Kant, Heidegger and Spacing

H. Douglas Burnham

Submitted for the Degree of PhD
Department of Philosophy,
University of Warwick,
For my parents, Hugh and Donna,
and my wife Nichola.

In gratitude

for years of patience.
Kant’s metaphysics of space in both the pre-critical and critical periods is explored via his relation to Leibniz, the incongruent counterparts argument, and the distinctive arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Sequentially, Heidegger’s phenomenology of space from the period of Being and Time is explicated in terms of concepts like deseverance, directionality, region and equipmentality. The two analyses are found to overlap on several key points. These include: the priority of the whole over the parts, openness, and exteriority and thus non-discursivity. The points of overlap we call ‘spacing’. Through further analyses, it is discovered that the concepts of spacing are precisely the concepts required by these two philosophers even when they treat of subjects not normally considered essentially spacial. These subjects include the nature of temporal relations, of selfhood and self-constancy, and of the experience and significance of art. The importance of spacing for these subjects is individually discussed, as are possible reasons why the language of space should be required.
Form and Contents

Programmatic Introduction.

Part One: Spacing and Transcendental Form in Kant.

1.1 Relational, Absolute and Transcendental Space.
   1.1.0. Introduction.
   1.1.1. The Handedness of God.
   1.1.2. Incongruence and Intuition.
   1.1.3. Towards the Propriety of Intuition.
   1.1.4. Matter, Form and the Object.
   1.1.5. Encountering Intuition.

1.2 Models and Closure.
   1.2.0. Minding the Gap.
   1.2.1. Second Analogy: Circles Within Circles.
   1.2.2. The Span of Intuition.
   1.2.3. Aspects of Necessity and Objectivity.
   1.2.4. A Priori Elements in the Second Analogy.
   1.2.5. The Space of the Subject.
   1.2.6. The Paradoxes of Schematism.
   1.2.7. The Monogram of the 'I'.
   1.2.8. Models and Closure.

1.3 Spacing at the Limits of Transcendental Thought.
   1.3.0. Introduction.
   1.3.1. The Argument of the Deduction.
   1.3.2. Discussion.
   1.3.3. Form and Consciousness.
   1.3.4. The Form of the Ideal.
   1.3.5. Ideas and Closure.

1.4 Pleasure is Like an Organism: Space and the Aesthetic Judgement.
   1.4.0. Introduction.
   1.4.1. Of Feeling.
   1.4.2. Subsumption and Finality.
   1.4.3. The Form of the Organism.
   1.4.4. Reconstruction of the Aesthetic Judgement.
   1.4.5. The Analogy of Excesses.
   1.4.6. The Intuition of Intuition.
Part Two: Being, Form and Spacing in Heidegger.

2.1 Methodological and Phenomenological Closure in Descartes and Heidegger.
   2.1.0. Introduction.
   2.1.1. Methods and Lists.
   2.1.2. Cogito and Finitude in Descartes.
   2.1.3. Existing as Possible Truth.

2.2 From Space to Spacing in Being and Time.
   2.2.0. Introduction.
   2.2.1. Being in a Fisheye Lens: Dasein’s Spaciality.
   2.2.2. Dasein’s Understanding.
   2.2.3. Temporality and Spacing.
   2.2.4. History and Resoluteness.
   2.2.5. Not-Space.

2.3 The Cite of Situation.
   2.3.0. Introduction.
   2.3.1. Earth and Nothing.
   2.3.2. That-it-is.
   2.3.3. The Form of the Fourfold.
   2.3.4. Mirror-play and the Form of the World.
   2.3.5. World and Art.

2.4 Inconclusions.
   2.4.0.
   2.4.1. Worlds.
   2.4.2. Spacing.

Abbreviations and Bibliography.
Programmatic Introduction

I. The Motivating Question.

At first, there is a mere empirical observation: spacial language is to be found everywhere. In common expressions like ‘your answer is very close’, ‘we have grown apart’, ‘that was a long time ago’, ‘a distant memory’, etc. These do not fall under a single metaphor, certainly, but as a family of metaphors they are perhaps more commonly used, more historically continuous, and more widespread throughout the world’s languages than any other ‘family.’ More pertinent here is the appearance of this family in philosophy. For example, in the roots of words like ‘understand’, ‘conceive’, ‘object’. Broadly, in Kant’s descriptions of his own project: the metaphor of the storm-locked island, of the abyss and the bridge, the dove in a vacuum, etc. And less dramatically, in the constant metaphors of inner, outer, combination and connection which to a certain extent Kant borrowed from the English and German traditions. We find example of this family also in the heights of ontology in Heidegger: ‘time stretches/spans’, ‘Dasein is ahead of itself/outside of itself’ and so forth. But, again less dramatically, Heidegger’s treatment of primordial space uses the language of everyday space (near, far, direction, region, etc.) while the treatment of for example Dasein’s ontological ownness avoids the everyday language of consciousness and personal identity. Why is space preserved in this way?

At the very least, this series of observations (concerning philosophy if not more generally) cries out for an analysis of spacial language which would answer the question: why, to what extent, and with what consequences does space serve as our first resource in the description the transcendental elements of experience? This question motivates the following work.
II. The Motivated Questions.

Such an analysis could be carried out in at least two ways. First, through the lengthy assembly of a historical and semantic map of spacial metaphors in philosophical language, and a subsequent interpretation of the elements of that map such that one could then judge whether a given metaphor was appropriate or inappropriate to its particular philosophical object. This would be the work of decades. Secondly, just the reverse: an inquiry into a metaphysics of space such that any given metaphor in a certain context might be interpreted into some determinate analogical content. The latter would be quicker for the following reason, which may not be at all valid but at least has a long tradition: a philosopher is normally said to have a more solid grasp over his or her thought than over his or her language. Thus, by analyzing what space is (for a certain metaphysics) we ought to be closer to what spacial language means (in that metaphysics).

Kant and Heidegger are the chosen targets. This choice was almost but not quite arbitrary - at least it can be said that both contain elaborate and influential theories about space. In each case a series of four questions is asked. Of course these questions look entirely different when asked in different contexts, and indeed fail to appear relevant or even intelligible in some contexts. 1) What epistemologically is space? That is, where does knowledge or awareness of space come from, and how primary is it in the order of our experiences? 2) What ontologically is space? That is, what kind of thing is space, how does it relate to other things? What do we mean in saying ‘space is x or y’ or ‘x or y is spacial’? 3) What epistemologically does space do? Or rather, in which elemental experiences does space play a role, what is that role, and how essential is it? 4) What ontologically is spacing? In other words, assuming that the spacial language that both Kant and Heidegger use to describe transcendental elements beyond ordinary epistemology has meaning - and thus there is some ‘spacing’ character appropriate to
entities not normally considered spacial - what is that meaning and how does it relate to the space of the first three questions?

Question four is the most important, since these questions are all projected by the motivating question given above. It suggests (for the moment without proof) that the concepts involved in an explication of space itself (the first three questions) might have philosophical value outside the investigation of space itself. That is, these concepts might prove useful in the explication of phenomena which are not spacial in an ordinary sense or at least not essentially so. We know these concepts are used outside their sphere - the question is whether this use has a value beyond an uncritical acceptance of traditional or contemporary language use. Provisionally, my name for this 'value outside' is 'spacing'. Spacing would be that which makes spacial language appropriate to non-spacial ontological and epistemological problems. Thus, properly interpreted, the fourth question is identical with the motivating question.

There are two parts to the thesis, the first about Kant, the second Heidegger. In each part, an attempt is made to answer the first three questions about space in the name of each philosopher. 'In the name of' demands a certain fidelity, which is seconded by the assumption made above of a 'solid' grasp of thought. Of course this fidelity is ultimately only regulative to an interpretation - and vis a vis the history of Kant scholarship especially, our interpretation will at times appear to reach new depths of infidelity. Nevertheless, every effort has been made to think Kantian (or Heideggerian) problems in the first instance through Kantian (or Heideggerian) concepts and conceptual language. To translate too quickly out of that language would be to assume the self-identity, relevance and existence of a philosophical object ('spacing') which we have not even yet found good reason to posit. It is also worth noting that this 'in the name of' solves (though again regulatively) questions about the method of this investigation.
Hopefully, however, these three answers will prove suggestive about possible answers to the fourth question. The posing of this fourth question will take place throughout, but culminate in a kind of test case for concepts of spacing. In both parts, my chosen test case includes (but is not necessarily limited to) the philosophy of art. It should also be noted that, in each case, the so-called 'test-case' takes over a theoretical centre from that which is its supposed to test.
III. The Motivated Sketch.

How then have these questions worked themselves out?

The external unity of the thesis (the manner in which these two parts 'hang together' from the first) thus arises from at least a) the sameness of the questions about space asked of each philosopher; b) the sameness in the target test case (aesthetics). However, there is an internal unity: one of the remarkable outcomes is a coincidence not just of the questions but of the answers, even and especially in the so-called test-cases.

Thus there are elements of Kant's theory of space (and of time - and thus of 'spacing' more generally) which are very clearly taken up by Heidegger and expanded upon in the very heart of his own enterprise. In fact, there are several parallel 'gaps' in Kant and Heidegger. In Kant we find the propriety of the mere form of intuition before (or perhaps rather in some ideal isolation from) the understanding opposed to the measured and synthetic propriety of intuition-concepts (schemata or, viewed from another direction, the principles). The basic characteristics of this opposition will be sketched in terms of concepts like wholeness, representation, exteriority and openness (chapters 1.1 and 1.2), while at the same time we show this opposition's importance for Kant's transcendental thought in its entirety. In Heidegger we will find what we will call 'neighbourhood-space' (the space for and the occupancy of world, which is described in Heidegger's provisional phenomenological analysis of Dasein in terms of such concepts as region, deseverance, sign, etc.) opposed to what can be called mathematical-space (chapter 2.2). Many of the basic characteristics of this opposition will be found to agree with Kant - though always subject to the difficult task of 'translating' between Kant and Heidegger and their very different projects and methods.
But there is another gap as well. In Kant, it lies between the intuition-concepts (through which objects are presented and thought) and the pseudo-noumenal projections of pure reason (through which an 'object' is 'posited' by rational desire). However illusory these latter are, however, they are necessary to drive the understanding forward to law. But in chapter 1.3 and 1.4 we will discover a surprise: certain of the essential observations about the form of intuition become relevant for this third space: for apperception and for the ideal. That is, we will find spacing at the furthest reaches of rational thought. In Heidegger, the three 'spaces' are arranged differently, but the same surprise awaits us. Immediately behind and opposed to neighbourhood-space (and thus only indirectly to mathematical space) and again as its condition of possibility, lies authentic Being-in-the-world (chapters 2.1 and 2.2) which takes it meaning from primordial temporality (chapter 2.2). But just as in Kant, essential observations about neighbourhood-space (and, equally striking, many of the same observations as in Kant) are at work in the description of this temporality. We will thus be able to arrive at a concept of spacing/nothing in the service of temporality as the highest point to which transcendental/ontological thought could be taken.

It should be noted that these discoveries can only occur within the context of an interpretation of these 'highest point's. To not engage with these problems separately (at least initially) from any question of spacing or spaciality, and to engage them with some degree of rigour, would be to either a) violate the value of fidelity, or b) assume prematurely that 'spacing' has a certain universality. Only from out of an interpretation of Kant and Heidegger - and indeed of particular moments in their work - can the problem of spacing properly arise. It is for this reason that the following work walks a difficult and narrow line: between a thematic consideration of that which we have called 'spacing' and a historical interpretation of two philosophical systems. Only the former can give the latter coherence and concision; only the latter can give the former validity.
There is, finally, a third gap. This time between 'ordinary' intuitions of objects, and intuitions lending themselves to either aesthetic or teleological judgement (chapter 1.4). By this point it will no longer be surprising to find that the concepts articulating this gap are the same as those already found in the Transcendental Aesthetic. The equivalent moves in Heidegger involve distinguishing the work of art from the mere thing, and showing the modes and consequences of disclosedness proper to each (chapter 2.3). Again, this distinguishing will recall the description of neighbourhood space from the opening chapters of *Being and Time*, which already echo Kant.

This triply redoubled parallel provides the framework of this thesis. About that framework, enough said for an introduction. Given the goals outlined above, it will be better to let Kant and Heidegger provide their own introductions and to insert a broader running commentary only when it is needed: i.e. at moments of philosophical exhaustion.
Part One.

Spacing and Transcendental Form in Kant
1.1.
Relational, Absolute and Transcendental Space

1.1.0. Introduction.

To come to a clear grasp of anything in Kant - even so (apparently) narrowly circumscribed a subject as space - would require a long journey through the previous history of modern philosophy. For on few topics is Kant more obviously at an intersection of alternate traditions. As a first gesture of economy (and not the last) we will allow Leibniz to be spokesperson for a tour of this intersection. This is fruitful since the Transcendental Aesthetic can be well understood as a series of arguments which extend and complete Kant’s attack on his Leibnizian heritage. But also much of what is interesting in Kant’s transcendental thought is not a break with but a carrying-over of Leibniz’s thought in a greatly modified form. This curious relationship will indeed be one of our early themes.

But what makes the transcendental an issue at all is finiteness (a point that for both Kant and Leibniz was probably theological, but need not be) - or more precisely, in Kant, the impossibility of intellectual intuition. Thus, taking Kant’s career-long discussion of space (as form of intuition) seriously helps restore Kant’s work to its proper historical context. Further, Kant’s engagement with these issues make problematic in interesting ways the kind of simple movement between intuition and concept that many commentators today read into Kant. That Kant distinguished between sensibility and understanding is heralded a great advancement, but it is less easy today to grasp just why Kant felt he had to articulate this general difference in terms of an essential and radical heterogeneity of form. Space helps to answer this question. Kant offers a treatment of several key concepts and a sort of critical illumination to the project of an inquiry into general spacing.
The current chapter investigates Kant's relationship to Leibniz, and several of the classic arguments made by Kant which modify Kant's Leibnizian heritage almost beyond recognition. We will also make a beginning at explaining why space and time were so important to Kant - which is to say, how they function more broadly in Transcendental Philosophy. Subsequent chapters will take this task to sections of Kant's work which go beyond an explicit discussion of intuition. In general, and at the risk of saying too much too soon, as we move further from space and time as ordinarily conceived, and yet find the same concepts at work, we will discover spacing all the more prominently.
1.1.1. The Handedness of God.

Leibniz's fullest account of space and time comes, oddly enough, late in his life in his correspondence with the Newtonian, Samuel Clarke. This was not because Leibniz had altered his views, or even extended them appreciably - but rather had found something so disturbing that an explicit elaboration of his philosophy of space and time became necessary. What was disturbing was not Newtonian physics as such, but - as the correspondence makes clear again and again - the implied theological implications of that physics. What Newton and his followers seemed to imply - at least to Leibniz - what that God used space and time as tools or organs to his purpose; in particular, that God perceived with space. Possibly Leibniz confused this point with Hobbes' materialism but, more naturally, Leibniz certainly considered this an imposition on God's radical transcendence. If space and time were organs of God, Leibniz thought, then they would not depend on him.

The objection is akin to his rejection of Spinoza's monism. Physical objects in space and time depend originally and constantly on God's grace. God is above them (transcendent) and yet with them. How? Through the perfect pre-ordinance of all events which none-the-less requires God for subsistence. Things must depend twice upon God.

Of things, metaphysics gives us two types: souls and bodies. The problem Leibniz inherited was their interaction, a problem which led Descartes to infamously absurd conclusions, and other philosophers to monisms of several varieties. Leibniz adapts his solution more or less from Malebranche but speaks of a pre-established harmony between soul and body, such that we call this harmony 'communication'. Time and space as separation and distinction have no meaning for God. Thus the second dependence of things upon God, their subsistence, is identical with the first; that is, space and time collapse or, rather, are eternalized. Leibniz writes, "God is not present in things by situation but by essence" (PW, 214). Similarly, no question about the location of the soul or the soul's affection in the body, its possible
extension, sources of movement, etc. need be asked. These are all spacial and temporal questions, and there is no need for space and time. Thus, by Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, space and time as such do not exist. ‘Space’ - for Leibniz does not develop his views with respect to time much further than a simple parallel - is, rather, our confused perception of the order and relations (and possible orders and relations) of co-existing things; as Leibniz puts it, space is the sum of all possible places. Which is not to say space is an order, and thus imply that order as such exists; that would be, as Leibniz rightly points out, an absurdity. Rather, space is that wherein or as-which the mind thinks relations.

Since the nature of a monad is universal representation, however, all relations are reducible to the internal properties of monads. By ‘internal’ Leibniz means a determination such that it contributes to an absolutely particular definition or concept of a monad. That we have no such concepts available to us in actuality is not at issue. Every absolutely particular concept of a monad is complete, which is defined as containing all possible information - and the monad, in reduced space and time, is “big with the future”. In particular, the complete concept includes all actual relations (actuality, being universal, includes all potential and past relations as well) to all other monads - what we normally represent as spacial and temporal relations. It is these attributes of substances considered in the plural that we confusedly represent to ourselves as separately existing as space and time. Things in general first open space and time by being plural and by being ordered. But this raises a problem: how are we to speak of quantity? Leibniz answers that relations (which word Leibniz continues to use as a sort of shorthand; we are close here to Berkeley’s ‘visual language’ - Kant too has a problem with relations, but it is exactly the opposite problem: how to think of relations without things related) are more or less simple. Simplicity is nearness; complexity is distance. And because it pleases God for the universe to be infinite in complexity, so space is perceived to be infinite in extent.
Leibniz has a number of arguments specifically against absolute space as conceived by the Newtonians, but of these one assumes an importance for Kant. Leibniz argues that if space were real in itself, then there would be no sufficient reason for God to have created the universe with the order A rather than in A's mirror image ("changing east and west" (PW, 212)), for the two universes are congruent in the mathematical sense in so far as their interior motions and positions are concerned. (By 'interior' I mean relations represented in space between the parts of a single determinate object - not to be confused with 'internal' which is equivalent to 'intelligible' or Kant's 'discursive' in this context. Where the single object is, in this case, the universe itself.) But if space consists only in the confused perception of internal representations - if it is "chimerical" as Leibniz puts it - then this problem disappears, for it is only space as a confusion that makes the mirror rotate its images through four-dimensional space. That is to say, it is space which first raises problems with space, problems which are not to be encountered in the intelligible properties of the object itself. The mathematical name for such objects taken individually is "enantiomorphism", and the commonest example is the human hand. But Leibniz speaks of all creation, not single objects, and within the former indeed no difference between left and right would pertain since all possible lefts and rights are interior. Accordingly, there are relevant differences between left and right hands taken singly (namely, their more 'exterior' relations to other bodies), but the human body as a whole, thought as perfectly symmetrical, could be mirrored and thus repeat Leibniz's paradox.

It is surely no accident that Kant uses a very similar argument to prove the opposite conclusion. The first appearance of Kant's version is in "Concerning the Ultimate Foundation for the Differentiation of Regions in Space" of 1768. Kant argues that there is a difference between the position and the region of an object. The position is determined (opened) by the object's relations to other objects, but the region is the relation of these object-relations as a whole to absolute
space. This distinction is required because there are certain properties of objects that are regional and not merely positional, left- and right-handedness being an example. That an object should be known to be left-handed requires that the regional space of that object be known to be orientable (i.e. its handedness is conserved in all possible spaces) and three-dimensional. Were the space four-dimensional or non-orientable, then the hands would not be enantiomorphs. Kant’s conclusion (in 1768) is that space must therefore exist absolutely and independently. Kant’s more extended aim, of course, is to demolish Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, especially as Wolff attempted to prove its inherence in the principle of non-contradiction. There is no reason why space should exhibit the orientability and three dimensionality it does rather than be, for example, non-orientable. The complexity of the universe is enhanced in neither case, since the Leibnizian internal properties of the objects are the same. God would be confronted with an undecidable dilemma.

Let us conduct a curious thought experiment, suggested in part by Kant’s comments at the end of the 1768 essay: if my hand were the only object in the universe, and if all the universe were precisely my hand, would it be a left hand or a right hand or both? This is precisely Leibniz’s question to Clarke. Clearly, however, the question makes no sense for the problem would never arise, just as we do not ask such a question of the universe as a whole. We cannot say whether the universe is left or right, for this would only be possible if the universe were brought up against some other cosmic torso. However, we can say that it is potentially handed. Why?

On the one hand (I beg forgiveness), the interior relations of left- and right- handed objects are, mathematically speaking, indeed different. They are equivalent only with respect to angles and distances considered on various two-dimensional planes, and not with respect to the full three-dimensionality of the object. This Leibniz
did not consider, and it is the fallacy of his argument. Thus, it is not merely the confusion of our perception that creates handedness. As such, though, this presents no problem to the relational theory of space, as we shall see below, but it at least requires Leibniz to rethink his cherished principle of sufficient reason.2

On the other hand, of course, Kant would argue that the difference in interior relations is only half the story, that the properties of the space within which the object rests (the region) are equally vital. For if the space were such that it permitted a rigid rotation through four dimensions, then no difference between hands would exist. Thus our universal hand-space would decide itself, and according to the properties of the space it itself was, whether handedness were possible. In this sense, the property of handedness is internal to the object because the object itself occupies space. The region need not be larger than the object, for it is not properly a place but a pure intuition.

The fundamental question is whether a relational theory of space can not only give the difference between hands as an interior relational property but also account for the observed properties of ‘space’ without covertly appealing to absolute space. If we take into account Leibniz’s description of space as the set of all possible relations between objects, then indeed his theory will cope. For we must merely stipulate that one particular relation - namely, the relation between two objects of a certain type which permits rigid rotation of one into the other - is impossible, and thus excluded from any possible appearance. Arguments of this type have indeed been made in recent years. Their terminal problem from Leibniz’s - not Kant’s - point of view is that there is no reason (much less a sufficient one) why such an exclusion should be made.

To the extent that a relational theory still has room to manoeuvre, Kant’s argument is inconclusive. But ‘incongruent counterparts’, as he
called them, occupy him not merely in one isolated text of the late 1760s, but for the next twenty years - that is, well into the critical period. The incongruent counterparts argument does not appear in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but apparently not because Kant abandoned it. What is the later form of this argument, and what is its relation to the *Critique*?
1.1.2. Incongruence and Intuition.

As should be obvious by now, much more is at stake in incongruent counterparts than the existence of space. For both Kant and Leibniz, space is linked directly to the broadest contentions of their metaphysical epistemology. Accordingly, from the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 onwards, right up to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science in 1786, the argument is still used but with a shift in emphasis. In particular, Kant uses incongruent counterparts to prove a modified theory of space: that space is a pure, transcendental intuition. How does this argument proceed?

For Leibniz, all properties are ultimately intelligible properties. Above, we said that this meant that all relations (that is, aspects that are perceived as space or time in empirical intuition) are actually reducible to internal properties - exterior no less than interior, but the interior with greater simplicity such that we, finite beings, perceive these as a (composite) body, and in the first instance, our body. To this extent, Kant agrees: we must think that simple related entities are prior to their relations, with the emphasis on 'simple'. Kant, however, will not admit that all relational (sensible) properties are reducible to non-relational (intelligible) properties. This residual non-reducibility is his main argument against the Leibnizian account of sensibility, which otherwise, Kant agrees (and Russell after him), would be inevitable. A property like colour, for instance, as a sensible property can only be perceived as relational (in space and time, specifically as a relation of alteration in my sensory organs), but within the determinate concept of an object it can be completely reduced to something like an inner determination. A colour is ostensive - in the sense that I cannot communicate a new colour without pointing it out - and yet I can certainly recognise it as a new colour on the basis of my concept of colour. What about figure and extension?
Now incongruent counterparts, Kant thinks, are identical so far as the interior relations (conceived of as spacial properties of the object) of their organs are thought. Such objects, in their exterior relations with each other, are determinately incongruent, but not considered (thought) in themselves. But since such objects are indeed incongruent in themselves, as is clear from our inability to map one onto the other, their incongruence is not purely intelligible; rather, it must be intuitive, but none-the-less real. Space cannot be thought. What does this mean, and how is handedness different from the colour, which is also only ostensive? Suppose someone who had never seen or imagined any colour. I show them a green card. From this point, although they almost certainly could not imagine other colours, they none-the-less already have a concept of colour in general. Showing them other colours would be something like showing a mathematician other integers. Handedness is different: if handed objects are possible, both left- and right- handed objects must be possible. Suppose again there to be a person who has never conceived the possibility of a handed object. Not only must I show them such an object to communicate the concept, but in order to get across my meaning I must also show them an oppositely handed object. For the translation from left to right is, according to Kant, not possible as a merely conceptual operation.

Thus the nature of space, qua space that permits incongruent counterparts, contradicts the theory of relations. This would mean at least that Leibniz’s theory of correspondence is wrong. Above we noted that for Leibniz, spacial relations were a confused perception of intelligible relations (themselves ultimately reducible to non-relational properties). This implies a direct correspondence between what Kant will call the phenomenal and the noumenal realms. But if there are certain relations that are not reducible in this manner, then such relations are not related - do not correspond to - any intelligible, noumenal properties. A gap opens up. Where do these peculiar relations come from? We all know Kant’s answer: pure intuition.
Kant's argument, stated in this way, is flawed. First of all, Kant rides on an ambiguity in 'in themselves', which means here both 'interior' and 'internal'. Similarly, Kant makes the distinction between 'interior' and 'exterior' do more work than it is able, since both types of relations, qua spacial relations, are equally reducible to the internal from Leibniz's point of view. Ultimately, though, handedness is potentially an intelligible property because it is simply not true that even the interior relations of incongruent counterparts are the same.

Ignoring this last point for a moment, let us try to purge Kant's argument of its other failings: The handedness of an object A's interior is only ever intuited through its exterior (its relation to another enantiomorphic object, B); if we think or reduce the interiors of A and B to internal properties of those objects, these properties will be equivalent; but if we think the exterior A-B, A and B have non-equivalent properties; we can only resolve this paradox by saying that the intuition of an exterior exhibits properties irreducible to discursive thought, and we call these properties 'spacial'; but, the same argument must apply to every part An or Bn taken individually of A or B; thus, A1 (say, for example, my left index finger) is both equivalent and non-equivalent to B1, or even possibly to some A2; if we allow ourselves to separate off an abstract An (as opposed to a 'real' part like a finger of a hand), then this partitioning can be continued ad infinitum; thus the intuition of the interior as such is emptied out in favour of the exterior. Far from confusing his distinctions, Kant is on the contrary giving the ground of these otherwise quite arbitrary divisions.

However, our separation of intuited the object and determining its handedness is artificial. We can intuit right and lefthness, which is what Kant means in saying that intuition gives counterparts as incongruent 'in themselves'. All intuitions are exterior, and the
interior is possible only through an exterior. When we say 'intuition of an interior' we mean 'intuition gives the exterior as interior'.

Even if we take into account the mathematical ability to describe interiors, Kant's position is not entirely lost. The question is complete reducibility. Yes, a purely geometrical description of incongruent counterparts can be given, but we do not know purely conceptually whether such a description applies to a given object. To return to Kant's earlier terminology: we require the region to determine whether the incongruence indicated by the positioning of the object is binding. And even were we to impose restrictions upon the possible manipulations of objects in a relational theory of space, such a restriction would not itself be reducible to intelligible, non-relational properties. Why? If it were, we would have to know, from the pure concept of an object or indeed of a monad, and thus independently of any sense experience, if the restriction applied. But of course, this is not true, the restriction is only ever given in sensible experience.

Furthermore, as we noted above, while any intuition of an object will determine whether or not it is potentially handed, such an intuition cannot determine whether the hand is left or right, until it is brought into a context; that is, into a further set of relations. The issue here is not possible but actual handedness - and actuality is the province of exterior intuitions.

A further argument is given alongside, and is a natural modification of, the incongruent counterparts argument. The relevant question is why does Kant reject Newton, after having argued for absolute space in 1768? Is he moved by the same theological considerations that brought Leibniz so elegantly to his own position? Quite possibly. In Kant's own peculiar way absolute space asserts an absurdity of God - namely, that finite human understanding might have such knowledge of space as an object. A less theological version of this argument is presented
by Kant in the *Prolegomena*. Absolute space, first of all, would be the spaciality of things-in-themselves; and indeed, if we wished to attribute some kind of independent reality to space, space would itself be a thing-in-itself. These two possibilities yield two different arguments. The two are not distinguished by Kant, for at this time he held, in a manner he was very shortly to question, that what transcendental principles held for space would necessarily hold for its contents as well. To avoid confusion, we separate the two arguments, one directed at the spaciality of things-in-themselves, and the other at absolute space as a thing-in-itself.

1) With respect to what we have called interior properties of an object that can be intelligible, incongruent counterparts are identical (so Kant believed). Their only difference is exterior: the impossibility of substitution. Above, though, we discovered that all intuitions are essentially exterior. But this violates the very notion of a thing-in-itself, which is, for Kant as for Leibniz, to be not merely interior (that is still spacial) but internal and not dependant upon relations at all. A thing-in-itself cannot be spacial. Again, Kant's argument is flawed, but perhaps not completely so, since if by exterior relation we mean relation to the region, to the properties of space as a whole (3-dimensionality, orientability) then indeed interior follows exterior. This reconstruction of a very incomplete argument would be one of Kant's implicit replies to that long tradition of critics who claim that he is making a metaphysical error in asserting that we know at least this of the thing-in-itself, that it is not spacial.

2) Kant writes, "In absolute space the existence and nature of every part would be dependant upon the existence and nature of the whole"; or again, "the part is only possible through the whole (Ganze)" (Pro. 40). What this means is quite simple for our present purposes: we can assert different properties of a portion of matter, and even its non-existence, without saying anything about the rest of existent matter. The same is not true of space: posit any finite region, and one must
posit all space; change the properties of any finite region, and one must change the whole. The whole is logically prior to its parts. But this is incompatible with the first assumption that absolute space would be a thing-in-itself, for a thing-in-itself is an object of the pure understanding, determinable by mere concepts. What does this mean?

For Kant, space and time are singular wholes, which is the same as to say they are intuitions and not concepts, for conceptuality is always the consequent unity of a plurality. Species which fall under a concept are differentiated by the addition of properties, meaning conceptuality is essentially abstractive, a closing down. As it is remarkably clear and concise, let us quote Louis White Beck's definition: concepts "are representations under an analytical (abstractive) unity through which they are discursive ... only as predicates of possible judgements do 'Vorstellungen' [in general] serve as concepts, and only as containing representations under themselves do concepts refer to objects" (Wolff 1968, 4). Regions of a conceptual space, then, would either have qualitatively different properties (which contradicts our thesis about whole preceding the parts, and in any case is empirically unlikely, though perhaps not for contemporary physics at its utmost frontiers) or quantitatively different properties, that is, different locations. But locations in what? Were space conceptual and a priori (that is, noumenal), it would demand some form of transcendental co-ordinate system, which 19th century physics would call the ether (and is again empirically unlikely). Conceptual space is 'God-space', so to speak. In this new argument of Kant's, we are brought straight back to the controversy between Leibniz and Clarke over the nature of God with respect to space.

Kant's argument against the Newtonians comes down to this: for physical science to achieve anything, space must be a possible object of knowledge. Either it is so because grounded upon concepts (absolute space and relational space both) or upon intuitions (a priori or a
posteriori). The former proves impossible to maintain without contradiction, therefore Kant concludes space is pure intuition - it will be in the Critique that Kant’s tackles the empiricist, a posteriori possibility.
1.1.3 Towards the Propriety of Intuition.

But these arguments only apply to a Leibnizian/Kantian thing-in-itself, and they remind one of a sophisticated reworking of Berkeley. If we redefine the thing-in-itself as "the thing so-to-speak 'intuited' as it is when not intuited", do these arguments still work? Kant's response is very simple: if we are going to discuss the properties of a thing that is not intuited, we must discuss with concepts. Concepts determine their objects as interiors. If we are going to talk about some intuition of an unintued thing, then - even if the paradox is not binding enough - Berkeley's argument applies. The difference between intuition and concept is not, for Kant, just a matter of degree, or of the exchange of a few 'subjective' properties, but is radical and absolute.

In 1770 Kant introduces the important thesis that space is not operative in us via a concept, for no concept can express what is distinctive about space. This final point cannot be stressed enough, and Kant indeed did so consistently. Consider the following quotation from the Dissertation:

"Which things in a given space lie towards one quarter and which things incline towards the opposite quarter are things that cannot be described discursively or reduced to intellectual marks by any mental acuteness. Thus between solids which are perfectly similar and equal but not congruent ... there is a diversity which makes it impossible for the boundaries of their extension to coincide, although they could be substituted for one another as far as concerns all the things which may be expressed in marks intelligible to the mind in speech."
In other words, there is at least one property of space and of spacial objects that cannot be thought, expressed, made intelligible. Space is unthinkable.

Now as we have said, no mention of the incongruent counterparts argument is made in the first Critique. There are several explanations for this, the least convincing of which is that Kant was simply confused about his position; the most convincing is that Kant’s passion for elegance in construction led him to eliminate an argument in the Transcendental Aesthetic that could not be repeated in parallel for time. Because time is one-dimensional for Kant, there is no question of any equivalent geometry of time except for its uni-directionality — and in the Analogies Kant makes it clear that he wishes to bring in a categorical basis for that. This may well be the reason why Kant briefly and perhaps tentatively notes for time that it is our representation for something noumenal, but not for space.

But what is ultimately most interesting about the incongruent counterparts argument is that, vis a vis Leibniz, Kant’s argument signifies a breakdown in the representational field. As we said, a gap opens up between finite representation and the noumenal, and no necessary correspondence exists. Indeed, there is no explanation of space, save that it is our sole means of intuiting certain forms and orders. But this gap is immediately duplicated by the pure intuitions themselves: space is always the intuition of a relation between ...; time is always the interval between .... (We will discuss elsewhere Kant’s views on ‘empty space’.) Thus the only perceivable space is an occupied space, and the only perceivable object is an object in space. And yet we still said too much: for without the categories there is no object at all. Thus the relation between ... loses the poles of its betweenness, if we are going to describe intuition in itself. It is a relation without things related. This paradox indicates very precisely the nature of the gap between sensibility and understanding. There is
no explanation of this gap, except insofar as the understanding legislates for one.

