure's prattle we can perhaps begin to see the relevance of Derrida's formulation: 'to risk meaning nothing is to start to play, and first to enter into the play of différence which prevents any word, any concept, any enunciation from coming to summarize and to govern from the theological presence of a center the movement and textual spacing of differences.'
It seems, then, that the proverb play readily offers itself as a specific instance of flexibility operating to place systems as such in question. It is, of course, fundamental to the very existence of the moral play that the vice figures should offer alternative interpretations of any moral message. The favoured technique for doing this has already been noticed at length: wilfully misapprehending the meaning of the virtuous figures' remarks and advice, often by taking metaphoric utterances literally.

The opening monologue sets out the play’s project, which is to explicate both the moral and the opportunistic applications of the proverb’s advice to seize the moment because ‘the Tyde Tarrieth No Man’. Naturally its aim is to demonstrate that the former is better.

The Prologue begins by explaining that a few wicked people can destroy the good name of a whole city, using the analogies of the woodworm in timber and moth in fabric. He then advertises the content of the play to follow as further explanation of what he has said.

To what ende these wordes we have spoken
In our matter shalbe more playnely exprejt,
Which the Tide tarieth no man, to name hath token

(A ii)

The avaricious use the proverb of the title as their excuse for this behaviour.

How greediness at such times, doth get what he can
And therefore still cryeth, Tyde tarieth no man

(A ii v)

The Prologue goes on to explain that the proverb could be better used for a godly purpose, in the lines quoted above. A concluding humble stanza follows, ushering in the players. Thus the play lays claim to an ability to interpret the proverb lucidly. It promises a close reading of the title, presented in dramatic form. Its first move in this business of practical criticism, asserting that two possible readings exist, is to locate these as occupying the polarized categories of virtuous and
vicious, and indeed of right and wrong.

In analysing the play we find that this attempt to take a firm grip on language and meaning is subject to various forms of slippage. The proverb that Wapull has chosen to exemplify is itself a statement of the slippery, mutable nature of the world, so one must be careful to distinguish between the various kinds of indeterminacy in the play.

The play attempts to control slippage by setting up an opposition between the 'good interpretation' and the 'bad interpretation' of the proverb. However, such a simple sub-division of morality is undermined by the very examples which purport to establish it. It would be wrong to see this as intellectual failure on Wapull's part. In fact, it is a demonstration by language in its fluidity of the impossibility of an accurate linguistic statement of truth.

The interpretative opposition is stated by the play's opening form: a pair of monologues sets up the two possibilities. The first monologue asserts the 'right' reading of the proverb, a reading which, we will see, is divided within itself. The second monologue balances that with a statement of Courage's intent, as vice figure, to see as many people as possible damned through a false reading. In asserting that the proverb has a virtuous and a vicious interpretation, the Prologue assumes an authoritative position, in control of the possible interpretations. It locates those interpretations as a pair of opposed, definable moral attitudes, but shies away from defining them neatly, inviting us to take the content of the play for explanation. However, throughout the play even the most overt attempts to grasp meaning firmly through language result in slippages away from the oppositional model. This problem is exemplified particularly in Courage's attempted control of labels; in the insecurity of the opposition between the virtuous and the vicious 'tyde'; and in the hesitations in which the play establishes its basis for defining morality and the nature of evil.

This fundamental slippage of meaning begins with a gesture of control, when
Courage and his crew take charge of the deceitful capacities of language. Courage claims a firm grasp on names, revealed in his ability to manipulate his own in the manner traditional to vice figures. Courage's self-definition is stated in his first monologue. He is both 'Corage contagious' and 'Corage contrarious': he will incite others to do evil, and he will also occasionally pretend to be virtuous. In this way he claims all forms of courage as aspects of himself.

The evil characters go through the standard moves of changing their names from accurate statements of their functions to misleading euphemisms. In this they signify the deceitfulness of worldly things. However, initially Courage himself was unaware that his minions had abbreviated their names, and is corrected for making the mistake of addressing them in full. This is an unusual state of affairs in the moral play, for it is more common for the principal Vice to determine the names of the others.

Hurtful Help renames himself Help, so that people will trust him. Similarly, Painted Profit calls himself simply Profit, and Fained Furtherance is Furtherance, the better to plunder the ordinary folk. The deceits are to prove effective. When No Good Neighbourhood enters, he demonstrates total confidence in his control of the effects of language. The analysis he offers of the various possible versions of his name is clearly more accurate and subtle than Courage's:

For if no good neighbourhood I be named,
Then of all men I shall be blamed
And if that good to neighbourhood I have
Men will say I doe it prayse to craue  

(B iii v)

For these reasons, Neighbourhood opts for the most ambiguous available version of his name.

Thus a system of meaning based on the binary opposition of virtue versus vice already sees division within the second group. Courage, who is theoretically in control of the group of evil doers, and so of one of the polarities out of which the
moral world as an interpretative structure is constructed, is revealed as himself subject to ambiguity. This takes place at the most fundamental possible level, that of naming.

The action of the play also contradicts Courage's assertion of control. Once ambiguity has been permitted, definitions can proliferate, and it transpires that this flexibility of language can be used by any and all the characters. This includes the virtuous, for all that they have a vested interest in sustaining clear definitions. A key word for this text is 'courage', and it is instructive to observe how even the virtuous characters depend on the flexibility of the term. Christianity first enters, skulking and mournful, shamefully carrying his perverted 'titles'. At this point, although it goes unstated, the feature that Christianity manifestly lacks is courage to act virtuously. Christianity's sword, properly labelled as 'God's word' has been turned around to display the title 'policy', a direct result of the general move towards self-interest by the population at large. Faithful Few sets out to cope with this:

By the power of God I wil not delay,

*He turneth the titles*

To turne this tytle most untrue and fayned,
And I will indue thee, and that straight way
With such weapons, as Saynt Paule hath ordained.

(F iii)

When Faithful Few restores Christianity with support and encouraging words, another version of courage is now on stage, and out of Courage's control. Faithful then confronts Courage's creature Greediness in debate, and matches his arguments:

G. Why I lende my money like a friend for good will,
And thereby doe helpe men at their neede.

F. A friend thou arte in deede, though a friend but ill,

*Pithagoras thy friendship, hath playnely decreede,*

*There be many sayth he, who no friendes do lacke,*
And yet of friendship they have but skant,
So thou arte a friend for their moneys fake
And yet thy friendship they alwayes shall want

(F iii v)

Having thus answered Greediness’s arguments by re-interpreting the word 'friend', they now clash over the word 'riches':

G. I put case poverty should me assayle,
   Can Gods word and fayth me anything ayde:
   Poverty agaynst riches can neuer avayle,
   I am sure fyr this may not be denayde.

F. We deny not, but in this world, riches beare the way
   Yet, it not riches to be called sure:
   For in Gods power it is to make riches decay,
   Whereas Gods word and fayth shall euuer endure.

(F iii v)

From this point it still seems as if Greediness's arguments may carry the day. Significantly, however, just as Faithful is proposing to refer the debate to God himself for judgment, the discussion is cut short by Courage’s departure. This is one of the rare occasions when Courage is off stage, and it is a weak move on his part as it leaves Faithful Few in possession of the stage, as if it were a field of battle. Faithful Few retains undisputed control from here to the end of the play, for by the time Courage returns he has been much diminished by the death of Greediness. There is a structural reason why Courage can now be physically absent from the stage, quite apart from the requirements of doubling: courage as a quality is still present in the person of Faithful Few, who shows a virtuous courage in the face of Christianity’s adversity.

In the verbal confrontation between Greediness and Faithful we see selfish and selfless forms of courage in combat. But we also see another conflict. Courage’s claim to establish the meaning of 'the tyde tarrieth no man' absolutely
has been constructed throughout the play by his behaviour as a kind of showman who has set up each relevant plot situation. Each time he has drawn the same moral, that one must rush in quickly, exploiting others in order to make money. We have heard Greediness stating his wish for independent control of meaning:

    Why would you not haue me, how to inuent,
    Which way were best to bring in my gayne?
    
    (F iii)

His use of 'best' suggests a moral dimension to his decision making. This claim on behalf of the individual is subverted by an external phenomenon: the virtue of a Christian life as exemplified by Faithful Few. He counters Courage's and Greediness' bid for independent interpretation with an argument elevating the interests of the majority:

    But not in such fort, to set thine intent
    That all the world of thee should complayne.
    
    (F iii)

In the example cited earlier, we found Greediness and Faithful disputing the usage of the term 'friend', with just the same opposition of the selfish and the social. Faithful introduces Pythagoras' authority - an appeal to communal standards. When Christianity is ready to give in to Greediness' arguments, Faithful makes the scene untenable to the vice figures by introducing another social form: that of a trial before a judge, in this case God.

    To God let us the cause betake:
    Whome I trust, when as time he doth see,
    He will for us, a deliueraunce make.
    
    (G i)

These two areas, of the public good and of God's judgment, are both outside Courage's linguistic control.

    By demolishing Courage's linguistic control over the play, Faithful Few has succeeded in sanitizing the concept of courage. The principal vice figure's position
as controller of labels has been shown to be a delusion. Nevertheless, Courage's requiem for Greediness utters a description of immortality which we all know applies equally to himself. Contained in that prediction of immortality is the inevitability of a continuing 'play' between the attempted control of meaning and its subversion.

While accepting that the proverb enunciates some kind of truth, the Prologue asserts opposed readings of the word 'tide'. There is a good 'tide', when man takes advantage of God's forgiveness:

There is time to ask grace, this may not be denied
Of thy sinful life so greatly abused
Let not that time then be refused

(A ii v)

People use the evil 'tide' as an excuse to exploit their fellow citizens.

For they nothing way, any needy man's case
But with greedy grype, their gayne they imbrace
No kind of degree that they will forbear,
Neyther any time will they let slip or spare.

(A ii - A ii v)

The exact nature of these readings is left unclear, as the Prologue expects the play to clarify them.

To what ende these wordes we haue spoken,
In our matter shalbe more playnely exprest.

(A ii)

Because the Prologue has a position in the play comparable with that of the messengers from God or the author in earlier moral plays, we expect him to take the side of virtue. He provides a small hint of what this would imply, apart from merely opposing greed:

There is time to aske grace,

(A ii v)

Two possible interpretations occur. The first, backed by his earlier references to
of 'worme', 'moth' and 'the grave', is that death is a person's last chance to ask forgiveness for a 'sinfull life'. The second is that the opportunity to reform one's life and to live well will not always be available: people must therefore seize that moment when it arrives. The nature of the virtuous tide is not clearly established: it may be living well, or dying well. Either way, where exactly the play claims the danger of missing the tide to lie remains to be seen. The Prologue is much more at ease talking about virtue in terms of the negation of its opposite. He categorizes the vicious tide as opportunism, particularly that greed for money which damages one's neighbours or fellow countrymen. This is the interpretation that Courage is to explicate further.

Courage, however, demonstrates an even wider variety of possible meanings for the 'tide' that one must hurry to catch. He begins by talking as a boatman, about a sea-tide and a barge which is to be loaded with a variety of villains: cut-purses, usurers, whores, and others. By representing himself as the ferryman, Courage seems to be speaking of death, and of himself as an agent of the devil. Like Charon, he is to transport the wicked to hell. He answers the Prologue's careful stanzas with a coarse, lurching metre, characteristics which his verse shares with the conventional description of the Dance of Death.

We meane to preuayle
And therefore we fayle
To the Diuell of hell

(A iii)

The rowdy catalogue generates for a moment a picture of the crowds who are ready to dance with him towards their doom. His rôle as the Devil's boatman is punningly referred to later, with 'what news in the coste?', (C iii v).

Like the Prologue, however, Courage shows by his behaviour that he is unsure what kind of opportunistic 'tide' he is talking about. His ostensible function is to use a wicked misinterpretation of the proverb to cause people to fall from grace. But where he reckons his self-interest to lie shifts between the corruption of
others and his own financial gain, because he uses the 'tyde tarrieth' proverb to refer to both.  

His first concern seems to be for the making of money, as the Prologue predicted. He uses the love of money to ensure that Greediness, the merchant, does not give way to the conscience that was stirred in him by his conversation with the preacher. Courage quickly interprets the preacher's morality as a wish to prevent the merchant from making money. What Courage doesn't notice as the play works through his catalogue of 'tides' is that they are not all of the same dimensions. The earlier versions of avarice constitute damage done by the individual to his own soul. Greediness harms himself by not listening to the preacher, and by taking no care for the welfare of others. When he again shows his disregard for religion by causing a debtor to be arrested at St. Paul's Cross, he seems like a first-class convert to Courage's hell-bent cargo. Other cases of villainy are more problematic. When Help pities the courtier:

Alas good Gentleman, he is fulued but ill,

(D iii)

Courage is pleased:

- - - - - - - - is he fo pincht I say?

By my troth that is a sport for to heare.

(D iii v)

It seems as if Courage himself has forgotten what the point of the exercise is, in his own eagerness for cash and mischief. The song 'We are winners all three' (D iii - D iii v) makes this point even more clearly. The audience can hardly be expected to believe that the Courtier's soul is lost because he borrowed unwisely. His motivation for borrowing is not all bad: a desire to wear fine clothes may be vain, but this is due to his wish to be part of a royal triumph. Even Courage has recognized this:
The one is good, no man will deny,
I mean courage to win worship and fame:

(C iii v)

In their final interview, the Courtier has recognized Courage's villainy, but Courage remains pleased to have fleeced him.

In faith this sport is trimly alone
That I can thus a gentleman fray:

(E iv - E ii)

['alone' is probably a misprint for 'done']

The Tenant takes this pattern a stage further, as he is entirely a virtuous victim whose monologue of complaint is both moving and relatively lacking in self-pity. Bringing the Tenant on stage makes his case more poignant and stresses the depth of No Good Neighbourhood's villainy.

This play contains a movement away from the earlier moral play structure in which groups of the vices and virtues strove for the allegiance of a figure representative of humanity. Instead the humanity rôle here shows signs of splitting into the separate characters of exploiter and victim. In a moral world composed entirely of inhuman vice figures and innocent victims, it becomes difficult to locate a neutral battleground where man's soul is interestingly in question. This is the rôle played by Mankind, by Youth in The Interlude of Youth, and by Humanity in The Four Elements, among others. In the early fifteenth century poem The Assembly of Gods, the human soul is represented as a battleground: the field of Macrocosmos. If that battleground has now, in the mid-sixteenth century, become the whole of society, secularization of morality is the result. Thus it seems that Courage's usage of the word 'tide' has slipped, away from one in which greed was merely the tool he used to lure people to hell, towards one in which financial gain or financial ruin are the ultimate stakes.

With the arrival of the maid Wilful Wantonness, Courage slips into yet another interpretation of the 'tide'. Wantonness is suffering from intense sexual
frustration, and wishes to soothe this state by rushing into marriage with anyone who will have her. Clearly, encouraging her to persevere with this intention involves two areas of spiritual danger: rebellion against parental authority and a misuse of the sacrament of marriage. In this case the tide which Courage asserts will not wait is youth. Wilful Wanton finds her match in Wastefulness, whose soul is endangered by a morality which only considers pleasure, and who sees anxiety about old age in purely financial terms.

Courage approaches this situation first by exploiting the young people's fear of aging, in order to incite them to a rash marriage.

Now arte thou youthfull, thy selfe to prefere,
And thy youthfull beuty, mens heartes may stere,
But youthfull beuty will not alwayes laft
The Tyde taryeth no man, but soone it is paft.
Therefore to wedding, fee thou make hafte,
For now much time thou doeft loose in wafte.

(D ii v)

However, he seems to have less than total confidence that this will be sufficiently destructive of their already shaky morality, for he soon slips back into his old stress on money, persuading Wastefulness to spend his fortune, on the grounds that he will enjoy it more while he is young.

Take time while time is, for time will away:

The niggard is neuer counted a man.

(E iii)

Like the Courtier, Wastefulness is not so much vicious as foolish, and Courage has merely encompassed his financial ruin.

Neither the Prologue nor Courage is clear what kind of tide they refer to, then. Both are inclined to begin with an interpretation based on the traditional Christian death-centred morality of an earlier day, and both slip towards social interpretations. This terminological slippage around 'tide' points to a conceptual
slippage central to the play.

The play purports to assert a Christian, or other worldly basis for morality. It is explicit about this in establishing Christianity and Faithful Few as the virtuous side of the conflict. Already in the Prologue, however, this is questioned by a more secular interpretation. It seems that what is wrong with excessive self-interest is that it gets a town a bad name:

Yet the fact of this one, the others good name doth spill,
And thus a reproch to his own towne ingendreth
And the good name of the whole town he hindereth

(A ii)

The Prologue, then, is opposing the individual's worldly advancement to the town's equally worldly reputation. The complaint appears to be not that they do harm to themselves, but that they harm 'their own countrey'. This theme is pursued and repeated through fourteen lines of verse, whose overall tone is one of conventional complaint on the ills of society:

The ymple ones commonly, by such are opprest
For they nothing way, any needy mans care

(A ii)

Only after seven stanzas is there any hint that this is not to be a wholly secular play.

There is time to ask grace, this may not be denied
Of thy sinfull life so greatly abused

(A ii v)

The virtuous characters in the play are constructed in the same identification of secular and spiritual status. The Courtier is accepted as a good person. No doubt there are tactical issues involved here: the playwright seems afraid the character may give offence. However, the Courtier's virtue is once again a very secular one - his other name is Willing to Win Worship, and this is the source of his downfall as well as of his respectability. Even Faithful Few subscribes to the social definition of
evil, discernible in the terms with which he upbraids Greediness:

Thou arte a Chri\(t\)yan with a canckered heart
And the cause of reproch to a whole citty

(F iii)

The rhythm of the verse form here reinforces a shocked emphasis on the second, secular line, at the expense of the Christian condemnation.

The Prologue is, perhaps, entitled to assume that his audience is alert to a connection accepted in sixteenth century theological teachings between the private virtue of individuals and public opinion of them.\(^{23}\) Because the Prologue takes that for granted, we are left puzzling over the validity of social opinion as a moral sanction in a system where the World is usually identical with evil.\(^{24}\)

The play's inbuilt confusion between a religious and a social definition of good is matched by a similar confusion about evil. At some points it is suggested that evil involves a neglect of one's individual soul. This is particularly clear when Greediness hesitates over his conversation with the preacher, and again in the tone of outrage the play attaches to his having the debtor arrested at St. Paul's Cross.

Evil is also seen as victimisation. The maltreatment of the Tenant, and his moving lament are reminiscent of the maltreatment of such virtuous figures in earlier moral plays as Pity in Hickscorne and Mercy in Mankind. The Tenant, by taking on the dramatic function of these allegorical virtues, further exemplifies the secularization taking place in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man. To a lesser extent, the Courtier, Wastefulness and the Debtor are also victims in this mode. There is even a mournful, defeated quality about Christianity, which aligns him with that group. However, the effect of this is not to allegorize the victims. Instead, sharing their tone stresses Christianity's dependance on society for success, as does his weakness as long as the faithful are few in number.

The play's predominant view of un-Christian behaviour is a very materialist one, and in this the apparent opposition between the spiritual and the material is conflated into one between a variety of materialisms.
In considering the play's interpretations of the proverb, one must notice the image which Courage's first monologue plays on. His list of the people who are to board the ship for Hell raises the great image of the Ship of Fools. Barclay's free translation into English (1509)\(^2\) of the immensely popular *Narrenschiff* by Brant (1494) describes at great length each of the huge variety of fools who are to be loaded onto the ship. This substantial work is further enlarged by the inclusion of a category of additional follies at the end, and one of its principal effects is an impression of eternity. The Ship is always about to set sail; it is always very nearly full. Urgency to get on board is really merely another aspect of folly, as it is never too late to damn oneself. The omnipresence of damnation is also part of *The Tyde Tarrieth No Man*. Although Courage traffics in the need for haste expressed in the title, and even seems to believe in it himself, it is a wholly spurious need. The people he manipulates can turn to evil at any time in the course of the multitude of opportunities that the play offers.

The same is true of good. Christianity, though varying in strength, is a presence in the play from the point when the Tenant appeals for him. When Wastefulness despairs, Faithful Few is instantly at hand to lead him away from his suicidal ideas. However, the play concludes with two suicides: that of Greediness is achieved but that attempted by Wastefulness is prevented by Faithful Few. In this scene, Faithful Few suggests the presence of eternity. He holds mutability in check by establishing a litany of repetitions, in which Wastefulness willingly joins. This is the price of his freedom from Courage's urgency. When Faithful Few adopts the term 'tide', it is not a re-interpretation, but a metaphysical irony.

*So shalt thou enjoy the Tide of his grace*

\[(G\, ii\, v)\]

The tide evoked here is clearly not Courage's varying, panicky ebb and flow, but a state of perpetual flood, impossible in nature.

The superhuman quality of evil has been noticed in Courage's speech of mourning for Greediness. The closing lines of the play explicitly raise the image of
Heaven as a continuous state:

So shall they be sure of a resting place,

In Heaven where reigneth all joy and bliss

(G iii v)

That statement of certainty is possible because Courage has been banished, and in its bland confidence gives the impression that the Prologue's intention to establish a virtuous interpretation of the title has been carried through. However, the existence of an eternal Heaven and an equally eternal temptation to Hell means that neither an evil nor a good reading of the proverb can be established in the context of on-going human life. A person leading a wicked life may repent at any moment, while good may as easily fall. Two incompatible kinds of time interact here: eternity and the human life-span. Thus, to read virtue, for example, as equivalent to a lived moment of the life-span and so as irretrievable once past, is to confuse the two varieties of time. It is only at the moment of death that interpretation can be fixed either way, and then only for a given individual. For the individual, chance often determines which state he or she is in at the moment of death, and one might imagine that this would stimulate a prudent person to be as consistently virtuous as possible. Such a cynical approach might itself be seen as morally dangerous, particularly in that reverse form in which self-seeking was used throughout life, with the intention of death-bed repentance, to take care of the future. For the person in the midst of life, only a sincere, moment-by-moment approach was acceptable.

From this perception one can next move to see that the play's project of seeking to establish a single, final truth is subverted by its recognition of the eternal nature of both evil and good. Even in the transcendent, extra-temporal world which supplies the touchstone for the 'meanings' of the proverb, truth is not single but double.

An observer, then, rather than a mankind figure, finds two terms existing in a perpetual opposition, and where there are two terms and an external observer,
there is a three-term structure. The circumstance of the moral play constructs such an opposition from its form as theatre, in which good and evil is displayed before the audience: an observer who inhabits the 'space between', and whose existence can deny the implied polarity.

The same triadic structure has been invoked at an earlier point in the play, when Faithful Few has defeated the vice figures by referring their dispute to external arbitration. That external phenomenon is itself linguistic, for it is constituted by Faithful's ability to talk Christianity round; to argue with Greediness on his own terms; and finally to take control of the dramatic arena with his own voice. When Courage and Greediness leave the stage, they leave Faithful still talking, still explaining his position. His control of the moral arena is manifested in his ability to cope with despair, when he saves Wastefulness from suicide. He achieves this by imposing his language on Wastefulness, who is a character very close to the traditional moral play's figure of humanity.

They both kneele, and Wastfull sayeth after Faythfull,

F. Well follow mee and I will conduct thee.

Oh heavenly Father, pardon my offence

W. Oh heavenly father, pardon my offence

F. And graunt that thy mercy may to me repayre.

(G ii)

In this manner, Wastefulness repeats Faithful's words line by line through four sentences, which drive away the 'ougly shape' (G i v) of the monster Dispayre. Thus the 'outside' of language and meaning is still also language, and there is no 'transcendental referent'. Though the Prologue attempts to establish a single supra-linguistic transcendental 'truth', the play cannot help showing that even that must be contained within a structure, and is part of a sign-system.
In this section I analyse a complex further process taking place in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man, to act as a convenient foundation on which to base discussions of the changes which took place in the moral play in the 1560's and 1570's. Approaching these changes through a discussion of subject and other identifies a previously unnoticed transition and casts new light on a rather well-known one. The process in question, involving the proliferation of mankind figures, is sometimes seen as the bifurcation of the mankind figure. It appears that, wherever the mankind figure is multiplied into more than one character, at least one of those is assimilated to the vice-crew. Here it seems that the opposition of subject/other has been almost completely abolished. This operation may leave the play entirely without any representation whatsoever of generalized humanity. This will prove to be the case in Like Will To Like (1568) where the representative of virtuous life, like Heavenly Man in Enough is as Good as a Feast (c.1565-70) behaves as one of the virtues rather than as a mankind figure. When the stage is dominated by the full-blown vice-play and the mankind figure has become cynical and evil, the original mankind figure is overwhelmed, together with his story. Only forms of otherness are represented, and a different kind of dramatic structure has been initiated. Thus the development of vice play is significant for theatre history, but it develops in this way because of the nature of language. As a term in a semiotic structure, vice play is bound to take on a wider and more varied load of implications: it has a tendency to ramify because it participates in the play of signifiers. Psychoanalysis, too, gives clarification here, for, as the representatives of the repressed, the vices are ebulliently inclined to 'return', like the physical symptoms of neurosis, in an endless collection of mutations. Linguistic theory can explain the changes in the moral play, but what do these changes imply for the theories that the plays put forward? The relatively simple other of the earlier moral play develops in such a way as to become complex and then all-engrossing. In one sense, then, the plays offer a theory of meaning as multiply ambiguous: as both
playful and to be played with. The 'satire on the times' mode, however, also describes nothing more than another totalizing system: one in which unrelieved greed rules.

When the changes in the moral play in the 1560's and 70's are analysed in terms of the growing emphasis on vice-play, loss of that polarity in which the meaning of the moral play had been constituted is found to result. That clear meaning generated in the early moral plays by the persuasively binarist view of the world succumbs to multiplicity of interpretation. Both Enough is as Good as a Feast and Like Will To Like display significant changes in the mankind figure, and related changes in the status of the vice-play.

It will be clear that these readings are based on a view of the plots of the plays as examples of discourse, and so as subject to the kinds of descriptions that are applicable to language. From this, the relation between vice play and narrative structure can be read as parallel to the relation between playful and logocentric forces within discourse.

In the case of The Tyde Tarrieth No Man, we have seen meaning asserting itself to be multiple, through the wide variety of interpretations of the proverb. I have suggested that the pattern of the moral play acts as a signifying code in its own right, in which the vice-figures are signifiers pointing at otherness, while the mankind figure is a signifier pointing at the idea of the unitary self. In this circumstance of subverted meaning, what becomes of that conventional division between the mankind figure and the vice-figure/other which we have observed the moral play striving so hard to establish? The answer is interesting, for it supplies a key to interpreting several contemporary plays, in addition to The Tyde Tarrieth No Man.

With signification now an issue, we find that the original oppositions of the code itself are no longer stable. The signifier 'mankind figure' slides radically under the transforming effects of vice-characteristics.
Man there are several candidates for the position of mankind figure and this in itself is an important circumstance to which I shall return.

The case of the merchant, Greediness is particularly interesting, for there is a slippage of labels in which the normal structure of the moral play is questioned by the growing tendency of otherness to appropriate the stage. We first meet Greediness when he is in a precarious state, largely given over to evil, but still capable of a twinge of conscience. At this point he most resembles such mankind figures as Youth, the King in *Pride of Life*, and Humanum Genus in *The Castle of Perseveraunce*, whose nature it is to appear in a condition of redeemable error. Like many mankind figures, Greediness has a vice figure, Fayned Furtherance, as his servant.

It was my chaunce with a preacher to meete

Whose company to haue I did not deny,

(B ii - B ii v)

At this point he is an ordinary human in the social world. When lectured by the preacher he experiences a sense of guilt and even uses the pious idea of confession in referring to his feelings.

His talke I confesse my conscience did nip,

(B ii v)

However, Greediness' reaction is to avoid discomfort by crossing the road and leaving the preacher.

But sodenly I gaue him the slip
And crosse the way to the other fyde

(B ii v)

Though Greediness has made a moral mistake here, he still does not seek bad company, but happens on it.

So alone I let mayster Preacher walke,
And here by chaunce I stumbled in.

(B ii v)
In the polarized view of the moral play, the 'waye' has only two sides, and when Greediness crosses to the side away from the preacher, he inevitably approaches evil. His perception that he has met Courage by chance is false, for we have seen that a vice figure's ubiquity makes him immediately available to those who, like Greediness, take a false step.

So far, Greediness has behaved like any other mankind figure. Indeed, he continues to consider repentance and a moral life twenty-two lines later:

Yea but truely his wordes did my conscience prick,
Of me he did so unhappily geffe
I promife thee he touched me vnto the quick,
For that in gayning I vfed excesse.
My conscience doth tell me, I haue done amisse,
And of long time I haue gone astray
And a thousand witnejjes the conscience is,
As Salust in mojte playne wordes doth say

(B iii)

He thus demonstrates an educated background and an ability to argue from authority. But using a classical author leads him into evil, for he can also cite counter-arguments (by 'Hyemes') which support Courage's viewpoint (V6). This is a potential danger, for it is an aspect of the vice figures' skill in argument that they can cite supportive authorities from classical texts, and even from the Bible. However, it is no more than a straw in the wind at this point, for such quotations may be used freely by virtuous characters as well. In Greediness' situation, neither argument has ultimate moral authority. Courage manipulates the polarized picture of the world to persuade Greediness, for he claims the opposite of greed to be poverty, designating the taking of excessive profits as prudent behaviour. Even the simplest of audiences could see that he has elided various versions of the middle way.

In the course of the play Greediness moves further and further towards evil.
When next he speaks with Courage, we find that his charity towards the Tenant has been eroded by money (C2). However, he still tries to see himself as guiltless in the matter, for he has not exactly evicted the Tenant himself, but has passed over responsibility to the new landlord, No Good Neighbourhood.

But I with that matter haue naught to doe,

Let them two now for that agree:

(C iii r)

By the time he has ruined the Courtier, Greediness can no longer understand a preacher's words.

For that goeth out whereas it comes in,

(E ii v)

Instead, as we have seen, he uses a pious occasion to have his debtor arrested.

In this sense, Greediness is Courage's greatest success: a human being whose soul has been lost through greed.

However, this movement is obscured by his assimilation into the crew of minor vice figures, who are scarcely responsible for their behaviour in any human way, evil being the foundation of their dramatic existence. In moving away from grace, Greediness becomes something other than an erring human being, and begins to function on a structural level as a vice figure. It is noteworthy that, in addition to being ubiquitous and grasping, Greediness has gone over entirely to money-lending in the course of the action (P14). Where originally he was a merchant with 'wares' that might deteriorate (B ii v), his various deals have left him as one who lives 'by the fruits of other men's toiling', as Faithful Few puts it. When he finally dies, he is accorded the same status as a major vice figure: his immortal, allegorical function has now fully superseded any earlier humanity.38

Why foole, Greediness?e will never dye

So long as couetous people do liue:

(G iii)

Courage reasons with himself over the true interpretation of Greediness's life and
death. The passage in which this occurs is extraordinary for its sense of a divided self in Courage. At first it appears that some sort of printer's error has omitted stage directions for a second character, to whom Courage might be talking. In fact, there is unmistakably no-one else on stage, since all other characters have departed, and Courage has entered alone. Courage's struggle to establish the proper meaning of Greediness's death is therefore a struggle to fix interpretation. However, the options are between an emotional interpretation (Greediness is a friend) and an allegorical one (Greediness is an attribute of the human race) and so cannot be resolved. Interrupted by the entry of Authority and Faithful Few, Courage reaches no conclusion, and Greediness's ultimate status is left in perpetual doubt. Courage ultimately hovers, undecided whether to interpret his play as a humanist document or as a moral play.

In Greediness, then, the polarisation of subject/other is subverted, but only up to a point. Insofar as 'Greediness will neuer die', the polarisation is sustained, for Greediness has merely moved to the other side of the opposition. But insofar as judgment is suspended, the opposition of mankind figure/vice figure no longer exists in its old form.

