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HEGEL ON TIME: DERRIDA, GLAS AND 'THE REMAIN(S) OF A HEGEL'

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Contents

INTRODUCTION

Preparing the "remain(s)": Derrida, differance and the expropriation of an aigle 1

- i. Speech and private property:
the differance of a bourgeois Hegel 5
- ii. The filiation of Derrida's Hegel:
Kojève, state and society 16

CHAPTER ONE

Fetishism strict and general: Hegel, Genet and the two columns of Glas 35

- i The "remain(s)" of castration:
Hegel-critique by way of the Ersatz 35
- ii. Fetishism of the commodity:
personality, property and the Ersatz 54
- iii. Genet and general fetishism:
the supplementary column and legal status 80

CHAPTER TWO

The Transcendental Tomb: Antigone in Derrida and Hegel 116

CHAPTER THREE

Religion in the Reliquary: The "remain(s)" of Spirit from Christian filiation to the mastery of the Jews 148

- i. 'Spirit' for Glas: autonomy, autonomination and the IC in the phantasm of the Father 152
- ii. Geist or Gesetz: 'The Spirit of Christianity' and the law of the "remain(s)" 184
- iii. 'On the Jewish Question':
Glas, Hegel and the trace of the Jews 230

CHAPTER FOUR

'Absolute Knowing' and <u>Sa</u>: the Causality of Fate and the "remain(s)" of <u>Gesetz</u>	273
i. Transfigured Night: from Absolute Knowing to <u>differance</u>	273
ii. 'Signification fulfilled or voided': the vacuity of <u>le propre</u> , the blindness of <u>differance</u>	284
iii. Absolute Knowing and the <u>agon</u> of community: substance is (not) subject	288
Conclusion: <u>Differance</u> and the <u>agon</u> of community	304

Thesis Summary

This thesis takes up the challenge of Jacques Derrida's Glas from an Hegelian perspective and addresses the central question of Derrida's book: "quoi du reste [...] d'un Hegel?" - "what remain(s) of a Hegel?". Glas construes a Hegel whose system is 'reappropriative' of all alterity and Derrida's efforts are devoted to disclosing the elements of Hegel's system that are not only incapable of reappropriation but which are, for that reason, the system's condition of possibility. Each chapter of the thesis addresses the construction of these 'remain(s)' with regard to Hegel's text. The essay considers Derrida's reconstruction of Hegel's conception of Sophocles' Antigone, of the absolute religion and the construal of the Jews, whilst it also addresses the 'general fetishism' that is the method of Glas and is particularly evident in the portion of the text devoted to Genet. In response, the thesis examines the Hegel of deconstruction and counters this construal with a rereading of the Hegel texts from which the 'remain(s)' are collected.

The fundamental argument of the thesis is that Glas presupposes and confronts the Hegel-reading of Alexandre Kojève: a 'reappropriative' Hegel whose system concludes with the self-transparency of the bourgeois subject as citizen of the modern state. The 'remain(s)' represent all that refuses to be subsumed by the law or 'concept' of this state. In parallel, the argument focuses upon Derrida's construal of Hegel's thought as the 'metaphysics of the proper' and the essay thereby conceives of 'differance' as the alienation that constitutes formal identity or 'propriety'. Thus, the inadmissible 'remain(s)' supply the formally-universal state and citizen of Kojève with the moment of 'difference' that it must suppress: the 'remain(s)' collude with the sphere of production and exchange, with civil society and the proprietor.

In contrast to the Kojevian Hegel of Glas, the thesis shows that Hegel's thought is not the narrative justification of modern, positive, property law but the determination of the latter's fixed and abstract oppositions. The response to Glas considers the 'remain(s)' to be the moment of alienation that is constitutive of the modern, universal right of private appropriation. Derrida, incapable of thinking otherwise than according to abstract law renders that moment transcendental. Thus, the thesis depicts Hegel as confronting the one-sided conceptuality of Kojevian 'right' and the one-sided emphasis upon non-identity and intuition in Derridean differance. The thesis asserts that Hegel's 'absolute' and the notion of 'ethical life', far from being the justification of positive law, adumbrate the possibility of cognizing this law without imposing the abstract concept anew. In the name of precluding the domination of the concept, however, the 'remain(s)' will simultaneously reassert positive law as 'unknowable' whilst maintaining the violence of the law's imposition and its undeterminable oppositions.

INTRODUCTION

Preparing the "remain(s)": Derrida, differance and the expropriation of an aigle

This essay is an attempt to address the opening question of Jacques Derrida's book, Glas: "quoi du reste, aujourd'hui, pour nous, ici, maintenant, d'un Hegel?"[1]. It does not attempt to undertake an exhaustive reading of Glas (were such a course possible) and there is much in that text that I have left unattended. The treatment of Hegel, too, is far from encyclopaedic and it should be made clear from the start that the 'time' of the title does not indicate an account of Hegel's concept of temporality but rather bears on something like the 'modernity' of Hegel - the question raised eliptically in Derrida's opening line. The thesis attends to the matter of the "reste", the "remain(s)"; to the construal of a Hegel who would leave such deposits, to the presuppositions of the thought which 'discovers' them, and to the validity of the former and its significance for the latter. Finally, it reconsiders Hegel in the light of that construal and its ends, to suggest not only that Hegel is misread but that deconstruction, forged from the claims of a certain Hegel-critique, is itself moulded by that misconstrual. Fundamentally, the thesis pursues a conception of Derrida's discourse that accords with its construction as "the sacrifice of mastery, the work of

self-dispossession"[2] and it convenes the "remain(s)" as those elements of a closed and appropriative system which are indigestible by 'speculative dialectics', which are **absolutely expropriative**, traces of differance.

As appropriative, totalizing, and scattered across Glas in the metonymy of the imperial all-conquering "aigle", the Hegel of Glas is the philosopher of - at - the end of history. This is the Hegel of Kojève. The thinker of the absolute is constructed as the one whose absolute knowledge is the comprehension of history's completion in the absolute state and in the full self-presence of the citizen of that state. The "remain(s)" of this Hegel, the expropriation of that identitarian subject and state, are excavated as the elements that refuse subsumption beneath its law. They are configurations 'unrelievable' inasmuch as they register the non-identity, the meaninglessness, that is **constitutive** of identity and meaning and are thus unrecuperable by the circuit of speculative dialectics' positing-negation. This essay, however, argues that the difference of the 'remaindered' element and the identitarian, circuitous whole is structured such that the "remain(s)" are nevertheless dependent upon that abstract identity and escape the latter's appropriation by way of the 'transcendentalizing' of Hegelian negation. This is not to return to absolute knowing as the apotheosis of formal identity, however, for this grasp of the

distinction of "remain(s)" and totality arises from the pursuit of 'differance' as a countering of 'absolute' (that is formal) identity. Identity is construed as total, dialectical difference its achievement: "negativity is always the underside and accomplice of positivity"[3]. My thesis rests on arguing that there is not a choice between a non-identity made transcendental - utterly unknowable except in its 'effects' - and an identity of total completion - either tautological or suppressive and occlusive. What is refused is to take up Hegelian antitheses in media res and to 'resolve' them by the transcendentalization of the (apparently) inferior term - a move which, whilst preventing the concept from gaining a foothold, is accomplished at the expense of the recognition of the aporia.

The question of the "remain(s)", therefore, is addressed by the thesis whilst attending to a Hegel who does not seek to carry through the imposition of concept over intuition, the imposition of 'identity' upon the non-identical. Indeed, in reconstructing the origins of this identitarian Hegel in France, it is possible to reconvene the remainder of an all-incorporative system in its social and political aspect. The Hegel summoned by Glas is the thinker of the abstract state; the "remain(s)" appear as the substance and content of that formal identity - they appear as the concrete difference of civil society that is

the presupposition of the state. Pursuing the Derridean construction of "the metaphysics of the proper" and speech's 's'entendre parler' as the model of formal identity - as well as its differance in 'writing' - through a reading of Hegel's grasp of legal personality, one comes to a recognition of the dependence of deconstruction upon the aspect of universal alienation that is inscribed in the legal right of appropriation. This view of the dissolution or differetiation of the identity of 'the proper' by way of the alienation, escape and 'mastery' of the object of property and the conception of this as the unappropriable - the 'left-over' - of le propre, is confirmed in its being situated as the alienating, disintegrating force of civil society upon the abstract state as one turns to the Kojevian account. In preparation for the "remain(s)", therefore, I shall - in this introduction - follow the course of deconstruction's repatterning of the 'dichotomy' of system and method whereby the former closes into the brittle totality of abstract identity, the latter into the movement and milieu of difference without which totality cannot be thought but which is, thereby, the anterior destruction of that closure. Pursuing the political and economic rhetoric of differance's explication, I shall then attend to the conception of state and society that the sitelessness, the 'utopia', of differance bears with it: its refusal of the

state, its embrace of civil society and the dissolving, mobile and expropriative master, the commodity.

i. Speech and private property: the differance of a bourgeois Hegel

Throughout Derrida's text Hegel is construed always the same. The traditional distinction of a radical method and a conservative system is once more restated by deconstruction. This time, however, the dichotomy of systematic identity and methodological difference will be radicalized according to the grammatological schema wherein difference takes up the quasi-transcendental 'site' of an arche-writing whilst identity is configured in the paradigm of speech as the self-completion of 's'entendre parler'[4]. Deconstruction adjusts - and adjusts to - the traditional Hegel as, 'on the one hand', taking the identitarian repression of writing and elevation of self-sufficient speech to its conclusion, whilst, on the other, supplying the resources for the breaching of that self-enclosure in speech and, thereby, anticipating the rescue of writing. In what one must now regard as the locus classicus of Derrida's schematized Hegel, deconstruction presents the fork whereby, as "the last philosopher of the Book", Hegel

"undoubtedly **summed up** the entire philosophy of the logos. He determined ontology as absolute logic; he assembled all the delimitations of philosophy as presence; he assigned to presence the eschatology of parousia, of the self-proximity of infinite subjectivity. And for the same reason he had to debase or subordinate writing. [...] Writing is that forgetting of the self, that

exteriorization, the contrary of the interiorizing memory, of the Erinnerung that opens the history of spirit." [5]

Yet, the denounced, repressed and introjected exteriority of the letter - offensive to the system - is nevertheless offered succour by the fact of Hegelian negativity: "all that Hegel thought within this horizon, all, that is, except eschatology, may be reread as a meditation on writing. Hegel is **also** the thinker of irreducible difference" [6]. Nevertheless, this negativity, this difference - in the construal of what would constitute 'irreducibility' - undergoes transformation.

Deconstruction radicalizes the dialectical method by dispensing with dialectics in the embrace of a 'transcendental' difference (albeit one that would rigourously adhere to its literal sitelessness - it is nowhere 'present'). By convening writing as a "supplement", an aide-memoire to the speech that cannot do without it and to which it cannot be reduced, Derrida not only damages the perfection of the idealized voice that hears-itself-speak but also renders this 'writing' transcendental. This is prompted by the Saussurean "arbitrary difference"; it is the realization that meaning is constituted and perpetuated by (and within) an unrepresentable 'non-meaning'. Thought comes upon an active 'nothing'. Nevertheless, deconstruction rigourously invigilates this void - all nomination is, in general, rendered (im)possible. This is to say that meaning

(vouloir-dire: wanting-to-say) is 'possible' on account of its constitution by non-meaning, 'impossible' inasmuch as that dependence renders it always incomplete - an admission in advance of the defeat of would-be self-presence. As 'differance' this constitutive (im)possibility of nomination is named and, although respecting that impossibility inasmuch as differance is "neither a word nor a concept"[7], as a 'name' it therefore remains metaphysical[8]. Thus, the irreducible difference of Hegel has been conducted beyond a dialectical re-opening of the systematic closure (a re-opening that would remain within the control of a positing negation and so not depart the system) to the 'apositionality' of a transcendentalized difference (the ruin of the systematic drive of self-presence by virtue of its registration of that constitutive 'nothing' which would be 'anterior' to the position or negation).

This reconstruction of the division of system and method is, then, the dissolution of its dichotomous configuration and the replacement, by way of that transcendental difference, of one term as the condition of (im)possibility of the other. Parenthetically - but of significance in light of the filiation of Derrida's 'Hegel' - one can note that this move also permits Hegel to be construed as never divorcing the system and the method: dialectics is positing by way of negation - it is

always already in identity with the fulfilled concept. Furthermore, still attending to the passage from dialectic to differance and, 'on the other hand', the systematic closure in the dream of self-presence, one notes that the deconstructive determination of Hegel takes a defining turn as that 'system' is configured as **proprietary**. The Grammatology expands on its description of the

'conservative' Hegel:

"The horizon of absolute knowledge is the effacement of writing in the logos, the retrieval of the trace in parousia, the reappropriation of difference, the accomplishment of what I have elsewhere called the **metaphysics of the proper** [le propre - self-possession, propriety, property, cleanliness]." [9]

Hegel's thought takes on a sharper delineation when it comes to be constructed as the metaphysical celebration and justification of private property: "History and knowledge, istoria and episteme, have always been determined (and not only etymologically or philosophically) as detours **for the purpose of** the reappropriation of presence" [10]. As the condition of (im)possibility of this property-right, the constitutive 'nothing' in the effect of differance will, therefore, enact an anterior alienation of this ownership. The self-propriety provided by speech is possible only through the prior expropriation of that 'propriety': differance follows (as its ruin) the logic of private property just as deconstruction renders that logic paradigmatic for metaphysics. This structure of an alienation "anterior to

[...] discourse" is powerfully evident in Derrida's comments on Artaud - the condition of (im)possibility of speech described such that "speech is stolen: since it is stolen from language it is, thus, stolen from itself, that is, from the thief who has always already lost speech as property and initiative".[11]

The Grammatology declares: "to make enigmatic what one thinks one understands by the words 'proximity', 'immediacy', 'presence' (the proximate [proche], the own [propre] and the pre- of presence), is my final intention in this book"[12] and it is this work of 'enigmatizing' that serves to occlude the dependence of the work upon the law - the concept, the abstract universal - of private property. In the 'transcendentalization' of difference, the alienation associated with appropriation has been rendered both anterior and enigmatic, unknowable. This is to say that, as the condition of all linguistic systems, the movement of differance cannot itself be included within them[13]; moreover, as the condition of meaning's 'presentation' it cannot be situated, presented, elsewhere. Differance is not a concept - it is not another law more fundamental than that of private property - and detached from a dialectical construal nor is it the negative of appropriation and thereby its accomplice. Yet the 'arrival' at differance by way of the Hegelian fork - the repatterned 'radicalization' taking the route of a

transcendentalization of the negative that ruins synthesis - is evident in this 'anterior alienation' and serves to unsettle deconstruction's security in its construction of a sublime mastery of the letter whose mute, enigmatic power would expropriate cognition in advance.

The transformed moment of difference in deconstruction is also the transcendentalized moment of alienation in Hegel's account of formal law - the alienation of the formal universality the law secures, an alienation effected by **writing**. In Hegel's account[14], the dissolution of the ethical order (Sittlichkeit) of the polis occurs through the triumph of posited law (Gesetz). The "aesthetic" character of Greek life, where legality is customary and morality is not divided off from juristic right[15], is irretrievably sundered with the emergence of prior, codified, law - a law whose abstractness is necessitated by its task of securing individuals' right to private property. The ethical 'state' of Greek antiquity had not known the principle of subjectivity and so had found possible the immediate unity of individual and universal. 'Law' takes effect as concrete, lived 'lore', a second nature - not as extrinsic and the imposition of principles and definitions whose achievement is to structure social life and its resources in terms of strict antinomies subservient to the right of appropriation. This is the dissolution of ethical life, of '**True Spirit**'

- substantial freedom knowing no 'subject' - by 'Legal Status' - the abstract (that is, legally-defined) identity of the 'person'; the 'absolute' subjectivity of a "rigid unyielding self"[16] for whom the non-identical is the inessential matter of appropriation. Beneath the rubric of legal personality, therefore, stands the recognised right to assimilation and appropriation by a formal universality of that which is posited as the contingent manifold. Derrida nowhere makes reference to this 'propriety' - at least not to lend it the significance afforded other figures and elements of Hegel's text - and yet it is this construal of Roman legality, of the formal universality of its positive law and the supreme principle of **personality**, that enables one to recognize the configuration of an ontotheological Hegel as 'proprietary' and the enrolement of writing as its 'condition of (im)possibility'.

The alienation of personality is effected by way of the abstractness of positive law - by virtue of its formalization, its encodedness, its inscription. Hegel writes that the definition of the individual as complete self-possession "is, in fact, merely the contradiction of a consciousness that is at once independent **and** dependent"[17]. The 'proper' - the absolute identity of the person - is 'independent' only formally: its abstractness, the fact of its definition in terms solely

of its right to property, means that any content it may have is the property of its object - and as such le propre is 'dependent', alienated **by definition**. In the sphere of legal status, however, this 'anterior' alienation of appropriative subjectivity is experienced as the flux of Scepticism: the 'absolute' 'I' experiences its vacuity, the expropriation of its substance, but returns resignedly to the irony of its knowing this loss. This is

"a negative rambling which, lacking any stable form, strays fortuitously from one form to another, dissolving them, it is true, in (its) absolute independence but no less recreating them; it is, in fact merely the contradiction of a consciousness that is at once independent and dependent. Personal independence in the sphere of **legal right** is really a similar general confusion and reciprocal dissolution of this kind. For what counts as absolute, essential being is self-consciousness as the sheer **empty unit** of the person." [18]

Indeed, just as the substance of this formal universality lies in its 'inessential' object of property, so is it recognised as such. In the "soulless community" [19] of property-owners exchange is the medium of social recognition and here the inessentiality of the subject is manifest - each is recognised as a bearer of property, a proprietor 'as such', on account of the object of property. The alienation of propriety takes the course of substitution: the absolute positing, the Setzen, of self-identity in 'personality' is transformed into an Ersetzen as the proprietor gains recognition in his 'substance', the thing of property. This process Marx described as the reification of the person and the personification of the

thing [20], Hegel gives account of it by noting that "consciousness of right [...] in the very fact of being recognised as having validity, experiences the loss of its reality and its complete inessentiality; and to describe an individual as a person is an expression of contempt"[21]. To be a proprietor is to have already been expropriated.

In addition, the substance of personality, the object of property, is also that of the community. The ethical totality of the polis was dissolved in the individualism of property-right - the movement from a subjective substantial freedom to abstract (encoded) subjective freedom - and just as the latter is convened only under the law of property, so is there no other positive form of recognition. As such, the object of property emerges as the unifying principle and substance of the community of private property. What this will achieve, therefore, is an effect of alienation upon the formally universal state mirroring that upon the person: the abstract totality of the state achieves its truth in the concrete community of persons. Yet that 'community' is nothing but the bond of persons in property-exchange and thus does the state find its truth in the sphere of exchange; the mutually-excluding 'universal' persons, in "the rigid unyieldingness of their atomicity"[22], are afforded mutual-recognition only by the object of property - a

recognition that is contemptuous - whilst this same object, as the 'principle' of community, is thereby the truth of the merely-abstract universality of the state. This is as much as to read the dissolution of ethical life into the divorced spheres of state and society[23]. This split and the appropriative, suppressive character of each half is evoked in the twin abstractions of formal, written, property law: "on the one side, Fate and the abstract universality of sovereignty; on the other, the **individual** abstraction [of legal personality]"[24]. Nevertheless, both abstract state and formal propriety find their substance in the posited non-identity, the object of property defined as secondary and subsumed. The universal right of appropriation breaches the ethical unity of the polis and gives rise to the difference of citizen and bourgeois - resident of the state, resident of civil society. The latter, defined by the law as a 'person', is then conceived as the concrete individual of society. Nevertheless, by virtue of the very legality - or abstractness - of that identity, the formal identity of the 'person' is breached in its recognition 'as such'. To be properly what he is, the person can only be a substitute of the thing of property - his content, the non-identical object. As such, then, the formal universality of le propre and of the state - the consequence of **posited** law, of the prior concept of a practical legislating reason - delivers them over to all

that they had defined as opposed: the inessential, the non-identical, the objects of intuition that are now to be re-cognised as the content the concept depends upon and suppresses. For Hegel, therefore, it is the very **formality** of property-law and personality that inverts the latter's appropriative designs. This formality resides in the encoding of law - it lies in its preceding of all deeds through its being **written**.

How does this bear on Derrida's reading of an appropriative Hegel? In the differance of the metaphysics of the proper, in the construal of an "arche-writing", is contained the movement of the transcendentalization of the moment of alienation that is secreted in personality's universal right of appropriation and its formal identity. Through a posited law the difference - the non-identical - is seen to emerge in its resistance to the intentions of that identifying law. Positive, formal law is **writing** and deconstruction identifies this inscription as the force that thereby breaches the absolute identity of speech. What differance carries out, therefore, is the alienation associated with civil society: the demonstration of the impossibility of the posited, legal universal - whether of individual right in 'personality' or in the constitution of the state. In short, deconstruction plays through the ruin of le propre as the abstract identical subject by attending to the suppression of its 'writteness' - the

formalization that necessitates it occlude (that is, misrepresent) all that does not fall under the category of proprietor, the manifold of intuition which will nevertheless return to thwart the self-definition of the person. In 'writing', therefore, Derrida recognises the positing of absolute identity but at the same time, in the structure of opposition and dependency that this brings with it (the priority of personality depends for meaning on its 'secondary' object), deconstruction tacitly acknowledges that dependency and so can conceive of that formalized - written, anterior - law as the 'inessentializing' of the essence it posits. Derrida takes the moment of non-identity - of alienation, the moment of the 'reemergence' of the suppressed object as it is recognized as the content of personality, the suppressed thing of intuition - and renders it the transcendental condition of the abstract conceptual propriety it frustrates.

ii. The filiation of Derrida's Hegel: Kojève, state and society

Derrida would construe a Hegel of le propre, one whose 'system' justifies the positive law of bourgeois personality and the modern state. This is a Hegel of "restricted economy", the Hegel addressed by Bataille and passed into the Derridean reading. Indeed, in the essay on Bataille this appropriative Hegel is clear to view.

One searches in vain for an admission of loss unrecuperated: the Hegelian system is one whose telos is to utterly exhaust meaning, positing by absolutely subsuming - by consuming - all non-meaning or negativity. Bataille reads a Hegel for whom death as absolute, unthinkable loss is not an issue; everything is recyclable, everything reaps a profit. Deconstruction derives a Hegel for whom loss is gain and who never 'extends' negativity far enough to sense the 'nothing' that constitutes the meaning of negation - the Aufhebung, Derrida writes,

"reappropriates all negativity for itself, as it works the 'putting at stake'[of life in the dialectic of lordship and bondage] into an **investment**, as it **amortizes** absolute expenditure; and as it gives meaning to death, thereby simultaneously blinding itself to the baselessness of the nonmeaning from which the basis of meaning is drawn and in which this basis of meaning is exhausted." [25]

The Aufhebung is a ruse of reason which enables speculation always to secure a profit - the risk is insured. However, whilst Derrida is at great proximity to Bataille's reading, the latter's "general economy" of unlimited loss - the baselessness of meaning, the absolutely irrecoverable expropriation in sacrifice, etc - although ambivalent in its construction as a simulacrum of death, thereby takes this 'play' (what is unthinkable by the Hegelian system as the history of meaning as negating 'work') too closely towards incorporation within the dialectic of work. The Derridean reading renders this baseless nonmeaning constitutive as the condition of

(im)possibility of dialectics. Nevertheless, what is of most concern in this explication of Bataille on Hegel is the Hegel of Bataille which Derrida absorbs - this is to say, where the question of the "remain(s)" of Hegel and the possibility of absolute loss originates. In a footnote to the essay, Derrida writes of the influence upon Bataille of "above all, Kojève, whose mark dominates visibly" and talks of "Kojève's reading of Hegel to which he openly subscribed almost totally"[26]. It is in a consideration of Kojève's reading that the appropriative Hegel of deconstruction most surely gains definition and it is through the filiation of Bataille's Hegel that one gains a perspective on the differance of the Hegelian propre as the dissolution of the absolute state and (as its justification) absolute knowing.

Bataille, setting up the antithesis of 'play' and the work that constitutes meaning - the antithesis that permits differance to transcribe play as the very milieu and movement that makes possible work - recounts this antithesis as the suppression of difference by identity: "Hegel, elaborating the philosophy of work (it is the Knecht, the freed bondsman, the worker who, in the Phenomenology, becomes God) suppressed chance and laughter"[27]. The Hegel of Kojève coalesces as the absolute identity whose condition of (im)possibility is registered in differance: the Hegel of le propre is the

one unfolded in Kojève's lectures and, most importantly, it is this **statist** Hegel who permits the reconstruction of its differance to take the route of addressing the social and political 'situation' presupposed by the rhetoric of propriety, ownership and economy. The Kojevian reconstruction of Hegel starts out from the propriety of an integral human subject and completes itself with the assimilation by that subject of alterity, recognised as its 'own' creation. The original integrity springs from speech: "Man becomes conscious of himself at the moment when - for the 'first' time - he says 'I'"[28]. It is speech which distinguishes man 'as such', elevating him above animality, corporeality and brute nature for it is speech which grants and performs the secure unity of self-consciousness. In a passage which cannot but site arche-writing as the differance of this integrity, Kojève asserts that the animal has no self-consciousness because "it cannot speak of itself, it cannot **say** 'I...'. And this is so because the Animal does not really transcend itself as **given** - ie as body; it does not rise above itself in order to come back toward itself; it has not distance with respect to itself in order to contemplate itself"[29]. The animal and man are at one inasmuch as they evince desire, but man is distinguished by the fact that in his desire for transcendence he desires not a given but non-Being - namely, another's desire "another greedy emptiness, another I"[30]. My desire is for transcendence, for

freedom and autonomy and it finds this in recognition by other humans, through the other's desire of my own desire. Yet this opens out onto a scene of considerable violence as desire and recognition can only be sought and satisfied through conquest, can only be conceived in terms approaching the anthropophagic: man fills himself, satisfies his desire through devouring and ingesting alterity (Derrida never forgets this image and it remains fundamental to Hegelian 'appropriation'). Most importantly, however, whilst this account permits no inclusion of 'economics', it nevertheless demonstrates the easy elision of anthropological 'desire' with appropriation and ownership: Kojève affirms,

"To be **human**, man must act not for the sake of subjugating a **thing**, but for the sake of subjugating another **Desire** (for the thing). The man who desires a thing humanly acts not so much to possess the **thing** as to make another **recognize** his **right** - as will be said later - to make another recognize him as the **owner** of that thing. And he does this - in the final analysis - in order to make the other realize his **superiority** over the other. It is only Desire of such a **Recognition (Anerkennung)**, it is only Action that flows from such a Desire, that creates, realizes, and reveals a **human non-biological I**"[31].

Maintaining a silence on matters concerning the **difference** of state and society, providing implicitly a narrative of the state's consumption of society, Kojève enables a formal universality to take precedence over the concrete differences involved in 'ownership'. Nevertheless, there is an attendance to the institutionalization of 'appropriation' - a tacit mention of positive law - but the Kojevian account assimilates this to the

anthropological exegesis of desire in its generality. In this way, therefore, will it serve not only to generalize a Hegel of 'appropriation' but also to obscure the **question of law** as basic to Hegel's system. Kojève serves to elide the legal right of appropriation with the anthropological 'facts'. Here are items left to Derrida: the deconstruction of le propre serves to elide bourgeois right with a Hegel whose system (concerned not with the determination of the fixed oppositions of right, not with the attempt to think a law other than 'positive') justifies and generalizes that right as 'truth itself'.

The pivot of Kojève's narrative is, of course, the dialectic of lordship and bondage. What is significant in the light of its education of deconstruction is that the Kojévian lecture construes the surrender of the slave-to-be as the result of the fear of death but goes on - against the grain of a Hegel for whom death is the difference that **demand**s cognition, that which effects the demand of complete re-cognition of individual and universal, death as determinate negation, the "speculative Good Friday", "the hard saying that God is dead", etc - the anthropological account goes on to assert that death is "something which is no longer anything more than an unconscious thing from which the living man turns away in indifference, since he can no longer expect anything from it himself"[32]. This is to return to a 'restricted

economy' for which death is not profitable yet, simultaneously, is evidence of that which as unprofitable, a matter of 'indifference', is unthought and unthinkable within the terms of appropriation. Derrida takes from the Kojevian Hegel that indifference to death that stems from the latter's unprofitability for speculation and asks after this aversion to absolute negation. The unappropriable loss becomes the constitutive 'nothing' - the differance of le propre - whilst, across the Hegelian text, it will be traced in the figures or elements that betray that 'indifference' in their intimations of absolute loss and unconsciousness. For Kojève, then, death is not 'demanding' but is rather a matter of profit ('what can I expect from it myself?') as death is mastered and put to work in the negating labour of the slave; the work which concludes - as Bataille notes - in the worker's becoming God, the state. The slave begins to work from fear of the master, the master supplies an ideal of autonomy, the slave finally grasps that the world against which he is pitted and which enslaves him is his own creation: this is work as the path to "perfection"[33], it is a process of positing negation which is time as it is synonymous with history - "it is only by work that man is a supernatural being that is conscious of its reality; by working he is 'incarnated' Spirit, he is historical 'World', he is 'objectivised' History"[34]. Through the labour of the negative - "forced labour"[35], at that -

through the desire of autonomy which is necessarily achieved only through annihilation of alterity, "at the expense of Being"[36], history can be completed as the human worker looks at a humanly-created world. Kojève transfers Hegel wholesale into the domain of practical reason: the 'ought' of autonomy, embodied in the master, is realized through the technological conquest of the non-identical, the telos of Spirit is to assimilate and "humanize"[37] hostile nature. Finally, with the realization of "the ideal of autonomy, of Being-for-self"[38], the slave completes history in the dissolution of the distinction of mastery and servitude in the worker's attainment of self-mastery. The initial integrity of the speaking subject, therefore, has been expanded to incorporate the world in its appropriation-through-negation by consciousness. This end is objectively achieved in the specific historical instance of the Napoleonic victory which, made understandable by Hegel, thereby becomes subjective, self-conscious. "History will be completed at the moment when the synthesis of the Master and Slave is realized, that synthesis that is the whole Man, the Citizen of the universal and homogeneous state created by Napoleon"[39]: the division of labour in the collaboration of Hegel and Napoleon is such that it is Hegel's task to affirm this completion and it is because Hegel knows that here the dialectic of master and slave is to end in the self-

mastery of citizenship, ie. the universal state, "his conception of the World is a **total** conception, [...] his knowledge is an **absolute** knowledge"[40]. As such, this knowledge sets forth the self-mastery of the former-slave as the fulfillment of Christianity - the bright transparency of the Napoleonic state burns away the misty residues of religious representation; the fully-satisfied citizen himself realizes "the myth of Jesus Christ, of the God-Man"[41].

For Kojève this is revolutionary (and Bataille, as Derrida notes, saw no "fundamental rupture" between a Kojévian Hegel and Marx[42]). Yet what is embraced in this account of Hegel - and what serves to join the 'metaphysical' and 'political' aspects of the notion of 'le propre' applied critically to Hegel - is the generalization of the legal right of appropriation (the presupposition of private property) through an anthropologized 'desire' (supposedly justified philosophically by Hegel's text) and the recuperation of this right in such a way that its universality is acknowledged without recognition of its formality. That is to say, Kojève conceives of 'identity' and 'cognition' always in accordance with the formal universality of concept of legality of the bourgeois state: desire's end is the self-realization, the autonomy, provided by that state - self-mastery in citizenship. Equally, the universality of the right of appropriation is

never questioned in its formality. Judith Butler is correct to identify the Kojevian Hegel as one always within the orbit of natural law[43] for that securing of absolute self-identity in opposition to the manifold echoes the criticisms contained in Hegel's 'Natural Law'. Recalling that essay's account of Fichte serves to focus on the fixity of the Kojevian opposition of worker-ego and 'alterity' - one is returned to the abstract oppositions of practical reason whereby unity may subsist but only as domination and subsumption, in the "formal Ideal of the identity of the real and ideal"[44]. The opposition persists and its violence can go unnoticed only if the adherence to its formal universality - the acceptance of its law - is maintained. Kojève passes down to his pupils a Hegel who is indifferent to legal form inasmuch as he presupposes and justifies always one form alone - bourgeois private property law; the abstract, formal universal which subsumes alterity or intuition beneath its concept. Nevertheless - and herein lies the 'solution' to the paradox of a 'revolutionary' Kojève - the fragility of this world-conquering imperial concept is its formality as registered in Kojève's attitude towards Rome: there is suppressed in the Kojevian account a re-cognition of Napoleonic 'right' inasmuch as the lectures, whilst embracing the bourgeois state (never qualified as such), reject - on account of its 'difference', its mobile and ununifiable structure - bourgeois (civil) society.

Napoleon is perceived as Hellenic: Kojève maintains a strict division between the self-mastery of the citizen and that of the person, the bourgeois, for whereas the former is the slave only of himself, the latter is the slave of his capital. The bourgeois is offensive to Hegelianism on this account for he does not work "by being supported by the idea of the **Community**, of the State: one can - and one must - work for the State"[45]. The Kojevian diktat is chilling for one recognises here the abstract legal state that disqualifies, in the suppression of its contradiction, the 'non-identity' of civil society. Here, the state and propriety have been allied in their formal universality and the substance of personality - money - has been acknowledged as their dissolution and for that reason suppressed.

One finds here, therefore, the filiation of Derrida's Hegel and the imperative of the differance of le propre. History comes to an end in the assimilation of alterity under the law of the absolute state, a self-transparency identical to that of the voice that says 'I'. The Cartesian self-consciousness is augmented by the Hegelian absolute knowledge of its own world-historical becoming and conclusion in "the one who perfects the ideal of the French Revolution by completing it"[46]. Yet this is half the story - Kojève has contrived to reconstruct a Hegel of practical reason (the 'identity' is relative - the concept

must suppress the non-identical) wherein 'closure' is achieved through the constitution of the bourgeois-revolutionary state but which remains implacably opposed to private property. This is to say that under the formal concept of 'citizenship' (posited a second time: Kojève's legislation being as abstract and 'unHellenic' as that of the revolution) the atomised world of civil society is occluded. In the celebration of the 'droits du citoyen' the 'other' aspect of the bourgeois revolution, the one that opens the formal universal to the unleashed force of concrete difference, the institution of the 'droits de l'homme', goes unmentioned. The question of Kojève (which is to say, that of the French Hegel) and of his position left or right is resolved in the anachrony of his status as propagandist of the bourgeois **political** revolution. The one-sidedness is never more apparent than when reflected by that singular account of the Janus-face of bourgeois revolution, Marx's 'On the Jewish Question'.

"The perfection of the idealism of the state was at the same time the perfection of the materialism of civil society. The shaking off of the political yoke was at the same time the shaking off of the bonds which had held in check the egoistic spirit of civil society. Political emancipation was at the same time the emancipation of civil society from politics, from even the **appearance** of universal content." [47]

Kojève's account shifts location from Athens to Rome, then, as the necessity of its maintaining the idealism of the state means the ever-more forceful suppression of the 'differentiation' of money. Despotic and abstract, this

'universal' is far from Hegelian ethical life, whilst its antipathy to the mobility and incoherence of a society organized by commodity exchange, means that it opposes the bourgeois by more loudly heralding the absolute knowledge of the citizen in his 'own' state.

This, then, is the Hegel that Derrida confronts. The "remain(s) of a Hegel" is the interrogation of that which escapes the law of the absolute state. Moreover, the Kojevian heritage of Derrida means that the multiple forms of 'law' (and thus of 'subjectivity') contained in the Phenomenology necessarily go unnoticed so that the prejudices of private property law - and that ready-made structure of opposition - renders the text uniform and continuous. In addition, the proximity of the Kojevian reading to natural law - its presupposition and generalization of the model of private property - is maintained and obscured by its one-sided adherence to the abstract, modern state that is manifested in its hostility to the 'effect' of private property. Kojève knows that legal personality is the dissolution of ethical life. The lesson that Glas will derive is to concur with Kojève in the construction of Sittlichkeit as the modern state and to embrace as its presupposition and dissolution - its condition of (im)possibility - the realm of commodity-production and exchange. The "remain(s)" of Hegel, therefore, are the elements which are convened as

inadmissable, unrelievable - unsubsumable. In the course of this essay I attempt to trace the construal of these 'elements', to demonstrate the 'statist' construction of Hegel that they depend upon and to determine them as the differance - the transcendentalised aporia - of that 'universal'. I attempt to show that Hegel does not pursue a course of 'legislating', of positing, and that he is not to be construed according to a strictly linear narrative of alienation and appropriation, concluding in a panoptical presence. The thesis, nevertheless, seeks to accomplish this **immanently** rather than counterpose (and thereby confirm) the system as 'Hegel-as-a-whole'. It seeks to reconstruct the 'difference' of Hegel from within the text of its transcendentalisation, to reanimate the "remain(s)" in the determination of their 'non-meaning' whilst not subscribing to the Hegel that necessitated their 'de-positing'. Equally, I have tried to respect the rhetoric and metonymy of Derrida's book - a work impossible to leave with a sense of having been adequate to the task of its reading - without, at the same time, remaining fixed in its glare.

Antigone, Genet, religion and the Jews - these are the figures of the "remain(s) of a Hegel" and this essay pursues their extraction and deployment as it does the Hegel for whom they are indigestible. In the second chapter I shall interrogate the deconstructive restaging

of Hegel's reading of Antigone - attending to the Kojevian directions that determine Glas's production - and confront the perspicuous focus on Antigone with its erroneous schema. In chapter three, the thesis addresses Glas's interpretation of 'Spirit' and the 'absolute religion' with particular reference to Hegel's essay on 'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate'. Contrary to Derrida's reading - conducted in the light of 'Spirit' construed as the identity of Father and Son with its itinerary conceived as one of self-filiation - I seek to reread the essay and the question of 'Hegel's Christianity' through the notion of 'fate' and its eschewal of positive law, underscoring Hegel's reading of Jesus' attempt to found a conception of ethical life beyond the fixed abstractions of (Jewish) law and the failure of this attempt. Whilst Glas conceives of Hegel's Jesus as an absolute positing - and thereby the 'fulfillment' of the Jewish law - the thesis argues that this is indicative of deconstruction's inability to conceive of law except as posited. For the reason of their 'insufficiency' in the light of the law of the absolute religion and their adherence to a nonmanifest God, Glas determines the Jews as a remainder and the second part of chapter three follows the 'relapse' of Christianity into Judaism as the impossibility of parousia is apparent. Replying to this, the thesis finds that this failure of identity of presence and re-presentation betrays once more the trace of Kojève: the distinction of

state and civil society - the formal self-identity of the citizen in the state and the concrete difference of the individual in the realm of needs - is also that of state and religion. Through a reading of Marx's 'On the Jewish Question' the significance of the Jews in this context and the 'return' of the absolute religion to that of the Unhappy Consciousness is explicated. The final chapter concludes with the reading of Glas's repatterning of the Phenomenology's 'Absolute Knowing', contesting the reading of that 'conclusion' as 'signification fulfilled'.

The reading of the remains is embarked upon, however, by addressing the question of a "general fetishism", what I take to be the 'method' of Glas and what enacts the sitelessness and 'undecidability' of the elements inadmissible to the system. By way of Freud's account of fetishism, this method 'sexualizes' the transcendental difference: what Glas will pursue in its construal of Antigone and the law of woman, family and the unconscious, is borne in differance as the 'trace' of maternal castration which the fetish both disavows and affirms. Glas thereby 'sexualizes' the aporia that is unrelievable by Hegel, simultaneously convening Hegel as the justification of the masculine law. The two columns of Glas with their indents, jealousies and judases, are the enactment of this method and Genet - whose text is read as affirmatively-fetishistic - is read as expropriative of

Hegel, as unsubsumable by Hegelian law in his refusal of position. Whilst refusing to accept the reading of Hegel propounded, I also seek to determine the communication of this general fetishism with the commodity-fetish. The argument that establishes Derrida as expropriative of the formal universality identified with property-right necessarily notices that the fetishism of the commodity is unmentioned by Glas as it attends solely to the religious analogy in Marx's account. Derrida identifies the determination of the fetish with a reduction to presence and the power of the fetishised commodity in its capacity of alienation and dissolution, its ability to render all 'persons' Ersatzen, elides it with the sublime power of the letter in written law. The radical self-dispossession of deconstruction is carried out in Glas under the name of a general fetishism; Glas would thereby 'situate' its alienation beyond any possibility of determination. Nevertheless, through the return to the elements of the works of Hegel that Glas 'remains' and by way of the lineage of the deconstructive Hegel-critique, this essay shall try to bear witness to that 'erased' law of Glas as a transcendentalised alienation which depends on and remains within - just as it disowns - positive private property law.

Notes

- 1 Jacques Derrida, Glas (Paris: Galilee, 1974), pla. Throughout most of this essay references will be to the translation, Glas, trans. John P. Leavey & Richard Rand (Lincoln & London: Univ of Nebraska Press, 1986), pla [References to Glas are hereafter abbreviated to G1: page refs to the 'Hegel' column are followed by the letter 'a'; to the 'Genet' column by 'b'.]
- 2 J M Bernstein, The Fate of Art (Cambridge: Polity, 1991) p192
- 3 Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Allan Bass (London & Henley: Routledge, 1978), p259 [Hereafter abbreviated to W&D]
- 4 Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins, 1974), p20 [Hereafter abbreviated to OG]
- 5 *ibid*, p24
- 6 *ibid*, p26
- 7 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Allan Bass (Brighton: Harvester, 1982), p3 [Hereafter abbreviated to M]
- 8 *ibid*, p26
- 9 OG, p26
- 10 *ibid*, p10
- 11 W&D, p178
- 12 OG, p70
- 13 cf. OG, p70
- 14 cf. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 'Legal Status' paras 477- 484 [Hereafter abbreviated to PhS]
- 15 cf. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), p289
- 16 PhS, para 478
- 17 *ibid*, para 480 [my emphasis]
- 18 *ibid*.
- 19 *ibid*, para 478
- 20 cf. below, Chapter One, section ii.
- 21 PhS, para 480
- 22 *ibid*.
- 23 This, admittedly, is not without a degree of anachrony: there is no democracy in the Rome of this time but the antithesis of an abstract state and atomised but 'concrete' civil society serves to underscore the relation of the Kojevian 'Napoleonic' state and the non-identity it presupposes and denies and which would subvert its formal unity. The thesis construes the latter as embraced by the 'expropriative' movement of differance.
- 24 Hegel, Philosophy of History, p317
- 25 W&D, p257
- 26 *ibid*, p334, n.7
- 27 G. Bataille, 'Le coupable' in Oevres Completes, p341 quoted in Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 1989), p195

- 28 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel
trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca & London: Cornell
Univ Press, 1980), p3 [Hereafter abbreviated as IRH]
- 29 *ibid*, p40
- 30 *ibid*.
- 31 *ibid*.
- 32 *ibid*, p15
- 33 *ibid*, p23
- 34 *ibid*, p25
- 36 *ibid*, p3
- 37 *ibid*, p11
- 38 *ibid*.
- 39 *ibid*, p44
- 40 *ibid*.
- 41 *ibid*, p70
- 42 cf. n.26
- 43 Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1987), p43
- 44 Hegel, Natural Law, trans. T.M. Knox (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975), p73
- 45 IRH, p65
- 46 *ibid*, p35
- 47 Marx, Early Writings trans. Rodney Livingstone &
Gregory Benton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p233

CHAPTER ONE

Fetishism strict and general: Hegel, Genet and the two columns of Glas

i. The "remain(s)" of castration: Hegel-critique by way of the Ersatz

For all its obscurity, ambivalence and duplicity, Glas asks its central question with a programmatic clarity. Its opening sentence inquires: "what after all, of the remain(s), today, for us, here, now, of a Hegel?"[1], whilst over the page and across the divide, in the right-hand column of the text, this "remain(s)" - 'reste' - gains greater definition as "indescribable, or almost so: not by virtue of an empiric approximation, but rigorously undecidable"[2]. The end of the textual exertions of Glas is the tracing of this remainder of Hegel and the method through which it comes to be si(gh)ted is that of the "remain(s)" as "undecidable". Enigmatic as this talk of remains is, it nevertheless harmonizes with the traditional Hegel-critique that maintains the assimilation of all alterity and the recuperation of all difference in identity by means of a dialectics cut short. The isolation of the "remain(s)" is to afford the possibility of gaining a critical purchase upon the Hegelian system which is, so Glas maintains, impossible so long as it is confronted on its own terms - that is, **confronted**: with its implication of opposition and, therefore, of identification-in-difference, confrontation with Hegel

will always be 'on his terms'. The "remain(s)" will, therefore, be the remains of the absolute identity constructed by the system, will be that which is useless to the structure or can only be included with the greatest of effort.

At first, then, this seems to be in complete continuity with the orthodoxy of anti-Hegelianism. indeed, it appears to restate that attempt at Hegel-critique which has, for example, been reiterated by a recent work - and in an essay whose subject, too, largely chimes with that of Glas. In 'On Hegel, Woman and Irony', Seyla Benhabib asserts "what remains of the dialectic is what Hegel precisely thought he could dispense with: irony, tragedy and contingency"[3]: the radical method of difference is what remains and does so still adhering to 'dialectic'. Yet the remains of Glas seeks to pursue that 'difference' to the point where it can no longer be included in any structure of opposition: to a point where - prepared by the tradition's **methodological-dialectical difference - its status is transcendental**. This is the difference that **permits** identification and which, literally 'no-thing' itself, refuses identity even as it is named: the difference which, in accordance with the tradition's knowledge of the transcendental, is unknowable and therefore excused from any structure of opposition. Thus, the "remain(s)" which is the radicalised method (the

dialectic which cannot be bound by the terms of the system) comes to be transcendentalised as it is afforded methodological priority. Whence it escapes even its oppositional structure, emerging as that which is no longer determinately negative (all determinacy is drained from the thing - its condition of possibility is the nothing of absolute difference) and so, constituted by an organising nothingness which, as such, cannot be known, the method of difference assumes the form of the "economy of the undecidable"[4].

The traditional dialectical remainder - of which Benhabib would be simply the most recent excavator - is, thus, utterly refused. Identified with the same presupposition of knowledge as assimilation, clarification, reduction to the self-same as that ascribed to the system, this dialectical remainder would, for instance, be an earnest definition of the meaning of irony, a reconciliation through explanation of the oppositions of tragedy, an account of the very necessity of the contingent - and all undertaken in the name of that which the system represses. The method and telos of Glas is the remainder maintained: the 'Other' of the Hegelian text is only just explicable - and then only as "undecidable". Like the tradition of the radical method it seeks to attend to what has been repressed, interiorised, coerced into reconciliation and does so - again in continuity with the orthodoxy - by way

of an account of the very impossibility of that reconciliation. Yet the radicals of the method viewed this impossibility as the result of an unreconciled socio-political world: Hegelian integrity was reconciliation under the duress of an antagonistic civil society, a **substitute** revolution. A most important and significant distinguishing mark of the Derridean critique - and one intimately bound up with its departure from 'dialectics' - is that, like the radical method, it attends to the substitutive character of the system, it continues to consider the latter's integrity as an Ersatz, yet its "remain(s)" - for all its contemporaneity ("here, now, today, for us") - abandons the social and political dimension almost entirely. Or rather, the Prussian Hegel, aristocratic apologist of the bourgeois state, **is** in evidence - indeed is the certified author of the system: the "aigle"[5] carrying higher the aquiline-imperial concept and emblematic of its apotheosis in the Kriegstaat - yet this is not what the substitute-system covers.

At the risk of anticipating the development of the "remain(s)" and the finer delineation of the method of the undecidable, this concern with the state could be sited within Derrida's construction by reference to a quotation from Freud's essay on 'Fetishism' - a citation absent from Glas yet, as will be seen, crucial to it. The Prusso-Roman Hegel of the imperium of the Concept is organised

according to a structure of substitution. In concord with the 'dialectical remains' of the radical method, the integrity of the Hegelian subject is regarded by Glas as a **substitute** for the unreconciled actuality of the social substance, however, in departure from this, the 'proper ground of critique' - the Hegelian concern to mask the contradictions of the state - Derrida indicates that the systematic need of integrity springs from a deeper well. When Freud discusses the child's discovery of the mother's lack of a penis he describes the consequent (unconscious) fear of castration and the defence against this loss: a fundamental difference - coming to light in the event of an attempt at union - is conceived as a threat to identity and in response this integrity is asserted, great attention is devoted to that which is under threat and this 'counter-assertion' spreads to other elements in the subject's life. The substitute that Hegel supplies is, then, an Ersatz for castration: the concern for the integrity of the state is not the result and mask of divided social interests so much as a response to the anxiety provoked by the cut that threatens to divide the boy-child from itself. Provisionally stated and in anticipation of the detail of this fetishism and its role in Glas, the significance of the social and political in that text - metonymically implied, the importance of sexual politics, the emergence of a phallocratic Hegel, etc - can be drawn from Freud's account. The conservative

system is configured as the sign of panic whose 'similarity' is the source of the "remain(s)", the realm constructed by "aigle" and to whose defence he rushes is then constructed within the context of castration anxiety.