Let us perform another thought experiment of the Kantian type: suppose the universe consists of but one simple object. Certainly, Kant would admit such an entity could be a possible object thought; but sensible intuition? Yes, but only because there is never only one sensible object: by definition, outer sensibility is the perception of what is outside us, that is, in a spacial relation to us. Kant’s analysis of space as pure intuition - as standing in for a gulf between phenomena and noumena - is completely equivalent to the erection of a subject/object space within which the possibility of representation is radically interrupted. Radically, indeed, and twice: once as phenomenon, once as sensibility isolated from the understanding. Indeed, as Kant says, not only is intuition a relation between subject and object, but it is nothing but such a relation: the content (space, time and sensation) of intuition is this relation.

Kant would agree that an isolated entity could be the object of a representation by the understanding, but clearly the word ‘object’ functions differently here. The subject/object relation is the ‘at least’ relation for sensible intuition. Again, however, we are saying too much: subject and object are concepts schematised from out of pure logic, and thus do not belong to space and time. Rather, it is only because intuition gives relations that relational categories can come to be applied. And yet, what links the understanding to intuition is their shared representational nature. As representations, though, the synthesis of the understanding is spontaneity, whereas what Kant in the first edition’s Transcendental Deduction calls synopsis (of intuition in appearance) is receptivity. This is Kant’s way of asserting at least that neither faculty has precedence: for the understanding is neither a secondary and distant receptivity as the empiricists thought, nor is sensibility a confused spontaneity as many rationalists held.

It is important to realize both that the spontaneity of the
understanding is a spontaneity out of nowhere - and consequently we might say auto-receptivity - in other words, the categories are indeed numerable, but their derivation is an act of hocus-pocus; and that the receptivity of sensible intuition is a kind of ecstatic-spontaneity, coming as it does from the unknown thing-in-itself. Knowledge is indeed a kind of miracle, a meeting in the moonlight of unmarked paths.

Let us, then, come away from this first discussion not only with certain details of Leibniz's and Kant's respective theories of space, but also with the following five observations: 1) what is proper to space can only be 'expressed' in an intuition; 2) space and time may be merely phenomenal or may not be, but in any case certainly are the very face of a breakdown in representational possibilities: they make possible the pure legislation of the understanding; 3) space and time, although a priori are formal (i.e. as a type of entirely exterior relation between ...) and thus only ever granted as the form of intuitions; 4) space and time, Kant insists, are merely the form that the relation between sensibility and objects takes, and thus the first spacial relation is that of subject and object; 5) the separation of sensibility and the understanding makes of knowledge a wonder or miracle (and thus a worthy problem for philosophical study) that it was not for non-critical philosophers.

We will need to explore further the strange gap between intuition and the understanding, and in particular the questions of spontaneity and receptivity. Let us however leave this first set of conclusions in favour of a more detailed discussion of the arguments in the Transcendental Aesthetic.
1.1.4. Matter, Form, and the Object.

One thing that has been indicated clearly is Kant's continuing adherence to Leibniz's theory of relations - not the thesis that space is nothing but internal representations perceived as interior and exterior relations, but rather that all that ever is perceived in space is relations. We can pick out this adherence even in the first few pages of the Aesthetic. Kant writes,

"In the appearance I call that which corresponds to sensation the 'matter'; but that which makes it such [macht] that the manifold of appearance can become ordered in certain [gewissen] relations [verhältnissen], I call the form of appearance. Since that in which alone the sensations can be ordered and placed in certain [Gewisse] forms cannot itself in its turn be sensation, so indeed is the matter of all appearance given only a posteriori, but the form itself must entirely lie ready a priori in the mind for sensations, and therefore can be isolated from all sensation and examined." (A20=B34).

The key words in this long passage are 'Verhältnis', 'form' and 'gewiss'. The first means relation, and indeed Kant frequently changes indiscriminately between the germanic and latinate forms. The second word is latinate in German, as is its partner, 'matter'. We hardly need discuss the matter/form distinction or its tradition, except to the extent that our third word takes us directly to one heart of that tradition with Aristotle. The third word 'gewiss' means certain or sure; it appears twice, and functions in this context to indicate that the relations and the forms are particular. They are not just any relations or forms, but these, here, now, in the present (even if, in fact, they are neither here nor now in the strict sense); space and time actualize matter.
Surely, though, sensations are not matter in any traditional sense, nor however are they without actualization. What can Kant be meaning? It would seem that, for Kant, the primary/secondary qualities distinction breeds into a trio: the a priori properties of an object in general insofar as these are constitutive in any way (i.e. extension, intension, substance, etc.); the formal properties (shape, duration, position, date, etc.); sensation properties (colour, taste, etc.).

Sensation properties are always linked to formal properties. If I feel a warmth at my hand, it is a warmth that covers a certain number of square centimetre of skin, and has a certain number of seconds duration. Even if I hallucinate, the image is spacial and temporal: the pink elephant has a location in time and its tail is a certain number of degrees of arc from its ears in my vision, etc. Any actualization from out of sensation is also necessarily an actualization from out of space and time. Kant then accepts the empiricist's explanation of sensation-properties and their concepts: namely, we know what yellow is because the reproductive imagination (the empirical laws of association) groups my sensations into empirical concepts considered as sets, not in the first instance by the qualities of these qualities (which colour) but by the mode of spacio-temporal givenness which they accompany (colour as opposed to sound). This is Kant's way of saying that sensation-properties belong to empirical psychology and not transcendental philosophy, and he ignores them without further ado.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant's first argument is that space must be a priori and not empirical knowledge because no such knowledge would be able to form the preliminary insight of experience as outer - a sensation would be indeterminate as to whether inner or outer, unless space made it possible for me to represent myself as in space, and in a spacial world. This is not simply a bland tautology - 'I could not have spacial representations without space' - but rather a statement that space is required first of all if my mental states are to be
possible 'representations of...'. That is to say, the supposed tautology above should be reemphasized: 'I could not have spacial representations without space'. Similarly, space is required for objects to be represented as different and, indeed, in different places - for two sensations to be ascribed to different objects, and for these objects thus to be different, requires a preliminary spacing or gap of difference, which 'spacing' may be either spacial or, as we shall see, temporal. This point is alternately clear and obscure in the literature on Kant: space does not serve to represent differences in objects, but is the first condition of the representation of any difference. Rather: space is not an object, but is the form of intuitions, thus we must say that space is difference. (This is the foundation for Kant's most direct confrontation with the Identity of Indiscernibles.)

Kant continues with the following famous argument: "One can never form a representation that space is not, though one can quite easily think that no objects will be encountered in that space" (A24=B38-9). One cannot have a representation of empty space (as Kemp Smith translates it), for space is always the form to sensation's matter - Kant's language is remarkably careful. Similarly, one cannot represent the matter without form. Space, then, is prior to all sensation - it "lies ready" in the mind; but equally importantly, this passage indicates that space is first and only ever granted along with objects. This thesis is fundamental to the Kantian theory of form, whether, as we shall explore later, that is a form of intuition, consciousness or understanding. The concept of space could never be a form. We may put the same point in this way: space is always irreducibly particular. It is this mode of phrasing (and the conceptual/intuitional difference that it describes) which will generate Kant's problem in the Schematism.

Kant continues by arguing that space is not a discursive concept of relations between objects (although again we only ever perceive space
as a relation between objects). There is only one space - not a space for each object-cluster. (The singularity of the representation is one characteristic property of an intuition, although that singularity is really only a consequence of immediacy while the reverse relation would not be true.) The parts of that space precede the whole, for our intuitions indicate that the parts of space co-exist infinitely. Thus the parts of space are an infinity (as Kant puts it) within and not under, as with the possible representations of a concept. Of course there is a concept of space, but first of all it is derived (the intuition, Kant says, is "original" (ursprünglich)); and second, its pure spaciality is always at odds with its conceptuality.

In speaking of the 'parts of space', of course, we are again treating space as an object. It is very tempting to speak of space like an object. But space cannot be anything like an object, because objects are synthetically constructed, while the form of space is certainly not. Indeed, Kant insists that the forms of intuition are 'nothing' (A291=B347). Thus when Kant says space is not a thing, but is a form of intuitions, he means that outer intuitions are not in space, nor are they parts of space, but are spacial. Rather than space we should say 'spaciality'. Spaciality is the being of outer intuitions. For example, the essential characteristic of space's limitlessness is given in every intuition in the way that intuition must be conceived as a limitation of a prior whole. That is, the understanding recognises that the intuition which would represent the end of space is not possible. Limitlessness (and other 'properties') is then an inference - and yet it has to be seen that, in an important sense, this limitlessness is also just given in the intuition, in the way the intuition is 'open'.

This does not mean, however, that space as the form of intuition also itself presents a pure manifold: rather, the propriety of spaciality (the properties of represented space) are given within each and every always particular outer intuition precisely as the form (or manner of
givenness) of the particular form (or spacial figure of the represented object) of that intuition. The conclusion of Kant’s argument would then read: the spaciality of intuitions is such that we must represent any intuition as a limitation of a prior unlimited whole, which whole can then be called space. We are not making an crucial mistake in talking of space as an object, provided we continually reemphasise those properties of space which are paradoxical when attributed to either an object or a concept, and which thus show that ‘it’ is originally a form of intuition. Indeed, treating space as an object is probably unavoidable.

To return to the above argument, the relevant distinction which Kant tells us to draw is between community as ‘communio’ and community as ‘commercium’. The former belongs to the pure understanding -apperception, the ‘conceptus communis’ and even the ‘sensus communis’ - the latter is linked with the peculiar property of reciprocity associated with co-existence in space, and Kant identifies the ‘commercial’ whole as an “aggregate” [Aggregat] (B112) or, later, a “composite” [Zusammengesetztes or compositum] (B262=A215). ‘Communio’, for Kant, signifies that synthesis precedes analysis in all cases and that all experiences are in one experience. However, Kant argues that once we refer to objects, ‘communio’ is no longer appropriate, but that time determination must translate into reciprocal influence, or ‘commercium’.

Now, to think this thoroughly would require that we discussed the category of community in relation to the disjunctive judgement -something we will postpone for some time. For the moment, let us say that neither ‘communio’ nor ‘commercium’ are quite to be equated with space and time as wholes, but are rather an indications of precisely the difficulty the understanding has with the forms of intuition as forms. For the elements in commerce, although mutually determining, yet stand “outside each other” as existent objects (B261-2=A215), and
thus are not thought from the whole but "constitute" [ausmachen] that whole. The paradox in this definition is revealing.

A look at the Concepts of Reflection at the end of the Analytic will give us a clue. The concepts of reflection are, briefly, pairs of opposed concepts whose opposition consists entirely of whether they are employed in the pure understanding or with respect to appearances. Thus, for example, the inner and the outer (internal and exterior in our terminology, but there are complexities, some of which we have already discussed): concepts have inner determinations, but objects in space have only outer relations as determinations. The concept of an object internalizes these relations, which makes empirical concepts possible, but does not allow us to assume that, in the thing in itself, all determinations are inner. Kant writes:

"... if we begin with mere concepts, we cannot think the relations of things 'in abstracto' in any other manner than by regarding one thing as the cause of determinations in another, for that is how the understanding conceives of relations. But since we are in that case disregarding all intuition, we have ruled ourselves out from any kind of recognition of the special mode in which the different elements of the manifold determine each other's positions, that is, of the form of sensibility (space), which yet is presupposed in all empirical causality" (A 285-6=B341-2).

Kant's point seems clear. Namely, and I quote again, a wholly relational object "cannot be thought through pure categories" (A285=B341). Intuition clearly must be altered if it is to be thought. This alteration is called: the synthesis of the manifold.

We might say that, for Kant, the wholeness of space for intuition must needs be reconstituted as a synthetic unity for thought, as a composite. But the form of this reconstitution is not, now, the
wholeness of space and time, but the original unity of apperception, and there is a difference between wholeness and unity. In space, pure coexistence is reciprocal determination of position of appearance in space - and similarly for pure succession in time. Formal determination of this type is, as Kant states, unthinkable, for it is determination only as outer and not inner - thought must have an inner determination, and therefore determines the manifold universally according to cause and effect relations. Thought converts properties that in intuition were outer into formal properties belonging to the object itself. Commerce is the attempt by thought to think the outer as inner, the intuitive as discursive, wholeness as unity. The fact that the concept of commerce is difficult to grasp and even paradoxical - Kant writes that things in commerce "stand outside one another and yet in connection" (A215=B261-2) - is a sure marker of the violence inherent in this attempt.

Kant's argument continues: there is a given finite region of space only through limitation. We know the infinity of space not because we can intuit the infinite as such, because we cannot - and this latter not for the reason that no synthesis of an infinite manifold could ever take place because we do not intuit space as a manifold of spaces that need to be synthesized. Rather, limitations which define a finite space are always represented as placed upon prior space - that is, space is given as itself limitless.

A brief digression might help us to understand Kant's arguments and how space could both be a form and singular and infinite. A classic question: could there be more than one space? If some dreamworld (the universe of which did not overlap with the wakingworld) were to become so persistent and coherent as to warrant the title 'real', then in one sense there would be two spaces. Obviously, if by reality I mean 'what exists in dreamworld' then all of wakingworld is not real, and the reverse. For the argument to work, my criterion of reality must be 'objects the experience of which I cannot believe is imaginary or
illusory'. The notion of experience is the key: that is, my inside is in some conscious relation to an outside, and the former alone supplies the continuity. But this continuity is compatible with other states of affairs, and thus empties the 'two spaces' of any radical content. For I could just as easily say that dreamworld is in the same space as wakingworld, but is indefinitely far away, or of indefinitely small dimensions - that is, such that I cannot experience the positioning of one in the other. Indeed, certain common expressions have just this meaning: I might say, for example, and be perfectly understood, 'she lives so far away from me that I might as well not exist'.

In the above dreamworld argument, space is functioning as a concept, namely the concept of location. What Kant is actually asserting is that for one intuition there will be one intuited spaciality. The proof of this is directly analogous to that proof (given by those who propose the above argument) that for time there can only be one: any other time will either be experienced before or after the first time, and thus already in the same time. For space, in any one intuition, spacel will either be to the left or the right, in front or behind, above or below space2, but in any case will already be in and from out of the same space. This 'same space' is not a super container space, which must itself either be an actual infinity, or be already in some even greater space; rather, it is just the already-being-in itself. 'Same space' is then a cognitive inference, and ultimately a dialectical illusion. But 'already being in' is not a concept of location, nor itself a thing, but rather the intuitive condition for the possibility of objects (like spacel and space2) being located. The 'from out of' is the limitation which gives actualization as particularisation. The form of space is spaciality which is 'already in and from out of'. Later, we will call examples of this type of form 'open'. No doubt this language would seem very strange to Kant. This is because he always spoke of space as always being either an object or a concept - which, as we pointed out above, is not harmful, so long as
one recognises that these are derived phenomena and does not let them get in the way.

In the interest of clarity, let us add to the list of five observations made above. 6) Space is the condition for the possibility of representations of outer objects, and of the identification of difference in such objects. 7) The manifold of space in intuition must be considered as another aspect of space as a relationship between thing and understanding. Space is encountered cognitively as containing a manifold. 8) Space and time actualise, but are only ever given along with that actualization. More precisely, what is given is spaciality and temporality as the 'already in and from out of' of every particular.
1.1.5. Encountering Intuition.

As we mentioned above, Kant later seems to retract the prior wholeness of intuition in the second edition Deduction (B160n), but in so doing creates other problems that could have been avoided. Virtually alone in the Kantian tradition, Melnick argues that the positions are not incompatible (cf. Melnick, pp 7-14). He gives us a most plausible corrective to Kant's contradiction. Melnick re-marks a distinction, which is normally clear enough in Kant, between the subsequent levels of a priori intuition and empirical experience. My intuition of space is of an unlimited magnitude; but I only ever experience limited, enclosed, demarcated spaces — and this for the precise reason that my experience is only ever categorical. Melnick then makes the revealing observation that empirical perceptions do not "duplicate" pure intuitions, but "conform" to them. Melnick thus points out very clearly the manner in which Kant's own withdrawal of space's given infinitude is untenable on Kant's own terms. The concept of space is always an empirical concept, we might conclude, while the intuition is pure and only occasioned by receptivity. In the footnote at B160 if "represented as object" is read as a restrictive clause, and we pay attention to a series of distinctions (space-space as object, intuition/concept, form of intuition/formed intuition) then the resulting interpretation does not contradict in any way the Transcendental Aesthetic as Kant seems to think it does, but rather alludes to the complexities of taking intuitions up into the understanding.

There is a similarly troubling passage at B136n. Kemp Smith's translation is an excellent attempt at making readable a difficult sentence. What is notable is that the whole latter part of the sentence, including the last phrases, is under the one verb 'angetroffen' which I will translate as 'encountered'. A modification of Kemp Smith is called for such that this is more apparent.
Space and time, with all their parts, are intuitions, therefore are with their manifolds singular representations (see the Transcendental Aesthetic) and thus are not mere concepts. For through concepts one and the same consciousness is encountered as contained in many representations, but in space and time, many representations are encountered as contained in one representation and in the consciousness of that one, and space and time are consequently composite. It follows that the unity of consciousness is encountered as synthetic and yet original.

This translation makes it more clear just how decisively Kant draws the distinction between sensibility and the understanding. The meaning of the last sentence is also more clear: the unity of consciousness is encountered as synthetic because of the way concepts come to consciousness, and yet as original because of the way intuitions do so. Let us explain this. The one in many is a synthetic operation (this being the basic thesis of the Deduction); that is, the many are combined into one and thus the one can be found therein. But the many in one is simply a restatement of the argument in the Aesthetic about the whole of space and time being prior to its parts, which parts are brought out of the whole by subsequent limitation. That is, the one comes originally, before the many. And this accords with section 16 (B132) where what Kant means by 'original' is that apperception generates the (possible) I think before all other representations - that is before the representation becomes a determinate 'I think this' or 'I think that'. Thus apperception is the form of consciousness.

It now becomes apparent why Kant felt the need to write the footnote, given that much of it only repeats the content of the Aesthetic. There is a real problem in calling something both synthetic and original. This is answered by the word 'encountered'. We only become conscious in our synthetic acts, but looking back, so to speak, (on Kant's
analogy, viewing reality as if it were a dream) we recognize that each element in the manifold must have been ours 'from the beginning' or originally, before any empirical synthesis. We might say that there are three ways of considering spacial and temporal intuitions: 1) as synthesized representations of objects; 2) as given manifolds looked back upon; 3) as pure intuitions.

This footnote, however, is not merely a defense against a possible attack, but implicitly contains a positive argument. Kant is saying that only on the basis of the gap in the faculties is any encountering of consciousness as both synthetic and original possible. Space and time as distinctive forms do not, certainly, make apperception possible, but rather make possible an encountering of consciousness as original, insofar as we recognize our intuitive grasp of space and time, and indeed as wholes, as being prior to any determining content which requires a synthesis, and yet as still 'ours'.

Returning once again to the Aesthetic, we find that the arguments with respect to time are similar, but not exactly so. First of all, time is shown to be prior to an empirical knowledge not only of all succession but also of co-existence. Time infringes, as it were, on space's territory because co-existent objects are always successively apprehended, for Kant. Kant continues, "One can not, in the consideration [Anschauung] of Appearances in general, abolish [aufheben] time itself, though certainly one can remove [wegnehmen] the appearances from time. Therefore, time is given a priori" (A31=B46). This formulation is slightly different from the parallel argument in the chapter on space. Why? The first part is easy enough to understand: if there are to be appearances at all, they must be in time; thus there is no need to specify a representation of either existence or non-existence. For a similar reason, Kant writes 'remove appearances' not 'remove objects'. Further, of course, any representation of time, as Kant will note later, is spacial. Notice, though, that Kant does not write 'the absence of appearances in time'
or 'empty time' but 'remove the appearances from time'. That is to say, once again, that time is always originally granted with appearances and as their formal relations. Thus there is no empty time, except in the intellectual process of abstraction. Trivial now, but important later, will be the observation that this parallel in the arguments between space and time begins from space - and time borrows the metaphors of 'remove' or 'empty'.

We should also notice that, in the second edition, Kant removes the argument concerning geometry and space to the Transcendental Exposition; however, with time, no such alteration takes place. Why? Not merely for the sake of brevity, as Kant implies. Rather, Kant knew that there were problems with the a priori knowledge of geometry - he had mathematician friends, such as Lambert, who were concerned with the difficulties that surrounded the parallel postulate (cf. Synth). Further, Kant came from a tradition, which included Berkeley and Leibniz, which questioned space's relevance to knowledge. The nature of space as a pure a priori intuition, then, could explain our intuitions concerning geometry, but the reverse would not be a strong argument - even at this point, well before the advent of any formally non-Euclidean geometry. There would just be too many objections. However, with time Kant felt on safer ground, and thus presented an argument for the a priori nature of time based on the apodeictic certainty of several propositions concerning time.

Through our discussion of sensation and in Kant's arguments in the Aesthetic, it is clear that, for Kant, mere appearances in pure space are not necessarily causally related, but co-exist; appearances in time are in sequence but not necessarily a causal sequence. Thus, the peculiar contributions of space and time are relations that are not thinkable as such and in their purity - which is why Kant feels we can be certain of geometry without ever being able to prove, and thus found conceptually, that certainty. In other, more Kantian words, synthetic a priori knowledge is made possible. Let us define (provisionally, it
must be said) knowledge in this famous phrase as 'true thinking of an
object', synthetic as 'requires the experience of objects' and a priori
as 'proceeding without or before all experience.' Kant's question
translates as 'How is a true thinking of an object which requires the
experience of that object possible without or before any experience?'
This paradox can only be resolved if 1) certain forms of thought (i.e.
concepts) are available before experience and 2) 'experience'
bifurcates into two meanings: a) thinking sensible intuitions and b)
thinking a priori intuitions and 3) sensible intuition depends for its
exhibition of pertinent properties upon the same forms as a priori
intuition. Thus it is clear that the importance of the Transcendental
Aesthetic for Kant's enterprise cannot be overestimated.

To our list of five plus three observations, then, let us add the
following: 9) Though interrupting some absolute representation (which
Kant labels 'intellectual intuition' and cannot strictly speaking be
called 'representation' at all) space and time are the very conditions
for the possibility of finite, human representation. It is thus not
enough to characterize the forms of intuition as forcing a truncated
infinite knowledge - finite knowledge has its own form. 10) Even at
this early stage we can see that any characterization of intuition qua
intuition as merely not-yet-determined thought - as 'raw material' - is
inadequate and must fail to accomplish what Kant requires of intuition.
This inadequacy is indicated by the paradoxes and failures of a concept
like 'commercium.'

Now in the Principles, Kant analyses the necessary imposition of
categories of judgement upon the undetermined manifold. The result is
the concept of space and the concepts (or modes) of time. But this is
only to reinscribe the gap in different terms, such that knowledge in
general is possible. In the next chapter, then, we must explore this
imposition and analyze the problems Kant encounters in terms of it.
The gap, we might well say, is broached, provided we allow that word to
resonate in its possible (and here incompatible) meanings.
Chapter Notes

1. But activity and passivity are also related to simplicity, a theme which has something of Spinoza in it. Those actions are called active, we can guess, which bear a peculiarly simple and direct relation to certain states of the will. For God, then, everything is simple.

2. Kant resurrects the principle of sufficient reason in the Critique as an a priori condition for the possibility of experience. But as such, it only applies to experience, and noumena are not of course objects of experience.

3. Perhaps a strict Kantian would not have to accept this step-back: giving a three-dimensional description of an enantiomorph is essentially to give another enantiomorph. It is perhaps not clear that such a language could be purged of all intuitive references.

4. Further, of course, there is Kant's infamous argument concerning the apodeictic certainty of geometry. As we shall see, in the second edition of the Critique, Kant seems to be recognizing this infamy.

5. Quoted in Broad, p41.

6. Quoted in Buroker.

7. Later we will find reason to question the lack of a parallel argument for time, or at least take the problem very much further.

8. It is helpful to remember this when reading such passages as the 'represented as object' at B160n.

9. In the next chapter, we will discuss more carefully successive apprehension.
1.2

Models and Closure

1.2.0. Introduction: Minding the Gap.

Analysis and Synthesis are brother-operations in the understanding, but have no meaning for intuition in itself. Thus, for Kant, the understanding is first responsible for the dis-communion of the 'object' as well as its synthetic reconstruction. Such an interpretation clearly throws into doubt many traditional interpretations of Kant's philosophy. It will be the job of this and the next chapter to show how our interpretation of the form of intuition leads to interesting interpretations of other key features of transcendental thought. What is more, and as we have already hinted, this does not mean that the concepts at work in the metaphysics of space and time will operate on the Critique from afar. Rather, these same concepts will prove essential in describing other transcendental objects of inquiry.

For these reasons it is no longer possible to treat the Transcendental Aesthetic as a isolated chapter - as if Kant just had a philosophical bone to pick and get out of the way - or as if Kant had a philosophical darling which was also a blind spot. Certainly it is the case that the whole notion of synthetic a priori knowledge cannot be understood without the doctrine of a priori intuition. But we must go further: what Kant means by 'synthetic' (and indeed by 'a priori' and 'knowledge') can only be explicated with reference to the Aesthetic. It is precisely this point that our work on Kant is meant to illustrate.

First, we need to take a look at topics derived from the Analytic of Principles, especially the Analogies of Experience, for it is here that
Kant is concerned with the details of what we have called the imposition of the forms of understanding upon intuition. Our exemplary analysis here will be the Second Analogy. We will find that several of the problems Kant's arguments encounter, problems that commentators have hashed and rehashed for two centuries, can be traced to precisely to the peculiar character of the postulated division of faculties. There is, we might say, an 'other' war of the faculties and one perhaps more fundamental than that against the metaphysical rhapsodies of pure reason.

The second half of this chapter will be devoted to the same set of issues in their highest generality: schematism. Here we will try to understand in general the becoming-sensible of pure intellect. In order to make our reasoning clear, a brief foray into the theory of models will be required. Seen in the light of our interpretation of the forms of intuition, the Schematism chapter appears as Kant intended it too: as absolutely central to transcendental philosophy, and equally difficult to grasp.
In contrast to the third analogy, which has been neglected - indeed, often entirely ignored - in the secondary literature, the second analogy has received more commentary than perhaps any other portion of the Critique. Why this surplus should be is not difficult to understand: here it is that Kant engages most clearly and devastatingly with Hume (and thereby the entire empiricist tradition). The second analogy, as Kant recognized, was the test of transcendental philosophy - much as Hume's general discussion of how mechanistic science was to be thought was the test of empiricism. At the same time, but for entirely different reasons, it has become apparent that the Analogies in general are of vital interest for our project here. This non-coincidence of motives, however, means that much of the secondary literature is quite beside the point for our purposes, and thus any reconstruction or analysis of the second analogy in traditional (and thus familiar) terms would only be of preliminary usefulness. Consequently, our interpretation here will at times seem unfamiliar and indeed digressive.

Kant's response to Hume is, however, easy enough to grasp on Kantian grounds. Kant says that Hume's argument concerning causality is circular, and the concise proof added in the second edition makes this relatively clear (B233-4). Let us paraphrase it, and fill in a few hidden assumptions. Kant takes up the problem of what connections are possible - and on what conditions - between two perceptions. Hume requires, Kant says, the apprehension of order in the subject, independently of any objective references for my perceptions, so that we may then observe regularities and form habits. Let us for clarity make a few strict definitions: 1) objective succession or order is order in the object, the order of events in time that we can attribute to the object of perception itself; 2) objective-in-the-subject succession or order (forgive the name) is the actual order in which our faculty of receptivity was affected - because the reception of a
sensory signal is itself an objective event, this order must be called objective, but in the subject. Of course, this order may or may not be identical with objective succession, for I may see the bullet breaking the window before I hear it being fired or, more ordinarily, I may see the dog limping before I notice the sore on its paw; 3) arbitrary subjective order is an imaginative giving of order out of the manifold which may or may not correspond to the above two orders. In this new terminology, the order Hume requires is objective-in-the-subject order.

Kant then argues that any consciousness of order outside objective reference requires that there be something only against the background of which can I make any connection whatsoever. This something cannot be time itself, for time is not itself perceptible. In the first instance, the something can only be (though Kant never says it) the transcendental unity of apperception, which is given in the 'I think'. This background is the condition for the possibility of any connection at all (whether temporal or not) being posited by the understanding. But the latter is, unlike objective time itself would be if there were such a thing, bidirectional. It consists merely of the possibility of the accompaniment of the 'I think' - two perceptions are equally mine whatever order they fall in, and yet to have any mutual relation in time they must already be mine. Thus Kant can say that, although the imagination does indeed link perceptions together in a certain order, this order has no significance whatsoever. In the absence of objective reference, what I construe as objective-in-the-subject order is actually arbitrary subjective order. It is only by reconstructing the situation in objective terms, which always involves the use of causal laws (it is, of course, precisely this important auxiliary step that occupies the majority of the pages of the second analogy), that I can become conscious of anything except an arbitrary directionality in my perceptions. (We should note that this problem is parallel to, but not identical with, the problem of distinguishing objective succession from co-existence.) But Hume's analysis of the habit of causal connections
could not but depend upon objective sequence, and thus upon the prior assumption of causal laws, and is thus circular. 3

Now, as we have already indicated, the weak-appearing step is that objective construction requires causal connection. The famous passage about the perception of the house versus the perception of the moving boat is pertinent here. Although above it became clear that Kant's first distinction was between two alternate subjective orders of perception, the distinction now is between two objective modes of time: succession and co-existence, and Kant argues that only causal rules can distinguish between these two cases. Briefly, the proof proceeds as follows (I am roughly following Arthur Melnick pp. 87ff; and again many of the steps are only implicit in Kant's text): All events take place in one time, and thus all events can be placed in a single series. This single series indeed allows the datability of an event (in terms of mutual temporal relations between events) only under one assumption, that ultimately all events are datable. Complete datability, of course, is not an empirical possibility, and thus time determination is strictly regulative. (Kant says as much about the Analogies and, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, spacial determination is said to be regulative in a much stricter sense.) Such a conclusion implies, however, that there is a real difficulty in moving from the objective qualities of things in discrete perceptions (which, in the absence of the perceptibility of empty time, are the only available data which might lead to temporal ordering) to their objective temporal order. The only way of surpassing this difficulty is to somehow introduce what are, in effect, global (or complete) determinations at a local level - namely, to apply universal causal laws to those objective qualities. This proof constitutes the important auxiliary step in Kant's broader proof.

Now all this would be fine if only things were that simple. It is safe to say that the above is an apt summary of Kant's thinking, or at least of a Kant at certain moments, but it is only necessary to suggest a few
difficulties that are suggested by Kant's work itself - that is, which are internal to the system - in order to show the presence of a subtext to the second analogy more in line with our interpretation of the third.

A first problem, which indeed many commentators have made much of, is that Kant's proof depends upon the doctrine of successive apprehension - that is, that perceptions are always at least temporally discrete. The aforementioned commentators have pointed out that not only is such a thesis untenable on the basis of more recent research into perception (i.e. Gestalt Psychology and its various after-images), but that on the basis of Kant's own analysis of (for example) imaginative construction in space, it is dubious.

There is yet another, equally disturbing problem with Kant's double proof as we have presented it. Our reconstruction of the auxiliary line of proof depends upon a distinction between objective properties and objective temporal datability. But on Kant's own terms this is impossible to maintain, for all that intuitions give us are external relations. An objective property, as its name implies, would be an internalized (that is to say, conceptualized) property. But surely such a becoming-objective must itself depend upon - or at least be developed alongside - temporal determination. All properties of objects are certainly also temporal properties of the object. Thus Kant's argument is itself circular. The difficulty can be extended, of course, in the direction of space. For example, an objective property p of X might be its orientation. But empirical knowledge of p is not possible - nor any significance p might have for X - without the intuition of X being first and foremost an intuition of context - that is, the relations that constitute X as such and, indeed, as an object with property p. (There is no special type of intuition called an 'intuition of context'. If it is a sensible intuition, then it is an outer or exterior intuition, that is the main point.) This context is at bottom obviously spacial and temporal: at what time does X have p,
and with respect to what other spacial objects is the orientation p determined?

We should further recognize that, in the auxiliary proof outlined above, the distinction is not between properties of objects but of perceptions. The only relevant difference this makes, on Kantian grounds, is that the perception could be of an event - that is, an alteration in a substance. (Every perception must be, treated objectively, either a perception of a substance which exists as object X, or of a substance altering from X to Y. Thus the distinction between object and event is identical to the distinction between objective succession and co-existence.) However, considering the perception of an event only makes our position clearer, for the content of an event (the alteration itself) is obviously only temporal and spacial relations. Given this dependence of p upon time and space, it is clear that only through a prior determination of the timing and spacing of X is any determination of p possible. Thus we cannot express the step in the auxiliary proof as the problem of moving from objective properties to objective temporal order.

Now, in the last chapter we noted that, for Kant, sensation - by which Kant means colour, taste, smell, etc. - can be taken up without difficulty into the intelligence. Subsequent developments allow us to interpret this as meaning that, for Kant, sensations are not relations. However, given that there is some property p of an event or object X that, in intuition, is entirely relational, how is it possible to arrive at an objective representation of p such that, on the basis of p, a causal rule could be applied? This question expresses the circularity of Kant's argument very concisely: the causal law must be applied before the causal law can be applied.

Having stated the second analogy and its problems with some rigour, it is now necessary to begin the salvage operation.
1.2.2. The Span of Intuition

Let us take stock: in summarizing Kant's proof of the second analogy of experience, we identified a main and an auxiliary proof. The main proof is concerned to show that objective-in-the-subject order requires the determination of order in the object. The auxiliary proof wants to demonstrate that the causal principle is needed to determine order in the object. We then found two basic problems with the central assumptions of these. The first revolves around successive apprehension; the second involved a circularity in Kant's argument about the moment of application of the causal law.