Indeed, the play has no single, obvious mankind figure of the traditional style. Although Greediness initially reveals some human characteristics, he is not the only possible mankind figure in the play, nor even the most obvious. All the following, as ordinary mortals, have some right to be considered for the position: the Courtier, the Tenant, the Debtor, Wilful Wantonness, and Wastefulness. Structurally, though, the Tenant gravitates towards the virtues, through his resemblance to Mercy, Pity, and similar figures who lament the times. The Debtor, too, is pure victim, only existing to demonstrate the depth of evil to which Greediness has fallen. Wastefulness and his wife, Wilful Wanton, show several traditional mankind figure traits. They fall into evil through sins of the flesh committed in youth. It is significant that Wastefulness is reformed by his ability to identify himself with the paternal linguistic code. In my opinion, one may assume
that Wilful Wantonness will follow his example.

However, the overwhelming impression left by the play is of an abounding multiplicity of allegorical representatives of humanity in one form or another. Typicality is lost in the statement of social variety, of the differing fates of individuals, and of the differing sins which must be on offer if everyone is to be tempted.

Several results of this splitting of the mankind figure can be seen more clearly in two further plays, also from the period of *The Tyde Tarrieth No Man*. These are *Enough is as Good as a Feast* and *Like Will To Like*. It is critical orthodoxy that *Enough is as Good as a Feast* contains a divided mankind figure, and certainly there are two figures who at first glance seem to be part of the remains of the mankind figure: Worldly Man and Heavenly Man. Not only is this interpretation an inaccurate reading of the relationship between Worldly Man and Heavenly Man, it leads one to misread the significance of Worldly Man's fall at the conclusion of the play. Heavenly Man is never the object of the vice figures' attacks by temptation, and his spiritual fate is never in doubt. He functions instead as a member of the team of virtuous advisers who are wrestling with evil for the soul of Worldly Man. For these reasons, one cannot see Heavenly Man as related to the mankind figure in anything but name. Worldly Man, on the other hand, is much more like any earlier mankind figure, beginning conventionally enough in a worldly state of wealth. He is soon reformed by the combined arguments of Heavenly Man and Contentation, who re-channel his concern to provide for his old age into a concern for his future after death. He is then tricked and persuaded into accepting the company of Covetous and his crew. However, once this has happened, Worldly Man's condition rapidly descends into extreme evil:

- - - - - - - - - - he

taketh on like the devil of hell

There was never one so hasty cruel and fell

(l.1008-9) (V13).
He acquires the specific characteristics of a principal Vice, laughing uncontrollably at his own power (M5):

    Ha, ha, ha! I must laugh, so God me save,
    To see what a lot of suitors nowadays we have

(l.1157-8)

Covetous, the chief vice figure, promises him a kind of universality (P):

    You shall have all the world to sue you shortly

(l.1160)

Worldly Man's speech of gloating over his possessions recalls Mundus' self-introduction in Mundus & Infans:

    --------how glorious my buildings do shine!
    No gentleman's in this country like unto mine!

(l.1165-6)

There is even a suggestion that he has developed that curious physical feature common to vice figures, devils and usurers on the Renaissance stage, a prominent nose (P):

    --it is not meet that such a beggar as he
    Should dwell so near under the nose of me

(l.1178)

The hint is amplified after Worldly Man is dead, when Satan informs us that he has been a usurer in secret (P4). In this way Worldly Man gradually becomes more 'worldly' than 'man'. World, of course, is one member of that sinister trio World, Flesh and Devil, all of whom are intimately related to the vice figures (V 13).

It seems, then, that this is a play from which the mankind figure has vanished, and which deals solely in a binary opposition between good and evil. In this case, though, there is no permanent assimilation of the mankind figure to the vice figures. Covetous must work hard at interposing his own voice (V6) to prevent Worldly Man from registering that there is hope in the Physician's message of imminent death. Worldly Man's deathbed scene has rightly been described as
moving, because one feels that he misses a genuine chance of salvation by a hair's breadth. His capacity to elicit a sympathetic response from the audience indicates that he cannot, finally, be seen as a vice figure. One must class Enough is as Good as a Feast with the earlier form of the moral play.

By contrast, Like Will To Like multiplies mankind figures on a rather different principle. In order to demonstrate the truth of its title, it creates duplicates of its sinning individuals rather than a variety of characters. Following that principle means that there is no reason why the mankind figure should not be multiplied indefinitely. This potential for infinite division locates Like Will To Like as the limiting case of the division of mankind figures.

Curiously, the feature of Like Will To Like that most immediately strikes the reader is that it threatens to be an astoundingly boring play. The first problem lies in choosing to apply the proverb-play mode to this particular old saw. The proverb asserts that people of a similar moral status will seek one another out and become friends. By the same token, they will reject the company of those who are either more wicked or more virtuous than themselves. The principal Vice, Nichol Newfangle, explains this on several occasions:

For the virtuous will always virtuous company seek out
A gentleman never seeketh the company of a lout,
And roisters and ruffians do sober company eschew:
For like will ever to like, this is most true

(1.305-8)

The complete title of the play is Like Will To Like Quod the Devil to the Collier. Coal in general, and hence the collier, were reckoned to have a special relationship with the devil, so the two are supposed to be an example of the proverb. The proverb is even uttered by one of the figures it refers to. That is, the devil is claiming the collier as one of this own, and his remark is self-referentially ironic. Combining the need imposed by the title to show the duplication of similar kinds of
sinner, with the cyclic form of the proverb-play risks excessive repetition of characters and circumstances. This indeed takes place.

A second element which threatens tedium is that there are only two jokes in Like Will To Like, both amply signalled in advance and both mildly sadistic. The first is the 'drunken grotesque' joke: that it is funny to see people falling over and stumbling in their speech due to drunkenness. The second is 'the sting': the idea that it is funny to see people's expectations fraudulently raised and then destroyed. In this case the expectation is one of coming into an inheritance of land, while the audience shares with the principal vice figure, Nichol Newfangle, the knowledge that the land in question must be the gallows, or possibly penury.

Finally, a certain inexpert flatness in the writing signals a deeper problem. Language is impoverished in this play, and little debate takes place between the virtuous and vicious characters. It seems unlikely that either side could handle such sophistication. No-one fights to redeem the souls of the sinners, nor are there the related efforts to work with metaphoric usages, such as those remarked in Mankind and other plays.

Briefly, the action of the play (one cannot call such a loose construction a plot) is as follows:- After an opening Prologue and some warming-up teasing of the audience by the principal vice figure, Lucifer appears and sets him the task of bringing similar people together. Tom Collier, a dishonest coal-dealer, enters. He dances and sings with the Devil and Nichol Newfangle, accompanied on a gittern. Tom and the Devil are deemed to be an appropriate pair, further evidence for which is derived from a pun on their singing skills, since to 'agree' is to produce pleasing harmonies:

A ha, marry, this is trim singing;
I had not thought the Devil to be so cunning,
And by the mass Tom Collier as good as he:
I see that like with like will ever agree.

(1.189-92)
Next the drunkards Tom Tosspot and Rafe Roister are brought together. Both of these are knaves and vain young-men-about-town, who lead others into evil company. Nichol Newfangle then sets up a mock court, in the course of which he beats Rafe Roister and Tom Tosspot, raging immoderately. He then promises a patrimony to 'the falsest thief of you both by my father's will' (1.383). They are delighted.

Hance enters, drinking; his oath-filled speech is slurred into a stammer:

Be go go Gog's nows ch ch cha drunk zo zo much today
That be be mass ch cham a most drunk ich da da dare zay

(1.451-2)

It seems he was a student, but has been corrupted by Tom Tosspot, whom he now calls 'captain' (1.454). He is incapable of finding his way home:

Bi bi bid Philip Fleming cu cu come hither to me
Vo vo vor he must lead me home now ich do zee

(1.465-6)

Rafe Roister now departs, leaving the others making fun of Hance until Philip Fleming, another drunkard, arrives. Both Philip and Hance have enormous bellies from drinking beer. It seems from their names that they are intended to be Dutch, though Hance's 'foreign' accent has strong rural overtones. As they leave, Nichol Newfangle identifies the three of them as 'mates now matched together' (1.564). Nichol, now alone on stage, explains the joke about the inheritance to the audience, thus also filling in time while costumes are changed so that Cutbert Cutpurse and Pierce Pickpurse can enter. These two, unsurprisingly, are thieves and they proceed to boast of their skill. Nichol describes them as 'sworn brothers in every booty' and offers them the 'Land of the Two-legged Mare' (1.645). This is a common euphemism for the gallows which it is rather surprising that they do not comprehend. (Their failure to be able to 'read' his meaning images the moral incomprehension that wrongdoers in the moral plays habitually harbour. They appear not to understand that sanctions may really apply to them.) They, too, are
planning to go drinking, when Virtuous Living enters, praising virtue at length. He rejects Nichol Newfangle's claims of friendship, and all agree that this is reasonable because it accords with the keynote of the play, the proverb 'like will to like', the idea that morally unequal people will not tolerate one another's company. Nichol Newfangle, Hance and Philip Fleming sing together and then leave, having repeated their intention of getting drunk.

Virtuous Living, now alone, muses on the relation of man to God, concluding that honour in the world is an important aspect of this. Appositely, Good Fame now enters, sent by God's Promise to be a permanent companion to Virtuous Life: he is thus in a sense another example of 'like will to like'. However in this case Good Fame is scarcely human - he is a condition naturally associated with Virtuous Life, and he has no dramatic function other than mere existence. The same is true of God's Promise and Honour, who join them and enthrone Virtuous Life in the seat of honour, with a symbolic sword and crown. Once this tableau is achieved, Good Fame leaves and the other three sing a holy song before leaving also.43

Nichol Newfangle comes in, crying his wares in the style of a pedlar. He is pretending to sell the equipment for a beggar, and two hangman's nooses. He explains that these constitute the inheritance he has promised. Tom Tosspot and Rafe Roister explain that they have gambled away their possessions, and when they turn to Nichol Newfangle for help he gives them the implements of beggary. They respond by beating him, but have to accept their fate. Aided by the Judge (Severity), Nichol next despatches Cutbert Cutpurse and Pierce Pickpurse, in the care of Hankin Hangman, to their execution. Nichol Newfangle gloats over this conclusion, before riding off to Hell on the Devil's back. Finally, Virtuous Living and Honour return to extol virtue. In the context, virtue apparently consists of the rather easy task of avoiding the company of thieves and drunkards. Furthermore, virtue and vice are pre-ordained conditions, not subject to alteration through persuasion or reformation. Good Fame joins the virtuous figures in a prayer and
there is a closing song on the 'like to like' theme.

What, we may wonder, has become of the rôle of the mankind figure amongst this collection of characters? Several are likely candidates, based on the model of the mankind figure as someone who lives in the world and is subject to temptation by an external figure to behave well or ill. The choice that he makes will determine the future of his soul after death. In the terms established earlier, the mankind figure must learn to use language, in the sense that he must learn to interpret the signs of wickedness. We have seen that in other plays, the mankind figure ends by locating himself within the sign system as an indicator of virtue.

The characters indicated by these criteria are Tom Collier, Tom Tosspot, Rafe Roister, Hance, Philip Fleming and Virtuous Living. In a conventionally-structured moral play, these are the characters who would show indications of repentance, and whose fall would at some stage be shown to be the result of temptation. The mankind figure appears to have been divided into a virtuous and a vicious part, and the latter, it seems, is diversified into five separate rôles. In the dramatic context which the discussion of the vice-convention has made clear, these apparent mankind figures can now be seen to have adopted so many vice-characteristics that their stage image can no longer be interpreted as representing the ordinary human being. To a later dramatist, the presence of this kind of a range of characters could lead into a comedy of humours, or even to a realistic representation of city life. To the writer of a moral play, it is an opportunity for reiteration.

It has been suggested that Virtuous Living is a mankind figure. However, there are reasons why Virtuous Living cannot be seen in this rôle. Firstly, he is never tempted to do wrong. Although Nichol Newfangle accosts Virtuous Living at one point, his attempts at concealing his true nature as a vice figure fail from the start, and Virtuous Living recognizes that he is an unsuitable companion. Virtuous Living has thus always known how to read the moral sign system. Because he is never tempted, he can never be in danger of falling, and that is an essential to the condition of humanity. Here, the need to keep to the founding proverb means that
Virtuous Living can only be an emblem, not an allegory. He is enthroned as a stage symbol of virtue at lines 847-851. Preaching to the audience, he speaks in the tones of Christ addressing a humanity from which he is excluded:

Oh man, what meanest thou with thy Saviour to fight?
Come unto him for he is full of mercy

(I.815-16)

The passage continues in this vein for a further thirteen lines.

Virtuous Living's arguments are strange. He asserts that evil need not even try to tempt the virtuous, for they are protected by God. He appears to ignore the impact that vice has had on the numerous characters that have dominated the stage before his entry. His argument also seeks to explain this play's lack of any of the tension that had traditionally surrounded the mankind figure of the moral plays and his decisions about conduct. Instead, Virtuous Living will 'tempt' the evil ones to reform via threats and blandishments, but with no success. Virtuous Living is not just boring, he is also rather stupid. The argument that one need not praise virtue as it will automatically be praised (I.791 ff) is especially hollow. Renown depends on people like himself, so the act of praising must occur if this good thing, renown, is to arise. On the other hand, he has in fact been praising virtue himself, but we must deem him incapable of realising why he was doing so.

With regard to the other pretenders to the rôle of mankind figure, the problem is clearly that too many of the characters behave similarly. The idea that we are offered a vision of society at large cannot be sustained because the possible mankind figures are all petty miscreants and drunks of very similar social origin. They are very slightly distinguished from one another by the fact that two are outright thieves, one is a fraudulent dealer, and two are incompetent gamblers and corrupters of youth. The dramatic effect of multiplying a single aspect of the old mankind figure's behaviour over several characters is to repeat the scene in which he roisters in bad company over and over again, instead of showing a single individual undergoing changes. The resulting repetitiousness of plot is a problem
for this play.

These figures, although they appear to derive from the mankind figure, in fact all gravitate toward the condition of vice figure. They take on several of the prominent characteristics of the vice figures. Visually, they are grotesques. Tom Collier's face is almost certainly 'blacked up' to match the Devil's (P14). Tom Tosspot and Rafe Roister begin by wearing ridiculously modish finery (P12), reminiscent of New Guise, Nought and Nowadays from Mankind, only to appear in extreme need in their last scene. When Tom Tosspot is presented as a captain who recruits people to his service, there is a tinge of the vice-feature of universality to his boast that his followers would fill Salisbury Plain. If everyone who is a drunkard is his servant, he stands as an allegorical figure of drunkenness in all but name (P3). His status here is comparable with that given to Greediness in the speech already referred to in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man: 'fool, Greedine e will neuer die - -'. Hance and Philip Fleming wear huge false bellies (P14), which Nichol Newfangle refers to on numerous occasions as denoting their chronic drunkenness (P3). Hance indulges in a reduced version of the principal vice figure's traditional monologue when he tells a nonsense story of an impossible voyage (V12). In this case, though, it is presented as a dream.

Methought ich was drowned in a barrel of beer,
And by and by the barrel was turned to a ship
Which, methought, the wind made lively to skip;
And ich did sail therein from Flanders to France.

(1.553-6).

The tendency of all of these five to collect in groups (P1), to fight (P2), to drink and to sing and dance (M1) all key into that non-verbal sign system which identifies them with the vice-crews we have observed in other plays. To some extent they are shown as separate from the principal Vice, for he is pleased to punish them and trick them (C1). The nature of that trick hints at another aspect of the vice figures noticed already: that they are set up as sacrificial victims. Presenting them as other
rationalises the glee that the audience can then take in their eventual punishment and humiliation. This, however, can be seen as a version of the conventional relationship in which the principal Vice dominates his crew of sub-vices by beatings and through his superior intelligence (C1). Tom and Rafe, that unruly crew, eventually turn on Nichol Newfangle and beat him (S.D., 1.1031; S.D., 1.1038). On a verbal level, they are signalled as outsiders by foreign or otherwise strange accents (a version of the grotesqueness of P14, but also frequent in stock 'country bumpkin' characters who are not vice figures). Tom Collier speaks in a rural dialect, Hance in stereotypical 'Dutch'. Nichol Newfangle also claims foreign origins (l.253; 256) (V12). Their swearing (V7) and discussions of hanging (V3) also locate this group as vice-crew. Tom and Rafe are finally turned out to wander the world as beggars, thus acquiring the vice-features of masterlessness (P11) and of travelling (V12). Cuthert and Pierce approach a more human condition when it seems they are actually about to be hanged. Hanging and the fear of hanging is of course a stock theme of the vice figures (V3). Pierce's closing remarks could be taken as repentance, but it seems more probable that they should be read not as a literal act of contrition, but as a plan (C6) to escape being damned for one's evil life by uttering a last-minute repentance at a well-chosen moment. Such an intention was itself, of course, a considerable sin.

And though our lives have licentiously been spent,
Yet at the last to God let us call,
For he heareth such as are ready to repent,
And desireth not that sinners should fall.
Now are we ready to suffer, come when it shall

(l.1151-5)

These five characters are not so much a group as a single entity. In the terms of the old moral play plot they share a single function. In order to match like with like, the plot creates a double for each of its vice figures. In the case of Tom Tosspot and Rafe Roister, the double is an exact copy. Both are old friends of
Nichol Newfangle, both swear intensively, both are described as 'knave' and their speeches are indistinguishable. Properly for a copy, Rafe is the weaker partner, for he is characterized in a less detailed way and speaks less often. When Tom analyses the situation of being caught in one's own trap by drawing an analogy with the bull of Phalaris, Rafe offers an equally authoritative comparison with Haman. Rafe may even have been called into being by the wish for a double that Tom has expressed:

*Similis similem sibi quaerit; such a one do I seek*

*As unto myself in every condition is like*

(l.241-2)

The incantatory Latin, uttered in Nichol's presence, begins a conjuring relationship. Initially neither of them has recognised the other. Once Nichol Newfangle has given his name, Tom Tosspot knows him as an old acquaintance. It is, of course, the signification of the allegory that he recognizes, rather than the individual who bears the name. Nichol has to 'know' Tom in a special sense. He describes remembering Tom as taking him into his mind:

*Tom Tosspot? Sancti amen, how you were out of my mind*

(l.255)

By knowing his name and recognizing him, he also knows his moral condition.

*And seeing that thou wouldst a mate so fain have*

*I will join thee with one that shall be as very a knave*

*As thou art thyself, thou may'st believe me*

(l.265-267)

This relationship results in the entrance of Rafe Roister, five lines later. Rafe arrives 'in pudding time', that is, with perfect timing, on the reiteration of the 'like will to like' proverb. Such an entrance, pat on cue, again resembles the calling up of a supernatural figure. In this case, Rafe's pallidity as a character yields a slightly anti-climactic quality. The dramatic effect lies not in his interest as a character, but in his extraordinary resemblance to Tom Tosspot.

Beyond the resemblance between Tom and Rafe it seems that both are
avatars of Nichol Newfangle. When Tom Tosspot sets out to prove himself a knave, he doesn't offer evidence, but appeals to Nichol's knowledge of him, in an intimately stichomythic exchange suggestive of identity, in which Nichol interrupts to complete both Tom's sentences and his couplets (lines 370-374). When Nichol requires that they should 'dance hand in hand like knaves all three' (1.297), he creates a stage image of three identical figures.

There is a sense that the existence of a double is inevitable and necessary. Historically, the project of the moral play had frequently involved a balancing of vice figures against their opposing virtues, often on highly logical grounds. Another 'doubling by opposition' commonly occurred when vice figures took new names, to masquerade as virtuous-seeming versions of their old iniquitous selves. Like Will To Like, by coining the same figure, causes three villains to become six. Since there are never more than four players on stage at any one time, and for much of the play two of these are identical twins, a certain stagnation sets in. This is in contrast to both of the earlier kinds of 'doubling' involving diversification: the setting up of an analysis of an interesting relationship between unlike entities.

One result of the difference which these later plays have introduced seems to be that mankind figures can be damned. In its original form, the moral play was always a comedy: one remembers that even the unrepentant King of Life, from Pride of Life, arrived at salvation. In the 1560's and 70's the moral play became willing to consign to damnation characters who were apparently mankind figures. However, it is the way in which they are damned that is revealing. If one compares these characters with Marlowe's Faustus, an important difference is revealed. Faustus dies without repenting and so goes to hell. But in his damnation scene he is a human being, and the emotional value of the scene rests in his human sorrow and longing for Christ. Despair, though seen as the ultimate sin, is presented here as most human. However, when the figure that is to be damned has previously been systematically established as a vice figure, the poignancy of his death vanishes. The death scene may even be played as a huge joke, as in The Longer Thou Livest the
More Fool Thou Art. In *The Tyde Tarrieth No Man* we have seen how the death of Greediness is ambivalently received because he has progressively metamorphosed into a vice figure. In that play, it is the presence of Wastefulness and his reformation that provide a traditional mankind figure.

It seems, then, that *Like Will To Like* contains no traditional mankind figure. Furthermore, the loss of the mankind figure has been effected in a way which destroys any sense of dramatic tension. What remains to give the piece its liveliness is the virtuoso display of an amazing variety of different forms of vice-play. Here is another version of the order of events in the play:- a bantering monologue by the principal Vice, involving direct address to members of the audience; the appearance of the devil; a dance; a 'three men's song'; a mock court; a fight; a comic drinking song; a moronic Dutch drunkard; a dance in anti-masque style ('as evil-formed as may be devised'); a second solo drinking song; 'special effects', in the form of false bellies for Hance and Philip Fleming; hysterical laughter and a nonsense spiel by the principal Vice; another 'three men's song', possibly in the form of a round; an imitation of a street cry; a return fight, in which the principal Vice is beaten; a second appearance of the devil; and finally a comic exit of the Vice to Hell. In addition to the vice-play, the virtuous characters further diversify the entertainment with the following: a metrical sermon; a tableau representing honour; and a serious song for four voices, possibly a four-part song. The piece concludes with a song for all four voices.

There is a second feature which an audience seeing this play in performance must admire, and that is the slickness with which doubling is handled. The title page of the original edition suggests that 'Five may easely play this enterlude'. It is not unusual for the titles of plays 'offered for acting' to get the number of players wrong, though more often they err on the optimistic side. On the contrary here, it is clear that this play has been most carefully crafted to allow *four* to play it. I attach the doubling plan for the play as Appendix D, to demonstrate this point. It
will be seen that the play has been constructed with the twin elegances of always allowing time for players to change rôles while keeping that time to a minimum, thereby maintaining as many characters as possible on stage at any one time. These ends are achieved without ever splitting a part between players, and with little suppression of rôles.

The point here is that theatricality has replaced a discursive plot: in so doing, it substitutes display for narrative tension as the principal source of the audience's pleasure. At the same time it substitutes 'presence' of an observable performance for the 'absence' inherent in linguistic forms. The play thus evades the problematic of language by offering the dominance of meaninglessness, of structural incoherence.

There is no combat over meaning whatsoever. Instead, the stage is occupied by the vice-play as action, rather than as an element in an argument. It is possible for action to function as argument, but in this case it operates as pure display. This, then, is the point towards which the development of the vice figure as other has been leading: a domination of the binary meaning-structure of interactive dialogue by the excessive display of the vice figures. This has a paradoxical effect, as, like the Elizabethans, we are inclined to think of vice play as 'the entertainment' and the moralizing portions of the plays as tedious. When the moralizing is squeezed out, however, the whole play loses momentum and tension, in spite of its songs, its comic grotesques and its horseplay.

With meaning itself challenged, the moral play responds by formulating a means of containing vice play. *All for Money* (1578) offers a solution to the problem of a moral play form which has ceased to signify, by controlling vice play with narrative structure. In the course of doing so, it discovers the narrative subplot, and the resulting possibility of metaphoric relationships between apparently dislocated structures of meaning. Re-possessing the moral play for meaningful discourse, the new complexity is a crucial move towards the sophistications of the
1580's and 90's.

It is the proverb-play's universalising tendency that allows the de-structuring of the moral play plot, so it is apt that a play of the universalising proverb-type should offer an original solution, functioning to reclaim vice-play within a structure which allows for a more abstract order of interpretation. All For Money focusses on form as a solution to the problems raised by the universal message. It finds a structural solution to the loss of plot by resurrecting the debate form of John Heywood's A Play of Love, but using it to regenerate complex significance in the vice-dominated display epitomized in Like Will To Like.52

The title All for Money has the appearance of a proverb, and certainly it has a proverb's qualities of being both pithy and generalizing. It is more gnomic and elliptical than is usual, even for a proverb play. Indeed, it is not clear that this title is a proverb at all.53 The Prologue behaves as if it were an old saying, and explains that the play is designed to show that 'All things is for money' (1.94). There are various possible readings of this phrase, though the main opposition is between saying 'Everything that people do is for money' and 'All evil is done for money'. There is a suggestion that this leads to the conclusion that all actions are thereby morally tainted. The title therefore has the proverb's qualities of a) a pretense to universality, and b) ambiguity. It implicitly invites a play which is dedicated to displaying wild behaviour by the vice figures, similar to Like Will To Like. Instead, the following five-part structure develops:

1. An opening set-piece of monologues by rather worthy and sententious allegorical figures, named Theology, Science and Art. One might choose to see the Prologue's very similar speech as part of this scene.

2. A long scene of vice-play, beginning with Money and Adulation, and including the parthenogenesis of Pleasure, vomited up by Money, of Sin by Pleasure, and of Damnation by Sin. Sin is the principal Vice. Vice-play here consists almost entirely of grotesque display, as in Like Will To Like. This takes the form of horrifying costumes ('Satan the great devil as
deformedly dressed as may be'), and of the spectacular theatrical trick of engineering the onstage 'births' from a trapdoor in the stage. The plot of this section is to enact the sequence of generations, thereby showing a causal relationship between Money, Pleasure, Sin and Damnation. Each time a more discursive plot seems about to begin, such as that suggested by Prest-for-Pleasure, another 'birth' supervenes. When that sequence is finished, Sin argues with Satan over their relative status as agents of evil. Again, the solution to this is not in the form of plot, but as display, for Satan calls up Gluttony and Pride as a spectacle to impress Sin. It seems, then, that vice-play dominates, to the exclusion of plot. The play does not, however, allow this to continue.

3. The third scene abolishes all the preceding characters in favour of a formal debate in the style of John Heywood. By harking back to a most stringent form, the play counters the structural licence involved in vice-play. The characters involved are: Learning with Money; Learning without Money; Money without Learning; and Neither Money nor Learning. The last figure does, however, possess a good dollop of simple faith. None of these characters is in any sense vicious, though Money without Learning has various inbuilt problems. The form is one in which language controls the action to such an extent that a static presentational mode is invited. The content of the speeches is all-important. Where the vice-play of Like Will To Like tended away from meaningful speech, and towards action as its raison d'être, All for Money rejects action at this point and fills the stage with four static allegorical figures who talk at length, and whose speeches interact. These figures respond to one another in a rational way, contrary to those in Like Will To Like, where vice-play reserved interaction to physical contact and to speech-as-action.

4. In the fourth section the character All for Money appears. It seems that he has been human once, like Greediness in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man and
Worldly Man in *Enough is as Good as a Feast*. Now, however, his perceived whole aim is to make money, while his theatrical point is to demonstrate the existence of widespread cupidity and related injustice. He is a biased bribed judge. Sundry corrupt and self-seeking characters approach him, and find that he will fix things in exchange for cash. The variety of types gestures towards both a demonstration of the universality of the proverb and towards the fashionable mode of social satire.

5. The final scene involves the further display of vice figures, in a pageant of damned souls, but here speech is also an important part of the action. Dives and Judas appear, spectacularly dressed to demonstrate the terrible torments they suffer. They lament their fate, and wish for an opportunity to repent or to live their lives differently.

At this point, then, the display of vice-play is contained by the language in which that display is given meaning. Dives and Judas combine the spectacular qualities of conventional vice play with the rational speeches of formal debate, and of virtuous characters. The emblem and its label have been re-instated as a unified object to be observed. Money and his crew have vanished from the play, together with their action-packed but anti-significant mode of theatricality. Vice, the vice figures and vice play can therefore be re-instated within the sign system which they have threatened to overwhelm with chaotic acts. Rampant vice-play can be contained only by imposing a new dramatic form. It seeks to contain fission within a new structure, which uses multiple form to generate complex meaning, rather than meaninglessness. Where the earliest plays found wholeness in the concluding form of the mankind figure as a sign of mature understanding, this form finds wholeness in the play itself. By containing vice play it asserts an over-arching meaning made out of physicality as vice play, and intellectuality as debate. Placing the two side by side in separate scenes draws attention to their differences and to their similarities as issues. From this comes their potential to be fused into a mode which one might
The proverb play as a development of the moral play can cast light on the signifying systems with which that form works. It seems that the concept of 'meaning' can be approached through the plays on three levels. The first, relatively negligible level, uses meaning in the commonplace sense of the meaning of a given phrase. This is what the virtuous and vicious figures argue over when they dispute the true meaning of, for example, 'the tide tarrieth no man', or the best answer to Mankind's question in *The Castle of Perseverance* 'whither should I wend?', or to Youth's question 'what hath God bought?'

The second sense is a discussion about the nature of language that takes place on the metaphoric level. Images of chaos confront images of order within the linguistic practices of the characters. It seems for example, that transgression is represented in the vice-characters' speech not just by a vocabulary of the material and the obscene but also by a free-wheeling use of verse forms and a refusal to participate in accepted 'truthful' relationships between language and reality. By contrast, the virtuous characters' diction images order through stately verse forms, and an insistence on 'truth', especially on the metaphoric/spiritual plane.

The confrontation is generally resolved in favour of virtue. For example, the disorder brought to Wastefulness by Despair in *The Tyde Tarrieth No Man* is defeated by a ritualized, pious repetition of prayers. Each play, however, finds its resolution of this confrontation in a different form, and hence suggests a different analysis of the construction of meaning.

The third sense is structural. That is the 'meaning' of the moral play seen as an entity or a genre. It includes what the form of the play has to say about the nature of language. The form of the play at this level is variously constructed depending on the ways in which the balance of the characters alters: the original relationships among the mankind figure, the good characters and the evil characters are adjusted over time. Who dominates, and in what ways, have developed as areas
of considerable interest. In speaking about language, the play also speaks about the possibility of truth. Its structure represents a theory about the way in which meaning is constituted. It is at this level that an ongoing debate over the nature of linguistic meaning takes place, based in that discussion of the separation between self and other which informs all moral plays from their earliest occurrence to the final dilution of the genre in later forms.

A brief summary of parallels may be useful at this point, though one must bear in mind that these 'parallels' usually need modification in their practical application to individual plays.

i) Mankind Figure = self

ii) Vice figure = other

iii) sustaining their separation =

(a) belief in meaning as single;
(b) belief in the possibility of truth
(c) belief in the subject as undivided

iv) multiplying vice figures and/or mankind figures =

(a) the fissive tendency of language, as in the 'play of signifiers';
(b) the tendency towards loss of meaning through excess

v) merging of mankind figure and vice figure =

the loss of meaning through the collapse of the originating difference. (This leads to a need within the play to locate meaning outside either plot or linguistic behaviour.)

Broadly, two arguments inhabit the discussions so far. The first establishes that three important processes take place during the twenty years after W. Wager's The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art (1559). These processes are the
multiplying of mankind figures; the merging of mankind figures with vice figures; and the growing dominance of vice-play. The second argument begins from these processes and analyses the effects they have on a reading of the plays which focusses on level three (above). Such a reading looks at the plays as signifying structures, referring to the nature of language, and to the relation of language and reality. The moves which the plays make correspond closely to a theory of language which sees it as conducting an autonomous struggle between its claims to embody truth, and its innate, différence-based, tendency to become meaningless. One might abbreviate this concept to a struggle between unity and fissivity. Each alteration in the form of the moral play can now be seen as a move in that debate, answering the position implicitly taken up by the preceding form.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR


2. Bernard Spivack, *Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil* (N.Y. and London, 1958): 'The process of change in the plays themselves, although rich in details, obeys a single law: like the epoch they mirror, they gradually submit to the secular revolution that separates the Renaissance from the late Middle Ages', p.206.