Freud writes:

"What happened, therefore, was that the boy refused to take cognizance of the fact of his having perceived that a woman does not possess a penis. No, that could not be true: for if a woman had been castrated, then his own possession of a penis was in danger; and against that there rose in rebellion a portion of his narcissism which Nature has, as a precaution, attached to that particular organ. In later life a grown man may perhaps experience a similar panic when the cry goes up that Throne and Altar are in danger[.]"[6]

Before returning to the interpretation of the system as erected against this fundamental threat and to the details of the discussion of fetishism, it is worthwhile to pursue the metaphor of the "remain(s)" insofar as it underscores the text's presupposition of the Hegelian subject. As has been noted, the dialectical method transmutes into the transcendental difference - the former's structure of determinate negation flattens into an "economy of the undecidable". This is the route and consequence of a difference rendered constitutive and the notion of the "remain(s)" carries this through by virtue of its allusion to the carcass or the droppings which are the traces of an animal. The remain(s) thereby reiterate what has fallen from the self-identical and cannot be reabsorbed, indeed - and most importantly - there is the unmistakable sense

that this excreta is the guarantee of vitality and simultaneously repellent to it. What is being deposited, then, is the 'inessential' shell or the waste-product as the sign of life or spirit that has fled: the remains indicate what was the condition of possibility of life - death, absolute difference - and they 'are' not, do not live, even as they were expelled as a vital self-positing. This is to rehearse in the language of Glas the grammatological schema already familiar from elsewhere in Derrida's oeuvre. Which is to say that this is to attend to differance as the condition of (im)possibility of self-presence; the necessarily anterior structure of iterability for the possibility of 'proper names', the transcendental alienation that is the possibility of appropriation. Iterability as the possibility of naming: this is to assert that in order that the Setzung of self-identity, "metaphysics of the proper [le propre]", the proper name, be possible there must be a transcendental ground of the Ersatz, or - as unnameable except metaphysically - an Ersatz 'transcendental ground'. The 'dehiscence' - construed as the sine qua non of meaning - to which the remains point, is then the transcendental Ersatz/Ersatz transcendental: the structure of iterability is what removes, as it grants, the stability and completeness of identity which the Setzung would seek. Named, this structure is one of transcendental alienation - in Glas it figures as theft and flight (vol) and,

registered in the complicity of castration-anxiety and phallogocentrism, it organizes around the no-place/no-thing of a certain hole. This context Derrida has already remarked upon in 'La parole soufflée':

"Speech is stolen, since it is stolen from language it is, then, stolen from itself, that is from the thief who has always already lost speech as property and initiative. Because its forethought cannot be predicted, the act of reading perforates the act of speaking or writing. And through this perforation, this hole, I escape myself." [7]

"The form of the hole", Derrida adds, "communicates with a scatological thematic": out of it comes the remains as excrement - the escape of the work from the author, the expropriation of the proprietor - whilst it is also a transcendental hole - anterior to the proprietor.

Differance as theft, differance as this hole: one arrives at Glas and the structure of transcendental iteration, the constitutive Ersetzung as **fetishism**, for the "remain(s)" will be configured as the effects and the registration of the hole; the 'hole' that reinscribes the Freudian maternal 'castration' - the self-identical Setzung reconstructed as the response to the threat of that differance of the phallus.

"Remain(s) is always said of the mother" [8]: differance is a **matrix**, for its 'no-place' is aligned with the construal of the mother's absent penis - a transcendentalized difference, sited only in its effects. This is, then, the complicity of signification and metaphysics in the

structure that Freud describes in 'Fetishism' - the 'castrated' mother produces a fear of castration in the male child which is denied in the erection of a substitute maternal phallus:

"Yes, in his mind the woman **has** got a penis, in spite of everything; but this penis is no longer the same as it was before. Something else has taken in its place, has been appointed its substitute, as it were and now inherits the interest which was formerly directed to its predecessor." [9]

This conception of the substitute, according to Glas, is a "strict fetishism" [10]: the truth is the (castrated) maternal phallus, the substitute - its ideological disguise, as it were (as will be seen, there is underway a critique of the radical method's concept of 'ideology') - is the fetish. The fetish would be a substitute, false and opposed to the self-evident truth of which it is a copy or imitation. For Derrida this means that "something - the thing - is no longer itself a substitute; there is the nonsubstitute, that is what constitutes the concept fetish" [11], the concept 'fetish' (and Derrida is approaching saying that the concept is fetishistic, the concept-fetish) is then "the sphere of truth, the opposition of Ersatz to non-Ersatz, the space of good sense, of sense itself" [12]. It is within this context, then, that 'phallogocentrism' makes sense - which is to say that the phallus **makes** sense. Just as the logocentrism of the s'entendre parler represses its constitutive difference - registered in its dependency on

the inscription which escapes the authorial voice - so does phallogentrism arise as the counter-assertion that seeks to maintain its integrity against an anterior threat of division, repressing the cut that is thereby its, the phallus's, constitution.

A closer attendance to the maternal phallus, to the occasion of the mother's castration, teaches, however, that the structure of substitution erected by strict fetishism cannot be maintained. The woman has always already been castrated, the maternal penis 'is' never. Whereas Freud asserts that "the fetish is the substitute (Ersatz) of the woman's (the mother's) penis"[13] and the phallus would thereby be the general 'key', the transcendental signifier (this is always Derrida's reading of Lacan's work: the phallus as undisturbed and maintained in its circulation, in its 'always arriving' at its self-destination[14]). This key, however, comes to be seen as a substitute for a substitute; the (fetishistically phallic) key as the 'fundamental' but never-present phallus of the mother. The maternal phallus is, itself, an Ersatz, is itself fetishistic: it is what "the little boy once believed in and [...] does not want to give up"[15]. Sarah Kofman considers that with this conception Freud, himself, effects a rupture with metaphysical opposition and is given too little credit by Derrida. According to Freud, the fetish

"breaks with metaphysics, with the idea of the penis as the 'thing itself' since the penis for which the fetish is the substitute is a phantasmatic penis, and has never been perceived as such, [...] the mother's penis, 'the thing itself', is always already a fetish fictionalised by the child, a belief implying at the same time the denial and affirmation of castration." [16]

This is a rupture with strict fetishism and is its inscription within a **general** fetishism. There is no original, phallic, Setzung except as a structure of Ersetzung and, thus, the substitute is not opposable to the 'thing itself' - rather, the constitutive no-place/no-thing provokes the attempt to erect the thing itself and within this structure 'opposition' transmutes into 'oscillation'. The transcendental Ersatz produces a phallic Setzung which both denies and affirms the fear of division and disintegration which effected it.

Fetishism as the method of Glas, the 'knell': the title resounds to this as the ceaseless oscillation of the clapper in the bell - the bell which is both hollow and hard, affirms and disavows the mother's castration, the bell which is the form of a sheath. Freud's account sets the text ringing with "the argument of the **girdle**, the **sheath** [gaine]" [17] as he describes the simultaneity and ambivalence of the fetish as with "the patient [who] oscillated in every situation in life between two assumptions" and in

"the case of a man whose fetish was an athletic support belt which could also be worn as as bathing-drawers. This piece of clothing covered up the genitals entirely and concealed the distinction between them. Analysis showed

that it signified that women were castrated and were not castrated; and it allowed of the hypothesis that men were castrated, for all these possibilities were concealed under the belt."[18]

The duplicity of the fetish - constituted by a perforation and escaping from comprehension as if through a hole - is then the reason for - and of - an "economy of the undecidable": this oscillation is a **death** knell for it announces the fundamental expropriation of the truth as self-presence, self-proper. The Hegelian system had been criticized as "dialectics cut short"[19], as recuperative: with the method of general fetishism dialectics itself is regarded as appropriative, its own 'cutting' - evident in its **oppositional** difference, self-inflicted for presupposing a fundamentally-integral subject - is reconstructed within the context of an attempt to control and contain the effects of a castration complex, maintain that presupposed integrity. The economy of the undecidable, general fetishism, would see all thought of 'truth' as fetishistic: overcoming that transcendental 'loss' of the maternal penis with the counter-erection (what Derrida terms the "antherrection") of the 'thing itself', its positing of the self-proper as a "sign of triumph"[20] over the female 'void'. It would regard the subsequent differentiating and self-dividing of determinate negation as premised upon the defence of what dialectics tries to maintain as a 'fundamental' identity. Earnest explanation of irony, reconciliation in the

'meaning' of tragedy, inclusion through the granting of rights to woman: this would be the 'truth' of the "dialectical remains", the difference regarded as surmountable inasmuch as it is predicated on opposition, thus, identity. Yet the oscillation of the sheath-argument surpasses this basic identity for the fetish is both denial and affirmation: dialectics, Derrida considers, is never entirely serious about the simultaneity of the terms of its 'contradiction' - "this at-once, the in-the-same-stroke, the du-meme-coup of the two contraries, of the two opposite operations, prohibits cutting through to a decision within the undecidable". The method of this generalised fetishism, therefore, "plays with the dialectical", it undermines the dialectical "feint" that "consists in pretending to lose, to castrate oneself, to kill oneself in order to cut [couper] death off" in its maintenance of the remain(s) wherein the transcendental castration - the originary Ersatz - is registered and repressed. The transcendental alienation will not permit the dialectical 'semi-castration' for there is, thereby, no possibility of a guarantee of accumulation through speculation - the subject of property alienating a portion of that property the better to appropriate the interest. The right to that propriety has always already been lost, the gambler cannot win: "one loses on both sides, in both registers, in knowing how to play all sides [sur les deux tables]"[21].

The "remain(s)", then, are deposits which refuse reappropriation: they indicate the impossibility of the Hegelian system and the conditions of that impossibility. As resistant to Hegel, Derrida is concerned that they should not reflect a naively 'external' view of Hegel nor, however, represent any 'immanent' critique. Indeed, the argument that attaches to the remains demonstrates - by means of its transformation of the dialectical difference into transcendental difference (that is, its departure from **determinate** negation) - what the 'radical method' chose to ignore: the indissolubility of 'method' and 'system'. The "remain(s)" of Glas complete the task of distinguishing method and system undertaken by the previous critique of Hegel: transcendentalised, the methodological difference renders impossible the systematic closure which the radical method, also, sought to preclude - and it does so by underscoring (again in harmony with 'dialectics') the **substitutive** character of this purportedly 'conclusive' identity. However, the deconstructive critique of Hegel then effects what amounts to a radicalisation of the radical method - dialectics, through fear of its being 'cut short', is sent into perpetual oscillation. The 'method' did not recognise its identity with the 'system' - contained in the determinate negation; identity and contradiction of the True as 'in-itself for-consciousness'[22] - and comes to the recognition of this unity only as Glas subsumes both,

together, under the category of strict fetishism or restricted economy. This is to say, the method conceived Hegel in terms of sheer, abstract opposition such that the 'in-itself for-consciousness' was recognised not as the process of recognition and misrecognition which affects consciousness and its 'object' - the history of formation (Bildung) of the determination of the abstractions and oppositions of metaphysics - rather, the methodological difference presupposed those abstractions and oppositions (indeed, **as** oppositions) and sought to reinvigorate the term it considered suppressed. In the formal-identical understanding of the 'in-itself for-consciousness' therefore, the determination of the true out of the self-inadequation of the thought of the object is transformed into the imposition of thought upon the object, the object devoured by an omnipotent subject - the 'in-itself' is subsumed beneath its characterization 'for-consciousness'. In response to this, the dialectic can merely seek to act as an emetic, compel the system to vomit, excrete what it has ingested, and in this the transformation effected in differance is realized: the attention to the "remain(s)" is to this excrement that indicates an unsustainable formal identity, the dialectical inversion of the 'in-itself for-consciousness' whereby the thing-itself escapes except as a relativistic 'for consciousness' - this is the passage to a generalised Ersatz.

This is the "economy of the undecidable": not only is the (formal) identity of the method's 'conservative system' criticised and abandoned but so too is the dialectic's oppositional structure for, adhering to the task of uncovering the false 'in-itself' of the system, the dialectical method nevertheless undertakes the attempt to determine the truth of that falsity. It is, therefore, in its unconscious fidelity to the - otherwise misconstrued - **speculative** thought of Hegel that the method is rejoined to the system by Glas. Indeed, Glas's rupture with the method of difference is due to its having known something like this unity all along thanks to the **Kojevean** reading which guides its Hegel. It is through this interpretation that Glas presumes the unity of 'dialectic' and systematic closure: the dialectical method is at one with the body of the system as the labouring-negating 'desire' of the subject of the system whose satiety in the product of its labour is the latter's closure (this is the "dialectic of **human** existence" which is, in Kojève's words, "in my opinion [...] Hegel's principal title to glory"[23]). It is this Kojèvean unity of system and method that, conducted on the side of a 'radicalism', effects the deconstructive need for a further radicalisation - the transcendentalisation - of difference.

The effects and indications of a transcendentalized 'difference' which retain the impossibility of synthesis

that such a **constitutive** 'cut' involves - the "remain(s)" - are thus the registration of the effects of the "trace" of castration. The metaphysical or dialectical difference - always conceived as the assimilation or victory of the masculine, 'active', term of differentiation over the 'passive' feminine - is 're-sexed'; the text resounds to the effect of the woman. This is to say that the elements which will be inadmissible in the system of decidability refuse the moment of synthesis through their dissembling, doubling, their asserting at one and the same time the integrity and the incompleteness of the 'subject'. Moreover, the alignment of the transcendental difference with the unrepresentable anteriority of the event of the castration of the mother, not only permits "the remain(s)" to indicate a 'feminine' effect on the text but also - in that this effect is the "antherrection", the disavowal of castration in the 'erection against' the threat, the structure of phallogocentrism as it represses the constitutive difference - this feminine effect as it gives rise to fetishism renders sexual difference, too, a matter of indecision. The girdle-fetish permitted the wearer to maintain "that women were castrated and that they were not castrated; and it also allowed of the hypothesis that men were castrated" and, insofar as it was 'just a girdle', that they were not castrated. "The remain(s)" preclude the decision for that "cutting through" would be implicated in the 'original' cut/non-cut of the mother and

be an effect of it. When the transcendental difference which is constitutive of Hegel's work is construed in "the remain(s)" it will, then, being evocative of this 'arche-threat', be the remains of a sexual difference which would not tolerate its constriction in a structure of opposition. The Ersatz, transcendental expropriation, would be the echo of a repressed feminine that shakes the solid, solitary, phallic column of metaphysics. Glas has two columns; the book practices this method of general fetishism whereby neither opposition, direct correspondence nor - so it would have it - a common 'law' makes it possible to combine the two. Kofman describes how the Ersetzung is played out such that the columns "are not opposed; yet, they are heterogeneous: the generalised fetishism does not end up as an indifferentiation, neither sexual nor textual: one column does not speak the language of the other, it obeys neither the same rhythm nor the same law; they differ one from the other as 'the dialectic of the galactic', they are as two colossal towers erected on a double solitude, without any apparent relation".

Nevertheless, the undecidability of the fetish means that - whilst each does not exhaust the meaning of the other as 'its' other - there is a relation:

"Not opposed but heterogeneous, they nevertheless communicate among themselves: because these columns are not unbroached [inentamees], because they are double, oblique, because there are judases, jealousies, there is established between them a series of exchanges, of winks [clins d'oeil] - they glue and unglue [collent et decollent] passing from one to the other." [24]

Before examining more closely the construction of "a Hegel" wherein the 'fundamental' act of Setzung obscures the dependence on a general and transcendental Ersetzung, the metonymic "aigle" which discredits dialectics and the 'radical method' by collapsing it into the 'conservative system', assimilating the Roman and Prussian eagles through the Kojevian Napoleonic Hegel, before attending to the Hegelian system as the dialectical construction of an imperium, one should attend to the 'truth' of the two columns. That is, examine how, in its "oblique" difference from the Hegelian 'tower', Genet's affirmatively-fetishistic text effects the former and what - as the structure of undecidability - stands between them. Displacement of a 'virile' subject, inscription of the repressed and unreappropriable bodily "remain(s)", the account of theft and expropriation, the parody of mortification, etc: what will be prepared by an examination of the use to which Genet is put, the effect of the 'other' column, is, then, an encounter with that Roman Hegel of Ego and dominion. The presupposition of Hegel in accordance with the "metaphysics of the proper" will be seen to site Hegel within Roman legal status and "personality"; the Kojevian aigle of the abstract state and its unrecognised presupposition, the commodity. In this, one might witness the misreading of Hegel as it is reinforced by the 'other' column and embark on the reconsideration of the deconstructive 'general fetishism'

in the light of the structure of Ersetzung coterminous with the Setzung of property law in the fetishism of the commodity.

ii. Fetishism of the commodity: personality, property and the Ersatz

Through the Freudian account of the effect of the 'castrated' mother, Glas can translate the transcendental alienation of le propre, which the Grammatology traced as 'writing', into the politics of gender. The metaphysical proprietor is masculine and the anterior alienation which general fetishism records is the registration of phallogocentrism as the attempt to maintain ownership, to maintain the law, despite its 'absolute' status already having been destroyed. The phallogocentric Setzung is seen to 'depend' on a sitelessness - the maternal 'phallus', which is never present and is always representational, substitutive. Thus, the Setzung is possible only through the infrastructure of a general substitutability - a transcendental 'Ersetzung' which thereby renders the absolute identity of masculine self-positing, its secure integrity, always provisional and always vulnerable to threat. The masculine law is ruined through the "trace" of woman; the masculine law is always constructed 'against' this threat and herein lies its identitarian and suppressive telos. Hence, the woman, the

mother, all that does not confirm the full self-presence of the masculine concept (a tautology), is inadmissible to the system, unsubsumable by the law, for general fetishism precludes the conceptual reappropriation of the 'different' ('woman') as its negation inasmuch as that figure is the trace of conceptuality's condition of (im)possibility.

Differance implies a general fetishism: dialectics, a restricted fetishism. Glas makes explicit the departure of deconstruction from the Hegelian 'radical method', as it takes in the Marxian appropriation of Hegel.

Dialectics does not leave the restricted economy of this totalizing and recuperative method for, in adhering to the opposition of negative and positive - even if by way of positing-through-negation - it establishes the opposition of Ersatz and non-Ersatz. This "restricted" fetishism, therefore, does not acknowledge its being conditioned by and included within a general fetishism. It holds fast to the material truth which it considers, hitherto, to have been substituted in idealism's mystifications. The strict fetishism of radical dialectics does not realize that its concept is effective only through the anterior 'nothing', differance, and that this leaves the self-identity - the integrity - of the 'proper' always already breached. In addition, strict fetishism responds to this anterior alienation by asserting more forcefully its integrity - an

assertion that, in accordance with Freud's notion of the "oscillation" of the fetish, echoes the structure of signification as it both affirms and disavows its representational and Ersatz character. The priority and absolute truth of le propre discover themselves to be secondary and 'proper' only within the context of a general substitutability, a structure of representation. In short, radical dialectics replays the systematic reduction of differance inasmuch as it is the further reduction of the substitute in Hegel. Nevertheless, attendant to the question of propriety and formal universality, Marx's notion of 'fetishism' can be seen to restage the 'general fetishism', bearing on its character of anterior alienation and substitution and disclosing the limitations of a reading of Hegel - as well as Marx - that assigns him to a 'strict fetishism'. Indeed, this task - the introduction of the Marxian fetish - is already undertaken by Glas. Furthermore, it is in the Derridean construal of the fetish and its omission of any mention of the commodity that one glimpses a parasitism of the "remain(s)" and its fetishistic 'method' upon the alienating, substitutive power of the commodity-fetish.

From Hegel through Feuerbach to Marx, Derrida sees the engendering of a materialist dialectic by way of the reduction of what is construed as the Ersatz - idealized, theologized reality - to its anthropological basis and

truth. This, for deconstruction, is the pursuit of full self-presence through the rejection of structures of representation. It is the attempt to fill the 'gap' constitutive of meaning but always menacing it. As such it seizes on religion and the mother - both representative, both registering an impossible 'time anterior to all presence'. Glas attends to the young Marx's criticism of Feuerbach: Feuerbach resolves the Ersatz-family, the Holy Family, into the truth, the secular family; Marx sees this 'truth' as itself an Ersatz-unity, demanding that "once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret (Geheimnis) of the Holy Family, the former must be destroyed in theory and practice"[1]. The point is, then, to reduce the effects of the mother: reducing the Ersatz amounts to curtailing the familial influence, the dialectic must effect the complete reduction of the substitute, of the 'gap' that still pertains in Hegel's idealism even as the 'philosophy of religion' sought to comprehend self-presence in religious representation. Derrida quotes further the young Marx: "After all these delightful antics of idealism (ie of Young Hegelianism) expiring in the guise of criticism, even now idealism has not expressed the suspicion of the necessity to settle accounts critically with its mother [seiner Mutter], the Hegelian dialectic"[2]. The objective is an anthropological self-propriety, man not divided from himself through the

substitute-unities of religion or family, Ersatzen which register the effects of the feminine. Thus the dialectic reasserts itself as the project of phallogocentrism: against the transcendental alienation in the mother, it seeks to erect itself as the true, the non-Ersatz. It is not surprising to find the construction of a Hegel - one for whom religion is to be reduced to its essence in the full self-presence of man - elided with the young Marx. The elision is achieved in the dependency of Glas on the Left Hegelianism of Kojève. The strict fetishism - like the restricted economy - is the unrecognised method of Kojévian anthropologism; it is the reduction of all discourse to the status of an Ersatz-anthropology, everything reflecting in its essence man's universality, his propriety. Kojève declares that

"[f]or Hegel, the real object of religious thought is Man himself: every **theology** is necessarily an **anthropology**. The suprasensible entity, transcendent with respect to Nature - ie the **Spirit** - is in reality nothing but the negating (ie, creative) Action realized by Man in the given World. But as long as Man is religious, he is not aware of this: he thinks as a theologian, he substantializes and externalizes the **concept** (Begriff) of Spirit by **re-presenting** (Vor-stellen) it to himself in the form of a Being (Sein) outside of Man and independently of his Action. While in fact talking about himself religious Man believes he is talking about a God." [3]

For Glas, dialectics is a strict fetishism in its attempts to 'comprehend' an alienation that is constitutive, that cannot be conceived even as it provokes such attempts. The Kojévian alignment of a Hegel for whom God is the

bourgeois state and the anthropological early Marx - the construction of the masculine subject of the system as the invulnerable self-identity that incorporates religion as its alienated truth - is the source of Derrida's attempts to resuscitate this 'externality' just as it is the source of the reading of the Marxian 'fetish' and its continuity with Hegel. The substitute will always be revealed for what it really is, brought down to earth as the alienation that the subject performed upon itself: for Derrida and general fetishism this procedure is the consequence of the effects of an alienation that has always already taken place, an alienation that constitutes and sunders the absolute identity of the secularizing subject, that achieves and destabilizes even its very gender. The method of Glas is to echo the effect of the transcendental alienation of this "Man". It seeks to echo the reassertion of the incision, the castrating-cut, the differance that makes possible the vocal Kojevian subject, the anterior alienation that the reduction of representation to presence, alienation to property, religion to philosophy, attempts to suppress. The transfer from Hegel to Marx, however, reveals in its choice of texts that it is Kojève who provides the course for Derrida's critique of a strict fetishism by general fetishism. Thanks to Kojève, radical dialectics is to return man from the substitutes of religion and family to his 'proper' - material, technical, appropriative,

'practical' - self. The passages Glas excises from Marx's canon adhere resolutely to the orthodoxy's notion of 'false consciousness' whose paradigm lies in the opiate of religion. The reading of Marx undertaken by general fetishism restricts itself to (and names) the 1844 Manuscripts and the Theses on Feuerbach - works of the younger Marx - whilst, in its interim conclusion, it alludes to (neither naming nor quoting), eliding with the above, The German Ideology and Capital - the latter being the occasion of Marx's mention of "the fetish".

The elision of two differing conceptions of ideology and the reluctance of Derrida to undertake any close, 'rigorous', reading of the work that addresses the notion of fetishism appear symptomatic. In that first chapter of Capital are the resources for a criticism of the "economy of the undecidable" which would, nevertheless, refuse reduction to the demystified and non-Ersatz anthropological subject. In the account of the fetish of the commodity one discovers the attendance to the phenomenon of the Setzung that the anthropological account never mentions and whose antitheses it presupposes and 'naturalizes'. That is to say, Marx's discussion unfolds the equivocations of the 'proper' in legal positing and its definition of ethical life - of **social recognition** - in accordance with the categories and oppositions of property-ownership. The "economy of the undecidable",

moreover, can be reconvened as the result of the transcendentalisation of the suppressed 'difference' of appropriation and exchange, elucidated in Marx's account. The **substantial inequality** in the exchange between formally-equal proprietors would arise as a difference inadmissible by the universality of property law - an injustice of legality. Similarly, the formally-secondary 'thing' of property would attain substantial priority over the owner in exchange, as each abstractly-identical person is recognised in the concrete difference of his property - the phenomenon of personification/reification which maintains the formal universality of property right whilst rendering that self-identical 'I' a substitute-thing. This has been addressed in the Introduction: differance and the "remain(s)" effect and register the transcendental alienation of a Kojevian self-identity through the attendance to its fundamental presupposition of a subject of private property. The "economy of undecidability" seeks to ruin this propriety and finds its means in the generalization of the 'substance' of personality, of its formal identity and equality - that is, alienation (the inequality of exchange) and substitution (the personification of the commodity, the reification of the proprietor). The Kojevian and Derridean accounts, restricted economy and general economy, divide appropriation from alienation: the Kojevian propre suppresses all mention of its substantial difference,

bourgeois society and exchange, whilst the Derridean differance - by way of the 'un(re)cognizability' of the transcendental - can evade acknowledgement of the law it presupposes by its anteriority, convening appropriation as conditioned and frustrated by a transformed 'alienation'.

Derrida attempts both to allude to Capital and to restrict its reading to that of an anthropological Marx - the focus remains on the religious, re-presentative, character of the fetish. The Marxian 'fetish' appears in Glas associated with the family's theoretical and practical destruction:

"[t]his problematic will have been developed in the dark chamber of ideology: grappling with the question of fetishism and of truth (unveiled thought), of the status of **analogy** in the Marxist or psychoanalytic criticism of religion." [4]

Whence this "dark chamber", whence this "**analogy**"? This construction of Marx's 'ideology' - the elision of two texts, neither named - is the confusion of two different conceptions. Whence the dark chamber? In describing how "conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour" a metaphor comes to mind and The German Ideology asserts

"[i]f in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from the physical life-process". [5]

This is the classical restatement of 'ideology' as

epiphenomenal, superstructural - it is an Ersatz-reality produced by a trick of the light. And Derrida's "analogy"? In Chapter One, Section Four of Capital's first volume, Marx interrogates the power of the commodity, the reason for the thing's dominant and determining force. Split into use-value and exchange-value, the thing is on one side a thing satisfying needs, qualitative, whilst on the other a quantitative amount of value realizable in exchange. With the latter, qualitatively different forms of labour are rendered formally identical as they achieve their ends in the realization in exchange of the value of their products and, this being the case, are determined in the marketplace by their product and its value in money. The mystery of the commodity lies in the fact of this physical thing's mediating between individual producers; as quantitative, as a value, it is the reduction to identity of heterogeneous products and thereby of the difference of labouring individuals. In the structuring of ethical life according to legal personality and the right of property, the social bond of individuals resides in their private property: it is in the private transactions of commodity-owners that the social whole is constituted - this, one might add, is the presupposition of the 'community' of the modern state. Moreover, just as the formal universality of the state and the abstraction of the citoyen are the release of this heterogeneity, individualism and an-archy

which is brought to order by the commodity, so too is the abstract universality of the legal person realized in its substance as the guise of the commodity. The ethical whole is impossible to conceive, social relations and recognition can be conducted and gained only through exchange and the commodity, therefore, appears as the sublime master of society:

"the labour of the private individual manifests itself as an element of the total labour of society only through the relations which the act of exchange establishes between the products, and, through their mediation, between the producers. To the producers, therefore, the social relations between their private labours appear as what they are, ie they do not appear as direct social relations between persons in their work, but rather as material [dinglich] relations between persons and social relations between things"[7].

This is the enthrallment of the producers to their product: by virtue of commodity-production - the private production of goods which gain a social character through their assuming the form of value - individuals come under the sway of the products of their labour, are 'socialized' by these things and experience their social existence as one dictated by things. This is the fetishism of the commodity -

"[i]t is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic [phantasmagorische - phantasmagoric] form of a relation between things. In order, therefore to find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the products of the human brain appear as automous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relation with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands. I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is

therefore inseparable from the production of commodities." [8]

Derrida would rather not address the question of the fetish of the commodity, preferring to attend to its religious "analogy" and thereby focusing on the aspect best suited to the deconstructive schematized Marx, pursuing the suppression of difference in the privileging of presence over (religious) re-presentation. Whereas the earlier - anthropological - writings of Marx posited an essential subject of "species-being" and assumed a ready-made structure of opposition in self and nature, ultimately subsuming the 'object' under the subject, the discussion of commodity fetishism accords with Hegel's construction of the dissolution of Greek Sittlichkeit in Roman legality and the principle of universal private property. That is, what commodity fetishism elucidates is the possibility of grasping the law of appropriation as one inscribing alienation and bondage. Furthermore, the fetish - despite Marx's religious analogy - is not simply an Ersatz, reducible in an instant of recognition to its 'reality' as social labour for, as Marx writes, the historical and geographical specificity of such a form of production

"appears to those caught up in the relations of commodity production [...] to be just as ultimately valid as the fact that the scientific dissection of the air into its component parts left the atmosphere itself unaltered in its physical configuration" [9].

What is underway in the account of the fetish of the commodity is not a reduction to the essential 'man' but an account of the commodity as a form of social (mis)recognition consequent upon the determination of the individual as a proprietor, a 'person'. Marx's discussion bears on the question of ideology not in order to posit - in place of the Ersatz - another law but rather to permit the aspect of the social whole suppressed and misrepresented to be recognised in its occlusion by the law of the 'person'. Equally, the elucidation of 'personification' permits the re-cognition of the aspect of ethical life excluded from the law to be grasped in its re-formation, in its 'recoil' upon the concept that would maintain its subjugation or occlusion by the law. This is the significance of the phenomenon of personification/reification: the propriety of the 'person' is inverted as the individual is recognised as a thing, the thing as a person. Within the terms of commodity production social relations necessarily take on a particular opacity, individuals are subsumed or overpowered by the things which - formally and legally - they enjoy priority over. What is under inspection, then, is not a non-Ersatz in its static identity, the imposition of 'another' law, but the re-cognition of the law of universal private property in the context of commodity-production and the negation of the formal universality and equality of that law by its substance and consequences,

together with the re-formation and inversion of the individual of 'personality' as the subject of that law.

The 'substitutes' of ideology are, then, determinable and effective in their residence in legal form as the inversion and expropriation that this abstract subject suffers. As with the account of personality's usurpation, delineated in the description of bourgeois society as a 'phantasmogoria' - phantasma, illusions or appearances which meet in the market-place, agora - it is the aporetic structure of the social and ethical whole that is under consideration, the incoherence of the claims of a formal law and its substance, the re-cognition of that aporia and of the social whole, hitherto obscured by the fixity of the law. In the matter of 'ideology', Marx in Capital does not posit the anthropological human essence - a "species being" - as the 'truth' of ideology but rather implies a notion of ideology from within the account of the justification, the legality, of the exchange of 'equivalents'. Both true - as between commodities of equal value - and false - in its presupposition and consequence of the social inequality registered in the extraction of surplus value - the law of commodity-exchange is ideological inasmuch as it maintains the one side of 'appropriation' without acknowledging alienation. The existence of ideology is not a sheer unveiling for there remains this duplicity - it 'is' in its untruth;

that is, it is structured by a difference that it denies. This is to argue against the Derridean construal of 'speculative dialectics' as the process of rationalization, whereby it would effect the positing of the self-identical in its totality through the demystifying act of tearing away the veil (the text, the non-identical, etc). The question of the 'fetish' of the commodity does not reduce the mysterious power to the self-mastery of the proper (what is implied in the attendance to the religious "analogy") but seeks to recognise its power as the substantial expropriation of any formal-legal 'self-mastery' in the commodity's control and mediation of all social intercourse. True and untrue - a formal law that is substantially unjust - this is not to construe the untruth as an Ersatz, reaffirming the 'proper' concept, but is to exceed the concept by the recognition of its self-inadequacy, the recognition of its aporetic structure. If Kojève, maintaining the concept of formal identity, can only do so at the expense of intuition - the suppression of substantial non-identity which, in his state-building account, means civil society - then the Derridean account can be regarded as the preclusion of the concept by a substantial non-identity made constitutive and therefore 'unknowable' as substantial. In this context, then, the fetish of the commodity would be taken in its religious analogy, as the alienation of self-identity: in its religious analogy, it

is a sublime master that enacts the ambivalent role of protector and threat, disavowing and affirming the 'fact' of absolute loss in maternal castration. For general fetishism the fetish is a 'resistance' to the imposition of the identitarian concept, configured here as the masculine law of integrity. Yet the undeterminability - embraced here as a refusal of subsumptive formal identity - can be configured as **complicit** with such identity when one reconstructs Hegel and Marx not as narratives of reappropriation but as thinkers of the tragedy of modern social and ethical life, the aporia of state and civil society. In this context, therefore, the undeterminable and generalized fetish preserves its alienating function - it refuses reduction to a present meaning - but only by virtue of the success of identity: the power of the commodity would not release individuals to 'difference' and the dissolution of the state (Kojève's aversion to the bourgeois) but would, of course, encase them in a formal identity extending far beyond that of the abstract state. The criticism of the 'fetish' is not its replacement by the non-Ersatz (effected by a change of consciousness - Hegel and Marx aligned in a Kojève-inspired Young Hegelianism) but the determination of a principle of equivalence realized as a form of social recognition. In the alienation and substitution of the commodity, therefore, undeterminable fetishism is not a liberation from the identitarian concept - the ruin of le propre -

but the extension of the writ of abstract identification and the invocation of an homogenization of the heterogeneous without resistance.

None of this Derrida can acknowledge. Hegel is presupposed as positing - as occupied in the Setzung of a metaphysics of the proper, presupposed as acting within the structure of the abstract law of property - the very law that the argument of the "analogy", the argument of commodity fetishism, seeks to determine in its contradictions. The elision of the two conceptions of ideology in Marx is eloquent testimony to this misunderstanding whereby the text - of Marx as with Hegel - is presumed to presuppose oppositions rather than determine the law which posits them. Overlooking the notions of phantasmagoria and legal status, the deconstructive reading regards the Marxian-Hegelian account as the reiteration of metaphysical oppositions, its telos the restoration of the superior term in ideology-critique's antitheses of real/false, transparent/obscure, essential/apparent. The deconstructive reading takes these antitheses as a starting-point for its displacement of the absolute identity which they are seen to, ultimately, restore. The presupposition of the law which determines the antitheses is overlooked, the antitheses regarded as the metaphysical workings of the text, the law then maintained and occluded by deconstructive practise which operates -

half-consciously - within the sphere of private property law, privileging (in the law's positing of both appropriation and alienation) the expropriative pole. Sarah Kofman has summarised this synthesising misreading and its strategic uses: "The German Ideology like Capital repeats a system of traditional, mythical and ideological oppositions and yet these same texts effect some displacements such that it is possible to start from them in undertaking a work of deconstruction of a system of oppositions to which they remain tributaries"[10].

General fetishism is parasitic upon the law of private property: it derives its critique of the proprietorial subject (albeit tacitly - Derrida seems but half-conscious of the dependency) from the determination of the law which underlies the fetish of the commodity, the positing of the **person**. The commodity-fetish becomes the general fetish as the Ersatz, transcendentalised, is both driven beyond any structure of substitution - generalized, it is no longer 'substitutive of' anything - and, at the same time, this arche-substitute does not depart from the traditional **indeterminability** of the 'transcendental a priori condition of possibility'. Thus, a general fetishism disguises its source, its **law**. The general fetishism takes issue with the strict fetishism which it construes as reducing the ideological epiphenomenon to the 'thing itself'. As such, general fetishism amounts to the

indefinite expansion of the camera obscura - indeed, to the extent that there cease to be an 'exteriority'. Parenthetically, one can note that this is to unearth Althusserian foundations: "ideology has no outside (for itself), but at the same time [...] it is nothing but outside (for science and reality)"[11]. In this strenuous division of ideology and science, the very 'anteriority' of ideology - unthinkable by science but effective - meant that science could not long hold out against its inclusion in ideology. And ideology, now generalised, ceases to bear the name. Science's very 'properness' subsumes it beneath 'ideology' and the generalization/dissolution of the latter is alluded to by deconstruction when, in Kofman's words, the impossible self-presence means that "the camera obscura is never relieved [relever] by a camera lucida"[12]. Yet this, it emerges from Kofman's account, is merely to say that the absolute self-propriety of the person is itself 'ideological': general fetishism is constructed upon the strict fetishism of legal status, of the person. Taking the latter in its lucidity, its definition of itself as, in Hegel's words, "absolute Being"[13], deconstruction - under the influence of the Kojevian reading (supplemented, one might add, with the Althusserian dehistoricizing of the legal subject[14]) - takes this to be the Setzung of 'the Hegelian subject', the 'non-ideological'. It then follows the destruction of this subject - a ruin maintained in the antinomy of its

Setzung: "the contradiction of a consciousness which is at once independent and dependent"[15] - and both repeats the dissolution of personality which is reiterated in the fetish of the commodity and, having cut off access to the law of its determination through its transcendentalising of alienation, deposits this fetishism as 'generalised'. Kofman underscores this movement and the presupposition of Glas when she describes the inadequate and narrow 'ideology' of a strict fetishism, writing that the revelation of the non-ideological in all its 'transparency' "would be to forget the possibility of hallucination, negative or positive, [which] would be to forget that transparency is, also, a product of history and not a given which would pre-exist ideology"[16]. Yet, having arrived at the positing of a pre-existent 'ideology' in the generalized, "always already" of the Ersatz, nothing further **can** be determined as to history's 'production'. This is to say that the 'general fetishism' eschews cognition and determinability as synonymous with the suppressive concept and, at the same time, insists upon the substantial difference obscured by that concept. Yet, disavowing cognition as always the reduction to formal identity through procedural reason, the deconstructive rejection of ideology-critique - for reasons of the latter's entrapment in the 'ideological' privileging of terms whose value is not given - would free thought from ideology by construing it as undeterminable

and thereby general, failing to realize that the questioning of the historical production of 'non-ideological' values is coincidental with that of 'ideological' ones. Transparency is not a 'Sollen' because - and this is implicit in Kofman's distrust of it as a 'value' - it is known to be occlusive in its result (the 'transparency' of legal right, for instance); as such, it is Hegelian re-cognition which permits a 'critique' of transparency in its duplicity for it reckons on the necessity to rethink this 'obscuring transparency'. Deconstruction - oscillating between full self-presence and absolute indeterminability - noting its failure of self-adequation, would find confirmed the constitutive role of indetermination and leave the concept to its uncognizability.

That the "remain(s)" as the focus of a general fetishism cannot do without the presupposition of the commodity fetish appears to be confirmed in the deconstructive treatment of the (contract-) signature in Glas. This 'substitute' is the power of the commodity which is no longer the property of its proprietor but that which determines him in his frustrated attempts at appropriation in exchange (losing more than he gains) and the loss of the 'absolute selfhood' of legal status through the structure of substitution that the commodity ensures. Loss of self through losing more than one gains: this is

the extraction of surplus value in the supposedly-equal exchange in the purchase of labour by capital. The loss of self in the exchange of the object of property, is the appearance of the proprietor as Ersatz-thing in being recognised in the exchange - the substitute necessitated by the fact that "commodities cannot themselves go to market and perform exchanges in their own right"[17]. That this general fetishism is dependent upon the presupposition of the subject of the Hegelian system as 'self-proper', that Derrida always presupposes the bourgeois subject as the justification of Hegel's 'speculation', that the displacement of this takes a route dictated by the law of private property - this is apparent as Glas describes the "remain(s)", the structure of the fetish, of its 'undecidability' and - as is also apparent - its character as the **reified** 'dehiscence' of the absolute subject. In the context of the Hegelian critique of the Kantian contractual marriage, Derrida writes:

"The contract signature is under the jurisdiction of abstract right, always concerns just a thing, the possession or disposition of a thing outside persons. **Isn't the seal of the contract itself in the end a thing, a remain(s) between persons that draws its efficacy from this status?**"[18]

The exteriority, excreta, signature, all that "falls" from the system becomes thus construed within the setting of the transfer of property and what is extracted from the person. Derrida conceives, rightly, that herein lies the flaw in the bourgeois subject - in exchange is its status

recognised and destroyed; it realizes itself as a person and yet is brought to this pass by the very 'subordinate' object of property and in this object is it recognised. Moreover, the antinomies of legal status - in particular the positing of personality as the institution of the confrontation of the Ego and an 'inessential' nature - are also drawn into line with the contract-signature, the alienation in appropriation through exchange, the excrement of the proper. In short, just as le propre is cleanliness, neatness, propriety as well as right of ownership, so, in the "remain(s)" does the Derridean account draw out the experience of legal status wherein the very abstractness of the proper means that its content and substance lie in the concrete difference - the 'inessentiality' of that which had been posited as its property. As such, the process of legal personality's learning that it is without substance is one embracing the fetishism of the commodity - the object of property comes to be dominant, substantial - yet, bearing within it the antinomies of the proprietorial subject, this process is also one wherein the 'inessential' and subordinate multiplicity of nature comes to inhabit its abstractly universal antithesis, personality. The "remain(s)" is the rehearsal of that reconfiguration of consciousness, described in the Phenomenology, whereby personality - in the shape of Stoicism and Scepticism - gives way to the Unhappy Consciousness. This is the discovery on the part

of the Self posited as "absolute Being" that it is, rather, inessential: taking its substance from another, it is left in the antithesis of the Unchangeable - the alien 'essence' - and itself qua the inessential and changing. When considering the Genet column of Glas the 'unhappiness' - or otherwise - of this consciousness will be considered, for the moment one may notice how with the "remain(s)" comes not only the fetishistic inversion and particularization of personality's universality but also the diremption of this hitherto 'absolute' Ego into a (non-manifest) universality and a 'natural' particularity which, absolutely sundered from its antithesis, is a realm of degradation and shame. The person discovers in himself the 'nature' which, whilst afforded its right in Greek ethical life, under the jurisdiction of abstract right and Roman property law has been suppressed by abstract subjectivity and now takes its seat within the person. Thus, Derrida's elision of a contractual signature - possible by means of the legal definition of the abstract equality of persons - and associations of repressed or unassimilable but 'indispensable' corporeality (the corpse, defecation, disseminative ejaculation - anticipating the discussion of Genet's text) indicated in the notion of the "remain(s)", this serves to assemble the consequences of Gesetz.

The contract signature is not merely the underlining of the flawed universality of the Ego of personality: Derrida - as has been emphasised - enroles this subject as the personification of Sittlichkeit. Moreover, the communication between the abstract Ego, posited in confrontation with inessential nature, and the structure of repression - again, noted by Derrida in the notion of le propre - is constructed according to this paradigm of a 'Roman' ethical life. Thus, Glas effects the arresting elision of Absolute Knowing, the categorical imperative and the Oedipal complex: the Roman "aigle" will be a universalized proprietorial subject which (as was documented in part one) will enjoy priority through the suppression of its constitutive mother; the autonomous, self-transparent and identical subject, personality, is the affirmation and denial of that which permits it to exist as such, indeed, constitutes it as such. The model of self-filiation enables the logocentric 'I' to persist in its universality: the subject of the categorical imperative depends on the myth of an immaculate conception, whilst the construal of Hegel's Spirit as the legal person permits the elision of this "IC" (Immaculate Conception and imperatif categorique) with Absolute Knowing and Sittlichkeit, savoir absolu. Derrida writes, "Sa from now on will be the siglum of savoir absolu. And IC, let's note this already since the two staffs represent each other, the Immaculate Conception"[19]. Hegel is

engaged in strict fetishism, constructing an uncastratable, self-filiating subject, yet the dependence of this reading upon legal status - echoing the "remain(s)" of the contractual signature - is announced by that con-founding of the kingdom of ends with Sittlichkeit: the categorical imperative takes its place within the Hegelian system not as the paradigm of ethical life but rather as the fundamental imperative of abstract right, of private property, the command which is the minimal condition of personality's realization in exchange. Hegel marks this when he says:

"Personality essentially involves the capacity for rights and constitutes the concept and the basis (itself abstract) of the system of abstract and therefore formal right. Hence the imperative of right is 'Be a person and respect others as persons'." [20]

Similarly, this abstract imperative - which invites the inversion of its formal identical subject by its concretely differential substance (the route which Derrida takes, transcendentalizing the latter) - is reiterated as solely, negative - a vacuity:

"The unconditional commands of abstract right are restricted, once again because of its abstractness, to the negative: 'Do not infringe personality and what personality entails'. The result is that there are only prohibitions in the sphere of right, and the positive form of any command in that sphere is based in the last resort, if we examine its ultimate content, on prohibition." [21]

The construal of Hegel as maintaining an ethical life founded upon the preservation of private property, the Roman "aigle" of imperium and Ego translated as Sittlichkeit and Spirit, would then permit the

transcendentalisation of its substance which, the realm of le propre as universal in name only, would be its prohibitions. Just as the thing of property permits a general fetishism when it emerges as the substance, the sine qua non of its proprietor - the subordinate and external thing as the possibility of the person - so do the prohibitions come into force as the content of the law guaranteeing that abstract right of propriety. Fetishism is aligned with theft: the figure of Genet approaches the text of Hegel as the 'substance' of the reign of propriety, the other column erected as the affirmation of a method of general fetishism.

iii. Genet and general fetishism: the supplementary column and legal status

If the methodology of a general fetishism cooperates with the presupposition of subjectivity and private property and - in this presupposition - is found to be tacitly dependent on the fetish of the commodity, how could the text of fetishism, the affirmation of fetishism in/as the text, the column of Genet, be thought to enact this fetish, operate within the sphere of private property?

Glas has two columns, the book practices the method of general fetishism whereby neither opposition, direct correspondence nor - so it would have it - a common 'law' makes it possible to combine the two. Kofman describes

how the Ersetzung is played out such that the columns

"are not opposed; yet, they are heterogeneous: the generalised fetishism does not end up as an indifferentiation, neither sexual nor textual: one column does not speak the language of the other, it obeys neither the same rhythm nor the same law; they differ one from the other as 'the dialectic of the galactic', they are as two colossal towers erected in a double solitude, without any apparent relation."

Nevertheless, the undecidability of the fetish means that - whilst each does not exhaust the meaning of the other as 'its' other - there is a relation:

"Not opposed but heterogeneous, they nevertheless communicate among themselves: because these columns are not unbroached [inentamees], because they are double, oblique, because there are judases, jealousies, there is established between them a series of exchanges, of winks [clins d'oeil] - they glue and unglue [collent et decollent] passing from one to the other." [1]

The two columns repeat, emphatically represent, the structure of 'antherrection' - the 'erection against' that is the mark of logocentrism's fetishistic control and denial of constitutive difference - just as the margin that is now central echoes the 'hole' that provokes the erection. The columns are as legs, the (foot-) fetishistic structure renders what separates them - the gap - as that which is of interest: oscillation from one column to the other is also uncovering as covering, disavowal and affirmation. Furthermore, the columns are not symmetrical and, as such, neither are they heterogeneous - in each case this would be to invite synthesis according to a 'proper' law. As Glas conceives it, the failure of propriety in Hegel's attempt to reduce

the threat to integrity is embraced by Genet - "he wanted to make a success of failure"[2] - and what binds the two texts, then, is what is denied by one, affirmed by another; is that to which both columns are subject yet which, in the 'other' column, Genet's, is registered in its effects with all the consequences for logocentrism's presuppositions of authority, communication, literality. This 'second' column affirms the constitutive 'loss' but does not escape it: the supplementary column knows that what is under way is the expropriation of the 'I' and erects itself as such.