The story of successive apprehension seems to be told fully in the opening few pages of the first Transcendental Deduction. In discussing the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction Kant apparently asserts that all representations are unities and that any two representations are necessarily successive in time. But there is an ambiguity here: when Kant says representation, does he mean any representation or only an intellectual representation? In our previous chapter, when we discussed the similar problem of the pure manifolds of space and time, the problem was solved by the observation (based on Melnick's) that space and time only have manifolds for the intellect. As intuitions as such, they do not present manifolds. Let us expand on this argument here.

Kant writes that "every intuition in itself contains a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity" (A99). What the first part of this sentence means is extremely obscure, and the second is little better. In the following attempt at paraphrasing for simplicity we treat only of outer intuitions: Every intuition of an object must be considered by the understanding as a manifold of
impressions; an intuition which contains nothing but relations cannot
for this reason be a intellectual unity and thus cannot be in a single
moment; the understanding represents this manifold by distinguishing a
sequence of impressions in time; thus if some representations are
contained in a single moment and are absolute unities, they must be
intellectual representations; intellectual representations are unities
through synthesis.

Thus the successive apprehension and synthesis 'in' intuition is not a
description of intuition itself (it cannot be), but a description of
the 'first' operation of the understanding (broadly defined so as to
include the imagination) upon intuition. The understanding synthesizes
by first taking apart, interpreting space and time as locations. This
is not equivalent to analysis, because intuition is not a synthetic
unity. The unity of intuition Kant discusses in the transcendental
deduction is, then, not the same as the wholeness introduced in the
aesthetic - and this is precisely where so many commentators have gone
wrong.

If indeed intuition as such contained any kind of a manifold, then - as
I believe Kant himself knew, since it was a common enough problem in
the literature (both philosophical and mathematical) before and since -
we would be faced with the absurdity of atoms (absolute units) of
spacial and temporal magnitude if it is to be possible to construct
magnitudes, and the forms of space and time would have no work to do.
Not of course absurd for Hume - but certainly so for Kant. Indeed,
such a theory contradicts itself by opening the possibility of a non-
manifold intuition, i.e. the intuition of one such atom. In addition,
it would be possible for such atoms to be identical (not in the
understanding, but in intuition) which is impossible for spacially or
temporally formed intuitions. See, for example, Kant's discussion of
Leibniz's Identity of Indiscernibles at A264=B320. Only for the
understanding's encountering of manifolds as manifolds of located
sensible atoms is the identity of elements possible, and Kant discusses this possibility at B131n.

Now there are other problems with successive apprehension as well. But the mere fact that there must be a level prior to such apprehension where, for example, an intuition of co-existence might be possible without material interaction, means that there is a Kantian way of, very properly, having one's cake and eating it too. The necessity of the categories as supplement to intuition is brought about not because of successive apprehension but because of the absolute difference between intuition and all thought.

In the broader, first proof, we said that there necessarily was a difficulty in moving from a subjective attribution of order to an objective determination of the order of apprehension. But as our consideration of the problem of succession makes clear, this may well be a problem generated by the understanding. An intuition never lasts merely a moment (whatever that would mean) - if it did it very clearly could not encompass the spacial and temporal relations that it does. But this does not therefore mean that an intuition is composed of a succession of micro-intuitions. On the contrary, the intuition has a certain wholeness or 'stretch' without discrete parts. Its apprehension of an event which is thought as XY need not be the apprehension of X followed by an already distinct apprehension of Y. Further, not having parts, it is difficult to see how the intuition could be reversible or capable of being scrambled in the same sense as a sequence of isolated and instantaneous representations; that is to say, being dependant upon the whole, it is always already oriented. Therefore, in at least some cases - namely those cases where the intuition/duration/span encompasses the event itself - the order of apprehension of the event must be implicit in the intuition. Thus the third type of order, arbitrary subjective order, would be a non-category, if we could prove that the 'order' implicit in intuition were somehow available to the understanding. Certainly, we never actually
experience an order as arbitrary, even if not at all objective - though in itself this is no proof. Thinking this 'order' as objective-in-the-subject order (that is, as belonging to embodied receptivity) requires, of course, the categories. The mere representation has to first of all be linked to the embodied organ of receptivity in a strict relation of cause and effect such that the order in the latter is delivered over into the former intact. Embodied receptivity is useless to the understanding unless the body is thought as such and as object. We can conclude swiftly that the subject/object distinction as the mind/body distinction is required by the understanding for experience (in Kant's sense) to be possible. Let us leave this here, for the moment.

What, though, are we to make now of Kant's famous argument about the non-perceivability of empty time? Kant must claim that time itself cannot be perceived or he leaves himself open to the spectre of idealism. The solution is as simple as it is revealing: the operative word here (and everywhere else Kant raises the issue) is perception, which does not simply mean intuition. Kant makes this clear in section 26 of the second Transcendental Deduction. Perception is equivalent to empirical consciousness and follows upon combination of the manifold. Naturally, time cannot itself be perceived, for in perception the intuition has already undergone its sea-change and is now thought "as appearance" (CPR B160), which is to say, the subject-object distinction is already in operation. Thus, in collapsing arbitrary subjective order into objective-in-the-subject order we are merely describing another of the aspects of how the understanding thinks the forms of intuition. This is not to say, however, that in any straight-forward sense empty time or time-in-itself is intuited - because time is not an object. Time is a form for intuition, there is no better way of expressing it.

The fact of an implicit 'order' given in intuition will cause grave but perhaps not insurmountable problems for Kant's argument against Hume, as we shall see shortly. First, though, let us develop one fascinating
implication. We are now in a position to develop, on purely Kantian grounds, a situation directly parallel to incongruent counterparts in space. We saw above that, for Kant, the incongruent counterparts were those that could only be thought of as distinguished by exterior but none-the-less intelligible relations, but which intuition gave as distinguished in their interiors because intuitions 'construct' interiors through exteriors. So long as we spoke of two events (or states of a substance separated by an event) X and Y, and introduced the notion of a causal law to determine their order, it was impossible to speak of the two orders XY and YX as being incongruent counterparts. This was because given the complete determination of one (which would include the causal law) the other was just another internal and intelligible manifestation (cf. Leibniz's complete concept). That is to say, there was no dependence upon the dimensionality (or any other property) of time as such.

However, recently we discussed the idea that the introduction of the causal law by the understanding was equivalent to the importation of complete determinability in time, and thus of intuitable dates. Now we have taken a further step and noted how a non-momentary intuition would necessarily though implicitly contain what we have called the objective-in-the-subject order, but only by virtue of the nature of the form of time as a whole. Therefore, the incongruent counterparts argument might proceed roughly like this: Orders XY and YX are indistinguishable in their interiors so far as the pure understanding is concerned, because it has no reason or means to demand uniqueness in temporal order; for the empirical understanding applying a particular causal law, the two are distinguishable, but only ever as exterior, first because the law is derived neither from X or Y but from a constructed induction from all other experiences, second because the criteria for the application of this rule are only determined in X and Y from their exteriors; it follows that for any mode of understanding, the two orders are equally possible in their interiors, and are indistinguishable - this just means that although the understanding
ultimately attributes order to the interior of objects or situations, it none-the-less defines order by way of a some set of rules that are not 'within' the manifold itself; however, this difference is given as interior in intuition; this proves that time, and the properties of time, are intuitions and not concepts with all that distinction implies in Kantian philosophy. (What it does not prove, as was the case with space, is that time is also an a priori and pure intuition.) Such a proof is important for our purposes since it shows the clear affinity of the givenness of order in intuition and the determination of order in the causal rule.

According to our analysis of the Kantian understanding thus far, it is clear that such an order is unthinkable as such. To think time, the intuition must be dissected and then reconstituted in synthesis, and order in intuition may be lost thereby precisely because the intuition of the whole time is to be replaced by regulative dating.
1.2.3. Aspects of Necessity and Objectivity.

The auxiliary proof needs to be recast. Melnick's assumption in his reconstruction of the auxiliary proof was based on the following definition: A causal law is a rule that allows us to infer from objective properties of perceptions of events the order of those events. Although at first it seemed plausible, we can now recognize (on the basis of the second problem we identified with Kant's proof) this definition as circular. What we overlooked is the fact that the event is already constituted by the empirical imagination with a provisional order of relation - our experience of the subjective order of apprehension is not as arbitrary as Kant sometimes tells us it is. We do indeed seem to have a limited ability to recall objective-in-the-subject order without any reference to causal sequence - and it is indeed the introduction of an artificial causal sequence (such as a mnemonic) that allows the trained memory to exceed this limited ability. Kant does vacillate between attributing to us knowledge of actual subjective order and mere arbitrary subjective order (compare B233, 238, 239-40, 243, etc.).

The whole intuition contains the actual subjective order (though not, of course, as an order) and it seems that this information cannot be always or completely lost. Thus, this provisional order is that order already inscribed in intuition. What this implies is that certain temporal relations are given, although when applied to the objective events themselves (order in the object) these admit of being reversible or (in the becoming-objective) reduced to simultaneity. This half-solves our second problem: there is something like time (and in parallel, space) determinations prior to objective determination, but they are given only as provisional or hypothetical. Let us call $P$ the provisional determination of that set $p$ of the objective properties of the object under consideration. We shall assume for the moment that a property set can be transformed into a unique order, and the reverse. If the provisional order is $XY$; the problem then becomes whether the
The only criteria for the solution of this problem are 1) the provisional determination \( P \) of properties such as \( p \), and 2) knowledge of empirical causal laws. Let us now define a causal law as one that generates hypothetically possible property-sets (call them \( (p_1, p_2, p_3...) \)) on the basis of the \( P \)-set. Notice that our definition has restored (against all odds, critics of Kant's architectonic would have told us) to the proof of the Second Analogy Kant's original concern with the hypothetical judgement form. Now, that \( p \)-set which is the actual objective set following from the objective order, will have as a necessary condition that it agrees with one of \( (p_1, p_2, p_3...) \) - that is to say, it will have (at least) internal coherence with respect to a rule. The understanding is assisted by the fact that, by and large, the possible permutations that make up \( (p_1, p_2, p_3...) \) are limited, and that there must be causal reasons for why the given order is the particular order it is - for example, it is useful to know the relative velocities of light and sound when one is estimating the distance away of a lightning storm. \( P \) is provisional, not arbitrary, and its order must be capable of being mapped onto \( p \), according to rules. Note also that, again, the introduction of the causal law is equivalent to introducing complete determinations into local situations because it is directly equivalent to intuitable datability. We do not directly infer order from observation but test hypotheses with observation.

It is thus unimportant to the auxiliary proof whether the provisional order has anything objective about it at all, and this must be Kant's point. The understanding takes intuition apart, gives its manifold a provisional order and unity in the empirical synthesis, and tests that unity and other possible unities against the rule which functions hypothetically. It is simply that the causal rule must first be
present or any notion of succession in the object is lost. Fair enough. Presumably, though, if Kant were interested in giving a Lockean account of the genealogy of empirical laws (but he is not), he would recognize the priority of objective-in-the-subject order. It is only later at a high level of development of experience in terms of hypotheticals that thought can discard the body, and the understanding can leap, as it were, entirely over receptivity as an event (though not intuition itself) from perception to object.

Now the premise we have been discussing in the last few paragraphs has wider significance. Kant’s argument against Hume is already in trouble enough, but if objective-in-the-subject succession is allowed without interference from the a priori principle of causation (in the form of a particular causal law that partakes of its necessity), then Hume’s point about the habit of causal connections once again has footing on which to stand, and Kant’s whole effort is wasted. Not that Hume would accept much of the above, that is not the point: rather, as we shall see, Kant’s connection between a priori necessity and the objectivity of the object breaks down. We may speculate that Kant (however unconsciously) held onto the notion of arbitrary subjective order as an artifice to make his anti-Humean job easier.

Before we ask how Kant might answer this new objection, we require an important detour. We speak of the categories, the causal law, the forms of intuition as ‘necessary’ and ‘universal’. What do these words mean here? Kant’s own definition of necessity is not of much use, for it itself is a category, and there are points in the Critique of Teleological Judgement where one suspects the concept of ‘necessity’ is on the verge of being drained and abandoned entirely. What one can say is that necessity is always the necessity either of a concept or a relation, never of an empirical object, for Kant. Given, for example, the actuality of a sensation, it is necessarily posited that sensation will have an intensive magnitude; given an event, the necessity of its connection to another event in a time sequence is also given.
Universality is something like the necessity of necessity - that is, this particular necessity has a necessary application to all x of this type. These definitions are becoming circular - let us narrow down.

One concept related to necessity is that of objectivity. Now, objectivity has two meanings for Kant, which are equivalent but in a complex manner: 1) objectivity as the objectness of the object, that which exist separate from us and is not subject to our whims or fancies or, immediately at least, to our will; 2) objectivity as the necessity and universality of certain rules, concepts or judgements. Now, the traditional interpretation of Kant has (1) following from (2). For example, in Robert Paul Wolff's elaborate and exceedingly careful reconstruction of the Deduction. The argument can be paraphrased so: the observed unity is possible and is made necessary only through reproduction in imagination according to a rule; the categories are these rules; objective reality means necessary connection, therefore the contents of consciousness have objective reality (Wolff 1968, 89ff). For the moment, let us take the complicity between the two meanings of 'objectivity' as read - observing only that, for Kant, the negatives of these are also linked: lack of necessity means lack of object, and thus Hume's scepticism cannot stop short of absolute.

Next, we have to ask ourselves what does 'necessary' mean here with respect to the law of causation, and what exactly is it that is 'necessary'. Let us list the possibilities: 1) the categories have necessity by virtue of being the unique modes of the unity of apperception under which all encountered manifolds of intuition are synthesized, and thus (for example) the law of causation will always be applied; 2a) some causal law is necessary to determine objective order with respect to every perception in time; 2b) that objective order should be experienced necessarily implies the 'prior' existence of some causal law; 3) the understanding cannot think the possibility of objective order without assuming the existence of a causal law. There must certainly be other variations. These are not exactly mutually
incompatible, but rather have their different moments. The first would be something like Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction. The main thrust of Kant’s arguments in the second analogy seems to be 2a, and this ‘main thrust’ has led to all the familiar difficulties raised by post-Kantian empiricists, who claim that experience would still be possible within a world that did not always - but only for the most part - obeyed causal laws. Possibility 2b would be typical of the type of analytic argument that Kant uses in the Prolegomena, and operates in the same manner as 2a though it is slightly weaker. The third possibility borders on the psychologistic thesis that, as a matter of fact, humans do tend to resist disorder or absolute contingency (and would consequently belong to anthropology) - but only borders, for it is fully capable of being a proposition in transcendental philosophy.

The necessity in 1 is axiomatic: the principles are simply content-variations (modes) to be derived under the a priori conditions of the forms of intuition from an a priori form. The necessity in 2a and 2b is functional: causal rules are thought of as conditions for the possibility of experience as we know it or could imagine it, although of course it is the categories which define what we know and imagine. Note that in general a concept or judgement which is axiomatically or functionally necessary is also material; that is, has determining content with respect to empirical objects or events. The necessity in 3 we can call regulative and has no content. Several moments in the analogies tend towards this third view of their necessity - certainly Kant states that the analogies are regulative, but what he means is that since being is not a real predicate, any principle that puts existence under a priori rules cannot be said to determine real properties a priori. This is different from the meaning of ‘regulative’ in the Dialectic where a relation is given to something that cannot be said to exist at all because it is not a possible object of experience. The precise meaning of ‘regulative’ is different for reason and the understanding, but its understanding of necessity is in
both cases the same: without the positing of some x as ground of y, y is unthinkable as such.

Above we said that the possibility of objective-in-the-subject order available to the understanding without the objectification by a priori rules upset the Kantian relation between necessity and the object. We can now pin this down more clearly. According to traditional interpretations of Kant, functional and axiomatic necessities are simply mirror images of each other. Now T.K. Swing breaks open this connection by showing how the Kantian system might function best grounded only in functional necessity - and indeed, at least for Swing, without a priori forms of intuition. In either case, objectivity consists in that which is necessary according to a priori rules. The type of necessity which we have called regulative is quite different: at issue here is the thinkability of those ingredients of objectivity mentioned above. Causation is the only available mode of thinking time-sequence, and thus it is necessary that causation be brought into play as a thought-construction, but there is no guarantee that all time-sequences will be available to thought. The only necessary connections are between mental states of the perceiving subject, and therefore the subject is the only object. The radical separation between thought and intuition comes into play here as soon as we ask, how might an unthinkable ‘time-sequence’ present itself to us? It is, of course, precisely this possibility that Kant speculates on throughout the third Critique.

The wholeness of intuition is precisely its dependence upon the a priori form of time and space as such. These forms the understanding cannot depend upon (which is the problem of the second analogy) because time and space are not available to it as objects of intuition. Thus it is the form a priori of wholeness which assures that the orientation of intuition in time is in itself necessary. Space, strictly speaking, only forms outer intuition and time only inner, but since time can only be thought in terms of space, and space only synthesized across time,
the two must be considered at least equi-primordial for all intuition. Thus, they must necessarily apply to all intuition, although what exactly they represent (noumenally speaking) is for Kant an insolvable problem. The character of wholeness of an intuition is not empirical, it is a priori, and thus the necessity of the order (and, in space, orientation) given in intuition is also a priori, although it is not an axiomatic necessity nor, strictly speaking, a functional one. The necessity in question let us call formal. This indicates that a certain order will be given in the very application of a unique a priori form, and thus the givenness of order is necessary. But not the order itself, which remains radically contingent; in other words, formal necessity is contentless, having to do with the mode of givenness of the contingent. It has this contentlessness in common with the regulative.

We can then describe intuition as such as entirely syntactical (though this is not quite proper since when, in the quotation we were referring to, Kant speaks of representations he is presumably referring to images in a manifold, but let it pass). Synthesis is not a purely syntactical operation, but is always synthesis under (the transcendental unity of apperception and the categories). The formation of the phenomenal categories can be rigorously described as alien to pure intuition in as much as the categories are discursive or class concepts and thus are not purely syntactic entities. We of course already knew this under different conceptual tags, for Kant makes it perfectly clear from the first pages of the Aesthetic (cf. B40).

Order implicit in intuition is given, then, and it is necessary a priori that it always be given, but by itself such 'order' (we enclose it in inverted commas because, as we now know, the implicitness of this order is something other than a mere hiddenness) is of no use to the understanding, for it is not yet an order of something. Being 'the order of' would place it within an alien representation field (discursivity) involving subsumption. There exists a classic problem
laboured over by numerous commentators concerning whether Kant's term 'intuition' means 'that which is intuited' or 'the intuition of that which is intuited' and at what points in the text it might mean which. It means both and neither, because intuition as such is unable to formulate that distinction. Thus, the implicit order being purely formal has no material content; that is to say, it is not an order the necessity of which has any generality; it is singular within the wholeness of the one space and time. Put in still other words the order is not an order of something, it is not part of a series or orders thought through as regular, nor determined by any laws of the understanding. As we have mentioned already, the necessity of orderliness in question is not axiomatic or even, strictly speaking, functional, but only formal.
1.2.4. A Priori Elements in the Second Analogy.

Kant could answer the empiricist's resurgence about the availability of order in several ways: 1) such retentions of order are insignificant because clearly brief and undependable - however, this is merely an empirical and not a transcendental argument; 2) retained order is only objective-in-the-subject order, and not succession in the object - in other words, only the auxiliary proof is kept, but this begs the question of how the two meanings of objectivity differ; 3) the forms of intuition are a priori, and thus it remains true that the necessity of order is granted a priori (not a move for purists, but interesting none-the-less); 4) however it may be given, objective-in-the-subject order requires a causal law to be understood as such. Surely this fourth possibility would be Kant's.

We can only further frustrate Kant if it could be shown that the order given in intuition were somehow necessary for the determination of order in the object by the understanding; that is, if arbitrary order alone did not supply enough information to the understanding for its laws to get a grip on experience. Now it may well be the case - were we to study the psychology of perception, etc. - that the understanding consistently makes use of what we called above the provisional order. But we can suspect that this will in fact be a matter of convenience (oversampling), and that the provisional order thus has no transcendental role to play in the possibility of experience.

Hume's point is stubborn: surely, the mere fact that order is given would be enough to set our empirical law-seeking instincts in motion. Above we said that the (for the understanding) regulative nature of time determination was overcome by the introduction of what were in effect global and complete determinations in the form of rules. Kant's most explicit description of this 'introducing' is quoted below. Kant is noting that objectivity cannot consist in a relation to a
representation, for then the problem would arise concerning the objectivity of the latter:

"How, then, does it come about that to these representations we posit an object or, beyond their subjective reality and as a modification, attribute we know not what kind of objective reality? Objective meaning cannot consist in the relation to another representation (of that which one wishes to name object), for then the question renews itself: how in turn does this representation go out beyond itself and acquire objective meaning ... when we enquire, then, what new character relation to an object would give to our representations, and what dignity would be thereby awarded, we find that it would do nothing other than to make necessary a particular manner [Art] in the connection of the representations, and to subject [unterwerfen] them to a rule; and conversely, only if a particular order in the time-relations of our representations is necessary, will their objective meaning be granted." (A197=B242).

(Let us note very quickly that we find here (as against Kemp Smith's translation) the confirmation of our characterization of the causal rule as hypothetically setting up and matching possible p-sets.) As we discussed above, objectivity in the dominant Kantian sense is essentially equivalent to the necessity of a certain p-set. The necessity, Kant obviously feels, is only granted in the causal law or rule, which itself derives its necessity axiomatically from the a priori understanding. The verb 'unterwerfen' (to conquer, subjugate, make submit to) is here very telling. Note also that in dismissing the possibility that objectivity might be found in a representation relation, Kant is here referring to what we might call 'experiential syntax': that is, the relation of one same-level representation to another.
With this in mind, we are now in a position to formulate at least the outline of an argument. Kant could admit that we are given an order in our intuitions which would be adequate for us to, over the course of long and regular experience, generalize or abstract to empirical 'laws'. But, Kant would ask How (ie, against the background of what) could we judge not order this time but regularity? This question can be seen in the syntax argument in the quotation above. Here we can insert the Refutation of Idealism which, since Kant saw Hume's argument against causation as an argument against objectness and thus reality, was also directed at Empiricism. Thus it is that the very same argument about the non-perceivability of time is repeated there. Kant's argument proceeds like this:

Existence in time means possible determination in time. Determination in time means that some event has a fixed location (which can be a predicate in the concept of that event) in time relative to other events, and ultimately all other events. To decide objective order of events, we would need to compare relatively representation \( R(A,T_a) \) of event \( A \) at time \( T_a \) and representation \( R(B,T_b) \) of event \( B \) at time \( T_b \). But this would mean that \( R(A,T_a) \) would have to in some way continue to exist until \( T_b \) (or the reverse, depending upon the objective order). That is, the comparison would mean comparing \( R(A,T_b) \) with \( R(B,T_b) \). If the existence of this third representation were itself an event, we would then have to prove that the representation was a representation of \( R(A,T_a) \), by comparing \( R(A,T_a) \) and \( R(A,T_b) \); but this would be only possible through another representation either of \( A \) or of \( R(A,T_a) \), and so on. The existence of this representation would not itself be an event. Therefore, if only events 'existed', there would be no reason or way to ask about the relation of one event to another, and no content to any assertion about events carrying causal indexes to other events. The very possibility of 'fixed location ... relative to...' thus requires that something be presupposed as not being eventful, i.e. being permanent or at least enduring across events. Furthermore, this
something must endure without question - it must be of its essence to endure, and not something which endures only accidentally. Otherwise, the question can be asked about whether the enduring thing in fact endures or merely appears to endure.

Because there are no other types of things, the enduring thing must be either a thing existing in time alone, a thing existing in space alone, a representation of a thing in space or time, or time or space itself. This thing which endures cannot be a thing that exists only in time, because things in time are in flux; certainly Kant can not disregard the possibility of a permanent non-extended substance, a soul, but his point is rather that such a thing cannot here serve: that is, a thing apprehended merely through time, for the reasons given above, cannot ground determination in time. Nor can the enduring thing be time or space itself (because time or space themselves, as objects, are something we construct). The enduring thing cannot be a representation of something in time (a memory) because (among other objections) such a representation as a representation in and of time can only be construed as contingently enduring. That is, a question about the validity of any or all memory as such can arise. This thing which endures also cannot be a representation of something which endures (i.e. a representation of something in space) because the concept 'representation of...' already presupposes a determinate time and space relation to something outside the representation. This thing which endures must ultimately be a thing existing in space. I have knowledge of my existence in time, therefore I have knowledge of things existing in space (and not merely representations of things in space). Indeed, my knowledge of my existence in time (i.e. my consciousness itself) depends upon such existing things.

Regularity is such by being referred to something which persists, that is, an object (matter as substance); in the absence of a concept of an object in general, the notion of regularity is also empty. In other words, order in intuition would give us the information for experience,
but only if we were also given, and in advance, the mode in which that information was to be gathered.

This mode consists in, of course, the forms of judgement as (re-)formed (by space and time) into phenomenal notions like substance, alteration, cause and effect, co-existence, magnitude and reality. Order is always 'order of' something, but what? events or objects? This is the significance of the house versus boat example: the question is not merely temporal succession contrasted with simultaneity but of what an object or an event is, where does it start and stop, and in what way does it relate to the next or previous object or event or history of events. In discussing hypothetical orders above, we assumed out of the blue that a given order corresponded uniquely to a property set, and that the transformation itself was always available. It is becoming clear that this assumption is only possible on the coat tails of judgements about phenomenal modes. The Humean bundle of representations needs form - notions of bundling in general - before it can think itself as 'mere bundle'.

Our first reconstruction of Kant's auxiliary argument was recast in terms of a provisional or hypothetical order that could then be tested against ongoing experience, using known causal laws as interpreters. Subsequently, however, we decided that this provisional order - which, because of the nature of intuition, was not arbitrary, but object-in-the-subject - was a mere convenience, not a necessity. Its formal necessity does not give an 'order of...' and thus its relationship to the objective situation is indeterminate. Finally, we noted that this syntactical formal necessity is so contentless as to be insufficient for any empirical account even of regularity. We require a priori and synthetic judgements as to the possible modes of an object or event (and these are the Analogies) before any construction of regularity is possible. Kant's argument in the second Analogy is explicitly designed to prove a strong thesis about the relationship between causation and objectivity. What it actually does prove, according to the above
reconstruction, is the weaker but still Kantian thesis about regularity and objectivity. This would be Kant's answer to Hume, then, an answer that has retreated several paces from the terrain of the Second Analogy, but that has kept its central bastion secure.

It seems clear now that this letting-become-an-object can also be seen in terms of the projection of objectivity into intuitive terms: a causal law could describe events separated enough in time that clearly no single intuition could encompass them, but it would be describing them as if the whole process were singly intuited. Indeed, if the causal law were converted into an imagined intuition, such an 'as if' would be precisely the content of that intuition. We will return to these issues in discussing schematism and models. For the moment it is enough to observe that the formal necessity of the givenness of order in intuition is the display in intuitive terms of the axiomatic or functional necessity of judgements about the phenomenal modes of objects (i.e. in discursive terms). And this is the case even though the given order is not required for determination in empirical thought.

But intuition is not merely left behind, for that too would be unkantian. Above, in presenting a temporal version of incongruent counterparts, we said that the understanding defines order by way of rules. But order is a temporal concept - no conceptual rules on their own could be a schema of order. Specifically, what is required is the one-dimensionality and the unity of time if we are to derive the notion of order from the notion of rule. Now, an empiricist could reply that these two are concepts derived from experience and subsequently applied in our causal judgements. However, we have already accepted the possibility of objective-in-the-subject order, or the order given by the imagination in the intuited manifold. The givenness of order, we said, was formally necessary. But if it were not the case that time, as an intuition, were one-dimensional and unified (or rather: whole) then order could not be given interior to the manifold. In fact, the formally necessary givenness of order just means: the givenness of a
presentation ‘already in and from out of’ a one-dimensional and whole network of betweenness. Which is to imply that, time itself incapable of being perceived and the form of time not an object for inspection, the givenness of order is just that wherein the a priori structure of time is encountered. The source of this essential information about the nature of time, without which no concept of order would be possible, must be the form of time itself. Thus intuition too must be a priori for Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy to succeed.

A priori here means that, given (essentially contingently) some representation in space-time, the form of that representation will be encountered by the understanding with particular synthesising judgements such that the latter are instances of general rules for all representations in space-time. Of course, a priori also means that, when the understanding attempts to understand the above process, it will necessarily encounter certain paradoxes which hint at the propriety of this a priori form of intuition as such. There are a priori discursive elements in the analogy, and also a priori intuitive elements, and both are required - but more: this double requirement is precisely due to their heterogeneity of form.

That the given, provisional order should be neither sufficient nor necessary is something we could have guessed long ago: the understanding even as functionally necessary delivers its own definition of functionality over to itself. Thus it should have been clear that possible experience in the Kantian sense of the various principles of objectivity, since these principles were derived from the understanding, could only be possible on the basis of the understanding. This circularity, because it is the understanding itself, can never be sufficiently understood, though it characterizes idealism and, after that, phenomenological hermeneutics. Still, although such questions always answer themselves with themselves, there remains for Kant an exterior barely thinkable that is called intuition - and thus once again and with undeniable tedium, the same question
returns, this time in the form: how does (or would) intuition relate to that which is intuited, and what is the significance of this relation for experience in the Kantian sense.
1.2.5. The Space of the Subject.

Above we quoted a long passage from the Second Analogy about the relating of one representation to another without ever finding objectivity (A197=B242). This we called syntax, and we used this notion to reinforce certain characterizations of the understanding which we had already developed. But what is new in the passage is the metaphor of 'going out beyond itself [aus sich selbst heraus gehen]'; the representation cannot of itself go beyond and form the 'relation to the object'. This spacial language is not accidental, certainly. The beyond is the projected field of objects. Space and time are in the subject and what is out of the subject - the noumenon - is also out of experience. Intuition is not of itself distinct from the intuited - a fact which has caused commentators no end of headaches and certainly no end of complaints about Kant's careless use of terminology. We have already explored a number of problems arising from this fact. It is as if the syntactical play of representations is a mere surface, and it is the task of the understanding to wrench an entirely new dimension out of it. This dimension is suspended between subject and object, inside and outside, mind and body, and is the first and minimum requirement of all thought.

What do we mean by subject and object? Do we mean the elements of a grammatical proposition, or the 'human subject' and the (possible) objects of its awareness? But for Kant, in an important sense, these two are the same. Any analysis of a proposition like 'the bulb is burnt out' will eventually resolve itself, according to Kant, into a proposition like 'My experience is of the burnt-out bulb'. Further, 'My experience' predicates nothing of anything except that this experience is mine. The 'is of' (and thus the 'the burnt-out bulb' as such) is made possible by certain rules. At the same time and in the same way as these rules turn my experience into a representation of something outside me, they constitute that something as an object which itself is expressed according to the language of substance. Thus the
two meanings of subject and object are directly linked in transcendental philosophy.

Yet space or a certain space is a condition for any 'going outside'. The new dimension of the becoming-objective of a representation is not a distancing of the understanding from space, but is rather and exactly the placing of the subject into space as one of its occupants, as an object, but an object which, at its 'centre' is also a judging subject. Further, the mere fact of objective-in-the-subject order and the problem it presents for Kant indicates that for the understanding our faculty of receptivity itself (our body) must be the first object, and that the understanding posits its own bare and empty spontaneity as subject. This is the true meaning of the Refutation of Idealism: everything we have of ourselves is in space and time and we depend upon their 'reality' for our own.

When, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant tells us that without space as a form of intuition within the subject, we could never have conceived insideness and outsideness, he is not thereby asserting that space as a form is sufficient (another of those crucial moments where, as we have seen, a whole tradition of commentary goes awry). Rather, Kant is saying that without space as a presupposition, the subject-predicate judgement form would never have been schematized as substance, and thus as the relation between the judging subject and its judged affectation-objects. And, similarly, without the spacial and temporal schematization of the hypothetical judgement form, the causal law would not be able to think the difference between inner and outer intuition.

Still, it would seem that the now of time (the present) and the here of space (the point of view) would inevitably be given (in order to anchor and orient the relational space and time) and thus be able to constitute, within intuition alone, a first objective time and place.
The time and place of the thinking, judging subject. In other words, what is the 'subject' in mere intuition?

Space's first thought relation is the relation between self and not-self - or what amounts to the same thing, between judging subject and object of judgement. But in the Aesthetic, space is also the preliminary laying out of outside and inside, which is to say that even as an intuition, space is oriented or constituted from out of a particular relational position, which the understanding will think as the 'here'. Obviously a connection exists between this thinking of subject and object and this preliminary laying out. We say 'outside' and 'inside', but of course in space itself there is only ever outside, both because all appearances consist solely of relations to the whole, and because time and time alone is the form of our relation to ourselves (inner sense). The 'inner' of space is mere position, viewpoint, but is not, of course, thematised as position: there are no keeps on a flat surface. Consequently, and strictly speaking, this 'point' is not a point-of-view, for who would be viewing what, under which causal story of sensibility? And strictly speaking, not even a 'point', as if the point existed of its own prior to the field in which it lies. As Kant himself says (significantly, in The Anticipations of Perception), the point is simply a limit to, and therefore dependent upon, prior intuitions of space and time.

In intuition, then, what is given as the subject (the point-of-view which is as yet neither point nor view) is entirely exterior, ecstatic. Space and time always exhibit a here and a now, but always in an exterior manner and thus always implicitly. (This is the same implicitness as, for example, the temporal order in intuition.) The outerness of space as intuition is not reducible to or directly constitutive of subject/object space. Subject/object space is already a thought space, and space therein a concept. Only thought can think the point-of-view. We might put this otherwise: in intuition, the primordial relation is object to object (this is shorthand: naturally,
the notion of an object is properly alien here) while in thought, the primordial relation is subject to object. Thus Kant's whole problem of object-formation is misleadingly labelled as a progression from the subjective to the objective, and can now be seen as the becoming-thought of intuitive space and time.

What about time? In an important and remarkably rich passage Kant writes:

'... there is an order among our representations in which the present (in so far as it has come to be) gives us a referral [Anweisung gibt (auf)] to some preceding state as a indeterminate correlate of the event which is given; but nevertheless, the correlate is determinantly [not 'determinately'] referred to the event as its consequence, connecting it necessarily with itself in the time-series ...