3. Lois Potter, in *The 'Revels' History of Drama in English*, vol 2, 1500-1576, ed. Norman Sanders and others (London, 1975): 'the interest of morality writers had moved, as in *Impatient Poverty*, from the study of an Everyman hero to the depiction of a variety of social types', p.198.

4. This kind of social analysis is not new with the moral plays in question. It is, for example, the foundation for that bitter gloating over the downfall of the mighty that permeates the medieval Dance of Death motif.

5. This is also the error committed by those who see deconstruction as a threat to established modes of analysis. It is not an either/or choice.

6. Mark Pilkinton in 'The Antagonists of English Drama, 1370-1576' (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Bristol, 1974), sees moral hesitation much earlier in the century, in the struggle over definition in Skelton's *Magnyfycence*. 'Skelton views sin quantitatively and not qualitatively as do his medieval predecessors. The black/white, night/day imagery of the cyclic drama gives way to an early Tudor Renaissance shade of grey wherein even a sin hitherto deemed deadly can become a virtue', p.300. This wilful redefinition, however, is a typical vice-ploy, as we have seen, and not a genuine hesitation on the part of the play.


9 The entertainment of Heywood's proverbs and epigrams comes from observing the paradoxes that are generated by assuming all interpretations of proverbs to be equally valuable. Heywood provides many neat examples of paradoxical interpretation, for example:

> A merry man by his master at meat set:
> 'Methinketh' quoth the master, 'thou canst no drink get
> 'Here is enough, though there be none,' said he.
> 'Then art not dry?' 'Yes, so mote I thee,
> And fain would drink.' 'How be thy words true then?'
> 'Thus: This word *enough* two ways we may scan;
> Th'one much enough, th'other little enough;
> And here is little enough.' His master lough.

However, the servant suffers for his wit in the end, for:

> More than enough were waste: he getteth no more.'

(Number 52 of *The First Hundred of Epigrammes*, 1562).

10 See, for example, Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London, 1976; first published in French, 1967): 'There is not a single signified that escapes, even if recaptured, the play of signifying references that constitute language. The advent of writing is the advent of this play; today such a play is coming into its own, effacing the limit starting from which one had thought to regulate the circulation of signs, drawing along with it all the reassuring signifieds, reducing all the strongholds, all the out-of-bounds shelters that watched over the field of language. This, strictly speaking, amounts to
destroying the concept of 'sign' and its entire logic', p.7.

11

We deny not, but in this world, riches beare the sway
Yet, it not riches to be called sure:
For in Gods power it is to make riches decay,
Whereas Gods word and fayth shall euer endure

(F iii v)

12 It is a model example of sophisticated doubling, and is described from that point of view in D.M. Bevington, From 'Mankind' to Marlowe (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp.149-151.

13 Wapull works with this need, and motivates it by establishing a dramatic 'other place' off stage, where Greediness, the merchant, is waiting. There is thus a reason why players need to rush off and return in order to transact business. In addition to suggesting a sinister location of evil somewhere out of sight, this 'other place' thus also generates a cumulative stage effect of Plautine farcical breathlessness.

14 It should be noted that we are moving between theoretical systems here. Lacanian psychoanalysis, for all its emphasis on a three-part system, usually functions with, and reasons through, dualities. (This is a contentious remark, as there are Lacanians, such as Professor Malcolm Bowie, who feel that his three-part structure holds up.) Derrida's analyses, towards which this discussion is now moving, delight in polarities because they lay themselves open to deconstruction.


16 Robert Hughes, Heaven and Hell in Western Art (London, 1968) sees a related philosophical difficulty for the artist who seeks for images with which to depict the 'chaos' of Hell. 'To paint Chaos in a chaotic manner would merely produce an illegible picture. And so the problem was to discover a form for the Pit without depriving Hell of its terrible and negative formlessness', p.156. 'They
evolved a set of images which were, to a surprising degree, stable. They were the negative images to Heaven's reality, doubling it, parodying it, like hallucinatory reflections in black water', p.157.


18 This move is wholly within the project that the Prologue has mapped out, and also manifestly not intended to deceive the audience. The vice portion of the play is in collusion with the Prologue in demonstrating one version of the Proverb's meaning.

19

For I am a broker the truth is so
Wherefore if men in me hurtfulnesse should know
There are few or none that with me would deale
Therefore this word hurtfull I never reueale

(A iii v)

20 The hesitation between devilish and human motives in the late moral play (c.1576 onwards) may be understood historically, as part of the gradual humanisation of the vice rôle documented by Bernard Spivack in Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil (New York and London, 1958). See especially Chapter Seven, 'Change and Decline in the Morality Convention', pp.206-250.


22 These names are both very general ones, and also very much open to interpretation, compared with the specificity embodied in such earlier stage virtues as Mercy, Pity or God's Promises, to name but a few.

23 That relationship, which the Prologue to The Tyde Tarrieth No Man glides over, can be found put with clarity in Like Will To Like:
Saint Augustine saith in his fifth book *De Civitate Dei*, *Conjunctae sunt edes Virtuis et Honoris*, saith he;  
The houses of Virtue and Honour joined together be,  
And so the way to Honour's house is disposed  
That through Virtue's house he needs must pass  

(Like Will To Like, 1.757-61)  

In *Like Will To Like*, then, public opinion is necessarily linked with spiritual virtue. Furthermore, one's secular standing in the world is directly associated with salvation:  

But if through virtue honour be attained  
The path to salvation may soon be gained  

(1.764-5)  

Consciousness of this difficulty is not a modern construction: it can also be found in other plays. Sensualitas, the vice figure in *Virtuous and Godly Susanna* (1578, c. 1568) sees worldly opinion opposed to spiritual credit:  

For God, or his threatninges, I passe it not a straw,  
But for myne honour in this world, is it I stand in aw.  

(1.433-434)  

A vice figure's opinion is a dubious one to rely on, but one also finds the sympathetic figure of Philologus reflecting on a comparable dilemma in *The Conflict of Conscience* (1581; c. 1570):  

My case indeed I see most miserable  
As was Susanna betwixt two evils placed  
Either to consent to sin most abominable  
Or else in the world's sight to be utterly disgraced  

(1.1201-1204)  


Plays in which proliferation of the mankind figure occurs are Wapull's *The
Tyde Tarrieth No Man (1576), Ulpian Fulwell's Like Will to Like (1568), and Thomas Lupton's All for Money (1577). One might include Nice Wanton (1560; c.1550) in this category and also those plays which, while retaining moral-play elements, move away from allegory towards romance: Clyomon and Clamydes (1599; c.1576), Common Conditions (1576), and Thomas Preston's Cambyses (1569-70). The mankind figure is bifurcated in W. Wager's Enough is as Good as a Feast (1560's).

27 This combination is a different effect from that discussed in Chapter Two, where evil and the main character are one and the same. This feature, often manifested as a youthful, almost innocent boastfulness about personal appearance can be observed in such earlier plays as Pride of Life, Youth and Mundus & Infans. The youthful boasting can be reminiscent of folk festivals celebrating fertility:

Youth describes himself in terms which suggest a Green Man:

I flourish as the vine tree.
Who may be likened unto me
In my youth and jollity?
My hair is royal and bushed thick,
My body pliant as a hazel stick

(Youth, 1.45-49)

28 That process can be observed in incomplete form in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man and Enough is as Good as a Feast, and in a complete form in Like Will to Like, in W. Wager's The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art and in All For Money.

29 Ulpian Fulwell, Like Will to Like quod the Devil to the Collier, in Four Tudor Interludes, ed. J.A.B. Somerset (London, 1974), pp.128-164.

30 W. Wager, Enough is as Good as a Feast, in The Longer Thou Livest and Enough is as Good as a Feast, ed. R. Mark Benbow, Regents Renaissance Drama Series (London, 1968), pp.79-146.

31 The same absence can be detected in The Longer Thou Livest The More
**Fool Thou Art** (c.1569), ibid., pp.1-78. Here the putative mankind figure is a single character, Moros, but he too is assimilated to the vice-crew, almost by definition.

32 At this point Victor Turner's theories of the 'liminal' and the 'liminoid' become relevant. *From Ritual to Theatre: the Human Seriousness of Play*, (New York, 1982), see especially Chapter 1, pp.20-59. Turner sees the liminoid as forming a parodic version of a previously serious rite of passage. In addition, 'liminoid phenomena -- are often parts of social critiques or even revolutionary manifestoes' (ibid., pp.54-5). Turner discusses both theatre and Carnival. It is frequently observed that the popular theatre in some of its versions, was 'outside' the socially acceptable. In other words it is inherently 'on the edge' in its own right: both culturally central and suspect at one and the same time. Its position depended on whether it was perceived as offering liminal descriptions, or liminoid ones. The transition from innocent immorality to a knowledge of the language of God, put forward by the early moral plays described in Chapter Two, would seem to be in the former category, while that of the vice-play-laden later moral plays would fall into the latter, suspect class.

33 At Appendix C I analyse the relative proportions of vice play, virtuous speeches, and interchanges between the two, in a selection of moral plays. Although more subjective than they appear, these figures give a reasonably reliable picture of the changes detectable over time.

34 This theory that language contains a tension between Derridean fission and a more conventional drive towards meaning is similar to one proposed by Stephen Greenblatt, 'Towards a Poetics of Culture', in *The New Historicism*, ed. H. Aram Veeser (London, 1989), pp.1-14. Greenblatt is not overtly talking about linguistic structures, but about political power: 'capitalism has characteristically generated . . . régimes in which the drive towards differentiation and the drive towards monological organization operate simultaneously, or at least oscillate so rapidly, as to create the impression of simultaneity', p.6. Later, he sees this oscillation as 'a
complex dialectic of differentiation and identity', p.7.

35 It is, however, important to distinguish between the slippage of a mankind figure towards vice behaviour in plays after 1559, and the 'innocent' sinfulness displayed by protagonists in earlier plays. Pride of Life, Youth, Mundus & Infans, The Castle of Perseveraunce and The Four Elements are all instances of plays in which an ignorant mankind figure embodies a kind of original sin. His problem can be solved by acquiring the understanding of maturity.

36 In its context as a reference to decay, it seems most likely that Greediness is referring to Winter. The argument is thus one between an authority and the physical experience of being human.

37 In the ensuing discussion of Greediness as a vice figure, I use the code developed in Chapter Three, and summarized at Appendix B.

38 One is reminded of Gryll, FO, 2, XII, 86-7, who ceases to desire ordinary human existence.

39 The moral interpretation of debt is another flexible area in this play. The Courtier's wish to borrow money is merely foolish, while Wastefulness's behaviour is more reprehensible.

40 This is the same 'linguistic mirroring' device that was observed in Mundus & Infans and The Castle of Perseveraunce, where the mankind figure reflects the last opinion uttered.

41 Schell and Schuchter see Wager as 'a very skillful dramatist in the mode of moral tragedy', and this scene as 'one of the best scenes in mid-century drama', English Morality Plays and Moral Interludes (N.Y., 1969), p.367.

42 He is referring to Lucifer, whom he has already described as his godfather.

43 This is the first occasion I have mentioned so far when virtuous characters sing. It is not a unique instance, for virtues sing in the plays for schools and for boys' companies. It is, however, true that the practice is considerably more common among vice characters.

44 Few authorities actually attempt to define what is meant by the mankind
figure, assuming that there is general agreement on this. It is clear from the present study of otherness that the concept is a much more fluid and ambiguous one than that approach would suggest.

Sylvia D. Feldman, in The Morality-Patterned Comedy of the Renaissance (The Hague, 1970), puts forward a set of criteria which is symptomatic of the usual attitude. She sees the mankind figure as a character who goes through a strictly delineated series of actions: 1) an optional virtuous beginning; 2) temptation and fall; 3) life in sin; 4) temptation to despair; 5) repentance; 6) forgiveness and promise of salvation. These over-rigid criteria would exclude from consideration those mankind figures who die in sin and are damned.

45 Hankin Hangman is a stage function, almost a prop, rather than a character.

46 J.A.B. Somerset, in his Introduction to Four Tudor Interludes (London, 1974), p.21, sees Virtuous Living as a human being to be rewarded.

47 'Yea, marry, I am an old friend of yours, perchance' (I. 688). One may contrast his effectiveness with that of a similar move in The Castle of Perseveraunce. There, the claim of old acquaintance is the point where the mankind figure is persuaded to leave the castle and return to his old worldly companions.

48 It is also the case that none is a woman. This is not the trivial objection that it may seem, for one may consider that women characters appear as mankind figures in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man, Lusty Juventus, Respublica, Nice Wanton, and the 'Wit' plays, to name the most prominent examples.

49 In The Castle of Perseveraunce, Bad Angel is balanced with Good Angel; Pride with Meekness; Wrath with Patience; Envy with Charity; Gluttony with Abstinence; Lechery with Chastity; Sloth with Industry; and Covetous with Generosity. See William O. Harris, Skelton's 'Magnyfycence' and the Cardinal Virtue Tradition (Chapel Hill, 1965).

In the tradition of the three living and the three dead men, parallel figures representing different ages or different social types may be confronted by their dead

50 Charlotte Spivack, *The Comedy of Evil on Shakespeare's Stage* (Cranbury, New Jersey, 1978), documents the transition from the humour of humiliation to Gothic suffering in Jacobean plays, pp.128-135.


52 This structural experiment, however, cannot be called innovative as it was not imitated by later playwrights. If it has successors, they appear much later in the use of thematic sub-plot, and in plays with a masque element such as *The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune* and *The White Devil*, to name two at random. It may be that some of the plays with titles like *Three Plays in One* are also related forms. The 'plot' survives of *The Seven Deadly Sins* (c.1590), which is thought to be a revival of ?Tarlton's *Three Plays in One* (1585), ed. W.W. Greg, *Dramatic Documents From the Elizabethan Playhouses* (London, 1931). *A Yorkshire Tragedy* (1606) is described on the title page as 'All's One; or, One of the foure plaies in one, called a York-shire Tragedy'. At 794 lines, it is scarcely a full-length play, and the character of the senselessly destructive father has much in common with the wastrels of the moral plays, perhaps combined with the Deadly Sin of Anger. *A Yorkshire Tragedy* (1606), ed. Sylvia D. Feldman and G.R. Proudfoot, from the edition of 1608, Malone Society Reprints (Oxford, 1973 for 1969).

53 In fact the phrase 'all for money' is only loosely related to proverbs in either Tilley or Whiting. It seems nearest to the following: Whiting: - M631 'Money reigns'; M633 'To money all things obey'. Tilley: - M1052 'Money answers all things'; M1084 'Money will do anything'; M1102 'What will not money do?'; and T163 'All things are obedient to money'.

54 Heywood, of course, devised an early vice figure, Neither Lover nor Loved, in *The Play of Love*, but that character's use of vice-play is very restricted. In fact, he is more involved in the debate, and the trick of running in shouting 'fire, fire' is
directly related to the subject under discussion.

55 As Terry Eagleton puts it: 'A text may 'show' us something about the nature of meaning and signification which it is not able to formulate as a proposition.' *Literary Theory* (Oxford, 1983), p.134.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE FEMALE VICE

whom hell it selfe complaines to keep within her race.¹

Joan Kelly observes the change in women's opportunities in the Renaissance in these terms: 'the startling fact is that women as a group, especially among the classes that dominated Italian urban life, experienced a contraction of social and personal options that men of their classes either did not, as was the case with the bourgeoisie, or [did] not experience as markedly, as was the case with the nobility.'² She is here using the Italian experience as exemplary of that of other European countries.

Kelly goes on to argue that the status of women steadily declined through the late Middle-Ages and the Renaissance, and that the decline resulted in a perception of women's economic rôle less as co-operative among equals, and more as subservient to male interests. Effecting this transition meant that women's behaviour generally had to be perceived as less important than men's. From that, women themselves could be seen as inferior, and then as other. One might expect some signs of this process to be visible on the popular stage. Kelly specifically lists as one of the 'criteria for gauging the relative contraction (or expansion) of the powers of Renaissance women and for determining the quality of their historical experience …. 4) Ideology about women, in particular the sex-rôle system displayed or advocated in the symbolic products of the society, its art, literature and philosophy.' (p.177). One cannot move simply or directly from observing stage representations of women to making remarks about the realities of social and cultural life. Indeed, such a move would involve a far more protracted and interdisciplinary discussion than the scope of the present analysis allows. Here, I put forward some basic and previously unexplored data on the subject, provided by
the Tudor moral plays.

Following Kelly's thesis, one would expect not only to observe female characters being denigrated, but also to see this taking place to a greater extent with the passage of time. The belittling of women's activities can be seen as significant to narrative in the drama as early as the often-cited Noah Play in the Chester Cycle. Woman's need to spend time in the company of other women is contrasted with a male need to obey orders, to hierarchize and to organize, whether by tallying animals, or commanding the world. Male association here takes place in a lineal family group of father and sons, and is contrasted with female association with peers (the gossips). In the Towneley Noah, both groups are engaged in productive and potentially complementary labour. However, the plot validates a male view of women's work as peripheral, and not to the point, by inserting it in a story where persisting in female activities will lead to death.

A second approach to the scrutiny of female characterization comes from linguistic theory. It assumes that women will necessarily be represented as other, because of the fundamental construction of language in desire, and its phallogocentric properties. Following this, one may analyse what traits are particularly attributed to the character of woman, and thereby rejected or repressed from the definition of the 'self'.

It is a commonplace that female speaking parts in the moral plays are in general relatively few and short. However, there is ample evidence available across the forty or so moralities and morality-related plays for a considerable variety of female characters and functions to be displayed. I put forward here the theory that there is a relationship between those conventional images of otherness which the mainstream moral play establishes, and its images of women. These plays characterize women in several quite distinct ways, however, which suggests that the relationship is a complex one, and not one of simple identification. In this chapter I scrutinize that relationship, firstly in order to document its qualities, and secondly to consider its implications for the subject matter of the plays. In addition I suggest
that the way in which a link between otherness and woman is put forward in the moral play has significance for the status of women in the sixteenth century.

In Chapter Four I have shown how, in the later moral play, the otherness of vice play came to be the dominant 'subject' of the text. When femaleness (as alternative other) can be represented as a vice figure, a channel is created whereby the marginalized can return to be the central focus of attention.

This chapter observes ways in which roles depicting women acquired the taint of those vice-characteristics discussed in Chapter Three. The principal plays involved are John Heywood's *The Play of the Wether* (c.1527), William Punt's 'dialogue', *The endightement of Mother Messe* (1548), and the anonymous *Lingua* (1607, 1590's). The relevant case of *The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune* (1589, 1582) is also discussed in passing. Through these plays the development of the 'female vice' can be demonstrated.

I should mention at this point those aspects of the representation of woman which this chapter does not attempt to deal with. In Chapter Six I show how woman is seen as representative of forces of chaos, in a social context where both 'self' and 'other' have been re-defined as social structures, rather than as individuals. The 'good woman' is discussed in Chapter Seven. The omission of other types is not a statement that they are unproblematic, so much as that they are extraneous to the arguments based on the overt oppositions which Chapters Three and Four have set up. In particular, there is a small number of plays where women appear among the 'low' group of knockabout rustics, for example Fund Jonet in *Ane Satyre of the Thre Estaitis*, and, in *Misogonus*, the uproarious Alison, Isbell Bushy and Madge Mumblecrust. These are figures whose prime affinity is with the likes of Skelton's Elinor Rumming: figures of joyous carnivalesque excess. Secondly, I do not explore that area of the moralities where woman is other in the sense of an object of desire. In several moral plays of the early part of the sixteenth century, women appear, or are mentioned, simply as whores to tempt the mankind
figure from virtue by offering gratification of the senses, thus functioning passively as objects of desire, not even as temptresses. Frequently these figures did not appear on stage, but were mentioned by the vice figure in his catalogue of seductions, and located at the tavern where they were classed, along with food and drink, as commodities to satisfy the needs of the senses. The danger that they posed for the mankind figure was that he might fall from virtue as a consequence of distraction from his prime purpose. Only Redford's *Wit and Science* (1539) offers a whore with more lively characteristics, in the figure of Idleness, who conducts a ridiculous dialogue with Ignorancy. Idleness's major scene involves the significant vice-characteristics of word-play, control of the stage and a dominating, teacher-pupil relationship. In those plays where women are equated with food, they have no status as agents within the moral order, which is located around the vice figures and the mankind figure. In other words, their otherness is ontological, not social/moral, and though of interest, it can be seen that these figures are not very closely connected with the argument in hand.

This study, then, does not claim to be a complete discussion of the position of woman on the moral play stage. Instead, it is specifically related to those areas of otherness established by the good-versus-evil world view set up by the moral play form. Some slippage of terminology between 'otherness' and 'vice figure' is therefore likely to take place, since they are homologous in the bulk of the plays.

It seems probable that, through the sixteenth century, plays became increasingly capable of characterizing women as possessing many of those qualities of otherness already described in connection with the vice figure. The relationship, once again, is not one-way, for vice-characteristics also developed and ramified through the period, as we have seen, and some of those ramifications are founded on stereotypically female characteristics: association in peer rather than lineal groups; inconstancy; love of finery; 'empty' speech; excessive speech; lack of self-control; and the use of artifice in deceit.
The idea of the stereotype is itself a problematic description here, as I am talking about a process which involves the evolution of a stereotype. In terms of stage image, the plays evince a double circularity. The idea of evil contributes to the image of the vice figure; the image of the vice figure contributes to the characterization of women; resulting stage conventions of the female contribute to social notions of what is bad. It is also possible to move around the same circle in the reverse direction. Thus, stereotypes of the female are added to the picture of the vice figure; the image of the vice figure adds to the concept of what is bad; that, in turn, supplements the presentation of woman on the stage. Thus stereotyping in part creates the process of change, in the course of which the stereotypes themselves alter. This change is a historical process insofar as the development of the vice rôle is itself a historical process, subject to such dynamics of social need as the abjection of the lowest castes and changing power-structures. The change is also a response to theatrical demands that plays must entertain. In fact the three terms, 'evil', vice, and woman, are locked into an interplay between the feminization of the vice figure and the abjection of the female right from the start. The third term, the concept of evil, is not comparable with the other two, being an idea rather than a stage image. It is that which enables abjection to be enforced. The key point for this discussion, therefore, is to demonstrate the nature of the connection between certain female characters and the vice figure. I shall show that by the end of the century, the figure of the 'female vice' was readily identifiable on the Elizabethan stage.

Before proceeding to individual examples of moral plays, however, one stage emblem which cuts across many plays and much of the sixteenth century’s discourse about women needs to be considered. This is the image of the bridled horse. Through this image the vice figure is implicated with that of the female in a way which highlights the interrelationship between the fictional image and the re-emergence of its conceptual structures in the real world. Thus the traditional iconography of female behaviour is amplified or rendered ambiguous when a stage
figure uses comparable conduct.

Plato in the *Phaedrus* famously describes the soul as a tripartite entity: a charioteer driving one good horse and one bad one (246a&b; 253c-254e). From this, Plutarch refers to ' "the horse of the mind" as Plato termeth it, that is so hard of reign (I mean the unreigned lust of concupiscence)'. It is as if Plutarch's horse imagery has elided the good horse and left only the image of uncontrolled lust as the important referent. It is instructive to consider the significance of the horse as an image on the sixteenth century stage. As with the vice figure, the emblematic attributes of physicality and lust are paramount. From these comes its quality as a paradigm for things which require controlling, and its consequent illogical power to relocate as carnal something which is perceived as in need of control. In the *Phaedrus* the evil steed is eventually tamed. An unspoken knowledge of the tamed horse's potential for practical service to its controller underlies discussions of its animal nature. It is thus an ambiguous image, intrinsically involved with the concept that repression is virtuous, and containing a quite specific statement that it is carnality that must be repressed. This equation derives very naturally from the mundane experience that the horse operated in close physical conjunction with its (usually male) rider or user.

A resemblance has been noticed between the vice figure and tamed animals in general. For example, the entrance of New Guise, Nought and Nowadays in *Mankind* has been read as imaging the entrance of a bear-ward and his animals. In *Like Will To Like* (1568), Hankin Hangman leads out Cuthbert Cutpurse and Pierce Pickpurse in a similar way. The stage direction at 1.1667 instructs:

*Hankin goeth out and leadeth the one in his right hand and the other in his left, having halters about their necks.*

Nichol Newfangle comments:

*Ha, ha, ha, there is a brace of hounds, well worth a dozen crowns,*

*Behold the huntsman leadeth away;*

*I think in twenty towns, on hills and eke on downs*
They have taken their prey.
So well-liked was their hunting, on hill and eke on mountain,
That now they be up in leace:

(1.1168-73)

There are several moral plays in which the vice figure is treated as a horse. In The Trial of Treasure (1567), the virtues must bridle the beast Inclination. This figure is characterized with a neighing laugh and horse imagery throughout:

Inclin.: We-he-he, it is good for you to hold fast
For I will kick and winch, while the life doth last

(p.233)

Next, Just draws the moral:

Thus should every man, that will be called Just
Bridle & subdue his beastly inclination

(p.233)

This theme is particularly common in those plays such as Enough is as Good as a Feast where, at the moment of exit, the vice figure rides out or is ridden out by the devil.

As one might expect, women as representative of sensual temptation, and of forces in need of control, are also associated with horses. The connection between woman and horse is most explicitly made in the anonymous Marriage of Wit and Science (1569): 7

And when you once perceyue her stomacke to aryse
Then cut her short at the first and you shall see
A meruaylouse vertue in that medisen to bee,
Giuue her not the bridle for a yeare or twayne
And you shal see her bridle it without a reine
Breake her betymes and bring her under by force
Or elles the graye Mere, wil be the better horse

(l.347-53)
This is advice on the management of a new wife, being given by Will, the figure of foolishness. Will himself is, as one might expect, lustful and lacking in self-control, and part of the comedy might be reckoned to lie in his projection of his own qualities onto women. Although the source of the remarks undermines any authority they might have, the use of the image is of interest.

It has been widely observed that an excessive use of language - particularly as speech - is attributed both to vice figures and to women. Again, it seems, an abstract characteristic is interpreted in physical terms: language becomes speech when it is female. To control such excess, then, is to control the organs of speech, and from this move into 'brute existence', combined with the horse-taming theme, come the images of both the bridled vice and the bridled woman. The scold's bridle is popularly believed to be a mediaeval instrument: in fact it appears not to have been referred to in literature before the sixteenth century. Here the theatre is once again involved as part of a sequence of over-determining symbolic structures which interlock with the real world.

Heywood's Play of the Wether was printed in 1533, when the stage convention of the vice figure was as yet undeveloped. Certainly it was unusual to describe either the clown or the representation of temptation as a vice. More commonly the tendency to wrongdoing was presented as inherent in the human being, and more or less inevitably elicited by the normal processes of daily living and growing up. Mundus & Infans, Youth and The Four Elements are the best examples of this structure. The active involvement of a devil who tricks an otherwise virtuous young man into error, as in Mankind, is relatively uncommon. It is not surprising that The Wether contains in Merry Report only a proto-vice figure. He manifests many vice-features, with the crucial exception of the desire to do evil. However, the comic and linguistic vice-features he does reveal are matched in the second part of the play by a female character, the Launder (laundress). On one level, the Launder is a good woman, who delivers a homily to
the Gentlewoman on the virtues of honest toil. It is surprising then (within the non-naturalistic structure of the moral play) that she also behaves like a shrew, sharing the vice figure's linguistic skill, his abusive ability, and his low comic presence. Most persuasively, she rivals his charismatic capacity to focus attention on himself.

The play gives every appearance of being a conventional debate play of a peculiarly static form. The action is built into a series of legal petitions. One petitioner after another puts his or her case to an eminent arbitrator, and all receive an answer in the end. The scene is introduced by Jupiter, who reminds the audience of a previous debate amongst the gods who control the weather. Jupiter now intends to call on public opinion, to establish which variety of weather is required. To this end he appoints a fast-talking volunteer, Merry Report, to act as his messenger, proclaiming the debate throughout the land, and so stimulating those people with an interest in the matter to come forward and put their cases. Merry Report is also to act as a master of ceremonies, deciding who may or may not speak directly to Jupiter, on the basis of their social standing.

The play proper follows, consisting of representations made to Jupiter firstly by a Gentleman and then by a Merchant. After these two have been heard the representations become more and more confrontational, and are interspersed with increasing interference by Merry Report. His dismissive tone towards the Ranger makes it clear that the Vice's claims to impartiality are false. A Wind Miller and a Water Miller argue over their conflicting needs, as do a Gentlewoman and the Launder. The Vice's determined enforcement of social hierarchy temporarily overwhelms his function of facilitating petitions, and he and the Launder abuse each other roundly. A scene of reconciliation follows when a little boy is the next petitioner, asking with gently comic innocence for snow and hard frosts. The whole piece is concluded as a joke, or a little myth of the origin of the weather, in which Jupiter has the last word.

The vice-like characteristics embodied in the Launder can be most conveniently listed in the order in which they occur. Some of these, paralleling
prominent traits of Merry Report's behaviour, are foregrounded as vice-play by the formal patterning set up by the play. Others are recognizable to us with hindsight derived from the overview of vice-characteristics presented in Chapter Three.

The Launder appears as if conjured from the other world (V13) when the light-minded Gentlewoman is about to be led into error by Merry Report. She is from a low social caste (P8), though her possession of a trade gives her some social position. The least ambiguous evidence is that her bawdy jokes (V7 and V10) match Merry Report's special brand of punning innuendo. With 'why haue ye alway kyst her behynde' (l.890), she confronts Merry Report on his own terms, for it is a version of his pun on 'backe syde' and 'fore syde' (l.889). The logic of the joke is founded on the same manipulation of double meaning (V9) as his earlier capping of the Gentlewoman's remark: 'I knowe not how to passe in to the god now', with: 'No but ye know how he may passe into you' (l.785-6). The effect of the Launder's wit is also identical with that of Merry Report: to seize control of the stage (C4) by seeming to be more knowing, more in control of the possibilities of language. The Launder uses oaths ('byr lady') and coarse language, including the conventional 'kiss my arse' joke (V7).

Merry Report attempts to control her through a highly rhythmic, repetitive series of remarks which stress her incompetence with language. Indeed, he describes her speech as meaningless (W6):

The more ye babyll the more ye fabyll
The more ye fabyll the more unstabyll
The more unstabyll the more unabyll

(l.984-86)

Her response matches both his rhythms and his linguistic skill.

The les your sylence the lesse your credence
The les your credens the les your honeste

(l.988-89)

Opposing the Launder to Merry Report in a flyting states their balanced, opposed
positions in the play's structure, both economically and with excitement. Merry Report inaccurately remarks that he has never heard anyone like her.

Such a raylynge hore by the holy mas
I neuer herde in all my lyfe tyll now

(1.959-60)

Again:

What monster is this I neuer harde none suche

(1.994)

At this point we are forced to recognize how closely her language skills parallel his own.

To be fair to the Launder, it should be noted that her presence stands ultimately for virtue, not vice. Her verbal tactics and to some extent her stage presence are all that is vice-like. What is of interest now is the stage symbol constructed by opposing two figures who are not opposites, but twins. I shall return to this play in Chapter Six, with reference to the relationship between order and chaos.

The next development in the matter of the female vice is to be found in a little dialogue by William Punt: a Protestant polemic titled the endightement of Mother Messe (1548). It is closely related to a dialogue by William Turner which covered rather similar ground, though in a significantly different manner.

Although called a 'dialogue', Punt's work is in dramatic form, containing several characters, speech headings and stage directions. It offers further evidence that it was coming to be possible for female characters to be accorded vice-characteristics. In this case, the author wishes to present a character as pernicious, godless, and threatening to the souls of Christians. The dialogue takes the form of a trial scene, in which the Catholic mass, characterized as a woman, 'Mother Messe', is cross-questioned by a group of male characters with names such as 'Verity' and 'Knowledge'. Mother Messe is a relatively developed characterization. When she
expounds her interpretation of her function she comes across as well-intentioned and rather innocent, even simple-minded, such that initially the play conveys some sympathy for this character.12

In the course of the trial, however, Mother Messe displays or has ascribed to her various traits which are strongly reminiscent of the vice figure. There are so many of these that I merely list them here.