Moreover, the reader is not spared this expropriation: one is holding a text impossible to grasp. Inscribed within the structure of general substitution, reader and author(s) (the latter pluralized on account of the parasitism of Glas and its extensive quotation) oscillate between two 'poles' for behind the self-sufficiency of the 'I' is that constitutive 'hole', difference, differance. On the side of the reader, Derrida accounts for the method of the two columns as the displacement of the reader as of the logocentric fetishist:

"Why make a knife [couteau] pass between two texts? Why, at least, write two texts at once? What is desired? In other words, what is there to be afraid of? who is afraid? of whom? There is a wish to make writing ungraspable, of course. When your head is full of the matters here, you are reminded that the law of the text is in the other, and so on endlessly. By knocking up the margin - (no) more margin, (no) more frame - one annuls it, blurs the line, takes back from you the standard rule [regle] that would enable you to delimit, to cut up

[decouper], to dominate. You are no longer to know where the head of this discourse is, or the body neck [cou] is dissimulated from you so that you cannot bear your own." [3]

This is the strategem of the author: to prevent the reader from occupying any secure site for contemplation of the "soliciting" of logocentrism; to emphasise that the 'transcendental', the 'anterior', the 'arche-' trace - difference, writing - do(es) not secretly permit their/its own location. The very typography laughs at any attempt to read it 'at once' and the hysteria (recalling the maternal 'trace' to which fetishism responds: differance as a matrix, 'womb'-like) is no less when one comes to read each column, each judas, even the discontinuities, 'as if' they stood alone or 'as if' they corresponded. Yet, from the glint of the blade to the (Medusa's) head, the authorial strategem operates within the ruse of castration - the latter is acknowledged. Derrida, on the side of Genet (the right-hand of the page) is therefore operating within the fetishistic structure such that the double-column writing affirms the textual unconscious without 'reducing' it, without assimilating it to the 'one true erection' of a phallogocentrism. Glas seeks not to escape the economy of the undecidable but to echo it - and few other places in Derrida's oeuvre bear witness to such an authorial, authoritative, authorized loss of mastery.

Self-expropriation is the insistent theme of this general fetishism. Parenthetically, one is therefore led to ask: does this general fetishism release the grasp of subjective, dominating, practical reason; does it evade the ultimate-propriety characteristic of the dialectical "remain(s)"? Is not the universal 'I', the "absolute Being" of legal status, maintained - above and beyond the antherrection - in the very **counterposing** of a constitutive loss to metaphysical, logocentric, ontotheological, Cartesian 'identity'? This refers one back to the 'trace' - only a transcendental 'hole' seems able to maintain the authorial mastery as that mastery's 'condition of (im)possibility': the mastery of the 'I' identifies the constitutive no-place as such and thereby is both affirmed and denied - "(im)possible". The Derridean 'Ego' and its positing is always already within that structure of Ersetzung, thus does Derrida's authorship contrive to escape charges of domination or mastery even as the textual strategem is announced. Embracing the general fetish, one is able to maintain authority, lose authority, posit the maintenance-in-loss of authority by virtue of the anteriority of the substitute. If I posit the substitute, the objection that this Setzung is the work of an absolute Ego is met with the response that this positing is, in fact, merely the counter-erection that seeks to control the effect of the 'original' substitute: the Setzung permissible insofar as it acknowledges its

possibility - the 'threat' of difference, the effect of an Ersetzung, the self-expropriation of the questioned positing. Derrida describes the method of this madness:

"It is not enough to be crafty [ruse], a general theory of the ruse **that would be part of it** must be available. Which comes down to making a confession, unconscious to be sure. The unconscious is something very theoretical.

If I write two texts at once, you will not be able to castrate me. If I delinearize, I erect. But at the same time I divide my act and my desire. I - mark(s) the division, and always escaping you, I simulate unceasingly and take my pleasure nowhere. I castrate myself - I remain(s) myself thus - and I 'play at coming' [je 'joue a jouir']. "[4]

That this has been construed throughout as a 'transcendental alienation' is the dependence of this argument upon the person, the universal Ego of abstract property law: alienation - the loss of self that takes place within the realization and recognition of personality - is made constitutive, unthinkably 'anterior' to the 'metaphysical' 'I', le propre. For Glas the dissimulating 'I' of Genet is the affirmation of this effect upon the absolute Ego. It is what has been anticipated in 'La Parole Soufflee': theft figured as the impossible self-coincidence of the 'I'. This theft is the constitutive difference of signification therefore aligned with castration, defecation, and death - the loss of self-completion, the insinuation of an original expropriation. The question of the "remain(s) of a Hegel" is, then, the indication of the other column: what the infinite self-return of the Hegelian system - the familiar course of its

"semiology"[5] - is seen to suppress is registered in the 'Genet column'. This is to say that theft or flight (vol) and fetishism - their involvement already adumbrated in the essay on Artaud - are convened within the text of Genet as the condition of (im)possibility of the self-present/proper logos: the "remain(s)" of this logocentrism, the general-fetishistic column describing its unassimilable and transcendental form, is "scato-logy itself"[6]. Indeed, this scatology gathers together theft/expropriation, the figure of the mother, and the "remain(s)" which Derrida indicates as "gl", all as the response to and attendance upon the orifice, the indication of an irreducible exteriority. As such, it is a scatology which is evident as the attendance upon the hole that is loss, flight, theft of all propriety and Genet is construed as the respondent to the threat of castration. Moreover, Genet engages a scatology which registers the transcendental alienation of birth whereby a constitutive separation communicates with the two orifices - Derrida has already written of "the orifice of birth, the orifice of defecation to which all other gaps refer, as if to their origin"[7]. This is, then, the constitution of the 'I' in the work as an "original alienation"[8]. Indeed, the account of Artaud's intolerance of all 'relation' and the abomination of difference - construed as the wild enactment of the identitarian telos of metaphysics - has figured this

anterior self-separation (constitutive of 'selfhood') as a reject-phenomenon and a "remain(s)"; it is "conceived as pollution, obscenity, 'filthiness', etc." [9]

Maternal hole, theft constitutive of signification, the droppings that realize the author-Ego and render that integrity both possible and impossible - this is how the fetish is thematized by 'Genet'. The "remain(s)" become methodological as the original alienation. Derrida refers to these "remain(s)" by the siglum, "gl". He thereby inscribes this expelled, ejaculated, unassimilable, 'work' of the 'I' into the text of Glas: constitutive of the 'I' because it is that transcendental alienation; fetishistic because the liquid substances elide into the string of the Ersetzung. One reads:

"just as The Thief's Journal leaves, proceeds from Guiana ('that region of myself: Guiana'), so gl begins to spurt [gicler], to trickle [degouliner], to drip [goutter]: out of the mouth or the tail of the stylite, of the tube of vaseline, of the nursing's esophagus. Sperm, saliva, glair, curdled drool, tears of milk, gel of vomit - all these heavy and white substances are going to glide into one another, be agglutinated, agglomerated, stretched out (on)to the edge of all the figures and pass through all the canals." [10]

This string is the truth taken from Genet's text - "that precious cobweb, a tissue which I secretly called le voile du palais [the veil of the palace, the soft palate]" [11]: Derrida's gloss is that "it is hardly useful to add that the 'voile du palais' furnishes another title for the question of truth" [12]. This veil of truth is the general

fetish as the reinscription of truth as '(un)concealment', aletheia. The fetish figures this for it accords with the textu(r)al as the weave of fleece - the female pubic fleece of which Freud speaks:

"Writing remains modest because it is caught in a fleece. A propos modesty, 'braiding', 'weaving', and 'felting', Freud proposes a model natural to the feminine technique of the text: the hairs that dissimulate the genitals and above all, in the woman, the lack of a penis." [13]

This keeps Genet circling signification as constituted by the 'hole', fetishism as textuality - occlusion and revelation, denial and affirmation - with the veil 'itself' as the object of attention and unstable, undecidable place. Thus, the "remain(s)" afford a truth to the text - as the text: the excrement, the substitute-structure of their conjoining or "agglutination" and the remarking of truth as (un)veiling are gathered and distributed as the "remain(s)" in Genet's voile. Against the metaphysics of the proper - and its truth as adequatio intellectus et rei - Genet's 'text' is one that affirms its own textuality: it does not seek to master its impossible self-coincidence - the differance that permits and escapes, ruins, it - rather it occupies itself around this 'hole' and the general Ersetzung it provokes.

Genet expropriates, thieves and sets in flight the self-proper, rings the "glas of the proper name" [14] with a florid, generous, act of expansion - an "act of 'magnifying' nomination" [15]. This is an inflation

(mindful of souffler as breath, spirit, theft) of the propriety of nomination, its appropriative character for which, it appears, "there is no purer present"[16]. The ceaseless naming that occupies Genet's work - characters named as things, characters named as saints (Genet's fetishism, one can note - anticipating - always involves the substitute-thing and the Ersatz-sacred) - this naming puts Genet in a certain position regarding literature and its 'condition'. Derrida asserts, "the name is not, as it seems on the first approach, a thing encountered in nature or acquired in commerce"[17] and what is being unfolded is the irreducibly **secondary** nature of the name. Although it is not explicated by Derrida, Glas sees to it that beneath this general 'secondariness' will be subsumed both the naive 'priority' of natural, proper, names and the inessential, substitute names "acquired in commerce" - thus is the Ersatz of the proper generalized out of the sphere of exchange. The name that is the substitute for the mother, the fetish of signification which covers, disavows and affirms, indicates that anterior dependence, the loss of absolute self-appropriation. The legitimate and proper name is that of the father - yet this is already substantially alienated by virtue of the 'secret' dependence on the mother. 'Genet' refers to and affirms this fetishism: the name is not a father's but always the register of the never-known, never-present mother; it advertises its constitution by the differance of the

mother whose "breast [sein] [...] steals away from all names, but it also hides them, steals them; it is before all names." [18] The name indicates the general fetishism and its 'source'; the mother's 'lack' reinscribed as the trace, the structural 'toujours deja' of the maternal-threat of the loss of integrity - the threat that provokes as antherrection, fetish, the phallogocentric attempt to 'stave' it off. Genet's name is, then, its own expropriation - advertises the nomination of differance whereby "all the names that it receives in our language are still, as names, metaphysical" [19] - and it refers to the 'other' of maternity knowing this to be the case; that there is a general fetishism and no proper essence, no "presence of the thing itself in its proper essence" [20]. The mother cannot be tolerated by strict fetishism because of her being always-already, escaping the self-presence, self-proper. Genet's embrace of this structure establishes his refusal of the metaphysical intolerance of the hidden, its castigation of the non-manifest divinity of all religions other than Christianity as 'jealous' ("if self-revelation is refused Him, then the only thing left to constitute His nature would be to ascribe envy to Him" [21]). Within the topography of Glas and the deconstruction of the Hegelian Antigone, the feminine/familial law is unconscious and unrevealed, escaping all determination, and in this its divinity is regarded as jealous by the jealousy of the human, maculine

law which seeks to reveal it in its full and conclusive presence. The itinerant 'mothers' who wander through Genet's novels register a generalized jealousy just as they do of a general fetishism: it is the embrace of the impossibility of seizing the constitutive difference, submission to - and a certain celebration of - the substitutive character of signification, the differance of all property, legitimacy, fulfillment. Derrida writes that

"the mother fascinates from the absolute of an **already**. Fascination produces an excess of zeal. In other words, jealousy. Jealousy is always excessive because it is busy with a past that will never have been present and so can never be presented nor allow any hope for presentation, the presently presenting"[22].

The maternal name of Genet, then, expresses that "original alienation" of which (reminiscent of Freud's "throne and altar") all public, civil, political life is substitutive - "this alienation, already [deja], even before I return to myself, promenades my proper name in the street"[23] - and this maternal trace is further evinced in 'genet', the "flower name"[24] which establishes the propriety of the author in this Ersatz. Indeed, the Ersetzung of Genet's text is played out across the number of substitutes that the flower can form - phallic in its erectness and stamen, maternal castration in its (bell-like) hollow, reversible like a glove (the double-use linking with the fetishist's girdle) and also undecidable in its allocation on the side

of either nature or culture. Indeed, the flower is the most apparent fetish of the 'other' column - yet, within that general fetishism, the flower will not be the 'key' to a logocentric settling of what Genet means-to-say. Sartre in Saint Genet has fallen into this "trap"[25]: even as he has indicated the 'textuality' of the flower, conversely, "the question of the flower, the anthological question is, among others, studiously avoided"[26]. What Derrida follows is the floral "remain(s)": the anthology that is the collection of dead flowers; the wreath that testifies to a flight, to what cannot be thought in the time of self-presence, what is no-longer or always-already; the floral evocation of textuality when, as the "flowers of rhetoric"[27], it is the image of poetry, the metaphorical expression of metaphor - what Sartre names "the poetic object par excellence"[28]. Whilst for Saint Genet this would be the location of rhetoric and the revelation of the truth of poetry - the floral Ersatz, Genet's "nocturnal language of flowers"[29] revealed as what it 'really is' - for Glas this is the pose of strict fetishism 'deciding', cutting through the verbiage as foliage to the thing itself, the signified in its glory. This is, then, the swordsmanship of the Setzung which is incorporated - as its cutting and decapitating motion suggests - into the structure of the antherrection and counter-castration, thus, into the Ersetzung of the maternal 'trace'. Yet, more than this - in this account

of the meaning of the flower in Genet, strict fetishism cooperates with the general fetish: this "poetic object" is, in Derrida's book, a "transcendental excellence", "the figure of figures and the place of places"[30] and Sartre has thereby made transcendental the metaphorical. The isolated, fixated 'secret' of Genet is exhibited as the figure which, in itself, 'is' nothing, is a signifier of something which is not there. Against a 'proper' univocality - the self-proper Setzung, the 'meaning of the metaphor' - the other column echoes a plurivocality and its constitutive 'trace'. The transcendental flower remakes the Sartrean ontological reading such that it affirms not the self-presence of the metaphor but rather the 'lesson' of general fetishism - and one which would have done with lessons, exemplary figures and the transcendental 'as such' - also the 'transcendental' as such. This transcendental Ersatz - necessarily, the impossibility of a true, somewhere self-present, transcendental condition of possibility - is named in the context of flowers as Derrida writes:

"If, then, there is no language of flowers, if the flower is in (the) place of zero signification, how can this symbolic zero **take hold** in a jungle of signs and figures belonging to the natural tongue, to nature, to the physical, to the physical tongue, as a mother tongue that is necessarily foreign to it? **A question again of phusis as mimesis.**"[31]

Saint Genet is in evidence in Glas where that structure of castration and antherrection - the structure wherein "a

certain mere nothing, a certain void [...] erects"[32] - is passed over and the Ersatz is always to be reduced. Derrida quotes Sartre to the effect that Genet has taken himself for the Other, that this is "the key to his conduct and his disorders", that "our certainty of ourself finds its truth in the Other"[33]. Below the reference to Sartre's "transcendental key" is the reminder of Lacan's - Derrida quotes from Ecrits and "the universal phallus (just as we say: universal key)" - whilst, contained in the judas aligned with the two quotations, one reads that the tendency of commentators on Genet to judge and imprison him within essays on his "case" or concerning his "failure" ('Genet's Failure' in Bataille, Literature and Evil), is equivalent to the turning of that transcendental key that reduces a general fetish to its proper meaning. Crucially, this is incarceration by/in the **dialectic**: "the case can falsify, rather force, a dialectical law, a lock [une serrure] that should nonetheless be open to all"[34]. The restriction of the general Ersetzung that springs Genet, that releases the tightly-woven (serre) text the lock contains, is the dialectical law that is followed as closely by Sartre as by Lacan, according to this reading. It casts a glance across the divide to the strict fetishism of "aigle" - in other words, to the impression left on Lacan, Sartre, Bataille, by the lectures of Kojève. The suppression of the arche-trace in maternal 'castration' by phallogocentrism is described elsewhere in

Glas as the metaphysical 'sexual difference' of masculine, active, dialectical opposition and feminine, passive, indifference. The reduction of the floral Ersatz, the "nocturnal language of flowers" is the Kojevian operation upon the nocturnal law of woman and the unconscious, whereby the other is recognised in its identity. It is the assimilation of the other whereby subjective self-certainty is made objective and the two self-consciousnesses, according to Kojève, "come to light"[35]. The 'dialectic' is the active differentiating-resolving of Reason which brings to light the passive unconscious of the feminine: this is the reliance on Kojève's reading of Antigone wherein the sexual difference is that of "the Universality of Action" in "the warlike citizen of a State" as opposed to "the particular and **particularist** Family" whose sphere is passivity, "the biological existence of man", "man in his **inaction** [...] as if he were dead"[36]. Dialectical resolution is a reappropriation of death and an assimilation of the feminine law of night and the unconscious; it rescues from "static, given Being"[37], from biological fact, the universal aspect and renders the unconscious explicit. So with the "universal key", the Other is brought to light in its alienation, its particularity is grasped, it is subsumed beneath the universality of a law, put in its proper place.

The right-hand column is the expropriation of the left: it robs the eagle-imperial concept of Hegel just as it is, itself, never in full propriety of its meaning. Derrida alights upon the figure of the eagle within Genet's oeuvre and, describing the works it spans and the forms it takes (tattoo in the Miracle of the Rose, chimera in The Balcony, aquiline nature of Ganymede in The Thief's Journal), sets in flight the eagle that is the assimilation of Rome, Prussia and Napoleon. The eagle of Genet is the vol du voleur - the self-expropriation evinced in 'The Parole Soufflee' - and its effect upon Hegel, the effect of a general fetishism, is "the flight/theft of his empire - polysemy"[38]. This is, then, the theft of absolute knowledge which translates, in accordance with the structure of the general Ersatz, the vol du voleur, the transcendental alienation, into Derrida's "theft is absolute knowledge"[39]. This is, once more, the evidence of "a Hegel" as conceived in Kojève: throughout Glas the eagle, the "aigle", bears witness to the alignment of Hegelian 'Spirit' with an Ego derived from the abstract, 'I' of legal personality and 'Sittlichkeit' with an 'imperial' order that echoes Roman "dominion" - the eschatology of "Sa" (the rewritten savoir absolu) enfolds both within the wings of the eagle-standard victorious at Jena. Genet's theft represents the resistance to a Hegel - and one for whom, as Kojèvean, a traditional left/right topography would cease to apply - who consummates the

virile subject and speculative thought in the absolute state of a heroic bourgeoisie. All talk in Glas of empires, eagles, Sa, is a parodic echo of the voice from the lectern asserting: "Absolute Knowledge became - **objectively** - possible because in and by Napoleon the **real** process of historical evolution [...] came to its end"[40]; that "the 'absolute' State that [Hegel] has in mind (Napoleon's Empire) is the **realization** of the Christian Kingdom of heaven"[41]"; an eschatological Hegel wherein

"the phenomenon that completes the historical evolution and thus makes the absolute Science possible, therefore, is the 'conception' (Begreifen) of Napoleon by Hegel. This dyad formed by Napoleon and Hegel, is the perfect Man, fully and definitively 'satisfied' by what he is and what he **knows** himself to be"[42].

The glas of logocentrism is the attempt to render impossible the fulfillment of this eskaton and it takes shape as theft insofar as the subject of the imperial Sa is the person: the Ego endowed with rights granted by this 'heroic' bourgeois state. Genet is enrolled in Glas as the one denied and denying legitimacy - of property, lineage, sexuality - by and to Sittlichkeit construed as Sa, the 'absolute' bourgeois state. Kojève has already asserted that the one who does not labour experiences only 'internal' change and is deprived of recognition, remaining 'mute'; "this change, then, transforms man into a madman or a criminal, who is sooner or later annihilated

by the natural and objective social reality"[42a]. Nevertheless, this expropriation of the bourgeois subject, the legal person, will follow the course of the fetishism of the commodity: the constitution of the state and its citizen (by whom "History" is "completed, realized and 'revealed'"[43]) will be unhinged by the loss of propriety experienced in exchange; the absolute 'I' of the citizen will be overthrown by the inessential, the inessential thing - as object of property or bodily excrement, "gl" - will come to take the shape of the 'absolute'. The Setzung, the positing of the law of the person, is effected in such a way that it can be nothing but Ersetzung: the law of the proper, the Gesetz, within the thief's journal is recovered in its consequences (the realization of personality in its substance: 'I' is an Ersatz, a 'mere thing'). The nominating operation of Genet's work, whereby "magnified, the recipient becomes somewhat the thing of the one who names or surnames him, above all if this is done with the name of a thing"[44], this operation draws attention to its appropriative aspect as it does to the subsumption of the person beneath the thing. In this there is, then, the tacit adoption of a notion of fetishism: Glas enrols Genet's as the text which in its string of names suspects and celebrates its dependence on the commodity, leading Derrida to ask "What is a thing? What is the name of a thing?"[45] and to deploy this substitutive-structure of the 'absolute'

against the Kojevian-imperial state. The structure is clear: on the one side is the discourse of proper law - Gesetz - which is also that of the identitarian state, the Roman "aigle" of Ego and dominium, (it is worth noting that on the open page of the book, Glas's Hegel is to the left and to the right - in accordance with the Kojevian Hegel, both 'radical-dialectical' **and** 'bourgeois-statist'). On the other side, the column of Genet, is the general Ersatz, the expropriation of the proprietor by means of its substitution in appropriation - the fetishism made general and, subsequently, constitutive. The latter move thereby displaces the opposition of the two sides, the vol du voleur repeats that structure of self-expropriation to which the "absolute person" of legal status falls prey - the 'absoluteness' of theft is the blurred copy of that substitute-self (the personifying commodity) which is the embodiment of alienation, the realization of personality in the thing, and as such "is a mere laying-waste of everything and therefore merely beside itself, and is really the abandonment of its own self-consciousness." [46]

"Remain(s)", resistance to a dialectical eschatology, theft of the possibility of conclusive self-presence: Derrida deploys Genet against the proprietorial subject of Hegelian logocentrism as "a writing that will never return, by some proper or circular course, to its own

place"[47] and this Genet thereby would trespass upon Hegel's 'property'. That this is the case has already been maintained - Derrida presupposes private property throughout the grammatological critique, establishes the logocentric propre in accord with Hegelian "personality" - but one can, moreover, catch Genet in the act: within the 'implicitude' of the concept of personality, the thief goes to work as the deferral of fulfillment. The 'self-return' of the person is attended to in the Zusätze to paragraph 66 of the Philosophy of Right. Hegel describes the accordance of the concept of personality with its existence, "the act whereby I take possession of my personality [...] and make myself a responsible being, capable of possessing rights and with a moral and religious life"[48]. Derrida, taking the definition of personality as, generalised, the absolute subject, renders Genet the errant, aberrant, possibility of the person - the possibility of the failure of self-coincidence and of the legal individual's (e)rectitude. What Hegel accounts for as aberrant in abstract right's constitution of the person, Derrida will render constitutive. Whilst the person, as bearer of rights, is autonomous and self-conscious: the self-coincidence of essence in its embodiment for

"it is just in this concept of mind [Geist] as that which is what it is only through its own free causality and through its endless return into itself out of the natural immediacy of its existence, that there lies the possibility of a clash: ie what it is potentially it may not be actually [...] and vice versa, what it is actually

(eg evil in the case of the will) may be other than what it is potentially."[49]

In the character of the infinite subject as constituted by the possible non-coincidence, the transcendental alienation comes to the fore and - in this case - personality's 'other' aligns itself with the role of Genet. In this non-coincidence "lies the possibility of the alienation of personality and its substantive being, whether this alienation occurs **unconsciously or intentionally.**"[50] This alienation, in turn, is conceived by Hegel as serfdom, the disqualification from property ownership which accords with the improper Genet as it does with the feudal apparel of his text - not only with the figures of dukes, kings, palaces, "Spanish grandees", but also with the Ersatz-sacred, with a proliferation of saints and cathedrals. Indeed, even as it accords with 'impropriety', the persona of Genet nevertheless also serves to confuse the 'aberrant person' of private property (a law which, instituting abstract equality and universality, also permitted errance, 'free', untenured, labour) with the servile subject of feudalism. Genet is set to straddle modern, abstract right and what Hegel has termed "Culture" (Bildung) - and in so doing aids Derrida in the generalisation of 'propriety' - yet the insistence of theft and impersonation within Genet's oeuvre cannot evade its presupposition of legal right. The prison is an Ersatz-cathedral ("we were carrying on

the tradition of the monks who went about their business at night, in silence. We belonged to the Middle Ages"[51]) yet the inscription of Genet within abstract right, Derrida's configuring of theft as an "original alienation", is confirmed in its intention of displacing the Hegelian subject when that 'theft' aligns itself with the account of the alienation of the person:

"alienation of intelligence and rationality, of morality, ethical life, and religion is exemplified in superstition, in ceding to someone else full power and authority to fix and prescribe what actions are to be done (as when an individual binds himself expressly to steal or to murder, &c, or to a course of action that may involve crime), or what duties are binding to one's conscience or what religious truth is, &c."[52]

This also brings the voleur - alienation of intelligence (meaning) and property - into relation with the "monk", just as it did the serf. Yet, less an incursion into the Middle Ages than a parody and embrace of self-abnegation and withdrawal to the margins, this brings Genet's work into line with Rome for the thief and the Ersatz-religious are parasitic upon Roman legality. Substitute, criminal and Catholic are conjoined in the antinomies of abstract property law and it is there that Genet's drama is staged, despite attempts to lend Genet an 'unlocatability' and regarding all attempts to think his work - including Glas's [53] - as efforts toward incarceration (granting Genet a freedom as abstract as that of the personality which conditions it). Rome is presupposed in the

proliferation of personae - the substitutes, representatives, the "'magnifying' nomination" - for here is the dramatisation of the Setzung of the abstract 'I', the **fiction** of legal personality, just as it this positive law which determines theft, criminality, as it does propriety and the person. Similarly, Rome is presupposed in the figure of the monk for the same anterior, positive law lays claim to the monastic as it does to the rectitude of the "unyielding rigidity of personality"[54]. With the dissolution of ethical life - Sitte - and custom's immediate unity of the individual in the universal (what Derrida mistakes for its very destruction: the 'absolute' identity of the person) the prior, posited, abstract law will see in the criminal "a sin existent, a trespass possessed of personality"[55] and the divorce of ethical right from the individual is also enacted in the withdrawal into cloisters - moreover, it echoes the vol du voleur when Hegel accounts for it as flight, for "rather than rouse a fate against himself, he flies from life"[56]. The monk is at one with the thief: moreover, the dissolution of ethical life in Roman legality - the decayed world that gives rise to monastic withdrawal and flight - leaves the isolated individual as an orphan through Jesus' demand that "his friends [...] forsake father, mother, and everything in order to avoid entry into the profane world"[57]. Genet thereby undermines Sittlichkeit - the orphan, thief, monk is set against

ethical life - yet occupies the sphere of an imposed law (Gesetz), the very law which Glas believes is dissolved.

The presupposition of the Hegelian 'infinite subject' as the self-relation of the person is the construction of a **Kantian** Hegel. For Hegel the categorical imperative pertains to personality alone - it is the command of personality and the guarantor of private property: "be a person and respect others as persons"[58]. A Kantian Hegel would, therefore, identify the mutual respect of the exchange relation, of **contract** (and all the time is looking for what escapes the identity of the two parties, the signature, the "remain(s)") with the structure of recognition in otherness: in short, it would transform the concept and imperative of personality into a formal identical 'being-for-self-in-otherness', it would elide formal identity (contract) with the speculative thought of 're-cognition', overlooking the latter's determination of the difference in oneness - and of the law which unites the different terms. Again, this 'elision' is the intrusion of the Kojevian reading; there recognition is construed as technical-practical domination - "man, to be truly 'man', and to know that he is such, must, therefore, impose the idea that he has of himself on beings other than himself: he must be recognised by the others"[59] - the law which unites the two is not determined in its necessity and contradiction, rather, it is presupposed (as

bourgeois right) and imposed in its generality. From this the production of an autonomous, transparent Ego qua 'self-consciousness' is regarded as the end of 'recognition' and, as such, (so Derrida is aware), it reflects the real violence of the bourgeois subject, so placid in the abstract 'ought' of the categorical imperative. From within the lectures on an "aigle", then, the assimilation and transmutation of consciousness, self-consciousness and Spirit into a logocentric metaphysics of le propre takes flight and this complete, transparent self-presence which overcomes all division and enjoys the autonomy of s'entendre parler is aligned with the antherrection and the trace of the mother, the structure of a general fetish. Under the siglum "IC" Derrida elides the imperatif categorique and the Immaculate Conception - the production of that autonomous Ego, the rigid, unyielding self of personality is continuous with the counter-erection of a fiction which maintains self-production and supresses the 'trace' of maternity in the figure of the father just as it expresses an Oedipal desire:

"so the son or the phallus of the virgin sleeps immediately with his/its mother, the father that is dead (or set aside [ecarte] by the Immaculate Conception, but because of this fact, excusing himself just as well from passing essentially through his mother, consequently engendering his son all by himself, self-inseminating himself and calling himself in him: the son that is the father is also the mother that is the son [...]) feigns to put no more obstacles in the way." [60]

This substitute-structure which attempts the overcoming of

the mother is advertised across Genet's text but is seen to be strictly disavowed in Hegel's production of the infinite subject out of revealed religion and the Trinity. Furthermore, and in accordance with the eagle-imperial completion and realization of the kingdom of heaven, the IC is joined with Sa - the rewritten absolute knowing is the celebration of the apotheosis of the self-proper, of the absolute transparency and self-revelation of the subject: the antherection is, to repeat, always construed as the rectitude of that "rigid unyieldingness"[61].

That absolute knowledge is in flight is also the experience of personality. As with the Derridean account, personality holds only to its appropriative capacity. It identifies alienation as unthinkable, absolute loss to which it is immune: what is not proper to it is posited as alien, opposed and inessential, to which it has a right of appropriation. Nevertheless, this right appears to be founded in absolute difference and to be in flight, stolen, as the abstract 'I' finds its substance expropriated, embodied in the inessential object. The "remain(s)" - the resistance, the refusal, the inassimilable on account of its inessentiality - 'operates' within a structure of recognition which (as has been noted), from its **contractual** arrangement is conceived according to the categorical imperative. Mid-way between the speculative determination of the law of abstract right

law, it is a **Kojevean** Hegel upon whose premisses Genet intrudes: the thought which effects both the generalisation of bourgeois right and yet which does not shy away from its implicit violence, indeed embraces it. Nevertheless, this is not to say that the thief does not follow the career of personality. As Genet's work - its dramatis personae as well as its poetry - displays, not only is the voleur inscribed within and by legal status, the affirmation of fetishism of the other column enveloping itself in the fetishism which accompanies positive property law, but it follows the course of the thought of the person, the abstractions actualized in legal personality as Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness. It follows personality in its self-consciousness yet casts these forms in ironical roles: just as Derrida has emphasised that differance is no negative theology or tragic Weltanschauung - "it would not mean a single step outside of metaphysics if nothing more than a new motif of 'return to finitude', of 'God's death', etc were the result of this move"[62] - so does the 'unhappiness' of Genet consume itself by virtue of a refusal of all nostalgia for lost presence. Yet this is not to say that it departs from personality - as witnessed in the monastic gaol, Genet's narrative is one which advertizes its play, inflates its metaphors, expands the simile to the point of its explosion: "Harcamone is God, since he is in heaven (I am speaking of the heaven I

create for myself and to which I am devoted body and soul)"[63]; "Stilitano whose image was already inscribed in a heaven of glory"[64]; "I call the Virgin Mother and Guiana the Comforters of the Afflicted"[65]. Derrida takes this elision of the sacred and profane to be the advertisement of the antherrection, the general fetishism of affirmation as well as disavowal whereby "Guiana" is Holy Mother and "that hole" - the fetishism that registers the "remain(s)". Yet just as this takes place within the anterior, positive law that unites monastic withdrawal, Jesus' refusal of ethical life, and the abstract, universal 'I' of personality, so does the profanation of an Ersatz-religion occur within the sphere of legal right. Genet rings the glas of the ontotheological subject without invoking the dead God, without 'nostalgia': he repeats the motion of Hegel's **comic** consciousness - "into the latter, all divine being returns, or it is the complete **alienation** of **substance**"[66] and is unthinkable outside legal status for "in the condition of right or law, then, the ethical world and the religion of that world are submerged and lost in the comic consciousness"[67].

'Genet' is, therefore, not a column set at an oblique angle from the Hegelian propre; rather, it enacts the impossible self-identity, the abstract and formal rigidity, of the legal person. It follows the universal

self of personality as a 'substitute', an appearance. Realized as a mask or a shadow, the Setzung of personality remains within the dissembling of the dramatic persona - affirmed and repeated in Genet's 'magnifying nomination'. Furthermore, the determination by legal personality of the 'inessentiality' of the thing - the transition, in Hegel's account, to scepticism - occurs as theft, flight (vol). The universal person is an Ersatz, 'inessentialized', all 'essence' is lost to the beyond and the 'I' consigned to the shame of its corporeity, oscillating between divinity and degradation: "this essence is the unattainable **beyond** which, in being laid hold of, flees, or rather has already flown"[68] whilst the "gl", the "remain(s)", is the mire into which consciousness is returned; "Consciousness is aware of itself as **this actual individual** in the animal functions [...] in them the enemy reveals himself", incapable of 'purifying' itself within the terms of the antinomy, consciousness therefore is glued to this enemy, "in fixing its attention on him, far from freeing itself from him really remains forever in contact with him, and forever sees itself as defiled"[69]. That monastic flight from the world - the purging of self, the mortification of the flesh, the vows of chastity and poverty, in other words the "holy" as opposed to the ethical[70] - this is then echoed and travestied by the comic consciousness within Genet's works.

Glas is attached to the notion of 'travesty' and therein it brings to the front of the house the question - alluded to several times already - of personality as persona, the dramatic antecedent of the legal subject. With the comic consciousness it is as if personality, following its travails and in the awareness of its inessentiality, returns to the 'explicit' consciousness of its fictionality. This is what the general fetishism achieves - the inessentiality of the Setzung sends it into the abyss of a general Ersetzung - and it acknowledges its substitutive character as role-playing, role-casting as not excluding sexual 'identity': the androgyny of Genet's text is allied with its comedy insofar as it is a **travesty** - it ridicules as it cross-dresses. Glas cites Genet:

"This may not be an original thought with me, but let me restate it anyway, that the patron saint of actors is Tiresias, because of his double nature... For seven years a man's clothing, for seven years a woman's... his feminity followed in close pursuit of his virility, the one of the other being constantly asserted, with the result that he never had any fixed point where he could rest." [71]

This question of sexuality is situated within the domain of sexual roles; the fetish oscillating in the definition of the role, in the 'secondary', 'inessential' matter of vestment - the improper and external as usurping the universal and necessary. Genet's 'undecidability' invokes a further complicity in the antinomies of private property law: the self-proper has transmuted from the mask, the persona. As ever, Glas conjures with the actor, ironist,

dissembler as a means of overturning Hegel's ethical life - yet does not recognise that the construal of ethical life (the "reign of law", of the absolute proper, the subject of Gesetz) is that not of Greece but of modern property law, that which posits with its formal, abstract identity the shapes of dissimulation and concrete difference. Tiresias remains within this structure of dissembling for representation comes on the scene with the dissolution of the substantial and immediately ethical life of Greece and the rise of the absolute 'I', the principle of subjectivity. The duplicity and oscillation of the actor is between mask and player: "the hero who appears before the onlookers splits up into his mask and the actor, into the person in the play and the actual self"[72] and the comic consciousness is in evidence as this role-playing is generalized, the notion that dissembling is at the heart of all universality. Nevertheless, the very substitute-stability of this general Ersetzung - the 'I' that holds in abeyance its own loss, staves off, in its comedy, the Unhappy Consciousness, what is kept in abeyance by Derrida with the refusal of a 'nostalgia' or negative theology - occurs as "the pretensions of universal essentiality are uncovered in the self"[73]. A general fetishism operates such that comic consciousness staves off its "completion"[74] in the Unhappy Consciousness - "the knowledge of this total loss"[75]. Glas refuses the 'unglückliche Bewusstseyn' by

adhering to a constitutive difference. The method of a radical self-expropriation maintains itself by refusing the thought of the aporetic except as 'anterior' and sublime. The glas that is the death-knell, constructed within the transcendental Ersatz, permits the gathering around the grave of life, permits a religious yearning (what Hegel once described as "the chaotic jingling of bells"[76]) and yet escapes the necessity of determining this loss, the meaning of its 'non-meaning', by the presupposition of a metaphysical conceptuality resolutely fused with self-propriety. It is in the account of Antigone that this tomb is configured as the constitutive 'loss' and it is there that the deconstructive schema of expropriation is disclosed as parasitic upon a Hegel from whom it derives its resources. In considering the reconstruction of Antigone's tragedy and the repatterning of the conflict of the two laws, the passage from determinate negation to transcendental difference can be uncovered. Moreover, in Derrida's enrolment of Hegel as Creon in Glas's production, the misconstrual of Sittlichkeit and the Hegelian 'absolute' are apparent and confirm Antigone as 'trace', differance. In the reading of Antigone, therefore, the meaning of Hegel's 'ethical life' will be contested, the adherence of Hegel to the 'masculine law' will be under question. In Glas's account of Antigone the construal of Hegelian legality is contested.

Notes

i. The "remain(s)" of castration

- 1 G1, pla
- 2 *ibid*, p2b
- 3 Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), p256
- 4 G1, p210a
- 5 *ibid*, pla
- 6 Freud, On Sexuality, 'Fetishism', p352
- 7 W&D, p178
- 8 G1, p116b
- 9 Freud, p353
- 10 G1, p210a
- 11 *ibid*, p209a
- 12 *ibid*
- 13 Freud, p352
- 14 cf Derrida, 'Le facteur de la verite' in The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Allan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987)
- 15 G1, p210a
- 16 Sarah Kofman, Lectures de Derrida, 'Ca Cloche' (Paris: Galilee, 1984), p136
- 17 G1, p211a
- 18 Freud, p356
- 19 Adorno, Negative Dialectics trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), p381
- 20 G1, p210a / Freud, p353
- 21 G1, p210a
- 22 cf PhS, para 85ff
- 23 IRH, p218
- 24 Kofman, p149

ii. Commodity fetishism

- 1 G1, p206b. cf also: Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach' in C.J.Arthur (ed), German Ideology (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1970), p222
- 2 G1 p201. cf also: Marx, Early Writings, p381
- 3 IRH, p71
- 4 G1, p206a
- 5 GI, p47
- 6 Marx, Capital Vol I, trans. Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p165
- 7 *ibid*, p165-6
- 8 *ibid*.
- 9 *ibid*, p167
- 10 Sarah Kofman, Camera Obscura de l'Ideologie (Paris: Galilee, 1976), p33
- 11 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster (London: NLB, 1971), p164
- 12 *ibid*, p33
- 13 PhS para.750
- 14 cf. Althusser, p164-5, The notion of the "interpellated subject" mirrors Kojève in its presupposition of the

antitheses of property law and its structuring of all forms of social recognition within a paradigm of 'appropriation'.

15 PhS, para.480

16 Kofman, Camera, p33

17 Marx, Capital, p178

18 G1, p195a

19 *ibid*, pla

20 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), para.36 [Hereafter abbreviated to PhR.]

21 Kofman, Camera, p33

22 PhR, para.38

iii. Genet and general fetishism

1 Kofman, Lectures de Derrida, p149

2 G1, p219b

3 *ibid*, pp64-65b

4 *ibid*, p65b

5 cf 'The Pit and the Pyramid' in Derrida, M.

6 W&D, p182

7 *ibid*, p180

8 *ibid*, p181

9 *ibid*, p181

10 G1, pp139-140b

11 G1, p139b. cf also: Jean Genet, The Thief's Journal, trans. Bernard Frechtman (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), p11

12 G1, p141b

13 *ibid*, p67b

14 *ibid*, p20b

15 *ibid*, p5b

16 *ibid*, p6b

17 *ibid*.

18 *ibid*, p133b

19 M, p26

20 *ibid*, pp26-7

21 Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), para.565

22 G1, p134b

23 *ibid*, p183b

24 *ibid*.

25 *ibid*, p27b

26 *ibid*, p13b

27 *ibid*, p13b

28 *ibid*, p14b

29 Genet, Thief's Journal, p5

30 G1, p14b

31 *ibid*, p31b [my emphasis]

32 *ibid*, p23b

33 *ibid*, p29b

34 *ibid*, p29b

35 IRH, p12

36 *ibid*, pp60-61

- 37 *ibid.*
- 38 G1, p57b
- 39 *ibid.*, p173b
- 40 IRH, p35
- 41 *ibid.*, p67
- 42 *ibid.*, p70
- 42a *ibid.*, p27
- 43 *ibid.*, p47
- 44 G1, p6b
- 45 *ibid.*, p5b
- 46 PhS, para.482
- 47 G1, p56b
- 48 PhR, para.66 (Zusatse)
- 49 *ibid.*
- 50 *ibid.* [my emphasis]
- 51 Jean Genet, Miracle of the Rose, trans. Bernard Frechtman, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p11
- 52 PhR, para.66 (Zus)
- 53 cf G1, p204b
- 54 PhS, para.481
- 55 Hegel, Early Theological Writings trans. T.M. Knox (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press), p238
- 56 *ibid.*, p236
- 57 *ibid.*
- 58 PhR, para.36
- 59 IRH, p11
- 60 G1, p104b
- 61 PhS, para.482
- 62 OG, p28
- 63 Genet, Miracle of the Rose, p13
- 64 Genet, The Thief's Journal, p103
- 65 *ibid.*, p212
- 66 PhS, para.752
- 67 *ibid.*, para.753
- 68 *ibid.*, para.217
- 69 *ibid.*, para.265
- 70 cf Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: one volume edition, the lectures of 1827, edited Peter C. Hodgson, trans. R.F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson, J.M. Stewart (Berkeley & London: University California Press, 1988), p484
- 71 G1, p227b
- 72 PhS, para.742
- 73 *ibid.*, para.744
- 74 *ibid.*, para.753
- 75 *ibid.*
- 76 *ibid.*, para.217

CHAPTER TWO

The Transcendental Tomb: Antigone in Derrida and Hegel

Throughout the Derridean text Hegel is construed always the same: a system which maintains the teleology of self-presence along a course in which the dialectical unfolding of the implications of immediate being-as-presence will entrain consciousness in the circular reappropriation of the whole as self-presence. The dichotomy of radical method/conservative system is reconfigured as the teleology of self-presence - the privilege of the voice which hears itself speak, of the light that is self-manifestation and parousia - versus the otherwise infinite chain of differance as evinced, paradigmatically, in writing - in the trace of an impossible presence which is difference as the only condition of possibility of signification. The agonistics of system and method are replayed according to this schema and Hegel is constructed such that

"on the one hand, he undoubtedly summed up the entire philosophy of the logos. He determined ontology as absolute logic; he assembled all the delimitations of philosophy as presence; he assigned to presence the eschatology of parousia; of the self-proximity of infinite subjectivity"

whilst, on the other,

"Hegel is also the thinker of absolute difference. He rehabilitated thought as the memory productive of signs. And he reintroduced [...] the essential necessity of the written trace in a philosophical - that is to say Socratic - discourse that had always believed it possible to do without it; the last philosopher of the book and the first thinker of writing"[1].

All the writings of Derrida on Hegel are, therefore, attempts to arrive at the 'thinker' through the deconstruction of the philosopher; to enter the circle of Hegel's logic and - without involvement in that circle in such a way as to legitimate it, without falling under the sway of determinate negation and the discipline of the Aufhebung - to extract the figure which betrays the difference, that refuses idealization, which resists the circle whose course is reckoned as the spiral ascent to 'Absolute Knowledge' and the annulment of difference. Hegel as philosopher is regarded as proponent of a semiology which appears to figure difference as the detour between an original essential identity and its reattainment. The time of this detour is always such that it permits nothing a place outside of it whilst everything within it cooperates in a time of 'implicitude' in which the very necessity of the course informs every element with the temporal tense of the future anterior - "what reason will have thought". The omnitemporal nature of the schema, evidence of difference in the service of identity - as the momentary loss which precedes self-return at a gain; the time between the two as "the time of a detour, the time of a sign. The time of the sign is... the time of referral ... always, from the outset the movement of lost presence will have set in motion the process of its reappropriation" [2]. As such this omnitemporality is an atemporality - the annulment of difference - which leads

the deconstructive pursuit of the thinker within the circuit of the philosophy in the direction of that which resists this history of self-promotion, of that which resists history, of what is left behind - what the system cannot use. At the start of Glas Derrida frames the question: "what, after all, of the remain(s) today, for us, here, now, of a Hegel?"[3], which is to say - what falls out of the circle, what continues to testify to an ineradicable difference that would be the ruin of all pretence to the fullness of self-presence in its very constitution of signification. This is to say that the thinker is to be sought in the philosopher, as the transcendental condition of the latter's possibility; the 'method' will be the sine qua non of the system and, rather than being disciplined by it, difference will be seen to be the condition of (im)possibility of Absolute Knowledge. '(Im)possibility' for it will render the detour that is the path between an original self-presence and its reappropriation as a deferral: the absolute identity which is the telos of the system will be deranged by an irreducible incoherence at the heart of signification - the identity as untenable, the difference which it disciplined is seen as its ground and destruction and a certain 'method' freed from the identitarian/logocentric 'system'.

It is clear that this is a - deliberately -
transcendentalized Hegel. The question of Glas is the
attempt to avoid an involvement in the rotation of the
circuit and to find an element which, unusable by the
revolution, will be found not only to be its "remains" -
isolated and at rest - but to be so as the pivot upon
which rotation takes place. The quest is for that which
bears witness to the transience of the system - its
omnitemporality as a kind of unceasing organic
circulation: a 'biological' Hegel of acorns and trees is
continually evoked - a witness which will testify to the
circle of reappropriation and its explosion. What is
being sought is the figure which, whilst in the train of
self-consciousness or at least a station on the road to
Absolute Knowledge, will not only refuse that movement but
also exemplify its impossibility. What is sought is a
figure that betrays the irreducible difference of
signification, the difference which is the only
possibility of meaning and which is only present as re-
presented, as never 'all there' - what Derrida famously
terms 'trace' or 'differance', what announces "the origin
of meaning in difference"[4] uncovering the "hinge
(brisure) in language" which, it is argued, "marks the
impossibility that a sign, the unity of signifier and
signified, be produced within the plenitude of a present
and an absolute presence"[5].

Throughout the Derridean text Hegel is construed always the same. In Of Grammatology one reads that the trace would be removed by onto-theology whose last word is Hegel's - "an onto-theology determining the archaeological and eschatological meaning of being as presence, as parousia, as life without differance: another name for death, historical metonymy where God's name holds death in check"[6] - a thought bearing the marks of Thanatos under the cosmetics of "infinite life". Whilst in the essay called 'The Pit and the Pyramid' one finds the circular path of signification moving from the "pit" wherein presentable memory traces await expression to the "pyramid" which is the sign and the status of its completion, an absolute concept as silent and timeless as the end of signification - as the tomb. Differance finds its proscription by this system to be predicated on the fundamental figure of the latter - death and the site of its commemoration and preservation, the tomb. Hyppolite (at whose seminar the essay was presented) had written of "The Concept of Existence in Hegel's Philosophy" as guaranteed by death; that "the animal is unconscious of the infinite totality of life in its wholeness, whereas man becomes the for-itself of that totality and internalizes death. That is why the basic experience of human self-consciousness is inseparable from the fundamental experience of death" [7] - the telos of the system inclines it toward death as the condition of

possibility of life, and also - Derrida adds - as the restriction of the otherwise-disseminative differential tendencies of life as signification. Hegel's 'tomb', for Derrida, is therefore ambivalent: it is secondary and discarded - the body of the meaning (Bedeutung) of Spirit, the pyramid as alien to its contents - yet "raised over the sober and abstract weave of the Hegelian text"[8] it is privileged to be the exemplar of the life of Spirit, "composing the stature and status of the sign". This ambivalence opens the system to the transcendentalising move, for just as Hyppolite declares "death is the principle of negation", "man cannot exist except through the negativity of death", "the movement of universal life manifests itself in this ceaseless and monotonous 'death and birth'"[9] so does that which testifies to this "principle" become the 'remains' of the system. And more: the tomb it is that 'falls' away, that stands outside the "ceaseless and monotonous 'death and birth'" as a testimony and comprehension of it, it is the condition of possibility of a philosophy which pretends to the status of a 'Book of Life' and seeks the annulment of the living, that is to say, temporizing, 'significant', difference. It is the paradigm of the comprehension and spiritualization of life in its containment of it:

Derrida writes that

"The tomb is the life of the body as the sign of death, the body as the other of the soul, the other of the animate psyche, of the living breath. But the tomb also shelters, maintains in reserve, capitalizes on life by marking that life continues elsewhere. The family crypt:

oekesis. It consecrates the disappearance of life by attesting to the perseverance of life. Thus, the tomb also shelters life from death. It warns the soul of possible death, warns of death of the soul, turns away (from) death. This double warning function belongs to the funerary monument. The body of the sign thus becomes the monument in which the soul will be enclosed, preserved, maintained, kept in maintenance, present, signified. At the heart of the monument the soul keeps itself alive..."[10]

The tomb is the transcendental condition of possibility of the system - the eschatological pursuit and reinstitution of an absolute identity which abolishes differance. And yet its very stasis is its refusal of the system. It does not so much present the absolute as re-present it: the soul does not find self-expression in the tomb but is referred to by the latter. Contrary to the systematic design, it evokes the trace precisely by its "resisting time" - the future-anteriority of the text - indeed, it thereby "resists the movement of dialectics, history and logos"[11]. The tomb, hitherto telos of the system, uncovers the 'method' in that it cannot but indicate the perpetual difference which is signification; the impossibility of full self-presence is attested to in the petroglyph which does not enact the speaking voice or the phonetic writing the voice will privilege and subsume, but which is the persisting trace of the unrepresentable, of loss without regain. As the sign, the tomb which is the pyramid thereby 'restores' the differance of signification: death is not "sublimated" in God but rather, as tombstone and work of mourning, the

impossibility of full presence is adumbrated - in contrast to the systematic sign as the route to a complete self-coincidence in signification.