What is being expressed here is both the regulative nature of the second Analogy and its necessity. But it is important to observe the two phrases 'in so far as it has come to be' and 'gives us a referral' as opposed to 'is ... referred'. It is the present itself, and not the representations given in the present, that gives the referral, and this because it has come to be. The present is always already constituted out of relations to and among the past (also to the future, of course, but this is not Kant's concern at the moment): it comes to be. As a coming to be, it refers outside of itself for its possibility as present. But this constitution, like the point-of-view above, has to be thought by way of order (order of course being the dominant concern in the second Analogy) for it to be brought out as 'the present' which 'gives a referral'. The present thus becomes the consequence of the determining correlate. The present as part of a predicable trio (present, past, future) is in the order, but the order would not of
course have been possible as such without the coming to be, from out of the whole structure of time, of the present.

This is the significance of 'gives us a referral'. If Kant had said that 'the present refers', he would have been open to the charge of self-contradiction with respect to the non-perceivability of time in itself. And yet, if he had said the present event referred, we would have lost the regulative nature of the analogy and with it the whole point about the construction of temporality by the understanding.

But also and at the same time the presentness of the present (here: as a time that has come to be, a point or a pointer) is considered independently from its formal and sensible 'contents'. Time is no longer being considered as constituting and actualizing form inseparable from temporal events, but as container ('time-series'). This too is a consequence of the construction of time via the determination of order - recall Kant's discussion of 'removing appearances from time' in the Transcendental Aesthetic (A31=B46). Only schematized with respect to time can the hypothetical judgement form become causation; only as realized by causation does time in itself (that is, as a thing) have a past, present and future all necessarily laid out in the time series.

The conclusion we come to is this: the objectness of the object indeed consists solely in the necessary connection of the 'flat' manifold of intuition. And it is only because there are objects that there is a subject which judges them, carries knowledge of them, wills them or takes pleasure in them. No subject without object, for substance is a category of relation and the relation comes first. And finally, because an intuition is not yet in itself a representation, it is impossible on Kantian terms to make the leap which must have seemed obvious for at least a chapter now: the development of an alternate, nondiscursive ontology wherein the forms of intuition are constitutive of 'objects'. Heidegger warns us against this often enough: the very
form of the question 'What is...’ already projects a metaphysical determination of objectness. Care that seems at times excessive must be taken.
1.2.6. The Paradoxes of Schematism.

In the Schematism, Kant seems to default. He writes, 'this schematism of our understanding in its view of appearances and their mere form, is a concealed art in the depths of the human soul, the nature of whose true labour we will scarcely ever guess and have laid open before our eyes' (A141=B180-1). But this is only a default if we cannot show exactly why - that is, transcendentally - the schematism, as such, is concealed; that is, why it is either unthinkable or not a possible object of experience.

Many interesting points are introduced in the opening paragraph. Kant writes,

'In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representation of the former must be homogeneous with the latter; that is, the concept must contain something which is represented (vorgestellt) in the object to be subsumed under it - which is precisely what the expression 'an object is contained under a concept' means. Thus the empirical concept of a plate is homogeneous with the pure geometrical concept of a circle, since the roundness to be thought in the former can be intuited in the latter' (A137=B176).

It has become traditional to reverse the 'former' and 'latter' in the last sentence. But in the empirical concept of a plate, roundness is brought to thought; in the geometrical concept of a circle, the clue to a schema of roundness is to be found such that 'roundness' itself, and not a determinate empirical object like a plate (which has a particular roundness as a property), is intuited or brought to a schema - since it is a geometrical concept, we may properly say 'constructed'. Thus there is no need to alter the order of Kant's words as later commentators have supposed.
What does Kant mean by 'homogeneous'? At issue is not an essential link between concept and object, but with the 'representation' of an object; namely, intuition. But Kant tells us in the second paragraph that empirical schematism is not the real issue, and that empirical concepts and intuitions are homogeneous without further interference. Then, of course, as every commentator has pointed out, Kant proceeds to give examples of empirical schematism and even, in the paragraph just quoted, speaks of homogeneity between two concepts. Provisionally, let us define homogeneity as that form- (but not content) agreement which makes possible the operation of thinking one representation in terms of another. Partly, of course, the discussion of empirical schematism was meant merely as an illustration or analogy for the concept of schematism in general. But the illustration was never clear enough for it to be functional in this way; let us interrogate it.

Kant writes, '... a representation that, from a general procedure of the imagination, supplies a concept its image, I call the schema to this concept' (A140=B179-80). Elsewhere, the schema is called a 'rule' or 'procedure'. The schema is a product of the imagination and is a representation, but is not singular, like an image. With respect to the pure concepts of the understanding, the schema is a determination of time; but apparently the schema of empirical concepts is not limited merely to time.' The schema, however, by being indeterminate and plural is still like a concept. We might term it a figurative concept.

Now it is certainly very queer, and I do not know if it has been noted adequately before, is that Kant does not widely use the notion of 'rule' or 'law' in the second transcendental deduction until its end, where he is essentially giving an out of place commentary on or introduction to the Principles. Why? We suspect this comes about for the same reason as Kant chose to eliminate the transcendental object. In the second deduction, the categories are 'forms of thought' merely (B150) and are simply the mode in which the unity of apperception is generated or exhibited within judgement. Rules are out of place here.
The notion of rules, Kant implies negatively, applies only to concepts considered with respect to the schematism.

Thus, we might say, it is the task of the faculty of schematism - which is the a priori imagination - to generate rules for intuition. Now, a pure category is certainly not a class concept for Kant, when he is thinking most clearly. Rather, we must assert with T. K. Swing that, prior to schematism, the categories are only the forms of judgement considered as forms for the organization of concepts or the materials of concepts. The relation judgement forms/phenomenal categories is not the relation genre/species. Whatever this may imply for transcendental schematism, it gives us a clue for the empirical schematism.

What is the meaning of Kant's statement that empirical concepts are not heterogeneous from intuitions? Empirical concepts already exist as rules; that is to say, empirical concepts are their schemata, provided we recognize that empirical concepts can never be only logical class concepts, but must also be synthesizing rules (see Kemp Smith 336ff).

The doubleness arises out of the necessary double operation of 'concepts' for Kant: concepts must unify manifolds of concepts (possible subjects for and predicates of) as well as sensible manifolds (concepts as rules for the connection of sensible particulars). So if schemata are supposed to solve the problem of how concepts meet intuitions, in the ordinary empirical case the schema is already there, and is not some 'third thing.' We can think of concepts in all these ways (as class, as rule, as schema) - it is thinking them in all of these ways together that is difficult and is the immediate object of our discussion.

There are thus two problems in the Schematism chapter. One is how categories become rules (i.e. acquire schemata) for the synthesis of a manifold. The other is how something like either an a priori or empirical rule can be both sensible and intellectual.
The very notion of a figurative concept seems to bring out what is decisive in this problem, since above we said that the significance of space and time was their ability to actualize the matter of a sensation. That is to say, what is distinctive about intuition is its immediate and singular relation to - its granting of the possibility of any immediate relation to - the presence of an object. It is impossible for a concept, which is discursive and thus caught up in notions of representation and subsumption, to be in an immediate relation to an object. This would be tantamount to the intellectual intuition. What is a schema if not either a mere concept nor an empirical intuition? What is distinctive about the schema is not only that it allows concepts access to the pure forms of intuition, but that it allows these forms to be generalized and abstracted - made concept-like. The schema thus represents the possibility of knowledge; and in particular this is the importance of Kant's example of the plate and its relation to the pure geometrical concept of a circle - the schema represents the possibility of a priori knowledge of geometry.

Now the conceptual determination of an object is also its loss; the detour of discursiveness is the loss of the actualizing effect of space and time. Space and time are the very face of finitude. But from the very first sentences of the Critique, we understand our being as essentially involved in means of access. The word 'Mittel', alone or as the root of compounds, occurs five times in that first paragraph. The etymological relation of Mittel to 'Mitte' or middle (also in English, of course: 'means' and 'mean'), and thus to spaciality, is probably a pun Kant would have chosen to disregard. The question of means, then, is essentially a transcendental question but transcendence is also a means; that is to say, establishing that distance, which is pure conceptuality itself, between mind and immediate intuition is the means by which intuition supplements its finitude, and knowledge of an object, if not the object, becomes possible. But if the supplement is to do its work, that distance must both remain and be abolished. This paradoxical tension is the schematism itself and, more generally, the
whole Analytic of Principles. We can see this tension operating in that tradition of Kant-commentators who not only dismiss Kant’s solution here but also his problem - that is, those who do not accept radical finitude as a problem.

Kant says that the representation of an object in intuition can never attain (‘erreichen’, related to reichen, to reach or extend) to the generality of a concept. But why not, if the particular by definition contains more ‘information’ than the concept? Perhaps because the concept is a concept by virtue of its unity, produced by the synthesis of imagination as regulated by the original unity of apperception. The concept, that is, is overlaid by a unity arriving from ‘above’. If the schema, then, is to produce an image of a concept (is to be a figurative concept), it must be a representation that imports to space and time the unified generality of the concept. Clearly all we have succeeded in accomplishing so far is polishing the glaring surface of the paradox; is it possible to do more?
What distinguishes the schema-concept from the concept as logical class such that it might be sensible? The difference between an ordinary image and the schema apparently lies in this: the empirical image, Kant writes, 'is a product of the empirical faculty of the [probably: re-] productive imagination; the schema ... is a product and, as it were, a monogram, of pure a priori imagination through which and in accordance with which, images themselves first become possible. These images, however, always must be connected with concepts by means of the schema, which they describe (bezeichnen), and are themselves never fully congruent with the concept' (A141-2=B181).

The metaphor of the monogram is interesting. In the first instance, this product is the mark, trace, or calling card of the a priori imagination; we recognize the existence and operation of the pure productive imagination via the schemata it produces. But a monogram is also a principle of unity and organization itself. A monogrammed 'I', for example, delimits a determinate range of names (Immanuel, Imogen, Issac, Isabella...) and gives the principle of their identity as I-ness, while yet being of their order, that is, being a letter, a figurative character in space. The unity of that manifold which the monogram unifies is given internally to the manifold, such that it is improper to speak of a manifold - it is always already an imminently determinate set. Kant's example of the schemata for numbers functions in precisely the same way as the monogram, for the unification of sets of fives (five dogs, five plates, triangles, turnips, etc.) is immanent in precisely the same way as the I, not needing to pass through the concepts 'dog', 'plate', etc.

The metaphor of the monogram is repeated in an interesting and suggestive context in, no less, the 'Ideal of Pure Reason', A570=B598). Here, Kant speaks of the so-called 'ideals of sensibility' carried by painters and physiognomists. Kant explains that such an ideal a
product of the imagination, incommunicable and unintelligible, furnishing no rules, and rather like a ‘blurred sketch’ [schwebende Zeichnung] or monogram acquired by multiple experience, and not even amounting to a determinate image. The difference seems to be this: that the schema arises out of the concept, the sensible ideal from empirical images, and thus has not been through the clarifying trial by fire of discursiveness - thus Kant says, it is incommunicable although it may well be the basis of (some kind of) estimation [Beurteilung]. It may well be that Kant draws attention to this distinction by using the word ‘Beurteilung’ rather than ‘Urteilung’.

Similarly, ‘monogram’ in Latin is translated by ‘Umriss’, and identified with schema, in the ‘Architectonic of Pure Reason’ [A833=B861]. There it stands for the sketch of a basic science, based on the rational idea of that science. Its construction is explicitly identified as not ‘technical’ in Kant’s sense of that word: its parts have an affinity [Verwandtshaft], not just a similarity [Ähnlichkeit]. Each of these uses of ‘monogram’ draws attention to an inner form of unity not strictly identifiable with that designated by the category of unity.

Returning to the quotation cited above, what could Kant mean in saying that images ‘bezeichnen’ a schema? Kemp Smith expresses his bafflement in translating this verb as ‘to belong to’. Bezeichnen means to mark or indicate; to describe; to call or describe as. The word also had an etymological partner appear a few lines above: the schema of a dog makes possible the ‘general delineation [verzeichnen] of the form of a fourfooted animal...’ (A141=B180). If we attribute to this connection the general meaning of ‘drawing’ or ‘describing’, then we must say that the various empirical (and particularized) images somehow mark out the schema as a schema through their figuration as images. The schema only realises itself in making possible images of things, so it is only through these images that we come to know the schema. And thus the schema is both indicated by the existence of and described by the form
of the images, for the images certainly contain all that the schema contains, but not as a rule.

Using the notion of the monogram as a clue, and reconsidering what we have called the wholeness of space and time, we can speculate that the schema is just the concept considered as a rule for the synthesising of manifolds - it thus represents the unity of the concept by a wholeness but within a closed space and time. An empirical intuition is not closed - that is, it depends upon (its relations extend necessarily to) the never simply present wholeness of space and time. Closure here has an essential link to the understanding's need to think determination internally. Now closure is, even for the understanding, predicated on a certain exterior, which is one reason why synthesis always precedes analysis for Kant. Kant argues, for example at B133n, that a concept is nothing (not one concept) if it does not exist in possible combination with other and diverse subjects, and thus synthesis precedes analysis. Every concept is thus a 'conceptus communis.' But closure here is not regulative (meaning a concept (like a proper name) with a unique extension of one is already a concept) and is always already accomplished (meaning the exterior is already a constellation of interiors, of synthetic unities and commonness), even if, as Kant argues in the Jäsche Logic, empirical concepts are condemned to an incompleteness; thus such incomplete vagueness and openness must be accounted as utterly different. In other words, closure in the understanding actually makes analysis possible - that is, constructs a determinate inside, which can then find its place in a hierarchy of class concepts. Such a determinate inside is something intuition, of itself, could never form. If an intuition were closed or bounded it would not be particular or actualized - singular - but would already be generalized. Synthesis, as the fundamental operation of the understanding but alien to intuition, effects, as it were, a sea-change.
The notion of closure gives content to what we have already called a 'figurative concept.' When Kant discusses the problem of geometrical construction again in 'The Discipline of Pure Reason' (even using the same example of a triangle) this vital point receives its confirmation: the schema is the singular construction (the triangle on the chalkboard) but considered as a universal, that is to say, closed off from the particularities of its singularity and context (A713-4=B741-2). Now, what is distinctive about a wholeness is that it is non-categorically relational. For example, the relation that is an object's determinate position is indeed an absolute particular, and we are only ever given these particulars in intuition. The wholeness (which is space itself) of such a set of relations lies in their pure side-by-sideness - in other words, the 'relations' between relations are themselves just relations, there is no conceptual or categorical meta-level that unifies them. (We have already discussed similar concepts in speaking of the 'span' and 'duration' of intuited 'betweens'.) If in the schema, however, the plurality of possible empirical images (which are themselves, for Kant, always mere relations of mutual limitation) stand together not as unified-under but as a whole-within (like the monogram), this is because their 'determination' as a particular representation but in a closed space and time agrees with their 'determination' by a concept. The schema's unity does not subsume, strictly speaking. The schema is nowhere and nowhen while any image, even if ideal and without a actual object, is always particular and somewhere.

Take Kant's example of a dog. With respect to the concept, the various images of dogs (which are thereby real, whether imagined or actual) are unified 'from above' by a common set of properties which collectively we call the intension of the concept 'dog'; but with respect to the schema, the wholeness of the collection of possible figures and forms is immanent to their plurality. Heidegger expresses this by considering the gegenstehenlassen (roughly, 'allowing objectification') as neither prior nor subsequent to subsumption, but identical with it,
and develops the point with his own example: 'this house which we perceive indicates how a house appears in general, and consequently that which we represent in the concept 'house' ... in order to be a house, it need not necessarily appear as, in fact, it does appear. It indicates to us 'only' the 'how' of the possible appearance of a house' (Kant-Buch, 99). The implicit distinction between representation (vorstellen) and indication (zeigen) is Heidegger's version of our own distinction between the unified-under and the whole-within, although Heidegger's exposition takes him in other directions. Thus, just like the monogram, the schema is not a principle of synthesis or subsumption so much as the same-order mark (figuration in space and time) of their belonging-together.

The figurative concept is like a stencil [Umriss, Kant says] which the understanding can place over 'raw' intuitions during or rather as synthesis. As a character it has, despite and indeed as its closed materiality, a certain set of rules for its orientation and application and consequently has generality - while as a mere 'thing' (in intuition) it would have neither. That is to say, its internal universality (whole-within) is only possible on the prior condition of its being as figuration in closed space and time, which in turn is only possible on the basis of a concept, a unified-under.
1.2.8. Models and Closure.

It may be possible to further clarify and extend this picture of schematism by a brief digression on the theory of models.11

A model consists of a hypothetical or real system whose relations are unambiguous and precise. By this I mean they are explicitly thematised above the objects related, and not that they are necessarily quantitative (although in mathematical models they tend to be so). Let us call this a model's structuredness. The relations are rule-governed in well-known ways. If a model has elements within it that do not belong completely to this structuredness, then either these elements can be abstracted from or else the model ceases to be a model.

Further, through a set of application rules and boundary conditions the limits of which must not be passed (let us call these mapping-conditions), the model can be and is intended to be associated to a primary system which it thus 'models' (this is its mapping-directedness). Without mapping-conditions, there can be no mapping-directedness, or perhaps the latter is a directedness towards everything and nothing. Both the primary system and the model system are presumed to be closed; that is, its structuredness and the rules of that structuredness are finite. If this were not the case, the relations would not be 'unambiguous and precise', nor would any useful mapping-conditions be available. This is to say that of course the model need not be a perfect model, but closure indicates that we must know when (have boundary-conditions, etc.) it is going to fail and to what degree. This closure may, of course, only be ideal for an actual, material model, but must be quite real for the model qua model.

In addition to its uses for prediction and explanation, a model may be exploratory. An exploratory model is one wherein certain associated but not yet mapped relations will hopefully provide clues to certain relations and effects within the primary system. In general, a model
can only be exploratory if its boundary conditions are either approximate or incomplete - although it is important to recognize that no model, as we defined a model above, can be infinitely exploratory - this follows simply from closure. The exploratory model itself has two modes: the generative and the hypothetical. The difference being that in the latter the not-yet-mapped relation was not in fact discovered afterwards, and may have been the reason why the model system was chosen in the first place. In a generative exploratory model, a new exploratory relation is discovered after mapping-directedness as a kind of added extra; however, this new relation first has to be determined within the model system. Thus, a generative exploratory model becomes in effect a primary system for a time; and the original primary, if it remains relevant at all, becomes temporarily a model.

In addition to the relation between the parts of the systems, there are also the relations between the systems themselves. The relation between parts in two systems we call representation, but representation is itself a model - between a part 'in the model' and a part 'in the primary system' there exists a relation which we then have a model for; therefore, the concept of representation can be called an application model. The relations between the relations can be called description - we say this because we like to think there is something not arbitrarily representative about the way a primary system is modeled. The concept of description is also an application model. Both of these are another way of thinking about mapping-conditions, though the very concept of mapping-conditions presupposes prior application models of representation and description.\textsuperscript{12}

Now representation and description are firmly directed: there is a signifier and there is a signified. But they need not be, and the notion of an example makes this clear. Consider a child learning new words. An adult holds up an apple and says 'apple'. It would be normal for us to think of the word apple as a representation, perhaps via a concept or idea, of the apple or of the set of all apples or
appleness, or whatever. But from the child’s point of view, the physical apple is targeting or representing the word. Of course, there are all sorts of paradoxes here which eventually evacuate the purity of the concept representation - I am not interested in them at the moment. What is important is that directedness is reversible: the primary system also models the model.

If in some essential way the model is not closed, then it cannot be said to have structuredness as we defined it above. A system that has no structuredness clearly cannot have mapping-conditions as such. Now, we might want to call such an open model a generative exploratory model. But there are two problems: 1) the generative exploratory model was, in an important sense, an accidental outcome of misestimating the precise closure and structuredness of a model; in our present case, however, closure is considered as abandoned from the beginning. 2) Even were such an identification possible, we would be forced to recognize that its status as a model of a primary system would be put in jeopardy - because, as we observed above, even in closed exploratory models mapping-directedness can be reversed and is at least suspended. Thus, if what we are trying to consider as a model is in fact an open system, and is not even ideally closed, then it cannot have mapping-directedness. Something strange now ensues. We could just call this a primary system without a model, except that we took the initial view (for whatever reason) that it was, in fact, a model.

Translating all this back into Kant, intuition can also be described as open in this more precise sense. Because ultimately we are trying to understand intuition, and we have no way of so understanding this except in terms of object-directedness (which Kant calls representation), which I am here modelling with the concept of a model, therefore our initial assumption of the state as model cannot simply be dropped, whatever paradoxes it may lead to. Intuition is always assumed (by the understanding) to have mapping-directedness or in other words, to be a representation: intuition is intuition of. If this is
the case, then the understanding of intuition by the faculty of cognition is made to disagree with intuition qua intuition. For in the latter, as we have been arguing all along, the discursive and thus self-closing rules of structuredness required for mapping-directedness are missing. This can be expressed another way: the intuition has a 'structure' only by virtue of a the forms of intuition which reveal themselves for cognition as always external and non-finite in nature, and thus they cannot be considered immanent, nor can the intuition be considered as an instance of the forms as concepts. Such a 'structure' is not, therefore, structuredness as we defined it above. And thus the intuition both is and is not a representation. This is perhaps the very centre of all the paradoxes and violences we have observed between the two Kantian faculties. 13

If we make the additional assumption, which Kant makes, that the object of intuition (the primary system) is unknowable in itself, then the problems only deepen, for in that case we can say that, in a sense, what we are actually intuiting are mere representations and descriptions (phenomena, in Kant's words). But from the point of view of the mere relations of representation and description, there is no way of telling the parts of an open model from the relations between those parts, precisely because there is no determinate order or structuredness in the model. The open model, then, has no objectivity criteria. Similarly, open intuitions cannot have mapping-directedness and cannot intuit objects - for there are no directedness nor objectivity criteria within intuition itself. As we metaphorically described it above, such intuitions are necessarily 'flat'. The becoming-representational of the intuition is accomplished by an internal reorganisation or transformation of the intuition (now considered as material and manifold) such that its form is given entirely internally or according to a finite set of rules. This is a more general description of precisely what we saw happening in our discussion above of the second Analogy of Experience.
We have already shown that the concept of representation presupposes both the intuition of outerness held in the pure intuition of space, and the objectification of appearances made possible by the a priori understanding. What is made additionally clear by the discussion of models is the relationship between representation and closure. Kant writes that images are possible only through a schema, but that nonetheless they also describe or mark out the schema. We were only partially successful in interpreting this above. Kant’s assertion seems paradoxical until we realize that when Kant says ‘image’ he does not mean the mere mental state which we have been calling ‘intuition’ (whether real or imagined). An image is always an image of..., a representation, and this is only possible through the closure of the schema. And yet, while the schematism is a concealed art, images can be looked at and communicated, and insofar as they are looked at as images of..., they make possible the schema.

But at the same time, in empirical judgement, this ideality is necessarily applied within an open field it cannot control; in the last chapter, we called this open field the syntactical. In the schema conceived as figurative concept, the closure is at least thought as possible - as soon, however, as the understanding is placed in the service of intuition, the closure is burst open, and becomes regulative, and even this only from the point of view of the understanding. We saw this happening in Kant’s miscellaneous descriptions (ie., in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science) of the never-complete determination of position in space and time. It is precisely because of syntax - which for the understanding means the always present possibility of non-agreement - that reason is required to regulate the understanding towards universality in all judgements.

Only in this way can we understand rigorously in what way the schematism can be said to be a ‘concealed art’: it is precisely that which cannot either be fully thought or fully intuited. Thus we have preserved intact that gap in the faculties that is finitude, while
accounting for the possibility of knowledge. But it is also on the basis of the wrenching open of closure by syntax that we understand the possibility of experience in its richness - substance as the source of inexhaustible aspects (the sublime), unthinkable forms (beauty), undecidable causes (teleology). The discursive understanding's failure to fully hold its own at the 'lowest' level of intuition must be necessary a priori or else Kant's critique of 18th century rationalist thought may as well have never taken place. Our interpretation of the schematism has indeed gone beyond the letter of Kant's text, but it remains 'strictly' Kantian.

It remains to note that, in our discussion of empirical schematism we have stumbled upon its relation to transcendental schematism and thus also treated of the latter. The schemata of the categories still belongs to the imagination, but in its most transcendental operation. No image can be found for a category, even an inadequate one; this just means that the schema will indeed be pure. Instead, the categories' relation to sensibility will be through certain transcendental determinations of time. But surely (many commentators have argued) a category like causation already stands in a relation to time, is it then already schematized? According to the letter of Kant's text, clearly not; yet such a line of thought is productive and leads to T.K. Swing's interpretation of the formation of categories from an encounter of the judgement-forms with intuition.

Now Kant argues that time is homogeneous with the category in so far as it is universal and 'rests [beruht] a priori upon a rule' (A139=B178-9). This, of course, is where Kant's analysis even on its own terms, goes awry: he does not indicate that the resting upon a rule is, strictly speaking, always one of two views of time. Time in itself is not axiomatic but formal - thus mere rulefulness is not adequate for homogeneity if the rules are of different orders. However, Kant seems to have given a glance in this direction in the last paragraph of the Schematism:
'... although the schemata of sensibility first realize the
categories, they at the same time also restrict them; that
is, constrain them to conditions which lie outside the
understanding (namely, in sensibility)' (A146=B185-6).

This indicates that the categories themselves in their application to
experience irredeemably take on the aspect of sensibility and thus
undergo a change which distinguishes them from pure thought - they
become the analogy of thought.\(^4\) That this should be expressed
paradoxically is no surprise. If the 'rule' of time were just another
rule, then this language would be ludicrous.

Rather, then, time is in itself ruled only after it has been
encountered and has passed through the activity of the understanding.
Closed time is rule-governed in the way Kant requires: it displays
axiomatically what was only formal, that time is whole, one-dimensional
and, by this point, sequential and infinitely divisible. Only closed
time can accept determination according to the pure understanding, and
thus serve as a model. Clearly, we are back to the same concepts we
used in treating of empirical schematism. But we are speaking as if
time is closed by something other than the sovereign act of
determination. On the contrary, schematism just is the production, as
a transcendental judgement, of time-determination which in turn just is
the realisation of the category as phenomenal.

But we are still telling narratives. As if, at some time \(t_1\), there was
pure intuition. Then, at time \(t_2\), the intuition is 'run through' by
the understanding. Finally, later still, a transcendental judgement is
made and a phenomenal category is born. There are many stupidities in
such a description. The following points need to be made:

1) As we recognised before, the distinction between intuition and
concept, as separate types of mental state, is a distinction the only
reality of which lies in intuition and concept being the two
necessarily possible directions of abstraction from actual experience. All experience demands this transcendental analysis, but obviously there is no parallel claim that at any time there exists a mental state called pure intuition or pure concept. The demand for such an analysis is just what Kant means by 'transcendental conditions of possibility'. The same holds for Kant's 'third thing', the figurative concept or the pure closed intuition. We should not be surprised if the transcendental schematism falls into line with the empirical - for it is the latter which demands the former.

2) Very simply and concisely, Kant's claim is this: of any empirical judgement it can necessarily always be claimed that this judgement arose from the encountering by concepts of intuition, which encounter was already in-formed by a transcendental judgement.

3) It follows that there is no harm in telling transcendental stories, provided of course no vivisectionist goes hunting for the lobe of pure space. It also follows that, although they are stories, they have consequence, precisely by virtue of the fact that they are transcendental and thus universal.

4) In many ways, transcendental schematism is the ultimate story, practically an epic. It brings together all the main plots: the propriety of pure intuition and pure thought, the encountering of intuition, the projection of objectivity, and so forth. (Only apperception and rational illusion are missing.) Because of this ultimacy, the story became too long for Kant to hide its fictionality, and he had to claim that it was self-hiding.

The missing elements of the story remain to be considered. We should hardly be surprised at this point if these elements too demand for their analysis the same formal structures which we have found at work from the Transcendental Aesthetic and which, in the Introduction to this work, we have called 'spacing'.
1. The reader should note that this brief reconstruction is my own, although no doubt it has been influenced in countless ways by the enormous body of literature alluded to above.

2. A much more thorough treatment of apperception will be given in the next chapter.

3. Thus T.K. Sing's objection that "contrary to Kant's arguments, we usually determine objective succession without invoking the causal principle" (Sing, 151) unknowingly but completely aligns itself with Hume and misses the point (indeed, misses the order) of Kant's demonstration. At this point I refer the reader to H.W. Cassirer's text, in particular the discussion of what has been labelled Kant's third argument, on pp. 195ff.

4. This is further thematised by Kant in his distinction between intensive and extensive magnitudes. It might well be that Kant's view of sensation (which is essentially a bizarre twist of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities) is wholly without foundation - or, in other words, no rigorous distinction can be upheld in this case between form and content. We will ignore this issue here, although we recognize that this ignorance may be a mistake.

5. Of course, speaking in terms of width, depth, span or duration is improper with respect to intuition because such language assumes space and time are object-like. What would be a proper language, however, is difficult to imagine. Perhaps one might begin by characterising intuition as a 'network of qualified betweens' - i.e. a 'red spacial between' or a 'loud temporal between'. However enjoyable, however, this naming is just theatre.

6. Which means probably we have a completely wrong model of synthetic experience. However, in epistemology our model does not matter, so long as the required output is logically possible on the basis of the given input.

7. Kant evidently had later reservations about only using time for the pure schemata - and rightly so. Cf. also the marginal comment to first analogy by Kant noted in Kemp Smith's 'Commentary', p360.

8. Now and again, Kant calls intuitions 'singular concepts'. This is a traditional designation Kant has inherited. Immediacy implies singularity, and not the reverse.

9. Although in the schematism Kant speaks of mathematical examples side by side with dogs, yet because mathematics can construct its objects a priori and thus only mathematical concepts can have complete definitions (in the Leibnizian sense), the meaning of schema as a rule must be different for the two types of example (cf. Louis White Beck in Wolff 1968, 31). If this is so, then it is impossible in the sensible ideal passage to be sure which type of rule - rules for estimating empirical objects or rules for synthesizing mathematical constructions - is in question. Possibly, Kant was just confused on the issue of how the rules differed that made possible different types of judgement. In as much, however, as at the very beginning of the Schematism Kant posits as possible a basic homogeneity between the empirical concept of a plate and the geometrical concept of a circle, it seems unlikely that we should consider the two rule-types which govern the synthetic activity of each (empirical concepts/mathematical concepts) as essentially different.
10. In paragraph 17 of the Critique of Judgement, Kant discusses a similar phenomenon, here called a 'normal idea' and describes it in words like 'mean' or 'average', 'contour' [Umriiss] and 'figure' [Gestalt]. The examples are very similar indeed. Here, though, although the normal idea is not based upon rules obtained from actual measurement, it is yet the condition for the possibility of any rules of estimating the perfection of a form, and is presentable. Separated by nine years, it is no wonder Kant's account of this phenomenon has altered.

11. The conceptual vocabulary is my own, but there is certainly a great indebtedness to Max Black and others.

12. Application models, being models, themselves require further application models. Either there is an infinite regress, which empirically is not the case, or something is missing in our description of models. These considerations will be more fully discussed in part 2.

13. The Paradox is enhanced when we realise that not-being-a-representation does not also exclude what phenomenologists understand by 'intentionality'. As we shall see, intentionality would be completely misunderstood if we took it to describe a mental state the immanent structure of which necessarily posited an X to which the state referred. This is one reason why Heidegger decisively drops the noesis/noema distinction.

14. Actually, for Kant, it is only the dynamic principles that could be called analogies, because they are regulative and not constitutive, but at the end of the introduction to the Analogies of Experience (A181=B223-4) Kant seems to apply the notion of analogy more widely to all categories inasmuch as it is the schema and not the category that applies to experience in all cases.
1.3.

Spacing at the Limits of Transcendental Thought

1.3.0.

Asking why we move now to a discussion of transcendental apperception is straightforward: Kant calls apperception the form of consciousness. It is imperative to understand what this means. We will eventually arrive at an interesting analogy between the form of intuition and the form of consciousness. This analogy Kant already and explicitly posits in terms of the presentation function of the forms. But the analogy has to be seen also in the mode of presentation. It will then be clear in what ways there lies a certain spacing in apperception, which in turn requires a slight modification to an otherwise traditional reading of the Deduction.

The second part of this chapter will discuss the Ideal of Pure Reason. It is equally easy to answer why one might want to take the question of spacing to the Dialectic. For it is implied in the Dialectic and asserted explicitly in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* that absolute space is an idea of reason. On one level this is clear enough and of only secondary interest, since absolute space is only a conceptual issue. But ideas of reason, it would seem, behave rather like intuitions in some respects (i.e. in their essential form), and thus Kant’s reasons for this move are more complex and suggestive than it would seem.

Though it is not our subject here, a few and too-brief speculations can be made which will place all this work into a historical context. The rationalist tradition had always taken its ideas of reason as constitutive. Ideas were either true or false representations of states of affairs. For Kant the ideas are regulative, the very act of the ‘as if’. This ‘as if’ is the ultimate outcome of the critique of
reason. This regulative nature marks the place of a certain gap or delay between the idea and its 'completion'. Of course, for Kant there is no question of the actuality of completion, and yet given Kantian premises, Idealism had no where else to turn. Thus representation of the absolute (if representation is an appropriate word) gets thought in terms of telos, project, Bildung, history. If this gap is figured, as it inevitably is, in terms of the subject/object difference and the constitution of that difference, then there arise all the questions of representation, mimesis, models, etc. Moreover, since the self both posits the idea and accomplishes or constructs its actuality, this project of the self is a journey of the self, its auto-formation. Finally, following the outer limit of what Kant's work suggests to us, we see, as the Romantic Ironists seem to have seen, that the impossibility of the completion of the project cannot be thought simply in terms of infinite regress, nor in terms of a necessary empirical insufficiency of resources at hand; rather, one must consider how the project posits itself as synthetic unity already within the duplicity of a representational space made possible by the annihilation of an intuited absolute. That is to say, reunion is not of the nature of the absolute. Or, to put it differently, the two ontologies refuse to coalesce in synthesis.
1.3.1. The Argument of the Deduction.