1. She is involved in a lineage of evil, being described as the daughter of the Pope.13 She is also described as the 'mother of al myschefe' (A iii). (Bale represents the Pope both as the Devil and as the father of vice.) (P16).

2. The Mass deceives by lying (L1).

3. On a theological level, the Mass mistakes the spiritual for the literal (V9), in the doctrine of trans-substantiation. This confusion of the literal and the metaphoric meanings of a word is a typical vice technique for generating puns and for mocking spiritual advisers.

4. She has a detrimental influence on mankind (C2). 'She murders the souls of men by leading them to damnation.'

5. She assists the devil (P16): 'a woman that hath brought the people in to a deuelyshe trade.' (A iii). 

6. The formulations in 4 and 5 suggest a further vice-trait, that of adopting a teacher-pupil relationship with mankind (C3). This is in addition to the more obvious tempter-fallen relationship.

7. She is reported to be boastful (V4), though we do not observe this in action: 'she vaunce her seife to be a god of gods.' (A iii v).

8. She propagates heresy.

9. She associates with morally dubious individuals (P1): we hear that those who will stand surety for her live in corners and have such names as 'Stiffneck' and 'Couetous'.

10. She attempts to reverse the 'natural' hierarchy of command. (C1; C2) 'She hath set her selfe in the seace wher the lyuing god heavë should sit' (A iii v).
The accusation is repeated at C iii r, in the judge's sentence.

11. Her fate is to be banished from the kingdom (P11).

12. Although banished, she is still seen as a perennially recurrent danger (P7).

13. Linguistically, the terms in which her behaviour is described belong with the vice conventions. She uses 'filthy doctrine' and 'subtil conueyaunce'. The latter phrase simultaneously anticipates Subtle Shift, from *Clyomon* and *Clamydes* (c.1576) and reminds one of Crafty Conveyance from Skelton's *Magnyfycence* (c.1515-1526), while a character called False Doctrine appears in Bale's *Three Laws* (1538). People also 'heare & se her play in her iuglyng garmetes' - thus linking a priest's ceremony with a player's performance, and his robes with a tumbler's or fool's costume. Juggling is also that 'playing with both hands' that is often referred to in the 1560's and 70's, in connection with the vice's treachery.

The characteristics listed above all emerge as reported behaviour. There is, however, a moment of on-stage vice-play which verifies the identification. When Mother Messe is about to be taken away to Newgate for the night, she mutters a remark for the audience's ears alone. Wisdom then asks her to repeat it, at which point she reverses its content to create an acceptable lie.

Wisdom. come on youre waies you shall go with me,

Messe. I am not very wel content

Wisdom. what sayste thou.

Messe. marye I say I am very wel content.

(A viii v)

This striking feature of uttering the truth and then changing it to a similar sounding acceptable falsehood is one of the vice figure's most pervasive and characteristic verbal habits (V11). No other character does it. 15

One can see most clearly what takes place in this dialogue by comparing it with its near relative and probable source, the Turner *Examination of the Masse*. The Turner dialogue is considerably longer, but more static. Its primary, even sole,
interest is in a theological debate about the nature and hence status of the mass. There is some slight characterization, but in general the speeches are lengthy, technical and detailed. These speeches are fascinating as examples of a thorough forensic examination, based on a pattern in which Catholic advocates identify Biblical evidence which appears to sanction the practise of the Mass. Protestants then counter each citation with an alternative explication of the text, and in each case conclude with an analysis of their reading's implications for contemporary practice. The difference in the titles of the two works distinguishes accurately between them: Turner's Examination is minutely logical, while Punt's enlightenment is entertainingly confrontational, though intellectually relatively superficial. Both belong to the late 1540's, and many expressions are common to both. In the Examination, Maistres Messe speaks only at the beginning and the end, framing the dialogue rather than taking part in it. The argument is wholly based on Biblical exegesis, and not at all on character. Although Punt makes many of the same points, he uses very little technical argument and so creates the impression that it is Mother Messe's character that is at fault. For example, Turner's Maistres Messe is shown to claim to make fair weather and rain, on the basis of a precise linguistic analysis. Her discourse is contained at all points by specifically relating it to Church ceremonial. Maistres Messe, demonstrating the difference between the Mass and the Protestant 'Lord's Supper', explains herself as follows:

I wyll at this tyme (compelled by necessytye) compare myselfe with theyr supper, and proue my selfe more worthy of place in Christes Churche, then it is.

the Supper that these fellowes sprake of euen after theyr owne confessyon, is but a memoryall of Christes death, of a gyuing of thankes, for the benefyt of mans saluation, wherby mans fayth is strengthened, and theyr loue is increased.....But harke nowe what I dothe do, and can do. I delyuer the sely soules that haue bene longe pytously punyshed in purgatory, from theyr paynes &* tormentes.
Where fynde you in all the hole Scripture, that the supper of oure Lorde, can doo so moche? I can make fayre wether, and rayne: I can heale all Sycknesses, and brynge dampted soules oute of Hell: I can purchasse remyssion of synnes, by the offerynge up agayne of Christes body and bloude. I can with fyue wordes, make both God and man. Which thynge, seynge that God cannot do: can not I do more, the God can do?

(A v v - A vi)

(* = next page in original)

Knowledge points out that it is blasphemy to make herself equal with, or superior to God.

When the relationship between the Mass’s claims and the Church is elided, the equivalent passage appears in the Punt dialogue as a claim to possess occult powers. In brief, Turner’s Maistres Messe shares only some of Mother Messe’s characteristics, namely those I have numbered 1, 7, 11 and 12 in my discussion. Even those are presented in a theoretical and impersonal way which never forgets that the object of discussion is a piece of Church ceremony.

One must ask, then, what effects are generated by a theatrical text which makes the Mass simultaneously a vice figure and a woman. There are several possible answers. The tradition which represents the Church of Rome as the Whore of Babylon allows a fear of woman as insatiable to be brought into play: 'not onely this could satisfye hyr wycked desier.' (C iii v). Alternatively, or additionally, the text adds to the vice figure's traditional deceptiveness the tradition of women as untrustworthy, and so as deceivers. Such a move hardly seems necessary. Given the nature of the vice figure, it seems more likely that contamination would move the other way, and identification with the vice figure serve to lower the female. Thirdly, the view of women as irrational makes the arguments put forward by Mother Messe in the debate structure of the trial seem less plausible: her femaleness undermines her attempt to use logic in debate. Finally there is one aspect of Mother
Messe which relates to her as female rather than as a vice figure. She is accused of acting as a white witch, or wise woman. This is linked with an apparently heretical usurpation of divine prerogative: 'she saith she can make fayre wether & raine & heale all sicknes, and bring dâpened soles out of hel' (A iiiii v - A v). At this point, if it were not for the Turner source, one might be tempted to wonder whether some real woman was the model for Mother Messe, for in the absence of Turner's detailed substantiation, the remark creates a sense of personal power in the character of Mother Messe.

The play contains an ambivalence towards its central character. Her defence has been sincere, but she is to be severely punished. As long as she seems virtuous but uninformed, her well-intentioned error is treated with a degree of warmth and sympathy. The endightenment, however, turns savagely against this mood when Mother Messe refuses to be reconstructed. This sequence again follows the narrative turn typical of those moral plays in which the vice figure is first seen as entertaining, but is reviled in the conclusion.

It seems most probable that woman is the primary characterization of the mass within this dialogue. A group of vice-traits is then assimilated to the figure of Mother Messe. These then function to reinforce the presumption of deceit, self-aggrandizement and mistaken reasoning that are already present in the female stereotype. However, they add to that stereotype an impression of a league with the devil, founded in the wilful mischief-making which is more than just an Eve-like susceptibility to temptation. From that, in turn, comes the sense of a pervasive threat that must be guarded against. The play concludes by incorporating the vice-characteristics firmly into the female ones.

The result of all this is to reinforce the process by which vice-traits could be seen as part of the female stereotype. The number of parallels and the exactness of the match between vice-traits and stereotypically 'female' characteristics are what is new and striking here. That single sotto voce remark of Mother Messe's is the
identifiable beginning of that process. It is not a simple one-way relationship, for the stage representation of both figures is in transition. Their interaction generates more elaborate forms. It seems more than probable, according to other work done on the vice figure, that even without that interaction each figure would have become elaborated under pressure from social forces and from developments in theatrical fashions.\textsuperscript{16} The feminization of the vice figure, and the corresponding assimilation of vice-characteristics by the images of the female add a further major force to those already generating change in the morality play. When a type begins to include an increased and flexible repertoire of determining features, the capacity for variations in characterization of the individual representatives of the type correspondingly becomes free to increase. Thus it seems that the transition to 'naturalistic' characterisation through the 1580's, often represented as diametrically different from the earlier mode, has its roots in a dynamic of character development already present in the earliest moral plays.

The terms of Mother Messe's dismissal are extremely suggestive for this argument about the incorporation of vice-features in the female. It is significant that Punt expanded this section of Turner's dialogue considerably, exploiting its potential for rhetorical display and for theatricality. He introduced extra characters - vendicta dei and a constable - who escort Mother Messe out to Newgate. This is consonant with the importance that the arrest and exit of the vice figure already had in the moral play. It is, of course, a motif that later became even more clearly stressed. Here is the passage in which her fate is announced:

\textit{judge} Then vendicta dei and fynall dessperacion shall haue the ouerseing of hyr to se hir conuied to hir father the pope againe, and *for thy part vendicta dei, se thou that she trauelith with moch paine and persecucion & let not my wrath neuer depart from hir but hang thou still ouer hir heade for euer & let hir neuer haue no prosperity but all
ways in sorowe & care, and se that she crepith not in to no mans house in eany wise as I knowe she will, if thou take not good heade therefore wayte narowlye uppon hyr and specially a bowghte Powlles amonge hyr fryndes there, and Ludgate and sayncte pulckers, and se that she carieth with hyr, hir two brother supersticyon and Idolatry, and for thy parte fynall desperacyon, so [sic] that she be broughte hyr Jorneys end wyth owght Soker or comfort and that she neuer returne agayne wiles the world indureth but always to abide In un*comfortable paine as a thing desperate of all comfort neuer to obtaine mercy.

final. My lord vendicta dei and I shal se this youre commaundement fulfyllled unto the uttermoste.

Iuge. I pray yow hartely do so & take hir with you.

(C ii - C iii)

Two familiar notes are struck by the detail of this banishment. The first is a reminiscence of Eve's banishment from the Garden of Eden. The choice of 'traueleth' is interesting, for it is appropriate to the journey to Rome that Mother Messe has been sent on, while also containing 'travaileth' - the doom of childbirth placed on Eve.17 The same image is picked up with 'sorowe and care'. A sense of eternity is present in the vow of 'eternal wrath' and 'neuer let her neuer haue no prosperity but all ways in sorowe & care'. Once again, a comparison with Turner's dialogue shows that much has been added. 'Crepith', in the next phrase, contaminates ideas of womanhood with the fate laid on the serpent, and so aligns Mother Messe with the devil as well as with women. It is significant that at this point the judgment passes into its second familiar mode, that of domesticity. This contrasts with Turner's association of the Mass with the priesthood.18

The 'crepith' phrase continues: 'and se that she crepith not i to no mans house in any wise as I knowe she will, if thou take not good heade.' The instructions seem now to be directed not so much at vendicta dei, as at each
individual, possibly even each man in the audience. Mother Messe herself has been
sent to Italy, so the allegorized individual figure is now generalized to mean many
people involved in the practice of conducting the Catholic Mass. However, it has
not lost its feminine aspect. The significance of this generalized, creeping figure is
thus enabled to slide from Catholics to women, while the sense that we are no
longer considering Mother Messe as an individual is reinforced when we are told
that, though exiled to Rome, she may be found at St. Paul's 'a monge hyr fryndes'
(like Mrs. Noah) or with 'hir two brother'.

Neither of these areas of resonance is necessitated by the direction of the
play, nor by the logic of the prosecution's arguments. Both, however, are founded
in the characterization of the Mass as female. Between them they focus the
femaleness of Mother Messe in such a way as to license the rage that fills the
pronouncement of her exile. By harnessing Biblical authority and the rationale of
analogy, the apparent justice of that dismissal is enhanced. Finally, the connection
between the mass and woman mobilizes what can only be seen as a sinister
overtone, associating the evil Mother Messe with a threat to domestic peace.
Suddenly it is important to ensure that she 'crepith into no mans house'.
Apparently the first area of assault that she is likely to choose is not the individual
or the soul, but the dwelling place. This is sinister because the rhetoric has moved
away from theological debate into the fabric of everyday life. On a pragmatic level
the 'house' in question is simply the physical location needed for a Mass to be
celebrated, given its exclusion from churches. Nevertheless, it is also the location
of the family, and so of negotiations between husband and wife. Finally, it is an
image of the self: that place where one is most private, most vulnerable, most
relaxed. In this play, then, woman is imaged as that which is threatening to the
domain of the self, that which triggers fragmentation. At this point the vice-
convention of ubiquity interlocks with the lived realities of domestic life to create an
atmosphere which suggests that it may be women in general who need perpetual
surveillance.

In its attempt to draw a general moral from the allegorical trial of a person called Mother Messe, the dialogue moves its discussion away from the immediately present situation of the dramatic trial to more wide-ranging advice to the audience about the use of the Mass in the world at large. At this point it appears that 'thou' no longer addresses the character vendicta dei, but is extended to describe the sixteenth century masculine householders: the position of selfhood to which the text appeals when it refers to 'no mans house'. Attributing ubiquity to the allegorical figure coheres, on the level of the referent, with a fear of the continued celebration of the Mass in many parts of the country, and on the figurative level with the dramatic presence of Mother Messe as a female vice figure. It is the translation of allegory into real terms that triggers this extra meaning.

These two aspects of Mother Messe are so interwoven in the judgement scene that the play's move to warn against evil cannot be dissociated from a partially-concealed warning against women. Indeed, that last offers a modified escape from the illogicality of combining the total banishment of evil with a belief in its continued presence. A sense of the omnipresence of the threat results in a feeling that some unidentified person must be eternally watched over. Again, the surface illogicality of combining banishment and presence masks a mode of reasoning which classically is accepted as valid only by the unconscious mind: the Mass is a woman; the Mass is dangerous; therefore all women are dangerous. Such an attitude feeds the fear that even 'good' women are a potential threat, for at any time their 'womanness' might overwhelm their virtue.

A state of eternal tension between (unsuccessful) banishment and (denied but feared) presence is, of course, the locus of the repressed other.

The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune (1582)\textsuperscript{21} is a moral play because it represents human life as subject to a metaphysical opposition. Where Mankind uses a farmer for whom success is the harvest, Love and Fortune makes its mankind
figure a lover, for whom success is marriage. Mankind is opposed by Titivillus' plank, Hermione by Fortune's placing of Armenio. In both cases the agent of opposition is defeated by a higher authority who re-institutes the original life script. This sketch will suffice for now, but it will require modification later, when I come to consider the social structures involved in the action. In this play the vice-features missing from Mother Messe and the Launder can be detected, though with a secularizing twist which is significant. I shall discuss the construction of this elaborate play at greater length in Chapter Six. Here, however, it is the ambience attached to the female characters of the framing plot which is of interest. Very briefly, then, the situation set out in Act One establishes a mechanism of control over what follows, such that the relationship is much more complex than that of a simple play-within-a-play.

In a contention over precedence, put before the court of Jupiter, Fortune claims that Venus has been denigrating her, to the extent that her status as a god has been attacked. There follows a dumb-show, presenting a series of historical figures whose falls were due to either Fortune or Love: Troilus and Cressida; Alexander; Dido; Pompey and Caesar; and Hero and Leander. The show is inconclusive, so as a further trial of strength Jupiter decides on a competition, influencing the lives of certain human beings. Whoever has the greater effect will be deemed the greater goddess. The project has clearly shifted from the original desire to restore Fortune's rights as an equal amongst the gods, and has become a simple contest for supremacy, in structure strongly reminiscent of a tilt. Success in that contest is now expressed as 'soueraintie'. Jupiter, in setting up the contest, rewrites its purpose:

there is a Prince beloued of his loue?
On whom I meane your souerainties to proue.
Venus, for that thy loue thy sweet delight,
    thou shalt endure to encrease their ioy:
and Fortune thou to manifest thy might,
their pleasures and their pastimes thou shalt destroy
Ouerthwarting them with newes of freshe anoye
And she that most can please them or dispight,
I will confirm to be of greatest might.

(1.258-66)

Thus the contention among the gods becomes the frame of a complicated Romance-plot, which occupies the ensuing three Acts, and is resolved, together with the resolution of the trial-of-strength plot, in Act Five. It should be said here that vice-traits in this play are dispersed through various characters in addition to the Goddesses: Vulcan is vulgar and confiding; Penulo plots; Armenio enjoys a high level of manic viciousness; Bomelio is a wizard of sorts; and even Fidelia has magical properties. Both goddesses, however, harbour the vice figure’s desire to interfere in the normal course of human events: to set themselves up as alternative authors (C6). Of the two, Fortune appears the likelier candidate for the title of vice figure, insofar as such a term is appropriate to this play, since she comes from Hell, where her father is Pluto, the King of Hades (P16). Their messenger is the fury, Tysiphone, represented as terrifying and devilish. Her function of spreading discord amongst the Gods resembles the rôle of Cacurgus in Misogonus. Fortune begins her petition to the Gods:

I cannot but confesse dread Gods I am not she, that seekes with Venus to compare in her supremacie.
I am not of that power, yet am I of some might, which she usurping chalengeth to keep me from my right

(1.151-4)

How far the audience can believe Fortune here is a question which each particular production has to decide. Some doubt is cast on her sincerity by the preamble to her plea, where she suggests that what she will say is a construction with an ulterior purpose.

--- how should I now begin,
Or which way should I couch my words your fauors for to win.

(1.146-7)

Fortune is not fickle, but deeply and consistently negative to human happiness. She interprets her own place in the scheme of things as entirely evil. Although she is 'High mastris of the rowling wheele of chaunce' (1.558), which is theoretically able to raise people's fortunes as well as destroying them, all her activities in this play are designed to damage human happiness by thwarting the plans by which people seek to control their futures.

Heerin consisteth Fortunes soueraintie,

that Fortune can on earth doo what she will.

when men haue builded on the surest grounds,

their strong deuises Fortunes power confoundes.

(1.560-63).

Fortune appears from a human point of view, therefore, as unpredictable and external. Her motivations, in particular, can only be mysterious to humans, who are necessarily unaware of the debate between the gods. The vice figure too was external, manipulative, and an alternative author. For these reasons the identification of Fortune as vice figure is believable, especially given that the vice figure came, by the middle of the century, to be represented as a manifestation of randomness, rather than as an agent of the Devil. Fortune's motivations, like those of the vice figure, are concealed from those human beings she manipulates. Love and Fortune can be seen as expressing a sense of personal helplessness and a paranoid sense of the other as an unexplained force. Here, causality is explored in a secular way. The earlier moral plays had seen the vicissitudes and the triumphs of life as attributable to two clear varieties of cause. The first lay in the inherent frailty of human moral structures, where moral weakness was peculiar to each stage of life. Thus childhood was wilful, youth sexual, old age filled with a love of money, and so on. At any age, simple tiredness, hunger or boredom standardly invited moral danger. Moral decline was therefore stereotyped, predictable in
nature, and avoidable by the exercise of the will. In the second model, morally
damaging events were also initiated by the active engagement of antagonistic forces
in human affairs. In other words, the Devil and his agents offered temptations to
evil tailor-made to the frailties of the individual. Agents of virtue were seen as
available at significant moments to describe the nature of virtue, to clarify the
consequences of particular actions, and to remind the mankind figure of the
existence of moral choice. Life events therefore were shown as centred on the
individual, and indeed designed to affect the individual's behaviour.

In the Romances one expects to observe the chaotic operations of chance and
coincidence: improbable events and hardships, voyages into the unknown and a
happy outcome are standard fare. However, once in the theatre, these narratives
became subject to the need to explain, and they take over the vice figure as a force
of deliberate but random malevolence. In *The Rare Triumphs of Love and
Fortune* events are represented as controlled by external forces. Because of the way
in which they are personified, these forces have aims wholly separate from concerns
about the future, or the spiritual well-being of the individual. The effect on the
human beings is to locate them in a world where random, unanticipated events take
place. Such events cannot be contained in the essentially anthropocentric view of
the traditional moral play. Within the play this stance can be a source of quasi-
comic irony.

**Bomelio:** And now somewhat it is but what I
cannot tell,
prouokes me forward more then wont to
leaue my darksome sell

![Image](1.608-9)

Furthermore, that sense of the incomprehensible, of uncontrolled yet controlling
forces, is insistently imaged as female.

Although the sense of randomness is present in the play, it also retains a
certain theological flavour in its assertion that such randomness has an explanation,
if one could only see into the minds of the Gods. It is a view of cause which has much in common with the empirical sciences.

The female vice can be found in its elaborated form in the anonymous play *Lingua* (sometimes attributed to Thomas Tomkis). The play is extremely interesting since it seems courtly, though it is usually described as an 'academic morality'. The language is often beautiful, often witty, and always attractive. It delights in aphorism, and moves smoothly between verse and prose. The plot is entertaining and the action hilarious. First printed in 1607, though clearly dating from the last decade of the reign of Elizabeth, it uses a series of wholly allegorical characters. The play narrates a moral conflict for control of the Microcosmos - the human body, or possibly the body politic of the nation - which harks back directly to *The Assembly of Gods*. In brief, it is a very late moral play. The Prologue is at pains to ensure that the audience does not expect any of the stock behaviour or characters derived from continental farce.

Our Muse describes no lover's passion
No wretched father, no unthrifty son!
No craving subtle whore or shameless bawd,
No stubborn clown or daring parasite
No lying servant or bold sycophant.

*(Prologue, p.335)*

Although it is a comedy, it is neither a Romance nor a farce. The players' aim to teach 'severe Philosophy to smile' is achieved by moving into a contemporary realisation of an old-fashioned form: the struggle for supremacy between good and evil. It will be seen, though, that the terms 'good' and 'evil' are very qualified ones in this case.

The scene opens with Lingua expressing her complaints to Auditus. It soon becomes clear that Lingua feels politically isolated. She is cut off from direct communication with Psyche, Queen of the Commonwealth of Microcosm, because
everything perceived by the Queen is mediated through her five Senses: Auditus, Tactus, Gustus, Visus and Olfactus. The Queen has a minister, Communis Sensus, whose function as judge Lingua also believes to be perverted by the Senses. Lingua therefore plots to 'set them all at variance, / And so obtain to speak.' With the help of her servant, Mendacio, she tricks the Senses into believing that a robe and crown, left temptingly by the wayside, are really a present from Jupiter for the one of the five who 'proves himself the best' (Act 1, scene 2; p.359) This is rather easily achieved, given the childish self-seeking that governs each Sense's mental framework. That is coupled with a shallowness of thought, which is itself related to the allegorical status of each Sense as perceiving only one facet of experience. For the purposes of this discussion, I omit the series of comic scenes involving various serving lads.

The expected dissent ensues, and battle lines are drawn up, with Auditus' and Visus' armies opposing those of Tactus and Gustus. Lingua takes the opportunity to have Communis Sensus convene a court. With hierarchy already on the agenda, the hearing becomes an opportunity for Lingua to put her own case for a different status. The Senses put forward a list of Articles against her claim. Communis Sensus chooses to postpone judgment of this matter until he has finished with the contention of the Senses for superiority. Their representations take the form of a series of five pageants with commentary, each advertising the worth of a particular Sense. The reactions of the on-stage audience - Communis Sensus, Phantastes, Memory, Anamnestes, and Heuresis - add to the expositions and the wit. Visus and Auditus display their attributes first. Act Four begins with comic byplay among the three servants. Next Auditus continues his display with the characters of Comedy and Tragedy speaking for him. The shows of Olfactus and Gustus each occupy relatively brief scenes, while that of Tactus is reduced to a simple speech, for his sensual show of Venus and Cupid has foundered on the problems posed by women's dress. Communis Sensus forms a rational judgement which rewards and compliments all the Senses, and so is acceptable to all. He also
judges Lingua not to be a Sense, but allocates her specifically to women as a sixth sense, the sense of speaking.

Lingua, left alone and furious, plots a further attack on the Senses.\textsuperscript{37} We learn that she has contacts with the dark powers, in the form of a witch called Acrasia who, in accordance with her classical identification with chaos, supplies a potion and a charm to enrage the Senses, causing each to lose his identifying quality.\textsuperscript{38} Somnus, mobilized to control them one by one, also comes across Lingua as she gloats over their state, and puts her to sleep as well. Because they all talk in their sleep, Lingua can be interrogated, and her rôle in the plot is discovered. Communis Sensus condemns her to imprisonment, representing the teeth and lips as guards and strong doors. The play closes with a witty little epilogue, which requires the audience's applause so that the servant Appetitus will wake up, and return to normal life.

The evidence that Lingua is a vice figure is overwhelming. I will consider in turn the evidence offered by her linguistic habits; by her associates; by her behaviour and the behaviour attributed to her; and by her place in the structure of the play. As we have found in previous discussions of vice-characteristics, these aspects frequently intersect. I separate them here for the sake of clarity of exposition:

It is Lingua's \textit{métier} to be extremely competent linguistically (V5). She can use gorgeous language, dark curses and humour. She tells lies readily (L1) and can mobilize classical paradoxes to provide a smoke screen for this habit. When accused of habitual lying, she responds 'I say so too, therefore I do not lie' (Act 1, scene 1; p.339). There comes a point, however, where her witty control leads into meaninglessness.\textsuperscript{39} When attempting a neat paradox, using the 'inexpressibility' topos to praise speech, she falls into the trap of simultaneously describing speech as both wonderful and inadequate.\textsuperscript{40} Here the paradox works against her needs, and her linguistic emptiness is revealed.
'What should I say more? I can never speak enough of the unspeakable praise of speech, wherein I can find no other imperfection at all, but that the most exquisite power and excellency of speech cannot sufficiently express the exquisite power and excellency of speaking.' (Act 3, scene 5; p.395).

She uses repetition (fie, fie, fie, fie) and gloating laughter (M5). At one point her laughter is uncontrolled, an outburst which cuts across the sentence she is uttering. She thinks aloud, sometimes apparently musing to herself (Act 1, scene 1; p.342), or elsewhere taking the audience into her confidence (C4) (Act 1, scene 3; p.344). In the trial scene, Lingua jumbles several languages together, apparently believing this macaronic construction to be appropriate to legal debate (Act 3, scene 5; p.392). Within English she embeds Latin, Greek, Italian and French. Her linguistic skill in changing styles to suit her audience is represented, in the terms of the play, as deceitfulness rather than flexibility. For example, she uses 'sugar'd words to delude Gustus' taste'; 'civet-speech t'entrap Olfactus' nose', and so on (Act 1, scene 1; p.341). When the Senses put forward a list of charges against her, they include a charge that she creates bad translations: 'she hath most vilely prostituted the hard mysteries of unknown languages to the profane ears of the vulgar' (Act 3, scene 5; p.396). Both 'mysteries' and 'profane' hint at a destructive meddling in theological matters (V9).

Like Courage in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man, she utters a speech which suggests a 'divided self' (Act 4, scene 8; pp.431-2). In this case, the speech could be recuperated as a piece of sarcasm followed by an honest description of her feelings, but it reads more credibly as a change of heart:

Well, now I see my cause is desperate,
The judgment's pass'd, sentence irrevocable,
Therefore I'll be content and clap my hands,
And give a plaudite to their proceedings.
What, shall I leave my hate begun unperfect?
So fouly vanquish'd by the spiteful Senses?

(Act 4, scene 8, pp. 431-2)

Here, when she plans revenge, Lingua is vaunting and hubristic, another major vice-trait.

It is a challenge to determine the extent to which Lingua associates with a vice-crew. On one hand we have the Senses' allegations that she associates with 'a train of prating pettifoggers, prowling sumners, smooth tongued bawds, artless empirics, hungry parasites, newscarriers, janglers and such like idle companions', (Act 3, scene 5; p.397). Within the action of the play itself, however, the dramatic function contained by the concept 'vice-crew' is much more applicable to the group of the Five Senses in many of their rompings and rivalries. Although Lingua is in conflict with them throughout the play, they cannot quite be seen as emblems of goodness. Indeed, conflict in the form of abuse and beatings often characterizes the relationship between chief vices and their followers. Though verbally clever, the Senses are not very bright. They turn against one another on the slightest provocation, and are equally easily made violent. They laugh at one another's misfortunes, and plot rather risibly for their own self-interest. This tendency to the ridiculous connects them with the vice-crew as a low comic group. Our impression that Tactus has a criminal mind is reinforced when he sings a tinkers' song. There is even a scene in which he speaks the truth and then changes it to a plausible falsehood. Again, the vice-trait of mishearing can be found in the very funny slapstick scene in which Auditus has been deafened, (Act 5, scene 9; p.442-4).

When the Lingua/Senses plot is in the background, the stage is taken over by a succession of 'comic servant' scenes. The balance of this play is thus weighted towards that dispersal of the vice-function into numerous characters, already observed in connection with The Tyde Tarrieth No Man and other proverb plays in Chapter Four. Lingua also resembles The Tyde Tarrieth No Man, in that the largest proportion of the play is devoted to the intrigue and knockabout comedy of
the vice and crew, with a corresponding reduction in stress on the rôle of virtue and of the mankind figure.

Since vice figures generally represent the physical/literal aspect of experience, as opposed to the spiritual, it is inevitable that the Senses, as allegory, cannot help resembling the bibulous and lascivious aspects of the vice-crew. For the purposes of the play, however, they are represented in a more courtly mode. The 'comic servant' scenes relocate the Senses in a higher social caste. Ultimately, their aggression manifests itself as a formal battle, described but not seen. The terms of the description suggest the coded refinement of the Accession-Day Tilts, or poetic descriptions of battle array, rather than the horseplay traditionally favoured on the moral play stage. The 'kitchen' theme of that part of the battle which involves Gustus associates it with folk-tale and folk-song bragging, but also with courtly banquets and civic receptions for the monarch, the narration of which takes delight in dwelling on the size and number of the comestibles provided. When presenting their shows, the Senses are permitted vivid and elegant verse. Through those lengthy passages they also assist in the constitution of the play as a delicately witty intellectual conceit. There is thus an ambivalence created by their characterisation as vice-crew, and their plot-function as courtiers. Again, in terms of subject/other, the femaleness of Lingua herself intensifies the opposition between the principal vice and her crew.

A clearer representative of vice-crew occurs in Mendacio, her page, who is at one and the same time a conniving servant from Latin comedy and, like Greediness, both ubiquitous (Act 2, scene 1; p.364) and ageless (Act 2, scene 1; p.365). As evidence of ubiquity, one notices his answer when Appetitus asks him where he has been:

Mendacio: Everywhere. In the court you
gentlewomen hang me at their apron strings, and that
makes them answer so readily. In the city I am
honoured like a god; none so well
acquainted with your tradesmen

... (and so on, at length)

(Act 2, scene 1; p.364)

He also offers evidence of his agelessness: 'I tell thee, three thousand years ago was Mendacio born in Greece, nursed in Crete, and ever since honoured everywhere.' He claims an influence in the composition of all the major works of historians, as well as of poems and legends. Although Appetitus responds by drawing attention to his capacities as a liar, there is more satiric mileage to be gained by reading these claims as honest.

Those characters who discuss Lingua attribute various significant behavioural qualities to her, in particular, lying and the deformation of language. I have already mentioned that they associate her with a troop of sinister figures. Her own language offers a loose connection with the devil: 'And do, in faith I will, the devil knows what' (Act 1, scene 1; p.342). The juxtaposition of 'faith' and 'devil' hints at an unhallowed allegiance. Her translations are described as making 'a new hell in the upper world' (Act 3, scene 5; p.396). As the only female character in the play, Lingua herself is an obvious particular referent when women in general are discussed. They are put forward as unlike men in 'peevishness and folly', in 'pride, deceit, prating, lying, cogging, coyness, spite, hate'. Of these, only peevishness and coyness are not standard descriptions of the vice figure. The passage continues: 'and in many more such vices' (Act 3, scene 6; p.403). In this exchange, then, the crucial differences between men and women are compressed into the term 'vices'.