Throughout the Derridean text Hegel is construed always the same. Derrida makes direct allusion to Glas in a footnote to 'The Pit and the Pyramid' in such a way that the essay appears almost as prologue: "In a work in preparation on Hegel's family and on sexual difference in the dialectical speculative economy, we will bring to light the organization and displacement of this chain which reassembles the values of night, sepulcher, and divine - familial - feminine law as the law of singularity - and does so around the pit and the pyramid." [12] The essay underscores a Hegel wherein signification is only possible as a circuitous detour between original identity and its reconstitution; elsewhere (at the start and finish) difference is removed in the name of absolute identity. The silence of death is both the end of such a vital process and its displacement, death unsublimated by ontotheology - in an infinite subjectivity - restoring that repressed trace of the unrepresentable. The eponymous "glas" will similarly entwine and separate these themes of death, difference and signification, and the transcendental oikesis will be assigned a guardian.

The eponymous "glas" is elusive, diffuse but insistent. As 'death-knell' it is, above all, the announcement of differance - the death of the myth of full self-presence in the (undifferential) sign. It echoes the death-drive of Absolute Knowledge ironically, as it is precisely the impossibility of such a closure: the "glas" sounds the "end of the Book" as telos and finis. No longer will the sign be fixed, stable, 'absolute' but rather, as evidence of an impossible presence, as the tomb-structure elucidated in the essay, it will have the character of a death-knell: sounding in commemoration of loss, akin to "differance as the relation to an impossible presence, as expenditure without reserve, as the irreparable loss of presence, the irreversible usage of energy, that is, as the death instinct, and as the entirely other relationship that interrupts every economy"[13]. Closure, fixity, decideability are all thrown into disarray by the differing-deferring of signification and, like a tombstone that marks this movement - that is, its trace - "glas" acts as the sign of this dynamic. Derrida plays throughout with the metonymy of "glas" - 'glissement', the sliding signifier; 'glans', 'gland', the phallogocentrism held in place by an organicist system and metaphors of seeding - and this is its paradigmatic perpetuity. Not the death heralded by the absolute concept but a death - or a sign of death - which is the witness (and 'producer') of life.

This "remains" which is indicated by and as 'glas' is - as the bell's 'oscillation' echoes that of a general fetishism -intimately related to the question of gender for Derrida and in this Antigone appears as its personification. The question of the tomb, of the remains, of the 'glas', is that of persistence, survival. If one recalls Hyppolite: "the movement of universal life manifests itself in this ceaseless and monotonous 'death and birth'" - the question of the remains of Hegel's system, its condition of possibility, the stasis and fulfillment of death, turns to the figure who guards the tomb, who survives all and commemorates their passing and who is witness to birth, being the one who gives birth. In the 'other' column - and as I have sought to relate - Derrida has chosen Genet as witness to this maternal perpetuity: Genet, the bastard child of a mother who has never been present and who himself takes on the role of mourner in Funeral Rites. Of Genet's 'mothers' Derrida writes "it is always the mother - now one knows what this word means (to say) nothing more than what follows, obsequences, remains after killing what it gave birth to" [14].

'Glas' is the tombstone, the differance that marks how "the death agony of language is structurally interminable" and this site of death, its interminable and perpetual movement, is watched over by the one who, discovered

within the Hegelian circuit, will express that which the system requires and proscribes. The "glas that can't be stopped"[15], the figure of death who, transcendentalized, permits the system as an organic, vital, circle and yet deranges it, rupturing the possibility of a stable, undifferentiated sign and of closure in Absolute Knowledge, is discovered in Antigone. Antigone is the differance which the system of ethical life attempts to overcome yet who is - as the difference that is the condition of possibility of its meaning - fundamental to the system as the death that is the "principle" of Hegelian life. Antigone is the "remain(s)" when one recalls this as all that does not fall in with the "Hegelian semiology" of the 'Pit and the Pyramid' - the sign as a detour between self-presence and its accomplishment, the sign as the "time of a detour" with an origin and conclusion in the timelessness of absolute identity. "Time's remain(s) - for the seminar(y) of Sa [Savoir Absolu] - that is nothing"[16], yet time as the temporization, as the active sense of differance, 'exhibits' such a remains in the movement of signification. A perpetual difference which will not subscribe to the determinate negation - regarded as an inverse affirmation of presence-regained - but will rather take effect as the "dehiscence" of the sign, its irony. An irony which, taking its cue from Hegel, delimits sexual difference in that it will draw together the mother and

sister under the law of the family whilst that law, with its prime function of servicing the dead, will draw out the very 'trace-structure' of the feminine. A quotation will carry us from the 'tomb of the sign' and the transcendentalized death-witness to the case of Antigone:

"The inalienable blow [coup] of the woman is irony. Woman, '[the community's] internal enemy' can always burst out [eclater] laughing at the last moment; she knows, in tears and in death, how to pervert the power that suppresses. The power of irony - the ironic posit(ion)ing rather - results - syllogistically - from what the master produces and proceeds from what he suppresses, needs, and returns to. Antigone is Cybele, the goddess-Mother who precedes and follows the whole process. She is at all catastrophes, all downfalls, all carnages, remains invulnerable to them, is killed invulnerable [y reste invulnerable]. Her very death does not affect her.

All remains in her. She is to come after, to be followed, to be continued [a suivre]."[17]

Derrida construes Hegel always the same: a refurbishment of the dichotomy of radical method/conservative system. The method not only escapes but also explodes the system on account of the transcendental status of difference: the method is the condition of possibility of the system by virtue of its "principle of negation" and, when such a differential dynamic is grasped in its full, destabilizing, effects, it takes shape as the condition of systematic impossibility. If the disseminative difference of signification is thereby transmuted into the form of Hegelian methodology despite itself, then in adversity does it confront a system constituted by the movement of Aufhebung - for Derrida, the serial incorporation of

alterity, the unfolding of the implicit absolute identity in Spirit, the familiar career of infinite subjectivity as self-presence. Antigone is convened as personification of the differance - the interminable death to which signification is subject, the ruin of possibility of systematic closure - a transcendental place whose Hegelian site was uncovered by Hyppolite; at the same time, as sorority she will refuse the systematic constitution that is the Aufhebung by taking no part in the dialectic of master and slave - the ruin of systematic closure as constructed by Kojève. Hyppolite and Kojève stand at each shoulder when Derrida exalts Antigone as the 'glas' of Hegel, they combine to yield the binocular view that Derrida takes:

"...Since the Hegel text remains to be read, I re-form here its ellipse around two foci: (the) burial (place), the liason between brother and sister." [18]

Derrida seizes upon the cleanly-delineated opposition of family and state which - for him - is Hegel's reading of the Antigone of Sophocles. Derrida's construal takes Antigone as the differance of the text, she always is found by the tomb; as guardian of the law of the family, woman, the divine, obscure and unconscious, of individuality, she confronts the living universal of the state (the law of the human, the masculine, the visible and illuminated) and assumes the function of one occupied perpetually with death. The reading of this section of the Phenomenology to be found in Kojève's Lectures

reproduces the conflict of family and state - of the laws of human and divine, feminine unconscious and masculine light - as a fruitless struggle, the result ruination and a descent into slavery thanks to the victory of the principle of woman. The conflict is one without possibility of synthesis: whilst the two sides co-exist - "the particular and particularist Family is a necessary complement of the universal and universalist pagan state" [19] - the very **passivity** which must be characteristic of a devotion to the dead renders the feminine inactive and therefore incapable of rising to the universal. The two sides cannot be united (in the terms of Kojève's reading) because woman is locked into particularity and, attendant upon the dead, she is unable to undertake the action necessary to constitute her as human - "the human Actions of Fighting and of Work"[20]. The tragedy of Antigone is, then, the compulsion on the part of the citizen to renounce the family and risk death "for the universal cause" which thereby sets the two - "mutually exclusive" - laws in conflict. The universal and particular cannot enter into the conflict which is the sine qua non of 'humanity', the paradigmatic struggle for recognition of master and slave, because one of the parties refuses to subscribe to this human law, indeed this is their conflict. Kojève delivers a "particularist" Antigone whose "essentially inactive existence is not truly human", who stops dead the expansion of the universal state -

conceived as the Kriegstaat for "since the only human value is the one realized in and by Fighting and the risk of life, the life of the State must necessarily be a warlike life: the pagan state is a human state only to the extent that it wages wars for prestige"[21]. This is the scenario for Derrida's restaging of the drama yet with a significant difference - one that both confuses and distinguishes Kojève and Hegel. Kojève is incapable of conceiving of the family, in its distinction from the state, as anything other than 'particularity' in opposition to 'universality'. Derrida's extravagances with the Hegelian text nevertheless show a greater attentiveness: the "individuality" that is familial separates Kojève from Hegel and underlines the level of generalization, schematization and abstraction in the former's 'Introduction', yet the confusion (to which we shall turn shortly) is apparent in the reliance, in Glas' restaging, on the stage-directions of Kojève.

"Individuality" releases Antigone from the abstract dialectic of the Kojèvean drama yet serves then to both expel her from the stage (subsequently to resume that drama of dialectical 'universalization') and exalt her as 'the stage': Derrida returns to Hegel for the unicity of Antigone, whilst remaining in Kojève for the general schema of ethical life and absolute knowledge.

'Individuality' is necessarily misread as 'particularity' by Kojève for it explodes the generalized agonistics of

master and slave: Derrida is intent upon this 'explosion' but within the terms of a misreading - the confusion of Kojève and Hegel - as significant for the ends of his own text as Kojève's was.

Antigone's 'singularity' draws out the transcendental structure of the differance anew; the irony of the universal, the refusal of the formative struggle for recognition - her completeness and apparent self-sufficiency - is borne out in the relationship which is the master/slave's deconstructive 'counterpart' (no possibility of its enrolment in the circle - unlike Kojèvean 'particularism'). Antigone is an internal resistance which refuses internalisation - she reinforces what has been seen to be the role of the tomb just as she is its guardian:

"The effect of focusing, in a text, around an impossible place. Fascination of a figure inadmissible in the system. Vertiginous insistence on an unclassable. And what if what cannot be assimilated, the absolute indigestible, played a fundamental role in the system, an abyssal role rather, the abyss playing an almost transcendental role and allowing to be formed above it, as a kind of effluvium, a dream of appeasement? Isn't there always an element excluded from the system that assures the system's space of possibility? The transcendental has always been, strictly, a transcategorical, what could be received, formed, terminated in none of the categories intrinsic to the system. The system's vomit. And what if the sister, the brother/sister relationship, represented here the transcendental position, ex-position?" [22]

The desirelessness of the relationship of brother and sister sets Antigone apart, assures her the transcendental place of one who, in a general schema, is "unique in the

Hegelian universe"[23] in that she is outside any dialectic of recognition. The brother and sister, for Hegel, are without desire, whilst the sister, in her work of mourning for the brother, is accorded the status of "the highest presentiment of the ethical"[24]. The sister - stranger to the war and desire characterizing the history of the master/slave and yet apparently the single supreme case of ethical purity - therefore revokes the principle of the masculine consciousness - the war against, and conquest/sublation of, alterity - and stands apart; as still and resistant to dialectical history and determinate negation as the tombstone, the marker which perpetually refers - outside the horizon of presence - to an unthinkable absolute negation. The law of the polis is refigured as the Kojevian procedure of Desire - war of desire leading onto the victory and satisfaction of the slavish consciousness in labour - and it is in confrontation with this history (which is, in the Derridean construal, 'History') that Antigone, as sorority, throws the conscious law into confusion. The brother and sister do not join battle:

"Brother and sister 'do not desire one another'. The for-(it)self of one does not depend on the other. So they are, it seems, two single consciousnesses that, in the Hegelian universe, relate to each other without entering into war. Given the generality of the struggle for recognition in the relationship between consciousnesses, one would be tempted to conclude that there is no brother/sister bond, there is no brother or sister. If such a relation is unique and reaches a kind of repose (Ruhe) and equilibrium (Gleichgewicht) that are refused to every other one, that is because the brother and sister do not receive from each other their for-self and

nevertheless constitute themselves as 'free individualities'. These for-self's recognize, without depending on, each other; they no more desire each other than tear each other to pieces." [25]

The feminine law as singularity, Derrida figures, will not participate in the state-and-system-building of a universalizing desire. Furthermore, in the opposition, as Derrida conceives it, of state and family are convened two laws which resist sublation on account of one of the terms not only refusing the textual schema of Aufhebung but also possessing the status of its transcendental condition of possibility. Kojève reported the two laws as "mutually exclusive", Derrida - alighting on the refusal of the two laws to conduct themselves according to the Kojevian plan - finds rather that one of them is in priority to the other. Within the terms of their opposition is contained the very 'displacement' of the system for which the antagonism of family and polis is constitutive. Derrida takes seriously and literally the status of the divine law as that of "the unconscious": in the confrontation of city and family there is a chain of terms in opposition and Derrida aligns them in such a way that a virile state and a 'virtual' logic are revealed and undermined by their antagonist.

"To this great opposition [family law and state law] is ordered a whole series of other couples: divine law/human law, family/city, woman/man, night/day, and so on. Human law is the law of daylight because it is known, public, visible, universal; human law rules, not the family, but the city, government, war, it is made by man (vir). Human law is the law of man. Divine law is the law of woman; it

hides itself, does not offer itself in this opening-manifestation (Offenbarkeit) that produces man. Divine law is nocturnal and more natural than the city. Once more the family appears as the most natural degree of the ethical community. Natural, divine, feminine, nocturnal, familial, such is the predicative system, the law of singularity. In this law - this is said more precisely, in this place, of the family - the concept is "unconscious". The Penates are opposed to the people, to absolute spirit, to universality-producing labour. The proper end of the family, of the woman who represents the family, strictly, is the singular as such." [26]

Woman - Antigone - becomes the textual unconscious in the twofold sense that she is organised, in the clash with the state, as the upholder of the "unconscious law" in face of the conscious, political law and that, as the transcendental figure, she orchestrates the teleology of the text, both permitting and confounding the opposed law (which is, of course, to be taken as the conscious end of the textual exertions). The Hegelian 'unconscious' is reckoned by the system to possess the teleological distinction of 'virtuality': "the unconscious is a possible conscious, a virtual truth" [27]. Disciplined by the law of the city, of light and man (vir), the text assumes an unconscious which is 'consciousness-implicit' - the assured bringing-to-light in all its implications and in the full presence of comprehension of that obscure law, the Aufhebung of the feminine. The text attempts to entrain that which it figures as 'unconscious' within the circuit of the conscious - a trait, incidentally, which is neatly explicated by Kojève's English editor: "Kojève

gives an example of what it means to follow out the necessity of one's position manfully and philosophically"[28] - the unconscious is figured as the implications or the implied, to be uncovered and illuminated by the subject of the masculine law. Yet Derrida finds in Antigone's tragedy - the crime which cannot be undone - evidence of the perpetual resistance to presence; the Nachtraglichkeit - delayed effect - which differance, as a deferring as well as (spatial) differing, draws on. Antigone refuses the role of an unconscious which is 'implicitly-conscious' - already what it is not yet - in that Hegel describes a tragic fate that befalls the ethically pure or - as in the case of Oedipus - the ignorant. Despite the illumination of the unconscious crime "the relief does not lift [leve] the culpability, does not wash away [lave] the crime. An after-effect [un effet d'apres] offers endless resistance there. The crime has taken place, the culpability remains"[29]. In the ineradicable discrepancy in the ethical action which is criminal, the "teleological temporality of self-presence" [30] - the law of the city, light, man - is disturbed and only the conclusion of death, that which leaves in Hegel the tremendous feeling of appeasement, seems to allow the death that is in fact perpetual - Antigone as the differance, the glas of the myth of full self-presence in signification - to be returned to the systematic structure of the Phenomenology: the deathly stasis of Absolute

Knowledge.

Already the eschatology of the system has been addressed - the mark of Thanatos which ontotheology is seen as bearing, only sublimated by an infinite subjectivity, God - and Antigone, whose destiny is to die as singularity, desireless, complete, immune to the mutual dependence and across-the-counter bargaining of the master/slave, is figured as the paradigm of such a systematic death-drive. And yet her opposition to its systematic organisation is such that she has an effect of ruination which exceeds the bounds within which the Phenomenology seeks to confine it. Antigone 'unmans' the community; the perpetual irony which unhinges the unity of the sign in the advance to Absolute Knowledge and Sittlichkeit, as Cybele she is the perpetual circle of birth and destruction whose priests - Derrida has recourse to Hegel's 'Spirit of Judaism' as reinforcement - "were castrated (verschnitten), unmanned in body and spirit (an Leib und Geist entmannt)"[31]. An absolute negation which mirrors the absolute identity that is the telos of the system and which, standing apart from its logic of determinate negation (characterised by Derrida as the means whereby "the absolute spirit records a profit in any case, death included"[32]), both guarantees that concern with death and renders its desire for 'sublimation' impossible. It is only with the employment to their fullest extent of the powers of the

masculine law that the text can subsequently reorder the 'ruin' of ethical life to its own advantage, yet Antigone remains - as the 'remains', the trace, differance, that which enacts the perennial "dehiscence" of the sign: "the one who poses the transcendental question of questions on the possibility of your own proper discourse can always be referred to the sister"[34].

One cannot configure Antigone's role in Glas, then, without pursuing the strange dependence of the discourse of differance and its transcendental tomb (and Antigone's role is once more assigned when Derrida writes: "crypt - one would have said, of the transcendental or the repressed, of the unthought or the excluded - that organises the ground to which it does not belong"[35]), the dependence of this thought which reiterates the perpetual differing-deferring, upon the Kojevian Hegel of closure and the cessation of difference in absolute identity. This dependence is evident in the Derridean Antigone's remaining within an eschatology, the differance appears to depend on 'death-dealing' in equal degree to its adversary. Antigone enacts the trace-structure and the interminable death that is signification - and displaces Absolute Knowledge - inasmuch as

"Nothing should be able to survive Antigone's death. Plus nothing more should follow, go out of her, after her. The announcement of her death should sound the absolute end of history. A glaze(d) virgin, sterile transparency. Without desire and without labour."[36]

One would be preparing to ask whether the 'glas' that is (enacted in the tragedy of) Antigone, the dramatization of différance, does not communicate with a Kojevian eschatology, remaining wedded to a notion of nihilation, of subjective striving-through-negation which, although no longer granted the tomb-like rest of Absolute Knowledge, is relieved in the stasis of the perpetuity of general difference. Derrida's account testifies that Antigone is the transcendental site of both Hegel's and his own thought.

Derrida has removed the misplaced Kojevian "particular" from the ethical order - the "individual" which Kojève ignores is reassigned its place for the reason that it was hitherto-obscured: in the conflict of family and state it appeared that this individual, this singularity, would refuse the subsumptive dynamic of the law, would stop the passage of the ethical order into the realm of Roman legality dead in its tracks. There could be no dialectical war of desire unless there were aligned the logical counterparts of particular and universal. The family is found to be the precursor of Roman 'privacy' through the continuum of the victory of its "particularism" - "that principle of Particularity that is hostile to Society as such and whose victory signifies the ruin of the State, of the Universal properly so-called"[37]. Derrida subscribes to the emphasis on

mutual-exclusion which each law exercises upon the other, and to the character and destruction of this "Universal" - but configures the 'individualism' of the family as that which, precisely, destroys perpetually the possibility of the system's self-recovery in the passage to legality. What draws both Kojève and Derrida into line, then, is that each conceives the opposition as one fixed and clear - "the Family and State are mutually exclusive"[38]; "the family imperils the head"[35] - and then proceeds to privilege one of the terms: Kojève the "Universal" and Derrida the "singular", in turn allocating the place of a transcendental condition of the eschatological system's (im)possibility to that privileged term.

Throughout its discussion of the Hegelian Sittlichkeit, Glas has construed it as given its model form in the ethical life of Greece, the citizen of the polis as the paradigmatic free subject. Being-for-self attains its ideal form in the Greeks and is a mode of propriety, the subject one of appropriation. "If one follows this value of the proper", writes Derrida, "of property (proprieté, Eigen, Eigentum) one must conclude that the free citizen's independence and quality go on a par with private property" [39]. Moreover, the ethical order is, according to Derrida, nothing other than "the reign of law"[40]: the implication - monarchism and positive law, the monarchism of positive law. The commerce of a transcendentalised

(mon-archival) 'ethical order' with one of positive law is emphasised in Derrida's reinforcement of the distinction and exclusivity of Family and State. Yet, in a move reminiscent of Kojève, the 'individual', 'singular', familial silently translates into the 'particular': whilst Derrida accounts for the ethical order in its division as torn between the 'written' law of the state and the 'non-written' law of the family, this introduction of positive law into ethical life is further confused when he writes of the family's "personal independence, independence of property (Eigentum) always bound to the family, personal right and real right (dingliche Recht) that assures possession"[41]. This is nothing less than **the introduction of the language of Roman legality into the sphere of ethical life.** The confusion sends the description of Antigone's 'singularity' into incoherence - as a representative of "personal right" she would belong to civil society, exhibit the "particularism" that Kojève describes and both confirm and confound the 'glas' of the system. **Confirm**, for, 'particularized' Antigone would underscore a model of ethical life which undertook the work of appropriation, which permitted the Aufhebung to be translated as 'relever' and 'relever de' (come under, subsume) - a model of practical reason. **Confound**, for it would thereby confer upon her a certificate of entry into such a system: as in Kojève's account, she would not prove

dynamic yet would serve as a dialectical step in the spiral ascent to Absolute Knowledge.

The point is: transcendentalised, the system necessarily cooperates with Roman legality; the search for the figure which justifies the text, the 'principle' according to which it unfolds, all presumes to accord a priority which is at odds with Hegel's description of the ethical order. Derrida, concurring with Kojève's account of each as a "hostile principle", "mutually exclusive", has alighted upon the opposition of family and state in media res - at the point of tragic conflict - driven them to extremes, and taken one of the terms as the transcendental. Although for Hegel the family is "substance in general", "general possibility of the ethical sphere", "the unconscious, still inner Notion of the ethical order"[42], this does not imply a transcendental priority but rather is the acknowledgement of the unknown in such a way that, unlike the movement of a transcendental structure, it will not be thereby dominated by the known, visible, illuminated. Indeed, it is only by alighting on the tragedy as its opposing terms have taken their place in confrontation that Derrida could render the ethical order a sphere of personality/subjectivism: the very structure of that "cleaved Sittlichkeit" which is the tragedy of Antigone is produced out of the mutuality of the Family and State - the abstract and ossified terms of 'individual' and

'universal' which reach such delineation in the confrontation of Antigone and Creon serve to obscure their 'circulation' in the ethical sphere. Of course, it is such a circulation - a resistance to criticism, to the granting of a critical purchase on this system without presuppositions - that drives Derrida to the seizure upon this apparently-transcendental place. Yet the misconstrual of the ethical order as the realm of Roman legality is the inevitable result of a transcendentalizing thought confronting Hegel - that is, a thought which betrays a greater adherence to positing law and its concomitant subjectivism than Hegel's does. Within the context of the Hegelian attempt to think political relations apart from the dominating subject, Glas strives to reintroduce personality - as if it were the only means deconstruction had of considering the politico-legal. As if its incredulous response to a thought seeking to derive and pursue the construction of the abstractions of positive law were to return that thought insistently to those abstractions, as if to deny the possibility of doing otherwise except by way of describing in abstraction the perpetual and general grammatological unsettling or instability of their terms.

The thought of deconstruction remains more than parasitic upon the abstractions of 'metaphysics' and this is evident in its transcendentalizing drive. The presupposition of

Hegel's 'system' as the legitimation of "introjective subjectivity" - a thought imagined to suppress the deconstructive transcendental difference with great force - serves to announce the very subjectivism of Derrida's discourse. The elision of the individual with the particular in certain moments of the discussion of Antigone betrays the fixity assigned to the oppositions of ethical life, a fixity which can afford the subsequent privileging of one term of the opposition as transcendental. Yet this is precisely what the dynamic of ethical life - without the figure of modern abstract 'subjectivity' or the particularism of civil society - outstrips in its constitution through the 'circulation' of individual and universal, family and city, woman and man:

"The husband is sent out by the Spirit of the Family into the community in which he finds his self-conscious being. Just as the Family in this way possesses in the community its substance and enduring being, so, conversely, the community possesses in the Family the formal element of its actual existence, and in the divine law its power and authentication. Neither of the two is absolutely valid; human law proceeds in its living process from the divine, the law valid on earth from that of the nether world, the conscious from the unconscious, mediation from immediacy - and equally returns whence it came. The power of the nether world, on the other hand, has its actual existence on earth; through consciousness, it becomes existence and activity." [43]

The difference is the dynamic of the unity of ethical life; one of the terms - as 'unconscious' - is not the condition of the other as 'the head', government, masculine and conscious law. Indeed, the question of the rapid Derridean elision of this opposition of conscious

and unconscious with the ethical order serves to demonstrate the distinction between the psychoanalytic schema which refers to repression and non-recognition, a transcendental unconscious ironically akin to the 'virtual' - ie transcendental - unconscious Derrida finds in Hegel, and the unity-in-difference of conscious and unconscious in the movement of the ethical substance. The transcendentalizing structure is the introduction of the terms and schemata of Roman legality and it is under such a law - with the abstraction of personality, the advent of the "rigid unyielding self" that is no longer "the self that is dissolved in the substance"[44] - that the necessary 'un-thinking' of the unconscious which Derrida sees as typifying the Hegelian philosophy of presence in its attitude towards the "hidden law" comes on the scene. Within each individual in the ethical sphere there is the immediate acknowledgement of the universal - and precisely because it is not 'written' or posited but is the actualization of the individual - whilst the universal acknowledges its "force and element" in the unconscious familial law. The transcendental thought which cannot dispense with a certain linearity and concern with unequivocal origins - even if despite itself; even if written in the insistent terms of "non-originary origin", "conditions of (im)possibility" etc - necessarily is incapable of conceiving of the ethical order except in terms of the structures of abstract subjectivity. The

transcendentalised, 'uni-directional' Hegel of the "virtual unconscious" cannot be sustained by a return to the Phenomenology, to the ethical order as

"an immaculate world, a world unsullied by internal dissension. Similarly, its process is a tranquil transition of one of its powers into the other, in such a way that each preserves and brings forth the other. We do indeed see itself divide itself into two essences and their reality; but their antithesis is rather the authentication of one through the other..." [45]

Derrida takes to task a Hegel for whom the system is the justification of a Sittlichkeit functioning according to the law of phallogocentrism; an infinite appropriative subjectivity which seeks to subdue what it determines as 'Nature' through 'the' Aufhebung conceived as relever. Derrida seeks to shatter the accomplishment of this end through the privileging of the alternative law to the one transcendentalized and, thereupon, he completes the transcendentalizing gesture: Antigone - "representative" of the law of the hidden, unconscious, obscure - is detached from that conception of non-positated law whereby the universal and individual were at one - an immediate knowledge of the right - and transformed to assume the position for which, in abstract isolation, she is so well-suited. As unknown - "undecideable" - her place is that assigned to the transcendental in accordance with a metaphysics which, whilst eschewing the language of de(con)struction, Hegel knew in all its abstractions. The transcendentalized Hegel returns us to those abstractions

whilst the differance which enacts the dehiscence of 'absolute identity', far from repeating the attempt at the determination and derivation of the abstract oppositions of philosophical culture, reaffirms them as according with an unknowable law of undecideability - an interminable shifting or alteration akin to the clapper in the bell, that bell which sounds the 'glas' of signification: the stasis of a perpetual difference.

Notes

- 1 OG, p26
- 2 M, pp72-73
- 3 Gl, pla
- 4 OG, p70
- 5 ibid, p69
- 6 ibid, p71
- 7 Jean Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel, trans. John O'Neill (London: Heinemann,1969), p30
- 8 M, p77
- 9 Hyppolite, p26
- 10 M, p83
- 11 ibid, p
- 12 ibid, p77
- 13 ibid, p19
- 14 Gl, p257a
- 15 ibid.
- 16 ibid, p226a
- 17 ibid, p142a
- 18 ibid, p147a
- 19 IRH, p61
- 20 ibid.
- 21 ibid, p62
- 22 Gl, p150-162a [break in the text]
- 23 ibid, p149a
- 24 ibid, p149a
- 25 ibid, p147a
- 26 ibid.
- 27 ibid, p149a
- 28 IRH, pxi
- 29 Gl, p173a
- 30 ibid, p172a
- 31 ibid, p173a
- 32 ibid, p187a
- 33 ibid, p141a
- 34 ibid, p164a
- 35 ibid, p166a
- 36 ibid.
- 37 IRH, p62
- 38 ibid, p61
- 39 Gl, p146a
- 40 ibid, p53a
- 41 ibid, p142a
- 42 PhS, para. 450
- 43 ibid, para. 460
- 44 ibid, para. 429
- 45 ibid, para. 463

CHAPTER THREE

Religion in the Reliquary: The "remain(s)" of Spirit from Christian Filiation to the mastery of the Jews

The discussion of Antigone in Glas bears witness to the deconstructive schematising of Hegel's attempt to rethink 'ethical life'. Whereas Hegel sought to determine - rather than defer to - the abstract oppositions of positive law, Derrida - with no notion of law other than as posited and identitarian - incarcerates the Hegelian attempt and leaves thought with an 'unthinkable' law; positivity 'sous rature'. Sittlichkeit and "True Spirit" are reconstructed within the matrix of a polis identified by deconstruction as "the reign of law"[1], a legality that is depicted according to the imposed unity of masculine Gesetz; a Hegel of Setzung and "regle"[2]. Derrida's misreading of Antigone holds a peculiar irony for it focuses on what is perceptively taken as 'exemplary' (and that 'exemplarity' - for Hegel - bears on the very (im)possibility of a nonposited law "for us, today, here, now") and yet it returns Antigone's 'law' to the fixed oppositions of positive law, understanding the tragedy of Antigone and Creon in terms of a hierarchical opposition geared to the restoration of the abstract state, that "reign of law". Thus, even as it reads the Hegelian attempt to think ethical life beyond the fixed oppositions of positive law and the discourse of Setzung,

the machinery of Glas cannot operate except in those terms; maintaining Hegel within them and itself evading the subsumptive concept only by configuring the latter's oppositions as its, the concept's, (transcendental) alienation. This procedure is repeated in the 'glassifying' treatment of 'Spirit': Glas turns again to an instance of Hegel's criticism of the suppressions and occlusions of positive law and, approaching the text with the schematic and oscillating oppositions inscribed in a general fetishism, it elides the intimations of ethical life with the abstract state just as it celebrates the violence and 'unconsciousness' of the legal concept and its application insofar as they testify to perpetuated difference and impossible closure.

The text that Derrida employs to carry out the displacement of identitarian Spirit is Hegel's early essay, 'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate'. As the 'family' - the oikos - was produced as paradigmatic of Hegelian self-presence, so does Glas undertake a reading of 'The Spirit of Christianity' that pursues this. Indeed, the path from oikos to oekesis - from the ideal self-propriety of the family hearth to its constitutive 'nothing', the crypt - is represented from within Hegel's account of the absolute religion and its Aufhebung of Judaism. Hegel's essay is construed as an example of Christian apologetics - a Jesus-Hegel emerges, for Glas,

from its pages - and Spirit is conceived as the identity through filiation of Father and Son. This familial identity, however, is displaced through a reconstruction of the Hegelian death of God and its premonitions - particularly, in the Last Supper (also the scene of filiation: the instance of the annunciation of Jesus' parentage). Finally, the failure of reconciliation which religious Vorstellung reflects - the failure of Christian filiation - would send the absolute presence of Spirit 'back' to the Jews: the return from a loving and revealed father to a castrating, jealous master - unmanifest and sublime. The "remain(s)" of religion in Glas is registered in its re-presentative aspect; it preserves an incapacity - a modesty, one might say, recalling the text as fetishistic "fleece"[3] - which holds it back from full self-presence, leaves Savoir Absolu as only ever re-presented, its closure deferred.

Rereading 'The Spirit of Christianity' in the wake of Glas, this chapter seeks to underscore the construction of a 'Spirit' which, by means of the deconstructive oikos comes to reassemble itself under the law of the Grammatology's "metaphysics of le propre". I maintain that the deconstruction of Hegelian 'Spirit' turns it in the direction of the subject of legal personality with the consequences of a Sittlichkeit reconstructed according to Recht and the antinomies of positive law. The "remain(s)

for us here, today, of a Hegel" will thus be deposited within the contemporary context of the abstract oppositions of reflection which, in the 'transcendentalising' schema of Glas, will be perpetuated as means of thwarting the pretensions of domineering logocentrism. Secondly, the construal of the implicitly-philosophical nature of Hegel's 'religion' is seen to pursue precisely the lines of Kojève's "God-Man" and the eskaton of citizenship in the bourgeois state. This has consequences less for the Derridean critique of the absolute religion than for the convening of the Jews as the religious "remain(s)". The third part of this chapter will reread Glas's translation of the Jews from Hegel's essay, regarding it as conducted according to the Kojevian schema that ejected all that did not succumb to the state-building route of war and labour. The Jews will be seen to 'personify' the suppressed difference of the Kojevian-Hegelian absolute knowledge/state, reintroducing the element that Kojève sought to reject. The first section of this chapter closely follows the construction in Glas of 'Spirit'. This somewhat lengthy exegesis is justified as the pursuit not only of the rhetorical and metonymic reconstruction of 'Spirit' and its echo of and cross-reference to the column of Genet in particular, but also as the inspection of the deconstructive appropriation of Hegel's essay. The exegesis seeks to unfold the manner in which the parasite prepares, making habitable and

nourishing, its host and - contrary to its claims - what violence it does to the latter.

i. 'Spirit' for Glas: autonomy autonomination and the IC in the phantasm of the Father

Glas produces a Hegel that is the justification of a (phal)logocentric subject. As such it construes a 'Spirit' that is the subsumption of 'nature' beneath the law of le propre: as the subject of Hegel, Spirit is conceived in accordance with the 'values' of breath and the voice, the absolute identity of the s'entendre parler. Equally, it is constructed within the left-hand column as an operation obeying the laws of restricted fetishism wherein the constitutive 'cut' is suppressed by way of an Ersatz-absolute, an identity which would stave off acknowledgement of the castration whose effect is registered in such an identification. This is to say that Glas situates Spirit 'en famille'. The identity of Spirit is one with the Father, the return-to-self of the speaking voice is repatterned according to the development of the Hegelian metaphor of the seed and its self-return in a phallic 'tree of life'. Furthermore, this Spirit that develops out of the paternity of the Christian God is also one that embodies the filiation of absolute knowing as Sa, its registration of divine immanence and the seedling of God is the recognition that it is the anticipation of that which has already occurred: the self-return of the

figurative 'divine' into its self-comprehension in Spirit and philosophy according to religion's designation by Hegel as philosophy-implicit. The question of the "remain(s)" of Hegel attends to this seed as it seeks to memorialize that which renders Spirit incomplete, that which precludes the fulfillment of the system's eskaton. The methodological 'remainder', then, attends to the family and to the teleology of a seed and it will seek to record the fall of this seed, its remaining only a part, its departure from the circle. This will reverberate to the "gl" of the Genet column and its method, whose end is the de-legitimation of spiritual paternity, will therefore be "a bastard course":

"a bastard path, then, that will have to feign to follow naturally the circle of the family, in order to enter it, or parcel it out [partager], or partake of [partager] it as one takes part in a community, holy communion, the last supper scene, or part [partager] it as one does by dissociating".[4]

Taking as his text 'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate', Derrida develops a reading of "absolute religion" which, derived from Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, is indissociable from the traditional conception of the sexual opposition of active/differentiating masculinity and passive femininity. The masculine route of Aufhebung is therefore unthinkable without a phallographic hierarchy and thus, for Derrida, the 'implicit' path from religion to ethical life follows a logic of 'virtuality' that is - through and through - masculine/paternal. Glas seeks to

reread the 'three-stroke' structure of "speculative dialectics" through the prism of the Christian Trinity but, in accordance with the method of a general fetishism and what Kofman terms its "sexualization of the text"[5] and along the route of the Kojevian education which teaches that the telos of the system is the "Perfect Man", the "God-Man", Glas rewrites the third term - Spirit - such as to hold it to its family commitments.

'Speculative identity' is to be thought on the terms of the relation of Father and Son. As Derrida writes: "one enters the analysis of Christianity and of the Christian family elaborated by the young Hegel as the conceptual matrix of the whole systematic scene to come"[6]. This is to say that the **unity** of Father and Son expressed in the notion of the Trinity is the speculative 'identity' and Glas rewrites the Hegelian 'absolute' as this - transcendental - identity such that "this a priori infinite synthesis [of father and son] is the condition of all synthetic a priori judgements"[7].

Glas attends to the Christian Aufhebung of Judaism as Hegel describes it in 'The Spirit of Christianity'. In place of an abstract and remote master, the Christian recognises a loving father; in place of a positive law with its concomitant discrepancy of duty and inclination, the Christian is granted the 'love' which overcomes the difference and fulfills the law. What is at issue, then,

is Spirit as the identification of finite and infinite. The Derridean reading maintains that this takes place in Hegel's text thanks to the role of a transcendental paternity: the antecedents of the revealed religion fail to effect this speculative unity on account of their insufficiently familial nature. In consequence, the maintenance of finitude unreconciled with the infinite is, in the terms of Glas, the refusal of the masculine-paternal 'values' (Creon's law) that are exhibited in revelation - lucidity, self-consciousness, self-possession, the expression of parousia - and this reconciliation thereby gathers within the notion of 'Spirit' the family, Christianity and Sittlichkeit. The Jew is conceived as antinomial on account of his distance from the divine, his restriction to the finite, his unfilial relation to an 'unknowable' father. This is a hard-hearted adherence to the law and the maintenance, within a Kantian-structural Moralitat, of an unknowable God. The Hegelian fulfilment of the law in love and the revelation of the divine as such is therefore accomplished as a bringing to light of God's paternity. The revealed religion is then the revelation of a Father through his off-spring, a relation that goes under the name of Spirit and whose 'combination' is the speculative identity itself. Glas notes that Hegel writes that whilst other religions referred to God as Spirit, this could only be realised in Christianity for there God - as a Father - is other than himself in His

Son; He is thereby revealed as diremptive and conceived in the unity of this difference[8]. Derrida glosses this strictly within the terms of a controlling paternity and insemination, reading the Spirit to the letter - in accordance with its familial metaphors and analogies - and preparing its construal as a thread or line of communication (fil) that is the generation of a phallogocentric identity:

"The Christian God manifests the concrete spirit, which still remained veiled and abstract in Judaism; but he manifests this only by becoming a father. The father - the Jewish God certainly was one - remains an abstract universal form, as long as he has no acknowledged son. A father without a son is not a father. He manifests himself as concrete spirit - and not just anticipated, represented, vorgestellt - only by dividing himself in his seed that is his other, or rather that is himself as the object for himself, the other for him and that then returns to him, in which he returns to himself: his son [films]."[9]

The self-return, the unity of the diremptive God, that which sets the Christian religion apart and permits its assuming the status of an **absolute** religion, is the third term that is the (self-)knowledge of the divine - the Spirit. Thus, for deconstruction, the fil is the Spirit; it is what aligns the Father and Son, it is that which identifies the different terms and carries itself back to the hitherto-abstract universal. If the Jews are as stones, needing to be raised by the eagle, if Glas rewrites this in accordance with a schema wherein "the logic of the concept is the eagle's, the remain(s) the stone's"[10], it is evident that this 'concept' is Spirit.

The third term of the Trinity, assimilated to the grammatological schema as the 'identity' of the difference and as the 'self-return' of the universal, is the concept which subsumes particularity beneath its identity. As Derrida writes that "the knowledge relation that organizes this whole scene is a third, a third term, the element of the infinite's relation to self: it is the holy spirit"[11], 'speculative dialectics' is configured in accordance with the radical dialectic arrested by a conservative system. Spirit, defined as the "knowledge relation", is synonymous with the conservative-systematic imposition of 'the concept' upon the non-identical. Meanwhile, Glas, in accordance with that "sexualization of the text", transcribes this concept as the vigilance of the Father. In Glas the 'Ego-Spirit' of traditional Hegel-critique is departed from but only insofar as this 'relational' Spirit is, nevertheless, the operation and expression of the Father:

"The spirit is neither the father nor the son, but filiation, the relation of father to son, of son to father, of father to father through the mediation of the son, of son to son through the mediation of the father. The spirit is the element of the Aufhebung in which the seed returns to the father." [12]

This seed called Spirit is then taken up as the figure of the 'acorn', scattered across Hegel's text and construed as the totality of Hegel's system. Derrida - in a reference to the Lacanian letter, attended to in 'La

Facteur de Verite', the letter that "always arrives"[13] - finds that "the style is almost a seminar's"[14]: the acorn, seed, semen, is determined as a representation of the relation to self as it is of the return to self "through its own proper production"[15]. Indeed, it is this concept of production as self-reappropriation (the **Kojevean-Cartesian** self-certainty which, as 'self-return', binds the Lacanian and 'Hegelian' seminars) that governs Glas's depiction: the logocentric 'Spirit' joins the finite and infinite as the route of a self-knowledge which would 'infinite' the contingent. What is under investigation in Derrida's account is, then, **the production of autonomy** or what the deconstruction of le propre rewrites as 'autonomination'. That the Kojevian subject is under (re)construction is not left to doubt when Glas sets the discussion of Spirit within the 'infinite' process of self-legislation. The debt owed by a spiritual self-filiation or self-insemination to the 'autonomy' of the abstract, legal person is made evident as Glas asserts that "[The human individual] conceives itself. Because it has interrupted the natural pressure and deprived itself of self-mobility, it has given itself law. It names itself, autonomously [autonomment]"[16]. That this (finite) autonomy can be infinite is thanks to the transcendental priority of that infinitude - the logic of the seed ensures a 'finitude' which is the particularization of the (prior) universal. Derrida's

familial Hegel, organizing the system as the logic of insemination and the development of the germ and construing this circuit as the infinite per se - the Holy Family - rehearses the 'ontotheological' construction of the subject: an infinite autonomy. This parasitic dependence of the Derridean 'family' upon legal-personal 'autonomy' can be gleaned from the definition of the familial at the outset. Identifying thought with a self-nomination ("to think is to call, to name oneself"[17]), for Glas the family will always be construed as the moment of self-proximity and transparency; the Hegelian 'speculative' will be reduced to a profiteering speculation through the self-proper as the oikos, the family-economy. Conclusively, Glas situates the family within the legal order of private property, its construction of the 'autonomy' that is the telos of the familiar (the raising, elever, of 'persons'), when Derrida writes:

"Economy: the law of the family, of the family home, of possession. The economic act makes familiar, proper, one's own, intimate, private. The sense of property, of propriety, in general is collected in the oikeios. Whatever the exportation of the concept economy, that concept never breaks the umbilical cord attaching it to the family. Or rather yes, it always breaks the cord, but this rupture is the **deduction** of the family belongs to the family process as that process includes a cutting [coupante] instance. The Aufhebung, the economic law of absolute reappropriation of the absolute loss, is a family concept." [18]

When the infinitizing logic of the family is in question, it is this reappropriation that is invoked: the familiar as "self-feeling"[19], as "being-(close)-by-self"[20], is positioned as the route of a speculative identity grasped as 'love' but configured by deconstruction as le propre, personality. Derrida describes the moment of love which implies the family strictly within contractual terms and as such the family is always already a person. The unity in difference that love expresses, the unity which is inconceivable for Verstand (why? because it could only understand a contractual relationship) is therefore rewritten by Glas as an exchange relation: the psychoanalytic language of personae (of (Er)Setzung) will be easily implied within the context of property-bearers. In Glas, Hegel's account of the paradox of love is translated into the strict and formal recognition of the contract:

"what I count for in love, the price of what I dispossess myself of is fixed by what the other finds in me. I am only as much as I count for something (ich gelte). I **count for something for the other**, a formula about which we would have to agree before concluding any deal [marche] whatsoever, good or bad. I speculate here, like the other, in order to derive some profit from a contract between love as narcissism and speculative dialectics." [21]

This pattern of 'recognition' would, of course, utilise the other in the interest of that narcissism.

"Speculative dialectics" (the 'speculative' arresting the dialectic, the dialectic set in train by profiteering speculation) are here inscribed within the family circle

of love, seeding, and all the figures that account for the production of an infinite autonomy wherein the marche that is the step or stair is ascended through the marche - the deal, the market. Nevertheless, the question of the "remain(s)" of the self-presence of love would be invoked in - or rather, as - the contract. As elsewhere in the text of Glas[22], the contract-signature will effect the dehiscence of the infinite subject qua le propre: the attention to the "ligament" that is the binding of those in love, the binding that is conditional upon an infinite filiation, upon the love of the paternal God, will be attended to in its instability. In accordance with the fetishism of the commodity, the contract which guarantees the exchange of property effects a loss of that which it is employed to secure. To anticipate, Glas finds this played out in 'The Spirit of Christianity's account of the Last Supper.

That 'autonomy' or 'autonomination' would preclude the general Ersetzung is evident as the exteriority of the metaphor is suppressed by the logocentric circuit. In the 'speculative' logic of insemination and the always-arriving seed of the family model there is, for Glas, the institution of the non-Ersatz which would render impossible the talk of 'models' as the involvement of all finite models in their infinite arche, their participation in the Father, would remove all accounting for

metaphoricity. The "Hegelian semiology" of the seed is one whose circularity is a self-justification: the question of the "remain(s)" and of the metaphor in Hegel's system is prompted, and its strategy promoted, by the deconstructive end of obtaining its condition of (im)possibility - something which the system precludes except upon its own terms, except by sweeping all 'exterior' and transcendental remnants into its circuit. That filiation expresses this is, for Derrida, evident inasmuch as the finite seed is conditional upon the infinite, divine, filiation (the participation of the infinite in the finite and, thus, the comprehension of the finitude of the 'human' seed). That the general fetish, the general Ersatz, which would also go under the name of "play"[23], is the question of justification (a justification which a system geared to the reinstitution of the immanent God finds only within itself), that Glas launches an inquiry into the legality of God - the law of the Father, the Setzung of the divine-paternal Gesetz - is clear when Derrida convenes the court that would try the case of God:

"In the case [cas] - unclassable - of the absolute spirit (God), (no) more play in that sense.

The case of God, can that be said? Can the name of God be classed?

If there were a case of God, if God could be taken as an example, that would mean that one takes God for a finite body, that one is mistaken in making God fall outside what God is, that one takes God for another. God, if he is God, if one thinks what is being said when one names God, can no longer be an example, and the play of substitution can no longer be brought about [s'operer]."[24]

God is his own justification by way of his Son, the Son is justified by the Father and, thus, the operation of logocentrism, the suppression of the metaphor as grammatology conceives it, is the absorption of the finite by the infinite - the finite becomes an infinite-in-waiting. Equally, the refusal of the 'trace' in the complete self-reappropriation of this ontotheological family cooperates with the resistance to the 'quastio quid juris' of "absolute spirit". In this way, then, would the transcendental question of the "remain(s)" rescue the metaphor and - as "play", "general fetishism" - render it the very condition of (im)possibility of that which seeks to install, in its 'non-place', infinite self-identity or autonomy. The language that is thought on the basis of the infinite seed, therefore, just as it ultimately disqualifies 'models', so it does metaphors.