If we may be so audacious, let us attempt to present at least a vague paraphrase of the argument in the second edition Deduction. We restrict ourselves to the second edition in the interests of economy; this necessarily means that our account must be incomplete, but then one suspects that, given the subject, it would be so in any case. Further, whatever we give below will tread on countless philosophical toes. This cannot be avoided, and one must begin somewhere - in this case, Kant's text itself is perhaps the worst possible place to begin!

The following is an attempt to outline, very approximately and briefly, the argument that Kant actually gives - and not yet the argument he should, might or could have given.

1. It must be possible for the representation 'I think' to accompany all my representations, otherwise I would be thinking representations which could not be thought, and owning representations which do not belong to me, both of which are contradictions. Let us call whatever generates this 'I think' the OSUA (Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception). This 'I think' is always possible, but not always actual. Indeed, precisely because of OSUA I am aware that certain representations are within me without having the tag 'I think' explicitly attached to them.

2. Since this 'I think' is only possible, the OSUA must justify that representation with respect to all representations but without actually justifying it in conjunction with all actual representations. That is, all the representations in the manifold of intuition bear a relation before all thought to the 'I think'. The OSUA generates its possibility transcendentally and a priori.

3. But, for the 'I think' to be what distinctively it is (the tag of self-consciousness), it is not enough for it to be linked to each
member of a manifold of representations. For though the 'I think' is
in every instance the same, there would be no guarantee within it as a
mere representation that in each case it referred to the identical
self. Rather, I must grasp the whole manifold as a unity and give it
the 'I think'. That is, I must synthesize the manifold under one (and
not many) 'I think' in order to have self-consciousness across the
whole manifold.

4. But the reverse is also true: in order to synthesize a manifold
under a rule, the elements of the manifold must all be my
representations, or capable of so being. This we call the Analytic
Identity of Apperception (AIA). This means that it is analytic that
whatever is mine must 'conform' to the conditions under which it can be
mine; or more concisely, that whatever has the 'I think' must already
(in some manner) 'belong' to the I that thinks.

5. Thus, though the 'I think' only becomes what it is properly with
such an actual synthesis, it must already have been possible.
Therefore the OSUA, which makes possible AIA, is transcendentally prior
to any given and particular synthetic act.

6. Experience is a determinate relation of a manifold of
representations to an object, but an object is simply that in which or
because of which the manifold of representations is united according to
rules.

7. But uniting of any manifold (as was shown above) requires the unity
of consciousness in the synthesis; thus, OSUA is the ultimate condition
of the possibility of a representation of an object, and thus of
experience.

8. Synthesis of a manifold means judgement about that manifold. Since
judgement is the manner in which representations are synthetically
brought under OSUA and thus become representations of objects, any act
of synthesis is determined in respect of one of the forms of judgement; and since the categories are just the forms of judgement considered as applying to intuition, intuition in general is necessarily subject to (and exclusively) the categories.

9. Finally, since space and time (as the actual forms of intuition) are both unique and themselves present manifolds requiring synthesis, no non-synthetic form of unity can be presented, and the categories therefore apply to all possible objects of experience.
1.3.2. Discussion.

Let us immediately say that we do not think this argument is acceptable. There may be dozens of problems, each resulting in a finesse (or complete overhaul) of the argument presented above. Indeed, one could easily discuss this celebrated argument for hundreds of pages. But one particular objection (and consequent finesse) is our target. To help us get there, it will be useful however to discuss a quite different problem.

Consider an argument similar to Körner’s argument against transcendental arguments in general. Such a counter-argument might claim that such arguments have no way of proving the uniqueness of the set of conditions as conditions of differentiation and identification. The transcendental argument, at best, could only prove that some one set of conditions were sufficient. However, this set is assigned the task of differentiating and identifying, which is a conceptual task. Thus, the pure set of conditions must be just the empirical field of concepts ‘purified’ of the super-added content of experience - that is, both levels have to be considered as concepts. One could indeed never prove from within experience that this purification must proceed in a certain direction, because we are guided only by the scheme we are attempting to prove is unique.

But if Kant’s thesis concerning the gap between the faculties is properly understood, then it becomes clear that the transcendental elements are not ‘similar’ to empirical concepts simply purified, precisely because they are divided into two heterogeneous groups: the forms of intuition and the forms of judgement. The problem about uniqueness, at the very least, is modified. The issue can no longer be whether a different set of concepts to Kant’s could perform the same work, because Kant simply defines a concept and the work it performs in terms of the forms of judgement and intuition both of which are contentless. Rather, we have to recognise that any question about the
uniqueness, completeness, difference or multiplicity of a scheme is already a judgement. Körner’s problem about getting outside one’s scheme becomes much more radical, but loses its force as an argument against transcendental deductions. Rather, one criteria for the evaluation of Kant’s transcendental deductions or arguments must be their ability to prove how the problem of the uniqueness of the object is set aside. Granting this, then, any questioning about uniqueness must assume one of the following: a) there is no consciousness; b) all the judgement forms, and thus general logic itself, must be overturned; c) we do not experience in space and time. It seems obvious Kant can make a good case against any of these three!

Indeed, it is only by understanding Kant correctly here that we can see how transcendental philosophy can both demonstrate and justify a priori categories - i.e. answer the quid juris. ‘Justification’ refers us back to Körner’s argument discussed above. For Kant, to be justified means to prove that any application of the categories does not distort or ignore possible objects of experience. Since, however, space and time bear no necessary relation to things-in-themselves, the categories are constitutive for what ‘possible objects’ are. Consequently, any proof which could show that a category was necessary for experience would also be proving both that the application of that category was justified and that its application was justified only within the limits of experience. Thus demonstration, justification and indeed critique itself are part of the same transcendental movement.

Returning to our main problem: the I think is the minimum aspect of consciousness, thus in saying that it must be possible for the I think to accompany all my representations, what I am saying is that in order for a representation to be actually conscious it must conform to the condition of possible consciousness. The emphasis on possibility is very explicit in the following passage:
'The thought 'these representations given in intuition belong one and all to me' consequently says the same as 'I unite them in one self-consciousness or can at least unite them therein'; and though this thought is not yet itself the consciousness of the synthesis of the representations, it does however presuppose the possibility of the latter; that is, only because I can grasp (begreifen) the manifold representations in one consciousness do I name them one and all mine; else I would have as many-coloured and various a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself ...' (B134).

But the outcome here is one of naming or calling the representations as mine: that is, of explicitly and consciously recognising them as mine. The combination of the emphasis on possibility and on naming or recognising greatly complicate the issues of the Deduction. If we ignore the 'possibility aspect', however, we encounter enormous and classic problems, as follows. The elements of a manifold have several modes of belonging together. First, they belong together as spacial/temporal - i.e. are a manifold of sensible intuition. Second, they belong together as representing an object - i.e. they behave according to discursive rules. These first two are relatively unproblematic. But third, they belong together as all being my representations. But this third belonging-together is paradoxical, since if 'being mine' means 'being conscious of', then I must have been conscious of something before I was conscious of it. Obviously, then, the transcendental mineness and the empirical mineness cannot be at all alike. This will prove to have important consequences.

So wherein lies the legitimacy of the 'transcendental synthesis ... in general' which assures the can? We might like to argue that, because space and time are forms of intuition which proscribe the form of all intuition (and because they are themselves manifolds, as Kant argues in the Deduction, against the Aesthetic), this transcendental synthesis
(as the giving of mineness to intuition in general) is possible prior to empirical intuition and synthesis. But Kant distinguishes between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis (B150ff.). In his discussion of this distinction, he implies that the OSUA is prior to any recognition of the OSUA with respect to a priori manifolds. In addition, he writes,

This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary a priori, may be entitled figurative synthesis (synthesis speciosa), to distinguish it from the synthesis which is thought in the mere category in respect of the manifold of an intuition in general, and which is entitled combination through the understanding (synthesis intellectualis). (B151)

But how are we to distinguish between 'the manifold of [a priori] sensible intuition' and 'the manifold of an intuition in general'? Kant allows for the logical possibility of other forms of intuition than our own space and time. Kant asserts that the figurative synthesis, though a priori, is in some way subsequent to the mere intellectual synthesis in the mere category. The categories are the rules which bring apperception to intuition, no matter what or how that intuition is. The categories are the way that any intuition is mine. The actual forms of intuition, space and time, are rather the contingent modes in which categories actually function. Since the former are unique and present manifolds which themselves require synthesis, the application of the categories to all possible objects of experience is assured, and so Kant considers his Deduction complete. But possible consciousness is not consciousness - actual consciousness requires an actual manifold, which is already transcendentally mine but cannot be recognised as such (i.e. the mineness cannot become actualised) without a fairly ordinary act of synthesis.
Of course, it remains a question of what this 'transcendental' synthesis means? We have to understand 'transcendental' as meaning: descriptive of the unique and necessary conditions of possibility of the empirical in any analysis of the empirical, or better: descriptive of that which, in the analysis of the empirical, provides but also legitimates the necessary form of the empirical. The transcendental synthesis does not take place (solely) transcendentally (as if the transcendental were a location or a time). Rather, Kant claims that within every empirical synthesis, as its very essence, and indeed as that which provides and legitimates the form of not just that synthesis but the 'every' as well, must (somehow) lie an act of transcendental synthesis.

Is all this coherent? It might well be, except for one niggling problem.

Kant seems to be going against both the content and spirit of the Transcendental Aesthetic in demanding that space and time themselves be intuitions presenting manifolds. How can something be both a form of intuition, and an intuition? That is, how can spaciality, space and something-in-space all be construed as the same? We might ask where then is this perception of space itself, or of time itself? Kant apparently says 'in geometry' (B150n). But what kind of a space is this? In geometry we either talk about the properties of space (i.e. talk about a concept, as for example when a physicist talks about 13-dimensional space) or we project a region of space within which, for example, we imagine the intersection of two objects (i.e. imagine a more or less indefinite volume, itself a kind of object, as a way of located other objects - but not space itself). We only ever have perceptions of things or forms in space, real or imagined. Space and time themselves are either intuition-forms (the form of the form presented in intuition), or conceptual abstractions. If this is so, then how is what Kant calls the figurative synthesis (which guarantees a priori the application everywhere and always of the categories)
possible? Clearly it is not 'in general'. But if the figurative synthesis is not available, then there is no sense in saying, in advance, 'I can combine under the categories this or any manifold of intuition'. How does this change things?

In the intellectual synthesis, by an essential directive of the understanding, and under the auspices of pure apperception, the categories relate to intuition in general. Kant then tries to claim that space and time, as the forms of our intuition, provide contentless manifolds a priori by which it becomes possible for the categorical OSUA to be thought across space and time. But, as we have just shown, Kant's own arguments show this to be impossible.

So how, in the intellectual synthesis, does the mere category (as a form of thought in the understanding) synthesize the manifold in them (B150)? To put this problem in other words, what transcendental relation does understanding bear to sensibility, always within but without depending upon the content of an empirical relation? The obvious answer is that the understanding, transcendentally defined, is that faculty which brings rules to manifolds - this is the essence of the understanding. The understanding, as some kind of mental potency, never just stumbles across manifolds of intuition, then combining them. Rather, the understanding is from the first directed in the way of law towards them. The understanding just is this directedness-as-law-towards-manifoldness.

What Kant has to worry about, however, is the possibility that something other than manifolds might present itself - that is, a something with a unity other than that categorically prescribed. For in itself, intellectual 'synthesis' is hypothetical: if there were always to be sensible manifolds, then the OSUA would always be brought to them by way of categorical rules. Thus the cautious phrase, '...provided only it be sensible' at B150. But there is no guarantee from this alone that all presentations will be intuited manifolds.
Then not all presentations would be subject to categorical unity, or even to the unity of apperception - and the possibility of the 'I think' accompanying all 'my' representations would not exist. Of course, this results in a contradiction, expressed by our 'my' - Kant himself says that the identity of apperception is analytic. What would a representation in me be like if it was not 'mine'? But the contradiction is just the problem: AIA might be analytic, but it still has to be transcendently analyzed. Thus Kant forces himself to contradict the Transcendental Aesthetic and speak of space and time as themselves intuitions with manifolds (in section 26). If, however, we bypass Kant's contradiction, can the Deduction still work and what will it look like?

In brief, what has to be added to Kant's account here is an addition to the transcendental definition of the understanding made above: the understanding is that which is essentially directed in the way of law towards sensible manifolds, and always as manifolds. We can be brief, because we have in fact been arguing this point for two chapters now. The encountering of intuition by the understanding and by apperception demands not that intuitions 'in themselves and always' be atomistic manifolds, but rather that the understanding necessarily and by its nature always so construe them. This is the only way of saving Kant's deduction, at least from this particular fault. The result is to inscribe on the stone at the heart of the Critique the absolute formal gap between sensibility and understanding. Kant's own most central argument can thus be brought powerfully into line with our interpretation of intuition.

Now let us reconstruct Kant's argument accordingly. The only step in the above outline which needs altering (to take account of our problem, and not of course to take account of other problems) is the last. It should now read:
9. If there were some mental state $X$ which had a non-categorical form of unity, it would not be a manifold. Of course, such a mental state could not come to consciousness and thus be experienced as such an $X$. But there is no guarantee that $X$ could not still 'affect' (or 'infect') the understanding and thus experience - thus compromising the exclusivity and constancy of the categorical application to intuition in general. No guarantee, that is, unless we assume that the understanding is that which is directed essentially towards manifolds and always as manifolds. At least for the purposes of Kant's theoretical philosophy, this assumption becomes necessary if the transcendental account-books of experience are to balance necessarily. It follows that the categories necessarily apply (and exclusively) to all presentations, making of them objects of categorical experience.

But what, on this interpretation, is the mysterious OSUA exactly?

That synthesis which gives the 'I think' its 'can accompany' is the so-called transcendental intellectual synthesis. But this is not, in fact, a synthesis at all, if by synthesis we mean combination of the manifold under a rule. The 'manifold of an intuition in general', before the presentation of space and time, is not a manifold, but merely the thought of manifoldness. The intellectual synthesis is simply the recognition that the understanding is that the whole essence of which lies in synthesizing manifolds. But it is in this 'synthesis' that Kant places the synthetic unity of apperception itself (B157) - or, put in another way, it is what he means in writing that 'I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination' (B158).

Thus, the transcendental synthesis of the a priori manifold - which ensures the possibility of actual consciousness in every actual synthesis - does not actually happen as a synthesis, either separately or together with empirical synthesis. The understanding itself, from out of its essence, projects itself as that which, everywhere and
always, synthesizes, and this projection just is original apperception. Thus Kant also writes, 'this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself' (B134n). 'Encountered as synthetic' does not necessarily mean, in all cases, 'product of an act of synthesis'.

But this is not enough, surely. What guarantees that everything which the understanding encounters will be mine? A question which bears a close relation to the problem discussed above. Let us suppose that I start to be aware of 'someone else's' thoughts. Insofar as I understand those thoughts, and situate them in time with respect to my 'own' thoughts, I must already be synthesizing them according to concepts of meaning and order, etc. They are mine in the sense of 'being inside my head', but they 'belong' elsewhere. I might think myself suddenly telepathic, such that the 'elsewhere' is outside me. Or else consider myself chronically schizophrenic, where 'elsewhere' now means 'in a different personality occupying the same mental faculties', such that the representation is formed for me during those intervals when I am 'in possession of all my faculties'. What could possibly convince me that these thoughts are not in fact mine in one of these restricted senses? Could any sense be made of the proposition that 'these are not my thoughts, but are also not someone else's thoughts'? It seems clear that this proposition is nonsensical.

Suppose however, rather than having 'voices in my head' as the phenomenon is often represented in fiction, I have full-blown thoughts in my head. That is, rather than discovering within me an unexplained manifold, I encounter something already synthesized and understood. Kant at any rate would claim this was impossible. He might argue, as at the note to B133, that concepts are only concepts if they already exist in possible or actual synthesis with other concepts. Thus to be presented with a judgement that was already synthesized in isolation - that is, discontinuously - and claim it is immediately and non-synthetically understood, is impossible.
Such hypothetical examples thus present no counter to Kant's account of apperception. We conclude that, for Kant, mineness can only mean: continuously synthesized, where 'continuity' however is not contingent (Locke and Hume) but necessary a priori.

Necessarily then, we encounter OSUA as the synthetic unity of ourselves (which makes possible analytic statements about our identity) but, as that which precedes any given act of synthesis, it is just the transcendental understanding as such as that which projects itself as everywhere synthesizing.⁶
1.3.3. Form and Consciousness.

Kant twice and each time very explicitly compares the unity of apperception with the forms of intuition (B139 and B144). Apperception becomes the 'form of consciousness'. What is the meaning of this? Obviously, Kant wants to create some limited analogy between the forms of intuition and the form of consciousness, particularly in the way they govern the givenness of certain presentations. But how far can this analogy be taken, and does it help us clarify any outstanding issues?

Part of the answer lies in the notion of continuity introduced above. The field of the understanding itself is only continuous in the sense of 'no concept is without the possibility of synthesis', which is simply a statement about the definition of conceptuality - i.e. the 'conceptus communis'. This is insufficient, since the total field of concepts is possibly both closed and finite. 'Continuous synthesis' here would just mean that, given a concept, I can form a judgement about it with respect to any other given concept. The continuity required by apperception, on the other hand means 'everything is necessarily given for possible synthesis', which is a transcendental and a priori projection of givenness with respect to the understanding. 'Continuous synthesis' now means that, before any givenness, I can guarantee that the givenness will be encountered as manifold and therefore given to the manifold. But this guarantee takes an odd form: that is, it guarantees something about a presentation that has nothing to do with its content.

As we saw above, this continuity corresponds to the self-projection of the understanding which Kant calls the 'intellectual synthesis.' But this is not in fact itself an act of synthesis, under any recognisable definition of synthetic act. And again, it does not function as a rule for the determination of any or all syntheses (though we sometimes express ourselves in that way). Even the categories, once intuition is
encountered, function as rules. Thus, the unity of apperception, as original, carries no determining content either in itself or in its application.

The transcendental unity of apperception cannot be accompanied by any other representation (as Kant says, B132) and is thus a senseless and intuitionless 'image', the mere form of unity, not even the tag of the 'I think' around all my representations but just the bare possibility of such. Such apperception is nothing like a subject. Intuitions and manifolds, Kant implies, have I-ness in the same way as (outer) intuitions are not in space but spacial. As with space, such an I-ness is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to think beyond the thing that is me, the I as subject, such that the 'I think' is then is some part of me. Further, the unity of apperception avoids the tired, unKantian metaphysics of a possible analysis that precedes synthesis by emptying self-consciousness of all content, making it mere form. The AIA (which says 'everything accompanied by 'I think' must be ascribed to me' - we have shown that this means 'everything in the possible form 'I think X' must first have been given as a manifold subject to ruled synthesis') bears a very tight analogy to that tautology with which some commentators dismiss the Aesthetic (i.e. 'everything outside me must be in space' - which we have shown means 'everything represented in space must first be given spacially'). These seem to be tautologies without consequence precisely because it is difficult to think through a condition of possibility which is not also a predicable content (i.e. a generic concept).

To explore this further, we require a brief diversion.

Kemp Smith, in his commentary, explores why Kant might have felt the need to strain critical philosophy in the direction of a transcendental self. The contemporary critics of the first edition of the Critique took the arguments in the Principles as definitive and concluded that, for Kant, everything was appearance (in the strong sense) and no
reality could be found - this meant that all appearance was essentially unconditioned and thus always only illusion. Kant felt the need for a rethought defense. Although Kant continued to maintain, of course, that the only knowledge we have of the self is mediated appearance in inner sense, none-the-less we can - and here is where his language reaches its limit - discover in the mere 'I think', and indeed as its equivalent, the 'I am', that is, the undetermined existence of the self. In the Paralogisms Kant desires to show, at great length in proportion to the weight of the tradition he is attacking, that merely from the 'I think' we can have no knowledge of the soul as substance - that is, as a determinate form of existence. Being violently brief, the argument is that the representation of the unity of consciousness is not an intuition, and therefore not an intuition of an object to which categories could be justifiably applied. We must dwell here for a time.

One famous note at B422 deserves special attention. Descartes' argument, as Kant reconstructs it, is the following: Everything that thinks, exists; I think; therefore, I exist. Kant asserts that the problem here is that the 'I think' given to me in self-consciousness is not Descartes' 'I think', and that the 'exist' in the conclusion is not the same as the 'exists' in the major premise. The I think is for Kant equivalent to the I exist, but the existence is indeterminate. The 'I think' precedes (or rather subsists with?) any intuition of the self as a self that would allow it to be determined in experience. Any temporal intuition of myself is necessarily already my intuition, and thus cannot be said to bear information about what this my-ness is in itself. Kant then says that the category of existence is not capable of being indeterminate - a thing either is or is not. Therefore, the 'I am' is not categorical.

Here, Kant calls the 'I think' an empirical proposition. We can assume that this means that, although its possibility is a priori, is actuality is given in some 'I think X'. Further, as we saw in the
Deduction, the 'I think' is a thought - it is, as it were, a comment on a synthesis. And yet Kant asserts that it 'expresses' an indeterminate sensible intuition or perception. The strain on Kant's language is evident - remember that the concept of feeling was also invoked in the Prolegomena - certainly what is thereby expressed cannot be an actual intuition, for it cannot be spacial or temporal or even manifold if it is to remain necessarily indeterminate. We are left with the analogy of an intuition. Kant continues, asserting that, as given to thought in general, this indeterminate 'intuition' is not an appearance, but also not a thing-in-itself, and yet exists 'actually' (in der Tat, which is not one of Kant's reserved words or phrases) and thus is not an illusion (for example, of pure reason) either. With these three, though, we seem to have exhausted all the possibilities and still not found our selves.

Now Kant uses the notion of form very widely to cover any mental entity which prescribes without content. Apperception could be called a form, because, as we saw above, it generates (the possibility of) a representation that is never necessarily accompanied by any other representation; the pure categories are forms - 'forms of thought', Kant calls them - because they can determine no object a priori; the forms of judgement are forms, if indeed they are different from the pure categories; and the forms of intuition are forms. Are all of these meanings to be understood as synonymous? Clearly not, if the gap in the faculties is to be maintained: the being of the intuition-form must be different from the being of the thought-form. The difference here is evidently that between the within of intuition and the under of subsumption.

Apperception makes possible any determination of representations as mine, though in itself it does no determining - but does it do so by subsuming representations under the concept of subjective ownership, or does it do so not by granting a relationship to a subject or concept of a subject but to other same-order representations? Apperception
certainly does not subsume, for if it did, it would be effected through or in an actual transcendental synthesis, which it cannot be - as Kant says, the unity of apperception is not the category of unity. Therefore, apperception must behave like a form of intuition.

At B136 Kant writes that,

> The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in its relation to sensibility is, according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that all the manifold of intuition should be subject to the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of the same possibility, in its relation to the understanding, is that all the manifold of intuition should be subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception' (B136, my emphasis).

There are a number of problems in this passage. How can a form be a 'principle' at all? In what sense does intuition have a 'relation' to sensibility? How can a manifold be subject to (beforehand, afterwards?) space and time? In any case the import is clear, and we have hinted at it above: the significant phrases are the 'in relation to's. Thus Kant is asking not just 'what is the condition of givenness' but 'what is the condition of givenness-to-X'. It thus seems plausible to paraphrase the passage as:

> The unique a priori forms under which presentations, when considered without regard to synthesis and lawfulness, must be given are space and time. The a priori form under which the same presentations, but now to the understanding, must be given is apperception.

Where by 'apperception' is meant: the possibility of continuous 'stretched' synthesis.
Let us allow ourselves the luxury of a moment of pure speculation:

The self-projection by the transcendental understanding out of itself and onto manifoldness is certainly not a temporal event according to Kant. And yet any actual 'I think' is within time. For Kant, this simply means that our self-affection is inner sense as intuition. Still, however, it must be possible for this articulation in time of the 'I think' to happen - in particular for the 'I think now' to happen - and this possibility must lie partially with apperception as the form of consciousness. If this were not possible, then any act of association or synthesis would be just another element in the continuous stream of representations. There would be many 'I think...’s - i.e. representations of identity - but no 'I think now, or thought then, or will think’. Space and time themselves are insufficient: it is only synthesis which finds in intuitions a here and now, and synthesis depends upon apperception. 'I think here and now' must come before and make possible an representation of a mere here or now.

Apperception is necessarily spaced out in a certain manner in order that the 'I think' might acquire a now from out of the unpunctuated stretch of temporal intuition, without of course apperception itself containing either the actual 'I think' or the now. Apperception contains the possibility of the 'I think now' - of self-consciousness in the full sense - in a way precisely analogous to the way space (time) contains the possibility of here (now), as we described that above. Namely, as the form of an unlimited network of differential betweens. Indeed, what is made possible in each case is not just the intuition or even the synthesis, but the grasping of that synthesis in a here (which also means now), a now (which also means here), or the 'I think here and now' - although these are not themselves given. Clearly we have discussed such an idea far too quickly, and yet it certainly illuminates in what way and to what extent apperception is the form of consciousness. Apperception must also be spaced, have spacing.
If transcendental apperception is indeed a form analogous to space and time, then (just like in the Schematism and Principles) the categories will necessarily encounter aporia in attempting to think it. But, is this not precisely what we have been discussing with respect to the Paralogisms? Namely, that the categories of existence, substance and causality make the soul thinkable but cannot properly be applied in order to determine it. Thus Kant gets into trouble since, in the Deduction, all he needs for apperception is the formal self-projection upon manifoldness of the pure faculty of understanding - but in the Paralogisms he seems to want to posit an 'indeterminate' intuition through which the 'I think' is at the same time an 'I am' but without the latter referring to any categorical mode of existence. That is, in the Paralogisms, there is something given about apperception while in the Deduction, it is generated [zu Stande bringen]. These can only be reconciled if we recognise: a) 'generation' or 'production' does not mean a synthetic act as such; b) any characterisation of this 'givenness' other than with the predicate 'original' - which Kant uses throughout the Deduction - would be an illegitimate judgement. Ultimately, the paradox of given/produced is nothing other than the paradox of spontaneity itself.
1.3.4. The Form of the Ideal.

Kant writes suggestively,

'All manifoldness of things is only a correspondingly varied mode of limiting the concept of the highest reality which forms their common substratum, just as all figures are only possible as so many different modes of limiting infinite space.' (CPR A578=B606, my emphasis.)

Is this meant to be merely an illustrative simile? What exactly is the relationship between the forms of intuition and the ideas? We will find many interesting structural analogies, and be able to suggest that these structural analogies were precisely why Kant felt he could throw any metaphysics claiming knowledge of the supersensible out of court from the beginning.

Now the Dialectic has an interesting and revealing history, for the details of which I depend upon Norman Kemp Smith's Commentary. In Kant's silent decade of the 1770s, when the critical program had been thought of but its details not worked out, the following three principles have the role of the table of categories:

1. The relation of substance and accident.
2. Ground and consequence.
3. Parts and composite whole.

To these three correspond three ideas, Kant's conception of which (as is clear too in the Critique) had more than a passing relation to Plato:

1'. A subject that was never a predicate.
2'. A ground that is not also a consequence.
3'. A 'unity, which is not itself composite' (Reflexionen ii.578, quoted in Kemp Smith, p433).

Of course, these three 'principles' become the categories of relation and the associated ideas the three Ideas of Reason: soul, cosmos, God. If 3' had been retained as it stands, the question of spaciality in its relationship to the divinity would have been very clear indeed. But this third was revised and was eventually replaced by community and reciprocity. This altered, as Kemp Smith briefly explains, Kant's whole conception of the treatment of the Ideal and made for some odd, artificial tensions in that chapter of the Dialectic (cf. Kemp Smith, p434). For our purposes now, however, what this original and its alteration shows is the close connection between the two problems of reciprocity and non-composite wholeness. It is a connection that we have been suggesting for some time, but it is more than a little interesting to see that, for Kant, this relationship is most pronounced with respect to the Ideas.

By the second edition of the Critique, Kant recognizes his problems with the categories are not over, and he adds paragraphs 11 and 12 to the chapter on the Categories. In the former addition, he singles out the third category of relation for attention - what does the logical form of disjunction have to do with community? Kant argues that the disjunctive 'or' in signifying mutual exclusion also signifies mutual and coordinated definition. He writes,

'Now in a whole which is made up of things, a similar combination is being thought, for one thing is not subordinated to another, as effect to cause of its existence but, simultaneously and reciprocallly, is coordinated with it, as cause of the determination of the other ...' (B112).
But we are lead to ask, in what way does disjunction serve to make up a whole? T. K. Swing observes,

'Since Kant takes the disjunctive judgment in its strong rather than its weak sense, it can be argued that the disjunctive judgment states the incompatibility or mutual exclusion of the disjointed members' (Swing, 25).

Kant deserves to give this point much more attention than he does. Let us see if we can render it plausible. Now Swing (and other commentators) are certainly correct in seeing a problem in moving from the logical form of disjunction to a concept of community in the sense of unity. The conjunctive logical form (Swing suggests) might well be better suited for this purpose.

But what distinguishes a wholeness (we might wish to say 'what is proper to wholeness') is that the whole as such is (in some sense) already given, and the parts are limitations upon it - as Kant patiently explains in the quotation that begins this section and the paragraphs that follow it in the Ideal of Reason. Kant says that, strictly speaking, it is inappropriate even to say 'limitation' [Einschränkung] of 'primordial being' [Urwesen], for even this is to imply that the latter might somehow be the sum of dependent beings, i.e. that Urwesen is of the same order as dependent beings. Better (Kant asserts) to think of the limitation of all that follows from the Urwesen, such as appearances. This squares more closely with space and time as forms of relations of sensations (not their container) such that the totality of possible appearances in space is not itself space (as it was for Leibniz) although that totality is indeed what is thinkable in space - and in particular squares with the notion of space and time as that which grants actuality. As we discussed in our opening chapter, intuitions 'in space' are not in space, or part of space, but are spacial. This is the meaning of space being prior to its parts: not 'greater' than its parts - that would be merely holism -
but the Being of 'its' parts, the condition for their being in the first instance 'parts of'. Urwesen is not some materia prima - or on the side of form a first mover on the ordinary understanding of that concept - nor is Urwesen the totality of matter and forms (the universe). Rather, Urwesen is the Being of any parcel of matter or delineation of shape or movement such that they necessarily refer back to such primaries and totalities.

Thus we must think of the disjunctive syllogism as a making-actual of the potential or the possible. Thus the Ideal is constructed by reason out of the ascending series of possibilities, not actualities. But, as we discussed in our first Kant chapter, this making-actual occurs by way of a being within a whole, within which alone exclusion is possible. An appearance 'elbows' its way into space and time and the relational field reorganizes and closes over it - which means that the wholeness already contained this 'elbowing in' as a possibility. Similarly, the disjunctive syllogism posits a whole which makes possible any given becoming-actual. Thus the form of disjunction, with its associated logical laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle, becomes a much more plausible 'clue' to the category of community.

The above provisional exposition of the Ideal indicates that its final significance is its relation to the whole of the Dialectic. Indeed, the reason why the whole and part relation could not be maintained (from Kant's thought in the 1770s) merely as a category of relation is precisely its overriding importance for the whole of the Dialectic, not only that division's last third. So let us take a brief step back and find a broader view. This is no place for a comprehensive interpretation of the Dialectic, of course; we will instead be concentrating on the relations between the faculties that are constitutive for Kant's most central theses.
1.3.5. Ideas and Closure.

Arguably, the central and opening gambit of the Dialectic takes place right at the end of the Introduction. Here Kant discusses the unity of principles as demanded by reason as being the principle of a search for the totality of the conditions which necessarily stand above or behind even the major premise of any syllogism. As Kant explains at a later point, the major premise consists in the complete extension of a predicate under a condition, which Kant calls universality. Applied to experience and knowledge, and thus determined by the relational categories, this universality becomes the totality of conditions for a given appearance, and therefore the transcendental concept of reason is a concept of the totality of conditions. But what makes this totality possible is the unconditioned, which is the ground of any possible synthesis of the conditioned. The transcendental concept of reason is 'explained by' the concept of the unconditioned (A322=B378-9).

But the logical principle with which this argument begins, Kant then cunningly writes,

'can only become a principle of pure reason through our assuming that if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one another - a series which is therefore itself unconditioned - is likewise given (that is, in the object [Gegenstande] and its connection [Verknüpfung]) ... Such a principle of pure reason is obviously synthetic ...' (A 307-8=B364).

The emphasis on 'pure' requires explaining. If Reason is pure, then it cannot be conditioned by receptivity, and cannot therefore comprehend what 'manifoldness' or 'time series' means, and so the whole series must be contained in the object. The logical maxim, then, with respect to reason qua reason is not the beginning of a regulated search for (or the expectation of) completion or totality, but simply the content of
a concept or judgement - more particularly, the content of the object and its connection. Now 'Verknüpfung' (here, 'connection') is not one of Kant's major terminological words and thus poses a problem. Since it is not here in the plural, it cannot mean an object's particular relations or connections to other objects. We must understand it as the unity in synthesis granted the object in general; that is, in accordance with the unity of apperception and the categories. Where could the 'whole series' lie, at least in its possibility, that is, formally? The primary unity is not however the category of unity, but the synthetic unity of apperception; the transcendental unity of apperception must be such as to indicate (formally) what a total series of conditions might be, such that the total series is itself unconditioned and yet 'determined'. We should keep our interpretation of apperception in the back of our minds.