Among the elaborate pieces of stage business, Lingua sends a false message (L5), in the writing that accompanies the cloak and crown, and also struggles (P6) when taken prisoner (Act 5, scene 12; p.447).43

Lingua is perhaps most vice-like in her structural position in the play. She wishes to re-organize the order of society, subversively putting herself forward as a sense (C5). To this end she is the author of two separate plots (C6), rivalling the
authority' of Communis Sensus' judgments. She is involved in creating symbolic 'uncrownings', causing the Senses to take leave of their senses. She twice creates anarchy amongst the Senses, first by stimulating war and then by maddening them with a drug. Lingua is also associated with social disorder, in that she is seen as facilitating discord between husband and wife and between close friends (C6) (Act 3, scene 5; p.397). In addition, her satire is supposed to upset the social hierarchy by 'railing on men in authority, depraving their honours with bitter jests and taunts' (V7) (Act 3, scene 5; p.397). Another of her actions is feared as a threat to established precedence: 'now by these translations every cobbler is as familiar with Alexander as he that wrote his life' (Act 3, scene 5; p.396).

On stage indeed, the dispersal of authority is represented by the ownerless crown and robe, which are fought over, concealed, and finally distributed. The crown and robe are fakes, and even Lingua has possession of them by default, for she was awarded them in a competition in which she was not even an entrant. Disputed authority is the foundation of the moral play form. Authority is only apparently symbolized here by the crown and robe, for these are in fact a red herring designed for the Senses. Lingua hopes that the real authority issue (an invisible matter to do with status) can be settled while they are arrayed for battle over the meretricious 'gauds'. The Senses, as always, have mistaken a literal, outward seeming for true value (V9). Even that abstract idea of 'superiority' that the crown and robe are purported to represent, is not of true value in a world where the Senses must co-operate if Queen Psyche is to achieve fidelity of perception. The existence of Communis Sensus as arbitrator among them is evidence of this. The solution to their rage appears when Somnus puts the Senses to sleep. This, however, allows a further reversal of authority, for the parasite Appetitus now changes his name (L6), ceases to be a servant, and puts forward great plans in pretentious language.

The arraignment of Lingua in a scene resembling a trial reminds us of Mother Messe, but also of the many vice figures who are formally judged and
condemned to social exclusion, either by imprisonment or banishment (P11). Like other vice figures, Lingua is spared from death, but condemned to a lifetime of imprisonment.  

There are further aspects of Lingua which have little to do with vice-conventions, but much to do with femaleness. She is connected with magic. She has access to the hag, Acrasia, and seems to have witch-like powers in her own right to utter magic charms. Her blood-chilling curses have a peculiarly credible, forceful quality.

May the loud cannoning of thunderbolts,
Screeking of wolves, howling of tortur’d ghosts,
Pursue thee still, and fill thy amaz’d ears
With cold astonishment and horrid fears!

(Act 1, scene 1; p.341)

This, spoken to Auditus, has an incantatory formality and elevation quite different from the human seeming frustration she expresses six lines earlier.

O, could I use the breath mine anger spends,
I'd make thee know - - - - - -

(Act 1, scene 1; p.340)

The Senses accuse her of witchcraft, among other things. Their description of her as a common whore is based in a pun on her linguistic properties, which identifies the detachment of meaning from truth with the loosening of sexual morality: she 'lets everyone lie with her'. She is also a scold, and, rather strangely, inclined to talk in her sleep. This last feature is seen as more common in women than in men: a case of stereotyping governing perception. The accusations are summed up by Article 10: 'Item (which is the last and worst), that she's a woman in every respect.' (Act 3, scene 5; p.397).

There is of course the problem with this attribution of generalized sinfulness to Lingua, that it is presented by a group whose reliability as witnesses is seriously
in doubt. Their evidence is unlikely to be taken seriously even before the presentation of the ten articles. However, the articles themselves display a circularity of reasoning which it is hard to credit. Lingua's 'crimes' are based on her femaleness and on her allegorical aspect. The allegorical construction of a character called Speech, or Tongue, must involve a considerable amount of talking, and probably considerable versatility with speech. Yet these are the very details which are also culturally established both as proper to women and also as constitutive of vice figures. The characteristics of the allegorical figure of Lingua are thus also identical with a selection of the commonplace about women. From this it becomes clear that the construction of Lingua as female is based precisely in an identification between the vice figure as a threat and language as a threat.

Lingua's motivations seem to be her most fundamentally vice-like feature. On a simple level she is motivated by malice: to Lingua a joke is much richer if it is at somebody else's expense. Ultimately, though, her motivation is that which, in one form or another, summarizes all vice-behaviour from the earliest plays onwards: the sin of Pride. Lingua wishes to aggrandize herself beyond the place designated for her in the order of things.

By creating a female vice figure the play of Lingua thus puts forward a view of women's speech as worse than merely excessive or undesirable, which is the situation presumed by the opposition of the good silent woman and the talking woman who needs to be controlled. Here, female speech is actively threatening to the well-being of the organism of Microcosmos. Because of the flexibility of allegory, one is free to read Microcosmos in several ways: as (male-dominated) society; as the human being (again presumably male, but significantly indivisible from the female/vice-like other that inhabits his capacity for language); as the union of husband and wife. How far is it possible to read Microcosmos as universal to all human beings, that is, as either female or male? The handicaps are in the presumed otherness of the essence of femininity. Microcosmos shares the alienating feature of
much (possibly all) language and literature, that the female is other. There is another woman in the play, who never appears: Psyche, the Queen to whom all the participants in the drama owe allegiance. This perfect female is not just silent, but absent, in a sense in which Microcosmos is not, for one can see Microcosmos as the physical surroundings: the stage itself. It seems probable that Psyche refers to Elizabeth I, offering the figure of the idealized woman for whom all courtly shows are intended. If, as I believe, the play was performed for Elizabeth, the character of Psyche was effectively on stage throughout, silently presiding over the action. The soul, interestingly, cannot be touched by the machinations of Lingua, whose magic in this play extends only over the physical world of the Senses. In terms of the stage image, the final arbiter, and so the most powerful individual, is Communis Sensus.

The play then reveals itself as an advice play to the monarch, like John Heywood's *Play of the Wether*, in this case recommending adherence to standard committee procedure, and advising against paying attention to the lobbying of advisers or talkative upstarts.

In the end, though, the presence of a silent 'Psyche' increases the pressure which isolates Lingua and her desperate schemes, for it turns the confrontation against her from a male/female one into one between 'virtuous people' on the one hand, and 'vicious woman' on the other. In this scenario, males can only be virtuous and sensible, virtuous and gullible, or comic servants.

In both *The Play of the Wether* and *mother messe*, we have seen female figures with some vice-like aspects. However, both lack certain crucial features needed to qualify them unequivocally as vice figures. The Launder is profoundly virtuous and, though her verbal style is gutsy, the only person to accuse her of shrewish behaviour is the biased and compromised Merry Report. Mother Messe, though defined as evil, makes no attempt at wit. Her position as defendant in a trial gives her no opportunity for vice-play, and strict adherence to the debate form
means that there is no plot for her to manipulate. Given that the essence of vice figures is performance and virtuoso display, the static terms of the dialogue-form incapacitate its participants from behaving as developed vice figures. It is clear that Mother Messe constitutes a reference to the vice-convention, and even an image of it, rather than an example.

In *The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune* female figures appear as controlling creators of narrative, and also as disruptions to the peace of both the realms Jupiter governs. The dignity and noble status of the goddesses, however, defend them from a vice-like identification with the 'low other'.

By the time Lingua occurs at the end of the period I have been examining, it seems that there is ample evidence for the existence of the 'female vice' on the stage. This is a figure which is separate from that of the ordinary chattering or railing woman of low comedy. Instead it is a vice figure in a moral play structure which involves a conflict between good and evil, whether for the well-being of the mankind figure, or for control of the play. For the audience, recognition of the terms of the good/evil division is constructed by the use of a set of key aspects of behaviour which I have called vice-features. It is in these features, welded to stock notions of the female that the character of Lingua is founded.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1 The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune, Malone Society Reprints (Oxford, 1930), (A ii).


3 On this theme, see George Ferguson, Signs and Symbols in Christian Art (New York, 1959), p.7.


6 The Trial of Treasure, in Anonymous Plays Third Series, ed. J.S. Farmer (London, 1906; reprinted Guildford, 1966), pp.203-246. As Farmer does not give line numbers, it is clearest to give page references for the quotations from this play.


8 Outside the realm of the moral play, the theatrical imagery of women in need of reigning or curbing is extensive, including pervasive occurrences in Shakespeare's The Taming of the Shrew, Riverside Shakespeare, ed. Harry Levin and others (Boston, 1974), pp. 110-139. In Antony and Cleopatra, Antony uses 'snaffle' and 'uncurbable' in his remarks about Fulvia. Riverside Shakespeare, pp.1347-86, (2, ii, 67-71).

9 In John Heywood's A Play of Love, Neither Lover nor Loved, though designated the 'Vice', is merely the most cynical of the debaters.


11 Turner's Examination of the Mass, BM C.21.Q.53; STC 24364Q, is
discussed by C.H. Herford, *Studies in the Literary Relations of England and Germany in the Renaissance* (Cambridge, 1886), pp.63-65. The first edition of the *Examination* provides no convenient date. It seems probable that the *Examination* precedes the *endightenment* because of the latter's summarized versions of the elaborate arguments of the former. I note Herford's opinion: 'I regard the *Endightment* as a somewhat felicitous adaptation of Turner's plan, produced not many months after it', p.66. The following discussion assumes the English *Examination*, rather than the German original, to be the direct source for Punt's work.

12 This characteristic of Protestant attitudes to Catholicism recurs in *Misogonus*.

13 Connecting the Pope with the Devil was a commonplace, related to the dictum of both Wyclif and Luther that the Pope was the Antichrist whose reign must precede the second coming. Herford, op.cit., pp.120-138, discusses this connection in the drama. Kirchmayer's *Pammachius*, in which the Pope is shown making a contract with 'the Fiend', was performed at Christ's College Cambridge in 1545, and translated by John Bale (now lost). Bale's *Kyng Johan* also shows similarities.

14 Though 1599 is the earliest printed edition, W.W. Greg's judgment has not been superseded: 'Clyomon and Clamydes is very likely by the same hand as, and almost certainly contemporary with, *Common Conditions*, to which it is, if anything, probably anterior.' [The latter play was entered in the Stationer's Register in 1576.] *Sir Clyomon and Sir Clamydes*, Malone Society Reprints (1913), p.vi.

15 Bernard Spivack memorably describes this habit as 'a unique piece of oral legerdemain ... which appears scores of times in the moralities, and is, in fact, a prominent signature of [the Vice's] rôle after 1550. . . . he flashes a gleam of truth in the face of his dupe, but quickly withdraws it, pretending a slip of the tongue or other words to another effect.' *Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil* (New York and London, 1958), p.168.
Bernard Spivack sees the intellectual/social dimension: 'like the epoch they [the plays] mirror, they gradually submit to the secular revolution that separates the Renaissance from the Middle Ages.' (op.cit., p.206). Again, 'the single transcendental subject is replaced by a world of particulars . . . topics equally specialized and secular', p.227.

While the confusion between the two words was a commonplace, it should be noticed that 'trave!' is generally used when the difficulties and effort of movement from place to place are stressed. Otherwise 'journey' is one of several options. The use of 'travail' as the spelling of both forms is thus not merely unsurprising, but reasonable.

Turner gives us:

Knowledge: Syr yf it please you, yf there be no man appynted to se this woman shypped, and conueyed out of the lande, the priestes wyll kepe her styll in theyr chambres, and wyll abuse her, as they haue done before. (Examination, G iii).

'Brother' was commonly used to mean 'knave', and is also frequently used as greeting and identification among members of the vice-crew.

On a more conscious level, the effect of this argument by metaphor is to foster the transformation of Catholicism from 'self' into 'other' in the moral play by personifying it as female. Where the earlier Morality had traditionally opposed the Christian 'self' to the devilish or heretical 'other', Protestantism needed to establish a Catholic other simply because Protestantism itself could so easily be located in the space of the heretical other. One needs only to add that 'self' had traditionally also been identified with conservatism, and with a fortress mentality (as in The Castle of Perseveraunce) and other had been linked with novelty, to see that the appropriation of reform for the 'self' was an urgent task. In this play we see how the pre-existing otherness of women is mobilized to re-locate the two opposed terms of the theological debate.

The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune, Malone Society Reprints (Oxford,
1930).

22 In this I differ from Bernard Spivack, who sees the mankind figure post-1500 as no longer universal: 'in neither case [Four Elements and Three Estates] does he stand any longer for the universalized concept of mankind. Rather he is limited in the former to that side of man which engages in intellectual pursuits, and in the latter he is man as king', (cit. in note 15, p.207ff). It seems here that Spivack's use of the word 'universal' to mean 'relating to every aspect of the human being' is not particularly helpful. My own approach sees, for example, ratiocination as universal, and accepts a Freudian view that a fantasy which refers to a king refers to a general concept of the self.

23 'Breaking her anckers downe' 1.44, has provoked editorial puzzlement. In his edition of the play, W.W.Greg glosses 'anckers' as (?auters= altars), reading it as a misprint. Far more likely is an identification between 'anckers' and anchoresses. (OED anchor, sb. Obs.2 An anchoress.) Included in the list of variant forms are ancre, ankre, anker. There is a problem that, from a literal point of view, it would have been their cells, not the anchoresses themselves that were broken.

24 The manner in which he carries out this function shows him to be a near relation to Prospero.

25 Vulcan, however, has a function like that of Merry Report in The Play of the Wether as a low comic and commentator, and forms an effective if short-lived special relationship with the audience.

26 It is possible that the Rare Triumphs is a source for Spenser's Mutabilitie Cantos, for Fortune as Chance has both characteristics and ambitions in common with Mutabilitie herself.

27 A reference both to Troilus and Criseyde and to Tysiphone in the Aeneid, this name sets a courtly, erudite tone for the play.

28 The episode also bears a strong resemblance to the arrival of Discorde at the Gods' feast in ?Lydgate's Assembly of Gods:
In came Dyscord to haue made varyaunce.
But there was no rome to set hyr in that hous
The goddys remembryd the scisme odyous
Among the three goddesses that she had wrought
At the feast of Peleus, wherfor they thought

They wold nat with her dele in auenture
Lest she theym brought to som inconuenyent.
She, seying thyss, was wrothe out of mesure
And in that gret wrethe out of the paleyce went,
Seying to hersylf that chere shuld they repent.

(1.409-420)

29 For example, Hoccleve's 'Tale of Jeroslaus' Wife', in Hoccleve's Works, vol 1, The Minor Poems, ed. F.J. Furnivall, EETS, ES, 61 (London, 1892), pp.140-178, narrates the trials of a woman cast out by her husband. Phillips cannot follow the same track in his comparable Patient Grissill without introducing the operations of Politic Perswasion as a motiveless, vice-like adviser to Duke Gwalter.

30 Lingua (1606; 1590's), in Dodsley, vol 8/9, pp.331-463.


32 Lingua has received virtually no critical attention. Many references in the text have the air of 'in-jokes': remarks about prior occasions, possibly entertainments or plays, in the reign of Elizabeth. The references to a 'Queen Psyche', superior over the microcosm in which the dispute takes place suggests a deferential inclusion of Elizabeth in the festivities, and allows for the possibility that the play was intended for presentation at Court, or in the course of a Royal progress. Unfortunately for this theory, I have been unable to find any specific reference to the play's appearance in such circumstances. In the course of my discussion of the text, I footnote those allusions for which some suggestion can be
offered, though it seems probable that further research would reveal many more.

33 Although Lingua is printed in Acts and scenes, it is far easier to locate quotations in Dodsley by page numbers. I therefore give both forms in the following discussion.

34 'In Aristotelian (and Scholastic) philosophy, Communis Sensus is a capacity with two main functions: to grasp certain kinds of attribute which are not the province of any one of the five senses (e.g. number, movement); and to compare the data of the five senses, assessing their relations to one another. The detection of identity/similarity/difference through the superficial play of perceived qualities is its crucial function.' (A. Barker, University of Warwick, personal communication, March, 1991.) Communis Sensus is thus qualified by definition to act as a judge in this dispute.

35 Anamnestes here is a comic old man, who is inclined to recall long-gone events in great detail at the slightest provocation, often incorrectly. He is a satirical image of that Platonic feature of the mind which penetrates to higher truths through a kind of 'remembering' based on an immediate perception.

36 Anamnestes' page, Heuresis (or Discovery), combines the features of a Plautine cheeky slave with the mental verve that his name suggests.

37 This double cycle of attack and repulse by the forces of evil is discussed by William O. Harris as an important characteristic of morality plays, in Skelton's 'Magnificence' and the Cardinal Virtue Tradition (Chapel Hill, 1965). See especially Chapter Four 'Fortitude and the Two-Part Morality Structure', pp.71-126 (pp.71-2).

38 'Acrasia' is the term in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Book 7, chaps.1-12) which is translated 'incontinency' or 'weakness of will', and is linked with effeminacy (a quality opposed to endurance). Aristotle's acrasia is linked with madness: 'outbursts of anger and sexual appetites and some other such passions, it is evident, actually alter our bodily condition, and in some men even produce fits of madness' (7,3).
Acrasia also appears in *FO II*, as the name of the enchantress who rules the Bower of Bliss, and who makes her lovers mad with pleasure, in order to cause their downfall into 'uses bad'. The drug in *Lingua* functions to madden the Senses by confusing their special properties, but without providing any special pleasure. In this it seems that *Lingua*, while harking back to Aristotle, has created an original conception of the effects of 'acrasia', related to but independent of both the classical and the Spenserian models. Ironically, 'the use of language by men in an incontinent state means no more than its utterance by actors on the stage' (*Ethics*, 7, 3), a continuation in Aristotle which *Lingua*’s learned audience may have appreciated.

39 I discuss the tendency of the vice figure's language towards meaninglessness in Chapter Three, in connection with *Mankind*.


41 Courage, *Lingua*, Richard III, and in some sense Faustus all move into this condition towards the end of their plays, when final destruction seems to be near. (See Chapter Two, note 21).

42 Here is a small portion of Visus’ self-description:

The third's a lesser room of purest glass;
The fourth's smaller, but passeth all the former
In worth of matter: built most sumptuously,
With walls transparent of pure crystalline.
This the soul's mirror and the body's guide,
Love's cabinet, bright beacons of the realm,
Casements of light, quiver of Cupid's shafts,
Wherein I sit.

(Act 3, scene 6; p. 405)

43 *Lingua*’s struggles when arrested may be compared with those of Courage in
Tide Tarrieth No Man.

44 The conceit in which her jail is described has much in common with Puttenham's in *Partheniades*:

A golden toonge in mouth of amber
That oft is hard but none yt seethe;
Without a garde of yvorye teethe
Even arrayed, and richelye, all
In skarlett, or in fine carrall


45 For this to be so, the play must have been written rather earlier than 1607, its date of first publication. This indeed seems extremely probable. The identification of Psyche with Elizabeth is supported by detail from the Accession Day Tilt of 1581. Here Sidney's *Four Foster Children of Desire* refers to Elizabeth as Psyche. See Jean Wilson, op. cit., pp.63-85. In addition, that tilt used a device called a 'rowing trench': a kind of artificial movable mountain, containing concealed musicians, which could be made to rear up to do homage to the Queen. This device could be what Lingua is referring to when she mentions an occasion when 'the hills leaped and the woods danced' (Act 3, scene 5; p.394). Lingua's speech concludes with a reference to Arcadia, also cueing a memory of Sidney.

England was characterized as Psyche in a Latin Anti-Protestant play of c.1595-1615, probably from the Jesuit College of Valladolid: 'England under the name of Psyche longs for the rose' (Chorus to Act I). (I am grateful to Alison Shell, St. Hilda's College, Oxford for this information.) The uncertainty of the dating makes it impossible to say whether Lingua derives from Psyche or vice versa.

46 The downfall of an ambitious woman in the presence of the Queen occurs in the 1592 Entertainment at Bisham, when Ceres' harvest cart collapses.
47 It may be relevant here to recall that a contemporary claim was made that
Essex's rebellion was an attempt to purge the court of bad advisers, and not an
attack on the Queen herself. See, for example, Alan Haynes, Robert Cecil. Earl of
Salisbury (London, 1989), p.64. Such an identification of Essex with Lingua, if
tenable, would considerably narrow down the boundaries for the date of
composition of the play.

48 An example of the chattering woman is the Welsh wife Gwenthian in the
Chettle, Dekker and Haughton version of Patient Grissil (1599).
CHAPTER SIX

WOMAN AND CHAOS

'deʃyringe all chriʃten men to beware of thys wycked spire'

When the concept of woman is involved with the stereotype of the vice figure, the way is open to read moral conflict as taking place between social groups, rather than within the individual. In my discussion so far, otherness has been seen to be constituted in relation to a very particular kind of self. That self was assumed to be the mankind figure - the struggling, fearful, inherently virtuous (or at least loss-minimizing) person, who was faced with moral decisions in this very material life. In Chapters Three and Four I looked at plays in which otherness has been defined as a lack of such conventional virtues as honesty, piety, and clarity of understanding. Those lacks could also be represented as a lack of social status, and a lack of subtlety in language skills. The paradox arises that the vice's linguistic flexibility and linguistic excess could, in the earlier moral plays, be perceived simultaneously as an incapacity with the meanings of spiritual discourse. In Chapter Three I discussed how these social and linguistic features were not initially essential to the representation of evil, but a set of conventional characteristics peripheral to the functional position of the vice figure as facilitator of the mankind figure's fall. Possibly because they proved to be entertaining, possibly because they raised important questions about the nature of language, these once-extraneous features came to be central to the characterization of the vice figure, and even to define it. In the heavily vice-laden plays of the 1570's and 80's, they had become readable as adequate indicators of evil in their own right.

Alternatively, the development of vice-characteristics could sustain a reading of the character from a more generalized point of view. Powerful classes in society
have a vested interest in justifying the powerlessness of other groups. Thus characteristics of the abjected classes, such as unemployment, could conveniently be associated with evil. Works such as Harman's Caveat addressed themselves to a particular, propertied class of reader, or to an individual as representative of a class. This differs from a play such as Mankind which invokes a classless universality transcending the bucolic occupation of its main character. The changes in emphasis of the stage representation of the vice figures served to further an association between vice figures and the lowest classes of society, and a consequent particularizing of the mankind figure as essentially respectable. There is no doubt that this is a problematic move, given the ambivalent attitudes of society towards the audiences for plays. There are clearly several very different kinds of audience to be considered. Willis' reminiscence of a performance of The Cradle of Security, quoted in detail in Schell and Schuchter, makes it clear that performances in large provincial towns were put on for the influential, but also for the ordinary people. In the great houses and at court, entertainment was particularly directed to the tastes of the well-to-do and the nobility. Finally, a broad spectrum of the urban population was found in the audiences of the new public playhouses. This included the disreputable and the criminal, who found playhouses a useful consorting ground where they could mingle freely with more respectable groups.

This already well-documented information, when put together with our knowledge of the increasingly demotic characterisation of the vice shows that it was no longer possible for every member of the audience to identify with the mankind figure and rejoice in the punishment of the vice.