Furthermore, if the latter is distributed on the side of the human and finite and its comprehension is positioned on the side of the divine or infinite, then the point of exchange between poetics and the absolute, argues Derrida, is in Christ - the mediation of the finite and infinite.

Thus does the question of the "remain(s)" turn to the Son as contractual. Christ is the contract struck between infinite and finite, love and religion, Father and Spirit.

"So only the figure of Christ can regulate the productive exchange - amortization and gain - between rhetoric and ontologic. Investment [Investissement: financial and cathectic] of the Holy Family, or rather of the

Trinity".[25]

The figure of Christ the mediator is constructed by Glas as the contract between two lives: he is the particular of the universal, the son of God, he is the medium and means of exchange between the finite life and eternal life. For Derrida and the question of the "remain(s)" of Spirit it is the Last Supper "scene", transcribed from 'The Spirit of Christianity', which is the signing of the contract in the bread and wine - the Host configured as the "morselling" of the body of Christ. Glas puns on la cene ('The Last Supper', 'communion') for this is also the primal scene of parental copulation which, under the mastery of le propre, is represented as the union of father and son. Spirit qua "filiation" represents the cene as autonomination, auto-insemination, self-filiation under the law of the Father. This reconstruction of the Last Supper alights upon it as the event which both joins the Father and Son as the naming of this filiation and effects the dehiscence of the absolute Spirit: Glas notes that la cene, the event of communion, takes place 'between stages'; between love and religion, the Son and the Father (that is, prior to the return) and the Father and the community-proper. The scene is within the effects of the 'glas' of religion for the family circle is interrupted - in spite of the bread-morsel's apparent purpose it does not return the believer to unity with the Father. One could have anticipated - Derrida is drawn to Hegel's

account of the Last Supper because it permits an elision of personality and the Unhappy Consciousness: the construction of the logocentric subject according to private property law is permitted to extend its jurisdiction for, in the account of the Last Supper, the expropriation of self-property in what was intended to secure that propriety - the "morsels" of bread and wine - cooperates with the sundering of infinite from finite in the religious feeling of the death of God. The Last Supper enacts the anterior alienation of all appropriation. Arising out of this construction, 'Spirit' will be construed by Glas as the attempt to stave off that expropriation and maintain the unity of infinite and finite - God's presence - all, therefore, within the terms of a subjectivity defined by/as personality.

The Last Supper, in Derrida's reconstruction of Hegel's account, is both the site of filiation and of the "remain(s)". It is the "love-feast" [26]: not yet religion, it is nevertheless the occasion of love, it respects what Hegel describes as the fulfillment or "the pleroma" [27] of the law achieved in Christ whereby (as Glas notes) the unrelieved alterity of abstract right and Moralitat is overcome in the self-presence of the feeling of love. In the deconstructive schema this means that the love-feast invokes complete assimilation for "love has no other" [28]. The Last Supper is occupied completely with

this love - it does not involve adoration or worship, it does not unite its common feeling of divine penetration with an image and as such is not truly religious[29]. Thus, as Hegel notes, the meal, the eating, the introjection, occurs in an unstable place - it floats between a table of friendship and a religious act, its spirit is difficult to characterize. Indeed, the very 'figurelessness' of the feast permits Derrida to give it a double site - a situation that is in accordance with the logic of "undecidability" and with the "remain(s)" and dehiscence of religious parousia. That is, the very 'paradigmatic' construal of the auto-affective character of love and the family would render the figurelessness of the feast an anticipation of absolute knowing - just as love, the Aufhebung of abstract right, does of Sittlichkeit. Nevertheless, the insufficiency of this love is announced in its transition to religion and, thus, the anticipation of Sa is also the restoration of the necessity of Bild and Vorstellung - figure, figuration, representation, the sign. Derrida attends to the 'objects' of the feast which are insufficiently religious in that they are insufficiently 'objective'. He attends to the menu for it is the eating that registers the undecidability of the occasion and it is the status of what is eaten that holds the feast in this 'between'. The interpretation of Hegel's discussion of the Last Supper in 'The Spirit of Christianity' takes it to be the communion

that a common eating always is (the example of the Arab's coffee drinking) but more inasmuch as the bread is offered with the assertion that 'this is my body'. For the deconstructive restaging, the 'interiority' of the love-feast does attain to an objectivity that is not merely symbolic, for

"something more still happens in transubstantiation. This more, to state it briefly, is a certain judicative proposition of the type S is P (this is my body, the wine is blood, the blood is spirit) and a certain intervention of the father in the discourse".[30]

The "more" (in Hegel's words, mehr, and Derrida slides the trace of the mother, la mere, into the passage) is supplied as the paternal annunciation, the (Lacanian) "Name-of-the-Father"[31] that ensures this identification and idealization. Transubstantiation would anticipate the transition from understanding to speculative reason, from a symbolic/allegorical comparison of bread and body to the disciple's feeling of a divine penetration in the ingestion. This path to the feeling of unity with the divine, achieved by ingestion and the resubjectivation of the morsels of bread/body and wine/blood, is identified by deconstruction as the process of Aufhebung. Furthermore, the grammatological interpretation of Spirit is given further impetus by the analogy whereby - in a "remarkable reflection" - "Hegel **compares** this penetrating resubjectivation to the real movement of the tongue's, as language's hearing-understanding-oneself-speak in reading"[32]. The would-be 'symbolic' morsel, thanks to

the feeling of divinity that comes through the presence of the Father at the feast, thanks to the Spirit, is returned to the infinite self and Hegel compares this to a reading which would - in its comprehension of the letter - cause the writing to vanish. This is, then, the 'success' of the feast; one of complete ingestion - not a crumb nor drop is left over, "the spirituality of the Christian Last Supper consum(mat)es its signs, does not let them fall outside, loves without remain(s)"[33].

Derrida seizes on two instances of the Son's filiation to configure and excavate Spirit's "remain(s)" and both resound to the 'glas' that announces what Hegel termed "the grave of life"[34]. Again, the trace of 'Antigone' as the identitarian self-propriety of the family economy, the oikos, will once more be shown to be founded on a non-place, the trace-structure of the tomb, the oekesis, the indication of 'flight' and impossible self-presence. This is to say that the account of Spirit follows its failure to the grave. This failure of self-return is considered to be exhibited in Hegel's account of the insufficiency of 'love' as described by the Last Supper, an insufficiency which anticipates the death of God on the religious Good Friday. The question of the "remain(s)" is inseparable from the form of the Unhappy ('ungluckliche' - a 'gl' not disinterred by Glas) or the Comic consciousness.

In Hegel's account the very success of the Last Supper is its failure[35]: the divine morsel is interiorised and swallowed but, with no objective register of this penetration, there is left in the believer a feeling of the loss of God. In Glas the effect of the right-hand column is felt in this discussion of Hegel's Christ. The seed of filiation gives way to an account which is informed by and echoes the Genet column's disseminative significance, the Last Supper is transcribed by Derrida according to the 'monkish' Genet, becoming a picture of fellation and a penetration that leaves not the impregnation of Spirit but the "gl" of the "remain(s)". Derrida focuses on the adventure of the "morsel", the thing, insofar as it supports a general fetishism. In the terms of Glas the contract of filiation - the 'autonomination' that is the naming of unity with the Father - is broken as the seal or signature of that union, the morsel, acquires an undecidable status. Derrida translates the Hegelian account of the insufficiency of the love-feast into the 'logic' of undecidability, the seal into the Genetic "gl":

"Consum(mat)ed without remain(s), the mystical object becomes subjective again but ceases thereby even to be the object of religious adoration. Once inside, the bread and the wine are undoubtedly subjectivised, but they immediately become bread and wine again, food that is digested, naturalized again; they lose their divine quality. They would lose it as well, it is true, in not being digested. Their divinity stands, very precariously, between swallowing [engloutissement] and vomiting; and it is neither solid nor liquid, neither outside nor in." [36]

What this excavates is the occupancy, in the very site of filiation, of the feeling of Godlessness (Gottlosigkeit). The undecidability of the contract-morsel (that which would be the guarantee, the condition of possibility of the union) contrives, by virtue of its very internalisation and assimilation by the finite subject, to release what it sought to bind to that subject. Derrida alights upon Hegel's account of "the mourning, the feeling of loss, of regret (Bedauern), of split (Scheidung) that seizes the young friends of Christ when the divine has melted in their mouths"[37] and this is, for Glas, the "gl" of the Son - a 'lost' semination, a familial seed which does not germinate but falls 'to the tomb' (tombe). Restaged according to these directions, la cene - the primal scene of filiation, signification, the Lacanian "Symbolic" - is, however, the 'site' of the "remain(s)" and differance. In this construal, therefore, Hegel's account of the Last Supper bears with it the deconstruction of ontotheological self-presence, exemplified in the family-economy. The seed falls: the "gl" of the Son describes how the self-identity of "the family economy", the oikos, stands over a grave, a tomb - the oekesis - that is its condition of (im)possibility. The question of the "remain(s)" circles the grave, the 'transcendental tomb' which acts as the sign of the constitutive trace or flight of the ontotheological self-proper.

As such, Glas is always at issue with the Hegelian construal of Good Friday. As announced in Of Grammatology, logocentrism cooperates with a 'negative theology' which would contrive to recapture the loss of the absolute dialectically, in its negative presence[38]. Thus, Derrida's occupation of the transcendental oekesis - the refurbished "grave of life" - will never be entirely continuous with the Hegelian Unhappy Consciousness for, as was described in the discussion of the voleur in Genet, embracing this 'loss' without nostalgia, the funerary glas echoes the 'abyssal' laughter of the **comic** consciousness - for this reason the 'gl' of 'das ungluckiche Bewusstsein' is unremarked. Not nostalgic, the comic consciousness, dissolving the divine in the irony of its absolute personality, is therefore akin to the consciousness into whom "all divine being returns" but as "the complete **alienation of substance**"[39]. Reconstructed along these lines, the "remain(s)" is, then, the indication of **the comedy of personality** - it is the embrace or affirmation of the (transcendentalized) loss of substance, that is the possibility of essential identity, the possibility of the Setzung as only ever an Ersetzung. The construal of the speculative Good Friday as the ontotheological reappropriation of loss is countered (in terms whose 'transcendentality' would nevertheless seek to refuse such an oppositional stance) by the grave, the "remain(s)", which registers the flight, loss, theft of the self-proper

- the alienation of personality - and this, in turn, cooperates with comic consciousness. The deconstructive telos is this alienation of substance, substance conceived as subject - the proprietorial subject of bourgeois political economy - and, thus, this religious oikesis will inhibit the achievement of the subject in Absolute Knowing conceived as Sa.

In the Derridean reconstruction of Spirit "the remain(s)" and "the grave of life" come to the fore. Glas maintains that the arrival at Sa - the return of the seed - can be effected by way of the releve of two occasions of loss, what Derrida describes as "Aufhebung first in the heart [sein] of Christianity, then Aufhebung of Christianity, of the absolute revealed religion in(to) philosophy that will have been its truth"[40]. The insufficiency of the Last Supper is the need for an object of worship, the necessity of religion, whilst the 'figurative' nature of religion - its infatuation with the alterity of its object - is the need for its "relief" in philosophy. In the terms of Glas, only apparently does the seed twice fail to arrive: in the philosophical comprehension of this failure - a comprehension that is its rescue and success - conclusively, the seed arrives. Sa, in the self-achievement of Spirit, is constructed as the conclusion in that Kojevian "perfect Man", that "God-Man", as the divine filiation unadorned with the deckings of

representation, understanding or mere feeling. It is the arrival of the seed in its germination of the subject of absolute self-possession. "The Last Supper", Derrida writes, "is not yet religion. Its remains - that is, a corpse - are yet to be relieved"[41]. This is the division that the communion gives rise to - instead of a return-to-self as the divine morsel, following the course of the seed and expressing in itself as much the whole as the part, the morsel is lost except as a swallowed glutinous substance or, rejected, a globule of matter. Glas proceeds to follow the Hegelian overcoming of this "gl", this resistance to - or dehiscence of - the assimilating subject of le propre. It follows the failure of feeling and the love-feast to the conclusion of religion and the point of arrival of the seed in philosophy. The failure of Jesus to found a conception of ethical life, the criticism made by 'The Spirit of Christianity', is reread by Derrida as the advent of a "new morselling"[42]. Glas repeats Hegel's account of a Christianity compromised in its political entanglements by an absolute refusal of mundane ethical ties and compensated in its passivity and disappointment by a unity with the absolute, the Father, either unthinkably primordial or of distant futurity. The grave of life, what recurs throughout Hegel as the expression of a self-consciousness debarred from the thought of the absolute, is the place where the disciples are left. In an

assertion that is more a remark upon its own schemata than a case of exegesis, Glas declares "everything happens around a sepulcher"[43]. What the question of Glas intends, therefore, is that the Unhappy Consciousness be made fundamental to 'the system'. As the registration of the dehiscence of an infinite self-presence it takes thought from oikos to oekesis and (to repeat), refusing in turn the nostalgia of a 'lost' propriety, it converts to an Hegelian comic consciousness. Everything, for deconstruction, happens around a sepulchre - this is the significance of the "remain(s)" - and thus, within the terms of the strict division of infinite and finite, for all the attendance upon God, the believers spend their time among the remains: "no doubt the memory of the rotting body was first effaced in the intuition of the glory, but it has returned, was insistent, to the very extent the split continued its work"[44]. Derrida continues this transcription, and the concern with the remains - as with the unHegelian focus upon transubstantiation in its strict figuration - installs a faint Roman Catholicism to the discussion: the effect of Genet is thereby registered as the Spirit is held back in its ascent as the "concept" and philosophy and is detained in the reliquary. The transcendental tomb, the index of the voleur, is inscribed within Hegel's grave of life and gathers around it Genet and the Jews in its expression of the dehiscence of the absolute subject, the failure of

Christ. From 'The Spirit of Christianity' Derrida recounts the sundering of infinite and finite that leaves the disciples unable to grasp the immanence of the absolute and, adhering to the memory of the sensuous presence of the God, they are seen to be thrown back upon this very 'empiricalness' in their faith. Thus is the Spirit inhibited, its wings clipped. Glas describes this Spirit as the exhalation of death: "[t]he dead body resting there in the interminable decomposition of relics, the spirit never raises itself high enough, it is retained as a kind of effluvium, of gas fermenting above the corpse"[45].

Hegel's account of the fate of Christianity, the failure of Christ to found ethical life and the consequent oscillation of the absolute religion between a degraded present and an unrepresentable absolute, 'beyond', is rewritten by Glas such that it cooperates with the familial model of 'Spirit'. Derrida follows the schema of the trace in Glas: the "remain(s)" as the transcendental tomb, the no-place that the restricted fetishism of one phallic column seeks to deny - these are the directions for a restaging of the phenomenological self-inadequation of religion. The Father, Spirit as 'filiation', the logocentric values of propriety, lucidity and the statecraft that they inform (one recalls the production of Antigone), all these are to be 'undermined' by the hole,

the abyss, upon which this family home is built. The insufficiency of religion is rewritten as the effect upon the Holy Family of the trace of woman and castration and, in accordance with the schema of the trace, this effect persists as the indefinite - and in(de)terminable - deferral of Sa. The occasion for this 'sexualization' of the passage from the absolute religion to 'Absolute Knowing' - the clue - is Hegel's analogy. Glas cites the ultimate paragraph of the Phenomenology's 'Religion':

"Just as (so wie) the **individual** divine man [einzelne is underscored: it is Jesus, the historical individual] has a father existing **in(it)self** (ansichseienden Vater) and only an **actual** mother (wirkliche Mutter), so (so) too the universal divine man, the community (die Gemeinde), has for its father its **own proper operation** (ihr eigens Tun) and **knowing** (Wissen), but for its mother, **eternal love** which it only **feels** (die sie nur fuhlt), but does not behold in its consciousness as an actual, immediate **object**." [46]

The opposition of faith and knowledge - the dehiscence of the ontotheological subject that is (in the grammatological reconstruction) the source of the 'unhappiness' of consciousness, what is anticipated in the abyssal engloutissement of the Host, the flight of the infinite which informs "the grave of life" - this is what Derrida rewrites, in a sexualization of the text, with the aid of the Phenomenology's familial analogy. This opposition, for Glas, is to be releve in Absolute Knowing. The overcoming of the antithesis of faith and knowledge is thereby '(en)gendered'; it becomes the act of masculine conceptuality and results in the explication of the

hitherto-implicit father - the realization of the paternal law, the Name-of-the-Father. 'Spirit' is the Aufhebung of the division of infinite and finite and is so in the explicit acknowledgement of itself as filiation. As the arrival at Sa - complete self-propriety through cognition of its unity with the paternal transcendental guarantor - Spirit brings to light the light, it presents presence: Absolute Knowledge as Sa, Sa as philosophy (rather than religion) is the fulfilment of a phallogocentric family. Derrida sets the scene for the (de)construction of the sublation of the division of infinite and finite and the passage from religion to philosophy:

"Now this ultimate split between presence and representation, between the for-itself and the in-itself, has the form of an inequality between the father and the mother, in the relation to the father and the relation to the mother. The passage from absolute religion to Sa is brewing as the relief of this inequality." [47]

Glas rehearses this "relief" in its impossibility and returns philosophy to 'religion' as the return of ontotheology to the the attendance upon the grave of life; the self-proper of the family-economy to the tomb - oikos to oekesis. The 'virtual', seed-logic of Spirit is also the expression of the absolute religion as implicitly absolute knowing: philosophy is the truth of religion and religion is the representative - before its arrival - of philosophy. Derrida construes the union of religion and philosophy in Spirit, a unity conducted, nonetheless, very

much by philosophy: the end is the logocentric self-presence of Sa, of which religion must show itself the figurative/representational precursor. To excavate the "remain(s)" of this implicitly-philosophical religion Glas scrutinises its temporality. Derrida magnifies the "temporal grammar, [...] the syntax of adverbs of time and negation"[48] which deconstruction's Hegel would permit only as figurations - representations of the absolute unity of "an eternal or intemporal circle"[49], representations which, their particularity grasped, will return to that circuit to which they already belong. However, the magnification of the time-sense of the link of religion and philosophy, focusing on the familial - that is, Christian-religious - will prevent this return and will lay out the "remain(s)" of Spirit and Sa through the unfulfilled time of religion. Whilst the circle of reappropriation is by definition "of the spirit's word, its **economy**, of the property law of the spirit"[50] and this is properly 'familial', the alignment of the family with the absolute religion (the Holy Family: the revelation of a loving Father in his Son, their relation in Spirit) nevertheless places the family within the sphere of "Vor-stellung". Thus, the family's self-proximity is affected by division and, in its capacity as the religious "anticipatory representation"[51], it is not the expression of le propre but rather the index of differance. Inasmuch as its 'implicitude' expresses the

absolute-already-there of that which is not yet, or the absolute no-more of the yet, this means that

"the **not-there** [pas-la] cannot be reduced to the circle of a family about which what it is and means-(to say) would be already familiarly known. On the contrary, the absolute essence of the family can be reached only in thinking the absolute of the **not-there**." [52]

Glas moves stealthily towards the image of a religious-familial 'completion' or realization occurring only in an absolute that is not there, a **phantasy** of union. Which is to say that religion and the family preclude an 'end of history' through their maintenance of representation. The lesson of the absolute religion is that presence is possible only as representation, the representation is contained in the absolute that is already **not-yet** - that is, reconciliation '**is**' but is not present, self-complete.

"Presence is present as representation" [53], the family is not at one but "has a double focus, a double home, a double hearth" [54]. This doubling is the effect of differance, it is the registration of time, a 'spacing' evoked by the 'step', the 'pace', the trace, of the pas-la wherein the incompleteness of self-presence betrays the necessity of time, constitutive of signification. What is underway here is the dehiscence of the logocentric subject which would concur with a Kojevian-Hegelian 'end of history' as it determined to have "annulled time" [55] in absolute knowing. What the magnifying operation of Glas seeks to expand and, like cinders after the explosion,

reduce to its "remain(s)" is the constitution of the self-present Spirit and Sa. Through attention to the familial-religious 'fascination' by the unassimilated object (that infatuation with alterity which prevents the Last Supper taking place as religion), by way of the time-sense of familial-religion in its bearing on Sa and through the question of representation in contrast to logocentric parousia, Derrida restores philosophy to religion. Sa is restored to a religion, moreover, which, resident at the grave of life, will hold off from any recognition of absolute Spirit but will dwell 'this side' of the division of infinite and finite - will maintain the insuperable barrier of faith and knowledge. Derrida restates this as the rescue of religion from ontotheology - the persistence of the object in religious Vorstellung enables even the Unhappy Consciousness, that is, a negative theology elsewhere refused, to take on a "critical" role, to join the side of deconstruction: "because it yet has an object, a desire, or a nostalgia, absolute religious consciousness remains in the opposition, a split. Reconciliation remains a beyond." [56] The Holy Family reflects this, its structure of division - actual mother and implicit father - has the effect of expropriating the philosophical self-proper:

"This dehiscence of the family proper forms an ellipse that parts [ecarte] the religious focus from the philosophical focus, Christianity from Sa. And if philosophy - Sa - was considered to be the myth of absolute reappropriation, of self-presence absolutely absolved and recentered, then the absolute of revealed

religion would have a **critical** effect on Sa. It would be necessary to keep to the (opposite) bank, that of religion and the family, in order to resist the lure of Sa." [57]

The trace of the family, then, as in the case of Antigone, would be for Glas the preclusion of the success of the concept: as familial "religion saves by/from itself" [58].

The division of representation and philosophy, the preclusion of the passage into 'presence-proper', thereby leaves thought on the side of Vorstellung and this - in accordance with Hegel's analogy - would permit its 'textual sexualization' as the side of the "actual mother". Derrida rereads the division of the parents of the God-child, then, according to the representation of presence, according to the religious picture of the production of the immanent absolute and the realized union of infinite and finite. The representation of the division of the maternal empirical, sensory, finite and the paternal ideal, infinite, beyond is translated into terms which not only reflect Glas's psychoanalytically-engendered reading but, in addition, mirror the paradigmatic role played by legal personality for Glas. The difference of mother and father is taken to be "opposition itself" [59] for Hegel - the very structure of representation - and, in the maintenance of each term in its opposition by a third which would be their comprehension, this conceptuality ("conceptuality itself") would be "homosexual" just as the structure of this

Aufhebung - philosophy out of representation's strict duality - describes the paradigmatic role of the "Immaculate Conception": "indispensable to the Hegelian argumentation, to speculative dialectics, and to absolute idealism, it commands what could be called the **approach** of Sa."[60] Derrida interrogates the Aufhebung of religion and representation according to the logic of the Immaculate Conception and this figure of maintenance and production of independence is inscribed as the siglum "IC". As such, it alludes to the imperatif categorique and the sexual difference constructed as opposition is regulated by the notion of **autonomy**. Absolute knowing is a masculine phantasy of le propre, of union in the Father and (thus) self-production:

"phantasmatic would be the effect of mastery produced by the determination of difference as opposition (and up to the value of mastery itself), of sexual difference as sexual opposition in which each term would secure itself the domination and absolute autonomy in the IC: the effect - the son (rather than the daughter) comes back to me all by myself."[61]

This is the conclusion of deconstructive Spirit. Its construction as 'filiation' registers a self-presence not as achieved but as a phantasy of autonomy and unity in self-paternity. Glas finds Absolute Knowing and Sittlichkeit as produced and patterned by this "IC" - as determined by and concluding with this bourgeois-economic conception of 'autonomy'. The deconstruction of "aigle" maintains that logocentric closure is only possible as

Vorstellen, the **representation** of presence, and thus the philosophical conclusion recoiling upon religion, feeling, signification, permits the elision of 'philosophy' as Sa with the IC - "a phantasm of infinite mastery"[62]. The phantasmatic character of the Immaculate Conception and its elision with an 'Hegelian' autonomy is, then, the logocentric phantasy of self-filiation - truth as self-presence, adequatio, le propre. Glas can assert (having excoriated "the imperialism or the colonialisms or neo-colonialisms of the IC"[63]) that "truth is the phantasm itself. The IC, sexual difference as opposition (thesis against thesis), the absolute family circle would be the general equivalence of truth and the phantasm. Homosexual enantiosis."[64] Derrida pushes the impasse of Christ's parentage to the point where it chimes with the parodic virgin-birth of Our Lady - "virgin born of a virgin, who announced himself - he is an archangel - and who says to us, in sum, 'I conceive myself without a father, I am generated [je nais as Genet] of myself or of the operation of the Holy Spirit', I am my father, my mother, my son and myself..."[65] This is the 'conceptuality' that sublates the sexual opposition but it is also the effect of Genet, the "bastard course" and the affirmation of a general fetishism which substitutes for the 'hole', the no-place of the mother; it restates the maternal side of feeling and biological immediacy, it hands back the child from the linguistic-significant-conceptual father to the mother.

Even as the Immaculate Conception affirms the self-filiation of the infinite family, then, it registers at the same time an absent father (phantasmatic, pas-la) and thereby displaces the logocentric legitimation that comes from paternity (which must always be 'announced', nominated). Spirit is filiation, the "remain(s)" of Spirit bear witness to a phantasy of autonomination. Delegitimated, expropriated, Absolute Knowing is returned by Spirit to the 'unrelievable' oppositions of religion and from there to the Judaeo-Kantian 'sublime mastery' as to the "figureless" Lichtwesen that draws a travestied Sa towards Zoroastrianism.

ii. Geist or Gesetz: 'The Spirit of Christianity' and the law of the "remain(s)"

Throughout the above reconstruction of Glas I have argued that 'Spirit' is patterned according to the metaphysics of le propre which, in turn, is modelled on private property law and its subject, the person. Derrida reconstructs Spirit as an identity sealed by contract. Spirit is an identity formed according to the logic of the "family economy". The notions of 'love' and 'life', evident in Hegel's 'Spirit of Christianity', are regarded as witnesses to the paternal-familial logic of insemination whereby alterity is ultimately returned to identity. The 'seed' - the example of the acorn - permits the non-identical to be designated as particular and swept into

the circular self-justifying course of the whole, the universal, "the concept". The deconstructive construal of Spirit as personality has already been rehearsed, then, and the "remain(s)" have been figured as the constitutive alienation of this self-propriety, the dehiscence of the subject formed by the contract. Indeed, as constitutive it is regarded as the contract and as such it is "undecidable" - as such is it "the condition of (im)possibility". Finally, the deconstruction of Spirit in Glas precludes any closure in absolute knowing as it registers the differance of the self-proper in the impossibility of eradicating the difference, the time, the "spacing" necessary for signification. This failure of Sa is reinscribed as the dehiscence of the absolute identity of Spirit by religion: in Glas, Derrida modifies the Grammatology's refusal of "ontotheology" by finding in Hegelian 'Religion' a "yearning" that enacts a perpetual deferral (rather than a dream of completion) of parousia. This is the "grave of life" as the means whereby "religion saves by/from itself". The eschatological humanism of the Kojevian Hegel is prevented from realizing its end - the realization of religion in the "God-Man", citizen of the bourgeois-revolutionary, Napoleonic State - by the impossibility of overcoming 'Vorstellen', by the perpetual flight of presence into the beyond, by the impossibility of the immanence of the absolute, by the death of God.

'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate' is Derrida's main focus. Here is where Spirit can be most easily configured as the third term of the Trinity, the relation of Father and Son as 'filiation'. From this, the family-economy - the Derridean oikos - can be explicated as the union and indissociability of infinite and finite. In the rereading of the essay Hegelian "love" and "life" - construed as admitting of no alterity - can be aligned, by Glas, with speculative identity and contrasted with the Judaeo-Kantian law that permits and maintains difference. Spirit, as the "pleroma" of law, 'love', and thus as the law that fulfils law, is constructed by Derrida as the law maintained in accordance with "the concept" - the prevailing principle, the prior universal - yet with the extension of the jurisdiction of that previous 'unrelieved' law. As 'love', the law now governs interior space, its commands bear on the internalisation of the law. In this context, then, Glas - even as it parodies and parades the Kantian law as "IC" - yet shows some preference for the legality that restricts itself, that resists an internal-policing, that acknowledges the non-coincidence of duty and inclination. Hegel is configured as 'carrying through' the autonomous Kantian subject by means of the "annunciation" of the Father, of oneness in Spirit. As such, the family economy represents the 'infinitezation' of that autonomy as an "autonomination" sanctioned by a divine paternity wherein the unity of

finite and infinite takes place by virtue of Spirit-as-filiation. In short, Derrida nowhere releases "aigle" from the cage of positive law. The confrontation of Jesus-Hegel and the Judaeo-Kantians (such as Glas directs it) will be that between a 'restricted' or 'differential' law and one which - acting in the name of the supreme law-giver - acknowledges no such differences except to annul, 'fulfill', 'relieve' them.

Ironically, this deconstructive reading seizes upon a text which is concerned with determining and re-reading the 'spirit' and 'fate(s)' of Christianity as a means of avoiding the dichotomous and impositional positive law. As I have sought to emphasise, Glas repeats the construal of Spirit and Sittlichkeit found in its account of Antigone - the "reign of law" constructed according to the imposed unity of masculine Gesetz; a Hegel of Setzung and "regle" - even as it reads the Hegelian attempt to think ethical life beyond the fixed oppositions of positive law and the discourse of Setzung. In his reading of 'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate', Derrida enacts a certain protection of positive law whilst reconfiguring Hegel as the champion of an absolute statism. As it addresses an essay whose concerns - crystallised in 'Spirit' - are to think beyond the positive legal determinations which culminate in 'personality', Glas remains unaware of 'Spirit' except in accordance with the

elevation of the Kantian moral subject. Thus, Spirit is "autonomination" whilst Sittlichkeit and absolute knowing (as Sa) are elided with IC. The deconstructive reading collapses Hegel into positive law for it possesses an incapacity to think other than according to the concept (that is, the positive law) of private property, an incapacity represented in its generalisation of le propre. By means of attending to this schema wherein thought would be always subsumed under the concept of self-property and differance would be the 'contractual' binding and alienation of such an identity, one notes that the deconstructive Ersetzung does not depart from the logic of the Setzung but rather that the latter is in its effects an Ersetzung. This is merely to say that a 'positing' that is the **imposing** of a universal remains faithful to 'difference' inasmuch as it thereby (in its impositional character) preserves opposition and substantial non-identity. Thus does Derrida maintain a certain vigilance over the question of law: its fictionality, its personae, its representational character all accord with the dehiscence of the absolute subject that the Setzung (against itself) would promise. Positive law is the enactment of the Ersatz, its Aufhebung in the deconstructive-Hegelian "ethical life" would appear to be the dream of self-lucidity and the annulment of non-identity. As such, for Glas, Gesetz must be defended against its fulfillment.

"Life" and "love" in 'The Spirit of Christianity' are received by Glas as shapes of le propre - the tree, the acorn, self-identity in otherness, etc - yet for Hegel they are not metaphors of law but rather ways of reuniting the fixed oppositions of duty and inclination, mind and nature, freedom and necessity. They reflect an attempt to rethink 'law' such that the social whole is no longer regulated according to a principle that, abstracted from and representing one aspect of life, is, in turn, imposed upon society as 'absolute', as the whole. "Life" and "love" are not construed as new 'principles', are not to be identified with a new positive law, but are thought in the context of Jesus' efforts to found an ethical community - one which would eschew the strict legalism of the Jews and the 'given', positive or uncognizable law. The mistaken identification of ethical "life" with le propre is clear when one recalls that the propriety which Derrida's concept evokes is one that gathers in its meaning a "cleanliness"[1] that is a purifying or purging. The metaphysics of the proper evokes a 'cleansing' that presupposes structural oppositions of the order of essential/inessential and this is fundamental to the Aufhebung as Glas conceives it - the elevation of the "aigle" and the revelation of essence in the stripping away of the veil of appearance. This, however, is the very structure of positive law - determined by a Sittlichkeit that is not, itself, posited and in this

context of 'love' and 'life', that is the 'ethical order' of Jesus' teachings. As it determines law as the imposition of one region of the ethical whole, that of possession, over the totality of relations and in the name of universality, so Hegel's account describes how all that falls outside the designation of 'right' is, in turn, experienced as immoral and a source of shame. The Phenomenology's account of the passage from the legally posited 'absolute self' of abstract personality to the Unhappy Consciousness split between a corrupt nature and a sense of unity with an inviolate 'beyond' bears witness to this path of 'purification' and anticipates discussion of propriety and phantasy. "Consciousness", writes Hegel, "is aware of itself as **this actual individual** in the animal functions. These are no longer performed naturally and without embarrassment [...] instead since the enemy reveals himself in his characteristic shape, they are rather the object of serious endeavour, and become precisely matters of the utmost importance." [2]

This opposition is perpetuated in le propre inasmuch as the latter bears that 'impropriety' as its self-disgust. The Phenomenology describes this scenario wherein "the enemy [...] renews himself in his defeat" as "a personality confined to its own self and its own petty actions, a personality brooding over itself, as wretched as it is impoverished" [3]. This is the mutuality - transcendentalised by the priority of one term - of "the proper" and the "remain(s)": it is the scenario of Glas. However, rather than endorsing the proper-subject and

maintaining its domination over the non-identical - the scatological construction of what 'falls' from the circle of propriety and the methodological deployment of the "disgusting"[4] - Hegel seeks to determine it. Equally, rather than seek to generalise this 'difference' as a means of precluding the self-completion of such an 'absolute' subjectivity, Hegel seeks to grasp the process of abstraction that posits - in Gesetz - such an identity.

In the 'Spirit of Christianity' "love" is Jesus' response to the law of the Jews. Love is the pleroma - fulfillment - of the law inasmuch as it is an attempt to take law beyond its sheer objectivity and to carry it to the point where it is returned to the ethical whole, where it is redissolved in the concrete social relations whence it was derived. Although in error in its reading of Hegelian philohellenism as the erection of a "reign of law", the Derridean account is not mistaken when it reconstructs the discussion - in particular, the confrontation with Jerusalem - as guided by Athens. Jesus' teaching is ethical inasmuch as it seeks to found law as "fate". Departing from the abstract, positive law where punishment remains alien to the transgressor and is imposed upon her as a preceding law, this "fate" evokes the Fates - the Eumenides - and the law of Antigone. Just as Antigone's acknowledgement of her crime and of the ethical whole, the "life", sinned against came not through the penalties of

the law imposed upon life as an 'absolute' external to it but rather through that life, so does the "fate" of Christianity in this sense mean an attempt to break with a law imposed upon life as a Sollen and to conceive the ethical whole such that its 'law' is immanent. Thus, in the echo of Antigone's "Because we suffer we acknowledge we have erred"[5] one hears the Christian "fate" whereby:

"When the trespasser feels the disruption of his own life (suffers punishment) or knows himself (in his bad conscience) as disrupted, then the working of his fate commences, and this feeling of a life disrupted must become a longing for what has been lost. The deficiency is recognised as part of himself, as what was to have been in him and is not. The lack is not a not-being but is life known and felt as not-being."[6]

This is punishment that permits the recognition of the ethical whole in that it enacts the re-cognition of self and one's relation to that whole in the distress of separation, in the agony. Contrary to the elision of Antigone's law and differance, this non-identity is not an unknowable or transcendentalised state of affairs abstracted from the ethical whole and (against all Derrida's protestations[7]) thereby **itself a concept**, a 'positive law'. The aporia is, rather, determinate - it is a 'difference' in life that is felt as such and compels the re-cognition of the self and that ethical whole. Rather than foreclose on the possibility of self-determination by imposing a Sollen, "fate" relentlessly returns one to oneself and the social whole in the consequences of the deed - "the man recognizes his own

life, and his supplication to it is not supplication to a lord but a reversion and an approach to himself"[8]. Punishment as "fate" means, then, that the one who transgresses arouses in the damaging of the ethical whole as life, life as a "hostile power"[9]. The machinations of this fate are the very actions of the trespasser and recognizable as such in that no abstract legal order has removed the individual from that whole, fixing her within a prior 'identity' and occluding the totality and substance of her relations with that social whole. This is as the contrast of Gesetz and Sitte. The 'law' as customary is consequent upon the deed and not an overarching principle which, only conceptual - an 'ought', a Sollen - is thereby nowhere existent, alive. Instead of the perpetual opposition of the Sollen - an opposition inscribed in le propre as that ceaseless 'self-cleansing' of propriety: the attempt to maintain 'autonomy' at the expense of 'heteronomy', purge freedom of necessity - punishment as "fate" permits the **determination** of freedom insofar as it enacts 'necessity' in and through the free act of the trespasser as it returns to her. Thus, in the trespasser's suffering in her separation from "life", punishment as "fate" effects the re-cognition of the inseparability of freedom and necessity: the immanence of the ethical in the community. This reconciliation is possible because in the opposition of the trespasser and the injured there is, nevertheless, a 'communality',

"life", and on account of this community the recognition of self and the ethical whole is one which does not imply the submission of the actual self to a moral imperative (the perpetuation of the dominating concept in the moralism which submits the 'is' to the 'ought') just as it does not evoke the submission of the self to the community (the domination of an abstract state, a repressive legalism). Jesus would evade positive law in that the ethical community of Christianity is forged in the common feeling of love. Hegel writes:

"it is in the fact that even the enemy is felt as life that there lies the possibility of reconciling fate. This reconciliation is thus neither the destruction or subjugation of something alien, nor a contradiction between desert in the eyes of the law and the actualization of the same, or between man as concept and man as reality. This sensing of life, a sensing which finds itself again, is love, and in love fate is reconciled." [10]

Derrida would conceive this 'love' in strict accordance with a 'fulfilled' positive law that is its internalization - the subsumption of all difference under the proper - and its further determination by Hegel (the very inadequacy of Christian love) is appropriated by deconstruction as the "morselling" of le propre. Whilst the "family economy" of love remains to be considered, one notes that Glas questions the pleroma of law only in order to return it to a 'Law of the Father'. With the further dimension provided by its inability to detach Hegel from Jesus ('love' in Derrida's estimate is both the principle of a Christian Gesetz and paradigmatic for Hegel), Glas

considers the restricted economy of love whereby the undecidability of two phallic columns - the castration-structure of 'antherrection' evident in the equivalence of the Jews' law of 'an eye for an eye' - is overcome by the supreme subject, the Father, in the promise of an infinite recompense for loss. "Pleroma, the rupture of the principle of equivalence"[11] yet returns to that principle at a profit: "forgiveness of sins is also raised above the law, that is, above the principle of reciprocity"[12]. Punishment as fate cannot be thought by Glas except as the dream of appropriation, a profit that is conditioned by the transcendental paternity of the Hegelian system, the supra-legal Father.

This fulfillment of the law in accordance with a divine paternity that is revealed - 'nominated' - is also, then, for Glas the fulfillment of Judaic law in Spirit. The latter's dissolution of positive law in the ethical whole, the totality of relations from which the law is abstracted, is constructed rather as the participation of the particular in the universal - the immanence of the absolute - proceeding from the phallogocentric model of the 'seed' of the Father. Within this schema, the revelation and recognition of divine paternity is that which overcomes the antinomies of law, which, indices of 'cuts', 'separation' and incision, are interpreted according to the logic of castration. Spirit as

"filiation" is the 'repair' of damaged integrity, the regain of absolute loss by way of the revealed God. Glas reads the determination of positive law, submission to the 'alien' command, according to the loving Father who does not threaten castration. The positive, alien, given, unknowable law is, by contrast, the mark of a loss of or threat to self-propriety - the threat of castration borne by a jealous (zelos, envious and unrevealed) God to whom Kant and the Jews would submit[13]. In other words, as Spirit is conceived by Hegel as the re-cognition of the individual and the ethical whole (rather than the subsumption of the individual under the alien 'absolute' of a given, undeterminable law) it is precisely at odds with a 'contractual' identity or relation. As the recognition of the partiality of legal categories and of the relativity of positive law's 'absolute', Spirit eschews the contract as the construction of the self just as it does not permit the latter to be thought in strict accordance with legal personality. Rather than identity formed by means of any 'contract', therefore, Spirit is a structure of social recognition and herein lies the connection with the "fate" of Christianity. Just as fate permits the ethical whole to be conceived and the very relativity of the hitherto 'absolute' law to be grasped, so is Spirit the Aufhebung of the Sollen inasmuch as its 'recognition' is that of the immanence of the absolute in place of any supervising concept or 'ought'. Spirit

breaks with the antinomies of legalism and moralism - construed by Glas according to 'castration' and the antherrection - in that the ethical order does not rely on the (im)position, Setzung (or Ersetzung) of the concept but, as with Jesus' community of love, self-recognition is acknowledged to be possible only through recognition of the other and of the totality of relations this implies. This is travestied by Derrida in line with a return of Hegel to a positive law with a theological bent - the construal of divine 'revelation' given the Lacanian-legal twist in the Name-of-the-Father. By contrast, Spirit, in its 'comprehension' of positive law departs from the dominating concept, wherein the object would be subsumed beneath the practical-rational subject, by way of a mutual re-cognition:

"The hill and the eye that sees it are object and subject, but between man and God, between spirit and spirit, there is no such cleft of objectivity and subjectivity; one is to the other an other only to the extent that one recognises the other; both are one." [14]

Glas, configuring Spirit as a 'synthesis' of universal and particular - themselves rigorously maintained according to representation's Father and Son - retains it as conceptual, as the dominating subject, the infinite personality understood by le propre. Derrida, it will be recalled, defines Spirit as a "knowledge relation" [15]. That this is the eye which sees the hill, the construction of infinite freedom via 'appropriation' of the object,

nature, is further underlined by "autonomination" - the emphasis placed upon nomination, consequent upon the schematic construal of a Hegel in line with the Name-of-the-Father'. Again, that which 'The Spirit of Christianity' seeks to re-think in its 'givenness' is reinstated by Glas as the word of the Hegelian seminar. In the emphasis on the nomination of paternity Derrida is at odds with the essay which, throughout, records love's antipathy for naming, judging, ruling. Glas would return Jesus to a positive law elevated as 'the Father's' even as this flies in the face of what Hegel describes as Jesus' refusal of all 'reflectiveness' in love. Against the (traditional) methodological Hegel in Glas - the deconstruction of Hegel registered in the 'gl' of a Roman "aigle", upholder of "regle" - "the living unity" of ethical life "will never be able to afford a rule, since it never has the force of a universal opposed to a particular"[16]. Against the 'naming' of a Father that would return the ethical order to a Symbolic/patriarchal order - phallogocentrism - Hegel's essay contains the resources to refuse this legalism and 'nomination'. Hegel writes that

"it is a sort of dishonour to love when it is commanded, ie when love, something living, a spirit, is called by name. To name is to reflect on it, and its name or the utterance of its name is not spirit, not its essence, but something opposed to that."[17]

The Name-of-the-Father would be a new positive law. Jesus does not establish a new law - this is what "fate"

signifies. Equally, Hegel does not endorse Jesus' 'love' or 'life' as paradigmatic - he no more posits love as a new principle than recommends a return to Antigone's law. What is adumbrated in the "spirit" and "fate" of Christianity is, rather, the re-cognition of positive, given, law such that it is determinable in the diremption of Spirit: out of the totality of social and ethical relations is abstracted the 'absolute' freedom of personality - the right of private property - and, with this, the antinomy of freedom and necessity, autonomy and heteronomy. This latter law is not, therefore, to be assimilated to Spirit - even with the aid of a restriction of Hegel to religious Vorstellen and divine "filiation". Hegel's Spirit is not the submission to a renovated/extended ('infinite') law but the possibility, in the philosophical register of phenomenological inversion, of the determination of that 'absolute' positive law in its incompleteness and in its self-inadequation. This is to say, Spirit is the ethical totality, although not posited in the stead of a 'relative' law (private property) pretending to universality but, in the inversions and contradictions of legalism's antinomies, that whole is both illumined and obscured as the (non-)identity of 'subject' and 'substance' is re-cognised and misrecognised.

However, Derrida does not so much present 'love' as Hegel's positing of ethical life as establish it as paradigmatic for the Hegelian s'entendre parler: "love has no other" - its site is identified as the family's and "the family economy" permits it to be generalised - whence 'love' becomes the route of an assimilating Sittlichkeit. In the context of Glas, the family is the image of the conservative system and - from the 'law of the family' as set out in the transcendentalized figure of Antigone to the Holy Family that is expressed in the "filiation" that is Spirit - 'the family' is the same. Once more, the discourse of "spacing" and "pas" - of differing-deferring - nevertheless reduces, in a panoptical gaze, the difference of the shapes of consciousness to overarching, conceptual or ideal types, just as it collapses the phenomenological witness that is for-consciousness into the philosophical reconstruction that is for-us. For Hegel the family is not the paradigm for speculative identity and is not, when grasped in its 'infinity' and according to the 'seed', Sittlichkeit. The family is not a general paradigm but - with 'love' - natural ethical life. Furthermore, this does not imply either that the family is primary - that it precedes the state - nor that it somehow 'emanates' from the state, even if Derrida manages to construe it as both. The binocular view of a Hyppolitean vitalism and Kojevian humanism[18] means that, as in the former case, for Glas the family is the approach

to ethical life - the son in the ethical order, Derrida writes, "goes into politics"[19] - just as, in the latter case, in accordance with its 'seed-logic', the state precedes and permits the family. In place of this characteristic marriage of the panlogical and the anthropological readings, the family qua "the ethical spirit in its **immediacy**"[20] is the attempt to reassert the 'reality' of ethical relations in the context of the dominance of the concept of abstract law: this 'natural', most immediate, bond of family is, for consciousness, the most immediate and concrete existence of the ethical community. Nevertheless - contrary to the panlogical and anthropological readings - Hegel does not represent "natural ethical life" as somehow 'detachable' from the state, from the totality of social and political institutions, for it cannot be thought without them. Indeed, the very presupposition of the latter by the family is acknowledged in Glas: "the family economy" leaves no doubt that Sittlichkeit is to be thought entirely within the horizons of the institutions of private property and abstract right. Focusing on this unconscious congruence of Glas with Hegel, one can reconsider the transcendental turn earlier described as 'oikos to oekesis', the deconstruction of Hegel as the "remain(s)" of "an aigle", as Derrida's attempt to **excavate of the social relations suppressed by positive law**. Excluded by Roman legality from the 'true', 'proper'

position - not persona but res - the position of woman, of the sister, of the mother, is seen as a legal 'apositionality' that permits transformation into its conceptual correlate - the transcendental "trace" - just as woman as res, the thing, the property that is the 'truth' of metaphysical proprietorship, transcendentalised is the Ersatz matrix of "general fetishism". Glas turns the suppression of the non-legal to its advantage, transcendentalising those relations (or rather, those 'figures' - not sorority but 'the sister') in their sitelessness and thereby rendering the legal Setzung dependent upon the Ersetzung, upon a fundamental inessentiality and 'proper-placelessness'. The suppressed relations - the figures of the feminine - are transcendentalised. The "family economy" is the inscription of a Hegel of bourgeois right. Ethical life is assimilated to positive law and - the result - "the remain(s)" is Sittlichkeit conveyed to its grave.

For Glas, the Last Supper, the primal cene of filiation, is the place where patriarchal love is vouchsafed (once more the nomination of the Father) and where the route of ingestion, introjection, devouring, is confirmed as the Hegelian path of infinitization-through-assimilation. The insufficiency of (paradigmatic) love is then attended to - registered by Hegel in the aspect of 'failure' in the Last Supper, in love, which resides in the need of alterity,

objectivity, and the anticipation in this failure of the impossibility of Absolute Knowing as "figureless" Sa. Grammatology finds its logocentric Hegel confirmed in that "remarkable reflection" whereby the consumption of the Host is likened to a reading which reappropriates all exteriority, even the written mark. This appropriation of the gramme is constructed as the telos of the 'familial', revealed, religion and the insufficiency of love alone is regarded as the need for its pleroma - the Aufhebung as relever - in a religion whose 'object' prepares it for completion in philosophy, self-recognition in Absolute Knowing. 'Religion' is configured, then, as the moment of difference, enacting love's need of alterity in the object of worship and implying the return to an elevated loving/familial figurelessness in the comprehension of that 'difference'. Again, Derrida takes the attempt to evade the concept of positive law - Jesus' 'love' - to be its extension and confirmation. Again, projecting the figurelessness of the love-feast onto Sa, reading the "remarkable reflection" as an Hegelian recommendation, Glas constructs the inadequation of the absolute to itself - here in the shape of love - as a failure of philosophy. This is to open the way to the "arche-trace", the "condition of (im)possibility", the fundamental Ersatz, etc, by collapsing the philosophical determinate negation into untutored consciousness' absolute negation and to seek out the "remain(s)" by asking after the justification

of (that is, construing as 'constitutive') that 'nothing'. Once more the one-dimensional, identitarian collapse of phenomenological witness and philosophical reconstruction conforms with Glas' inability to think other than juridically.