Clearly, Kant is playing a game here the field of which is the entire Dialectic. He sets out these propositions about the givenness of the unconditioned hypothetically and then, without drawing attention to the fact, proceeds to disprove a remarkably similar contention in the Ideal of Pure Reason. This at least leaves him room to manoeuvre for, throughout his later life Kant constantly wavers between the 'official' scepticism and relatively 'unofficial' theological positions. What is important for our purposes is the link, which lies in the very heart of Kant's project, between Kant's arguments here and the question of unity and wholeness. Kant writes:

'Now since it is the unconditioned alone which makes possible the totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned, a pure concept of reason in general can be explained by the concept of the unconditioned, conceived as containing a ground of the synthesis of the conditioned' (A322=B379).
This seems a contradiction: if \( x \) makes possible \( y \), how can be then say, in the same sentence no less, that \( y \) is itself \( x \)? Only if \( x \) and \( y \) are a very special object: a mere unity will not do (self-identity), what is required is wholeness (auto-constitution). We still have to differentiate: the totality is not different from the unconditioned, but differently grasped. Working towards the totality is thinkable, grasping in what way that totality is its own condition is not, except 'through' the idea.

Kant of course does not say that the conditions are in a series subordinated each to the next, but rather each to the other. At issue is not a temporal - nor even a hierarchical - series of conditions. What is being described is a network of conditions such that each has a part in determining everything else. The series need not in this case be finite. In the Critique of Teleological Judgement, Kant discusses similar self-constituting wholes, such as the living organism, and is concerned again to show that such wholes cannot be made available in their propriety to the understanding with its category of causation. The unthinkability of this kind of series does not depend upon the unconditioned condition, but upon a projection towards teleological (non-mechanical) causation. But this unthinkability is again not appropriate to the Dialectic. The organs of the organism are not parts, working together, but generate each other - which is not a universal phenomenon. Nevertheless, this is an important clue, and one which Kant gestures towards in several prominent metaphors.\(^{10}\)

We have to say that the totality of conditions, understood in this way, is thinkable in its form, though not in fact. One fine exemplification of these classic issues is in the debate between Copleston and Russell on the existence of God.\(^{11}\) Note Russell's essentially Kantian distinction between the meaninglessness and the unintelligibility of the universe. The universe is meaningless - how can the universe have any relations to entities that are not themselves part of the universe?
- but not unintelligible: entities within the universe obey laws, which is not to say that a complete description of the universe is materially possible, but only formally so. Russell accordingly, and much to the exasperation of Copleston, sees no need to posit that the 'universe' must have a cause, or even that such a positing would make any sense.

But an important further step comes when Russell rejects the Sartrean designation of the universe as 'gratuitous'. He replies: 'Well, the word 'gratuitous' suggests that it might be something else; I should say the universe is just there, and that is all.' What Russell does not like about 'gratuitous' is that it implies that, in the context of something else outside the universe which makes the universe what it is, the universe is conditioned to be 'gratuitous' - that is, 'gratuitous' suggests that the universe has this meaning: 'the universe has no meaning'. A universe that is just there we might describe as 'unconditioned' in this sense: nothing causes the universe to be this universe.

In Kant, reason cannot be satisfied with this. The need for complete and absolute determination forces the positing not just of a totality of conditions (which would be unconditioned in Russell's sense) but the unconditioned itself. But again this does not mean some first and highest mover. Rather, the unconditioned would be such in the sense of conditioning itself, auto-constituting: the unconditioned would make itself necessary. Only in this way could the unconditioned be said to ground the synthesis itself of the conditioned, and not just its formal possibility.

It is important to note that Kant, at several points, speaks of the synthesis of concepts in reason as a parallel to the synthesis of intuitions in the understanding (see for example, 'Regulative Employment' A643-4=B671-2: '... reason unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas ...'). But, as Kant insists, reason generates no concepts only orders them, and therefore the idea is not, strictly
speaking, a higher order class concept that could contain other concepts right down to the empirical. And why not? First of all, certainly, the idea has no possible content, but more importantly an old friend reappears here in a place no one would have expected. Kant writes,

'This unity of reason always presupposes an idea, namely, that of the form of a whole of knowledge - a whole which is prior to the determinate knowledge of the parts and which contains the conditions that determine a priori for every part its position and relation to the other parts. This idea accordingly postulates a complete unity in the knowledge obtained by the understanding, by which this knowledge is to be not a mere contingent aggregate, but a system connected according to necessary laws' (A645=B673).

This of course is in its form the same argument used in the Aesthetic with respect to space and time not being concepts. That it should be found here, at the end of the Dialectic and 500 pages later certainly poses an astounding and interesting puzzle, and may well turn out to indicate one of the most central insights of the whole Critical project. So, what is going on in the unification of the manifold of concepts? The 'synthesis' must bridge the gap between the experienceable and the non-experienceable, a gap which is essentially formal. It is now clear that there is a vital analogy between the form of intuition and ideas, or rather the objects of ideas. The notion of wholeness that was distinctive of intuition is found to pertain to the ideas, and indeed are such as to be conditions of the possibility of anything like a critique of pure reason.

Let us elaborate. The Ideal remains regulative because no experience would be adequate to it. But what does this mean? That a supreme being could not make itself perceptible? Obviously not. It is not that experience is not big enough or long enough to 'hold' such an
intuition, but rather that experience, by its very form (that of thought: synthetic unity under the categories) is inadequate to the idea because of its form.

Considered as an entity represented, a rational idea-object is an absolute whole for which notions like representation, part or production are entirely inappropriate. However, considered as an 'entity' within human reason, a rational idea is a representation of an infinite synthetic activity, or a completed infinity, where the infinity of the regress is the categorical interpretation of an absolute formal heterogeneity. In accordance with this latter, the idea in itself is nothing but a certain course of action formally and not materially prescribed by the feeling of need. No single element or group of elements in this course is or could be correct by virtue of anything other than this feeling.

But, as the latter half of the above quotation states, the idea is also and essentially a rule (or rather the form of the rule, since the rule will only ever be hypothetical, see A646-7=B674-5) for the systemisation of knowledge from above. Are we now to think that the 'course of action' does have a content after all?

'[Ideas] ought not to be assumed as existing in themselves, but only as having the reality of a schema - the schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all knowledge of nature. They should be regarded only as analoga of real things, not as in themselves real things. We remove from the object of the idea the conditions which limit the concept provided by our understanding, but which also alone make it possible for us to have a determinate concept of anything. What we then think is a something of which, as it is in itself, we have no concept whatsoever, but which we none the think for ourselves as having a relation to the sum [Inbegriff] of appearances which is
analogous to that in which appearances have with respect to one another [unter einander]' (A674=B702).

We think that we can now understand bits of this at a profound level indeed. The schema is the use of the regulative idea, giving the conditions under which an instance of it can be recognised. But this schema is not formed by the addition of the ordinary conditions (pure intuitions), for these have already been removed. Rather, the additional conditions are merely analogies of actually subsisting thought-relations in the field of appearances. This is not a schema making possible an experience, but just the reverse: a schema making possible a thinking.

As we mentioned above, the idea is regulative in the sense of being a project. The condition for this project is formal incompatibility: neither the idea, nor what it purports to represent, nor the principle of pure reason which stands behind it can be brought to thought. The rule is regulative and not given, only representing the form of the idea as a closed wholeness, i.e. as a formally possible series. The rule is a rule of analogies, legislating for the totality of conditions and not the unconditioned as such. The analogy above is the following: the relation between idea-object and sum of appearances is like the relations that pertain among appearances. The relations among appearances are governed by the categories of relation - particularly here causation. In this way, the something which the idea represents is like the cause of the sum of appearances. But relations and analogies work both ways: just as the effect refers us back to the cause, so does the sum refer us to that which the idea represents. In this case, the sum refers because it is the schema, it is object-directed. The sum or totality of appearances is available to thought so that what it refers to, what conditions or causes it, might operate within thought - or rather be a part of thought's operation - without itself being thinkable.
The idea as schema of wholeness, then, lies at the very border of thought, shrouded in paradox, representing that which can only be represented in the schema and only then as analogy. But there is no way we can say that the idea first exists, and then becomes depicted in analogy, without hypostatizing. The idea is a consequence of reason's natural tendencies and urges. The analogies and the schema for thought come first, the object is posited afterwards as transcending the former. This is the point behind Kant's often scoffed at formulation that the ideas are simply concepts with their thought-conditions removed. In entirely other words, reason necessarily posits the opening up of the schema's closure.

For Kant, the difference between closed and open when considered with respect to the ideas of reason is clearly marked: in the introduction to the Dialectic, Kant distinguishes between 'totality of conditions' and 'unconditioned'. Now the former of these is formally although not actually available to thought, because the units out of which it is built (x conditions y) are thinkable units, as are the individual synthetic acts. The latter, however, is not available to thought (except negatively) either formally or actually. In this way, the unconditioned transcends both thought and thought's object: the totality of conditions. The totality of conditions, by virtue of the demands of reason, is 'opened up' as the unconditioned itself. This openness is figured as a wholeness which can explain because of its priority and its essentially-never-a-part-ness, without ever being just another element in the series, or the total series considered as a sum of elements, or being just any categorical explanation. Just as with the notion of experiential syntax discussed above, closure can be opened. Openness and closure reduplicates the divide between intuition and thought, Urwesen and phenomenon, unconditioned and conditioned, Being and entities. Not that all these differences can be reduced to the same difference, but rather that for Kant they are structured the same way.
There is no need now to delay: this structure is spacing. It is certainly no surprise that Kant, even here, should be talking about limits, ascending, aggregates, etc. The unconditioned as a certain spacing which alone allows the conditioned to appear as what it is: the actual, the self-identical and self-different, the enclosed.

The essence of space is spaciality. Spaciality in its form is spacing, considered as the unthought possibility of the categorical cluster: actuality, identity, totality, difference and nothingness. These are the root concepts of existence. Therefore, the Being of things qua things is spacing.

Vis a vis Kant, all this borders on nonsense. But only borders - for Kant certainly suggests it, implicitly perhaps but none-the-less elaborately. Heidegger will articulate such themes more explicitly. But before we allow our second subject to speak, it is necessary to point to one last and illuminating set of phenomena which spacing suggests and explicates.
1. What is seldom noticed is a quite consistent but always implicit
distinction between what we have just called AIA (Kant uses the phrases
'Identität der Apperception' or 'analytische Einheit') and OSUA.

2. My daydream of a unicorn does not have a fixed or determinable
measurement, does not obey the laws of physics, can not be brought to
the same location as my tumble dryer, cannot be seen by other
observers, etc. But surely we are missing something important if we
say that it is not a spacial representation at all. In what way then,
we would ask, is its horn in a 'different location' from its tail? In
what way then do its hooves 'move' when I imagine it galloping? In
what way is it not 'a' unicorn - is it rather 'unicornness'? It would
be nonsensical to claim that the unicorn is not represented as a
particular being in space.

3. See the discussion below.

4. This qualification is necessary, since something like this X seems
posed in Kant's account of aesthetic experience. This does not
contradict the argument here: the understanding remains that faculty
which can find a mere sensible manifold in any presentation. But, Kant
argues, it is possible for this objectifying intentionality of the
understanding to be deflected or delayed in favour of a comportment
towards law-analogies.

5. There are three possible examples: the forms of intuition, as
forms, do not present manifolds, and therefore a) we could never assert
that such a form 'existed' or had such-and-such categorical properties;
and b) we could never become conscious of such a form as some kind of
representation within us. All this accords nicely with the
difficulties we have had in calling space and time objects. Similarly
for the 'I am' of pure apperception and the regulative/presupposed 'it
is' of a noumenon.

6. The 'as that...' raises its own problems, for it thinks of the
understanding as a thing, which is then either my thing or not, and
which then messes up the account of mineness as continuous synthesis.
Properly, the understanding is a faculty, i.e. a potency.

7. What this cannot guarantee is that the manifold will be a manifold
of space and time. This is why arguments about a second space
(essentially a third form of intuition) which, though ultimately
inconclusive, nevertheless seem plausible. Cf. our chapter 1.1.

8. This is, of course, the ontic-ontological difference expressed as
clearly as possible.

9. Why does Kant choose not to depict the Ideas of reason as derived
from the categories of relation, but rather from the syllogistic forms?
Since, if the former were true then, as commentators have pointed out,
it would be impossible for Kant to discuss the ideas a group, that is,
as arising from essentially the same need of reason for totality.

10. For example, see A834-5=B862-3.

11. Conveniently to be found in Edwards and Pap, A Modern Introduction
to Philosophy.
12. Operate regulatively, like the indeterminate postulation of the existence of the causing object in the second Analogy - thus the use of the term 'regulative' here is also an analogy.
Up till now, our work on Kant has concentrated on the propriety of the forms of intuition, especially space, and the relationship these forms maintain with the structures of the understanding and with reason. Although the Critique of Judgement is not a text about the metaphysics or the epistemology of space and time, yet in important and not always obvious ways, it furthers and expands upon Kant's earlier thinking. First of all, the aesthetic judgement of taste asks of both the imagination and the understanding that they leave their ordinary dwellings - the residence of the imagination being synthesis, schematism and memory; the residence of the understanding being concepts and their unity - in favour of the abyss of indetermination and free play. That we must link this exodus with a certain spaciality is indicated by the words Kant himself uses to describe it: swing, play, vibration, harmony, etc. Further, that which causes such a migration is nothing other than the pure form of an object - that is, an object considered merely as a set of relations in space and time.

Secondly, in the Critique of Teleological Judgement, we find an organism being described as both cause and effect, both end and origin. Now, in discussing the forms of space and time as wholes - as opposed to unities or totalities - we have already observed a very similar set of concepts at work. Kant himself explicitly draws this parallel. What, then, is the relationship between these two Kantian themes?

Finally, we also need to look at the sections on genius and aesthetic ideas and ask what it means for an 'aesthetic idea' to be contained in a purely formal intuition. What is the implicit formality within the
very concept of an idea such that an aesthetic idea is possible? Clearly, our work on the Dialectic in the previous chapter has relevance here.

Once again, the concepts we have called 'spacing' will reappear. But far from being just another example of this bizarre migration of the language of space, Kant's aesthetics shows us in what way we might come to have access to spacing as such. Briefly: that difference in attitude and cognition between aesthetic and ordinary experience which most theorists of art have assumed for centuries, can be described and is indeed necessitated by the form of spacing.
1.4.1. Of Feeling.

Historically, Kant’s concern with feeling in the second and third Critiques is understandable, since English moral sense theorists were one of his biggest targets. And yet on the terms set up in the first Critique, feeling certainly seems an unlikely subject for transcendental philosophy, because of its radically subjective and empirical character. At one level feeling is a fairly simple concept: it is my subjective response to a representation, insofar as that representation consists in or contributes to some goal (Absicht), and thus (to be perfectly accurate) is opposed to sensation (Empfindung) which although subjective must be considered part of the content of a representation.

Thus while sensation is a representation, feeling is not. Kant is often confused on these point, sometimes though not often even calling feeling a representation. Moreover, the term feeling has at least four distinct uses in Kant: the feeling of pleasure, the feeling of the spacial difference between left and right (in "What Does it Mean: To Orient Oneself in Thought"), the ‘feeling’ of the noumenal I (Prolegomena), and rational or moral feeling. The very term feeling (being an apparently substantive noun) lends itself to confusion. However, the Critique of Judgement makes attempts to clear up this issue. First of all in making a clear distinction between sensation and feeling (in the first sense above, which will be our immediate concern here). Secondly, we find passages like the following: “But that which is subjective in [an] a representation, which can be absolutely no element in knowledge, is the pleasure or displeasure connected [verbunden] with it.” The feeling is both in and connected to (not caused by, notice) the representation. As such it could only ever seem to be a predicate. Finally, Kant asserts the identity of the consciousness of the cognitive harmony with the pleasure itself, which we inaccurately say ‘arises from’ it - just as there is an identity
between the determination of the will and pleasure. This vital passage will be discussed in detail below.

Thus, even though having a sensation of some shade of red is my criteria of reality for a red object (modal category of reality), nonetheless the sensation as representation is distinct from the object. A feeling however is not distinct from the subjective state: we do not have a feeling of... in the same way we have a concept of... or a sensation of.... We just feel the state. In this way Kant could talk about clearly object-linked feelings (my feeling of pleasure in the owning of a new car) as well as objectless feelings (my state of depression, for no clear reason). What we feel in the first case is the proposition ‘I own a new car’ considered as a mental state; in the second, my depression is itself a mental state.

First of all, a question of terminology: what would it mean for a feeling to feel different? The question assumes that feeling is a distinct representation that is then felt, and thus fails to take over the full radicalness of Kant’s (and, it is important to note, Hume’s as well) account of feeling. Strictly speaking, a feeling is neither a subject which could take a predicate (A bad feeling) nor a predicate (How does it feel?) which can be passed around between different subjects. A representation (for Berkeley, Hume and Kant) is something had by a subject, and thus must be ‘in’ that subject in a manner which is founded on both the representation and the subject. This ‘manner’ (the word is Hume’s) is precisely the feeling of the representation. Given that our subjective constitution is fairly constant, then if a representation feels different, it is because the representation is different.

In the Anthropology, Kant writes, “What immediately (through sense) urges [antreibt] me to abandon my state ... is unpleasant to me, it hurts me; what urges me to remain in a state ... is pleasant to me, it gives me enjoyment.” Kant writes in general that pleasure [Lust] is
the agreement of objects or acts with the subjective conditions of life." Pleasure and displeasure are defined by and indeed as the impetus which sensation gives to the will. Feeling is evidently not a mediate stage, since sensation operates "immediately". Thus it seems Kant would like us to understand pleasure as behaviour, which works well enough for differences in amplitude. But what about qualitative differences? Such a question is too complex for discussion here. We should only note that all feelings are different in themselves and by their very nature, but this need not rule out different (classes of) differences. If a feeling is the in-me-ness of a representation of sense, and if in the aesthetic and moral feeling of pleasure we wish to be pure from sensation itself, then what alone remains to 'differentiate' feeling is the form of the representation-in-me. This will be precisely Kant's solution.

In two huge areas of his critical philosophy feeling assumes an importance. In the first part of the Critique of Judgement, the feeling of pleasure is not of course an objective property, since no feeling is, but via the subjective constitution of the human 'Gemüt' or mind, and providing that certain extraneous factors can be eliminated, such pleasure can be linked necessarily to formal features of the representations of objects. Thus our judgements concerning beauty can be universal, communicated, symbols of morality, etc.. Similarly, in Kant's practical philosophy, the notion of moral feeling (respect or reverence) is not constitutive of duty, but is the completely subjective effect of the moral law within our rational freedom. This feeling serves a purpose in providing the interest [Triebfeder] for moral action to our amoral, empirical self. Kant argues that we have no way of knowing whether our actions in any one case were motivated sufficiently by moral interest or not.

These two instances have two opposing properties in common: 1) that, as subjective, feeling contributes to no knowledge whatsoever; 2) that, as purely subjective, feeling has a universal validity. Kant overcomes
this contradiction by inventing two new categories of non-discursive ‘knowledge’: the practical, which culminates in faith; the aesthetic, which culminates in a culture of taste.

But the two applications of feeling have another feature in common. We can introduce this through two classic debates which are remarkably similar although this similarity has not been sufficiently discussed. We noted above that, for Kant, it is impossible to judge whether the ultimate sufficient cause of our actions had its origins in practical reason. And yet Kant also seems to feel that we can, in any given case, distinguish a moral interest from a pathological one. Yet, so far as either our empirical self or our theoretical reason is concerned, all feelings are alike in being sensuously conditioned, precisely because the peculiar causation by which the practical reason effects a feeling is incapable of being thought. Given this, how could Kant ever claim that - qualitatively or however you please - a distinction between feelings could be noticed and thus judged. Yet this is precisely the claim Kant seems to make: in a footnote to the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, Kant writes of the moral feeling of reverence,

"It might be urged against me that I have merely tried, under cover of the word ‘reverence’, to take refuge in an obscure feeling instead of giving a clearly articulated answer to the question by means of a concept of reason. Yet although reverence is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through outside influence, but one self-produced through a rational concept, and therefore specifically distinct from feelings of the first kind, all of which can be reduced to inclination or fear".  

The point here is the notion of a specific difference. How are we to understand the possibility of such a difference?
A precisely analogous problem occurs in the Third Critique. How is the feeling of pleasure which arises from the aesthetic judgement proper to differ from the pleasures we take out of interests in objects? We might point to certain passages in Kant and argue that the question is irrelevant, since we do not judge on the pleasure, the pleasure being only a consequence of judging. All pleasures are alike, it is the source that is at issue. On the other hand, though, we could cite different passages and maintain that there must be a specific difference in how the pleasure feels (if such a phrase is not in itself contradictory) for Kant's aesthetic system to 'work.' If pleasure is our only access to the harmonious accord of the faculties (as Kant sometimes implies), and if that pleasure is not distinct from other pleasures, then an aesthetic judgement would not be possible.

What I want to propose is that - to the extent that pleasure cannot be separated from the pleasurable representation, and is indeed nothing but the way that representation is a representation-in-me - aesthetic or moral pleasure must be considered formed as the representation-in-me is formed, in a manner not merely distinct but radically so from other representations and thus other pleasures. That is to say, when Kant argues that we can distinguish among pleasures by virtue of their origins (which is the thesis of the first moment of the analytic of the beautiful), he is not necessarily or only asking us to reflect on the causes or 'grounds' of the pleasure. Rather, and as if from a different point of view, he is asking us to reflect on distinct 'types' a priori of pleasure, giving the concept of type the only intelligible content it could have with respect to pleasure. Because of the very nature of feeling, Kant necessarily equivocates between two points of view: the behavioural (all pleasures determine the will in the same way, though these pleasures may arise from different sources) and the original (essentially different origin-forms produce different 'types' of feeling).
1.4.2. Subsumption and Finality.

Kant writes:

"... since the freedom of the imagination consists [bestehen] in its schematizing without a concept, so must the judgement of taste [Geschmacksurteil] consist in a mere sensation of the mutual enlivening [belebenden] of imagination in its freedom and understanding with its conformity to law [Gesetzmässigkeit]; and therefore the judgement rests upon a feeling [Gefuhl] which allows the object to be judged [beurteilen] by the finality of the representation (through which the object was given) for the promotion [Beförderung] of the cognitive faculties in their free play. And taste, as subjective judgement, contains a principle of the subsumption, not of intuition under concept, but of the faculty of intuitions or presentations (the imagination) under the faculty of concepts (the understanding) ..." (CAJ 143).

Much here we already know, belonging as it does to the famous formula that Kant never tires of repeating: that the representation of the object brings the imagination in its freedom and the understanding in its lawfulness into a subjective and final harmony, thus producing a feeling of pleasure, and so forth. We are not in a position yet to make of this paraphrase anything but a parody. Every time Kant repeats this formula he varies it slightly. In the instance quoted above, a number of new elements are introduced, chief among which is the notion of schematism. The function of schematism in the first Critique was to show how it might be possible for a concept, which itself involved no reference to space and time - in other words, a pure concept or category - to ever apply to an intuition which is only ever given in space and time. The category must be schematized by the imagination, must be made to present itself as if it were an intuition.
Here, however, the imagination is asked to schematize without a concept. Such a schema would be an intuition of the general lawful character of the understanding. But can the understanding just be 'generally lawful'? - most commentators take this at face value and move on quickly. Elsewhere in critical philosophy, when Kant says lawfulness he means 'that which falls under one of the twelve categories'. Certainly, he cannot mean that here. And yet, Kant is also not saying 'indeterminate but determinable' meaning 'that which would fall under a category if we knew which one to apply'. For apart from the obvious problems about what type of entity the 'that which' would be, the 'object' of the aesthetic judgement is not contingently indeterminate but necessarily so. Nor does Kant mean 'that which falls under two contradictory categories at once', for paradox is not law. We can only conclude that lawfulness means: 'that which has something in common with (analogous to) the categories but is not categorical', that is, cannot be thought as such.

So, what would such a schema look like? Rather, without a concept there is not a schema, nor schemata, but schematizing: an activity without a product. The very freedom of the imagination is said to reside in this undetermined schematizing. What then happens, according to Kant, is that the imagination is subsumed under the understanding. Now what could this mean? We would like to be able to say, as Kant does explicitly with respect to the sublime, that the representation (of art or nature) is itself the schema - of, perhaps, an aesthetic idea. But there is no clear indication as yet that this is what he had in mind. Rather, we must remain provisional and merely say that the object judged as beautiful - or rather its representation - has some property or other which makes it possible for the understanding as such but without any determinate concept to enter and organize the imagination as presenter of manifolds.

We also know that such subsumption, such mutually enlivening play, is also final. Oddly enough, in a book crowded with references to
subjective finality, Kant is very vague about what exactly it might consist in with respect to the aesthetic judgement.¹⁶

"The consciousness of the mere formal finality [Zweckmässigkeit] in the play of the subject’s cognitive faculties [Erkenntnis-kräfte] upon a representation wherein an object has been given, is the pleasure [Lust] itself, since it [referring to consciousness] contains [enthält] the determining ground of the subject’s activity in respect of the enlivening of the cognitive faculties, and therefore an inner causality (which is final) in respect of cognition in general, but without being confined [eingeschränkt] to a determinate cognition, and consequently a mere form of the subjective finality of a representation in a aesthetic judgement. ... [the pleasure] involves a causality within itself, namely of preserving without further aim [absicht] the state of the representation itself and the engagement of the cognitive faculties. We tarry [weilen] by the contemplation of the beautiful, for this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself of itself." (CAJ 64).

We might remark on the fact that "consciousness of" here is pleasure, which is not to say that pleasure hijacks consciousness (ecstasy), nor even that pleasure is the sole object of consciousness, for in this case consciousness has, strictly speaking, no object. Pleasure, as a sensible feeling, arrives at consciousness through inner sense and within the form of time. Nevertheless, it is a pleasure bound up within the closed circuit of the cognitive faculties. Closed indeed. Kant tells us above that the consciousness of finality in cognitive play contains the determining ground of cognitive activity. We are back to a peculiar phenomenon discussed in the previous chapter: here is an x which contains but also is the ground of y. What does all this mean?
Now Paul Guyer makes a distinction here, which is quite clarifying, between a first 'judgement' which receives pleasure and associates it with the representation of an object, and a second more proper judgement which looks at the conditions of that pleasure and asks: was I disinterested, was I judging apart from any concept, etc.. Only the latter is the judgement of taste proper (Cohen and Guyer, 22). Guyer's distinction plays on the ambiguity in the concept of 'reflection': reflection in the sense of 'reflection upon the conditions of' and reflection in the sense of reflective judgement or not-yet-determinate judgement. Let us survey this with a digression.

In the Critique of Pure Reason (in the last appendix to the Transcendental Analytic), Kant defines reflection as "that state of mind in which we first set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which [alone] we are able to arrive at concepts" (CPR 276). In particular, this involves determining the faculty of the mind (either sensibility or pure understanding) where a given concept first arises. Here Kant states that all judgments require reflection (after the fact) if they are to be critical. Then, in the introduction to the Critique of Judgement, Kant immediately differentiates between two forms of judgement, the determinant and the reflective (CAJ 18). In the terms of the first Critique, we can understand this distinction as between an 'automatic' but unobserved judgement and one that calls attention to itself (Kant writes, "something which ... makes us attentive" (CAJ 28) and indeed, "even when it has no intention of so doing" (CAJ 30)) by immediately bringing in either pleasure or displeasure via the a priori assumption of finality in nature. A judgement, that is, that proceeds by conscious reflection upon a feeling of the mind.

For both the first and third Critiques, then, the concept of reflection, in its purpose, essentially remains the same. For in calling attention to itself in this manner, the reflective judgement demands immediate reflection back upon its own task of groping after a
concept. Kant develops this in his discussion of the "sensus communis". Here, the common sense - or rather the common critical faculty of self-reflection - is that which allows the universal communicability of an aesthetic judgement and simultaneously grounds its demand of universal assent as a judgement. The critical faculty Kant describes is precisely the "confining [of our] attention to the formal peculiarities of our representation or general state of representative activity" (CAJ 151); ie, as in the first Critique, the determination of the subjective conditions of, not a concept, but a lawful but undetermined synthesis of imagination. Guyer's distinction, then, clarifies what is involved in the judgement of taste, but does not show how the two moments are essentially linked, or if their distinction is real or ideal.

We have still not realised the full radicality of this judgement Kant is attempting to describe. The act of judgement, in turning towards the representation-in-me, is sustained in that turning by the pleasure. This Kant expresses in saying that consciousness and pleasure both have an "inner causality" and a "causality within itself". But why should this sustaining occur, unless the judgement about the conditions of the 'first' judgement is itself a judgement concerning finality (i.e. the finality of the cognitive harmonies at play), and thus generative of pleasure?

Remember that it is precisely the 'formal peculiarities' of a representation which are the ground of the judgement's being reflective and thus aesthetic. Further, the feeling of pleasure is not some thing that is distinct from the act of judgement about finality such that the two could be separated. In any ordinary judgement, one could focus on the cognitive elements and ignore any associated feeling. But in the aesthetic judgement, there are no cognitive elements, such that the feeling itself is the judgement and is our only access to the accord of the faculties. Consequently, any second judgement about the conditions of the first judgement must also be a judgement about the conditions of
the pleasure. But pleasure is precisely the consciousness of finality. Thus, any secondary reflection on conditions and purity must necessarily be caught up in these 'formal peculiarities' and itself be a reflective and aesthetic consciousness. It follows that there is no point at which the reflective judgement can 'get on top of', so to speak, its nature as reflective. Only thus Kant can say that the consciousness both contains the ground of and is identical with, the pleasure. The aesthetic judgement is certainly peculiar.

Guyer defines Kant's concept pleasure as the feeling of the accord of an object for "some basic need or objective" (Cohen and Guyer, 30), a definition he derives logically enough by abstracting the definition given in the second Critique from its concern with the faculty of desire. But here the possibility exists that 'objective' and 'feeling' may collide in one representation or consciousness of representation. The feeling may be its own end. It can be so in this sense: pleasurably judged to be final is the accord between representation and the cognitive powers (the beautiful representation as in-me); but pleasurably judged final also is precisely this first pleasure which grounds 'enlivening' of 'cognition in general' (CAJ, 64).

Kant writes,

"... the pleasure can express [ausdrücken] nothing other than the conformity [Angemessenheit] of the object to the cognitive powers, which are in play in the reflective judgement and insofar as they are in play, and thus express merely a subjective, formal finality of the object" (CAJ 30).

Note the 'insofar as they are in play'. This means that the pleasurable conformity with the (representation of the) object is conditional upon the play; but of course, we must also say that the play is conditional upon the conformity."
What is happening here is not a carelessness in Kant's philosophical writing. Rather, there is an attempt to describe what, as far as Kant is concerned, literally indescribable. Here is a mental state which is its own condition and its own end, and which thus generates and sustains itself. One cannot even escape by saying that the mental state is conditioned or brought about by the presentation of a beautiful object - for it is not the object that is judged but its representation, and not as a representation but simply by being a representation-in-me.

Pleasure (consciousness of) causes pleasure and is produced by pleasure - it is a pleasure machine that only exhaustion or distraction can grind to a halt. And not a machine, for a machine was built for..., has an end or design and is thus not simply a finality. Pleasure is more like an organism: a pleasure organism.
1.4.3. The Form of the Organism.

Above, we asked what it might mean to say that the understanding itself subsumes the imagination. We now find an additional question of what it means to say that such a subsumption, otherwise known as play, serves itself as a concept for an object. This concept, if it were a concept, would be the end - for one gets the impression in the aesthetic judgement that the object was produced precisely for the generation of this harmonious play. Nature, Kant says, is seen on the analogy with art (CAJ 92). But of course, there is no concept, not even an indeterminate concept, but merely play - and thus we are left with mere formal and subjective finality. The formality is the key to the immediacy of the aesthetic judgement which Kant insists upon - and which is left out of so many interpretations of Kant. And again, we have to return to our first question - a question now broadened and deepened - of what it is about this play, this harmony, this accord, this subsumption, that serves as finality, and how is this play brought about by a representation.

But we already have half of the answer: the withinness and innerness of the auto-generation of pleasure in finality. In order to understand how this might be related to our problem, we must look to the Critique of Teleological Judgement. Kant is here describing his conception of an organism as a natural end or end-in-itself:

"In such a product of nature every part is thought as having its presence there through all the others, and also as existing for the sake of the others and the whole; that is, thought as a tool [Werkzeug] or organ; which however is not enough ... each part is [also] an organ producing [hervorbringendes Organ] the others, and consequently each the others reciprocally" (CTJ 21-2).
The telos here is internal, inherent, in itself. Furthermore, it is reversible: the parts constitute the whole, and the whole directs the parts. More, the whole is the condition for the parts not just being things, but being tools or organs. The concept of 'part' is no longer adequate. The organism, then, exists not as a conglomerate of objects that work together (a machine), but a set of materially constitutive relations. Kant goes on to claim that such a notion of causality cannot be thought by any concept of causality native to the understanding. But - and this is important - the distance of such a concept from our concept of the causal law does not make the organism lawless, without law.

We are already familiar, however, with such a concept of 'causality'. First of all from above in talking of the pleasure organism. But perhaps more importantly for our purposes is the propriety of space and time. Space, then, functions like a natural end insofar as its open whole is prior to its parts. Kant makes this explicit later on in the Critique of Teleological Judgement: space, he writes, "has some resemblance [Ähnlichkeit]" to the real and supersensible ground of the teleological judgement (CTJ 65). Let us examine this passage in more detail.

Having already noted that such a causality is not our category of causality, Kant then asks what type of understanding might indeed be able to form an adequate conception of a natural end or organism: it is the intellectus archetypus. The comparison is strategically similar to the issue of intellectual intuition in the first Critique. But here, the intuition is granted - that is, there are organisms available as objects of sense. The problem for Kant is no longer the finiteness of intuition (that intuition always intuits the particular) but in the finiteness of the understanding. Or rather, the type of form available to the discursive understanding. The intellectus archetypus would be capable of thinking the part entirely from the whole without moving
through the intermediary of a representation, thus erasing the contingency of the part as particular instance. Kant writes,

"But following the very peculiarity of our understanding, it can not happen [for us] that the whole could contain [enthält] the ground of the possibility of the nexus of parts - which in the discursive type of cognition would be a contradiction - rather and only, the representation of a whole could contain the ground of the possibility of the form of that whole and the nexus of parts that belong to it. But now, in that case, the whole would be an effect or product, whose representation would be seen as the cause of its possibility; but the product of a cause the determining ground of which is the mere representation of its effect is called an end" (CTJ 64).