In this way, the conflict between good and evil, between self and other, can be seen as having a social dimension, and there are plays in which this social dimension has prime importance. Plays which begin as an 'Assembly of Gods' are typically founded in the social structure of a law court, and investigate an issue of public significance. They describe the effects of an opposition to happiness in social terms. When a conflict occurs, it is as a general dissent, spread amongst
many members of society, rather than located within the soul of any single individual, who can, like Mankind, represent each separate human being. Instead of the human microcosmos, such a play is concerned with the well-being of a macrocosmos: the body politic. In a 'social' moral play, then, the play's centre of gravity is the state of order itself. It is, of course, possible to impose a 'social' reading on any moral play by interpreting its characters and their interaction as figures for relations between social structures. This discussion is based on two plays already used in Chapter Five, *The Play of the Wether* and *The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune*. Although similar points could be made about numerous other texts, I have chosen to discuss *Love and Fortune* because it is a neglected play with many literary and dramatic virtues. In *The Play of the Wether* and *Love and Fortune*, moreover, a social reading is invited by the terms in which the plays see themselves.

```
whence springes this strife of late
who are the authors of this mutenye:
or whence hath sprung this civill discorde here:
which on the sodaine strook us in this feare.
If Gods that raigne in skyes doo fall at warre,
No mervaile then though mortall men doo iarre.
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(A ii)

Argument is not seen as a matter between individuals, but as 'mutenye' (a condition involving authority structures) and as 'civill discorde' (concerning the state as a whole). It is inevitably linked with the conflicts of mortal men, and though 'iarres' may simply mean disagreements, it is also a common word to apply to wars.

It is to be expected that this alteration of structural emphasis from the individual to the social can be clearly observed in plays where vice figures are female. I have already documented that transition in the case of *Mother Messe*. The judge's diatribe against Mother Messe as an individual quickly moves to a
domestic rhetoric, which in turn encourages a picture of women as a pervasive threat in society. When plays became more interested in the individual and less in the allegorical representation of types, they did not shed the early moral plays' sense of adversarial otherness, but translated that, too, into naturalistic terms. The capacity of women to act as figures of otherness in both realms made them especially appropriate to transcribe moral disorder into the domestic terms of this new individuated realism. The link between the female vice and the 'social' moral play is not a perfectly consistent one, for there are several plays in which a male vice figure has the function of social disruption. However, even in those plays the vice figure operates in a feminized way, as an agent of chance. I shall return to this connection between the vice figure as a representative of chance and the allegorical image of randomness as a 'feminine' function in connection with The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune.

The plays in which it is appropriate to discuss this relocation of dramatic otherness into the female are two of those from Chapter Five: John Heywood's The Play of the Wether and the anonymous The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune. Significantly, both are believed to be court plays and both involve assemblies of the Gods. They begin with an overtly patriarchal structure, in which Jupiter is not just a God, but also a King and a father. He is thus triply the head of the structures into which human beings must fit: the spiritual/moral, the economic/political, and the emotional/age-based. All, of course, interlock philosophically in the sixteenth century, and each is capable of acting as a metaphor for either of the others. Such comprehensiveness suggests a desire for fullness: a fear that any mere metaphoric representation of the law-giving Father cannot be enough, but that every loophole must be anticipated and filled. With this degree of overkill present in the plays' statements of paternal authority, the nature of the subversive elements which disrupt Jupiter's order must be very significant indeed. It is, in fact, a relatively new critical idea that these plays offer any uncontained disruption at all.³

Both the plays show a fear of the female as disruptive, combining this with a
series of narrative moves designed to contain the disruption. These moves seek ultimately to end the play with an assertion of order, represented as equivalent to good.

An outline of the *The Play of the Wether* (1533) has been given in Chapter Five. It has been argued that the play contains a statement about control and the monarchy. It is a lesson to quarrelsome subjects not to be too demanding, and a compliment to the King about his importance as a wise moderator. The underlying structure of the play is thus an opposition between order and rebellion, and the prize to be gained is no longer the soul of mankind, but the smooth running of society. In both the individual and the social cases a kind of ideal state is put forward, away from which the organism is inclined to fall. What is of interest is the alteration in what is perceived as the subject of the play. In *The Play of the Wether*, the subject being fought over is the social and physical framework within which human life is conducted, in contrast to plays like *Mankind*, where the subject of the contention is the condition of a representative individual's soul. In *The Play of the Wether* the presence of this new subject is signalled by hints within the play at metaphysical concerns with the nature of the matrix within which human life is defined, in this case, time itself.

Attention to the implications of the title yields interesting connections, for if anything is closely linked with the weather, it is the passage of time. The weather gods who provoke the debate are connected with the movement of day and night and with the cycle of the seasons. Here and there within the play the temporal order begins to break down. The action of the play takes place in a temporal limbo, signalled by a loss of control of time as well as weather in Jupiter's opening speech. This is effectively a prologue which explains the origins of the present situation. Jupiter refers to the earlier debate amongst the gods, reporting the scene and the cases they put to him. He is now embarked on a project to collect public opinion before giving his verdict.
The god is thus a figure of order and control over the play: he decides what is relevant in past history (the debate), and how it is to affect the present (the play will take place). His opening speech establishes an all-embracing order which defines his own status and that of all humanity. His control extends to a meticulous accuracy about his location of people and events in time. He places himself at the end of a long tradition of honour and power 'to large ...to recyte.' (1.1) He also places himself in a present shared with those to whom he is speaking: this opening line refers to 'now'; he stands in high renown 'at this season' (1.12); he assesses how much information people should be offered, according to the current situation 'as we se mete for tyme present' (1.16). In the very simplest of terms he also controls the future: 'to the mater gyve care and we shall say' (1.21). He is, it seems, contained by a very straightforward past-present-future pattern, which remains coherent when he moves into flashback to narrate that parliament of the gods and goddesses before which Saturn, Phebus, Eolus and Phebe conducted their argument. The gods and goddesses 'hath late assembled' (1.24); Saturn 'hath entred such mater as served his entent' (1.39). The assumption is that human time and divine time are one and the same. One might call this structure 'natural narrative time'.

Linguistically, however, this structure is called into question by Jupiter's use of grammatical tense, suggesting that he has a relationship with a time beyond the natural narrative time of human affairs. It seems that he knows the future: 'As the thynge seife shall prove in experyment.' He asserts his own existence in eternity by referring to the length of past history: 'We Jupiter were ever pryncypale' (1.7). It is within this perception of eternity that the continuous present tenses of God's parliament slip into the narrative. They feel natural because of the tautness of the rhyme royal metrical structure. This and the dignity of the rhyme scheme produce a smooth, persuasive effect on the reader. But the narrative is divided, simultaneously describing a past event and a present condition. Of Saturn, for example, Jupiter explains: 'How be yt he alledgedth that of longe tyme past' (1.43).
Saturn, therefore, did not just allege in the parliament, he continues to do so. 'When' gains the force of 'whenever' in: 'When he hath laboryd all nyght in his powres/ His glarynge beames maryth all in two howres' (1.48-9); and in: 'For when he is dispyoyd his blastes to blow/ He suffereth neyther sone shyne rayne nor snow' (1.60-61). This is not the colloquial, historical present, but a continuous present tense. The upshot of the debate is: 'Thus can these. iiii. in no maner agre.' (1.64). The dispute is as yet unended, for they inhabit a time in which godly personality traits are fixed and enduring. A second clue to the existence of an order alternative to that of 'natural narrative' is that Jupiter has pretensions to be treated as a Christian god - he describes himself as receiving 'honour' and 'laude' (1.3) and 'glory' (1.4). He is also 'beyond the compas of all comparyson' (1.9). However, being divine in that sense would carry with it the concept of an immediate total knowledge of all time. What Jupiter has repressed, then, is what The Assembly of Gods knows: that Jupiter's order of things is constructed and partial. His kind of narrative can only take place in 'natural' time, for all that he exists in perpetuity. It cannot take place within the eternity which is proper to a god.

Jupiter undermines his own authority in other areas as well as the temporal. His claim to be beyond comparison is undercut by his own interest in comparatives: 'For syns that heaven and erth were fyrste create/ Stode we neuer in suche triumpahaunt estate' (1.13-14). It is also shaken by a flicker of self-doubt and reassurance: 'If we so have been as treuth it is in dede' (1.9). The effect is of a comically unconscious contradiction: the mock-heroic. Thus uncertain and referential, Jupiter is a joke god who depends on human praise for his sense of personal status. He has attempted to assert the existence of a 'human' time encapsulated by his own divine time, but his monologue, depending as it must on adverbs of time, and hence on the relativities of language, reveals an inability to sustain the distinction: the two temporal structures collapse into one another, with language subverting the patriarchal order.

Once the temporal dimension has been called into question, the play shows
patriarchal law to be vulnerable on that level on which its very existence is established by the repression of 'other' forces.

When Jupiter begins the play by calling for an assistant, Merry Report offers himself to the Law of the Father with a sincerity unusual in a vice figure, for he serves the god loyally. His gain in the business is in enhanced status. Initially a character whose 'apperence ys of to mych lyghtnes' (1.116), as the god's servant he gains power over others, and also believes himself to have moved up the social hierarchy: 'Not one of you that wyll make curtsy/ To me that am squyre for goddes precyous body' (1.196-7). He carries out faithfully his instructions to regulate who may approach the god according to their social rank.

Jupiter: Here to receyue all sewters of eche
degree
And suche as to the may seme moste metely
We wyll thow brynge them before our
maieste
And for the rest that be not so worthy
Make thou reporte to us effectually

(1.170-4)

The terms of the dispute have thus been defined as between the social orders. It would seem at first that we have here the multiple oppositions of a Derridean view of linguistic structure, and not the binary oppositions of naïve structuralism or of the traditional morality play. However, the play proceeds to function in terms of opposed pairs - usually of equal status - such that no sense of otherness is created. Instead there is a sense of opposed similarities, of balanced argument, when for example the Wind Miller is confronted by the Water Miller, or the Ranger by the Forester. The term 'woman' disrupts this balancing act, for when the play attempts to set up another see-saw opposition between the Gentlewoman and the Launder, a more fundamental kind of otherness is uncovered, as we shall see. Even before their entry, however, Merry Report follows Jupiter in
perceiving that the symbolic order is founded on exclusion. He willingly, if
mockingly, introduces both the Gentleman and the Merchant to Jupiter. 'yes mary
can I and wyll do it in dede' (1.345). No investigation is required for him to decide
that the Ranger must be excluded from direct contact with the god:

Ranger: I wold fayn speke wyth the god Jupyter
M. Report: That wyll not be but ye may do thys
Tell me your mynde I am an offycer of hys

(l.414-16)

He proceeds to impose that status of exclusion on women, for he allows neither the
Launder nor, significantly, the Gentlewoman to have direct access to Jupiter.

That this exclusion can be read as the repression of the subversive other
becomes clear when one traces the idea of the female through the text. Its first
function is structural: once the disorder in the weather has been contained, its rôle is
taken over by the Launder, in her confrontation with Merry Report. The second
function is linguistic, for Merry Report's monologues about milling (lines 724-50
and 760-74) turn out to be a protracted sexual innuendo. Armed with this hint, one
finds much of interest in Merry Report's discourse. The order established at the
beginning is an essentially masculist one, both symbolically, in the hierarchical
description of time, and literally, in the characters who appear. Jupiter has
appointed Merry Report to see that the social order is maintained: those of higher
rank may speak directly to him. To begin with, it scarcely seems remarkable that
the first three characters we meet are male. Women, however, are present in
language. Merry Report, that vigorous, earthy babbler of supposedly spontaneous
remarks is a kind of conduit of the repressed. He cannot stop talking about women,
particularly in terms of bodily functions and sexuality. For example, when the
Gentleman enters, preceded by the sound of a hunting horn, Merry Report pretends
that he thought it was a woman farting:

I went it had ben the gentylwomens blowynge
But yt is not so as I now suppose
For women's hornes sounde more in a mannes nose

(1.223-5)

He also draws attention to the women in the audience, identifying them as proper objects of the Gentleman's hunt.

*Here he poyneth to the women*

He wolde hunte a sow or twayne out of this sorte

(1.257)

He mistakes, or pretends to mistake, the Merchant for a Priest, and enquires after his wife.

*Mayster person now welcome by my life*

*I pray you how doth my mastres your wife*

(1.337-8)

Merry Report, then, mentions women in order to denigrate them, a standard ploy in the moral interlude, since the vice figure, like the fool, enjoyed a particular licence to shock the audience and to utter obscenities. The interesting point here is that the obscenities are far from indiscriminate: almost all the crude jokes are to do with women, and many of these connect women and dirt.6 Overtly, the sexual woman is being cast out of the social order, but it is the very force of that casting out that constitutes the symbolic order within which Jupiter can function. The repression of that knowledge of the dependence of the established order on the 'other' term is masked by a constant need to reinforce repression with half-denigratory, half-fascinated jokes. Merry Report is thus both the agent of repression and the sign of its failure.

In this way *The Play of the Wether* demonstrates an obsessive consciousness of women. They are mentioned again and again in the course of nearly eight hundred lines, but do not appear. In that space of time, the pressure on the play to recognize this alternative state becomes more and more intense through the accumulation of references to it. The issue is shelved for a time while the Merchant and the Ranger follow the Gentleman as petitioners, but forces its way back into
consciousness when the Wind Miller wishes to explain how feeble the wind has become.

Nor skantely shatter shytten sayle
That hangyth shatterynge at a woman's tayle

(1.526-27)

We are thus gratuitously reminded of women; of an animal association ('tayle'); and of a link with excrement. The Wind Miller is characterized as both earthy and rhetorically forceful by his use of the insistently alliterative line. In addition, the recurring sibilants and assonating 'a's here give his lines a special force, and a tone of distaste. Pressure is building up, but before it finds its climax Merry Report leaves the stage, and we are treated to a concentrated piece of artistry in a formal debate between the Wind Miller and the Water Miller. One enjoys the points they make and also relishes the incongruity of hearing a legal debate conducted by 'lewd' characters. One effect of their debate is to enhance the unexpectedness of Merry Report's next speech, which contains some of the most explicitly coarse language in the whole tradition of the moral play. Merry Report offers a virtuoso narration of sexual relations between a bored man and his demanding wife, couched entirely in an extension of a double entendre on 'grinding', appropriate to millers (1.724-68). The latter are completely taken in and offer unintentionally relevant advice about the proper care of millstones. The genuine wit of this passage also contains a view of women as sexually aggressive and deeply threatening, which accords with and partly explains the denigration expressed in the earlier jokes.

When representations of women eventually appear on stage, they are initially a balanced pair: the Gentlewoman and the Launder. The Launder, however, gradually steps out of this structure to confront Merry Report in the flying described above. Although the Launder resembles Merry Report in many respects, she is also the sign of a variety of virtue different from that associated with Jupiter. The Launder is cleanly and hard-working, and capable of applying moral standards to other people's behaviour. Perhaps most significant is her love of the sun, which
keys in to that range of Christian imagery to do with the sun/Son of God connection, and which is overtly linked with both light and moral comprehension.

In The Play of the Wether, then, we have a text which puts forward a many-levelled discourse about order and chaos. It seems to be specifically concerned with social order, as its use of occupational and class designations for the characters suggest. Within that context, the play attempts to establish woman as a term equivalent to disorder, without ever wholly succeeding. Its concluding confident assertion of the patriarchal order is already undermined by the assertion of an alternative virtue, which the Launder has symbolically put forward. Here, then, the opposition is not between forces of good and forces of evil, but between terms defined by the text as reason on one side and madness or folly on the other. Those terms are then represented as social organisation versus rampant self-interest, with a concealed gloss of them as male qualities versus female ones. Again, the subject of the conflict here is manifestly not the soul of mankind, nor even that of an individual. It is the maintenance of a beneficial state for the inhabitants of the social hierarchy. The condition of the people here supplants the soul of man as the centre of interest. Thus the introduction of a figure adumbrating the female vice has coincided with a change in the area in which the moral play operates.

Before considering representations of women in The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune, some of the logical background needs to be sketched in. One of the key developments in the later vice figure is his ambivalence. In plays of the 1570's and 80's, especially the 'hybrid' plays such as Clyomon and Clamydes, Common Conditions and even Cambyses, the vice figure is commonly represented as a servant to a well-born hero-figure. This version of the principal Vice, may 'play with both hands' by deceiving his master, by telling lies, and by generally working for his master's worldly or (less commonly) spiritual destruction. For this reason, a vice figure who functions as a servant can be perceived as peculiarly unreliable. A
vice figure who, acting unpredictably, is also in an authorial position and so is capable of engineering situations which re-direct the hero's life-story, comes close to the position of a god. At the least, he could appear to the victim to be a controlling external element in the world. When the vice figure is also represented as Fortune, a play has moved to viewing the situation even more strongly from the point of view of the mankind figure as victim. At the same time, women were seen as unpredictable because illogical and, particularly important for this theory, they were seen as fickle in their affections, also interpreted as loyalties. Dramatically, if not elsewhere, the husband typically regarded his wife's friendship groups (her 'gossips') as potentially threatening to his position of control.

For these reasons, one cannot be surprised that the rôle of Fortune could combine both feminine characteristics and vice characteristics, and cross indiscriminately between the two. Indeed, no distinction needed to be made between the sources which fed this compendium of all that seemed to be most terrifying to the struggling individual: that loss of order could be externally imposed; that reason had no place in the world. 'Fortune' could image many concepts, including madness and power, meaninglessness and the revolt of the female against male ordering. Her wheel could raise the image of torture and the dismembered body. The only image that could contain Fortune herself was that of her wheel: the inevitable fall that must follow a rise. Yet Fortune was seen as controlling the wheel to some degree, affecting when it moved and how fast. Man's only way of dealing with that externalized figure of Fate was to practise resignation.

The mythological image of Fortune with her wheel forcibly brings to mind that most common of female occupations: the spinning of wool or flax into yarn. An alteration in the stage behaviour of that quintessentially virtuous woman, Patient Grissell, suggests the transition of the underlying suspect qualities in the emblem of the spinning woman. In Phillips' play of 1565-6 two stage directions instruct Grissell to spin.
heare enter Grissell, Syngyng and Spinning: wyth her parents and Indigent Pouertie.

Later, at 1.1835-6:

Go once or twice about the Staige, let Grissill/ Singe some songe, and sit Spinninge.

The first instruction suggests a spindle, while in the second case a wheel is probable. Spinning and innocence could be associated emblematically at this period. It is in the 1570's and 80's that randomness, the vice figure and women are explicitly interconnected on the stage. By 1599, I suggest that spinning had become too ambiguous as a stage image, and Grissill is a weaver of baskets in the Chettle, Dekker and Haughton version of the play. In this version, Duke Gwalter first sees Grissill when she is carrying water from the well. Because of this developing link between Fortune and the spinning woman, the image of the recalcitrant Uxor Noe, and of the sinister, controlling Fortuna was enacted daily in every house in Europe. Subliminally every woman could be implicated in the emotional content of that set of images.

I have already shown how the female gods in The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune can be treated as vice figures. The next move is to see how they fit into the patriarchal pattern which these Assembly-of-Gods-type plays inevitably create. It is of interest that the inner plot to do with relationships and matters of the heart also shows a concern with structures of authority, while the outer plot, ostensibly about official hierarchy is much concerned with family relations. Thus neither part of the play escapes the theme of the extension of patriarchal structures through both the political and the familial worlds.

As in the Heywood play and the Lydgate poem, this play begins with the gods in the traditional state of 'civill discord'. The difference is that discord here has a feminine quality which is both overt and profound. Not only is the dispute between two women, but the first agent of change on the stage is the female Fury,
Tysiphone, who is seen in a dumb-show spreading dissension among the gods, before any speech is uttered. Jupiter appears baffled by the problem which has, he says 'on the sodaine strook us in this feare' (1.10). Tysiphone is a creature of hell, but it is a pagan hell, populated by Furies and damned souls, and ruled over by Pluto. Indeed, this hell is not a subversive other in relation to Jupiter's heaven, but a co-operating part of the extra-human world. Both function according to the same patriarchal structure. To see this in the conceptual terms of the moral play structure, it is as if Manichaeism had been recognised as dogma. Pluto is Jupiter's brother, so their daughters are cousins. Furthermore, the Fury's main task is to punish those who break Jupiter's laws. Tysiphone's speech, therefore, institutes an inclusive world of complex, close relationships. Here, all things are encompassed by a single comprehensible system. Beyond this, however, Tysiphone also embodies a certain wild spirit of casual malice which functions outside Jupiter's comfortably ordered system: 'unto all that liue and breathe, I wishe a worlde of woe.' (1.62). This parting line is unnecessary, except to enhance the dramatic spectacle of the Fury's exit: 'gape hollow hell below'. The discord she has brought is in answer to what is perceived as a previous disruption of the proper order, when Venus' attacks on Fortune have sought to reduce the latter's status as a God.

Even the gods are drawn with touches of naturalistic characterisation: Jupiter, supposedly the soul of paternal fairness, exhorts Venus to tell her story honestly, at the same time as he apologizes to her for offering such an instruction. There is a sort of domesticity in his apparent fear that she might touchily misconstrue his command. He hastily justifies himself, explaining that he is giving this instruction, not because he thinks she might be dishonest, but because scrupulous accuracy is necessary, given that Fortune is not present to defend herself.

And Venus heere I charge thee on my grace,
Not that I found thee heertofore untrue:
But for thine aduersarie is not yet in place
thou tell uprightly whence your quarrel grew:
what woords betwixt you therof did ensue.

(1.90-94)

Jupiter's syntax is scrambled in his attempt to retain his twin positions of distanced judge and loving father. He continues:

Say lovely daughter tell us flat thy minde
they shalbe blamed on whom the fault we finde.

(1.95-6)

One notices first the indecision in line 95, where the wooing tone of 'say lovely daughter' is overtaken by the slap of monosyllables, suggestive of the plain-speaking terms of the quarrel. But to what or whom does 'they' refer? At first they seem to relate to the 'woords', which, though shared 'betwixt you', are to be blamed on one. A more reasonable reading is that they, on whom the fault is laid, should be blamed. Jupiter here avoids hinting that blame might attach to Venus by moving into the indeterminacy permitted by the third person.

Indeed, even that even-handedness does not please this spoilt daughter. Just as Jupiter feared, Venus reads his speech as an accusation of herself.

what hath thy daughter so deserued? what doth she silly dāe:
Before ye thus to be abused with undeserued blame?

(1.99-100)

Venus then blends her legal arguments with a tone of clamorous demand and railing. It is even difficult to discover exactly what it is that she is objecting to. 'thus' recurs, but its referent is unclear.

But she no merveile though she seeke my seat thus to staine
When otherwise she cannot tell, aduantage how to gain.

(1.105-6)
Later in the same speech:

Is this my soueraigntie, is this so glorious:
Is this becomming thy renown, to quit thy daughter thus?

(I.137-8)

The lack of a clearly identifiable referent for all these incidences of 'this' also suggests a questioning of Jupiter's way of dealing with the situation as a whole, and a sweeping, inclusive authority over it. Venus appears to believe that the law should not apply to her, but that her position in the family should put her outside normal judicial processes. At the same time, she wants Jupiter to use the processes of the law to maintain that position. Her attack on his judgment in deciding that a hearing is necessary is deeply contradictory. Emotionally, it fits with the confusions arising from blending familial relations with the official hierarchy. The content of her argument is a claim to be more powerful than Fortune because more universal. She demands that her father keep his word that she should rule 'all things heer beneath the Moon' (I.134), implying that this includes a superiority over Fortune. For all its apparent rationality, the tone of this appeal is pettish, brattish and spoilt. A sense of the intimate structure of family relationships has been set up and imposed on the formal structure of the court of law. Jupiter, finally, is placatory.

When Fortune enters, her position in the debate appears to be fore-ordained: her initial speech locates the gods as the objects of her prayers, as well as of negotiation. In other words, she locates them above her before she tries to locate herself as their equal. The lowliness of her position is stressed: she needs permission to speak, for which not she but her father 'humbly' prays. She is part of a family structure parallel to that of Jupiter and Venus, and in this one too personalities intervene. Pluto was enraged on her behalf, but is now apologetic.

My Father humbly praieth you to giue me leave to speak
And pardon him yt in his wrath he did your quietnes break

(I.149-50)
Fortune’s oratory is so smooth that one begins to doubt her sincerity. Perhaps her self-deprecatory opening remarks are mere deceit: the seeming harmlessness of the clever lawyer. Further, she appears to want to re-define the terms of the debate, claiming that she does not wish to contend with Venus for supremacy, but that she only wishes to claim her rightful level of respect. She accuses Venus of deceit, and in particular, of using empty language. Venus’ presumed linguistic incompetence is the flip-side of a full capacity with gesture:

I graunt she may doo much with her aluring smiles,

But soon your Godheads can perceive her woordes be full of wiles

(1.155-6)

In contrast, Fortune displays a command of the felicitous phrase at that point when she identifies her power with that of mutability:

therefore ye see al earthly thinges, are wearing out alwaies

As brittle as the glasse, unconstant like the minde:

as fickle as the whirling wheele, as wauering as the winde.

(1.166-8)

Fortune’s examples reflect her own limitations. She refers to ‘the minde’ as changeable, not noticing that she here refers to all minds in general, not just to those ‘beneath the moon’. Thus she suggests the possibility that even the gods’ minds operate erratically, like human ones.

Nevertheless, Fortune seems to have the best of the nimble stichomythic squabble with Venus that follows, and even Jupiter’s partiality is swayed. ‘Affection shall not marre a lawfull cause’ (l.200). He feels he cannot deliver a judgment without investigating the matter further. For this examples are needed, so he commands Mercury to bring on the ghosts of people slain by Venus and Fortune, respectively. This is an opportunity for a spectacular sequence of magical manifestations, a dumb-show performed to musical accompaniment. Mercury acts as commentator, with Vulcan supplying an antiphon of crudities based on his character as naïve low-comic.
Oddly, Venus and Fortune have identical effects on people, since both cause destruction. The show, therefore, re-interprets the criteria of judgment originally laid down by Venus. It is established that no decision can be taken on the basis of this evidence. In a move parallel to the conjuration of women in *The Play of the Wether*, the dissension of the women in heaven releases Vulcan's lewdnesses. Vulcan is Venus' husband, but he behaves like a dim-witted member of the audience, and is much given to sexual innuendo. He functions in two modes: an elbow-jogging familiarity, and a sense of amazement at dramatic devices. Both of these are grounded in a total incapacity to see subtlety, and an equally comprehensive belief that his perceptions are shared by the audience.

As described in Chapter Five, Jupiter now dictates the terms of a new contest. The goddesses are to take part in a kind of joust, and their weapons are to be human beings who are going about their daily lives. Jupiter decides exactly what they are to try to do, to whom, and how the result is to be measured. In this way the judge controls the disruptive, quarreling women and directs their energies. Jupiter has decided that display is not enough, and substitutes narrative. The immediate effect of this is to dispose of both Venus and Fortune to the sidelines of the stage (possibly to a gallery above), and to restrict their function in the narrative to framing the following three Acts with musical shows.

The narrative of the Romance play-within-a-play is, predictably, complex and incredible, the more so since the Gods do more than set the crisis going, they intervene in the course of events. For this reason, the following summary of the plot is necessarily rather protracted. Fidelia, the daughter of Duke Phyzantius, is covertly in love with the virtuous and unknown orphan, Hermione. A clandestine meeting between the two young lovers is observed by Fidelia's brother Armenio, possibly thanks to Fortune's intervention. Armenio, outraged, confronts them, and is wounded in the ensuing fight. By chance (!) Duke Phyzantius enters, and banishes Hermione, who flees with the Parasite Penulo to a cave in the woods.
Fortune's Triumph, accompanied by drums and trumpets, closes the Act.

With Venus in command, we next meet the wronged hermit Bomelio, who apparently inhabits the same cave with his servant Lentulo. Although this is Venus' Act, mischief still thrives in the person of Penulo. He and Lentulo meet both verbally and in a fight near the cave. Penulo's plot to bring the antagonists Hermione and Armenio together fails. Instead, first Bomelio befriends Fidelia, then Armenio arrives and forces her to return to the court. Bomelio has recognized both of them, and calls down a curse of muteness on Armenio. Finally Bomelio and Hermione manage to meet, and are revealed to be father and son. They rejoice. This constitutes a triumph for Venus, who celebrates with viols.

Act Four can only be described as astounding in its ludic extremity. It exploits the theatrical possibilities of hysterico/magical transformations and the revelation of secrets in a joyous playing-off of Romance capabilities against naturalistic expectation. This protracted sequence begins soberly enough with another 'low comic' passage between Penulo and Lentulo, during which Lentulo explains that he has fallen in love with Fidelia. Apparently Venus' effects have been rather arbitrarily spread. Bomelio, disguised as a physician and speaking in heavy francophone English mingled with macaronic courtesies, now appears and asserts his ability to cure many ills, including muteness. The scene lends itself to both comic and sinister overtones, blended with a dawning amazement at the capabilities progressively being revealed by the sometime hermit. Doubtless extemporizing, Bomelio explains to Phyzantius that Armenio's enchantment can be lifted if his tongue is washed with 'the dearest blood in the tenderest parte' (1.1185) of his worst enemy. Surprisingly, this enemy turns out to be neither Hermione nor Bomelio, but his sister Fidelia. After a pause for contemplation we are further informed that 'Tis in her pappes, her dugs vor der be de tenderest parte,/ And de blood be dearest, it comes from de hart', (1.1217-18).

The Duke's response cannot fail to bring the house down: 'This thing is somewhat easier if she consent therto,' (1.1221). But his next line performs the same
sinister volte face which is this play's speciality: 'If not, I can inforce and make her it to do'. Convoluted syntax images the moral distortion involved in Phyzantius' thinking. Bomelio is now enabled to converse with Fidelia privately, and help her to escape from the Court for a second time. Meanwhile, back at the cave, Hermione has discovered Bomelio's books of black magic, and burns them in a passion of revulsion. Next, Penulo and Lentulo raise the alarm about Fidelia's second flight. When Bomelio and Fidelia arrive at the cave, the love duet between Hermione and Fidelia is soon broken by Bomelio's impassioned rage over the loss of his books. Amidst a flood of gutter curses he carries off Fidelia, leaving Hermione to mourn and identify his opponent, not as his father, but as 'The Fates and Fortune' (1.1522). Fortune's triumph follows, the drums and trumpets now augmented with cornets and guns.

Act Five sees an intervention in Fortune and Venus' dispute by Jupiter, through Mercury. Jupiter does not wish to see the matter fought out to the bitter end. They compromise with a non-intervention treaty, and the project of the remainder of the play is to find a resolution for the disasters they have created on earth. Invisible Mercury therefore soothes the insanely raging Bomelio into becoming a comic, dancing simpleton, and then into slumber. The new concord in the heavens is imaged by Mercury's use of both pipes and fiddles: Fortune's wind instruments harmonize with Venus' strings. When Hermione and Fidelia cast themselves on Phyzantius' mercy, he is at first suspicious and angry. Venus and Fortune have no choice but to show themselves to Phyzantius and persuade him to leniency, re-defining Bomelio as 'good Bomelio', and revealing Phyzantius's father as having been in error. Fidelia is now prepared to provide the blood that will free both Bomelio and Armenio, and the play ends in concord amongst both the mortals and the gods.

Because the chaos stirred up by the rivalry between Love and Fortune is ultimately gainsaid by Jupiter, it seems that this play establishes the image of the
good father, and in doing so validates patriarchy. Jupiter's participation in a double structure involving political authority and paternal manoeuvrings has already been detailed. On earth, too, the relationship of father to child is central to the plot. Male control is structured by and connected with the lineage of paternity. Duke Phyzantius is father to two children, Fidelia and Armenio, and is in addition adoptive father to Hermione. He functions conventionally as a location of power, offering anger and retribution when his power is challenged. The presence of his power generates secrecy, within an economy in which information becomes valuable. Thus Fidelia and Hermione conceal their meetings, but Armenio conveys information about them. Following from his role as a judge, Phyzantius determines who is the 'good' child and who the 'bad', and his power enables him to act on that judgment. Hermione thus was adjudged 'good' until his sexuality, directed towards Fidelia, seemed to intrude on the stasis of aristocratic interbreeding.

Phyzantius's own father, now long dead, is crucial, for Hermione and Bomelio (and hence all the others) are living through the results of his actions. This Duke, too, acted on the basis of secret information when he banished Bomelio, never learning that the information was false. Thus Phyzantius, though apparently strong and just, is controlled by external circumstances laid down for him in turn by a father. In the course of normal life those circumstances can never be righted, for the father is now dead. For all his trappings of authority, Phyzantius is a remarkably powerless father. The list of his weaknesses is extensive.

1) He lives the consequences of his own father's misjudgments.

2) His daughter conducts a socially inappropriate love affair, whose secrecy has been successful until Fortune intervened.

3) He cannot persuade: Fidelia's arguments against giving her 'dearest blood' counter his need to cure Armenio.

4) He is incapable of curing his dumb-struck son. 'Phyzantius' is thus another spurious 'physician'.

5) He cannot see through Bomelio's disguise.
It follows from all these weaknesses that Phyzantius cannot control language, desire or knowledge. Linguistically he is an empty sign, the mere appearance of a father.

The pattern emerging from the play is one of paternal error and imperfection, combined with a certain level of power. The secrecy resulting from power itself has the potential to generate injustice, functioning to serve evil interests as readily as good. Phyzantius, then, emblematizes a critique of patriarchal structures.

To oppose a fallible patriarchal structure with a better one is a common theory of rebellions. Bomelio appears on the scene to take up that position and demonstrate its inadequacy. Bomelio is puzzling because he implicitly subverts any concept of paternalism as unequivocally virtuous. The banished hermit is a locus for contradiction, which is in turn projected onto the anonymous Hermione. He is apparently ineffectual and pitiful, having been banished from the court, and having lost his son to Phyzantius. In this way, he seems at the end of Act Two to be submissive to the double paternal structure, and willing to renounce his own status within it.

At first he gives a strong impression of benevolence by taking in the fleeing Hermione. In the damaging economy of secrecy and information, he appears to be virtuous, for he desires to reveal the secret of his true relationship with Hermione. We sense that he desires good generally, for his goal to unite the lovers is manifestly also the goal of the play. Suddenly, when he strikes dumb the voyeur/informer, Armenio, he appears to be a white magician. Here, it seems, is a supernatural power, alternative to that of the court or the Gods, and working to control the narrative. Bomelio's behaviour next begins to contradict this picture. The low comic devices, the undignified disguises and intemperate rages reveal Bomelio as a necromancer whose power has a fiendish source. We can only question the wisdom of Fidelia's decision to exchange the father who says 'no' for the father who promises satisfaction on dubious terms. Yet Bomelio's behaviour