The insufficiency of love, therefore, grasped by Hegel in the reconstruction of 'The Spirit of Christianity', is the failure of the most immediate community of "feeling" on account of its conjoining a sheer interiority on one side and an attachment to unmediated sensuousness on the other. On the matter of logocentrism and the appropriated letter, Hegel's account is not a 'recommendation' but is the implicitly phenomenological account of the necessity of the religious object - this is the criticism of Christianity and 'feeling' wherein love is not to be assimilated to positive law but equally is not to be preserved as the philosophical alternative to Gesetz. Indeed, it is only as the latter that an Hegelian logocentrism - and a Derridean legalism - can be maintained in the "remarkable reflection": Hegel would be elided with the ethical life of Jesus that he criticises for its dissolution of all determinacy (Hegelian "figureless" Sa), just as Glas would remain faithful to an equally indeterminable positivity of the letter. Furthermore - and to anticipate - when the Sa, by means of the ca, communicates with the 'Es' of the Heideggerian Es

gibt Sein, when Derrida travesties 'Absolute Knowing' as an ultimate and originary figurelessness and as the Zoroastrian Lichtwesen, the sheer interiority of "feeling" is brought into coalition with the positivity of the 'given' law or letter. This occurs insofar as the indeterminability of both establish a transcendental and sublime mastery - one which the thought of ethical life, the re-cognition of formal-legal identity, will not tolerate. This - as Derrida knows well - is for Hegel the collapse of Jesus' "fate" into the antinomies of the Jews, the failure to grasp the immanence of 'divine law' such as Athens (or Thebes) knew it. Hegel writes that the disciples'

"relation to the world was bound to become a dread of contacts with it, a fear of every form of life, because every form exhibits a deficiency (as a form it is only one aspect of the whole and its very formation implies fixed limits), and what it lacks is a part of the world. Thus the community group found no reconciliation of fate but only attained the extreme opposite of the Jewish spirit not the middle course of beauty." [21]

In the flight of all determinacy, in the sundering of infinite and finite, the return of Jesus to the Jews, is "the grave of life" that haunts revealed religion and - need it be repeated? - is registered by the death-knell as differance. The Last Supper, as Glas declares, anticipates this 'dehiscence', and is attended by Derrida because of the 'undecidable' status of the bread and wine as the consequence of the 'interiority' of the experience.

In its anticipation of the death of God, the Last Supper thereby effects an alienation of that which - according to the "New Testament" drawn up as "the new contract entered into with religious pomp"[22] - it was intended to appropriate. The Hegelian Last Supper concurs with deconstruction insofar as it is the love-feast concluding with that antithesis of "faith and the thing"[23]. The 'materializing' effect which Derrida assigns to the 'morsel', whereby it fails to be entirely 'spiritualised' even in the context of absolute appropriation (the "remain(s)" in the "gl" of the swallowed, rematerialized thing), is one which, nevertheless, perpetuates the opposition of 'matter' and 'spirit', of nature and freedom. In addition, and as the subsequent flight from determinacy displays, this not only reintroduces, despite Jesus' ethical "fate", a dichotomous structure such that freedom is cast into the void but also returns to the dominating concept of positive law. Thus, the embrace of the grave of life by Glas - even as it reckons itself a 'materializing' effect [24] - replays within the structure of the Setzung and Gesetz the sundering and fixing of finite and infinite, nature and freedom, matter and spirit. This - rather than any respect for alterity and non-identity - is to return to the Unhappy Consciousness and its experience of a 'spiritless' nature of shame and degradation and an indeterminable, abstract, divinity commanding a perpetual self-cleansing. Of course the

Unhappy Consciousness undergoes a certain transformation in the pages (and columns and niches) of Glas. The Setzung of a structural opposition of infinite and finite, with its - albeit unattainable - telos of their union, is discarded by a thought too sophisticated for such "nostalgia for presence", for a negative theology. For this reason, the 'concept' of the opposition, its positing, itself is never present but, holding the fixation of the aporia to its word, this non-identity is nominated (conceptualised) only as 'substitutive' - not Setzung but Ersetzung. Within Hegel's discussion itself, this structure of general fetishism is exhibited in "faith and the thing" and it is its emergence in the context of the left-overs at communion that keeps deconstruction on the side of religion, that keeps it this side of the river, safe from "the lure of Sa"[25]. In 'The Spirit of Christianity' the Last Supper, concluding with faith - where Spirit is present but is in antithesis to the bread which 'remains', chewed and swallowed as unassimilated as if it were vomited, matter - reveals the incompleteness of the communion-in-love to be its impasse in an unreconciled empiricism. "The love made objective, this subject element become a **thing**, reverts once more to its nature, becomes subjective again in the eating"[26]: this echoes the general fetish insofar as 'presence' - Spirit as 'faith' - is incomplete due to the thing and, conversely, the thing is not exhausted by the 'concept' of Spirit as

le propre. In this way does a general fetishism cooperate with a "radical empiricism"[27] and do both find a certain 'confirmation' in the Last Supper. Unreconciled and 'empirical', as the glutinous "remain(s)" the thing escapes though configured as the interiorizing, appropriating route of identity - auto-affection, love and the "family economy". At the same time and according with the general fetishism, thought itself (its 'presence' unempirical, unrealized) can present itself only as represented, substitutive - within a structure of Ersetzung without any non-Ersatz.

Inspired by the "family economy", Jesus - according to Glas's reconstruction of 'The Spirit of Christianity' - would attain to ethical life, achieve the pleroma of the Judaic law, by replacing a Jewish sublime master with a Christian father. Grasping this filial relation is the fulfillment of the law, the entrance into love. Hegel writes that "to the Jewish idea of God as their Lord and Governor, Jesus opposes a relationship of God to men like that of a father to his children"[28]. The implications for Glas of this "filiation" have already been considered, yet absent from Derrida's account of the opposition of Jew and Jesus is the filiation of this 'filiation'. Glas would remove the Jews from the discourse of the familial - the jealous God would preclude the 'loving father'; the father who does not threaten castration and guarantees

integrity in that annunciation of paternity in Jesus, a "strict fetishism". Yet 'The Spirit of Christianity' does not embrace an infinite paternity in the way that Derrida's schema maintains. Rather, in the reconstruction of Jesus' attempt to found an ethical community **not** subservient to the positive law, Hegel reads the relationship of filiation as one that chimes with the family as "natural ethical life" - that is, it would 'rescue' the concrete totality of social relations from abstraction or suppression in the categories of law. Furthermore, in contrast with the subsumption of this 'familial' Jesus beneath the family-economy of le propre, not only is this an attempt to wrest the whole of social and political life from the grip of legal (mis)representation - and as such at odds with the construction of the family according to the law of private property - but the source of Jesus' 'familialism' is his very re-cognition of the ethical life of the Jews. The filiation of 'filiation' is Jewish. In a passage that merits quotation at length, Hegel writes:

"The most commonly cited and the most striking expression of Jesus' relation to God is his calling himself the 'son of God' and contrasting himself as the son of God with himself as the 'son of man'. The designation of this relation is one of the few natural expressions left by accident in the Jewish speech of that time, and therefore it is to be counted among their happy expressions. The relation of a son to a father is not a conceptual unity (as, for instance, unity or harmony of disposition, similarity of principles, etc), a unity which is only a unity in thought and is abstracted from life. On the contrary, it is a living relation of living beings, a likeness of life. Father and son are simply modifications of the same life, not opposite essences, not a plurality

of absolute substantialities."[29]

Of course, just as attending to the Trinity in strict accordance with Vorstellen - each term understood in its isolation, 'three persons' - will bear out the construal of a Hegel of positive law, so the deployment of The-Name-of-the-Father, whilst schematically indispensable for Glas, cannot be seen to be confirmed in Hegel's essay. Indeed, Hegel's reading of Jesus' employment of the relation of filiation is the attempt to escape that sublime law: the 'figure' of the father and of paternity is not the invention of Jesus - this is not a case of Setzen - but is taken from the patriarchal social order of the Jews. The filiation that is Spirit is, then, the attempt to think the 'circulation' of the ethical whole whereby the 'universal' and the 'particular' are not frozen in opposition - to be joined only in the unrealizable Sollen or the concept of positive law - but rather are each the condition of possibility of the other. Again (and contrary to the "fate" - that is, historical destiny - of Jesus' teachings) this is to eschew a "freedom only in the void"[30] - the absolute without determination - and its corollary, a 'nature' that is a region of compulsion and degradation. The Trinity is the attempt to refound ethical life as inclusive of the absolute such that the particular, the 'object', appearance, is not simply a limit, a restriction, but is, rather, essential to the whole as its mediation.

The immanence of the absolute as announced in the Trinity expresses 'Spirit' as it expresses the re-cognition of the relation of the part, the individual, to the (ethical) whole - not the primacy of the whole in a suppressive legalism (the imperial "aigle" of the Kriegstaat) nor that of the individual in an interminable moralism, but the mutual acknowledgement of individual and ethical whole. Indeed (and again unmentioned by Glas), in contrast to the flight of the imperial aigle - the advance of the Kojevian Roman-Napoleonic State - and against the construal of a Hegel whose Hellenism fuels an eschatological history of Recht, 'The Spirit of Christianity' explicates the unity of the Trinity and of the "filiation" that is Spirit not in accordance with positive law and 'the West' but rather in terms which not only censure the occident but, with the example of the Arabs, underscore the consideration of a region and people that Glas will maintain as schematically possible only as objects of hostility for Sa. Derrida writes of Genet who is "among the Palestinians at war", who is in a region where "what interests me always takes (its/his) place" - a Genet, who "no longer inhabits the Judeao-Christian West"[31] and "leaps wherever that explodes (ca saute) in the world, wherever the absolute knowledge of Europe takes a blow"[32]. Arabia - or the Palestinians who Genet loves because of their statelessness, sitelessness, absence from the state-building march of history[33] - thereby rings the glas of

3a. Yet, departing from the aigle of legend, one reads a Hegel who writes:

'Even in the expression 'A son of the stem of Koresh', for example, which the Arabs use to denote the individual, a single member of the clan, there is the implication that this individual is not simply a part of the whole; the whole does not lie outside him; he himself is just the whole which the entire clan is. This is clear too from the sequel to the manner of waging war peculiar to such a natural, undivided, people: every single individual is put to the sword in the most cruel fashion. In modern Europe on the other hand, where each individual does not carry the whole state in himself, but where the bond is only the conceptual one of the same rights for all, war is waged not against the individual, but against the whole which lies outside him. As with any genuinely free people, so among the Arabs, the individual is a part and at the same time the whole.'" [34]

This does not present the advance and elevation of the nation-state; this is not the Kojevean-Napoleonic standard raised over Egypt. Hegel contrasts the modern, legally-defined relation of individual to the socio-political whole, 'person' to the state, to that of the Sitte of the Arab. Overlooking the historical veracity of Hegel's construal of this 'custom', what can be noted is that despite the attention to the practise of war this is not a celebration of the Kriegstaat for this would be, precisely, to fall back into a strict 'legalism' - the 'whole' apart from and dominating the individual. Indeed, that this is the experience of the contemporary 'West' (to reluctantly remain within the geography of Glas) is reflected in this century's practise of war whereby the individual - contrary to yet confirming Hegel's estimate - in accordance with the 'suppressive state', **does** become

identified with 'his' state and, thus, a target. The aside that takes in the Arabs is germane to the attempt to rethink the fixed, abstract terms of 'individual' and 'whole' rendered sclerotic by modern, conceptual law and, most significantly, to return the figurative and representational relation of Father and Son in the Trinity to its 'ethical truth'. This is to grasp the Trinity as the triune structure of recognition: Spirit, the 'third term', is not a detachable "ligament" nor to be confined to religious representation as "filiation". Vorstellen would keep the universal as the indeterminate abstraction of the Father, the particular as itself - sensible representation - and the Spirit as the reconciliation of God with his creation. In the Trinity is contained the comprehension of the 'essentiality' of the particular, the finite, its identity-in-difference with the infinite and universal in contrast to any domination of the former by an indeterminable, 'given' universality. It is the recognition of the whole by the particular which is part of that whole but which, in cognizing its relation to the whole and its lack of identity with it, both further determines that universal (which thereby ceases to be a 'sublime' or unknowable abstraction) and is driven - by the failure of adequation of its concept to its own existence - to re-cognise itself (and thus cease to be split between nature, heteronomy and freedom, autonomy).

Glas, in its attention to "the tree of life", the "acorn", and all the metaphors of the family-economy, resolutely adheres to Vorstellung. Indeed, Derrida restricts Hegel to representation, construes Absolute Knowing in accordance with Verstand - the eskaton of a 'logocentric' utopia of sheer (self-)lucidity and abstract identity - and thus, from this impossible philosophy 'returns' Hegel to religion without having once 'departed' from it. The "tree" - as with the family and its metaphors - reflects, once again, the contemporaneity of Jesus: within the language of nature and 'natural' ethical life is the fulfillment of the law expounded. Indeed, this attention to Jesus' **time**, invoking the second meaning of the eponymous "fate" - that of the historical destiny arising out of the contradictions of the ethical whole - is underlined when Hegel addresses Jesus' teachings on poverty and the contempt for riches. The insufficiency and distance of Christian love '**for-us**' is explained as the historical-institutional force of private property law, yet at the same time - by a reconstruction of that 'love' - the contemporary power of property law is also recognised:

"The fate of property has become too powerful for us to tolerate reflections on it, to find its abolition thinkable. But this at least is to be noticed, that the possession of riches, with all the rights as well as all the cares connected with it, brings into human life definitive details whose restrictedness prescribes limits to the virtues, imposes conditions upon them, and makes them dependent on circumstances. Within these limitations, there is room for duties and virtues, but they allow of no whole, of no complete life, because if

life is bound up with objects, it is conditioned by something outside itself, since in that event something is tacked on to life which yet cannot be its property. Wealth at once betrays its opposition to love, to the whole, because it is a right caught in a context of multiple rights, and this means that both its immediately appropriate virtue, honesty, and also all the other virtues possible within its sphere, are of necessity linked with exclusion, and every act of virtue is in itself one of a pair of opposites." [35]

This lengthy quotation permits one to reply to Glas for it refuses to support a Hegel of le propre just as it reveals the tacit Derridean schema of disrupting that identitarian loving/familial, statist, Hegel with the 'inessentializing' effect of the thing of property. One recalls Marx's dictum - "where money is not itself the community [Gemeinwesen] it must dissolve the community" [36]. In keeping with the method of a general fetishism that is, rather, the dehiscence of the self-proper subject according to the logic of commodity fetishism, the assimilation of 'love' with le propre thereby permits the introduction of the the object of private property and with it the fracturing of the ethical whole into structured and abstract opposition as well as into relations of competition maintained by contract. The Derridean general fetishism and radical empiricism propose an 'object' - secretly pre-determined by property Recht - which would be prior to and disruptive of thought qua self-propriety. This is the 'thing' which would escape determination (the latter construed as 'appropriation') and leave the proprietorial dream of self-presence always

operating according to a structure of 'Ersatz-ownership', representation instead of presence - a 'substitute-thing' which would both suppress and declare the impossibility of full propriety. This is the deconstruction of Sa prefigured - as Glas reflects it - in Christian 'love' and the "remain(s)" of the Last Supper.

Derrida would turn the 'failure' of Jesus' attempt to refound ethical life to his own ends - the glas rings for the death of God. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of this "fate" of Christianity remains in continuity with the deconstruction of infinite personality, le propre. The mediation of Jesus is figured as 'contractual': he is the means of exchange between finite and infinite life. For Glas the infinite and finite must be set forth such that their identity is formal and, in consequence, can be deconstructed by attendance to its formality, to the signature on the contract, to the ligament or thread (fil) that binds the pair. The law of this contract remains unquestioned - it is transcendentalized - and, as the "condition of (im)possibility" (it binds but is the dehiscence of the identity), it remains within the discourse of Verstand, thinking finite and infinite (and reconstructing their union in Hegel) as opposed. Jesus is entombed within the confines of the law he seeks to fulfill - and this occurs twice, so to speak. First it occurs as the second "fate" of Christianity as Hegel

constructs it - the destiny of Jesus' 'love' in its inversion through 'infection' by the corrupt actuality of the social institutions of his day; faith's assimilation of the antinomies of Roman law. Secondly, it occurs as Glas collapses the Hegelian reconstruction into that "fate", repeating it as the demonstration of the impossibility of escaping the oppositions of abstract property law, and these oppositions (in particular the effect of res upon persona), concurring with the general fetish, will keep thought from straying across the border, marked by that river which would divide religion from philosophy[37]. Yet, in contrast to 'love' as the 'economic' pleroma of the law (a maximization of profit in the kingdom of heaven), Hegel's account presents a Jesus who commends not the exchange of finite for infinite but the "kingdom of God" as the **union** of finite and infinite - the immanence of the absolute in the community of love as a "living harmony of men", "what is common to all is life in God" and "this is not the common character that a concept expresses but love, [...] a living bond which unites the believers"[38]. This is as close as Christianity comes to the law of Antigone - that "middle course of beauty"[39]. As Glas is aware - and upon which its 'critique' of Spirit depends - 'love' is insufficient, yet, whilst Derrida would render this an epistemological and semiological question (the question of an impossible 'closure': how can signification be possible without an

object, knowledge without alterity?), in 'The Spirit of Christianity' the impossibility of love's interiority bears on the ethical community - bears on the "fate" of Christianity and the oppositional structure, the Verstellen, of religion.

The ethical life of the kingdom of God sees spirituality as a "friendship of soul"[40] - the possibility of the recognition of each in his/her wholeness in contrast to the abstractions of personality and positive law - and the unity of the community is found in the love of God. This love, according to Hegel, as that which 'binds' the community, is to be distinguished from the love between individuals. Extending across a community, 'love' is weakened both by its new generality and - because Jesus has taught the shunning of all ethical ties other than this loving union in God - by the absence of all other communal institutions. The consequence of the flight from determinacy already noted: the inversion of Jesus' attempt to depart from the Sollen of the 'concept' of law and to find the principles of the ethical in the 'is', in actuality, "life", with the "fate" of a sundered infinite/finite in the death of God and the return (noted by Derrida as a Jesus "decidedly too Jewish"[41]) to a God of indeterminable sublimity and of substantial freedom only in the void - "phantasmatic". This 'love' and its fate not only bear witness to the Derridean repetition of

Christianity's collapse into positivity, it also evinces the generalizing strategem of Glas whereby, beneath the concept of a "family economy" is subsumed not only the family law of Antigone but also the Holy Family. Similarly, 'love' - identified with this law - would apply equally and without distinction to the family in general and to the community. Leaving aside the inappropriate application of 'love' to Antigone ("True Spirit", immediate substance, has no experience of the subjectivity of love: "because the ethical principle is intrinsically universal, the ethical connection between the members of the Family is not that of feeling or the relationship of love"[42]), one notes 'love' in its very '**application**'. That is to say, love - as the law of the oikos - is transformed by Derrida's reconstruction into a general law of the text, a concept to which the elements of the system must conform, a Sollen designated The-Name-of-the-Father. This is the positive law which Jesus attempts to determine and sublate but which, owing to his refusal of the ethical institutions of his day, is Christianity's fate. The return to this positive law is, moreover, not only a 'reversion' to Judaism but, more importantly in this context, the effect of Rome. Whereas Derrida would find the failure of Christian Sittlichkeit to indicate the effect of a 'Jewish' differance - the failure of an Aufhebung of positive law understood as the impossibility of complete self-presence, parousia - and further

determine this failure as 'sexualized' in that "Jesus also suffers from the divorce of his parents"[43] - that is, the split that opens between the "actual mother" and the "implicit father" - the influence of Rome upon the fate of Christianity goes unmentioned. Embracing the structure of commodity fetishism as 'the effect of impropriety' - the "remain(s)" in the Jew and the woman - Glas maintains its elision of Hegel and "the metaphysics of le propre" by gliding over the fatal influence of Rome upon Christianity. Derrida thereby restrains the 'dehiscence' of the eschatological aigle (the forced identity of Hegel and the Roman-imperial "absolute person") as of the "God-Man" (the blurring of Hegel and Jesus such that the absolute person purchases 'infinite life'). Like the text's bad conscience, Rome bears no mention for, although Glas arranges matters such that the woman and the Jew alienate the self-proper subject, Rome removes Hegel from the Kojevian imperium and reminds Glas of its own complicity and confinement within private property law.

In 'The Spirit of Christianity' 'love' produces the split of infinite and finite - but not because it is structured from the outset as a positive law. As already seen, Derrida, despite noting the pleroma of law, never escapes from 'love' understood as a commandment. As an attempt at complete self-propriety and self-production it is identified with IC as both autonomy and Oedipal auto-

insemination. Similarly, love is seen as annulling all positivity, all discrepancy between 'outside' (duty) and 'inside' (inclination), by an interiorization of the former. Derrida's reading of this move is in line with a Hegel subsumed beneath an ('infinite', 'self-conscious') categorical imperative. Glas examines Jesus' releve of divorce in love: ethical life would train desire to be "a desire that no longer desires what it cannot have or only desires what it can have", which is translated into the demotic "nothing coming from the outside prevents you from cheating on your wife, but you no longer want to since you love her"[44]. To return Hegel to positive law is - of course - to stage a 'Kantianized' Hegel and the repressive 'love' which Derrida here constructs is the internalized mastery that Hegel finds loathsome in Kant and which 'The Spirit of Christianity' itself takes note of as the "partial subjection under a law of one's own, the self-coercion of Kantian virtue"[45]. Hegel writes that

"between the Shaman of the Tungus, the European prelate who rules church and state, the Voguls, and the Puritans on the one hand and the man who listens to his own command of duty, on the other, the difference is not that the former make themselves slaves and that the latter is free but that the former have their lord outside themselves while the latter carries his lord in himself, yet at the same time is his own slave."[46]

What Hegel finds in Jesus' 'love', in the reconciliation of 'fate', is, however, precisely an attempt to overcome this 'divine' sublimation of the distress of self-division

- a sublimation which nevertheless, as an 'ought', perpetuates the opposition and its violence - and to find a way to afford the recognition of the individual's social relations and activities in their completeness, precluding the oppositions of universal and particular arising from Recht. The contradictory rights of duty and divorce bear witness to the antitheses preserved in the 'union' of marriage: 'love' is not the decision in favour of duty (as Glas would imply) but rather the recognition of the disregard that the positive law pays to the social, extra-judicial context of the divorce and the promotion of vice and injustice that this right compels. In fate punishment falls differently than in right, but there it reveals - in the broken whole that is the contradiction of duty and right - the substance of an abstract law, its injustice. Equally, Hegel does not propose that this fate should be 'resisted' by a Sollen, commanding - in opposition to the right to divorce - the 'internalized' or subliminal duty to love, but rather that the one-sided nature of the concept of the positive law should be recognised within the ethical whole, a recognition that brings with it the acknowledgement of a justice 'greater' than that of the law. Despite Derrida's attempt to configure this love as masculine-identitarian by the citation of Jesus' qualification of the husband's right to divorce "when the wife has bestowed her love on another"[47]), Hegel's reading of the pleroma of the law

is the possibility of determining Recht as vicious - the positive, 'undeterminable' law is yet recognised as unjust on account of its very **masculinity**:

"To cease loving a wife who still loves compels love to sin, to be untrue to itself; and a transfer of its passion to another is only a perversion of it, to be atoned with a bad conscience. To be sure, in this event it cannot evade its fate, and the marriage is inwardly sundered; but the support which the husband draws from a law and a right and through which he brings justice and propriety onto his side means adding to the outrage on his wife's love a contemptible harshness." [48]

Contrary to Derrida's estimation, 'le propre' is emphatically included in the account of the absolute religion - indeed, it is the 'fate', the destiny, of Christianity. Moreover, this fate of Christianity not only enacts that 'dehiscence' of the forced identity of the Kojevean Hegel, in addition it repeats the deconstruction of Christianity as 'love' - its collapse into the antitheses of the Unhappy Consciousness. Furthermore, it reflects the second column of Glas: the effect of Genet is in evidence. 'Love' fails because, in its name, Jesus' 'fulfillment' of the law ultimately takes the course of the refusal of all contemporary ethical ties: "love" turns against "life" as Jesus teaches an indifference to all contemporary institutions - the refusal of family and a passive relationship to the state. In addition, as this indifference is promoted by a revulsion towards the corrupt institutions of Rome [49], the very abstract individualism of the legal order is

absorbed by faith: instead of re-cognising the substance of existing formal, legal relations "the citizens of the Kingdom of God become set over against a hostile state, become **private persons** excluding themselves from it"[50]. This flight from determinacy that is the response to property's dissolution of the community in Rome - the response to the fragmentation and atomisation of right and 'virtue' in Roman law - echoes the glas of Spirit, it chimes with the constructions of the Genet column. 'Love' becomes siteless as it turns against mundane ethical relations, "life", and in turning against those relations such as the ties of family, the fate of Christianity finds itself on the "bastard course". Equally, in the rupture with the world is that 'holiness', already noted in connection with the parodic saintliness of Genet's text - the Ersatz-monkishness that echoes, upon its expiry, the message of an impossible community. What was constructed in the voleur Genet as the flight/theft of Absolute Knowing and Sittlichkeit - the propriety of logocentric Hegel - emerges, in a reconsideration of Hegel's 'ethical life' and Spirit, as the embrace of the "fate" of Christianity as Hegel describes it. The attempt to found substantial, immanent freedom stands inverted such that the unknowable law is restored in an indeterminable freedom, subsisting 'beyond', whilst the mundane - divorced from the absolute - is a site of flight or yearning, of degradation. In this Unhappy Consciousness,

Genet finds his fiction: here all pretence to 'propriety' finds its truth in that 'natural' condition of shame and abasement and - in conditions where degradation is, thus, the site of spirituality - so, in imitation of Our Lord, does a religious text situate itself among the "remain(s)", the corruption of the finite, the improper, among those who shun the 'ethical ties' of a decadent world.

Finally, religion saves itself from philosophy as the result of a 'sexualization of the text'. The divorce of Jesus' parents - the "actual mother" and the "implicit father" - would repeat a psychoanalytic structure already adumbrated by the deployment of the Name-of-the-Father in the construction of Hegel's Spirit as "filiation". That is, just as the Father permits access to signification, to the Symbolic, so does this give rise to the escape of the sign from the control of the speaking subject: the Hegelian seed-logic of a "loving" father who would not castrate or cut up, seeks to prevent this 'flight' and to maintain the logocentric subject in its integrity. With implicit reference to Lacan's account of Freud's 'Schreber', Glas addresses the unresolved antinomy of religion - that of faith and knowledge. Derrida attends to the 'feeling' of divine presence, of the absolute, and the barrier to its realization, to its actual presentation in knowledge and constructs this antinomy within the

context of the Holy Family in accordance with the Phenomenology's analogy. What Derrida finds is that the father as "implicit" is, thereby, phantasmatic - there is an identification with the father such that I produce myself, the hole (castration-anxiety) that is constitutive for signification is filled or, more precisely '(un)covered'. The "phantasmatic" Father is therefore announced in Spirit, a phantasy of logocentrism, of "autonomination": the implicit-father of religion evokes Hegel's Sa as a phantasy of self-production which effects an Oedipal congress with the mother (I am my own father) as it displaces the mother (in "filiation" it is the father who is privileged, the mother is "mere matter"[51]). Lastly, this phantasy is the progenitor of 'difference' as opposition-awaiting-synthesis, the identification itself achieved in that active paternity.

What this construal relies on, of course, is the telos of an infinite personality. The 'infinitezation' of Kant is undertaken as the elision in the "IC" of the 'autonomy' of the categorical imperative with the Immaculate Conception and the amalgamation of the two sigla, Sa and IC, in the production of a Hegel for whom there is no theoretical correlate to a **practical** reason now more than 'primary' - the 'in-itself', the object, is simply 'for-consciousness' inasmuch as the latter has posited it. The Setzung, for Glas, is thus the infinite annunciation, the Name-of-the-

Father, the law (Gesetz) of the subject enacted by Spirit as filiation. It has already been seen both that this positive law is not germane to Hegel's Spirit and that the Ersetzung that Derrida would privilege is the obverse of a proprietorial positing. Similarly, in the paternal law which posits difference as opposition one does not find the synonym of Spirit or Sittlichkeit but rather the **consequence of positive law**: all difference is structured according to opposition, according to a prior (legal-positing) 'concept' to which "life" - the multiplicity of ethical relations from which that concept is abstracted - must conform. Glas would regard this law of the Setzung as that of le propre and the Father whilst the general fetishism of an Ersetzung is the alienation of that property in the dissolution of all phantasies of self-proprietory according to their substitutive structure: their 'truth' is the (un)concealment of constitutive lack, of that 'hole', of differance. Thus, deconstruction turns to religion as Vorstellen and finds in the opposition of feeling and knowledge - wherein the absolute can only be represented, where even the revealed religion fails the accomplishment of divine parousia, persisting as a fetishism in the presence of an unreconciled object of worship - the glas of philosophy, an unrepresentable God, the repetition of a Jesus "too Jewish" who, instituting a Father who nevertheless withdraws from his creation, thereby re-establishes a sublime mastery. This

construction of a phantasmatic father is the erection of a sublime mastery that accords with the Jewish Lord (from whom, it will be recalled, the ethical Vorstellen of the Christian 'paternity' derives) as it does with the undeterminable positive law.

Inscribed within legal right, Derrida's "phantasm" is a sublime mastery which chimes with the Roman "absolute person", "the lord and master of the world"[52]. Within the telos of Glas this phantasm would restrain the positing of le propre, maintaining it as the symptom of an ontotheological paranoia. However, structured such that it speaks as a Sollen (to this end are devoted the textual exertions of "IC"), the phantasmatic infinite unity, whilst not possible as 'realized', nevertheless guarantees a perpetual violence of appropriation as it is **imposed** upon actuality. The rigid adherence to the letter of the text - the fixation upon the opposites of an actual mother and implicit father - accords with the strategem of Glas in that the paternal Sollen will appear impossible by virtue of the inversion suffered as it is imposed upon the - maternal - actuality. The logocentric father, dependent upon the woman, is nevertheless rendered unrealizable by the latter, configured as his "remain(s)", his "condition of (im)possibility". Derrida's 'reification' of non-identity - his refusal of all determinate negation or speculative identity due to its

construal as a quasi-Cartesian restoration of that which was negated - achieves a restoration of that which was 'deconstructed'. In place of a formal, 'absolute' identity is established its condition of (im)possibility: in the stead of the subsumptive concept of practical reason (wherein the Ego prevails) is the 'concept' of non-identity. The fixation of difference - trace, transcendental 'nothing', differance - would imagine itself in the break with metaphysical opposition, yet just as a general Ersetzung is not the discoherence but the obverse of practical-legal Setzung (and demonstrates a tacit awareness of the inversions of 'positing'), so a **phantasmatic** Sollen does not overthrow the formal subject but rather enlightens it as to the 'inescapable' oppositions of its condition, inducts a naive voluntarism into the oscillations of "undecidability". Concluding in the phantasm, differance responds to le propre with the Sollen: the discourse of positive law has never been left and its deconstruction - the "remain(s)" of a 'proprietary' Spirit - has served to entomb thought perpetually in an ironic self-disgust at that which it bears within itself and which it is unable - by definition - to comprehend. Non-identity is set frozen - as if "in ice and frost, glass and gel"[53] - as a principle which, therefore, cannot preserve itself from conceptuality for its very 'flight' (vol) - the "trace" that would remove it from its 'proper' place - is the concept's movement of

'indetermination' wherein it is detached from the agonistics of ethical life - from the totality of social relations - upon which it can then only be reimposed even if as an aporia made constitutive. The deconstructive Sollen of differance - the perpetuation of a 'yearning' without hope for presence, an 'ought' under erasure - will be only confirmed by pursuing the discussion of the Jews in Glas. The consolidation of a Kojevian Sa - the absolute knowing that is the citizenship and propriety of the absolute state - is witnessed in the deconstructive deployment of the "remain(s)" of the Jews as the inadmissible of that knowledge/state. However, in concord with the dynamics of the fetish of the commodity, this 'personification' of the Jews as expropriative of that propriety evinces - in its embrace of the anti-Semitic archetype in response to the 'anti-Semitic' Hegel - the very incarceration of the schema of Glas in its own hall of mirrors.

iii. 'On the Jewish Question': Glas, Hegel and the trace of the Jews

In its construal of a Hegel for whom 'Spirit' is the phallogocentric seed nurtured by the Christian family, Glas follows 'The Spirit of Christianity' in its construction of a Jesus "too Jewish". As absolute religion cannot be 'relieved' in absolute knowing, so the inhibiting element of the Jews is held responsible.

Derrida excavates 'the spirit of Judaism' as an absolute resistance to the logocentric telos of istoria and episteme, as a catastrophe which Hegel attempts to contain. Traversing the deployment of the Jew in Glas, the reader is drawn to the Derridean construal of Hegel's Greece - realm of le propre - whose displacement the Jew effects. The Hegelian contraries of Jew and Greek are exploited by Derrida to refuse the abstract state and its 'infinite' subject. Nevertheless, the scrutiny of the deconstructive misrepresentation of the polis and the Jew's "alienation" discloses the manner in which Glas's construction of the pair elides with the division of state and civil society. Inspection of the contrast of Jew and Greek confirms this essay's argument that Derrida enacts the refusal of formal universality without its comprehension; a refusal expressed in an embrace of the sphere of difference - civil society - and the pursuit of the course of the commodity which, as "absolute alienation", is transcendentalised. Thus, "the Jew" expropriates le propre - occupies civil society as the personification of the commodity - and this dwelling in civil society then elides 'alienation' and the inversion of formal property law with the resituating of Hegelian Absolute Knowledge (as Sa) in religion - not parousia but the representation of presence, autonomy possible only as the "phantasmatic" union of IC.

Hegel-critique has always found the Unhappy Consciousness to accord with the construal of Judaism and a monotheism without incarnation: subject divorced from substance[1]. Glas continues to work within this tradition as it twists the tale to accommodate a "grave of life" reconfigured as trace, differance and "remain(s)". The echo of the fate of Christianity that is heard in the Derridean death-knell - the repetition of the 'failure' of love and then Absolute Knowledge to achieve complete self-presence - is the unfolding of the text as it returns to a divinity sublime and non-present, the conclusion of a Jesus "decidedly too Jewish"[2]. The absolute religion seeks the Aufhebung of Judaism yet cannot get over it. Furthermore, for Glas the attempt at the releve of the Jews and Hegel's construal of the latter - as unreconciled, contrasted with the "beauty" (Schone) of Greece, unethical, unfamilial, without right or freedom, etc - not only disgorges an anti-semitism of recognisably traditional-Teutonic hue but, in addition, expresses the telos of speculative dialectics such that its twin goals of state-building and infinite parousia are clearly in evidence. The Jews, in Derrida's reconstruction, are foreigners to the system and, whilst expulsion is not in order - the system does not know of an exterior - a conceptual conversion must be sought: 'The Spirit of Christianity' (still the text that supplies the evidence) teaches that the Jew can become free only by becoming

Christian[3]. In face of this, for Glas 'the Jews' will not permit configuration according to a dialectical opposition but will rather refuse these terms whose end is the synthesis of infinite self-propriety. Just as the "remain(s)" has been seen to reconstruct the Unhappy Consciousness according to the deconstructive trace - no nostalgia for presence but the indication of a transcendental 'nothing' - so the Jews will both confirm their traditional site within the system and, furthermore, bring the latter to ruin. The Jew, like Antigone and woman in the family or proper name, is a figure inscribed within Hegel's system yet refusing dialectical opposition and, according with the trace, registering the oscillation of undecidability.

'The Spirit of Judaism' - part one of 'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate' - is reconstructed by Derrida attending to an identification of the Jews as the spirit of non-reconciliation and aligning this with the 'cut' of castration. In contrast to the beauty of Greece and the reconciliation of Christianity, the Jew is hard-hearted and ugly. In contrast with the creation-myth of the Greeks - the story of Deucalion and Pyrrha who "made a peace of love"[4] and "invited men once again to friendship with the world, to nature"[5] - the Jewish figures of Noah and Nimrod testify to a "prodigious disbelief in nature"[6] resulting in the fixing of an

opposition of man to nature and both placed beneath the sublime mastery of a God: "both made a peace of **necessity** and thus perpetuated the hostility"[7]. Glas reads this Jewish 'ugliness' as the opposition of Hellenic integrity to the Jew who is both erect and incised - "stiff, on edge, taut in his opposition to maternal nature [...]. He remains cut in two, and the very tragedy of his cut [coupure] is ugly, abominable"[8]. Thus does Derrida frame the opposition of Athens and Jerusalem within the discourse of castration: the opposition of a Greek 'appropriation', Setzung, law and strict fetishism to a Jewish 'expropriation', Ersetzung, the remains of law in general fetishism. In addition, therefore, deconstruction refers to the Hegelian verdict concerning the difference of the Jewish tragedy to that of the Greeks with the intention of sounding, in Hegel's unfavourable comparison of the former with the latter, the shocking echo of contemporary barbarism. Glas cites 'The Spirit of Christianity':

"The great tragedy (Trauerspiel) of the Jewish people is no Greek tragedy; it can arouse neither terror nor pity, for both of these arise only out of the fate which follows from the inevitable slip of a beautiful being (schonen Wesens); it can arouse horror (Abscheu) alone. The fate of the Jewish people is the fate of Macbeth who stepped out of nature itself, clung to alien Beings, and so in their service had to trample and slay everything holy in human nature, had at last to be forsaken by his gods (since these were objects and he their slave) and be dashed to pieces on his faith itself."[9]

For Glas the concept that marches under the eagle-standard cannot waste pity on the unnatural Jew and in strict

contrast to the Jewish thought of absolute loss - the transcendent God - is the tragedy of the Greeks that expresses the teleology of an infinite humanism. In this reconstruction man is reconciled with nature, the polis reconciles man with man, the self-lucidity of le propre is consequent upon the sufferings exacted in now-recognised 'fate'. In the conflation of positive law (le propre) with Greek ethical life, therefore, (and all conducted within the terms of "the family-economy") the analogy of Macbeth can be maintained as the condemnation of a Jewish refusal to abide with self-presence and the proper in contrast with the commended Greek state, the "reign of law" that embraces the integral subject. Glas, however, does not refer to the essay's further citation of Macbeth. There the tragedy of the Jews is considered as that of a subjectivity - more 'Roman' than the abstract imperium of the deconstructive Hegel's Greece - unaware of the arousal of fate in its actions, unaware of the consequences of its sheer self-centredness. Hegel writes that

"The illusion of trespass, its belief that it destroys the other's life and thinks itself enlarged thereby, is dissipated by the fact that the disembodied spirit of the injured life comes on the scene against the trespass, just as Banquo who came as a friend to Macbeth was not blotted out when he was murdered but immediately thereafter took his seat, not as a guest at the feast, but as an evil spirit." [10]

This is to say that, "it is the deed itself which has created a law whose domination now comes on the scene" [11]. This is 'punishment as fate', this is the law

of Antigone which Macbeth - by contrast - does not acknowledge. Macbeth - as the Phenomenology's allusion maintains - never learns the duplicity of the command of law issued by "the equivocating sisters of Fate"[12]. He does not acknowledge the 'hidden' law, custom, in its effects of inversion but adheres resolutely (with the stiffness and tautness of the Jews or, one might add, with the unyielding rectitude of the legal personality) to the positivity of the command. Thus, in contrast to an 'Hellenized' positive law of le propre it is this latter that most resembles the Jewish coupure. Instead of the 'cutting' which Derrida would identify with the expropriation of the integral self-present subject of Hegelian Greece it is, therefore, the register of that 'propriety' which not only is determined in the dissolution of Greek ethical life - abstracted from it and reimposed over the totality of 'life' as a universal - but is found to accord with the legalism of the Jew's law. Derrida reads 'the Jew in Hegel' as the effect of castration, yet the figure "cut in two", instead of enacting a movement of oscillation that would thwart the appropriative infinite subject in an economy of undecidability, is, rather, the one who maintains a rule of law **against all fatal equivocation**. Glas equates Hegel's 'fate' with the (ultimate) reconstruction of an absolute subject whilst, in the case of the positive law of the Jew, transcribes and transcendentalises the

inversions of a legislating consciousness, its alienation. Hence, in this construal 'the Jew' would be the self-propriety that in its self-constitution - its cutting itself off - shows itself to be no such thing. This becomes clearer as one follows Derrida's reconstruction, governed as it is by this 'coupure'.

The coupure of the Jew is - according to Glas - fundamentally the adherence to a nonmanifest God. The absolute that cannot appear, that is cut off from the finite, enacts the 'unspiritual' nature of the Jews as it does their self-separation, and this exclusivity - dictated by a 'nothing', a 'dead God' - slips from secure self-propriety to absolute expropriation. This is to draw the connection between the Unhappy Consciousness and castration. The familiar 'return' to the Unhappy Consciousness - from the Jews to the Christians with the interlude of divine incarnation[13] - is rewritten such that attendance to the 'cut' (the transcription of the fixed difference, its 'reification') will remove all suggestion of the Unhappy Consciousness' absolute 'recuperation' of lost presence: differance, to repeat, is not negative theology. In its construction of the Jews, therefore, parallel to the movement of 'Antigone' in the text, Glas sends ethical life from the family-economy to the grave of life - from oikos to oekesis. In a reading of 'The Spirit of Judaism', the echo of this glas can be

heard in the ringing silence of the tabernacle, the Holy of Holies, hearth and home of the Jewish people. In Hegel's terms, the divorce of infinite from finite in the cutting-off of the transcendent God renders all thought of the absolute, of the unlimited, as that of sheer sublimity: God can 'inhere' in no finite form and, thus, that form remains simply matter. For this reason the holiest place and centre of Judaism is 'nowhere': there can be no present, visible 'site' for the divine. Hegel writes,

"after Pompey had approached the heart of the temple, the centre of adoration, and had hoped to discover in it the root of the national spirit, to find indeed in one central point the life-giving soul of this remarkable people, to gaze on a Being as an object for his devotion, on something significant for his veneration, he might well have been astonished on entering the arcanum to find himself deceived so far as some of his expectations were concerned, and, for the rest, to find himself in an empty room." [14]

A reflection no doubt as 'remarkable' in Derrida's terms as that concerning the ingestion of bread analogous to the interiorization and erasure of the letter in reading. Indeed, this account appears to confirm a Hegel definitively Roman: the "experience of powerful Pompey at the end of his greedy exploration" [15] cut short by the ungraspable Jewish essence; tearing aside curtains and covers, the aigle penetrates the defeated opponent, seeking to appropriate, in its difference, the essence of that other yet confronting - quite literally - **nothing**. Equally, this 'nothing' would do no less than describe,

within 'The Spirit of Christianity', the structure of the trace, differance, truth as aletheia, general fetishism, etc. In the "arcanum" - translation of 'Geheimnis', for Glas "secret, [...] the family and secret intimacy"[16] - what is supposed to be "the most familiar, secret, proper, near, the Heimliche of the Geheimnis presents itself as as the most foreign, the most disquieting (unheimliche)"[17]. For the Jews the familiar is uncanny; where one might expect to find the fullness of the nation's self-presence is found sheer vacuity. In Glas, therefore, the Jewish temple is reconstructed from Hegel's hostile account as the home of differance: the tabernacle is "a signified without a signifier"[18]. The Jewish hearth - its oikos - is evidence of expropriation which is, in turn, aligned with a grave - oekesis.

The coupure effected in/by the transcendent God - the conceptual connection of a nonmanifest absolute and castration - is then joined, as ever, to the presupposition of private property. This is a conjoining which, nevertheless, does not depart from Hegel's account but rather confirms that account in its criticism of positive, abstract, law. Derrida concludes from his reading of the trace-structure of the tabernacle that "the Jewish essence is totally alienated. Its ownness, its property would be infinitely foreign to itself [...], what the Jew enjoys is under the seal of expropriation."[19]

The Jews do not possess their 'secret': this is no negative theology wherein the non-present would, thereby, be dialectically presented. Rather, "absolute expropriation makes the secret of the sacred inaccessible to that very one holding its privileges"[20]. In the tabernacle one is returned to a general fetishism, for where the object is 'nothing' it cannot be a matter of deciding as to its reality or untruth but rather, naming the 'hole', the structure where the possibility of positing the true thing is obviated, one can only be always already engaged in the business of substitution without any original non-Ersatz. The trace, truth as aletheia - (un)concealment - is the expropriation of le propre whose law is that of the self-certain Setzung, positive law of Gesetz. The tabernacle, wherein the uncovering is ceaseless, never arriving at the unveiled 'true thing itself', is the perpetuity of differance whereby the 'whole truth' never appears except as deferred, under erasure, as 'a venir', yet-to-come. Just as the deconstructive reading of Heidegger follows a 'trace' which describes how in the ontico-ontological difference "all is not to be thought at one go" but is derived from "differance, an economic concept designating the production of differing/deferring"[21] so the Jewish tabernacle leaves a trace to be followed which is the trace of/as its truth - a truth which is structured according to the oscillation of undecidability, an

Ersetzung. This is all configured within the terms of "absolute alienation" and "absolute expropriation"[22] - the law of private property: the significance of the Jews in Derrida's reading of Hegelian Sittlichkeit is, then, that their abstract law assures differance. For Glas it is the Greek spirit and ethical 'fate' that posits an absolute 'I' whilst the (positive) law of the Jews maintains the frustration of that Hellenic eschatology of self-appropriation. Indeed, that Hegel is construed as 'legal' - that is, methodological, applying the aforementioned "regle" of the text[23] - is witnessed when the law of the Jews goes to work on the system. The same procedure is adopted by deconstruction as in the case of its seizing upon Antigone: having encountered this figure of differance - here registered in the general fetishism, the 'undecidability' and 'trace' of the tabernacle - Derrida constructs the Hegelian system as the attempt to restrict its effects. In 'undecidability's excess of the strict oppositions of determinate negation - for Derrida always 'positing-by-negation' - the Hegelian system displays a conservative **method** as it behaves other than it 'should', as it contravenes its own Sollen, its devoir:

"One cannot even decide the expropriation, cut through to a decision regarding castration, or run after its truth. A system's undecidability is here more powerful than the value of truth. Like the text of Hegel, Das Unheimliche should de-border, should have de-bordered [devrait, aurait du deborder] the opposition, verily the dialectic, of the true/nontrue." [24]

Derrida's construction is of a Hegel who modifies his own textual law or executes it such that it compels certain recalcitrant subjects to conform; the "remain(s)", the figures unrecognised - "inadmissable" - by the law. Glas deals with Hegel in accordance with the law just as the construal of the system's bearing towards the Jew is described in terms imbued with the language of the legal-political. In this construal, Hegel must prevent the Jews breaking their defined bounds, leaving their enclosure and threatening the construction of Spirit and Sa conceived as the maintenance of the economy of decidability's "true/nontrue": "Hegel [...] and his discourse, depends on truth" - a dependence which is behind Hegel's trial of the Jew - "[w]hence the political accusation hurled against the Jew. The Jew cannot become a citizen, he cannot have any true laws of State"[25]. A nonmanifest God deprives the Jew of truth and with it comes the deprivation that equates to the impossibility of proprietorship: everything is on loan from God. In the Jew (as Derrida reads matters) truth, freedom and ownership are elided. Again, Glas alights upon Hegel's deployment of the contrast with Greece: the impossibility of ethical life for a people dependent on the unknowable command of a transcendent God is contrasted with a people whose legality is customary, a second nature, and whose ethical institutions are their own creation. Nevertheless, in the deconstructive transcription of this contrast the focus is upon "property

rights"[26] such that the polis is rebuilt by Glas as the union of legally-defined property bearers, **the polis is composed of 'persons'**.