And thus, Kant concludes, it is because of the very lack in our understanding that we must necessarily think in the supplementary terms of teleological ends rather than, as would be more appropriate, intrinsic finality. Teleology is only a substitute for the unthinkable. We will return to this passage in a moment.

Kant continues: we know further that the whole organism we observe is only a phenomenon, for if it were a thing-in-itself then "... the unity [Einheit], which constituted [ausmacht] the ground of the possibility of natural formations [Naturbildungen] would be simply the unity of space" (CTJ 65). Now this is a more complex and important issue than Kant makes it appear. Space is not real, Kant continues (and after nine years of Critical philosophy, he no longer feels he has to argue this point). Although, he then says, the form of space has a certain resemblance to the real ground. Thus the full argument must be this: The organism is either a phenomenon, or a thing-in-itself. Its constitutive unity appears as a unity in space. If the organism were a thing-in-itself, then its unity would be identical with this spacial
unity, and space would be something real. But space is not real, therefore the organism is a phenomenon.

The importance of this passage for us is not the issue of phenomenon/thing-in-itself, but the tight link between the final unity of the representation and the propriety of the pure intuition of space. It is not enough to say the unity is given in space - what outer unity is not? - but there is this essential resemblance which helps foster the stubborn illusion that the organism is a thing in itself. Space, as we already know, as an intuition not a concept, exhibits appearances as purely relational and thus, so far as the discursive understanding is concerned, inherently final. A closed representation in space would be final with an end which is potentially distinct from the representation itself, though that end need not be determined and given; an open representation would indeed be final, but without an end, and such that any thought of an end as such would be self-contradictory; we may name this pure finality. It is our finitude (we must think categorically) which forces us to think teleologically rather than in the more appropriate terms of inherent finality. But, and this is the important part, this more appropriate manner is most closely approached by the 'unity' of the intuition of space.20

Immediately above, we found Kant observing that, by way of a representation of a whole, the necessary entrance was found to the teleological principle. Kant wrote, "... rather and only, the representation of a whole could contain the ground of the possibility of the form of that whole and the nexus of parts that belong to it." Not the whole, but the form of the whole - in other words, the whole considered formally, apart from any 'matter'. That the representation should be the ground of the whole thing itself would mean asserting that noumenal reality itself and not just this synthetic reality was a product of the representation: i.e. intellectual intuition. The representation can only be a determining ground and not a cause. But
such a 'form of that whole' is the whole considered merely as a spatio-temporal set of possible relations.

If we then translate this back to the situation presented by the aesthetic judgement, we find something similar. Certainly, Kant insists that the representation is only to be considered formally - here because any sensation would make the consequent feeling of delight dependent upon empirical interest. Kant is equally adamant with respect to the aesthetic judgement that it is the representation we are judging - both because beauty cannot be considered an objective property and because, similarly, the object (being conceptually indeterminate) is not yet constituted and pro-jected as an object - for it is precisely a priori concepts that project the horizon of objectivity in the first instance. Taking this further, then, we are not strictly speaking judging a representation, nor even a mental state, since these concepts depend upon a complete act of synthesis. The concept of the representation-in-me, valuable as it is, none-the-less has validity only for (to borrow a relevant expression of Fichte's) an external observer.

It is this latter point which is perhaps most important: it was the notion of 'representation of' which distinguished our mode of understanding (intellectus ectypus) from the intellectus archetypus which could think the propriety of both intuition and the organism without need of the teleological supplement. In other words, what is at issue here is nothing less than the constitution of the representation as a representation by a synthetic act of the understanding, which has been our theme since chapter one. Kant is here indicating anew and in a new context what we have discovered over and over again: that this constitution is in its essence alien to the above mentioned propriety. We will need to return to this in detail.

How does all this help us understand what Kant means by aesthetic judgement?
1.4.4. Reconstruction of the Aesthetic Judgement.

Combining, then, Kant's discussion of teleology with, first, his
discussions of subjective finality, and second the propriety of space
as form of outer intuition, we find that we can formulate the following
preliminary conclusion: the lack of any determinate subsumption of the
intuited representation under a concept is itself the condition for the
possibility of the release of the intuition generally from the
constraints of any concepts of space and time and associated concepts
of causal laws, and thus a release for the inherent finality of
spacality (which now means: spacing) beyond either discursive or
teleological thought. It is in this sense that we anticipated that the
aesthetic judgement could (rather loosely but revealingly) be called an
intuition of intuition.

Let us take another look at the following passage from the Critique of
Judgement:

"The consciousness of mere formal finality in the play of
the cognitive faculties ... is the pleasure itself, because
it contains a determining ground of the Subject's activity
in respect of the enlivening of its cognitive powers, and
thus an internal causality (which is final) in respect of
cognition generally ... This pleasure is also in no way
practical."\textsuperscript{21}

Meredith translates 'belebend' as quickening, which is a lovely, rich
and ancient word. Sadly, I have been forced to the decision that, in
order to retain more obviously the connection of 'belebend' with life,
I would translate the word as 'enlivening', as I have done above. What
this word does is to clear up the meaning of a phrase that Kant uses in
the very opening section of the Critique. He writes that the aesthetic
judgement differs from a cognitive judgement in that "... here the
representation wholly becomes referred to the subject and indeed to the
subject's feeling of life [Lebensgefühl], under the name of a feeling of pleasure or displeasure ..." (CAJ 42, my emphasis). But Kant is not simply appealing to the values attached to these words - that is, 'life' is not merely used as a metaphor in the same way as, for example, 'animation' often is.

In the Anthropology, we recall, Kant writes that the alternation of pleasure and pain just is life. We can say that, analogously, aesthetic pleasure 'alternates' or 'oscillates' in the important sense that harmony also necessarily involves restriction: restriction of the imagination's potentially senseless freedom, and restriction of the understanding's ability to subsume. This restriction realises the pleasure as pleasure in the mere form of finality. Without this restriction, the beautiful could not be said to 'enliven': there would merely result the univocal and terminal pleasure of a determinate judgement. Finally, in the late Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that anyone who did not have moral feeling would be "morally dead." What we are attempting to show is that this supposed mere 'metaphor' of life is used very broadly and according to strict rules of analogy. In no other way that by investing this metaphor with philosophical content can we simultaneously explain all five of the following: 1) why pleasure is essentially the feeling of life; 2) how the feeling of life can be associated with a purely formal representation; 3) the manner in which pleasure as 'consciousness of' carries causality within itself; 4) why an aesthetic representation is judged to be final and not merely lawful; 5) why is it appropriate to speak of a representation having or lacking a soul [Geist] which is 'animating' [belebende]. More traditional interpretations - which generally place the judgement itself in a purely epistemological horizon - cannot explain the above.

One epistemological stumble is the quite concrete difficulty of reconciling Kant's description of the feeling of unity without concepts in aesthetic judgement with the apparent requirement of the categories for any unification in the Transcendental Deduction. How do we prevent
Kant from removing the cornerstone of his own philosophy? The by-now classical solution to this issue is indicated for English readers by Paul Guyer. In the Transcendental Deduction it is necessary to take seriously Kant's explicit distinction between subjective and objective validity, and thus to distinguish between synthesis resulting in knowledge and synthesis (probably according to laws of association) the result of which we believe or which we merely feel. However, though Kant does talk in this way, he also speaks of any 'empirical unity of apperception' being necessarily derived from the 'original unity' always 'under given conditions in concreto'. Thus the possibility of a judgement resulting in a feeling of unity is never just a free-floating possibility.

Using Kant's examples, we can see this. His first example is of word-association. Even a brief analysis of such a situation would show that, though the relations between the words associated are certainly subjective, the words themselves have to be treated as objects (i.e. not mere sound-sensations) and as distinct unities. Similarly with Kant's other example - 'If I support a body, I feel an impression of weight' - which necessarily involves quite elaborate, objective concepts of body and weight and, most importantly, of 'I'. The 'I' appears in this experience both as an object (my body supports...) and as a consciousness (I feel...). Again, the relationship between all these elements has not been 'thought through', and is thus merely subjective, but the elements themselves cannot so be if the relationship is to be able to come to consciousness. The elements 'pre-exist' the relationship (in objective knowledge) and effect it. Thus for Kant, any subjective judgement is always grounded in a prior objective judgement.

Although this opens up a possible avenue for interpreting the aesthetic judgement, it also forecloses on the uniqueness of such a judgement. The latter becomes merely an uncompleted determinate judgement. Quite apart from erasing any distinctive content that Kant's notion of a
reflective judgement might have had, or of the 'rule' which Kant says
judgement gives to itself, this interpretation certainly falls short of
what is required when we come to aesthetic ideas. The latter, Kant
tells us, not only are not objectively judged, but cannot be.

Let us examine this more carefully. Any subjective judgement, as one
that 'seems' or 'feels', is necessarily based on prior
objectifications. But in the aesthetic judgement, however many
objectifications may have been made or be possible, the judgement
itself proceeds independently. In the subjective judgement of the type
'x seems unified with y' where x and y are separately determinate
objects (i.e. parts preceding the whole relationship), because of this
prior objectification the seems is always capable of becoming an 'I
know is (or is not)'. But in the analogous instance in the third
Critique, which is the way in which the aesthetic attributes make up
and give forth the aesthetic idea, however determinate the former are,
the latter can never become an element in an objective judgement.

Further, if the beautiful representation-in-me did not have the form we
have described, my feeling of pleasure would have to be a feeling of
unity and not a feeling of harmonious finality as unity. That is to
say, the understanding would have no role, and there would be no
harmony between the faculties. The unity would just be purely within
the manifold given by the imagination, and it is difficult to see just
how pleasure could come from this. Indeed, because of this pure
within-ness, the feeling of such a unity would not even be subjective -
in the sense of that which something gains by merely being in a
subject - and we have already shown this to be an inappropriate
interpretation of Kant's notion of feeling.

If, for example, I refrain from objective synthesis and just associate
words together, I may indeed feel a certain pleasure from this
diverting game, but this pleasure cannot be construed as coming from an
unexpected accord with the understanding. And if I then stumble upon
an exciting conjunction of words, my pleasure now comes from abandoning
my subjective state (where we mean by subjective merely non-
objective\textsuperscript{27}) and objectifying a certain association, e.g. as a
metaphor. Thus, I must either be freely subjective without reference
to cognition as such, or I must bring cognition to bear in applying a
concept. And this is the case even if my cognition does not 'exhaust'
the content of the association. An aesthetic idea must be more than
this since, strictly speaking, any subjective conjunction of words will
have practically inexhaustible similarity content, certainly without
being poetry or even being a 'successful' metaphor.

Finally, Kant describes the consciousness of beauty as containing a
quickenning internal causality and yet being indeterminate. If the
'parts' of the representation are felt as belonging together, this
would imply that in making up a unity, they would have to be
determinately related to that unity as cause to effect. But Kant
argues in the Critique of Teleological Judgement that the supposed
'internal causality' cannot be categorical.\textsuperscript{28} Further, if the unity
were felt without any rule of unification, then we would have to say
that the parts as appearances are in themselves causes, which is surely
unkantian. Indeed, Kant explicitly tells us that to ask of the
imagination that it be both free and in itself conforming to law is a
contradiction.\textsuperscript{29} If we insist on saying that the beautiful
representation in itself and as a manifold conforms to law, then such
a law must be a law of the understanding and thus the imagination
cannot be essentially but only contingently free. This argument
corresponds to our first point above.

Granted, then, an intimate connection between feeling and the life of
an organism (either sensuous or rational), which connection is no mere
metaphor for Kant, it remains a question what "enlivening of its
cognitive powers" might mean. Do our cognitive powers suddenly assume
a life of their own? This seems absurd, and yet soon after the above
quotation from the third Critique, Kant writes, "[The pleasure]
involves an inherent causality, that, namely, of preserving the state of the representation itself ... We dwell [weilen] on the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself". Is this not precisely how Kant describes life and the operation of pleasure and pain in the Anthropology? There is nothing figurative here: indeed, the remainder of the passage indicates clearly that this first description is the literal to which other forms of pleasure are only "analogous." Pleasures of sensation are mediately auto-causative, operating through my will; but aesthetic and moral pleasure are immediate, containing something like a separate primitive will within their very representations-in-me. The representation of the beautiful is within me as a pleasure organism. This is no mere clarifying and colourful description, as it still was for us above, but is the essence of the situation.

We thus return to our 'preliminary conclusion': The representation of the object of contemplation stands in a relation of categorical excess to the faculty of the understanding and imaginative synthesis in general. This representation effectively de-centres the faculties of cognition, which we call the freeing of the representation for its pure formality in space. This excess sets the imagination and the understanding into a self-reinforcing harmonizing akin to the activity of life itself. This harmonising is final both for itself and with respect to the judgement of the representation. Moreover, this harmonizing consists in the schematization of the general lawfulness of the understanding. We asked how we are to understand the notion of schematization and subsumption?

As we saw above, this lawfulness cannot be categorical; rather, it is 'natural' - that is to say, the lawfulness is precisely the unthinkable law of natural organization, for as Kant says in one of his most famous but bewildering passages: through Genius, 'nature gives the rule to art' (CAJ 168). And for this reason, the lawful representation also is final without a determinate exterior end, for it is pleasure or a state
that is auto-reproductive, both cause and effect, and purely formal. The imagination and the faculty of intuitions more generally, which contains an analogy of this very rule or law in the pure but closed forms of space and time but not as a rule or law, is subsumed under the understanding which contains lawfulness but not this rule or law, thus producing a bizarre form of cognition. But also: nature must be ‘regarded after the analogy with art’ (CAJ 92). Thus this ‘subsumption’, which is nothing other than the representation-in-me, is not only final within itself but also final with respect to the judgement of an object – i.e. with respect to a judgement about the initial aesthetic judgement’s being a true aesthetic judgement, and thus maintaining a universal though subjective relation to an object. The odd relation Kant posits between nature and art provides an index to the distinction between an aesthetic judgement, and the judgement about that judgement.

The object reaches an accord with this cognitive harmony because, as a purely formal representation in space, it too contains or rather precisely consists in the same inherent finality which is directly analogous to a natural end. This then is the answer to our over-riding question of what it is about a purely formal representation in space and time that forms a condition for the possibility of the harmonizing play of imagination and understanding. The form of cognition produced by the harmony of imagination and understanding is thus a ‘thinking’ (via or within spaciality) of the beautiful, with the feeling of pleasure and finality as schema.

Granting, then, this interpretation, our difficulties are not over. We can introduce the next stage by asking: if it is the mere form of space in a representation that brings the faculties into accord, then will any representation do? Are all intuitions beautiful? Clearly this is not the case: something must be missing from our account so far: namely, what is it about particular representations that make them suited for bringing the faculties to harmony? These questions follow
from the fact that Kant has interrogated merely the subjective conditions for the judgement of taste in the opening sections of the third critique. (This trend culminates in the Sublime.) Now, however, it is necessary to think nature and art as, as it were, beautiful objects. Kant raises this issue by introducing, towards the end of the Critique, the question of genius and the related issue of the aesthetic ideas. How does our interpretation of the finality of the aesthetic judgement bear upon these passages?
1.4.5. The Analogy of Excesses.

Kant’s first move is a move beyond mere taste, which until then was essentially the sole defining element within the realm of the beautiful. The artist, merely using taste as a dynamic feedback mechanism, can produce works of ‘taste’. But works of fine art, as products of genius, must have soul, must be alive in a particular sense: that is, must in-corporate aesthetic ideas. Very schematically, Kant lays it out like this: an aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination which as an excess-to-mere-thought functions as a ‘substitute’ presentation for a rational idea, and which in soulful art is communicated from genius to observer via the work. A genius is a genius and his work a work of genius to the extent that the activity involved in the beautiful representation-in-me functions in this way. Let us examine Kant’s theory in detail.

Aesthetic ideas are representations of the imagination to which no concept can ever be adequate; they are not ideas in the rational sense (to which no intuition can be adequate), but rather are the mirror images of these rational ideas. This inadequacy of any concept is not simply quantitative, for that would be the sublime. We can already suspect that the content of any qualitative difference must be formal. Kant says, the aesthetic idea has bound up within it so much representational wealth that the mind is pleasurably carried away. Each of these two ‘ideas’ always strives to close the gap (between the sensible and the intellectual) and thus, as it were, meet precisely itself at the back of the mirror. This meeting, however, is strictly impossible, for the aesthetic idea is always out there, on the other side of the understanding - which is as much as to say that it is another flesh. It is this mirrored striving, this duplicated and mutual excess, that is the “most important reason” for breaking Kant’s own rules of nomination and calling these representations ‘ideas’ (CAJ 176). None the less, it is quite definitely one mirror: the aesthetic idea is a product of the imagination as confronted by a particular
rational idea. The two are (to use Kant's various metaphors) attached, linked, or companions. How this is possible will be one of our major questions.

The aesthetic idea is attached (at a distance) to its concept (eventually, a rational idea) which exceeds it (since the product of genius is never actually perfect, and because a concept as such is discursive and thus cannot be an object of intuition) and which it, in turn, exceeds (it induces thought which goes beyond the confines of any concept, no matter how 'huge'). The mechanism of attachment is the aesthetic attribute, a substitute image (Kant's examples are symbols), which serves in the place of a logical attribute. The aesthetic attributes then "grant [geben]" the aesthetic idea. The talent that constitutes genius, then, seems to be both the ability to generate the aesthetic ideas, and to hit upon the attributes which - out there in paint, stone or poetry - will grant the aesthetic idea back again in universal communication. That would be a fairly common reading, but is not quite what Kant says. Rather, the aesthetic attributes are part of the conceptual "expression by means of which the subjective mental condition induced by the ideas and as the concomitant of a concept may be communicated to others." (CAJ 180). It is the mental state which is communicated, not the idea itself. This is important as we move to discuss the type of being proper to an aesthetic idea.

The aesthetic idea is clearly not just an ordinary intuition (even though we know that the imagination for Kant is the faculty of intuitions), for as such it would amount to a direct presentation of a rational idea, which would be quite uncritical. As we now know, any intuition as such can not be conceptually grasped, but in its excess just any intuition cannot be linked to a particular rational concept. On Kantian terms, the aesthetic idea is quite simply an impossible object. Certainly, we might call it an indirect presentation of the rational idea by way of attributes. But this leaves open just what kind of 'thing' the idea itself is. The notion of attribute supplies
the answer. Attributes 'grant' the idea, Kant says, leading the mind into a "field of kindred representations" (CAJ 177). This leading-into-the-field-of is precisely the cognitive harmony. Then, as we have just seen, it is not the idea which is communicated by genius (as we might have expected) but the mental state. The idea 'is' not at all in itself, but only 'is' insofar as 'it' induces a mental state - but all we (as reflecting subjects) have access to are attributes and mental harmonies. We are forced to the conclusion that the aesthetic idea just is this "field", this "manifold of partial representations" (CAJ 179), insofar as they are representations-in-me and also, while being a manifold, they none-the-less belong together without the possibility of synthesis. This aesthetic idea can only reside in the form of the relations or "affinities" between and among the attributes. This is not Kant's conclusion, but then he does not properly interrogate the aesthetic idea as to its location in the transcendental-critical anatomy.

As a product of the imagination (faculty of intuitions) the aesthetic idea is only and purely a formal network, a regulative idea of a wholeness. As formal, the idea consists only in a set (in this case, an always incomplete and indefinite set - i.e., not a manifold in the way that intuition is a manifold for the understanding) of relations, or to use the word Kant prefers in this section: 'Verwandtschaft', affinity. The aesthetic idea, considered from the point of view of the understanding, is not an idea strictly speaking, because it is not an object. A rational idea, on the contrary, is an idea - that is, can function in thought through its being a schema, and indeed precisely by always referring itself to the unthought - which is why dialectical inferences are a necessary though regrettable movement of thought.

How, then, does Kant's discussion of the aesthetic idea and the state of mind it conjures up relate to the final harmony of the understanding and the imagination which we discussed above? Once again the obvious solution - schematism - is not explicitly mentioned by Kant with respect to aesthetic ideas. Further, the section entitled "The
relation of genius to taste", which we might expect to be useful, is not terribly. There we learn that, since art demands a prior concept of what it is to be, taste merely is required to laboriously hit upon the proper form of a representation of that concept. This is not fine art yet, however, for the concept might well be a quite ordinary one (as of, following Kant's example, how to appoint a table). Thus we learn that the aesthetic idea, which is the contribution of genius, is the source of true art.

But there is a danger here, and a revealing one. If the beautiful (work of) art depends upon the presentation of a rational idea then it is not a finality without an end. Kant writes elsewhere (and too famously):

"... the finality in the product of the fine arts, although indeed intentional [absichtlich], must not appear [scheinen] intentional; that is, fine art must have the aspect [muss ... anzusehen sein] of nature, though one remains conscious of it being art" (CAJ 167).

This is accomplished by the perfect exactness of the representation with respect to the rules of representation, but without this ruled character being at all apparent in the product. Only in this way can the work please in the mere estimate of it. Now this, of course, is utterly bizarre as it stands - which is precisely why the passage is so famous. It is rabbit-out-of-a-hat, fly-by-night philosophy. What this description lacks is precisely the equally famous "nature gives the rule to art" in the paragraph immediately following. We have already discussed the meaning of this phrase: nature being the source of the (spacially inscribed) law of a natural end. Isis, Kant points out explicitly, is Mother Nature. Thus when art takes the aspect of nature, this is not merely a question of "being clothed with" (as Meredith translates it) in the sense of a disguise which leaves the transcendent and sovereign essence of the work as work untouched, for
the aspect of nature is an aspect radically distinct from work, product and production in the ordinary sense - that is, from finality with determinate end. Rather, this aspect of nature is a transforming of production itself.

As an intellectus ectypus, I can only understand the peculiar final and formal organization of attributes of the beautiful representation-in-me as dictated by a pre-existing aesthetic (and correlative, rational) idea which conditions it, and by a post-existing aesthetic (rational) idea towards which it strives. If, however, I were an intellectus archetypus, the attributes and the idea would be within the same space: the whole would be in there determining the parts, as it must be if we are to accept the above description of the being of the idea. Thus, it is only when we think of the aesthetic idea as linked to a rational idea as the representation of the supersensible does teleology enter the picture: the end is an end because it is (partly, minimally) discursive. Such a judgement would be alien to the aesthetic judgement on Kant's own terms and despite his fudge, and also alien to the essence of a rational idea which is clearly not just any concept or representation. This is not to imply that the aesthetic judgement proper is the work of the (merely hypothetical) intellectus archetypus but rather that, qua aesthetic and reflective, it formally approaches such by crossing out the transcendental conditions of the intellectus ectypus. Thus Kant gets into those famous binds discussed above, and seems alternately to be prescribing representational realism and abstract formalism.
1.4.6. The Intuition of Intuition.

We are left with one problem which can be expressed as follows: given that there is no ordinary sense in which an aesthetic idea (or the network of attributes which constitute it) is an 'expression' for the rational idea and that, conversely, the rational idea is not, in any straight forward manner a conceptualisation of the former - given all of this, how are the two linked such that the aesthetic judgement is properly singular. First of all, what does this question mean? We mean in what way does art, for Kant, remain representational. In the first instance this means: not representational in the sense of 'being a picture of' but rather in the minimal sense of singularity. I.e. what could prevent Kant from prescribing the destruction of all works of art bar one? Since all works give pleasure, having more than one is redundant. The pure formalism we have been describing seems inevitably to lead to this. Now this will prove to be a fairly simple misunderstanding, but a revealing one.

The ultimate object of communication, as we have already pointed out, is neither the attribute nor the idea, but the mental state: the subjective, pleasurable, self-sustaining, cognitive harmony. It is not immediately clear to what extent this harmony is a particular: does it make any sense to claim that one harmony at time t1 is the same or different from the harmony at t2? This is the crunch. Remember, however, that this harmony is (and above all else) something felt. As we discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the key to Kant's theory of feeling is that, from an external (i.e. behaviourist) viewpoint those feelings are identical which have the same effect on the will; from another subjective viewpoint, however, they must be capable of distinction. This duality of truthful descriptions is made possible by the observation that a feeling is not an entity, but 'is' a representation-in-me. The feeling of pleasure is singular in precisely the same way that any intuition is singular, and necessarily so. However, have we solved our problem? What is to prevent this
singularity from being just contingent? This is just the particularity of a random number, or a momentary image in a kaleidoscope. Such a singularity says nothing about the necessity and universality of the aesthetic judgement.

We should begin at the lowest level, with the attributes. Now the communicable concept of the attribute is always "original" - in the sense of new, not contained in prior rules. The originality of the attribute means that the work of a genius is not duplicable and 'followable' in the same way as the work of a great mathematician. It is thus at a radical remove from the origin-al (now in the sense of that from which something de-pends, as a pendant) rational concept. This 'remove' guarantees that no conceptual analysis can lead from the latter to the former. This is because the object of the rational idea has no properties, in the sense of categorical properties - and the attribute has none other. However, as we have seen, in the Dialectical movement of the 'as if' the categories arrive as analogies of the uncategorical. The notion of the analogy, in the first as in the third Critique, bridges incompatible forms - or rather broaches, meaning spans but also divides. The 'originality' of the attribute simply means that, qua analogy, there is no possible proof of the correctness of the attribute. Jove's bolt of lightning seems correct as a representation of godhood, but that correctness ultimately depends on other analogies: height, light, fire, anger, phallus, power, weapon, etc.

The possibility of a (apparently) complete distancing of original and attribute is always available, and indeed, in Kant's discussion of the representation of war or death, the attributes must take a "pleasant guise" [sich gefällig ausnehmen] (CAJ 174). We have to assume the possibility that the guise and its object have only a conventional relationship. Further, Kant claims that models of taste in poetry must be composed in a dead and learned language (CAJ 75). Besides the simple ridiculousness of the outmoded, there are perhaps two reasons
for this: in the first place, because poetry in a modern language might, through evolution of the language, lose its conventional 'object'; but even if the object is preserved (and often enough it is - we understand, for example, Milton well enough), there is the danger that the structure of attributes and their affinity in which the aesthetic idea and its essential excess precisely consists will be gradually erodes away (we understand Milton, but he may fail to affect us in a properly aesthetic manner).

The notion of rational feeling is taken up by Kant in "Was Heisst: Sich in Denken zu Orientieren". It is of course linked to awe or respect in the second Critique and performs a similar regulative guiding function. Respect is not the origin of my duty - it is the signpost of that duty. And in the same way, a highly particular feeling of pleasure in the aesthetic judgement is not the origin of that judgement, but the indicator of its validity. Thus the important metaphor of orientation. The familiar point here is that, as indeterminate thought (of the supersensible), a rational idea is capable of virtually any predication - thus the dialectical inferences of the first Critique. But rational feeling in its various guises provides a guide, a way of orienting, either for metaphysics at its limits, or for practical action, or for the aesthetic and teleological judgements which exceed discursive validity. Thus we can see that as soon as Kant links the beautiful to the idea of the supersensible (by way of genius and the aesthetic idea) such that it becomes even a symbol of morality, then the pleasurable feeling of the aesthetic judgement must also be linked to - indeed, identified with - rational feeling. This feeling guides, and forms a nondiscursive (that is, not productive of knowledge) criterion of correctness. Thus representations, when these are purported to be representations of the supersensible, can never be merely conventional.

Kant calls up a comparison between a despotic state and a hand-mill. He writes, "...there is certainly no likeness between a despotic state and a hand-mill, whereas there surely is between the rules of
reflection upon both and their causality" (CAJ 223). In other words, there is no visual or other sensible similarity, but a similarity in the application of certain concepts in the proper understanding of each. However, this is not what Kant means by symbol in the most important sense, for a 'despotic state' is an ordinary concept and not an idea of reason. He moves into this field in talking of our knowledge of God as being symbolic and, of course, beauty being the symbol of morality. Now the latter of these has a long heritage in the secondary literature, and does not directly concern us here. But the idea of God as supreme being is clearly a certified rational idea which might and often does appear in fine art. God differs from a despotic state in as much as there are proper modes of description for the latter, but only symbolic for the former. A new trinity (and indeed scale of being) is postulated: God the symbol (intuition), God the idea (thinkable) and God the unconditioned conditioning 'being' (unthinkable and unintuitable, except through analogies).

Now without further ado we can identify the symbol with the aesthetic attribute. What is missing in Kant's account of the symbolic is precisely the manifold of symbols and the form within which they reside - in other words, the manner in which the symbols/attributes 'give' or 'grant' the aesthetic idea (or rather the mental state = feeling) which exists in analogy with that for which the rational ideas are 'schemata'. If I say 'God is our father', I am using a symbol (under Kant's definition), but I have not yet written a poem. Nonetheless, symbols both in and out of art works are representational. And yet, symbols must function together and purely formally in order to exceed thought as fine art does, and thus to free imagination and cognition from their former constraints and functions and for the presenting of absolute form within their enlivening harmony and its accompanying pleasure.

But this latter presenting is always a presenting from a certain direction, from out of a particular set of attributes. There are thus
two 'representations' going on, which roughly parallels Kant's own famous distinction between the contributions of genius and taste. In the first instance, there are the symbolic relationships which, by way of particular schematic analogies, and guided by feeling, can be said to be representations. Also, however, the together-in-me-ness of these attributes grants a relationship (which is no longer strictly representational or produced) to the supersensible in its formal essence (so far as our natures are capable of apprehending it). That is, a relation to that which formally makes the supersensible necessarily beyond possible experience.

But in the latter too, the relation is given in and as feeling. In art, for Kant, we are quite literally overwhelmed by the supersensible - it is within us and indeed as us. We expressed this above by saying that the aesthetic judgement must be seen as somehow 'approaching' the intellectus archetypus. For Kant, art is thus the 'intuition of intuition' where this phrase is understood as follows: 'within a particular both a representation given as appropriate of that which lies beyond thought and the formal essence of the beyond thought itself.' We must also say that by overwhelming us with the supersensible, art brings us to (something approaching) our noumenal selves - which necessarily also means our noumenal not-selves: the whole formal field of supersensible - in the manner of feeling. Thus, art is an essential component in a major critical project: revealing ourselves from within ourselves for what we are. Art brings us face to face with a constituting world which otherwise could only be encountered through the directives of pure reason. This will prove of the greatest importance in understanding Heidegger.

With this chapter, our work on Kant alone is finished. We have traced the problems and implications of the theory of forms of intuition through much of the critical project. Our goal, however, has not merely been to offer an interpretation of certain problems in Kant. Rather, we have constantly been concerned to show how that set of
concepts first encountered in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and which we have named 'spacing', is required to understand apparently distinct sections of Kant's work. In exploring Kant's work, we have also been exploring 'spacing'. We will now show how a similar odd cross-pollination occurs in Heidegger's work. However, we might expect that Heidegger will offer some greater degree of illumination as to what this 'spacing' means, due to his greater concentration upon the language he uses. We will be only half disappointed in this expectation.
1. Cognition, we say, is the aim of the understanding. Only when the understanding discovers Nature behaving according to the expectations of reason (i.e. behaving teleologically) do we then feel pleasure. However, Kant then writes that even the most everyday experience would not be possible without the contribution of such teleological experiences. Thus, it becomes perfectly possible to say that every cognition is accompanied by some form of possible pleasure insofar as every cognition is necessarily also a judgement about the finality of nature.

2. Kant. Critique of Judgement. Trans. Meredith. p44-5. Feeling is 'subjective sensation - but for Kant, even 'objective sensation' is predominantly subjective, so the terminology is less than useful.

3. Ibid. p. 29. Translation modified.

4. Ibid. p.63-4.

5. Similar arguments are raised by Richard Aquila in Cohen and Guyer, p. 92ff. Although Aquila's wider view of critical philosophy (sketched in this paper) ignores the gap in the faculties, nevertheless he offers an interesting (and Kantian) account of what sensations, intuitions and judgements are qua mental states.


7. Kant, I. Akademie Edition II 11n. Similarly in Fichte, although he doesn't recognise it: "With immediate feeling," Fichte writes, "all transcendental explanation comes to an end" (Science of Knowledge, 2nd Introduction, p61).


9. p.11n. (Translation modified)

10. This belief of Kant's and its problems seem to explain why, in the Groundwork at least, Kant seems reluctant to speak of moral feeling and the feeling of reverence together.

11. For example, Critique of Judgement, p. 30.


13. Note just how easy it is for commentators to elide this whole problem, and thus rewrite it in entirely empirical terms: e.g. McCloskey 1987, p 26f.

14. Space and time, as forms of receptivity, are simply the way sensible representations are in-me. The in-itself prior to feeling would be a representation-not-in-me, which involves precisely the same contradictions as the non-spatial, non-temporal noumenon. And yet, we can generally abstract from our feelings about, say, some attractive hue, and judge the hue simply as a sensation. Feeling does not completely 'rewrite' the representation. Further, space and time have a certain priority, since feeling as linked to form must be a spatio-temporal-representation-in-me. Also, properly speaking, the 'representation' is not a representation until formed by space and time.
15. It is this kind of formulation that the distinguished commentator Donald Crawford gets himself into (Cohen and Guyer, 172). Kant does not seem to be arguing that we simply or consciously avoid making determinate judgements (for if that were possible, we could always do it, with any representation), but that we are not able to so judge without foreclosing on precisely what is most valuable in the representation. This has to be kept in mind.

16. See also CAJ 216.

17. It is the playing of the cognitive powers which acts like a concept for the aesthetic judgement. This will become important later.

18. Similar issues are to be found in the First Introduction.

19. Which brings Kant's work here into much closer line with our interpretation of the Dialectic than we could demonstrate previously.

20. We here speak primarily of space and not of time because in the realm of nondiscursive 'thought', space has the priority. For Kant, the elimination or exceeding of discursive causality is also the reduction of temporal orientation and order to a general spacing. (cf. 67-8, where time is reduced to simply the field of composition; also p107-8, where the reduction of time is explicitly discussed with respect to measurement and the sublime.) On the other hand, the feeling of pleasure certainly arrives back at itself via inner sense, which is time.