does nothing to support Phyzantius as the 'good father'. Rather it continues to undermine the institution of patriarchy.

Venus and Fortune function as authors, in relation to the play-within-a-play. But the matter goes further than this, for it seems that their feminine dissent has not just disturbed harmony on Mount Olympus, it has also released some sort of wild power in the world below. There is a strong suggestion that the goddesses are able to create characters. The surface assumption is that they can move people around. For example, Armenio observes the lovers only after Fortune has stepped in, though they have kept their secret successfully for some unnamed space of time before that. However, the name 'Armenio' is also very similar to 'Hermione' - almost an anagram. It is as if Fortune has cloned Hermione in order to create a new brother. In a love tale where one party has mysterious origins, incest is always a fear. At an early stage of the play this seems to be a possibility, especially given the intensity of Armenio's reaction. The two now occupy identical spaces, for both are Princes and both in a filial relationship to Phyzantius, yet we only hear of Hermione's upbringing, not of Armenio's. Armenio's desire is to obliterate Hermione utterly, and there is no explanation for this settled enmity - except perhaps that it has been constructed along with its owner by Fortune, to suit her ends. In normal circumstances, two objects cannot occupy the same space. In order for Armenio to survive, therefore, Hermione must vanish.

Go wend thy ways obscurer then the night
and Fortune for reuenge plague thee with spite

(1.487-8)

Bomelio, too, has an invented quality. From a practical point of view, his occupancy of the lovers' trysting place must have been extremely surreptitious to have continued unobserved for five years. Again, he has been prompted forward by a mysterious agency - perhaps not just into action, but into life itself. When Mercury soothes Bomelio asleep, he defines his rage as both 'madness' and as a
dramatic construction: 'That Beadlom up and down he replaies his part' (1.1605).

Both of these 'invented' figures show great instability: sudden rages occur, unexpected information comes to light. It seems that Bomelio is being re-written as the play goes along. Both become mutilated, Armenio by loss of speech, Bomelio by madness. These two language disorders have the side-effects of neutralizing their sufferers as agents. Armenio becomes null once silent, functioning only as a motivating point to allow for Bomelio's antics, and as an additional piece of discord to be resolved at the end. In bringing forward Armenio and Bomelio, Fortune has also released a sense of passionate rage. Both of these characters feel strongly, and speak strong and attractive verse. One may contrast this with the cardboard repartee about jealousy with which the lovers spend their snatched hours together. It is different again from the kindly tone in which the supposedly furious Phyzantius banishes his betraying foundling, Hermione. Raging emotions have already appeared in this play, as part of the character of Fortune's representative, Tysiphone, but Fortune herself has had to deny these feelings in order to gain a hearing with Jupiter. It is not so surprising then that her creations should be the bearers of these suppressed emotions.

Whether Fortune has created Bomelio or merely brought him into play, wild powers have been released. Bomelio himself is an alternative author (as well as an alternative father), and a particularly transgressive one. He possesses theatrical skills of disguise and comic accents, together with the authorial skill of formulating plots. For example, it seems he has invented the 'dearest blood' idea as a device to justify his being alone with Fidelia, but his invention becomes fact. It is not just a solution to Armenio's muteness, but ironically rebounds on himself as the necessary cure for his madness. There is also a suggestion that he has been using magic to challenge the Goddess Fortune herself. The book scene identifies Bomelio as a rival to Fortune, and thus as suffering an overweening pride.

Not in that wanton youth, not in that plesant mate:

Could Fortune with her ficklenesse his wonted mind abate.
He rather challengeth to doo her very woorst,
And makes a semblance of delight, although indeede accurst.
My father therupon devised how he might,
Revenge and wreak him self on her, that wrought him such dispite.
And therfore I perceiue he strangely useth it,
Inchaunting and transfourming that his fancy did not fit.

(1.1348-55)

Bomelio, therefore has been attempting an exchange in an improper direction: the margin between gods and men can be broken by interference in one direction, but presumably only by prayer in the other. What Bomelio does is impermissible within the play's founding principles. Was he then the source of the original discord between Venus and Fortune? If so, we have here a very neat invasion of the frame by the inner play.

Unfortunately Bomelio does not have total control: Fidelia rejects his initial friendly overtures; Hermione burns his books; and he appears to be incapable of deciding finally whether he is good or evil. His goals are good, his methods evil, and the love of the methods is dangerous to him. His madness signs the ultimate breakdown of his attempts to control the plot.

Superficially, the inner play puts forward a traditional debate about the relative merits of virtue versus nobility, and resolves all difficulties with the happy discovery of Hermione's noble parentage. At another level the play consistently provides an analysis of male versus female control. With women established as causes of dissent in the heavens, the feminine principle is also established as the major disruption of happiness on earth. Indeed, one might see the play as identifying women and discord. Ultimately, of course, the closing scene locates all control with the male, but the ways in which the female principle are foregrounded are significant.

The play crucially aligns happiness and the patriarchal order with stasis, and
so with no possibility for play, or for a play. The female, on the other hand, is aligned with rebellion, but also with passion, and with the initiation of the 'play world', thus with creativity and authorship. At this point the function of the female is very close indeed to that of the vice.

Female powers rapidly become so strong that ritual blood-letting is demanded before male stasis can be re-imposed. Bomelio invents the ritual, but his status in the male/female opposition is in question. More importantly, Mercury supports the demand that Fidelia shed her heart's blood to restore her brother's speech. Female blood, then, has magic properties. (It has already been observed that neither of Armenio's more obvious enemies qualifies to do him this service.)

In that apparent opposition between stasis and creativity, we see an impossibility - the division of the world in a way which imposes non-existence on power. One solution to this impasse is to see power/stasis as containing and generating the creativity that on one level it seeks to repress. Thus 'resistance is never in a relation of exteriority to power; rather resistances (plural) are inscribed in power "as an irreducible opposite".'

The other condition for the restoration of order is that Phyzantius should accept his place as part of a concealed double patriarchal structure. His final benevolence depends on the gods' revealing themselves to him, and also on the narration of the secrets of his father's reign. Two secrets which signify his helplessness are also the source of his power to be magnanimous, and so to function as a king. At this point the action can be drawn to a close.

Bomelio functions as a nodal point, at which the two systems come together, for although he is a father, he is also an occasional servant of the female principle. He is an important agent of both Venus and Fortune, and probably their construction.

As a father he sets up an 'alternative patriarchy', which rivals both Jupiter's hierarchy and Phyzantius's. When he moves to appropriate Fidelia as another
child, he is a fake 'physician', in opposition to the genuine father Phyzantius. His hellish magic and conjuring powers rival those of the gods. Even when Bomelio is charmed and foolish, his spell over Armenio can only be lifted through the remedy he originally laid down. Bomelio's 'alternative patriarchy' is important, for, like the women, Bomelio stands as a sign of patriarchal failure, and thus for the chaos on whose repression the patriarchy is founded.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX


2. My opinion is contrary to that of, for example, Peter Saccio, in *The Court Comedies of John Lyly* (Princeton, 1969): 'Neither Love and Fortune nor *The Cobbler's Prophecy* is a particularly good or a particularly interesting play', p.192.


5. In *The Assembly of Gods*, the inability of the Gods to control Atropos is the key to a movement into an exposition of the story as a Christian allegory.

6. By way of contrast, one may notice the scatological concerns in *Mankind*, which are not gender-specific. *Fulgens and Lucre* contains both homosexual and heterosexual innuendo.


8. One may notice an interesting comparison with the very similar inner plot of the 'Tale of Hemetes' in the Entertainment at Woodstock (1575), in *The Complete Works of George Gascoigne*, ed. John W. Cunliffe, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1910; reprinted New York, 1974), II, pp.473-510. Clearly, a Romance plot could stand as story in its own right, even when a semi-magical scene was built in to flatter the
Queen through the conditions of the plot's resolution. By contrast, the Love and Fortune structure introduces control as a theme by establishing a divine framework which is not outside the story.

9 Tysiphone's status as out-of-control in this system is coherent both with the traditional behaviour of Furies, and with the points to be made below about female creativity.

10 At this point Love and Fortune suggests a relationship with Spenser's 'Mutabilitie Cantos'. There, however, the positions of Venus and Fortune have been combined, and it is Change with her 'ever-whirling wheele' (FO, 7, vi, 1) who claims a right to rule not just 'beneath the moon' but also amongst the Gods. Like Venus, Mutabilitie is beautiful, she is mollifying towards Jupiter, and she refers to the moon. Like Fortune, she is an outsider in Heaven, she is related to Chance, and she is descended from a royal father. Mutabilities's behaviour in wrestling with the Moon for her seat has similarities with Fortune's desire to be instated as equal with the Gods. This last feature, of vauntingly occupying a high seat can be seen as a continuous tradition from Infans' occupation of Mundus' throne, through Mother Messe's claim to sit 'in the seace where the living God should sit', to Mutabilitie's challenge of orthodox belief.

11 He echoes the kind of playfulness with theatricality that one associates with Fulgens and Lucre's A and B. He purports to perceive Jupiter as 'an honest man in the Parrishe' (1.251). He jokes about evacuation; he refers to eating fish in Lent; and he invites the audience to share his surprise at the Gods' speedy exit (a feature of the fashion of the mid-century for plays with much doubling). In all, Vulcan is like a character out of another, older play, left behind by a lost world of theatrical innocence and pantomimic broad humour.

12 Jupiter, however, has already described him as 'a Prince beloved of his love' (1.258), so both the Gods and the audience are aware of some part of the plot's secret.

13 This is comparable to the stone-like stasis that Humanum Genus must
achieve, hiding in the Castle of Perseverance in order to be acceptable to God.

CHAPTER SEVEN

WOMEN, SILENCE AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF VIRTUE

So far, the figure of woman has appeared as an opponent of order, while the vice figure is a character specifically devised to represent wrongdoing in very similar terms. If the vice figure were to behave well or be reformed, it would no longer be a vice figure, nor, consequently, a figure of otherness. Woman seems to be more problematic, for however good she is, she can never be male. From this point of view, woman is always and inevitably other. Nevertheless, the paradigm for female possibility has long been contained by the joint images of Eve and Mary. Mary, clearly, is on the side of virtue and, indeed, of the kind of virtue that the patriarchy requires of both women and men. The question now arises: how do the plays present the 'good woman'?

The woman who follows the instructions of the sixteenth century books on behaviour is two things above all: obedient and silent. In other words, virtue is established as a linguistic condition: good actions are generated by other people's commands, while the ideal woman's own language is inadequate or incomplete exactly because it is subject to control beyond the standard grammatical and syntactic restrictions. Ideally, that incompleteness is voluntary and control is internal - the good woman knows when not to speak, and what not to say. Moreover, she has internalized that knowledge as her own desire. Thus the good woman is an emblem of the Law of the Father - the Non/m du Père - and an extreme representative of the controls to which all language users must submit.

For the mankind figure (including any female mankind figure) language is complex, to be interpreted, and the successful mankind figure concludes his play when he takes charge of interpretation, understanding how to 'get it right'. We have seen that standard moral maturity for a mankind figure involves a capacity to
interpret language metaphorically. In other words, the mankind figure has learned how to thread the maze of multiple interpretation with confidence that a correct path is available. Thus he enters into a fullness of language; a sense of completion that comes from having located the 'correct' metaphoric meaning, to add to the obvious literal one. The 'good woman' figure, by contrast, does not develop the mankind figure's capacity to manoeuvre the doubling of literal and metaphoric meanings. Instead, meaning continues to be established for her. Because she submits to external interpretation, her access to language and semiotic systems is generally single. For the good woman figure, independent interpretation is not permitted: she must not generate re-readings.

The mankind figure is seen as inherently virtuous, even though the human condition presupposes that he is in danger of falling into error. Through the sixteenth century, the figure of the 'good woman' loses this capacity to lapse and be reclaimed, since any fall comes to be seen as permanent. As 'good' she indicates absolute virtue, but as 'woman' she indicates ineradicable otherness. Within the semiotic of the good woman, then, is a sign of radical otherness under strong control. This figure is the mark of a fear of interpretation and a fear of creativity. It is part of the system that the strength of the control should be undetectable: the 'good woman' is perfectly, effortlessly good. As a sign of perfect control, then, she is not only a sign of the Other, she is impossible.

With reference to the moral play, two areas of interest emerge: How do the virtuous women of these plays measure up to the standards of silence and obedience? Secondly, and more significantly, what implicit judgments of their behaviour do the plays offer?

I suggest that the sixteenth century shows a transition in attitudes to female virtue, moving from Mary Magdalene (in the Digby play), Lucre and Queene Hester, via Susannah and the Lewis Wager Mary Magdalene as transitional figures, to a group of heroines such as the Phillip Patient Grissell, Lavinia and Desdemona. Where good women of the first group could be read as mankind figures, this ceases
to be the case in the later moral play. Two effects appear: firstly that the 'perfect woman' is tacitly recognized as an impossibility by the plays. The second effect is to interpret one version of perfection - the 'silent woman' - as mutilated or inhuman. In other words, the plays recognize that it is problematic to describe silence as equivalent to virtue for a human being. It is noticeable that this occurs in the same period that the plays increasingly group women, speech and the vice figure together as a significant cluster, for it leaves no structural location for woman to occupy. All that remains is an extra-structural location, if one can use such a phrase, and that is a condition of absolute otherness.

Early moral plays contain virtuous women who speak freely and well. Amongst these is the Digby Mary Magdalene (c.1480-90)\(^2\) whose saintly mankind figure behaves in a way which is indistinguishable from such broadly contemporary generalized mankind figures as Mankind or Humanum Genus. The fall into temptation, the reformation and subsequent atonement are all similar. Furthermore, not only is Mary permitted to speak, her virtuous language is essential to the plot of the second part of the play. Mary is sent to convert the King of Marcyll (Marseille), a traditional figure resembling the Mystery Play Herod in his boastfulness and corruption.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
Kyng and quene converte xall \textit{3e},
And byn a-mytyd as an holy apostylesse
All \textit{3e} lond xall be techyd alonly be the
goddes lawys on-to hem \textit{3e} xall expresse.
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textbf{(1.1380-83)}

Speech here is both Mary's reward for her reformation and a source of power: she is given the importance and dignity of being the only missionary in Marseille. Later in the play, Mary is seen to preach in public, and to control the welfare of the King and Queen of the country. The status that the play claims for the virtuous woman's speech is thus supported by the images it offers of the virtuous woman
speaking. In the final scenes, Mary resolves to live in the wilderness, in a condition of humility, patience, charity and abstinence (l.1990-95). The play has no interest in dwelling on any possible suffering or loneliness involved in this programme. Instead it moves immediately into a celebratory mode, in which Mary is regularly transported to heaven to feed on manna, wonderfully accompanied by angels. That scene merges directly into one presenting her apotheosis, thirty years later.

One might wish to read Mary Magdalene as a play which sets out to repress female sexuality. As a mankind figure, however, Mary's career has followed a standard course, for moral plays were equally concerned to repress sexuality in general. Furthermore, years of holy bliss have accompanied Mary's virtue, during which it appears that she has enjoyed the most intense satisfactions.

In Medwall's Fulgens and Lucre\textsuperscript{3} (c.1500) we meet a virtuous woman who is highly articulate, and who is shown to be competent in negotiating the minefield of sexual and class politics without a false step. Fulgens and Lucre\textsuperscript{3} is not a moral play in any strict sense involving externality or the adversarial mode. On the other hand, Lucre\textsuperscript{3} is required to discriminate not between good and evil, exactly, but between good and better. (In fact, the play tactfully avoids drawing moral conclusions about the failings of the high-born Cornelius.) Essentially Lucre\textsuperscript{3} is the arbiter in a debate play, but it is a moral debate, and the figures of A and B inhabit the rôle of those who tempt a mankind figure into making the wrong choice. In the Prologue to the play - the summary of plot offered by B - Lucre\textsuperscript{3} is all-powerful. The play itself, however, shows her initially to be properly obedient to her father's will.

Cornelius reports to Fulgens:

-she abideth to have youre counsell
For as she seyth, she will no thing
In suche mater to do withoute your counsell(yng)

(l.324-6)

Lucre\textsuperscript{3} 's obedience is rewarded by her father's recognition of her right to choose:
Fulgens:

How be it, certeynly I am not the man
That wyll take from her the liberte
Of her owne choice - that may not be!

(1.336-8)

Lucres proves herself capable of controlling emotion, desire and sexuality through reason. The crude puns made about her reflect on the characters who create them, and if anything point up her virtue by their manifest inappropriateness.

Lucres kindly corrects B's error:

Nay, nay, man, thow art farr amys!
I know what thyn erande is,
Though thow be neclygent.
Of thy foly thou mayst well abasshe,
For thou shuldis have sayde the holow asshe:
That hole thy mayster ment

(1.294-299)

Her careful detail forces him back to the truth and to a more courteous tone:

By God avow, I trow it was!
I crye you mercy, I have done you trespas.
But I pray you take it in pacyence
For I mistoke it by necligence.

(1.299-302)

Lucres' fine control of expression enables her to recognize the political implications of her choices, and to defend herself effectively against criticism. Further, she can move into a careful, tutelary relationship towards A and B, the lower orders, in which her own dignity is unimpaired, and their understanding of the world improved. Lucres, then, is wholly the heroine of the play. She can only gain by speaking.

One can see Lucres and the Mary Magdalene of the Digby Plays as
belonging to the same category of virtuous, articulate and powerful women. By 1567, when Lewis Wager's play was published, Mary Magdalene is almost unrecognizable as a transformation of the Digby character. In this context it is particularly significant to observe the behaviour that Mary is permitted following her repentance. Certainly there is a hint that she can be verbally powerful in her promise:

I shall declare his mercy in towne and citie

(H iii v)

The promise, however, goes no further. Mary leaves, and her presumed preaching is realized by the play as her absence from the stage. The scene presents instead an essentially digressive concentration on Christ and on the plotting against him by Symon, Infidelitie and Malicious Justice. That particular narrative strand is soon abandoned, never to reappear. One suspects that the play's main interest is in the early scenes, which occupy fully half the play in detailing Mary's seduction by Infidelitie and her life in sin with both relish and theatrical skill.

When Mary returns to the stage for the closing scene, it is in order to be lengthily instructed in theology by two characters called Justification and Love. Thus even at this point Mary speaks little, though what she does say is represented as virtuous and admirable. A male mankind figure concludes his play by taking responsibility for the interpretation of spiritual truth: he may himself assume the characteristics of a sign, and assert the meaning of that sign; he may prepare to go into the world as a teacher of others. Mary, by contrast, is treated as if she is still incompetent with the interpretation of spiritual truth into language.

At my being here euen now of late,
It plea(ed my Lord Jesus of his great mercy
To speake sentences here in my presence.
Of the which I haue no perfect intelligence,
The fyrst is: Many sinnes are forgiuen hir sayd he,
Because she hath loued much, meanyng me

(J ii)

The knowledge that we might be justified in believing her to have gained is uttered for her, and her condition as a virtuous woman is to be attentive to male instruction.

I pray you most holy Justification

Of this sentence to make a declaration

(J ii v)

Justification's answer, and various expansions on it, take most of the eighty-two lines to the end of the play. Of this section, two groups of four lines each fall to Mary. Both express gratitude to God. Mary's knowledge has remained at the level of 'knowledge of sin' (J iii v).

Thomas Garter's play, Most Virtuous and Godly Susanna (1578) demonstrates a mirror image of this attitude toward the ideal of female silence. Where Wager's Mary Magdalene is said to speak, but does not, Garter's Susanna is said to be silent, but becomes voluble at exactly the point where her silence is most emphasized. Her volubility is necessary to the plot, theatrically impressive, and definitively virtuous.

In the course of the play, Susanna speaks freely, putting forward arguments, for example, to dissuade the Elder (here named Sensualitas) from his intentions.

Alas me thinkes your thoughtes and wordes together do not gree,
You are of age, and know right well, that no such sinne hould be,
You know also God doth it cure, and eake our lawe on earth,
Doth recompence such sinners to, with harpe and cruell death.
And therefore good my friend I say, doe leaue as you begon,
And I will holde me so content, and hyde that you haue done.

(l.753-8).

Indeed, her appeals to God for help break off the threatened rape.

Oh Lord, oh God, oh King of blisse, what stormes do stop my breth,
'Stop' here must mean 'hamper' or 'make irregular', rather than implying an inability to breathe, for there are five powerful lines of decision-making still to be uttered in this speech before the elders break into it by calling the servants. It is striking that they use the words that ought to come from Susanna: 'Help, help, oh help'.

Here there are two clear occasions where female speech is virtuous. It is exactly this voluble virtue that leads to Voluptas' and Sensualitas' punitive accusations against Susanna's honour.

At the trial scene, Susanna maintains the silence of injured virtue, against the expectations of the judge. It seems that speech here is seen by the judge and the onlookers as a conventional part of the judicial process. Furthermore, from the remarks of others in the court, it also seems that her earlier arguments against making unsubstantiated assertions are no more than rationalisations.

\[
\text{Speake for thy selve it is high tyme, what haste thou to say then} \]
\[
\text{Wherefore thou oughtest not to dye, for I must sentence giue} \]
\[
\text{Speake forth or else I know not how, that longer thou shouldste liue} \]
\[
(1.1040-42) \]

Susanna's impassioned eight-line reply is clearly inaudible to the Judge and the public, for the Judge continues as if she had not spoken and condemns her to death. Her prayer is addressed to God, and, of course, the audience. Thus though technically silent Susanna is verbally prominent. The judge acknowledges that agitation and some speech have taken place, but ignores their content. Her words, however, are effective on the planes both of theology and of theatre. At this point the S.D. instructs:

\[
\text{Here the Judge ryfeth, and Susanna is led to execution, and God ray} \]
\[
\text{feth the spirite of Danyell} \]
\[
(1.1061-2). \]

These bald directions contain the potential for a sequence of actions passing through dignity and intensity into spectacle, and possibly of several minutes' duration. The
essence of a dumb show is its unnatural speechlessness. Here the spoken interactions of the courtroom are superseded by silence. This silence is broken by the male representative of God and virtue, when Danyell directs the judge to reconsider the case. Danyell denounces the judgment, and the judge responds particularly to his pronouncement, rather than to his person or his sensational appearance.

I pray thee friend what meane thy wordes, which seeme of suche a waignt

(1.1065)

Only male language can carry virtuous persuasion here. Susanna again prays in stage silence, for ten lines, describing her own worthlessness and vowing to spend all her life and breath in praising God. In other words she will be silent on all worldly matters, uttering nothing but prayers.

Now Lord while life and dayes shall laft, and till my breth be spent,

I will fet forth thy gloryous prayse, which is fo parmanent

(1.1091-2)

Once freed, Susanna keeps this promise with a public oration, in which she transforms herself into an example of God’s help, in the time-honoured manner of mankind figures. Furthermore, she has the authority to explain in detail her own exemplary qualities and their application.

See here good people, unto you all I speake

How God doth helpe the innocent, and eake their sorrowes breake,

Let myne example comfort you, in all kinde of dißtreffe,

That if you suffer for his sake, he will your cares releafe.

And let not feare of any man your constannt hart remoue

From him that thus moﬆ constantly, his simple flock doth loue

You see I am at libertye, that earﬆ hath bene in thrall,

And thus will God deale with all such, as on his mercy call

(1.1105-1112)
This is not, however, the end of the play, for Susanna’s authoritative speech must be contained. There follow 290 lines containing the trial and execution of the elders, conducted with clowning verve. Ill Reporte, the principal Vice, is identified and executed in a scene which enjoys his verbal displays of skill as much as the inevitability of his fall. One effect of the scene, in this context, is to override the energetic presence of Susanna’s speech and to re-locate her as absent and therefore silent, through the course of these rumbustious vulgarities. She returns, but now surrounded by her parents and husband, whose speeches dominate the conclusion.

In short, though interested in asserting the silence of the virtuous woman, the play puts Susanna forward as a speaking subject. Ambivalence about the status of female speech appears firstly in the ambiguous audibility of her prayers; secondly in the appointment of Danyell as a male representative who speaks as Susanna’s proxy; and finally in the use of two important scenes to conclude the piece in which she is either absent or speaks very little, even though it would be perfectly proper for her to dominate the play at this point.

Phillip’s Commoditye of Pacient and Meeke Grissell (1565) sees female virtue in a more extreme light. The story itself is a very old one, based on the folk-tale of the human being who is ‘tested’ by a supernatural spouse. It is found in Boccaccio, taken up by Chaucer, then by Phillip and substantially modified by the collaborative group of Chettle, Dekker and Haughton. Each age offers a characteristic, and significant, reworking of the material. Here, I shall mainly be talking about the play by Phillip, with some reference to Chaucer’s Clerk’s Tale, and to the later play by Chettle, Dekker and Haughton.

Patient Grissell is a moral play, not because of Grissell’s virtue, but because it interprets Duke Guatier’s experience as a kind of test, provoked by the external influence of Politicke Perswasion as the principal vice figure and tempter. The play also picks up, though lightly, on Chaucer’s clerk’s comment to the effect that obsessively patient people provoke unreasonable behaviour in their husbands. Grissell is thus the occasion of the temptation, and the Duke’s own social position is
the innate condition which renders him liable to fall into the abuse of power. To read the story with this emphasis, however, is to skew it away from the prominence that the action gives to Grissell.12

The differences between Chaucer's version of the story and Phillip's point up the change taking place in the sixteenth century view of virtue. Phillip offers us a Grissell of almost unnatural gifts. Like Lucre, she already has a reputation for virtue. Lucre is adequately well-born, though not noble, while Grissell, in her poverty, could be seen as an exaggerated form of this 'dignity in the lower classes' theme.13 When Chaucer's Duke returns from hunting, he passes through the village, under the eyes of the people. Chaucer presents a village, and a society of peers, among whom Griselda's family, though the poorest, clearly belongs.

Amonges thise povre folk ther dwelte a man
Which that was holden povrest of hem alle

(Clerk's Tale, 1.204-5)

They live in extreme poverty, but this condition is like that of other people, not unlike them. Griselda and her family are part of a society in which they have a public reputation and a status. When village maidens and gossips communicate the story of the Duke's wedding to one another, Griselda shares that sociable information. Phillip, by contrast, erases this society from his plot, and offers us a household which is isolated and vulnerable. He stresses that they lack the support of an adult male. Unlike Chaucer's Walter, Phillip's Duke encounters Grissell while in the process of hunting and discussing confidential affairs of state. One result of this is that Grissell's cottage seems to be situated in or near the woods and this produces resonant effects. Grissell, her parents and Indigent Poverty inhabit a kind of No Man's Land, socially and literally. The woods are traditionally the location of 'wild men',14 and also of mystical experiences.15 Grissell's location and Guatier's discovery of her call to mind those medieval lyrics in which a noble hunter is struck by a religio-erotic experience of the Virgin Mary. Janickel's description of Grissell also raises Marian associations: 'My daughter is a Virgin
puer, and wanteth terren store' (l.698).

Griffith's relation of Patient Grissell to folk-tale stories of human beings who are tested by magical spouses is clearly interesting and helpful. Unlike the human Griffith refers to, however, Grissell never fails in her patience, and our judgment hesitates over which of the principal characters in the play should be seen as the supernatural spouse and which as the tested human.

Grissell is constructed in the powerlessness of poverty and low rank, as well as of femaleness. An initial low estate seems not to be essential to the tale of her patience, but it is stressed in all the versions. She reacts to the Duke's suddenly commanded betrothal with the simple obedience of a vassal, and subsequently believes herself to owe him enhanced obedience as a wife. His ill treatment of herself and her children is always met with acquiescence, characterized by silence as a refusal to complain. This contrasts with Chaucer's version, where Griselda makes substantial speeches of dignified submission. Grissell in herself is an inhabitant of the margins between the normal and the supernatural: her behaviour is exceptional, and noteworthy in its excessive virtue.

The play itself contains a commentary on Grissell's behaviour, in the speeches of those other female characters who have suffered loss. The Countess Pango, Guatier's sister, presents an alternative model of natural grief. In The Clerk's Tale this character's husband is alive, and co-operates in the plot. Here, the Countess mourns her husband's death, complaining about unjust fate with 'grefe and dolefull paine', but is still open to comfort from her maid, and to distraction by events in the outside world:

My heauie minde you comfort much, but nature shoes hir kynd
For shee hath welsprings to mine eyes, to morne his death assynd,
His loue his faith so fully showne, to me his spoused mate,
Doth giue me cause to poure out plaints, to shoe my haples fate,
But who is that that now to us hasteth thus a pace.

(l.1251-55)
More significant is the scene where Grissell's daughter is taken from her, ostensibly to be killed. Here, Grissell has one long speech of response. Her reaction moves through several phases, none of which involves other than acceptance of this fate. This form again resembles the medieval lyrics in which Mary laments for Christ on the Cross. Through lines 1097-1110, she reacts by: 1) questioning his words; 2) pitying herself; 3) wishing she had stayed poor; 4) asking women in the audience for pity, tears and wailing; 5) pitying the child; 6) criticizing the murderers; 7) resolving to be patient; 8) placing the problem with God and Time to be sorted out; 9) handing over the child to Guatier's pleasure. She then remains silent for eighty-three lines, during which the Nurse demonstrates an alternative approach, arguing for the child's life by putting forward cases, examples and precepts. Finally the Nurse offers to exile herself from court for the child's sake. Later, when the second child is threatened, the nurse is prepared to fight for it. Physically overpowered, she is prepared to continue the struggle by means of reason, and appeals both to natural feeling and to divine law:

\[
\text{Giue heede to my teares, let my wordes pondred bee:}
\]
\[
\text{To slaye this young Infant is contrary to reason,}
\]
\[
\text{Thy raige and furye vouch thou, with pittie to season:
}\]
\[
\text{Who would commit murther, or slaye an Innocent}
\]
\[
\text{At anie mans chardge, and transgresse Gods commaundement,}
\]
\[
(1.1425-29)
\]

Grissell cannot make these moves, simply because she is a type of patience and also of perfect wifeliness, for which we are invited to read perfect obedience. 'Meke' has equal status with 'patient' in the title of the play, an ordering which is obscured by the familiar shortened title. Thus any action is denied her, even though an action against a wrong decision seems likely to be right.16 Grissell therefore first speaks of passive behaviour, and then remains silent, elevating the virtue of obedience above all other virtues. The nurse points out the moral irrationality of a theory which leads to this result. The nurse, indeed, attacks obedience as it relates
to Dilligenc, and goes further to generalize her criticism:

And knowe it is better to please God, then anie mortall man

(1.1433)

We are left to draw our own conclusions about Grissell's use of passivity to please Guatier. Grissell's patience is far from unproblematic, for it serves Guatier's political needs, not his moral well-being. Dilligenc's answer to the nurse echoes Guatier's statement to Grissell:

But if I kill it not I my selfe shall dye,

Therefore better to slaye, then with the sworde to be slaine:

(1.1435-36)

Grissell does not attempt to weigh moral paradoxes, as a mankind figure might. The nurse has an interesting couplet which stresses Grissell's position:

I mourn thee poore Grissill, thy hap I lament

But thou in this case art merueilous pacient:

(1.1468-69)

The force of the words 'but' and 'merueilous' asks to be considered. 'But' suggests that a situation is about to follow which leads to some lessening of the previous statement: that Grissell's patience might make her less pitiable. This would be true if patience was not a great effort to her, as it is to ordinary people. 'Merueilous' might be read rather lightly, as 'extremely', or else one might give it its full possible weight: 'miraculously'. Grissell's behaviour then is presented as saintly, to an extreme that recognizes her response as humanly impossible. In spite of this, she is presented as an example of patience in adversity, for others to follow. The Chaucer version recognizes how unlikely it is that real women might behave as Griselda does. Instead, a more general moral is put forward to do with behaviour in times of stress.

This storie is seyd nat for that wyves sholde

Folwen Grisilde as in humylitee,

For it were inportable, though they wolde,
But for that every wight, in his degree,
Sholde be constant in adversitee
As was Grisilde;

(Clerk's Tale, 1.1142-47)

Given that Grissell is superlatively patient and obedient, one may wonder how she relates to the ideal of female silence. Although through large areas of the play her silence is made prominent, it is also true that she is permitted to speak at some length on several occasions. Those speeches, however, have a rather specialized content. Not only do they state Grissell's passivity, they enact it by refusing the modes of argument or exposition, or even of any emotional expression except pity. Grissell's speech when banished generates a conflict between the audience's expectations of a key dramatic character, and the actuality of Grissell's absolute acceptance. Grissell begins by detailing the history of her relationship with Guatier, and of her feelings about that relationship. Instead of drawing that evidence into a reasoned argument, however, she utters an elaborate acceptance, and the expectations raised by a listing of factual detail are disappointed. One expects a speech at this point to be argument in a debate, or dramatic involvement of the individual in the action, but this is a speech of passivity. It is, in a sense, an anti-speech, functioning to display her resignation. Indeed, from an early stage in the play Grissell's utterance has been emblematic rather than rationally communicative. Song, for example, has been used to perform functions of exposition and self-introduction. Grissell establishes herself as a sign of virtue in her 'maidens all come learn of me'. Within a spoken drama, song has an odd status for it can readily give an insincere impression, as if it were no more than a rendition of pre-existing words and music. Grissell's song of mourning for her mother's death also draws attention to tears as the non-verbal sign she chooses to use, instead of speech or explanation. Grissell's speech-modes thus run persistently against the grain of conventional speech: they are emblematic rather than rational. In reply to the banishment speech, the maid once again offers the 'ordinary' point of view:
that it is proper to grieve. The maid is again astounded by the holy dedication, which allows Grissell to rejoice in her husband's prosperity. For us as well as the maid there is shock value in Grissell's appropriation of the order that maltreats her.

The view that Grissell is unique is expressed within the play by Politicke Perswasion and, earlier, by Sobriete and Reason. If Grissell is unique, her example cannot possibly be imitated. Further, the example of Grissell is the example of an absence from that place in which the example can function, namely the secular world.

Sith that my absence shall ioyes innumerable increase

(l.1607)

Self-negation here is balanced against a number of joys too large to count. In other words, her value as absence is seen as infinitely high. This is indeed the case, for the value of the absent or silent female is the whole world of the masculine order, created by defining the female as other and elsewhere.

When the banished Grissell returns to the place that she came from, she performs a circle, which constitutes an assertion that her story can be concluded with no change. The beginning and the ending can be closed together in a timeless stasis, identical with the stasis that we have already observed as characteristic of the unimpeded masculine order. Her one request is of interest on several levels. In the first place, it is a request for further negation: that her body should be covered with a simple undergarment, a smock. Thus it seems she will not be looked at, ostensibly because to expose her body is to expose Guatier, but also because she does not wish to draw attention to herself. Nevertheless, to preserve the perfection of her unchanged return to her origins, the smock is not to be a gift or concession, but something she has bought with her virginity. Attempting in this way to live within an economy of perfection carries an unavoidable residue. The smock is also a sign of her sexual relationship with Guatier, as much as her body might have been, and so functions as a statement of their unalterable past. In this way it works against the attempted stasis, with exactly the appropriate power: that of sexual