To produce this verdict Derrida alights upon the discussion in Hegel's essay of the difference in the similarity of the Greek and Jewish restrictions upon property-ownership. For Hegel (holding the Derridean construal in abeyance for a moment) this is, on the one hand - with regard to Greece - a people for whom each individual is substantial in his immediacy, a 'citizen' (and, one must add, in her immediacy - guardian of the family). In the polis each considers the ethical whole as transparent and his or her work, whilst conflict and transgression are justly punished in a 'fate' recognised as one's own action and an avenue back to the violated whole. On the other hand - with regard to the Jews - Hegel conceives of a people for whom the world is insubstantial, being dependent on the favour of an unknowable master whose prior, codified law is imposed from without. The Jews are subject to a God who institutes the individual as inessential yet - by virtue of his 'command' and the oppositions in which it sets the individual to suffer - subjective; a 'particular' structurally unreconcilable with the 'universal' to which it must nevertheless conform. It is in this context that Hegel can contrast an equality based on citizenship with

an equality of subjection. A citizenship - one hastens to add - that is not (contra Derrida-Kojeve) the one informing the citoyen of the Napoleonic-Roman aigle, not one defined a priori by abstract law, for it is this - in its affinities with the positive law of the Jews - to which Greek ethical life is in contrast. 'Citizenship' is not posited, is not legislated in advance, but springs from substantial ethical life: "[t]he Greeks were to be equal because all were free, self-subsistent; the Jews equal because all were incapable of self-subsistence"[27]. Yet Derrida's account of Hegel characteristically maintains the opposition of polis and tabernacle (although, construing the Jews according to the 'arche-trace', as 'abyssal' and within a general fetishism, Glas will dispute any 'oppositional' configuration of the two) and the Greek is allocated a place on the side of le propre, of abstract property law. If Hegel conceives that the ethical Spirit of Greece "perish[es] in the **condition of right** or law, ie in the proposition: 'The Self as such, the abstract person, is Absolute Being'"[28], Derrida's reconstruction remains unaware. Not only does Glas assert that "the Greek process founds right and politics, constitutes family **subjects** as citizens"[29] but also underscores this depiction of the polis as 'legislated Sittlichkeit' when the abstract law of private property is rendered the sine qua non of Greek ethical life: "every subject has to have his own proper goods [son bien

propre]"; "if one follows this value of the proper, of property (propriete, Eigen, Eigenheit, Eigentum), one must conclude that the free citizen's independence and quality go on a par with private property"[30]. Glas, self-consciously scrutinising the Hegelian letter with an unrelenting rigour, seems nevertheless (and yet again) to find departure from the language of private property law impossible. This is to reiterate the irony unconsciously attendant upon Glas. The book seizes upon works of Hegel whose intent is the determination and evasion of positive law and its violence and, reading those works in accordance with a schematics of 'le propre', Glas resituates Hegel within Gesetz whilst, for its part, offering "the remain(s)" as that which defies abstract law as its undeterminable condition of possibility - what this essay has previously characterised as a positive law 'sous rature'. The prior definition of Hegel as exponent of a 'metaphysics of the proper' means that in Derrida's account a '**juridical prejudice**' **always remains** and serves to collapse the distinctions such as Consciousness and Self-consciousness, Subject and citizen, ethical life and right in order that a Hegel of le propre might be repeatedly justified.

From this property-right - according to Derrida's reading - derives the capacity for statehood which the Greeks possess and the Jews lack. Self-propriety, guaranteeing

"right and politics", is therefore the possibility of self-legislation. Just as the transcendent God of the Jews removes the possibility of knowing the law according to a model of 'autonomination' (this is Glas's 'legislating Sittlichkeit' which leads to the elision of "ethical life" with the 'Oedipal' phantasm of union as self-filiation in the "IC"), so does the contrast of Greek and Jew conform with the confrontation of logocentrism with the gramme. It is, writes Derrida, a "question of the letter"[31]. In this reconstruction of Hegel's account, as a religion that is the revelation of law, Judaism is concerned with the externality of a letter oscillating between the poles of a transcendent beyond - unknowable, it "prescribes acts but enriches our knowledge with nothing"[32] - and a Godless world which leaves the application of law to a pragmatics of the finite, whereby "the scribes are not guided by the spirit of a law. They obey empirical rules, precepts and commandments. This writing is heteronomic and as this literality remains empiric, the prescription can always be violated when the situation of forces permits or requires it"[33].

This is that "radical empiricity" to which the absolute religion gave way: the acknowledgement of the impossibility of justifying the Setzung; the devolvement of the authority for positing ('deciding') onto a general Ersetzung; the a priori transcendental condition of possibility of signification left to a 'nothing' of difference-deferral. The Unhappy Consciousness - as the feeling of Gottlosigkeit, the registration of the loss of

the incarnate absolute, a 'flight beyond' of truth - inheres in this deconstructive structure and can be noted as Derrida describes the 'disincarnation' (so to speak) of law: "there is an abyss between the divine all-powerfulness and the empiric unleashing of forces. No law comes to schematize the abyss that leaves the dead letter to the scribes"[34].

No law, that is, as long as "radical empiricity", "economy of undecidability", "general fetishism" are not the names of such a law 'schematizing' the "abyss". Indeed, this construal relies on the 'alegality' of the letter based on its occupation of a finitude divorced from infinite justification. In a startling passage which - even again - confirms the 'Romanized' Athens of Glas, Derrida contrasts an abstract legal order with a social order without codified law. Yet this is not, respectively, Jerusalem and Athens but vice versa: the subordination of the Jews beneath the unknowable command of a sovereign is rendered a matter of simple - unlegalized - 'force', whilst the customary, substantial and unformalized freedom of the Greeks is rendered juridical.

"So the Jews are all slaves of an invisible sovereign, no legal and rational mediation, only heads of tribes appearing or disappearing according to the state of forces. The powers are real, not juridical."[35]

Again, the juridical prejudice: Glas cannot conceive of ethical life except as mediated according to abstract

legal categories. However, here it bears with it the significant addition that the radical empiricism grounded upon 'justification' - its impossibility - thereby lends itself to **an extra-legal violence**, gives itself over to following "the state of forces". Refusing to shore up the formal universality of the law, of le propre, of the state, Derrida's (mis)reading nevertheless drives him into an anarchic and opportunistic embrace of a supposedly-'alegal' and empirical 'force'. What appears to occur here is an unconscious adherence to positive law in its inversions - this is the celebration of the "letter" of the law, adopted due to its expropriative 'effect' upon le propre - and a conception of that effect as thereby 'beyond' legality inasmuch as, transcendentalised, it is constructed as the non-identity upon which self-propriety is founded. The inability to acknowledge Hegel's 'ethical life' (its simple elision with the abstract state) means that Glas dwells in civil society as a means of excavating the "remain(s)" construed as the elements suppressed, unrecognised, buried by the formal-legal identity and rectitude of Hegelian regle. The Jew, like Genet, like Antigone, would be the "figure inadmissible in the system"[36] as the substantial individual suppressed and unacknowledged by the abstract universality of prior, positive law. The "remain(s)" personify that "abyss" that represents the non-coincidence of custom and law, "divine all-powerfulness and the empiric unleashing of forces":

the former is identified not with an unrepresentable (in Hegel's terms) ethical whole but with a formal, legally-defined universal and is thereby collapsed into what Hegel means by the latter - the imposition of an abstract law upon the whole of life. Equally, with custom and law conceived not as agonistic but as fixed either side of their difference - "the abyss" - the 'empiric' letter is reduced to the effect of a positive law which cannot recognise itself. 'Radical empiricism' or 'general fetishism' fix the unstable difference such that it comes to ground their enactment of an ironic Setzung - fetishism's Ersetzung - and the consciousness of inversion in legislation, judgement, Ur-teilung, division, decision, cutting, is enrolled in a logic of 'castration' and 'undecidability'.

Glas draws the Hegel of a legislating Roman aigle into line with the impossibility of the subsumption - all conceived within the terms of ascent and 'spiritualisation' - of the Jews beneath its "concept". In addition, for Glas this Judaic departure from legality alludes - by attendance to the associations of a certain Hegelian simile - to the coupure of castration. Once again, the Jews refuse incorporation into the eschatology of Sa and their refusal is the sign of castration and its effects. Derrida quotes Hegel's citation of the aquiline metaphor from Deuteronomy wherein Moses

"compares (vergleicht) the way in which his God had led the Jews, through his instrumentality, with the behaviour of the eagle (des Adlers) which wishes to train its young to fly - it continually flutters its wings over the nest, takes the young on its wings and bears them forth thereon"[37].

Hegel extends this metaphor which - for Glas - brings with it not only the meaning that "the logic of the concept is the eagle's, the remain(s) the stone's"[38] but also echoes the economy of castration and fetishism. Hegel writes,

"the Israelites did not complete this beautiful image (Bild); their young never became eagles. In relation to their God they rather afford the image of an eagle which by mistake warmed stones, showed them how to fly and took them on its wings into the clouds, but whose weight can never become flight [vol], whose borrowed warmth never burst [eclate] (aufschlug) into the flame of life."[39]

The 'stoniness' of the Jew is the static and unliving character of a people strangers to the vitality of Spirit; it is the expression of the ethical exclusivity of the Jews, once again the registration of their being cut off, their cutting themselves off. The effect of this coupure is in line with the Greek analogue that Hegel introduces: like the Jews "the Gorgon's head transformed everything into stone" [40]. Where Hegel gives an account of the removal of the Jews from their neighbours and their attitude of hostility to all that was not their own - "outside the infinite unity in which nothing but they, the favourites, can share, everything is matter (the Gorgon's head turned everything to stone)"[41] - Derrida exhumes the mark of 'castration' by attendance to the associations

of the Gorgon. In a supplementary column alongside this account in Glas, Freud's discussion of the Medusa's head - conceived as both an expression of the castration anxiety and an Ersatz-phallus mitigating the horror - serves to situate the Jews within the economy of general fetishism and undecidability. In addition, the Freudian verdict reconstructs the unspiritual, 'materializing', Gorgon-effect Jew as a threat of castration. Circumcision - in Derrida's view - Hegel glides over, yet 'The Spirit of Christianity' regards it as continuous with Jewish exclusivity: "[Abraham] steadily persisted in cutting himself off from others, and he made this conspicuous by a physical peculiarity imposed upon himself and his posterity"[42]. For Derrida this convergence of ethical exclusivity/hostility and genital mutilation introduces the strategem of castration-anxiety and renders the Jews explicitly and generally fetishistic: they play out and 'magnify' the "ruse" of castration. Their exclusivity is a self-maintenance in separation from or subjection to a transcendent master and this subjection or cutting-off grants, in turn, the power of subjection. The lesson is Freud's: "[w]hat arouses horror in oneself will produce the same effect upon the enemy against whom one is seeking to defend oneself"[43] and thus,

"the Jew effects (on) himself a simulacrum of castration in order to mark his own-ness, his proper-ness, his property, his name: to found the law he will suffer in order to impose it on others and to constitute himself as the favourite slave of the infinite power. By first incising [entamant] his glans, he defends himself in

advance against the infinite threat, castrates in his turn the enemy, elaborates a kind of apotropaic without measure. He exhibits his castration as an erection that defies the other"[44].

Tracing the role of the Gorgon to Freud's account of 'Das Medusenhaupt' enables Derrida to characterize the Jew as a threat to systematic integrity. Nevertheless, whilst the "ruse, simulacrum and violence"[45] that stave off the threat of castration are assigned to the Jews, this is for Glas the very method of the Aufhebung; "renouncing life and mastery in order to secure them"[46], cutting and dividing in advance in order to maintain the whole. The Jew would fall short of the latter's success for he can secure mastery "only in petrifying the other, only in becoming stone himself. Playing so not too badly, he has become Medusa to himself"[47]. The Jew would maintain a general fetishism against the strict fetishism of the Aufhebung. Whereas the former is always impelled by the unrecuperable loss, an event which nevertheless has never taken place - the 'absent' God was never present - the latter is the identification of the infinite in the finite, granted by virtue of an incarnate absolute; a 'good' loving, uncastrating, unfeared and present Father.

Thus, against the logic of the eagle - spiritualising ascent - is the logic of the stone - petrifying and fetishistic. The latter will discohere the dialectical-oppositional situating of the two terms for instead of the

decidability of true/non-true, the stoniness of the Jew testifies to a perpetual 'hole' - the transcendent, jealous God - which impels a perpetual substitutionality and representation without the possibility of absolute immanence. The petrifying-effect is the effect of that 'original' coupure of God from his people, his people from their world, their language from its truth. The Derridean reconstruction of the Jews within Hegel's thought pursues the metaphor of the stone through its associations with Medusa - thus is the Jew a threat to the system - up to the 'impossibility' of its elevation, whereby the "abyssal", alienating character of the Jews renders impossible their conscription into the march of history and politics understood as the construction of right, of le propre. Derrida quotes Hegel's view that "all the subsequent circumstances of the Jewish people, up to the mean, abject, wretched circumstances in which they still are today" are the consequences of "their original fate" - "an infinite power which they set over against themselves and could never conquer" - thus, "they have been maltreated and will continually be maltreated until they reconcile it by the spirit of beauty and so relieve (aufheben) it by reconciliation"[48]. Yet, doing so the Jews would become Christians; that they have not (and that the fate of Christianity is, in a certain way, Jewish) is the "remain(s)" of the Jews. It is their expropriative, petrifying effect and, as such, the Jew is for Glas

"what does not let itself be raised - relieved perhaps but denied from then on as Jew - to the height of the Begriff. He holds back, pulls the Aufhebung toward earth. The case of the Jew does not refer to a past event. He is even what as such **resists history**, remains **paradigmatic**".[49]

The eagle is the concept of le propre, undertaking the ascent to an absolute ethical life grasped as the Kojevean-Napoleonic state. Sittlichkeit is interpreted as the polis refracted through the prism of Roman property law and a bourgeois-revolutionary republicanism. The stone is the refusal of this elevation and the gravitational downfall of the eschatology of proprietorial, 'personal', Spirit. That this construal of Hegel relies on a presupposition of private property law with "ethical Spirit" as its justification need not be repeated. However, the 'stone' occurs elsewhere in Hegel's discussion of Greece and, indeed, Derrida attends to it in his transcription of Antigone. This stone concurs with Derrida's yet it demonstrates not the frustration of a dominating and abstract universality, but rather the refusal of ethical action in and through which the very duplicity of 'the law' might be acknowledged. In the context of the Phenomenology's discussion of Antigone, Hegel describes how the individual, acting in accordance with her law, is split; no longer at rest in a "simple certainty of immediate truth"[50] but now divided between self-affirmation and the external world, the consequences of the deed. Moreover, this 'external world' now reveals

to the one who acted her guilt: the law obeyed nonetheless infringed the right of the other law - the rectitude of the divine law is the errance of the human law. No prior, codified principle or command, this hitherto-obscure or unacknowledged law is therefore recognised not as imposed upon the individual (and thereby perpetually violent and antinomial) but arising in the individual's own deed. Furthermore, this recognition of the other law, the feeling of guilt and estrangement from substantial ethical life, comes as a re-cognition of the social whole and that which the obeyed-law suppressed. In the context of this equivocating fate, wherein ethical action is also guilty and where the aspect of 'life' that the law damages gains its right - is neither buried under a formal universality nor 'contained' in a persistent violence of domination and inversion - Hegel is not proposing a teleology of appropriative subjectivity by way of 'decision'. Instead, the ethical 'decision' results in that which was **other** than its intention coming to light and, rather than the individual recoiling into a 'general undecidability' - the 'application' of its law has failed or produced the contrary result, removed the agent from power and self-propriety - this other law, the life damaged by decision, the legally-unrecognised aspect of the ethical whole, is acknowledged. In these terms, guilt cannot be removed from the 'right action', as the latter renders explicit the equivocation of the ethical. Thus, duplicity and

self-separation are avoided only in the pre-defined self-adherence of the categories of positive law. Here, where one is fixed, defined in opposition to the inessential 'thing' devoid of right, the 'opposition' - the "abyss", the difference - is undeterminable for it is obscured by the formal identity proclaimed in the subject and rendered abstractly 'perpetual' in the structural impossibility of reconciliation or re-cognition of (for example) the 'thing' by the subject. In this sense, then, does Hegel's metaphorical stone reflect a certain conception of ethical life. Hegel writes that "[i]nnocence, therefore, is merely non-action, like the mere being of a stone"[51]: the stone 'materialises' - the Jew's "Medusa'ing power"[52] - inasmuch as it freezes, catches "as in ice and frost, glass and gel"[53], the 'other law', what abstract law suppresses. It accords with positive law insofar as its fixity is that of the imposition of the universal, the perpetuation of opposition in the impossibility of reconciliation - of re-cognizing the 'hidden law', the life infringed - and the persistent sense of arbitrariness and injustice. Glas transfers to this violence and perpetual antagonism the generalised 'alienation' of self-propriety, the title of "hidden law", yet it emerges as the undeterminable **command** of the sublime divinity of the Jews. The hidden law, rather than recognise the relations of positive law, of le propre - as it does in Hegel's account and as Derrida would have it do

in the "remain(s)" conceived as all that is "inadmissable" in court - is, nevertheless, for Glas **dependent upon abstract law**. It is not the recognition of the injustice of the state's right but rather the hypostatization of the discrepancy, and its generalization such that all 'justice' is to be expropriated, dissolved in the transcendentalised lack of identity. Derrida alights upon the Jews for the unknowable command of God most closely approaches the nearest that deconstruction can come to an 'ethical life'. The Jewish coupure that institutes obedience to a sublime, separated, God as well as founding Jewish self-identity, thwarts logocentric propriety for the divine guarantee of self-identity is - on account of that 'cutting off' of God - nevertheless, the expropriation of self-propriety. The ethicality of the Jews for Glas lies in the 'undecidability' of an ego that, asserting itself as such, lays itself open to radical heterogeneity and an 'ethical' alterity. The ethical is contained in this "de-bordering": the ethical is the difference, the abyss, the tabernacle where le propre - positing law - is frustrated by the emptiness that is the space of the difference between the undeterminable posited command and its execution and consequences. Appropriative and dominating-legislating subjectivity would be sent into the abyss by an unknowable law. The tabernacle would show this law to be the frozen, spatial difference lying between the absolute and the finite: the experience of a

Roman Hegel entering that space is one wherein self-propriety is expropriated by an 'original' difference that one now recognises as the agonistics of Sitte and Recht, glassified and rendered transcendental and expropriative.

Expropriative, the Jew is the resistance and refusal of Sittlichkeit as the abstract state. He "remain(s)" for that state does not recognise him as he is, the Jew is inadmissible for he is incapable of spiritualisation. Strung between a transcendent God and a Godless world, an absolute 'nothing' and a "dead letter", the Jew can be rescued only by an incarnate absolute and the spiritualised letter - which is to say of the Jew's spiritualisation: "[i]f he became capable of it he would no longer be Jewish. When he will have become capable of it, he will have become Christian"[54]. Consider this construal of Hegel: the Jews refuse the telos of state-building, refuse absolute Spirit as the "reign of law", their 'uncanniness' discoheres the 'homeliness' of the proper, the self-identity of the ethical citizen and it takes effect as an "absolute alienation" of le propre. The contrast of Athens and Judentum takes shape in Derrida's text as the polis is conceived as the conflation of the bourgeois state and "ethical life"; Greece unfolds the metaphysics of le propre according to the formal universality of private property law and upon this is the citizen's 'homeliness' constructed. At the same time, the

Jews are unsubsumable by this law - they are barred as such from its jurisdiction - and yet, outside the Heimliche polis they would be its condition of (im)possibility, trace of the difference upon which logocentric identity is constructed. In this construction, one notices the architectonics of Young Hegelianism. Through the lense of Kojève and a left-Hegelianism whose radical method is devoted to the erection of the revolutionary **state**, Glas reflects the concerns of Bauer as Marx's 'On the Jewish Question' represents and answers them and it projects those concerns onto the facade of Hegel. The state cannot tolerate the Jew, the Jew cannot be granted emancipation except upon his own emancipation from Judaism - the source of his cutting off of himself from the community. Once conforming to a Christian state he can then, with his fellow citizens, be emancipated from religion tout court. Crudely and roughly, this is the deconstructive-Hegel's passage from Judaism to the absolute religion to Sa. The "remain(s)" of the Jew is the latter's unacknowledgement by the state. In its turn, Glas plays a variation on Marx's theme whereby the state, supposedly incapable of absorbing the Jew, would be itself absorbed by the Jew - the formal universality and self-mastery of the citoyen would be displaced by the "remain(s)"; gaol-bird, woman, Jew, are all those excluded from citizenship yet revealing the incompleteness of the universal in Sa. Already it has

been seen that the deconstruction of le propre pursues the suppressed moment of 'alienation' contained in the formal universality of the 'person', the appropriative subject of private property law. Already it has been seen that Derrida underscores what is taken to be the line between the self-propriety of the polis and citizenship and the metaphysics of le propre. The 'trace' of this propriety - metaphysical and legal-political - is, thus, the fractured echo of the Marxian 'presupposition' of civil society by the state: the formal universality of the latter whereby "far from abolishing these **factual** distinctions [of birth, rank, education, occupation, property, etc], the state presupposes them in order to exist, it only experiences itself as **political state** and asserts its **universality** in opposition to these elements"[55]. Marx responds to Bauer's attack on Jewish demands for emancipation - obviated by their religious incapacity for freedom, a free state - with an account of the formality and vacuity of union in the state and of the consignment to civil society of that for which the anti-semite excoriates the Jews. Glas refracts this criticism of Left Hegelianism's state-worship - brought to its apotheosis for the contemporary Hegel-reception in Kojève - and does so in the freezing as the "remain(s)" of the elements of civil society. Nevertheless, associating the abstract state with Sittlichkeit, Derrida is unable to think further than the legality refused - the "reign of law" - and, thus, Glas

pursues the frozen figures representative of civil society to the point where they assume an 'abyssal' status. Glas thus considers that it displaces a 'dialectical' opposition by rendering the figures of civil society radically expropriative. The "remain(s)" are "inadmissible", nothing of Hegelian legality 'should' survive them, for Derrida transmutes the fact of civil society's 'presupposition' by the state to one of transcendental constitution. The condition of possibility of le propre lies in the sphere of isolation, mutual hostility and estrangement: which is to say, that the legal-political Setzung discovers its truth as an Ersetzung - the legal 'person' discovers himself as the substitute-commodity, is recognised solely as its personification. The echo of Marx sounds in Glas as the transcendental alienation of the "remain(s)" configures the 'real' individual presupposed by formal law to be, itself, illusory, yet - with that law unknowable in its generality - this illusoriness must be put down to a general undecidability which is 'exemplified' in castration-anxiety and fetishism whereby the loss is both acknowledged and disavowed - but never determined as the fate of positive private property law.

The Jew, of course, is the figure of this exemplarity: his circumcision is the dwelling in an undecidable space - he cuts himself off to be 'proper', alienates himself to

maintain his integrity. The undecidability of a general fetishism is the simultaneity of (legal) proprietorship and (concrete) alienation. The fetishism is that of the commodity whereby the right of appropriation is secured through self-separation, opposition to an alien and 'inessential' object and - consequently - subjection to it. The exemplarity of the Jews is their personification of the self-exclusiveness of civil society and as one attends to the deconstructive 'Jew' reflected back through Marx's pages, the "remain(s) of a Hegel" are disinterred as the intention of Derrida's text to re-position Hegel's ethical life in civil society - an intention that would be fulfilled in the resituation of Absolute Knowing as religion. Personifying the commodity, then, the Jew is 'expropriative' as the presupposition of the state - in the split of civil society and state, the Jew is bourgeois, the substance of citoyen. For Marx - carrying through Bauer's criticism to the point where 'the Jew' is the bad conscience of the citizen, registration of the latter's abstractness - "the bourgeois, like the Jew, only takes part in the life of the state in a sophistical way, just as the citoyen only remains a Jew or bourgeois in a sophistical way", adding, "but this sophistry is not personal. It is the **sophistry of the political state itself**"[56] Furthermore, this personification of the Jew accords with Derrida's attention to a figure of "errance" in Hegel, it responds to a nationalist aigle armed with

the Aufhebung (whose volkische credentials for Derrida are unimpeachable: "a people that has the Aufhebung in its throat denies itself as a particular people, strangles and depopulates itself, but in order to extend further its imperium and deploy infinitely its range"[57]). The Jews' inability to found ethical life - the fact that their land is on loan, is the sublime master's - is, for Glas, their expropriation of nationality. This is the significance of the tabernacle: there is no Jewish hearth, no self-present oikos. Once again, the polis must be configured as the abstract state and the Jewish "remain(s)" accord with a Hegel-out-of-Bauer. Nevertheless, this chimes with the Derridean embrace of the commodity and civil society as Glas installs the Jew as the **personified commodity**: the expropriative effect of the Jew is the effect of the commodity whose Ersatz (as its bearer) 'the Jew' becomes. The 'errance' of the Jew - his sitelessness, that desert wandering to which Derrida pays such heed - is the personification of the commodity just as is the concrete alienation of 'propriety' that 'errance' also suggests. When Marx writes that "[t]he **chimerical** nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the merchant, of the man of money in general"[58], rather than a hackneyed anti-semitism what is divulged here is the nationality of 'errance' as the **nationality of the commodity** transferred to Judentum (the bitter double meaning Marx plays on - Judaism and commerce), transferred in the personification

of the commodity, the reification of the 'person'. As such does the Jew in Glas cooperate with private property law, as such does the text - in its embrace of the universal alienation of civil society - **cooperate, despite itself, with anti-semitism.** That Glas does not recognise this - and that such a failure is continuous with its generalization and extension of formal property law to **all** conceptual thought as a 'metaphysics of le propre' - is displayed in its conviction that the "remain(s)" would "resist history", that the 'abyssal' structure of civil society (as we have transcribed it) would be the grave of the state as oikos - formal identity in appropriation. In its pursuit of the expropriation of le propre deconstruction shadows the commodity, in its congealing in ice the Ersatzen of self-propriety - presupposed by formal law, substitutes without an 'original' insofar as they are the illusory 'persons' posited by the law - it dwells in but does not comprehend the alienation of le propre. Thus, whereas it would conceive the figures inadmissible to the system to be the ruin of self-propriety, they are, rather, its perpetuation for they are the personification(s) of the commodity. As such, the Jews do not "resist history" - in Marx's words; "Judaism has managed to survive not despite history but through it"[59]. Finally, as Derrida collapses Sa into absolute religion and returns Jesus to Judaism, Hegel 'remains' in civil society for - contrary to the telos of a stately

Sittlichkeit - restrained in religion, Hegel cannot attain to the realised (although dominating and oppressive) union but only to that "phantasm" of union, of autonomy, and he cleaves only to the "representation of presence". Glas rewrites the sundering of ethical life in private property law - its split into formal universality, "the idealism of the state" and 'personality', and the unacknowledged, concrete differences, "the materialism of civil society"[60] and the Ersatzen of personification - as deconstruction's own deed. Conflating Sittlichkeit and abstract law in 'le propre' it then 'displaces' the identitarian Spirit by way of its constitutive difference. Nevertheless, civil society is imposed unacknowledged as the frustration of the abstract state, the violence of the former (evident as one considers the transcendentalisation of alienation and fetishism in commodity exchange) goes unmentioned. Indeed, it is intimated only as the salutary 'impossibility' of parousia and is sanitised by the 'conclusion' of Hegel in religion - by rewriting Absolute Knowing (construed as abstract, "figurelessness"[61]) as Das Lichtwesen, the Light Religion, the form of religion it would most resemble. The perpetual, abyssal, alienation of le propre, the displacement of the self-identical oikos, is achieved by resituating Kojeve-Hegel in "the essence of difference" (civil society) and reconfiguring familial-germinative Spirit as religion - "the spirit of civil society and the expression of the

separation and distance of man from man"[62]. The Jew secures for Glas the deconstruction of a 'stately' Hegel and the 'transcendentalisation' of civil society: religion is prepared as the 'concluding' stage of Spirit and reconciliation and recognition are possible as only phantasmatic, represented, matters of 'feeling'.

Notes

i. 'Spirit' for Glas

- 1 G1, p142a
- 2 ibid, 30a
- 3 cf above p88
- 4 G1, p6a
- 5 Kofman, 'Ca Cloche', p73
- 6 G1, p55a
- 7 ibid, p80a
- 8 ibid, p30a
- 9 ibid, p31a
- 10 ibid, p55a
- 11 ibid, p31a
- 12 ibid.
- 13 cf Derrida, 'La Facteur de la verite' in The Post Card
- 14 G1, p27a
- 15 ibid, p28a
- 16 ibid, p29a
- 17 ibid, p20a
- 18 ibid, p133a
- 19 ibid, p14a
- 20 ibid, p22a
- 21 ibid, p18a
- 22 cf above p75
- 23 cf OG, p50: "Play" is constructed as "the game of the world" on the condition of the absence of a transcendental signifier; what this essay has rewritten as the condition of a general Ersetzung.
- 24 G1, p30a
- 25 ibid
- 26 Hegel 'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate' in Early Theological Writings [Henceforth abbreviated as ETL], p248: cf. also G1, p65a
- 27 ETL, p212
- 28 G1, p64a
- 29 ETL, p251: cf. also G1, p65a
- 30 G1, p66a
- 31 cf Lacan, 'On the possible treatment of psychosis' in Ecrits: A Selection: cf. also Gregory L. Ulmer, 'Sounding the Unconscious' in John Leavey, Glassary (Lincoln & London, Nebraska University Press, 1986)
- 32 G1, p69: cf also ETL, p251 where Hegel's passage reads: "This return may perhaps in this respect be compared with the thought which in the written word becomes a thing and which recaptures its subjectivity out of an object, out of something lifeless, when we read. The simile would be more striking if the written word were read away, if by being understood it vanished as a thing, just as in the enjoyment of the bread and wine not only is a feeling for these mystical objects aroused, not only is the spirit made alive, but the objects vanish as objects."
- 33 G1, p71a
- 34 ibid.

- 35 cf ibid, p91a - Derrida's remark concerning Genet: "he wanted to make a success out of failure".
36 ibid, p71a
37 ibid, p72a
38 OG, p47
39 PhS, para 752
40 Gl, p70a
41 ibid, p72a
42 ibid, p91a
43 ibid.
44 ibid.
45 ibid.
46 PhS, para 787: cf. also Gl, p94a
47 Gl, p94a
48 ibid, p218a
49 ibid.
50 ibid, p219a
51 ibid.
52 ibid.
53 ibid, p220a
54 ibid.
55 PhS, para 801
56 Gl, p221a
57 ibid.
58 ibid.
59 Gl, p223a
60 ibid.
61 ibid.
62 ibid.
63 ibid, p224a
64 ibid.
65 ibid, 82b

ii. Geist or Gesetz

- 1 OG, p26
2 PhS, para 225
3 ibid.
4 cf Rodolphe Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cambridge, Mass & London: Harvard University Press, 1986), p127
5 PhS, para 470
6 ETL, p231
7 cf 'Differance' in M, p3: "differance is literally neither a word nor a concept".
8 ETL, p231
9 ibid, p230
10 ibid, p252
11 Gl, p159a
12 ibid, p161a
13 ibid, p213a: cf. also Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, para 564
14 ETL, p265
15 cf above, note 11
16 ETL, p246

- 17 *ibid*, p247
18 cf above p128
19 G1, p166a
20 Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, para 518
21 ETL, p288
22 G1, p65a
23 ETL, p252
24 Simon Critchley in his lucid 'Commentary upon Derrida's reading of Hegel in Glas', Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain (No.18 Autumn/Winter 1988), p31 n5, glosses Derrida's construal of matter as "outside of itself and outside the horizon of essence and the thinking of Being", asking "whether a deconstructive reading could be understood as a materialist reading". This is to take Hegel as positing the opposition of matter and Spirit - nature and freedom - and to collude in the fixing of this opposition.
25 G1, p221a
26 *ibid*, p251a
27 cf Gasche, p186 where the "infrastructural chain" is impelled by "the universality, or rather the generality, of something I shall call a radical empiricity". The 'thing' cannot be entirely captured/justified, 'as such' it evades thought as self-presence, and thus - the deconstructive supplement, the Ersetzung.
28 ETL, p253
29 *ibid*, pp259-260
30 *ibid*, p285
31 G1, p207b
32 *ibid*, pp36-37b
33 cf Genet's posthumously-published work, Prisoner of Love tr. Barbara Bray (London: Pan Books, 1989) where the Palestinian fedayeen are lauded in such terms. cf also Simon Crichtley, 'Writing the Revolution: The Politics of Truth in Genet's Prisoner of Love' in Radical Philosophy 56, Autumn 1990, where this 'statelessness' of the Palestinian revolution is conceived as rendering its 'truth' unrepresentable and as dissolving writing through the immediacy of that ethical community (the text concludes: "the last page of my book is transparent" *op cit*, p357). For Critchley this is the moralist dissolving the writer. However, one might see in this 'Palestinian Sittlichkeit' the same 'figurelessness' as that of Hegel's Christian community of love. The fedayeen's violent divorce from all prevailing institutions that leaves them with only the immediate feeling of 'revolution' as their bond echoes the Christian community in its second 'fate' - whereby 'love' is set against the corrupt world and thereby in unreconcilable opposition with "life", invoking the subsequent displacement of reconciliation into a 'beyond'. The perpetuation of violent and unthinkable opposition intimates that the moralist dissolves the writer but the ironized moralism of Genet's previous work is still visible. The moralist of the 'figureless'

revolution and the expropriative differance accord as they did when Genet was 'voleur'. There remains a 'Sollen' inasmuch as all cognition is conceived as formal-universal and proprietary whilst, in the sublimity of a yearning - 'religious' or revolutionary - the imposition of the concept is frustrated and 'presentation' (which now means the possibility of re-cognition and determination) is perpetually deferred.

4 ETL, p260

35 *ibid*, p221

36 Marx, Grundrisse, tr. Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p224

37 G1, p221a

38 ETL, p278

39 *ibid*, p288

40 *ibid*, p278

41 G1, p91a

42 PhS, para 451

43 G1, p222a

44 *ibid*, p35a

45 *ibid*, p244a

46 *ibid*, p211a

47 ETL, p217: cf. also G1, p36a

48 ETL, p217

49 *ibid*, p286

50 *ibid*, p284 (my emphasis)

51 G1, 223ap

52 PhS, para 480

53 G1, pla

iii. 'On the Jewish Question'

1 cf Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology (Northwestern: Evanston, 1972), pp199 ff.

Derrida explicitly aligns the Jews with the Unhappy Consciousness in the essay, 'Edmund Jabes and the Question of the Book' in W&D, p68.

2 G1, p91a

3 *ibid*, 34a

4 ETL, p185

5 *ibid*.

6 *ibid*, p182

7 *ibid*, p184

8 G1, pp39a-40a

9 ETL, p205: cf also G1, p40

10 ETL, p229

11 *ibid*.

12 PhS, para 737

13 cf Hyppolite, *op cit*.

14 ETL, p193: cf also G1, p40a

15 G1, p49a

16 *ibid*, p50a

17 *ibid*.

18 *ibid*, p49a

19 *ibid*, p50a. The construal of the Jew as siteless and

without property or essence is maintained in Derrida's essay on Celan, 'Shibboleth'. In this essay there are numerous continuities with the schema of Glas (its convening within the ambit of 'trace' the notions of 'date' as gift or destining and the association of this date with an 'encrypting' that occurs through incision, etc.) but most strikingly, perhaps, the Jew of Glas is evident in the declaration, "[t]his is the course of a meditation on the Jew, son of a Jew, whose name is 'unpronounceable' and who has nothing of his own, nothing that is not borrowed, so that, like a date, what is proper to the Jew is to have no property or essence." cf 'Shibboleth' in Hartman and Budick (eds) Midrash and Literature (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1986), p328. The echo of the unheimliche Jew is heard in the poem's encrypted Shibboleth which "does not concern a determinate secret" but "marks the fact that there is ciphered singularity which is irreducible to any concept[...]." *ibid*, p327.

20 G1, p51a

21 OG, p23

22 G1, p51a

23 cf above, p148

24 Derrida Glas, (Paris: Galilee, 1974), p61a: tr p51a

25 G1, p51a

26 *ibid*, p52a

27 ETL, p198

28 PhS, para 750

29 G1, p52a (my emphasis)

30 *ibid*, p53a

31 *ibid*.

32 *ibid*, p51a

33 *ibid*, p53a

34 *ibid*, p54a

35 *ibid*, p53a

36 *ibid*, p151a

37 ETL, p199: cf also G1, p54a

38 G1, p55a

39 ETL, p199: cf also G1, p55a

40 ETL, p188: cf also G1, p45a

41 ETL, p188

42 *ibid*, p186

43 G1, p46a

44 *ibid*.

45 *ibid*.

46 *ibid*.

47 G1, p47a

48 ETL, p199-200: cf also G1, p55a

49 G1, p55a (my emphasis)

50 PhS, para 468

51 *ibid*

52 G1, p44a

53 *ibid*, p1a

54 *ibid*, p54a

- 55 Marx, 'On the Jewish Question' in Early Writings
[Henceforth abbreviated to OJQ], p219
56 ibid, p220
57 G1, p10a
58 OJQ, p239
59 ibid, p238
60 ibid, p233
61 G1, p237a
62 OJQ, p225

CHAPTER FOUR

'Absolute Knowing' and Sa; the Causality of Fate and the "remain(s)" of Gesetz

i. Transfigured Night: from Absolute Knowing to differance

Glas arrives at no 'conclusion' as such. Rather, it would play with the Phenomenology's 'Absolute Knowing' and simulate the Hegelian 'closure' in returning the end to the beginning - but as the return of impossible self-presence to its condition of (im)possibility. Derrida, in Glas, does not depart from the interpretation that deconstruction has always taken from Hegel and which has always founded itself upon a reception of the last chapter of the Phenomenology as enunciating the eskaton of metaphysical propriety. Glas does not quit the construal of the "horizon of absolute knowledge" established within the terms of the Grammatology as "the effacement of writing in the logos, the retrieval of the trace in parousia, the reappropriation of difference, the accomplishment of [...] the **metaphysics of the proper**"[1]. Thus, the reading of Hegel's "absolute knowing" developed in Glas constructs this route of reappropriation as a circle in which all is "precomprehended"[2] and configures the "remain(s)" of the circuit as the attempt to think that which is not subsumed under - "relevait de"[3] - this absolute presence. This remainder is intimated, for Derrida, in the very 'completion' of absolute knowing as

it renders the question of (its own) time - "annulled"[4] in the full self-coincidence of Spirit - "indecipherable"[5].

Derrida's point is that the Hegelian absolute cannot determine that which it depends on and thereby demonstrates the impossibility of its 'truth' as absolute self-presence. In this incapacity either to conceive of this dependence or to dispense with it, the deconstructed Hegel evinces the impossibility of this closure. Glas attends to the temporal syntax of the Phenomenology's final chapter; the fatal discord of the 'already/not yet' which not only marks the refusal of difference to be quieted but also opens onto a difference that cannot be utilised by dialectical appropriation. A 'difference', moreover, which would situate itself as constitutive of all presentation, signification, all 'absolute knowing' and, in so doing, render impossible any conclusive determination of such a 'site'. This arche-difference, then, insinuated into the syntax of 'Absolute Knowing' through the evidence of its **need of time**, is the differance of 'absolute' knowledge. The effect is marked by Derrida in a breaking open of the spiritual self-coincidence of the Phenomenology's conclusion with the force of a literality that the claims of Hegel's work (as far as deconstruction is concerned) cannot withstand. For Glas the Hegelian parousia can only be 'maintained'

(underscoring the temporal sense, its punctuality and completion in a 'maintenant' and by a 'main-tenant') as re-presented, as phantasmatic, as differing-deferred.

It is in this manner, by way of this 'Vor-stellen' - convened by Glas as "anticipatory representation"[6] in order to preserve that sense of deferral - that Derrida manages the 'return' of Hegel to religion: the Phenomenology's conclusion is displaced onto its penultimate chapter. Nevertheless, taking the course of a displacement of its original telos, this return or restriction will not - of course - retain unchanged the Hegelian determination of the shapes of religion but will, rather, adapt them to the ends of expropriation - that is, 'expropriation' qualified by its generalization as effective differance so that such ends can claim no final, conclusive, position. Alighting upon the **phantasmatic** character of the absolute religion's logos - addressing its sitelessness in the fact of its failure to attain self-presence, its restriction to 'representation' - what Glas manages, therefore, is to revisit the Grammatology's elision of "absolute knowledge" and a Christian-divine "'transcendental' signified"[7] (an elision always presupposed in the subsumption of Hegel beneath the rubric of 'ontotheology') with the consequence of salvaging 'religion' as the resistance to - the "remain(s)" of - the logocentric propre. This is the basis of the claim, made

earlier, that in Glas the deconstructive conception of religion undergoes transformation. Here 'religion' is less recognisable as the Grammatology's negative theology - the closest that it may accord with differance yet from which the latter must be rigorously distinguished; negative theology construed as the dialectical moment of 'lack' that would be the ante-chamber to presence and philosophy [8] - for in the pages of Glas religion pertains to ontotheology less as its synonym than as its differance. The focus on the time of absolute knowing serves to effect the dehiscence of religion from ontotheology. The Hegelian releve of religion is the "triumphal moment of mourning"[9] regulated by the diurnal law: for Derrida it is the bringing-to-light of the unconscious, the passage from the darkness of the tomb to the pure light of parousia and self-transparency. This relief is made impossible by the necessity of time, a time that is constituted by and posterior to differance[10]. Equally, the deathly 'nothing' of this transcendental condition of signification's possibility is respected in the (unrelieved) religious persistence in mourning. There is a maintenance of mourning insofar as death remains without the Aufhebung of philosophy and, thus, the abyssal, unfathomable tomb remains the focus - which is to say that there is nothing to sight. In this unrelieved religion, then, there is no negatively-present infinite being and hence the dislocation of onto-theo-logy is

effected as the return to religion from 'Absolute Knowing' and it is thus that "religion saves by/from itself"[11].

This 'return to religion' is the return to and restatement of the condition of (im)possibility of absolute knowing. This return is the movement from absolute knowing as the completion of self-presence to the constitutive difference which permits its self-positing just as - unthinkable within the terms of that Setzen - this difference removes the security of le propre, leaving it mobile within the "infrastructure"[12] of a conditioning and necessarily-unpresentable 'iterability'; an Ersetzen that has dispensed with the strict-fetishistic opposition of truth and error known to dialectical self-positing. Indeed, the translation of absolute knowing, Savoir Absolu, into Sa is the reconstruction - mimetically, parodically, within the structure of the general fetishism that elides pastiche and Genet's 'postiche'[13] - of 'absolute knowledge' as the constitutive difference. Throughout Glas, Derrida has attended to what he construes as the sheer sublimity of the Hegelian absolute - its aversion to representation or positivity, its very unrepresentability. The deconstructive question to Hegel is always prompted by its construal of Hegelianism as an oscillation between this aversion to positivity and the imposition (through the ruse of relever) of an 'absolute' positivity, full self-presence. This is the reiteration of the Grammatology's

dichotomous "thinker of irreducible difference" and metaphysician of le propre. Recalling the account of the Last Supper as the "love feast", one notes deconstruction's construal of Hegelian-Christian love as paradigmatic in its independence of objectification. This is the adumbration of what, in the last pages of Glas and its account of the Phenomenology's 'Absolute Knowing', can be discovered as the uncanny continuity of absolute knowing with differance: a unity springing from the construal of absolute knowing as "signification fulfilled or voided"[14]. The continuity - the transformation of Savoir Absolu into Sa - resides, therefore, in the figurelessness of the former (the full-self presence of the hearth, the proprietorial 'being-at-home-with-itself' that has removed any threat of alterity harboured in the Vorstellung) as it is dependent upon the figurelessness of the latter (the sublimity of a 'nothing' that is traced in its nomination as a 'constitutive' difference and which is, as such, the ruin of the pretence to figurelessness of the former). Sa is, therefore, oikos and oekesis for its 'absolute knowledge' is that the propriety of the oikos (absolute knowledge 'as such') is found - that is, irrecoverably lost - in the nothing 'harboured' by the oekesis. The 'closing' pages of Glas send absolute knowing to the grave of differance as Derrida finds that Sa - Hegel's absolute - 'is' nothing: the conclusion of Glas enacts the tracing of this sublime power to religion

as the only possibility of its presentation. Moreover, attendance to the first and final shapes of religion and their identity according to the circular logic of Hegel's system, enables this represented-figurelessness (absolute knowing returned to religion) to reaffirm its character as differance as the focus shifts to its 'presence', to the ontological status of this absolute. This is the insertion of Heidegger's account of the 'gift' of Being - 'Es gibt Sein' - into the reading of 'Absolute Knowing'. Heidegger is slipped into the Phenomenology: the absolute would be properly unthinkable whilst its being-positing and positing-being in the text of Hegel would be the receipt of the gift as it is sent from that unthinkable 'Es'. Sa becomes the Ca of this 'It', this 'Es', and ultimately absolute knowing is reengaged in accordance with the History of Being. From this perspective its propriety - 'being-for-self' as formal identity - is admitted as the determination of Being as absolute positing subjectivity.

This passage from absolute knowing to religion as the insertion of the Heideggerian 'gift' into Hegel's system - and its chiming with the pursuit of the "remain(s)" of the absolute - is carried out in Derrida's reading of "das Lichtwesen". This, for the Phenomenology, is religion in its sheer immediacy - the first shape of Natural Religion. Glas, identifying the continuity of signification fulfilled-**and**-voided - the diurnal brilliance of pure

identity with the nocturnal blindness of pure difference - constructs a further twist to the circuitous route of Spirit such that "one might say that Absolute Knowledge (Sa) transforms itself into an It (Ca)"[15]. The "luminous essence" accords with Heidegger's unthinkably-anterior 'gift' of Being. This is the registration of the differance of absolute knowledge achieved through the deployment of Heideggerian 'Ereignis' - the gift of presence as "event of Appropriation"[16]. Expounded as the granting of Being and time in their belonging-together - as prior to Being and so unthinkable as an existent[17] - the 'It' that gives, thereby "withdraws what is most fully its own from boundless unconcealment"[18]. Thus does the Ca takes up a 'siteless' place according to aletheia and in a fashion that echoes the oscillation of a general fetishism. Unveiling does not provide the conclusive grasp of the thing in its 'properness' - the unveiling is equally a veiling for what it depends on in its presence withdraws, 'is' not. The constitutive difference is, then, the 'gift' of Being as presence, that which inaugurates the Hegelian circuit of speculative-profiteering 'propriety' but which is unthinkable within that economy of exchange. The Lichtwesen effects this excess of restricted economy for it would mirror, for Glas, the figurelessness of absolute knowing. Furthermore, the luminous essence elides with the 'Es gibt' as the Phenomenology unfolds it as a "sacrifice

[Opfer] to being-for-self, so that from its substance the individual may take an enduring existence for itself"[19], a pure flame which "must determine itself as being-for-self"[20]. From this, Glas confirms the luminous essence as the giving of Being, and Sa, through this intervention of reconsidered Ereignis, is 'evinced' as differance inasmuch as it is "undecided" - 'unbestimmt'[21] - a figurelessness that absolute knowledge (as the dream of figurelessness in the Aufhebung of representation; the desire of a total reappropriation of alterity) is dependent upon and 'reflects'. Reading the sacrificial, unthinkable figurelessness of the Lichtwesen's "all-burning [brule-tout]"[22] as a "holocaust"[23], Glas conceives of philosophy as the reflection of this original gift and an attempt to reduce it to the 'meaning' of the positing subject and thus the attempt to contain it within the structure of reflection's 'opposition'. "The dialectic of religion, the history of philosophy (etc.), produces itself as the reflection-effect of a coup de don [the gift's blow, stroke, time, etc] as/in holocaust"[24]. As such, the Phenomenology 're-starts' and thus is the 'figurelessness' of Savoir Absolu the representation of Sa/Ca as absolute subject, the pure light of self-propriety.