rather than gender difference. That which Grissell says should not be displayed is not the sign of her coding as female, but the sign of her sexual association with Guatier. While gender difference is part of the static Symbolic code of Guatier's power, sexuality, as part of the Real, confronts that code.

The play tacitly recognizes that this attempted absence of the female cannot be sustained, for it follows Grissell, not just as the centre of our attention, but also as the centre of attention for a whole group of people who accompany her. Her behaviour as negation is of interest, for she focusses the presence of others, through her journey of humiliation, which at one point she compares to the Stations of the Cross.

For Patience to suffer this, hath armed my hart:
This Crosse is not contemned, but willingly imbrased,
On God my trust, and confidence is placed,

(l.1706-8)

The courtiers and the public join her, and she is seen through her effects on others.

Even in her final resumption of her worldly position as Duchess, and expressions of great joy, Grissell moves towards negation. Her joys are 'innumerable' (that word again), and tears prevent her from speaking. When she does make a suggestion, it is that they should all absent themselves.

That this example of great virtue is impossible seems, finally, to be accepted both by Grissell herself, and by the courtiers. Guatier's praise, 'I have not see my lyke in all my dayes' (l.1940), is comically outbid by Reason's comment from the standpoint of a timeless allegory that he has 'not seene hir like since the time of my creasion' (l.1990). This is repeated by Sobriete. When Grissell advises against testing other women as she was tested, this seems not to be a statement of their inadequacy, so much as of the impossibility of any expectation that her conduct could be replicated. Her behaviour, because ideally obedient and patient, is thus represented as essentially inhuman.

Not only is Grissell's virtue impossible, her 'silence' is clearly punished by
the further tests that it provokes in Guatier. Only when her speech becomes powerful and active does he raise the burden of his torments from her. There is no hint in Phillip's play that Guatier intends to take Grissell back when he sets the scene for his new marriage. Grissell is provoked into a soliloquy in which she calls on Patience and Constancie to help her in her struggle to bear suffering. It is no longer effortless for her to be unmoved, even glad at Guatier's prosperity. The trigger in dramatic terms is her substantial speech blessing him and the children (1.1911-1918). When Grissell has expressed some weakness, and at the same time moved to use language for effect rather than for its emblematic quality, her status as impossible saint has changed. At the same time Guatier is released from his obsessive condition as fiendish tormentor. The play moves into the mode of romantic comedy, with a happy ending between lovers who are seen as wholly human. Janickel appears onstage at the appropriate moment, in a manner identical with the coincidental endings of Romance.

It is notorious that Romance endings are too tidy. Here too we are left feeling that time cannot be negated in this way, and that Grissell's twelve years of suffering are indelible: that aging, separation, and the past act here as the Lacanian Real, and as such resist the Symbolic order that Grissell imposes on them.

Phillip's Grissell, then, functions as a sign of excessive compliance with the patriarchal law. By making Guatier's position seem preposterous and undesirable, she calls into question the virtue of his behaviour, and hence the moral feasibility of the structure in which their chosen sets of behaviour are embedded.

From this discussion, and from the preceding chapter, a parallel pattern emerges in which the vicious woman moves towards speech and the virtuous woman towards silence. Both are punished as they reach the extremes of their movements. Lingua was punished by ridicule and imprisonment, and the silent Grissell by intensified trials and a move into absence.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN


4 Also from the early part of the century is the play of *Godly Queene Hester* (1527), in which a virtuous woman controls evil entirely through her verbal powers. Sexuality, political influence and persuasion are collected together in the figure of Hester.

Other figures that might reasonably be identified with this type are the Queen in *Pride of Life*; Anima in *Wisdom*; Lady Science in Redford's *Wit and Science*; and Melibea in *Calisto and Melibea*. Respublica is clearly a mankind figure.


10 *Patient Grissil* (1603, 1599), Shakespeare Society (London, 1841).
But wedded men ne knowe no mesure,
Whan that they fynde a pacient creature.

(Clerk's Tale, 1.622-3)

This is one reason why the Chettle, Dekker and Haughton version is not relevant to this argument. There, the Duke is a focus of attention, and suffers from his treatment of Grissil at least as fervently as she.

The theme is a common one for set debates. See for example Rastell's Gentleness and Nobility.

Richard Bernheimer describes the wide variety of possible relationships that folk tales narrate between 'wild' people and humans, including the thirteenth century epic of Wolfdietrich, in which a wild woman wins the love of a prince. *Wild Men in the Middle Ages: A Study in Art, Sentiment and Demonology* (New York, 1970; first published, 1952).

Numerous fourteenth and fifteenth century religious lyrics contain a situation in which someone goes to the woods (among other possible locations) to 'play', and there encounters a spiritual revelation. See Religious Lyrics of the Fourteenth Century, ed. Carleton Brown (Oxford, 1924), nos. 10, 11, 95, 105, 107, 117, 121, 130; Religious Lyrics of the Fifteenth Century, ed. Carleton Brown (Oxford, 1939), nos. 2, 39, 78, 105, 147, 178, 186.

A further Marian hint comes from Grissell's line 'much musyng in my mynd', which in its alliterative use of 'musyng' echoes a line from a Marian carol 'Quid petis, O fili?'

Musyng on her manners so nigh marr'd was my main
Saue it pleased me so passingly that passed was my pain

(Musica Britannica, 18, no.105)

'Musyng' appears in Carleton Brown (1924), no. 132, and Carleton Brown (1939), no.73. This evidence is no more than suggestive, since 'musyng' is also to be found in a variety of other situations.
The same question of how virtuous it is to obey bad orders is raised in Shakespeare's *Henry V*, (IV, i, 130-185), *The Riverside Shakespeare*, ed. Harry Levin and others (Boston and London, 1974), pp.935-975. A similar issue lies behind the argument with which Emilia deflects Desdemona's much simpler question about adultery. *Othello*, (IV, iii, 68-87), ibid., pp.1203-1248.

In 1566, it could not be politically innocent for a play to enact subjects pleading with a monarch to marry and get heirs. To display marriage as unthreatening might be seen in the same way: as an encouragement to Elizabeth to marry.

This point, crucial to the Phillip play, is no longer present in the Chettle, Dekker and Haughton version, where their 'Grissil' speaks within emotionally credible conventions, and reserves obedience to the Duke to her actions alone.

See Appendix E for a discussion of the ambiguous qualities of weeping on stage.
CONCLUSION

'Otherness in the Morality play? But that's everything.'¹

In a way, this remark is inevitably true, for the entire world view of these plays is adversarial, and so from time to time any feature of the world may take on the aspect of otherness. What is of interest, though, is to determine the moral plays' particular areas of interest, as indicated by their allocation of the mode of allegorical externality.

Otherness is a complex term and I have not set out to simplify it. Instead I have operated investigatively, putting a selection of modern theories of otherness together with close readings of the moral plays. What has this method revealed about the moral play which was not known before?

The concept 'otherness' is useful in three polarizing structures. In the first, otherness as an imposed, external structure, associated with virtuous characters, generates a view of its opposite, the human being, as spontaneous or wilful. This is based in the naïve mankind figure's feeling that rules are irrelevant, and so must stem from a source outside himself. Secondly, when otherness appears as chaos, as it often does in the vice figures, their unstructured verve is opposed to the human being as desirous of order. This was the view of religious orthodoxy, that rules saved the mankind figure from the sinful other lodged within. In the third structure, otherness as the female adopts both of the first two functions, appearing at times as a paradigm of virtuous behaviour, at times as the wayward in opposition to male order and propriety. In each of these forms, otherness is a way of making sense of the world: a necessary term in the construction of a comprehensible and reassuring coding of reality.

Both 'good' and 'evil' therefore, may appear as external to the human being, whether opposed to his most deeply imbued nature, or to his spiritual best interests.
When the other appears as good, it is in conflict with the mankind figure's physical nature, and its function is to control that physicality. It may do this by suggesting that immediate pleasure will lead to future suffering, or, similarly, that present self-denial will lead to future happiness. The problem is to find a way of explaining this convincingly to a character who cannot comprehend the spiritual half of those equations: the 'future suffering' and the 'future happiness'. This is the pattern of the early moral plays: a mankind figure is embedded in the vigorous enjoyment of present life, and perceives advice about the soul or the afterlife as so much irrelevant twaddle. The Pride of Life and Youth contain the best examples of this attitude. The mankind figure's incomprehension of his life's pattern is explicable in terms of linguistic incapacity, for a pre-linguistic (or pre-Symbolic) intellect has trouble with structural terms involving time. More crucially, it cannot comprehend the metaphoric language of spiritual advice, for such advice necessarily involves a capacity to use language ambiguously, substituting not just for the thing itself, but also for the concept that attaches to that thing. Such basic terms as 'suffering' and 'happiness' cannot be literal: Heaven and Hell are both absent to one who is hale and hearty. In general, a physical reminder of mortality is required to shock the mankind figure into an understanding of his own place in temporal structures, and, following that, in linguistic ones.

Early moral plays show an educative process, in which the mankind figure must learn to value the metaphoric and excise the literal. Any loss that one might believe to accompany that excision is masked by categorizing the physical as undesirable or evil, and thus transforming it into the other. Congruent with that process, the metaphoric is appropriated to the self. When the plays systematically categorize the excised aspect of the self as other, they present it as laughable, dirty, and degraded in various ways. Mankind and The Play of the Wether, for example, both associate otherness with scatological humour and with meaningless utterances. The moral plays, therefore, try to strike a balance between the theological need to represent the other as repulsive, and the theatrical gains yielded by constructing an
entertaining and attractive vice figure. Clearly, though, they overdo the treatment, and through the sixteenth century the irresponsible 'low other' comes to take over the moral play to the point where a wholly new dramatic structure appears to be developing. Fulwell's Like Will to Like (1568), for example, apparently loses its relation with any discussion of the nature of truth because there is no forum in which that discussion can take place. In some plays, the abolition of the mankind figure means that there is no longer a location where 'good' and 'evil' can interact, while in others, the traditional debates about right and wrong and about reality are subsumed by galloping vice-play. In Like Will to Like, form is etiolated in favour of sheer physicality. When a play contains nothing but vice-play, the fissive properties of language have taken over. In its developed form, vice-play is a specific, and extreme, example of the loss of meaning through multiple ambiguity. It is as if deconstruction were the only theory of language available, or as if a psyche were pure, unstructured id. Furthermore, developments in the conventional behaviour of the vice figure threaten the validity of the binarist view of the human situation. When the vice figure implicitly refuses to remain a definable term, it inadvertently demonstrates the fissive properties of language, and so deconstructs the moral plays' polarized picture of the world.

Woman as low or wicked other takes on many of the vice figures' characteristics, but at the same time vice figures share many of the qualities stereotypically attributed to woman in her role as spiritual threat. It seems probable that assigning vice characteristics to the figure of woman on the stage contributed to the historical deterioration in the status of women. In some plays, on the other hand, the figure of woman is put forward as a pattern of virtuous behaviour. This pattern is only partly intended for women to follow. Women's virtue, especially that of the good wife, was also traditionally seen as instrumental in the encouragement of male virtue. When the image of the good woman is staged, however, it subverts the binarism of good versus evil, for the plays tacitly acknowledge that polarized extremes of virtue are impossible. Even emblems of
perfect silence, or perfect patience are revealed to be impractical as patterns to be imitated.

Lacanian theory prompts the consideration of the plays' own psychological insights in conjunction with their linguistic practices, and produces a view of the mankind figure as a maturing self. From Lacan comes the idea that the moral plays themselves display, that it is the absence or repression of something essential to the self that constitutes language. The negative that bans physical pleasure and creates desire is also the foundation of that structuring that enables conceptualisation, abstract thought and language.

The plays' view of spiritual 'truth' winning over physical 'falsehood' is subverted from one direction by a psychoanalytic view of the continuing presence of the repressed. This is, indeed, the condition which the moral plays dramatize, for, as a coherent group, they narrate the endless plasticity and vitality of those figures that image the repressed.

From another direction, Derridean deconstruction of the concept of 'truth', following its categorization as a linguistic concept, informs my reading of the moral plays' view of the world as insistently binarist and adversarial. Their conceptualisation of the world is thus linguistic, and their subsequent subversion of that view irresistible, for the plays do not in the end offer us that uneasy but reliable co-existence of the structuring and the repressed. Vice figures, for example, do not merely go through a cycle of ebullience and suppression, they break out of that cycle to rewrite the moral play conventions, and attack the concept of plot altogether. Only on that large-scale level of the genre are they finally contained. The forces at work in the plays thus parallel the forces at work within language, eternally exploding meanings, and eternally striving to recuperate the fragments of the explosion into meaningful conceptual structures.
Feminist awareness of the construction of stereotypes fosters insight into the intrication of vice-trait traits with stereotypical femaleness. The structural otherness of women in society gathers power from the cross-referencing on stage of stereotypes of evil and of the female. By putting feminism together with deconstruction, I revise the conventional idea of the function of the perfect woman in the plays. Far from supporting orthodoxy by exemplarizing virtue, the image of the good woman renders the binarist view of the world suspect, through its implied impossibility. Thus even in what appears to be their most secure haven, the structures of patriarchy question themselves.

In these ways, then, otherness in the plays deconstructs the binary world view in which both it and they are constituted: the plays criticize their own founding principles in apparently simple terms, but ones whose interactions produce endless complexity.
NOTES TO CONCLUSION

1     John Goode, June 1989.

2     I do not, however, intend to suggest that the stage behaviour of the virtuous characters is not entertaining: it has its own attraction, which one might summarize as based in qualities of beauty, impressiveness, poetic speeches, and a sense of reassurance.

3     Work on the frequency and content of witch trials needs to be correlated with this material, but is outside the scope of a study of the moral play.

4     See The Book of the Knight of Latour-Landry, ed. Thomas Wright, EETS, OS, 21 (London, 1868), which lists amongst the wife’s duties to her husband: 'to praye for hym benignely and paciently, to counsaile hym for the welthe of his soule, and so to deturne hym from eueri euelle dede, in as moche as is in her powere; for therto is bounde euery good woman', p.134.

5     It is of interest that this image is called into question in exactly the period of religious 'iconophobia', when many exemplary pictures were seen as spiritually damaging objects. See Tessa Watt, Cheap Print and Popular Piety, 1550-1640, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History (Cambridge, 1991).
APPENDIX A

'THE CHOICE OF HERACLES'

Scholars invariably relate the origins of the moral play to the Psychomachia of Prudentius, in which a group of allegorical vices and virtues do battle for supremacy on the field of 'Microcosmos' - a locution for the human spirit. There is no doubt that this way of seeing the human being's orientation to moral problems was a popular one in Medieval and Renaissance literature. Lydgate's Assembly of Gods: or, The Accord of Reason and Sensuality in the fear of Death, for example, draws on it substantially. There are, however, aspects of the Psychomachia which do not fit very happily with the founding concepts of the moral play. In the first place, it contains no character which represents mankind. The struggle takes place with humanity as the battlefield, but in no way is he a participating character in the sequence of events. There is no suggestion that his own thought or struggle - or culpability, for that matter - might have any capacity for influencing the outcome of the battle. Although the moral plays' mankind figure seems in many ways to be impossibly passive and easily lured from one course of action to another, nevertheless it is always he who must choose. Responsibility for the choices made and the use of rational persuasive techniques are intrinsic to the plot of the plays. One reason why we have been misled into focussing on the Psychomachia is that a pitched battle in a style very similar to the one in that work does in fact take place in one of the earliest plays, The Castle of Perseveraunce. This resemblance is a distraction, for, within the plot of that play, the battle quickly takes second place to a display of attempted persuasions aimed by the vice figures at Humanum Genus. Though clearly it is one source for moral play modes of perception, the Psychomachia is unsatisfactory when one considers the moral play from the point of view of externality and a self/other distinction.

The famous 'Choice of Heracles' of the fifth-century sophist, Prodicus,
reported by Xenophon has been neglected in the search for morality play antecedents.¹

First one notices that Heracles is at a specific stage of life, and that life is imaged as a journey. 'When Heracles was setting out from childhood towards manhood,' Furthermore, he is at that point in his career that the earlier moral plays find particularly interesting: 'at the age when the young become independent . . .' One thinks of Youth, of Nature, The Four Elements, and Nice Wanton, as well as of the opening scenes of Mundus & Infans and the Digby Mary Magdalene.

Vice and Virtue in this text are generalized figures, like the characters who advise the mankind figure, not abstractions of specific qualities such as the Seven Deadly Sins. The scene is a 'dramatic' one, involving movement as well as speech: 'the first of the two continued to advance in the same way, but the other, wishing to forestall her, ran up to him and said: . . .' This encapsulation of meaning in movement and gesture, together with the description of costume and make-up, invite a staged imitation.

The dialogue here is interested in interpretation as a factor in the development of the protagonist's moral awareness, in exactly the same manner as the moral plays. The figure of Vice that confronts Heracles has two names: a true name, and a euphemistic version of the same form. 'My friends call me Happiness, but people who don't like me nickname me Vice.' Thus, like the vice figures, she raises the question of ambiguous interpretation of moral actions. She attributes naming to taste, rather than to a relationship between description and truth. A feature of very many of the moral plays is a re-naming scene, in which the vice figures decide to conceal their true names behind euphemistic aliases. Again, though, the 'true' name of the lady Vice is publicly available: Heracles has genuine choice. The capacity he must develop in order to choose correctly is understanding, exactly as Mankind, Humanum Genus and all the others must.

The figures of Vice and Virtue compete for the attention of their auditor. Vice is constructed as seductive through a concern with clothing. 'robed in a way
that revealed as much as possible of her charms. She kept on examining herself, and watching to see if anyone was looking at her, and glancing at her own shadow.' One might in particular compare this with the famous stage direction in Lewis Wager's *Mary Magdalene*: 'here entreth Mary Magdalene, triflyng with her garmenetes'.

Like the plays, the ethical situation is rendered in terms of movement: the mankind figure goes with the vice figure, usually to an inn, or to some location representative of degeneracy. In the same way, Heracles, at a crossroads, is invited to follow one path or another. In neither case is the nature of this evil location visible, except through the figure of Vice itself, though both Vice and the moral plays' vice figures describe it in glowing terms which are accurate exactly because of their ambiguity. 'You shall refrain from nothing from which you can derive any advantage, because I authorize my followers to benefit themselves from all quarters.' 'Advantage' and 'benefit' in this offer can refer only to physical indulgence, not to 'spiritual' benefits such as a good reputation or a sense of personal worth.

For the final point about this text, I turn to an interesting comment by Jon Whitman: 'Perhaps the most immediately revealing feature of this brief, limited vignette is that it considers Heracles, a man celebrated for his heroic exploits, not really from the outside, but almost from the inside, confronted by his own options.' Indeed, the opening line suggests that the whole thing may have taken place within Heracles' imagination. One does not, then, need the *Psychomachia* in order to find a text in which a psychological condition is externalized.

The arguments are strong for including the 'Choice of Heracles' in the sources of the moral play. This does not mean that one should dispense with other sources entirely, for clearly both 'Heracles', the *Psychomachia*, and the debate forms, such as the various parliaments of Gods, all contribute to the construction of the moral play. I argue here for a more even-handed vision of the classical origins of the form.
NOTES TO APPENDIX A


APPENDIX B

CODED LIST OF VICE CHARACTERISTICS

(This list is intended only as an aid to locating the full discussion of particular vice characteristics in Chapter Three. It does not include every aspect of the characteristics discussed, in the interests of manageability.

Physical Characteristics

P1  Vices operate in crews, typically of one chief and either two or three subordinates.

P2  They are inordinately vigorous, bursting into activities such as dancing, wrestling and brawling at the least provocation.

P3  They eat and drink to excess and offer the mankind figure journeys to the stews and to taverns full of meat and drink.

P4  They are uninhibited about defecation.

P5  They have easy access to sex.

P6  Both major and minor vice figures go in for fighting and brawling.

P7  The principal Vice may flaunt a 'dagger', with which he may fight with others or alone.

P8  A mock tourney sometimes occurs, involving the use of kitchen utensils as armour.

P9  Vices show clear indications of ubiquity.

P10 Parallel to their ubiquity in space is an imperviousness to time.

P11 They may ultimately be punished by banishment, often to Hell, or by beating or other humiliations.

P12 Their class is distinctive. They are most commonly
'masterless men'. Vice figures sometimes claim to be ex-sailors or ex-soldiers.

P13 These low characters evince a love of fine clothing and a strong wish to sport the latest fashions, particularly if these are extreme, and hence ridiculous or wicked in some way.

P14 Vices are often usurers.

P15 They may be physically grotesque, sometimes having large or 'bottle' noses. They may have ugly faces, or large heads. There have been suggestions that vice figures were played in masks.

P16 They may assert or display lineal descent from the Devil.

**Verbal Characteristics**

V1 They are inordinately garrulous.

V2 The vices are interested in one another's exploits. They question one another on their lives in the elsewhere of off-stage and before-now.

V3 They habitually refer to the dangers of hanging and going to Hell.

V4 Vices are braggarts.

V5 They employ a wide variety of styles from repartee to argument to narrative monologue. Thus they are linguistically versatile.

V6 They are particularly skilled at persuasive argument.

V7 The vices abuse conventional language forms by blaspheming and using foul language.

V8 Vice figures use parodic nonsense phrases to mock the logical argument that is the characteristic diction of the pious characters. Similarly, aureation and Latinity are mimicked in
abusive dog-Latin.

V9 The vices use ludicrous literalisms.

V10 They indulge in puns or wilful mishearings.

V11 They have a habit of accidentally-on-purpose uttering a true opinion, then quickly retracting it and offering a similar-sounding honourable remark instead.

V12 Vices are addicted to discursive and often digressive monologues, including autobiographical monologues about impossibly protracted journeyings through many countries, and adventures in many towns, usually within England and France.

V13 They can hear and be conjured up, like any devil.

V14 The vice figures are particularly addicted to proverbs and sententiae.

V15 Vice figures distinguish themselves from the speakers around them by the use of contrasting verse forms.

**Controlling Moves**

C1 The principal Vice wishes to control his own unruly crew through beatings and orders. They, in their turn beat one another up when the opportunity arises.

C2 Vices attempt to control the mankind figure, through argument and appeals to his physical needs.

C3 The principal Vice adopts a tutelary relationship towards both the mankind figure and the vice-crew.

C4 He makes controlling moves towards the audience by entering into colloquy with them through his use of knowing asides and of monologue, both techniques which can generate a collusive atmosphere.
He sets out to control the overt plot by re-defining the good characters as mockable, impractical, boring, and incomprehensible.

His frequent formation of schemes, and their working through locate him as an alternative author.

Stage directions on occasion specifically give vices and other low characters freedom to improvise.

**Lying and Double-dealing**

L1 The simple utterance of falsehood.

L2 He may re-interpret the virtuous character's counsel in order to lure the mankind figure into dissolute ways.

L3 He may appeal to literality disguised as common sense in order to re-direct the mankind figure's good intentions.

L4 The principal Vice may be represented as morally 'ambidextrous', more like the figure of Fortune than like a descendant of the Devil.

L5 Lying is often intensified when the lie involves the conveying of a false message, or a false letter.

L6 The name-changing which is so significant to many vice plays also falls into the category of alternative interpretation mentioned above.

**Relations with and Resemblances to Women**

W1 Vices have access to illicit sex as part of their location in and near taverns.

W2 Their coarse language frequently tends towards sexual innuendo.

W3 In relation to women a vice-figure can himself take on the
aspect of a victim.

**W4** Vice figures denigrate their wives as shrews and live in fear of both their sexual demands and their physical violence.

**W5** Women, too, were reckoned to be excessive talkers.

**W6** Women's discourse was deemed to be empty.

**W7** Women's 'illogical' speech is like the vices' non-sequiturs and nonsense narratives.

**W8** Both vices and women are seen as dangerously persuasive, often to an almost mystical extent.

**Music. Singing and Noise**

**M1** Vice figures have a predilection for music-making in general, and singing in particular.

**M2** Song acts as another of the vice's controlling devices. It occupies the auditory space, precluding other dialogue.

**M3** Controlling the pace and articulating scenes, the vices' songs structure a play.

**M4** Vice figures make a show of insincere weeping.

**M5** Demonic, or uncontrollable laughter signals a vice figure's glee, usually over someone else's misfortune.
APPENDIX C

DOUBLING SCHEME FOR 'LIKE WILL TO LIKE'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene</th>
<th>Player 1</th>
<th>Player 2</th>
<th>Player 3</th>
<th>Player 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i)</td>
<td>Prologue</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>Lucifer</td>
<td>Tom Collier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>Rafe R.</td>
<td>Tom Tosspot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii)</td>
<td>Hance</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>Rafe R.</td>
<td>Tom Tosspot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv)</td>
<td>Hance</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Tom Tosspot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v)</td>
<td>Hance</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>Philip F.</td>
<td>Tom Tosspot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>Cutbert C.</td>
<td>Pierce P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii)</td>
<td>V. Life</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>Cutbert C.</td>
<td>Pierce P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix)</td>
<td>V. Life</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>x)</td>
<td>V. Life</td>
<td>Good Fame</td>
<td>God’s Prom.</td>
<td>Honour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xi)</td>
<td>V. Life</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>God’s Prom.</td>
<td>Honour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xii)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xiii)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>Rafe R.</td>
<td>Tom Tosspot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xiv)</td>
<td>Severity</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xv)</td>
<td>Severity</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>Cutbert C.</td>
<td>Pierce P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xvi)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>Cutbert C.</td>
<td>Pierce P.</td>
</tr>
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<td>xvii)</td>
<td>Hankin H.</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>Cutbert C.</td>
<td>Pierce P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xviii)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>xix)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nichol Newfangle</td>
<td>Lucifer</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>xx)</td>
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<td>Honour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xxi)</td>
<td>V. Life</td>
<td>Good Fame</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Honour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# APPENDIX D

## CHANGING PROPORTIONS OF VICE-PLAY

(Figures have been rounded to the nearest whole percent.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name of Play</th>
<th>Lines</th>
<th>% Vice</th>
<th>% Virtue</th>
<th>% Mixed</th>
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<tr>
<td>1470</td>
<td>Mankind</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1539</td>
<td>Wit and Science</td>
<td>1121</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1547</td>
<td>Impatient Poverty</td>
<td>1079</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1550</td>
<td>Nice Wanton</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1550</td>
<td>Lusty Juventus</td>
<td>1168</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1553</td>
<td>Respublica</td>
<td>2123</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1558</td>
<td>Mary Magdalene (Wager)</td>
<td>2115</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1559</td>
<td>Patient Grissil (Phillip)</td>
<td>2141</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1560's</td>
<td>Enough is As Good</td>
<td>1632</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1567</td>
<td>Conflict of Conscience</td>
<td>2160</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1568</td>
<td>Like Will To Like</td>
<td>1243</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1569</td>
<td>The Longer Thou Livest³</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1576</td>
<td>Tyde Tarrieth</td>
<td>1780</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1577</td>
<td>All For Money⁴</td>
<td>1564</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>65</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1579</td>
<td>Wit and Wisdom (Merbury)</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES TO APPENDIX D

1. Excludes songs, which are required by the stage directions, but whose length and content are not specified. For example, S.D., 1.65: 'Adulation, Insolence, Oppression intrant cantantes'. The overall effect of excluding the songs is very slight as virtues and vices have two songs each. Counts all scenes in which Respublica and the vices are on stage together as mixed.

2. Counts the shared scenes either vice-dominated or virtue-dominated, except where they are especially evenly balanced.

3. All For Money contains a debate scene, which makes problems for this kind of analysis. The first set of numbers counts that scene as 'mixed'. A second problem resembles those found in Respublica, for there is a scene involving Dives and Judas which is vice-dominated in the sense that the display of evil is the main dramatic interest, but virtue-dominated in that these two are seen suffering. The first set of numbers therefore allocates that scene to the virtues, the second to the vices (which I feel is correct) and the third to the 'mixed' category.
APPENDIX E

THE WEEPING ACTOR

The identification of virtue with silence and tears poses problems on that level where stage images intersect with images applied to women in real life. As silence came increasingly to be stressed, it was also often associated with tears as an expression of suffering and virtue. However, tears on the morality stage were already a powerful signifier of insincerity, especially when applied to the vice figures.

It is a convention that vice-figures, and especially major Vices, weep on stage. Clearly this is seen as important for the role, for it features in the otherwise infrequent stage directions. This behaviour has three functions. Firstly it works on the level of theatrical convention for the audience's benefit, establishing this character as a vice. Secondly, on the level of plot, it deceives the mankind figure into believing in the vice's sincerity by playing on his emotions. A good early example of this is in Nature II (Henry Medwall). Sensuality weeps to entrap Man into returning to his frivolous companions out of pity for their sorrow. (Here a whole vice-crew sets up a hideous wailing off-stage):

Then he wepyth (S.D., 1.80)
And ye saw the sorrowfull countenaunce
Of my cumpany, your old acquayntaunce,
That they make
For your sake,

I dare say ye wold mone theym in your mynde
They be so louyng and so kynde
That I am sure
Yf ye endure
In thyse peuyshe opynyon,
It wyll be theyre confessyon!
There ys none other remedy
But for sorow they shall dye.

(1.83-94)

(The persuasion is effective.)

The audience, understanding the convention, can delight in watching gullibility led by the nose. Finally, this behaviour entertains as stage spectacle, offering noisy, excessive behaviour outside the range of what was normal or acceptable. For example, in Mankind, New Guise, Nought and Nowadays all howl and weep vociferously at 1.417. Once the victim has left the stage, weeping is on some occasions followed by loud laughter, for example in Impatient Poverty, 1.508, when Envy weeps to see Conscience leave, but laughs once he has gone. In a similar way, in Enough is as Good as a Feast Covetous indulges in a very obviously fake display of grief, 1.699-710.

So far I have rehearsed the evidence for a rather familiar point: the vice, as a figure who pretends to be what he is not, affects to weep as one prominent feature of his display. This point, however, has an important consequence. The Vice is an actor amongst other actors, but the 'falseness' of his weeping is not mimetic in the way that the behaviour of the other characters is. Thus, the vice is a character who plays a part: uniquely on the morality stage, an actor plays a character who is in turn an actor. One signal to the audience of the presence of this character is his weeping. To weep on the morality stage was to define oneself as a liar, and perhaps even more importantly, as an actor.

However, women too had an important relationship with tears. The conduct books specified that this relationship should exist, and put forward tears as the virtuous alternative to speech. The author of Hic Mulier (1620) sees tears as a woman's proper weapon: 'the weapon of a vertuous woman was her tears, which every good man pitied' (sig.Biii). Where a bad wife railed, a good wife was silent; if she was ill-treated, words were still out of order but tears were then permissible
as a way of working on the controlling male's conscience. There is even a popular historical story of a queen and her waiting women whose silent tears pleaded successfully with the king to save a group of rebels from execution.

Clearly some sort of double-bind is created here, whereby a weeping individual in the real world could resemble a vice, or a virtuous woman, or perhaps even both at once. As further cues of femininity became attached to the vice-figure, the possibility for such metonymic confusion increased.

There is significant evidence that confusion was possible, for the virtuous women of the plays do not weep. Neither of the Patient Grissils weeps, nor does Susannah: they are allowed, respectively, silence and apparently inaudible prayer. One may speculate that the danger of an ambiguous interpretation meant that weeping was excluded for these characters. Othello demonstrates what these plays must avoid for their heroines:

Oh devil, devil

If that the earth could teem with women's tears

Each drop she falls would prove a crocodile

(IV, i, 239)

With tears the sign of deceit on the popular stage, it becomes clear that a woman weeping is at best an ambiguous sign.
The bibliography is in four sections: Section A lists editions of the medieval and Renaissance plays mentioned; Section B lists relevant non-dramatic works up to 1700; Section C lists modern works of criticism and critical theory referred to or used in the preparation of this thesis, while Section D lists unpublished modern material.

The conventions used are those of the MHRA Style Book (third edition), with the following minor variations. In Section A, the edition cited is that to which line references are made in the text. Where more than one edition is listed, an asterisk indicates the edition referred to in quotations and footnotes. Where there is an early edition of the play, the date of that edition is given in brackets immediately after the title of the play. Where scholarship has suggested a date of composition earlier than that of the first printed edition, that date appears in italics within the same brackets. An italicized date with a question mark indicates a disputed or doubtful dating.

**Abbreviations**

- **EEDS**  
  Early English Drama Society
- **EETS**  
  Early English Text Society
- **ES**  
  Extra Series
- **Dodsley**  
- **FQ**  
Happé

Peter Happé 'The Vice 1350-1605: An Examination of the Nature and Development of a Stage Convention',

Harbage


Manly

Specimens of the Pre-Shakespearean Drama, ed. J.M. Manly, 2 vols (Boston and London, 1904)

Materialen

Materialen zur Kunde des älteren Englischen Dramas

MED

Middle English Dictionary, ed. Hans Kurath (1930-59); Sherman M. Kuhn (1963-83); Robert E. Lewis (1984-91), (Ann Arbor, Michigan)

MS

manuscript

NS

New Series

OED

Oxford English Dictionary

OS

Original Series

PMLA

Proceedings of the Modern Language Association

The Riverside Shakespeare


Schell and Schuchter


S.E.


Tilley

M.P. Tilley, A Dictionary of the Proverbs in English in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1950)

SECTION A: MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE PLAYS

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Bowers, Fredson, ed., The Dramatic Works of Thomas Dekker, 4 vols (Cambridge, 1953-61)

Brandl, Alois, Quellen des Weltlichen Dramas in England vor Shakespeare, Quellen und Forschungen zur Sprach- und Culturgeschichte der Germanischen Völker, 80 (Strasburg, 1898)


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Tudor Interludes (London, 1972)

Specimens of the Pre-Shakesperean Drama, 2 vols (Boston and London, 1910)

English Miracle Plays, Moralities and Interludes (Oxford, 1923, first published 1890)

English Morality Plays and Moral Interludes (New York, 1969)

Four Tudor Interludes (London, 1974)

Four Tudor Comedies (London, 1984)

The Non-Cycle Mystery Plays, EETS, ES, 104 (London, 1909)

English Moral Interludes (London, 1976)

Anonymous Plays

The Castle of Perseveraunce (c.1400), in The Macro Plays, ed. Mark Eccles, EETS, OS, 262 (London, 1969), 1-111


Everyman (c.1519), ed. A.C. Cawley (Manchester, 1961)

Godly Queene Hester (1561), ed. W.W.Greg, Materialen, 5 (Louvain, 1904; reprinted Vaduz, 1963)
Grim, the Collier of Croydon (1662, c.1600), (probably by William Haughton), in

Hick Scorner (1516), in Two Tudor Interludes, ed. Ian Lancashire, The Revels Plays (Manchester, 1980), 157-238

Impatient Poverty (1560; c.1547-58), ed. R.B. McKerrow, Materialen, 33 (Louvain, 1911; reprinted Vaduz, 1963)

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