The movement from absolute knowing to the Lichtwesen is that from parousia to differance. It is the 'encrypting'

of Sa - the unthinkable anteriority, unilluminable obscurity, constitutive difference - into the full self-presence of Savoir Absolu as the ruin of this latter. This is precipitated by a particular reading of absolute knowing as 'figureless' - that is, the 'deconstructability' of absolute knowing lies in the paradox of its identity as "signification fulfilled or voided". Here is the route to the "remain(s)" of a Hegel - the possibility of destroying the speculative circuit by never leaving it - and it resides in the arc described in the passage from one sublimity to another, from brilliance to blindness. The pure light of parousia in this absolute knowing is the conclusive appropriation by the subject of that luminosity and transparency that the last stage of religion ascribed to its loving Father - "everything shines with his light"[25] - and through the fact of this 'shining' can Glas describe the Lichtwesen as "the origin and end of religion"[26]. This is, then, the elucidation of the Kojevian "God-Man". The identity of the 'objectless' religion of pure light and the self-knowledge of absolute knowing and Sittlichkeit as "pure sight"[27] depicts the "aigle" of 'the end of history' that equates to the complete self-knowledge of positing subjectivity - the reappropriation of all alterity by way of the consciousness of the object as 'posited'. As Glas describes the Lichtwesen as "abstract subjectivity, [...] figureless figure"[28], it confirms the Kojevian 'Spirit'

as that of a universalizing, positing, **legal** subject. The 'figurelessness' of absolute knowing and Hegel's aversion to Vorstellung are summoned by Glas as evidence of an eschatology of abstract identification and in the luminous essence, therefore, this telos is considered to be discohered. Whereas the Lichtwesen, for Derrida, mirrors the freedom from alterity in the notion of ethical life (the adherents of the light-religion, as Hegel writes, "do not adore the light under the form of the sun; their adoration is not, in the strict sense, a cult of nature; but the light directly signifies the Good"[28]), this lack of objectification is what necessitates representation, thereafter aligning itself with a dialectic of Ersatz and non-Ersatz. The blazing of the light, however, cannot be thought in its own right. In other words, it cannot be thought 'as such', only as re-presented and, thus, the dialectic of substitute and truth it inaugurates is originated by something that is 'itself' possible only as re-presented, substitutional. As Glas conceives it, the paradigm of absolute knowing - the pure self-illumination of abstract subjectivity untroubled by non-identity - is thereby 'nothing'. Differance is structurally parasitic upon Kojevian 'absolute knowing' as the **vacuity** of its plenitude - which is as much as to reformulate the sentence that delivered absolute knowing to the Lichtwesen and thence to Ca, Sa and the "remain(s)": 'signification fulfilled **as** voided'. The encrypting of Sa in Savoir

Absolu, therefore, is the intimation that the nearer thought would approach its total reappropriation, the more evident would be its dependence upon difference and, thus, at the extremes of 'origin' and 'end' - with the concomitant intensification of the suppression of that non-identity - the more apparent is its incoherence. This is evident in Glas's treatment of the temporal syntax of 'Absolute Knowing' as it clashes with the desire for closure in the "annulment of time" just as it is in the 'origin' of a pure all-burning in the "luminous essence".

ii. 'Signification fulfilled and voided': the vacuity of le propre, the blindness of differance

Yet (to repeat) this construal of Hegel is Kojevian. It reruns the victorious career of the universal concept wherein all non-identity is reappropriated as it is subsumed beneath the anterior law of the legislating subject (le propre). Contrary to Kojève, contrary to Derrida, the 'vacuity' of this plenitude is one that confirms - in adversity - Hegel's **speculative** (begreifenden) identity. It is the vacuity of the concept divided from intuition - suppressing it in the refusal to acknowledge a mutual dependence. It is the failure to carry out the speculative reading of Kant's dictum whereby "concepts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind"[30]. The 'unthinkability' of absolute knowledge is the apotheosis of the concept as it detaches

from intuition in the security of its concluding history: against Kojève, this vacuity is carried through - from absolute knowing to the gift - as 'differance'. It emerges, therefore, as the acknowledgement of the 'intuition' that absolute knowing cannot do without if it is to live up to its name. Yet, persisting in the construal of the latter as formal identity, the subsumptive concept, this 'intuition' is transcendentalised - **fixed** as constitutive of absolute knowing - and thus, divorced from the concept, it resolves to reside in the blindness of sheer intuition. The circuit of 'fulfillment' and 'void' - Savoir Absolu to Sa - is this passage from vacuity to sightlessness.

The 'return to religion' is, therefore, the restriction to intuition. Following what Glas reconstructs as this failure to secure the passage from religion to philosophy (the passage that is the construal of the 'speculative Good Friday' as the subjective appropriation of substance), there is the failure to effect the "triumphal moment of mourning"[31]. The 'shift' from oikos to oekesis is the deconstruction of absolute knowing resulting in a maintenance in mourning; a 'mourning' deprived of the possibility of cognizing its loss lest this take the form of a denial of that loss by way of the "triumphal" concept - the compensation of a transcendental signified. Thus, the Unhappy - unglückliche -

Consciousness and the temptations of a negative theology are avoided and the work of differance - the ringing of the glas and the attendance upon the oscillations of general undecidability - maintains deconstruction within the structure of the comic consciousness. This is the consciousness that echoes in Glas's construal of the irony and abyssal laughter of Antigone - the 'irony', moreover, that Hegel has written of as a vacuity, a formal identity, that would, alone, escape the 'need' of philosophy[32]. Nevertheless, just as the Derridean reconstruction of the 'nocturnal law' and the tomb of Antigone was the sightless night of **intuition** rendered constitutive - that is, the "condition of (im)possibility" - of the suppressive concept (Savoir Absolu as Kojevian identity), so is this return to religion the flight into the 'unknowable' **substance** of positing subjectivity.

The communication of this divorce of substance and subject with the "remain(s)" has been reiterated throughout this essay's treatment of Glas. In the Derridean reading of absolute knowing and our recognition of the echoes of this 'Savoir Absolu' in the Sa of Antigone and the Ca of the gift (as well as in the 'undecidability' of general fetishism, in the Jews as 'cut off' from God and in the collapse of the absolute religion into Judaism) this

splitting of substance from subject as the death of the 'cognizable absolute' has been the occasion of the ringing of the death-knell. This, then, is to rephrase the dehiscence - effected by means of their identical abstractness - of concept and intuition. Nevertheless, rather than invite this movement, the Phenomenology's 'Absolute Knowing' enables one to comprehend it. In anticipation (such is Hegel's 'precomprehension'!) of a return to representation, multiplicity, difference, etc, as the response to a sterile and suppressive 'universal' concept - the adherence to the play of a radical empiricity frustrating abstract law - 'Absolute Knowing' notes that

"[s]ubstance, just by itself, would be the intuition devoid of content, or the intuition of a content which, as determinate, would be only accidental and would lack necessity. Substance would pass for the Absolute only in so far as it was thought or intuited as **absolute unity**; and all content would, as regards its diversity, have to fall outside of it into Reflection; and Reflection does not pertain to Substance, because Substance would not be Subject, would not be grasped as reflecting on itself and reflecting itself into itself, would not be grasped as Spirit. If a content were to be spoken of anyway, it would, on the one hand, only be spoken of in order to cast it into the empty abyss of the Absolute, and on the other, it would be a content picked up in an external fashion from sense-perception. Knowledge would seem to have come by things, by what is different from itself, and by the difference of a variety of things, without comprehending whence they came." [33]

Substance devoid of subject is 'abyssal' whilst subject devoid of substance is thereby uncomprehendingly 'inscribed' into the infrastructure of a general iterability and abandoned to a radical empiricism.

iii. Absolute Knowing and the agon of community: substance is (not) subject

The dehiscence of substance from subject is, then, the refusal of the possibility of the comprehension of substance. Deconstruction seeks to dispossess cognition of the possibility of the determination of difference and the different for it cannot conceive of this except as the cunning, circuitous route towards non-identity's subsumption beneath a universal. Equally, therefore, the closed circularity of its Hegel is the imputing of formal universality to the absolute as it is always considered by Hegel - a result[34]. Constructed diachronically, synchronically and fused in the absolute presence of philosophical 'precomprehension', the Hegelian 'absolute' is, for deconstruction, the registration of the desire for full self-propriety and the intolerance and suppression of difference. Throughout Glas the Hegelian notion of the absolute conceived as a result is registered by Derrida in an attendance upon the Hegelian tense of future perfect: what reason "will have meant (to say)" - the syntagm of 'already/not-yet', addressed throughout as the (Lacanian) **time of desire**[35], the mastery of a contingent futurity by its 'already' having been conceptualised. Just as differance from the outset was conceived with the strategic end of the destruction of this (so construed) 'comprehended temporality' as the end of history - the union and, thereby, the abolition of all diachrony and

synchrony in the course of an inevitably- successful self-reappropriation - so the question of the "remain(s)" in Glas is prompted by (and is the answer 'of') an impossible temporality. As we have seen, the figurelessness of 'time annulled' is transformed within Glas from the impossible atemporality of blinding parousia (which is to say, its emptiness) to the constitutive (a)temporality of vacuous differance (which is to say, its blindness).

Neither blind nor empty, not dissolved into the shadowless noon of pure sight, the 'speculative' Hegel would concur in the construal of a time of desire but would neither exempt the recognition of that time from such 'desire' nor foreclose on the possibility of such recognition by harnessing thought to desire as disseminative duree. Glas constructs its eschatological Hegel upon the Phenomenology's affirmation that Spirit

"appears in Time just so long [so lange] as it has not grasped its pure Notion, ie has not annulled [tilgt] Time. It is the **outer**, intuited pure Self which is **not grasped** by the Self, the merely intuited Notion; when this latter grasps itself it sets aside its Time-form, comprehends this intuiting and is a comprehended and comprehending intuiting. Time, therefore appears as the destiny and necessity of Spirit [das Schicksal und die Notwendigkeit des Geistes] that is not yet complete within itself[...]."[36]

Contrary to Glas and its fixedly-literal reading of the Spirit of Hegel, the paradox of 'Absolute Knowing's temporal syntax - the appearance of time unannulled "as long as" it remains uncomprehended - is not the evidence

of a breakdown in the communication of the 'already' and the 'not-yet' in the Hegelian absolute. It is not the scenario wherein "the already-there of the not-yet, the already-no-more of the yet cannot agree [s'entendre]"[37] - the breakdown that marks out the constitution of the model of 's'entendre parler' in a suppressed non-coincidentalness. Rather, the passage discloses that time, for Hegel, is conceived within the terms of the **causality of fate**. Thus, contrary to Derrida's estimation of a temporality of the production of formal self-identity, the comprehension of time is the annullment of time not as its abolition (which would be the 'figureless' conclusion that serves Derrida so well, enabling him to resort to the 'transcendental' figurelessness of differance) but as the cessation of the representation of time as 'pure form', the Kantian "inner form of sensible intuition"[38].

In the 'annulment' of time, therefore, what is at issue is the intuiting of the itinerary of Spirit as it is reformulated, subverted and inverted through the consequences of its own deeds. This is to say that 'time unannulled' is the totality of this process as it appears to consciousness as occurring 'in' a formal structure and as the gathering therein of the 'whole' - such as the opposition of a positing autonomous, 'moral' subject and the brute, heteronomous nature it confronts and which, in turn, confounds it. For Glas the itinerary of Spirit is a

'process' inasmuch as it is the career of le propre - the history justifying and securing the establishment of the jurisdiction of the legal subject, personality, the concept. Derrida asserts this with his insistent reiteration, throughout the text, of "proces", legal "processus"[39], yet this does not cohere with the 'procedure' of Spirit for, conceived as the causality of fate and its recognition, Spirit permits the comprehension of the injustice of the legal concept in the positing and subsumption of its 'oppositions'. This means that this 'comprehension' itself cannot follow the procedure of subsumption but that - seeking to escape the injustice of the formal-legal 'concept' - its 'concept' must **include** the universal and its oppositions, comprehending them in their mutuality. This is not legal process but the possibility of determining its injustice and cognizing what it suppresses - the 'procedure' first adumbrated in the "fate" of Christianity and presented in the tragedy of Antigone.

Thus, Hegel's 'time' is not the victory of le propre - it is not the (fore)closure of the case of "the subject-in-process"[40] by a presupposition or prior application of a law of identity. Rather, it is the intuition (in 'time' as formal) of the gathering up of the diverse failures of such posited identity. Time is not processus but "das Schicksal und die Notwendigkeit des Geistes": it 'is' as

fate and need or necessity. Hegel's conception of time as the appearance of the destiny - the fate, das Schicksal - of Spirit is, therefore, the preparation not for the dissolution of a non-coincidental that is (as in Glas) the condition of possibility of such an attempt at dissolution, but the preparation for the movement away from a positing subjectivity of le propre and its 'inessential' object. Time as fate as law is the preparation for the comprehension of the 'counter-effect' of that posited 'object' upon the subject that defines it and of the unity of the two in the difference of that recoil - this, then, is the identity of subject and substance. Indeed, just as Jesus' "pleroma of the law" in "love" and "life" was the attempt to evade the fixed antitheses of the Jewish law and their consequent, irresolvable, violence[41] so was 'punishment as fate' invoked as a "lawfulness without law"[42] which, departing from the one-sided positing subject, sought to enable the re-cognition of the life, the ethical totality, offended against and thus the re-cognition of the individual in its need - its necessity [Notwendigkeit] - of that whole. Herein lies the 'desire' associated with Hegelian time: in the dis coherence, in the agony of the 'difference' that is the sundering of subject and substance the desire for the whole compels consciousness (and without any 'systematic' guarantee of success) to re-cognition. This is involvement and circularity, no doubt,

yet not as the secure foresight of a "precomprehension" synonymous with the stasis of 'absolute' self-presence but as its **dissolution** - the melting and motility of the frozen, glacial concept in the agon of thought's experience of its failure and the 'circuitous' route of re-cognition whereby, as Hegel describes in the Preface, "we discover by experience that we meant something other than we meant to mean; and this correction of our meaning compels our knowing to go back to the proposition, and understand it some other way." [43]

If Hegel's 'setting aside of the time-form' is to mean anything - that is, if it is not to be construed as the supersession of intuition, alterity, contingency, etc, in the 'universality' of sheer abstraction, pure theory or "sight" - then it is this re-cognition of subject in/as substance. It is the determination of the partiality and the false-universality of posited law through the comprehension of the 'fatality' of the elements of life misrepresented as 'inessential', 'heteronomous', etc. This is the annulment of time inasmuch as time is the immediate intuited 'collection' of that whole as it develops at odds with itself. It is a 'whole' evident in its totality regardless of its structured antithesis of concept and its oppositions - that is, inclusive of the frustration of posited legality and moral subjectivity at the hands of the oppositions they define as such. Time is the intuition of the causality of fate. Thus, time is

'**comprehensive**' (begreifendes) and recognised as such - recognised as the process or form of (re)formation wherein the misrepresented or denied substance, relegated to the status of 'object', reforms the 'subject' which maltreats it - time is grasped as the procedure of social (mis)recognition, Spirit. If the latter is thereby "absolute knowing; [...] Spirit that knows itself in the shape of Spirit, or a **comprehensive knowing** [begreifendes]" [44] it is as this immediate 'inner form of sensibility' that it can therefore be described as "the Concept [Begriff] that is there [der da ist]"[45]. For Derrida this 'Da' confirms the identitarian precomprehension of the 'time of desire' as Glas aligns it with Freud's account of the game of Fort/Da - it repeats the manipulation and maintenance of a circuitous time as the return and reappropriation of absolute loss[46]. Yet remaining within the Freudian lexicon one can pursue this construal of Hegel and witness the communication between differance and the causality of fate in considering that psychoanalytic mode of temporality which is one of the most important resources of 'differance'. I am referring, of course, to the notion of 'delayed effect', 'retroaction', 'Nachtraglichkeit'. With this borrowing, deconstruction reinforces the unconventional temporality of differance as one of an unthinkable anteriority that breaks with any successive, developmental time of 'presentation' and 'bringing-to-light' - the "vulgar"[47],

linear time whose monotony Hegel interrupts with the dialectical rhythm but whose progress to self-propriety he nevertheless confirms. Derrida writes that "the structure of delay (Nachtraglichkeit) in effect forbids that one make of temporalization (temporization) a simple dialectical complication of the living present as an originary and unceasing synthesis"[48] and, as the time of the unconscious, it is the ruin of all self-presence - the nonmanifest law of the oekesis that 'underlies' and ruins the law of the state. Nachtraglichkeit is therefore the temporality unmasterable by appropriative subjectivity.

Nevertheless, this conception of Freud's offers no necessary resistance to 'time annulled' - and not for the reason that the supposedly abstract-conceptual vacuity of this annulled time would despatch it to the sheer darkness of the former as differance and transcendental tomb. One of Lacan's commentators, Malcolm Bowie, has written how "an entire dimension of Freud's work redramatizes the myth of the Furies: the past is revisited upon the individual in a series of violent incursions, and his future, if he has one, can be envisaged only as a prolongation of these and a continuing helpless desire to lift their curse." [49]

Whilst this emphasises uncomprehending reception and repetition - and for that reason permits Bowie to construe **Lacan** as the supplier to psychoanalysis of a future tense - its enrolment of the Eumenides 'brings to light' (yes) the community of Hegelian 're-cognition' and Nachtraglichkeit. We have already witnessed the contrast

between Macbeth and the Greeks (summoned by Derrida in the prosecution of Hegel on the question of the Jews); the contrast between the former's single-minded obedience to his law that carries him to the conclusion of an uncomprehending destruction and the latter's obedience with its 'circularity' of subsequent return and recognition of that which was damaged in such pursuit[50]. This is to say that the determination of the phenomenon of Nachtraglichkeit evokes the causality of fate: the therapeutic response is the need and necessity of recognition[51]. The speculative reading of the identity of substance and subject, intuition and concept, permits one to refuse the (equally) 'abyssal' choices of formal self-possession or transcendental difference. In the former case it was the 'application' of its universal law, its positing, that 'summoned' like a fate the return of the repressed - a return which is beyond positing, beyond its control and thus without the calculable predictability of linear (or 'punctual-circular') chronology. Yet - looking to the difference that "demands to be thought"; in this case, the agony of the dis coherence that sends the patient to analysis - one might be permitted to ask where, therapeutically, does the transcendentalized Nachtraglichkeit leave the analysand? The comprehension of the causality of fate permits one to underscore the distance that absolute knowledge would be from the phantasy of self-mastery inscribed as le propre. As the

time that is the re-cognition of the recoil of damaged life upon the concept, the causality of fate acknowledges the recoil as delay and incalculable - indeed, as 'irruptive' - yet where it departs from Derrida's conception is that it is a 'difference' not transcendentalised but felt as the incompleteness and fragmentation of that which was hitherto 'proper' and is now determined in its inadequacy. In this manner, then, is Spirit to be considered a result and the identity of subject and substance configured not as the production of an identity guaranteed from the outset but an itinerary of (mis)representation and re-cognition. Absolute knowing therefore is not a sheer figurelessness assimilable to abstract subjectivity but the grasp of "the process in which Spirit **becomes** what it is **in itself**"[52].

The 'causality of fate' invokes the re-cognition of substance in its loss: in the aporia, in the cutting-off of the individual from the ethical whole and the suffering of the latter, is the substantiality of the subject recognised. Equally, in the recognition of the differentiation of this 'immediate' ethical substance as the dehiscence of the individual from the whole the subjectivity of substance comes to cognition. It is re-thought not as a sheer alterity that is irreparably lost, as alien to cognition - the latter understood solely within the terms of a metaphysics of le propre and the

procedural appropriation of non-identity in subsumption beneath a concept. In the sense of pain and the agony of its loss, substance is, rather, **cognised** as lost; a recognition that recoils upon the 'subject' to announce its insufficiency and the very limitations of le propre - its sheer formality and abstractness. This would bear on the absolute subject which supplies the exemplar of 'the proper'. The alienation of legal personality in appropriation, expropriation by way of the exchange of legally-defined 'equivalents', would be the loss impelling the re-cognition of the untruth, the insubstantiality of that self-propriety - it would express the 'identity' of substance and subject in the cognition of the misrepresentation of substance by subject: 'personality' permits no right other than that of possession and acknowledges as substantial no element of life save that, such as labour, which attends to propriety. In the substantial expropriation of propriety registered in the Ersetzung that is the 'effect' of the Setzen of this absolute subject - its transformation into a substitute-thing in the phenomenon of personification/reification - the substance-denied is glimpsed in its recoil upon the subject. The 'identity' of the two comes to light as the misrepresentation of substance as subject is grasped - and grasped through the agony of their difference.

The paradigm of legal personality guides the Hegel of le propre because deconstruction, Kojève's bastard, convenes the Hegelian system as the justification of the bourgeois-revolutionary state and subject and its Begriff as the 'concept' that accords with positive, abstract law. The Hyppolitean heritage informs the transcendental difference of this infinite proprietor by way of the negation - death - that is the condition of possibility of the Setzung, perpetually re-enacted in the Aufhebung. The transfer of oikos to oekesis could be said to take place across the texts of the two great Hegel commentaries of France - the flight of "aigle" from the restricted economy of Kojève to the transcendental tomb derived from Hyppolite. This is the passage from light to dark, from the diurnal law to the nocturnal, from Savoir Absolu (masculine Gesetz, full self-presence, absolute self-transparency) to cryptic Sa ('Antigone's law' of woman and the tomb; the Ca that is the Es both as the unthinkable anteriority of Heidegger's 'gift' and the unrelievable 'unconscious' of Freud; the movement from the brilliant figurelessness of parousia to that of the dark void of differance constitutive of meaning). The central argument of this essay has repeated this resonance of the 'glas' ringing over the tomb in its quotation of the "grave of life"; the transformation of the divorce of substance and subject has been traced in deconstruction's gliding from the 'Unhappy' to the 'Comic' Consciousness. Once again, this is the deconstruction of

Hegel as the sundering of substance from subject - the rendering of the 'difference' borne by the labour of the negative in speculative identity as glacial, frozen. 'Difference' is reified in a transcendental structure that equates to the preservation and perpetuation of the violence of the subject by the unknowable, occluded 'substance' of differance. Derrida's reading of Hegel collects the remains that are unrelievable and engraves its own epitaph when it addresses a Hegel for whom, "everything takes place around a sepulcher"[53]. The "remain(s) of a Hegel" - the slide from concept to (constitutive) intuition, from subject to unrepresentable substance - is the transfer from the figurelessness of Kojevian absolute identity to the transcendentalized negativity of Hyppolite. The shift from oikos to oekesis (the excavation of the former beneath the latter) is the retraversal of a course between the two great Hegel commentaries of France. This is the long day's journey into night that is the passage from parousia to differance (to speak as if the latter were a station en route - rather than the very passage).

Nevertheless, just as the community of all-burning and pure difference joins das Lichtwesen and differance in a way that evinces a Hegel of formal identity - thereby echoing the Hegelian criticism of such formality in the vacuity and blindness of, respectively, concept and

intuition - so does the refusal of a 'speculative' graveside enact the elision between concept (the victory and fulfillment of universal law, abstract identity, complete self-presence) and intuition (the undeterminability of this 'completion', its comprehensibility cast into the abyss). For Derrida, absolute knowing is the triumphal moment of mourning, the reappropriation of alienated self-propriety in resurrection. Differance is the registration of an interminable mourning but one without nostalgia, without any illusion as to the possibility of 'reappropriation'. In this resides its affirmation, its jouissance as well as its resignation: dispensing with a transcendental signified - even as 'negative' - there is no concept but, equally, no closure. Deconstructive 'mourning' would be that celebration of betrayal and treason that is enacted in Genet's Funeral Rites. The transcendentalized difference, the oekesis, forbids spiritualization - the happy conclusion of a self-disinterrment - except as represented, substituted or travestied and then the result (again, one might refer to Genet's work of mourning) is to repeat the confrontation with the cadaver in its singularity, its 'flight', its refusal to be subsumed beneath a universal.

The diurnal law, therefore, revolves into the nocturnal and Derrida neatly plays through the chiming of pure sight

with differance, Savoir Absolu with Sa (or Ca - Antigone and the gift) as the etymology of pyramis supplies him not only with crypts and tombs, forms "guard[ing] the trace of death", but also with "a cake of honey and flour [...] offered as a reward for a sleepless night [nuit blanche] to the one who thus remained awake. It was also a cone-shaped cake given to the dead"[54]. The blinded state of panopticism and pure sight[55] (returning concept to intuition) as the transfer from absolute knowing to the unthinkable alterity of the gift is, thus, the deconstruction of the (con)fusion of night and day in the 'white night' of an insomniac system. There is a gift for Hegel - he is no doubt receiving a reward for his work at the graveside, his "thinking of irreducible difference" - yet the sleeplessness inevitably mirrors (or attempts to reflect) that 'rest' which is the mourner's domesticating name for death. Hegel must oscillate between obscure night or brilliant day and can be configured as the thinker of difference by way of the blindness of both. Yet contrary to the construal of a Hegel for whom night is abolished, the 'night' of absolute knowing - "the night of [Spirit's] self-consciousness"[56] - repeats the speculative comprehension of subject and substance, concept and intuition, and maintains that comprehension as structurally one of mourning. This is to say, the speculative Good Friday can be witnessed neither as the prelude to parousia nor, as in the stalled system of Glas,

as restriction to mourning without end. We return to the mutuality of night and day - of the hidden and manifest 'laws' - and its re-cognition by way of the causality of fate. What is at issue in the difference enunciated in both the "Calvary of absolute Spirit"[57] and the causality of fate is its **agony**: it does not take up an unknowable constitutive site but rather **as** experienced, as the feeling of total loss, it demands cognition - it impels the re-cognition of the whole from the perspective of the dissolution of that which had hitherto passed for it. It is the re-cognition of self that is impelled by the agony of its diremption, whence springs not a simple, restored self-propriety in the brilliance of the resurrection but a comprehension - in its being thrown back upon itself in its 'inessentiality' and incompleteness - of the becoming of Spirit through (and as) the agonistics of its reformulation at the hands of that which it misrepresented, sought to master and define, and to which it must now return and seek to re-cognise. This is to return 'difference' from a transcendental site whose 'unknowability' carries itself through to the logical conclusion whereby (as 'trace', 'differance') it cannot even be conceived as such, to one that refuses assimilation to the fullness and void of abstract identity but which 'is' conceivable only determinately - in the agonistics of 'subject' and 'substance'. A recent commentator, responding to deconstructive a/theology,

succinctly addresses the question of the 'transcendentalized' difference from the perspective of the speculative Good Friday. The speculative difference, Rowan Williams suggests, is not the prelude to conclusive plenitude but a demand of re-cognition. Contrary to the Derridean account of 'Hegel's semiology', the Hegelian negative is not a detour, the 'difference' merely an interlude dividing self-presence, rather

"the negative, as it appears in the cross, is the destruction of human valuation, and so the collapse of communicative practice itself; more than a formal polarity set against affirmations of presence, etc. In a sense, it is just as much a breach in language, an interruption of exchange, as the 'trace' in Taylor's aesthetic; what is different is that it cannot, in Hegel, stand as a timeless space for the holy. Because it is the negation of the human itself, it demands to be **thought** if the project of communication is to continue." [58]

Conclusion: Differance and the agon of the community

Contrary to the deconstructive 'transcendental' difference - the unthinkable 'nothing' which, like the void white spaces, makes signification possible and unending - this is a difference that, offering no assurance (neither of inevitable success nor of inevitable failure [59]) nevertheless, **demands** to be thought. A demand that can be refused, Hegel has noted, only through the self-involvement of irony, for him the refusal of alterity by an abstract subjectivity [60] - the transformation of the Unhappy Consciousness into the Comic consciousness. In the 'figurelessness' of this demand, then, is not the

phantasm of a Sollen - an Hegelian kingdom of ends, borrowed from Creon's polis, elided with the aquiline-imperial states of Rome and Napoleon and somehow already realized by virtue of the 'implicitness' of its Concept. The figurelessness, rather, is that provided by a refusal to posit or legislate: 'Absolute Knowing' is not the systematic full(filled) stop. Rather, it evinces the presentation of the absolute in its negation - the kaleidoscopic re-view wherein "our own act here has been simply to gather together the separate moments"[61]; it presents the 'shining' of the absolute not as final parousiac lighting but in the necessity of the appearance, the Erscheinung, of the whole in its misrecognition and denial. The absolute shines in the 'recoil' of the causality of fate, which is to present 'the absolute' in the tragedy of its fragmentation and not to posit it in its inviolate integrity. Hegel is not grasped if he is construed as the thinker of the Setzung, of Aufhebung translated as 'subsumption' (relever de). The 'figurelessness' of "a Hegel" is not the blinding light of complete self-transparency, or of a flame whose sheer self-consumption would leave remnants of cinders, supplying to a supposedly-complete system the reprimand of an unrecuperable residue. Otherwise than Derrida conceives it, the 'law' of the text is 'figureless' as one which is not representational - one which does not conclude with the fixing of the manifold of intuition

beneath the exemplary figure it expresses. The 'law' of the text is 'figureless' for there is no prescriptive regle 'as such': the difference that is determinate, the flux respected by the speculative proposition, comprehend (include) that single-minded application and pursuit of principle and learn from its reformation at the hands of "the equivocating sisters of Fate"[62]. In 'Absolute Knowing's rehearsal of the non-positated law encountered elsewhere as 'the causality of fate', one is witness to the fact that the resistance of this law to criticism is not equivalent to the abstract self-identity, the self-completeness, of a universal concept - a law to be applied. The resistance of Hegel's 'law' to criticism is that that law seeks not to foreclose on non-identity by the construction of a positive law and - furthermore - it seeks this for the very reason that it grasps the fate of positive law: its perversion by that which it deems, and excludes as, perverted. The resistance of Hegel to criticism, however, is dissolved in the construction of "a Hegel" convened under the eagle-standard. An "aigle" whose wingspan would enfold a Romanized Hellenism, the heroic bourgeois-revolutionary subject of Napoleon and the sinister shadow of Prussia: an aigle, therefore that inscribes into the system a politics to which numerous commentators have previously joined it and which here reflects a Hegel of "the imperium of the Aufhebung"[63].

Hegel, therefore, grants reading a critical purchase once he has been 'regulated' - subjected to the construal of his 'law' as conceptual, universal, posited, one-sided. This is as much as to say that Hegel is reconstructed within the schematics of "the metaphysics of le propre" and that the "remain(s)" of Glas carry out this 'critique'. (One might add, however, that deconstruction would disavow self-description as 'critique' just as it would balk at its rigorous construal as 'transcendental': the very fact of a 'constitutive' **difference** would be enough to divide it from the critical enterprise, the latter still wedded to an ideal of self-presence.)

Previously, this strategy was described as conveying Sittlichkeit to its grave: Derrida's case is predicated on the construal of Hegel's 'ethical life' as the modern state. The 'metaphysics of the proper' take philosophy to market - thinking, on this account, is entwined with the formal legal subject of property - just as the formality of that identity, its concept, takes philosophy into the business of state- and empire-building. However, Glas finds as an element in the very system of Hegel the configuration of an obstacle to this process of construction. Alighting on the Phenomenology's account of the tragedy of Antigone - the confrontation of the divine law of woman and the family with the human law of man and the state - Derrida renders the latter synonymous with le propre (which is to say, with the eskaton of the work and

eskaton of the work and its author) whilst construing Antigone as (thereby) the ruin of the system, inadmissable and indeterminable. As the "irony of the community" Antigone is convened as the differance of a statist Hegel. The discourse of the "remain(s)" seizes on this confrontation in media res (characteristic of Derrida: the oppositions are fixed and 'paradoxical' from the outset), it excavates the law of Antigone - of woman, the unconscious, the obscure, mourning and the dead - and establishes it as the transcendental difference of the textual propriety of community, state, masculinity, the manifest, etc. Antigone is thereby a figure of absolute expropriation intolerable for the system of le propre and the exchange economy of dialectical being-for-self. In a move whose pedigree was recognisably Kojevian, Glas arraigned Antigone against a Hegel enroled as Creon, that is (and contrary to Hegel's reading of the part) as the personification of the abstract state.

Constructed on the presupposition of a Hegel of abstract subjectivity, the "remain(s)" are collected as the elements which are suppressed by the systematic concept. Convened according to differance, this is therefore to configure both the sine qua non of the system as well as that which perpetually defers its self-coincidence and is, as such, its ruin. This is the "remain(s)" of a Hegel: that which departs from the law of le propre, the remains

are discovered as the elements "inadmissable to the system". As 'exemplified' (and refusing subsumption to a positive law - differance "is not a concept" - they thereby would discohere any sense of the 'exemplary') in the deployment of a reconstructed law of Antigone, Glas undertakes an expropriation of Hegelian property. Guided by the 'method' of a general fetishism, this attendance upon the "remain(s)" is the excavation of that which would occupy a site of 'general undecidability'. The propriety, self-presence, the 'concept' of the element (which is to say, its 'necessity'; its interiority to the system) is simultaneously expropriated by a transcendental 'nothing', difference. The loss of self-mastery in the constitutive differance is the slide into a general substitutability: the loss of a transcendental signified engages nomination, etc, as a general Ersetzung without a non-Ersatz, it ruins a self-identical positing. Yet this notion of the alienation of property occurring by means of the law instituting propriety washes a 'general' fetishism onto the shores of commodity fetishism. The differance of the metaphysics of the proper is the embrace of a radical expropriation, an alienation contained in the inscription that guarantees property. In the alienation of the proprietor - his passage from essential subject to substitute-object by way of the law that formally secured his propriety: the result being the reification of the property-bearer and the personification of the commodity -

in this process can be recognised the procedure of differance and 'writing'. Written law is the displacement of the totalitarian concept of le propre: whilst its abstractness and anteriority appear as the guarantee of that self-identity (and thus at one with it), that law nevertheless perpetuates and fixes oppositions and definitions which, in turn, bear on the essential legal subject and thwart its self-definition and desire. Derrida appears to follow Marx insofar as the abstract (written) law of private property is the law of its alienation and, furthermore, the law of the recognition of le propre as an Ersatz - what the law defined as the secondary and inessential thing of property assumes mastery and the (written) law of propriety is a law of universal alienation. It appears to sanction the power of that which the law of appropriation suppressed. As such, the significance of a general fetishism, when read through the prism of the metaphors of economy and state, lies in its elision with commodity fetishism and in the celebration - as expropriative of formal property law - of the object maligned as 'commodity'. The posited 'secondariness' and substitutionality of the commodity can be generalized, moreover, as the proprietor, the person, comes to be recognised as substitutive and secondary - as 'constituted' by 'his' property. Thus, transcendentalised as the difference - the substance, the intuition - of propriety, this universal commodity which is the

substitute of all 'originals' (as the embodiment and realization of their value) will destroy the very possibility of a non-substitute for it is the means, medium, etc. of the further substitution of that qualitative, 'proper' thing, that "non-Ersatz". Beneath the formal universality of private property law is a general substitute - a substitute which not only alienates the proper but renders the rhetoric of 'foundation' void. The alienation of the proper - 'anteriorized' in accordance with transcendental difference - is the presupposition of universality as the condition of (im)possibility of that formal legality: civil society. Antigone - relocated as the catastrophe of the abstract state - is repositioned 'abyssally' in Marx's "sphere of difference".

The "remain(s)" configured in Genet explicitly take up this site (which, as the realm of circulation and substitution, is 'siteless') when Glas quotes his assertion, "I wrote to earn money"[64]. Enrolled as the "irony of the community", Genet thereby describes himself as such in describing the 'general' irony: the universal commodity that, if it is not itself the community, dissolves it. This affirms a participation in the substitutionality of personae and personification which marks out the text of Genet as one that embraces a general fetishism. The Genet column is the alienation of Hegel as

the totemic representation of all that the Hegelian propre would suppress - theft, homosexuality, a fetishism and transvestism that would discohere the fixed oppositions of sexual difference and the masculine law of Creon and the state. It is dependent upon its twin pillar of a statist Hegel and it reflects the reading of 'general fetishism' that sees it dependent upon and perpetuating the antitheses of legal personality.

Finally, with religion Glas siezes upon the refusal of subsumption beneath the universal law of state by the form of consciousness that would be configured as implicitly reducible to that law. Glas attends to religion as Vorstellung, and addresses the question as a matter of deferral - the maintenance in religion of an obstacle to complete ontotheological parousia. Thus, does deconstruction reinscribe the 'difference' of state and civil society. Religion is a remainder for it refuses the absolute self-propriety of the laws of the state - its status as supra-mundane locates it in an unrepresentable 'beyond' of those laws, a 'flight' with which differance finds little difficulty cooperating. Refusing the formal propriety of state, however, is as much the participation of religion in the division of state and civil society as it is the differance of the former as the realization of the Hegelian concept. In conclusion, therefore, the refusal of a metaphysics of the proper takes the course of

'religion' for it displaces Creon's law of the state: adhering to its preservation of Vorstellung, religion would perpetually defer the arrival of absolute position in parousia - the manifest, revealed light of God is never 'present' only re-presented, substitutional; the Ersetzung of an unknowable, 'feminine', divine law. This is the passage of Christianity and its adherence to 'manifestation' into Judaism and the hidden divinity. Yet this passage illuminates the **contemporaneity** of Glas and the "remain(s)" for it is the configuration of the difference of 'human' and 'divine' laws as the difference of state and religion in modernity's (unacknowledged) distinction of concrete difference and formal universality. Glas encrypts 'the Jewish Question' within its pages as the "remain(s)" of the aigle of the system but this Judaic figure emerges as more than the differance of ontotheological self-presence. The emancipated Jew arises as the embodiment of civil society, the achievement of the modern, abstract state and as the personification of capital in the eyes of a hostile 'statism'. In short, religion is conveyed from Christianity - the state-religion, implicitly one with the concept - to Judaism - the embodiment of the difference of state and civil society (the liberation of religion from the suppressive identity of the former and its 'displacement' into the latter - the very sphere of displacement and substitution).

The state is 'constituted' by civil society:
deconstruction absorbs a certain reductive Marxism as its notion of a formal universality 'presupposing' concrete difference lends itself readily to the transcendental difference of Saussurean pedigree. The sheer uncognizability of the "realm of difference" - its complete dehiscence from the concept - is rendered possible as the apotheosis of the state is grasped in a Hegel of the 'end of history'. Pushed to the extreme of its law of light, the state's abstract identity displays a figurelessness that, in its indeterminability, explodes the concept and, in its 'meaninglessness', leads the way to its condition of possibility - equally 'unthinkable' but 'possible' by virtue of its effects; (provisional) identification, signification, positing. Thus is the 'presupposition' unknowable: the 'difference' of state and civil society is located in the latter as the alienation and presupposition of the former, whence the 'presupposition' is rendered transcendental - unknowable 'as such'. Glas, in its criticism of Hegel by way of the "remain(s)", proceeds from a Hegel of positive law - a Hegel whose system is the validation and infinitization of private property law, the conclusive moment of the metaphysics of the proper - and excavates as buried, suppressed, those elements across the text that reflect the identitarian violence of that law of the proper. Glas is the embrace of intuition as 'abyssal' of the concept,

substance as the ruin of subject, and it maintains with great vigilance the uncognizability of this 'intuition' and 'substance' for to permit their being cognized would be to restore the jurisdiction of le propre, return to the positive law of Hegelian statism. This strategy misconstrues ethical life and absolute knowing as the imposition of the suppressive, legislating concept. It then takes the route of rendering the elements 'suppressed' as suffering on account of their sheer inadmissability, their absolute alterity to the law. Deconstruction thereby dispenses with the concept as necessarily 'appropriative' and, thus, can have no way of re-cognizing the presupposition of the concept. This is to say that the residence of differance in/as civil society as the constitutive difference - the condition of (im)possibility - of formal identity as 'le propre', means that the 'difference' of state and civil society cannot be cognized. The fear of identitarian thought drives deconstruction to the point of assimilating all 'legality' to sheer domination whilst taking flight from the behemoth by way of a transcendental difference, the differance which both institutes 'propriety's (violent) desire of identity and renders it forever incomplete - which is to say, perpetual.

The criticism of the metaphysics of the proper is the fixing, perpetuation and occlusion of the fragmented

ethical life of modernity. Setting out from the modern subject of private property, the subject of formal law, deconstruction effects a breach in this identity by way of suppressed difference - the difference that it conceives as constitutive-expropriative and 'radicalizes' as death, the oekesis, the tabernacle, in order to configure the blind spot of the concept of relever. Yet this is never to depart from private property. Whilst Derrida would construe a Hegel of property-law - constructing him within a rhetoric of economy, speculation and exchange - it is the fixing of writing and difference in the position of (formal) propriety's 'anterior' alienation which, mirroring prior, codified - written - property law, sends differance to market. The **difference** of concrete difference (civil society) and formal universality (state) is transcendentalised - it is elided with civil society and identified with the alienating power of the commodity, the (formally unacknowledged) principle of the community. The expropriation of le propre is announced in the 'glas'; the impossibility of appropriating-sublating the other.

Derrida has said that "the non-subjectivable in the experience of mourning is what I tried to describe in Glas"[65] and this, under the impossible relation with alterity that is marked out in mourning, is the fundamental role of Antigone in the text. As this "irony of the community", then, does Glas embrace what it regards

as the law of Antigone. The mourning without nostalgia that the 'glas' would sound is the transformation of the compulsion to cognize the difference - negation and the loss - into the embrace of difference as the perpetual alienation of all conceptuality. It is the **cancellation** of the demand to think the difference - thought, fearful of its own ends, prefers now to be 'conditioned' by difference. For Derrida, to determine the difference is to salute the subsumptive concept, to enforce the law. To translate the difference to a transcendental structure, meanwhile, is to ruin the law. For the discourse of the "remain(s)", to (re)cognize the law can only be to confirm it, whilst to configure that law 'secondary' to its unthinkably anterior condition would be to confound it. This transcendental indeterminability - pursued in Glas as the anterior alienation of a general fetishism and registered in the legal-conceptual 'utopics' of the "remain(s)" of religion, Genet, the Jews, etc - is found to be represented most poignantly in Antigone's mourning. Yet the writing that seeks to preserve and shelter that 'singularity' from the concept - snatch Antigone from the eagle's talons - has failed to recognize the very 'singularity' that is borne by Hegel's account of a non-positived law. Derrida has presupposed the oppositions of a positive law and from the alteration of the antitheses - the ruse of dialectical universalization - 'singularity' has been rescued but at the price of its cognition, its

determinability, its configuration of meaning and existence.

Glas, for all its obsequial manner, yet fails to recognize the 'mourning of Antigone' in its double-nature - as a subjective **and** objective genitive. Antigone's mourning is carried through into the act whose error is acknowledged by virtue of the suffering it brings: an acknowledgement that is possible only for a society substantially free, only for a society in which singularity is not subsumed beneath an anterior, external law. As such, this is an acknowledgement impossible for the fixed antitheses of modern law and its 'absolute' subject and unrecognizable to a thought incapable of thinking otherwise than according to the law of expropriation. Equally, the mourning of Antigone takes place as the mourning of the loss of a freedom that never was. It is the cognition of the impossibility - and yet, necessity - of concrete recognition on account of its structuring by abstract universal law and the existence of private property. Thus, the mourning of the death of singularity is to be found not in its being rendered 'constitutive' - a 'transcendental' difference; the law of the expropriation of law - but in the thought of the absolute that amounts to the agon of an ethical whole 'presentable' only in its self-falsification. The mourning of Antigone is the compulsion to re-think the fragments, it is the demand to

set in flux the fixed oppositions of modern law by way of thought's acknowledgement of its own participation in that conceptuality. To mourn the expulsion of 'singularity' from the world is to depart from the abstract conceptuality of a Kojève, then, yet it is not to abandon cognition as 'domination per se', embracing as constitutive the 'presupposition' of appropriation. The law of Antigone still glimmers in the comprehension of the mutuality of alienation and appropriation, concrete difference and abstract law: to keep faith with Antigone is to persist in the possibility of re-cognition - to refuse the subsumptive concept. Yet, equally, this is to refuse the consignment to the grave of that very refusal; it is to refuse the 'transcendentalizing' of the difference of formal identity. Antigone, in Glas, is interred a second time; now not by way of the tragedy of family and state but through the victory of positive law - the law whose violence she would condition and whose determination she would preclude. As the personification of the constitutive difference of abstract identity, as the figuration of the oscillation of a 'condition of (im)possibility', Antigone would perpetuate the violence of le propre - a violence which would, moreover, persist with a greater frenzy by dint of the structural 'deferral' of its realization. The 'mourning' of Glas, therefore, is the preparation for the dissolution of the violence of abstract subjectivity by the intensification of that

violence through its being structured as uncognizable. The bitter irony of the "remain(s)" is such that the 'law', which for Hegel had offered the perspective of the determination of the violent oppositions of conceptuality without their repositioning, now not only maintains them but forecloses on the possibility of their determination. In the "remain(s)" a spectral Antigone returns not as the shining in negation of an unrepresentable whole, a lawfulness without law, but as the complement of the formal universal state - the violence of civil society rendered undeterminable.

Notes

- 1 OG, p26
- 2 G1, p226a
- 3 *ibid.*
- 4 G1, p228a: also cf. PhS, para 801
- 5 G1, p228a
- 6 *ibid.*, p221a
- 7 OG, p20
- 8 OG, p68
- 9 G1, p221a
- 10 M, p8
- 11 G1, p221a
- 12 cf. Gasche, pp185ff
- 13 cf. G1 pp210-213b where the fetish is explicitly acknowledged by Genet in the account of the "postiche", the "cluster of grapes", worn by Stilitano, "a queer who hates himself": cf. also Genet, The Thief's Journal, p41
- 14 G1, p228a [my emphasis]
- 15 Critchley, p25
- 16 Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper, 1972), p19
- 17 Heidegger, p22: cf. also G1, p242. Glas finds a greater intimacy with 'Ereignis' than hitherto: the emphasis upon the 'proper', issues of belonging and 'ownness' led Derrida in the 'Differance' essay to distinguish differance from Ereignis on account of the latter's persistence within those terms of le propre. Heidegger's account of the withdrawal from unconcealment in the sending of Being - "[e]xpropriation belongs to Appropriation as such"[p22] - is translated by Derrida into a return to adequatio and positing subjectivity and from which differance is distinguished insofar as "it is neither position (appropriation) nor negation (expropriation), but rather other"[M, p26]. Nevertheless, the textual utility of Heidegger's 'event' would now appear to deconstruction in the force of the undeterminable gift which no longer permits construal according to the traditional 'propriety' of metaphysics - positive-appropriative or negative-expropriative.
- 18 Heidegger, p22
- 19 PhS, para 688
- 20 *ibid.*
- 21 cf. Hermann Rapaport, Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press), p136
- 22 G1, p238a
- 23 cf. Critchley, Hegel Bulletin and Rapaport for the significance of this 'holocaust' with particular regard to Heidegger.
- 24 G1, p242a
- 25 *ibid.*, p239a

- 26 *ibid*, p236a
27 *ibid*, p217a
28 *ibid*, p238a
29 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion vol II, edited Peter C. Hodgson, trans. P.C. Hodgson, R.F. Brown, J.M. Stewart with assistance H.S. Harris (Berkeley & London: University of California Press, 1987), p352: cf. G1, p236a
30 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason trans. Norman Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1965), B75. cf also Gillian Rose, Hegel contra Sociology (London: Athlone, 1981), p103
31 cf. above, note 9
32 Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, para 571
33 PhS, para 803
34 cf. *ibid*, para 59
35 cf. G1, p218a: also Lacan, Ecrits A Selection trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), p306
36 Hegel, Phaenomenologie des Geistes, p429; PhS, para 801. cf. also G1, p228a
37 G1, p218a
38 cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 'Transcendental Aesthetic', Section ii, passim
39 G1, pp8a, 34a
40 cf. Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia, 1984): Hegel's subject would be a 'subject in process' not as its subsumption, a priori, under a law but as the response to the demand to cognize its self-inadequation.
41 This reading is validated by Derrida just as that violence is embraced by 'general fetishism' in the "antherrection".
42 The phrase is borrowed from Bernstein, Fate of Art
43 PhS, para 63
44 Hegel, Phaenomenologie des Geistes in Gesamelte Werke Band 9 ed W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1980) p426; PhS, para 798
45 Phaenomenologie, p429; PhS, para 801
46 G1, p219a; cf. also, Freud, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' in On Metapsychology trans. James Strachey (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984)
47 cf. 'Ousia and Gramme' in M.
48 M, p21
49 Malcolm Bowie, Lacan (London: Fontana, 1991), p182
50 cf. above p235
51 cf. Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1978), p236; cf. also for an account of the 'causality of fate' and its relevance to Habermas and post-structuralism, J.M. Bernstein, 'The Causality of Fate: Modernity and Modernism in Habermas', Praxis International vol 8, no 4, Jan 1989.
52 PhS, para 802
53 G1, p91a
54 G1, p240a
55 cf. W&D, p252: This appears to accord with the verdict

in 'From Restricted to General Economy': "The slumber of reason is not, perhaps, reason put to sleep but slumber in the form of reason, the vigilance of the Hegelian logos. Reason keeps watch over a deep slumber in which it has an interest."

56 PhS, para 807

57 *ibid.*

58 Rowan Williams, 'Hegel and the gods of postmodernity' in Berry and Wernick (eds), Shadow of Spirit: Postmodernism and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992), p78

59 Derrida would follow Genet as he "wanted to make a success of failure"; cf. G1, p219b

60 Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, para 571

61 PhS, para 798

62 *ibid.*, para 737

63 G1, p10a

64 *ibid.*, p218b

65 Derrida, ''Eating Well' or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida' in Cadava, Connor, Nancy (eds) Who Comes after the Subject? (London: Routledge, 1991), p107

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