21. CAJ p64. Translation modified.


25. CPR B140.

26. CPR B142.

27. Certainly this ambiguity in the meaning of 'subjective' helps lead to difficulties in understanding Kant's theory of sensation and feeling. The two meanings mentioned above do overlap, but they need not do so. Probably Kant confused the two, at least at times.

28. CTJ, sec. 65.

29. CAJ sec. 22 (General Remark).

30. CAJ p. 64.

31. Kant says that attributes must play a role in all arts of speech and formative arts. And music is brought into the fold only by means of an essential kinship with language (cf. CAJ 194).
Part Two.

Being, Form and Spacing in Heidegger
2.1.

Methodological and Phenomenal Wholeness
in Descartes and Heidegger.

2.1.0. Introduction.

Having just spent so long working out the issue of spacial wholeness in Kant, and the implications for Kantian epistemology, ontology and transcendental method, any move forward a century and a half to Heidegger will be something of a shock. In order to minimise this shock, we will not be beginning (as we did with Kant) with an account of the phenomenology of everyday space. Rather, we will move directly into the problem of wholeness, especially as it relates to the familiar Kantian problem of the unity of experience. Further, we will be comparing Heidegger with Descartes rather than with Kant in order again to maximize clarity. This approach will show to greatest effect the parallel between Kant and Heidegger on those concepts we have called 'spacing'.

Only in the next chapter will we return to the phenomenon of space as Heidegger understands it. It will then become clear how, just as in Kant, issues of wholeness begin with the analysis of space, and are never able to leave space completely behind.
2.1.1. Methods and Lists.

Constitutive for all the familiar themes of Being and Time—such as Angst, Death, Authenticity and Ecstatic Temporality—is a methodological point which while not easily overlooked is certainly easy to underestimate or misunderstand. This point concerns the demand for and possibility of getting to grips phenomenologically with the whole phenomena. Heidegger is constantly emphasising the importance of this: we must not, he says, merely list and describe individually the characteristics of Dasein’s Being, but come to see Dasein in its wholeness. We cannot accomplish this seeing through lists, because listing predicates is an essentially inappropriate logical form for an entity like Dasein. Any such list, however exhaustive and rich with discriminating detail, would always miss Dasein itself. Heidegger writes,

...It is beyond question that the totality of the structural whole [of Dasein] is not to be reached by building it up out of elements [Zusammenbauen der Elemente]. For this we would need an architect’s plan. The Being of Dasein, upon which the structural whole as such is ontologically supported, becomes accessible [zugänglich wird] to us when we look all the way through [vollen Durchblick durch] this whole to a single primordially unitary phenomenon which is already in this whole in such a way that it provides the ontological foundation for each structural item in its structural possibility. (BT 181)

There is an interpretative problem here. The final ‘so dass es...fundiert’ phrase is obviously a consequent, but what is the antecedent? Macquarrie and Robinson interpret it in the above as ‘[the phenomenon] is already in this whole in such a way that...’. More interesting might be: ‘we look all the way through this whole... in
such a way that...'. The implication being a very tight relation indeed between the ontology of the object of the look [Dasein] and the appropriate phenomenology of the look. In any case, it must be recognised that initially Heidegger's is merely a methodological point. That is, the phenomenologist must find a type of description that will be appropriate to the entity confronted. Since Dasein is not a mere entity present at hand, or even ready to hand, any type of description (in this case, a compilation of predicates, and predicated relations between predicates) appropriate to the latter two will not be for Dasein.

But this methodological point quickly crosses over into something other. Dasein is that entity for whom Being - and in particular its Being - is an issue. Thus Dasein (and not just the phenomenological investigator) is already oriented towards or away from an appropriate grasp of itself; i.e. a grasp of itself as a whole entity. This orientation is essential, and the ways in which it might be appropriate or inappropriate are given from out of the analysis of primordial temporality. Also given are the ways in which Dasein, as Being-in-the-World, is as a propensity for having an inappropriate grasp of itself. That is, Dasein necessarily tends to understand itself through (or, as Heidegger says, 'alongside') its world. One can say that it is proper for Dasein to be inappropriate.¹ At issue now in general is not an exterior 'imaging' (phenomenological/ontological grasp), but a self-'imaging', such that indeed the concept 'image' (implying 'representation of...') is no longer appropriate.
2.1.2. Cogito and Finitude in Descartes.

We can better understand what Heidegger is driving at by taking the problem historically. For Heidegger is not the first philosopher to form links between method and implication.

Take Descartes, for instance. The *Meditations* were written with a covering letter to the faculty of theology at Paris. Here Descartes writes, 'Whatever certainty and evidence I find in my reasons, I cannot persuade myself that all the world is capable of understanding them.' (156) The radical method of doubt is not for everyone, then. But a few pages later, Descartes is asking the learned scholars to look over his manuscript and suggest amendments and reformulations. In this way, he hopes they gain not merely the rhetorical clout and advertising copy of approval by the Paris school, but also a clarity and air of exactitude. Such a clarity, Descartes says, will bring it about that 'all the errors and false opinions which have ever existed regarding these two questions [of God and of the soul] will soon be effaced from the minds of men.' (158).

Descartes, of course, is here very cleverly buttering up not only his own work but especially those he hopes will receive it. There is also an explicit understanding of the power of philosophical fashion, and an express desire on Descartes' part to jump on the gravy train as soon as possible. Even the most cursory examination of the passage will reveal that, for a rationalist, Descartes' reveals a very strange idea of the relationship between prestige and truth. Though all this is very interesting, my point lies elsewhere: Descartes is announcing that, although this will be difficult, his work must be targeted for mass consumption ('mass' by 17th century standards, at any rate). If not, truth will continue to be in a bad way. How do we explain this?

At times, Descartes feels that this method - the method of radical doubt and of clear and distinct ideas - can be exchanged for any
content. If a natural scientist encounters a problem thinking about matter, then all he has to do is apply that method radically enough, and he must eventually arrive at true premises and eventually true conclusions. Descartes himself spent years doing just this. Thus, Descartes says, the Meditations are just another application and test of the method (156). And yet nothing could be further from the truth. For the method can only justify itself by way of Descartes' theological and metaphysical conclusions, which are precisely to be found in the Meditations. The 'I think' has no consequences, except insofar as Descartes can prove that God exists and is no deceiver. Only then can Descartes move on to problems in physics, biology, etc.

In other words, Descartes' method can be called a 'tool', but only if we recognise that for a certain ideal (the economic community of one) the issue is not merely do we know how to use the tool, but rather that no one can be said to use a tool properly unless they can build it.'

God is not a deceiver, and thus human beings are, in their essence, in the truth, surrounded by it, saturated with it. Only internal prejudice - which for Descartes is never merely internal but rather is always communal - leads us away from truth. But anyone who does not pursue the truth - which means to pursue it in such a manner that simultaneously proves its possibility - is scoffing at this divine privilege. Even the philosopher whose theories are in agreement with things, whose conclusions are 'correct', is astray if there has been no reflection upon what makes that agreement possible. (cf. Second Replies, p. 238-9) Descartes' sometimes amusing arrogance has this root: he is not only philosopher and scientist, but also priest and prophet.

There is thus no way that Descartes' method is purely formal: it inevitably leads to its own conclusions. Not surprisingly, his method is also a metaphysics. Further, both method and object are posited as whole. Descartes, in his 'Preface to the Reader' rails in advance
against 'those who, without caring to comprehend the order and connections of my reasonings, form their criticisms on detached portions arbitrarily selected...' (160). This kind of advice is common amongst philosophers. It gives the texts the air of craftsmanship, or even of art, and usefully discourages not only premature criticism but any criticism at all. In Descartes, however, it must be said that there is additional justification for such advice. Namely, his method is both linear and self-grounding, and can plausibly enough be placed in a narrative form. Because of the way that method elaborates both itself and its object, it is indeed (or should be) impossible to thoroughly disengage any one section of Descartes' text.

For exactly the same reasons, Descartes' method posits the absolute unity of its object. All philosophy and science is one, and has a certain order and orientation. In the Principles Descartes calls this 'the true philosophy' (302 or 305). He writes famously, 'Thus philosophy as a whole is like a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches, which issue from this trunk, are all the other sciences' (305).

What is important to realize is that it is not the case that there are, for example, some finite number x of basic and closed axioms from which all knowledge is derived, and thus all knowledge can be said to be one knowledge. Descartes is not systematic in the way later rationalists are. Nor is it the case that all knowledge is a whole simply because it is all knowledge - i.e. in the same way the universe forms a whole simply because there is not anything else. For though in fact there may not be any other true propositions other than those contained in Descartes' 'true philosophy', nonetheless this completeness does not entail the root, trunk and branch metaphor. Nor finally, is knowledge one just because object of knowledge has the predicate of being possibly doubted. For it is logically necessary that I at least doubt that I have knowledge of that of which I cannot have knowledge.
Rather, Descartes' method determines its object as a whole. The important point is not that everything can be doubted, but that there is a position from which everything can be doubted. If I doubt everything that is not both clear and distinct, I am left with two propositions that I cannot doubt. First, that I am doubting. And secondly, that everything which is clear and distinct can be called true. But this latter proposition is equivalent to: I exist in possible truth by virtue of a perfect and infinite creator. Why are these equivalent?

The multiplicity of modes of the I think (I feel, I doubt, I understand, etc.) and indeed of the 'I' itself, are united existentially by the I am. The I think, in its generality, is equivalent to the I am, because I am a thinking thing. I.e. the essence of spiritual matter is to think. Thus 'I am capable of true thinking' is equivalent to 'I exist in possible truth'. And the two are equivalent in such a way that the 'I' in each is not a mode of some prior and more general I-substance, but are themselves one and the same. But 'possible' here clearly implies a defect for Descartes; thus to claim 'I doubt' is to claim 'I exist finitely'. In other words, this position from which everything can be doubted is not merely an 'I am' but an 'I am not in-finite.' Such a position ultimately has its possibility in a beneficent God. I exist in the possibility of truth by virtue of a transcendent, infinite and perfect being.

A Heideggerian would recognise that this 'existing in' is where Descartes first and primarily treats the soul as a thing, though certainly incorporeal. I exist in possible truth, not as possible truth. God alone exists as truth, not just because God is infinite but because God is infinite and perfect. Knowledge becomes one, accordingly, by virtue of this perfection. Thus Descartes' method leads to the unity of its object: i.e. to true philosophy. But it does not constitute that object, rather it makes itself ready for an already given encounter with the object, but now as precisely that object which
it is. That is, an encounter with the one, true philosophy as both one and true.

Thus Descartes' borrowing of the distinction between objective and formal reality. Thought, as a mode of a thinking thing, has no formal reality other than the self-identical formal reality of the thinking substance itself. Considered, however, as a representation, the thought does have objective reality. The ontological force of this distinction is to assert that clarity and distinctness, illuminated by systematic doubt (Cartesian method), is precisely what we mean by the adequation between idea and object (the whole of which is 'true philosophy.'). For to define adequation in any other way would be to assert that corporeal objects are formal, material and efficient causes of ideas, which would force the reality of the cogito to be dependent upon the reality of the world.

It no longer makes sense to say that, for Descartes, God and man have the same type of intelligence. The narrative and linear pattern of Descartes' philosophising (considered as a limit to that philosophising) is essential to it, since that philosophy is a construction of a unitary complex out of the simple. It would make no sense to attribute such an understanding to God. God presumably has no need to quest after grails, to construct things or thoughts, or to strive to think them adequately. At least one function of Kant's distinction between our understanding and the 'intuitive understanding' was simply to draw attention to the fact (as he makes clear in the third Critique) that our understanding functions by way of images and representations - further, we have already explored in detail the relationship between 'intuitive' and 'non-representational'. As we can now see, this notion of image-thinking was explicit in Descartes' metaphysics but more importantly already implicit in Descartes' method: the giver of truth and the apprehender of truth are not the same.
2.1.3. Existing as Possible Truth.

In Heidegger, however, we cannot only say that method points to and prepares us for a certain unity of its object. We cannot even merely say that method inevitably leads to the positing of such unity. It would be a distortion, which Heidegger himself sometimes falls into, if we suggested in this manner that Heidegger's phenomenology and its method was in some ordinary sense a description of its phenomena. Even in the first division of *Being and Time*, the discussion of language would prohibit such an interpretation. Language is the explicit articulation of a projective understanding - and such an understanding cannot be reduced to a set of representational concepts in some subject's mind - or, for that matter, a reality-starved mode of a thinking substance.

Rather, and in an important sense, method constitutes the unity of its object. Of course, this does not mean the absurd proposition that Heidegger's method creates Dasein. What has to be recognised is that Dasein is properly - as its ownmost self - only insofar as it is capable of grasping itself as a whole. The paradoxes apparently involved in the previous sentence all stem from our continuing tendency to think of Dasein as a thing. It then becomes nonsensical for a thing to bring itself about by first apprehending itself.

But if we avoid thinking Dasein as a thing, if we think Dasein existentially, then Heidegger's statement that 'Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue' (H191) becomes more clear. 'To be an issue' translates 'um gehen', a common expression which might be more idiomatically translated as 'to be about' or even more so, 'to be at stake'. It is the phrase, 'an issue' that I object to, as if ontologically there were others. A German might say 'Es geht um Leben und Tod' which is only inadequately translated as 'It makes life and death an issue'. Dasein's being is always the issue for it, even when Dasein has no issues in the ontic sense. Dasein is about its Being.
But this does not imply that, in each case, Dasein’s Being about itself is factically identical. On the contrary, Dasein can be about itself in many ways. Heidegger’s insists, however, that phenomenologically there is an appropriate way to grasp the Being of Dasein. And thus in parallel there should be an appropriate way to have that Being as the issue of one’s Being. This appropriate way he terms ‘authenticity’ which, temporally articulated, is anticipatory resoluteness.

It is now clear that Heidegger’s method is not something like a tool for getting the Being of things into one’s grasp. The method is a part of that grasp. For, caught up in the Hermeneutic circle, only the grasp makes possible the adjustment of method to that grasp. In other words, we have to have an access to Being - and in particular an access to our own Being - before any question of an appropriate or authentic access to that Being can arise. The phenomenological method is a constitutive part of what Heidegger calls pre-ontological understanding. Dasein must get the whole of its Being into its grasp in precisely the same way as phenomenologists must get the whole of the Being of their object into their grasp. We are all phenomenologists, for better or worse.5

In Descartes, we saw method having necessary metaphysical consequences which eventually circle back and ground the method. Here in Heidegger, it is not the case that method is one thing, its consequences another, and its self-grounding a third, however logically inter-implicative these things are. Rather, method is the central characteristic of Dasein’s authentic self-understanding.

I would go so far as to suggest that this difference is the most radical point to which we can take Heidegger’s distancing from Cartesian philosophy. As we saw above, in Descartes it is possible methodologically to step outside of our world and in such a manner grasp that world as a contingent mode of our essentially defining relation with God. Any reference to the wholeness of our world, our
experience or of our self has to be negotiated through a reference to God, as the not only infinite but perfect being. Without question, this theme is to be found throughout the rationalist and empiricist traditions and including most especially Kant.

But in Heidegger, this reference relation is collapsed. Dasein exists as a whole by virtue of itself. There remain, of course, essential traces of the reference relation, such as when temporality is said to be 'ek-static', standing outside of itself, or that Dasein is said to be already ahead or beyond itself. Such phrases embody the continuing but unHeideggerian suggestion that Dasein is first a (spacial, temporal, substantive or semantic) point and only afterwards outside of itself. For example, see Heidegger's self-chiding regarding 'already out there' in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 167. Heidegger's phrases are deliberately paradoxical in an attempt by Heidegger to wrench us out of entitative thinking. Further, the phenomenon of the everyday suggests that it is always possible for a Cartesian ontology to reassimilate and reinflate this collapse. But, phenomenologically, Dasein must look through itself for a wholeness that is already in itself. Above all, then, Dasein does not represent its wholeness across a space of difference from itself - and this is in the first instance because its wholeness is not discursive, that is, does not exclude difference in accordance with a classical/logical understanding of identity. Ontologically, Dasein is identical with itself by virtue of the way its self-divergences are its own.

It becomes clear now why certain ways of talking about authenticity and falling are mistakes. For example, talking in terms of ethics or theology. To consider Dasein's authenticity as a choice, or even an indefinite series of repeated choices, is to misconstrue the spacial and temporal aspects of Dasein's Being-a-whole. In this interpretation of Heidegger, the concept of choice functions precisely like the concept of doubt in Descartes. Doubting means finding a position for doubt. In choice, I either have no reference to wholeness, or I
negotiate through a representation of my whole Being, with respect to something not constitutive of my Being. Authenticity, even though saddled with such misleading phrases as 'Augen-blick' translated 'moment of vision', cannot be thought in terms of choice. Authenticity is precisely not the ability to disengage oneself from one's world, and to start having objective and dispassionate representations of that world. Rather, it is the potentiality for Being-in-the-world as a whole.7

Obviously, what interests me are the spacial metaphors. From the analogy of the architect's plan or of 'looking through' in the quotation I read at the beginning, to Descartes' famous tree of philosophy, to the very notions of ahead of itself, or standing outside of itself. All of these are not merely prominent, but seem essential. Of course, one could just ask: what other metaphors could there be? As if such metaphors would only be interesting if we had a choice between, say, spacial and colour metaphors, and for some reason always (empirically) chose the former. Instead, it might just be possible to ask 'why are there no other metaphors?' or 'why does the very notion of 'privileging space' involve a redundancy?'.

If our interpretation of Kant in previous chapters has been correct, then we have part of an answer. We have termed 'spacing' that which is ontologically most general and significant in the phenomenon of space (and thus, according to Kant, in time as well). Spacing, throughout Kant, is the intuitive (therefore nondiscursive) condition for the possibility of fully functional discursive concepts, and thus of experience. We have analyzed the necessity of spacing in Kant's account of the principles of causation and reciprocity and, through an analysis of open and closed models, in the schematism more generally. It is clear that all of these deductions depend upon the transcendental deduction and its problem of the possibility of the experience of self-identity (the I) and self-positioning (subject-object) - but here too we have shown a necessary relation to spacing in the problem of the
'form of consciousness'. And we briefly carried the problem of spacing to the Ideal, showing how spacing was the model with which Kant constructs our concept of the (disjunctive) divine.

Finally, we have shown how spacing, as the intuitive analogy of life, becomes definitive in Kant's account of the aesthetic. The aesthetic representation is the intuition of intuition — that is, the presentation in a phenomena both open and particular of the very character of openness itself, or the supersensible. At first, our chapter on the Third Critique looked like a test case for our interpretation of Kant. Indeed, Kant would say that, as families of phenomena, aesthetic and teleological judgements are of secondary importance to the onward march of science and philosophy. However, he would also admit that the problem of judgement itself — for which the aesthetic and the teleological are central — is the essential 'bridge' between theoretical and practical philosophy, i.e. between our supersensible and our transcendental-cognitive selves. In other words, the third Critique is a radicalisation of the much earlier problem of self-coherence. Thus, our demonstration of spacing at work within the problem of judgement, in addition to being a test-case, completed our analysis of the relation between spacing and whole-experience.

As should be clear just from the above few pages, we intend to show an overlap between Kant and Heidegger on precisely these ideas. It will seem odd that we should do so without concentrating on Heidegger's extensive writings on Kant. However, Heidegger had other concerns in those texts, among which was not space and spacing. He evidently felt that the Transcendental Aesthetic, and all it entailed — historically locked as it was in a long and pedantic tradition — was irredeemable for the ongoing project of fundamental ontology. As far as it goes, we also hold this opinion, and this was one reason that we refused to read Kant as Heidegger might. Rather, we tried to read Kant with an eye to his very own problem of the spacing of intuition, allowing this question to accrue to its own perspective an interpretation of
transcendental philosophy. As if by accident, but almost certainly not so, this interpretation has also prepared us for a thoughtful encounter with Heidegger.

With Kant, we began with the particular phenomenon of space as ordinarily understood, and showed how the essential content of that phenomenon could be generalised ontologically. This generalisation involved an elaborate description of wholeness which agrees at every point with Heidegger’s methodological/ontological analysis - certainly with respect to the relationships of this wholeness to theoretical knowledge, to the concepts of representation and subjectivity, and to the operation of synthesis. In its turn, and for both thinkers, such wholeness demanded the presence of pre- or non-discursive intuition-schemata or models (in Kant) or understanding of Being (Heidegger) if the ‘categories’ are to achieve experience, and thus be recognised as categories (for Heidegger, that is, if entities are to uncover themselves as already bearing significance). Again, as in Kant (where, in the Transcendental Deduction, the unity of apperception must be posited as the first and highest wholeness to which finite ontological knowledge can be taken back), the problem of wholeness is particularised into the problem of grasping the wholeness of our own Being.

What is fascinating, as we have already identified, is the consistency with which this problem of wholeness is imaged in spacial terms by Heidegger. Indeed, as we shall see below, the language of space is the only language which seems to be left over after the (always incomplete) destruction of the history of ontology. Is this an oversight, the mark of an impurity in the revolution in ontology? Or is there rather an essential connection between Being and spacing?

This seems absurd: for Heidegger, the horizon for the understanding of Being is time. But we intend to show how, in Being and Time and other texts of that period, what is essential in the characterisation of time
as ontological meaning per se is nothing other than a radicalisation of Heidegger's (apparently earlier) analysis of the phenomenology of space - and the language of that analysis is still present. Which is not to say that we are elevating space above time, or some such nonsense. On the contrary, we are simply attempting to understand the relation between time and Being as thoroughly as possible. And this involves a recognition of the centrality of spacing - which itself has a relation to 'familiar space' only but not contingently via a family of metaphors. Because of the persistence of this family of metaphors, it seems fruitful to arrive at the problem of time and spacing by way of the problem of familiar space. Thus our sojourn with Kant, who first though probably unwillingly suggested the possibility of such an arrival at fundamental ontology from out of the ontic problems of space.

This arrival will now be repeated in Heidegger's work (chapter 2.2). Further, just as in Kant we took spacing into a kind of test case with an analysis of aesthetics, so we will for Heidegger (chapter 2.3). For Kant, the problem posed and solved in aesthetics is of a kind of wholeness - there, wholeness between the cognitive and the supersensible, if only by way of feeling. Similarly in Heidegger: the wholeness of Dasein and its history, the wholeness of a community, the wholeness of art, artist and origin, the wholeness of language with respect to Being. The linkage between all these apparently diverse problems is spacing, which describes the possibility of identification and origin and which, particularly in art, reveals itself as this possibility in this possibility.
Notes

1. These themes are preserved in Heidegger’s lectures from the late 20’s. See particularly the discussion of world and totality in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, pp. 170ff.

2. Descartes, Rene. from The Essential Descartes.

3. Descartes’ himself smugly asserts that there is no reason why he (even at the age of 50) could not himself fill out all the details of the sciences, given appropriate research funding (307). This jack wanted to become a king - and a mere practical matter stood in his way to the throne.

4. Arguably, both Hume and Kant held similar notions. One difference is that their methods (especially in Kant) are not so linear as Descartes’. No doubt this is one reason why Husserl found Descartes so attractive once his phenomenology had clarified its mission.

5. Or ‘All existing is already a philosophizing’ (Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 212).


7. At great risk of obscurity, I would say that Augen-blick is not a grasp of things in a moment of time but more like a grasp of time in a moment of things, where ‘moment’ in the latter is understood as a metaphor borrowed from physics. Heidegger himself uses the concept of ‘momentum’ in an analogous context in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p.207.
2.2

Spacing in Being and Time

'Nowhere', however, does not signify nothing; rather, it is where any region lies, and there too lies any disclosedness of the world for essentially spacial Being-in' (Heidegger, Being and Time, H186, tr. mod.)

2.2.0. Introduction.

... Dasein's 'dependence' [Abhängigkeit] on space - a 'dependence' which manifests itself in the well-known phenomenon that both Dasein's interpretation of itself and the whole stock of significations which belong to language in general are dominated through and through [(ist) weitgehend ... durchherrscht] by 'spacial representations'. ... from those spacial relationships which making-present is constantly meeting in the ready-to-hand as having presence, it takes its clues for Articulating that which has been understood and can be interpreted in the understanding in general. (BT H369)

The prevalence of space is no problem for Heidegger, inasmuch as it is merely a determined consequence of falling everydayness. For that which provides clues for the articulating of the understood is a spaciality removed from its primordial temporality - space, that is, in its opposition to that time which we intend when, in our everydayness, we say 'space and time'. Our problematic, then, does not 'take hold' for Heidegger as a mystery; it is a derived phenomenon.' Given Heidegger's description of the understanding, and Dasein's Being-in-the-world as a Being-alongside the ready-to-hand within involvement -
given, that is, concern in general - the observed properties of
Articulation will follow.

On the other hand, Being and Time itself is saturated with spacial
language. Consider that set of carefully placed prepositions - in, an,
auf, bei, vor, zu, gegen, and so on - or fundamental notions like
'entwerfen', 'Horizant', 'Gegend', and of course 'Dasein' itself. More
obviously, 'ent-fernen' and 'Ausrichtung'. Even in the passage quoted
above Heidegger already seems to require several spacial 'metaphors' to
express his point. The phenomenon is well known. Making it more well
known is pointless unless that burden finally breaks some stubborn
camel's back.

It is easy to see, moreover, that even Heidegger's treatment of
primordial temporality is infested by and indeed depends upon spacial
language: time 'stretches', is 'spanned' and 'ec-static' or standing-
outside-of-itself, and so on. We might add Heidegger's bizarre diagram
in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. In itself all this demands no
particular alarm. Even should we insist on purity, we could readily
admit a certain inadequacy in Heidegger's language which is to be
corrected by increased vigilance. A transcendental proof would be
required to show that any description of temporality could not remove
itself entirely from spacial language. But whatever it might mean, and
whether it can be said to be necessary or not, spacial language does
exhibit a certain prominence, even where we least expect it. Further,
Heidegger's explanation above is not helpful enough. It assumes that
Dasein's everyday understanding of itself through its world is of no
consequence. In fact, it clearly proves more difficult for Heidegger
to wrestle himself out of spacial language than out of, for example,
the language of transcendental consciousness - which is the fight he
has most stomach for in Being and Time. This is because in
authenticity, when Dasein grasps itself ontologically as a whole,
Dasein does not cease to have space. Space is not just a
misinterpretation or an ideal hypostatization, in the way transcendental consciousness is for Heidegger.

Space is not merely that within which we move; while the understanding is not simply the non-spacial juggling of concepts and representations. Instead, the two merge in the space of concern. Dasein has space a priori, but not in the same way that a stone does - not, that is, as an object present-at-hand in an abstract space of coordinates. For Heidegger, Dasein has space - or more correctly, spacing - because, with greater primordiality, Dasein’s Being is care. Dasein understands also in the manner of care. And understanding, as a grasping of involvement and a projecting of Dasein onto its possibilities, is an operation in spacing. Dasein’s understanding is [as] Dasein’s space.

We will examine these two issues in more detail as Heidegger presents them. We will find that they only offer us a beginning, and that we must dig at Heidegger’s text to its very end - through the issues of death, Nothing, and temporality - in order to uncover their roots. Spacing, it will be discovered, is an issue throughout Being and Time, and the space of concern as such is only its most everyday manifestation. However, we will eventually find a certain failure on Heidegger’s part to bear witness to the radicality of his own text’s treatment of spacing - a shortcoming particularly obvious in passages like the one quoted above. How much this failure is due to the incompletion of Being and Time remains unclear.

The goal of the following chapter is to first explicate the phenomenology of space proper in Being and Time, and second to apply this to non-spacial objects of description which none-the-less are put in spacial language. At no point are we merely aping Heidegger: not only is the phenomenology of space underdeveloped in many details, but Heidegger says nothing interesting at all about our second goal.
2.2.1. Being in a Fisheye Lens: Dasein's Spaciality

Immediately in paragraph 22, the space of the ready-to-hand is distinguished from the space of the present-at-hand. The proximity or closeness of the ready-to-hand, we read, is not merely such that we encounter the entity first in the order of our experiences, but that it is 'in der Nähe' (BT H102). This common expression is adequately translated by 'close by', but surely Heidegger keeps the literal force of the spacial preposition (perhaps paradoxically, Heidegger is among the most 'literal' of philosophers). The entity is 'in nearness', then. Heidegger writes, 'Every entity that is 'to hand' has a different closeness, which is not to be ascertained by measuring distances' (BT H102). What is the Being of this closeness?

Nearness, within which ready-to-hand entities are, is regulated by circumspective concern. Similarly, entities are set up in their directionality, which again is not merely their 'Stelle' (position) but their 'Platz' (place), in the sense of the English expression 'everything has its place'. Equipment belongs to a place because it belongs to a context of involvement - that is, an equipmental totality. But more generally, such a totality has a place which makes that totality possible as such. This place Heidegger calls a 'Gegend' (region) (BT H103). In the German, this expression captures both nearness and directionality.

A region is that area wherein an involvement is distinctly given. Although it may well be, a region is not necessarily an area in space like a kitchen or a yard - with the cheese grater or the hedge-clippers each in their place. Nevertheless, the region signifies the level at which concern, at its most 'abstract', coincides with space. The most constant entities ready-to-hand grant (have already granted) regions, and places for equipment are oriented thereabouts. Let us consider Heidegger's example. The sun's pattern of (apparent) motion grants definite regions of utility within which more-or-less specialized
equipmental-totalities are located: the arrangement of windows and rooms in a house, the layout of streets and gardens, the symbolic location of church axes and grave-yards. Regions, as ready-to-hand, and the specific ready-to-hand entities whose places - as members of a totality of involvement - belong within them, are given beforehand to Being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world (care) makes possible Dasein’s specific spaciality. But it is important to recognise that the essential structures of this Being-in are always spacial.

In this description of what we will here call ‘neighbourhood-space’, which as yet is only preliminary, Heidegger asserts that any equipment context is not in a priori space (3-dimensional, coordinated space), but generates space a priori. Here Heidegger says only that this ‘bare space’ is, as yet, ‘veiled over’ (BT H104). Later, he writes of the thematization of space, in which the world is de-involved, and this naked space revealed. Let us call this other space ‘mathematical space’. This kind of wording, ‘veiled’ and ‘revealed’, allows one to think that mathematical space lies ‘behind’ Dasein’s space as its transcendental condition. But, Heidegger insists, such a space is always a subsequent move, and space is in any case only possible within a world.

Now, a thesis of this type goes against common sense in a violent fashion. And yet, it is inescapable at least to the limited extent that one’s existence precedes in chronological time one’s ability to measure abstractly. Any measurement of a thing, Heidegger points out, is a measurement using tools and procedures ready to hand. The coming to measure must also involve measurement and thus an infinite series - which is counter-factual - or else we must assume that at a certain inevitable point Dasein just ‘knows what it is doing.’ Such an ad hoc ‘rule’ is an understanding not of a given material or sub-process in abstract isolation, but of its always particular involvement-character in a broader system; that is, of a material or sub-process’s projection in and through an equipmental totality. A good engineer, we might say,
does not necessarily have a greater knowledge of engineering science - its models, procedures, tools and materials - than some less able colleague; rather, in a way that is not strictly a form of propositional (Kant said 'discursive') knowledge, he can successfully apply that knowledge. This skill of application may be arrived at through, although still not capable of formulation in terms of, experience with certain materials and tasks, or perhaps through something like 'natural talent', or both. In any case, it involves a notion of understanding-how-to-work-with that is much closer to the kitchen's cheese grater than, say, the totality of a nuclear power plant. Formally speaking, the power plant is just a huge number of cheese graters to which clearly two types of approach are possible: an approach by way of the individual cheese graters or by way of the huge number considered as organised number. This is too simple of course: the cheese grater is what it is because of the cheese, quiche, oven, people to feed, etc. (i.e. the kitchen environment). Thus the nuclear power plant must be 'there' in the 'cheese graters' which make it up, but not there in the same way as in the consideration by number.

How does Dasein move and function in neighbourhood-space?

The two principle characteristics of Dasein's spaciality are de-severance (Ent-fernung) and directionality (Ausrichtung). In encountering entities, Dasein brings them close, it de-severs their remoteness. Dasein brings things to hand, considers them, prepares them, discovers them in proximity to things it holds most dear. De-severance is not a measurement of some displacement or interval; rather, Dasein estimates the de-severed in ways that are ready-to-hand for it: 'a ways off', 'a good distance', 'just around the corner', 'as far as I can spit'. In language borrowed from a slightly later Heidegger, we might say such expressions are strict but not exact. They are, Heidegger says here, 'thoroughly intelligible' (BT H105). De-severance, then, is the discovery of the spaciality as the readiness of the ready-to-hand. It brings close entities out of a radical
distance which is simply non-concern, and it brings them to that neighbourhood where concern has met them. Heidegger's example has become famous: a path along which one walks is de-severed the moment it is encountered by concern as 'that along which I must walk in order to ...'. And our 'subjective' evaluations of whether the path's end is 'distant' or not are proclaimed by Heidegger as the discovery of the 'true' or 'most real' world (BT H106). Again, this can be understood as an inversion but remaining-within of common sense: this most real world is that world we occupy most of the time and in the most immediate manner. As a first approximation, this is at least helpful.

The apparent 'subjectivity' of the issue, however, can be multiplied by a different example. Consider a deep cut which Dasein discovers on the back of its own hand. Such a cut might, if only for a moment, but perhaps at odd intervals for days, leap out for Dasein, de-severantly taking over its neighbourhood-space completely. Certain entities might drop from space altogether, crowded out of Dasein's zoomed focus: the room one is in, the people one is with. Clearly, concern distorts Dasein's 'space' around it, like a fish-eye lens. Consider my glasses: they are closest to me in mathematical space, but in the space of concern they are nowhere, out of sight - unless of course they draw attention to themselves by being dusty, bent, broken, uncomfortable, lost, or a philosophical example. Familiarity, for Heidegger, is a kind of being far away, being out of mind and going on without one. Thus, bringing-close as de-severance does not alter the location of an object (how could it?); rather, an object is brought into the range of a concern. This - the coincidence of the near and the far - is a paradox only in mathematical space. Here there is a suggestion, and certainly for the Heidegger of a few years later, that memory and imagination are also explicitly forms of de-severance. We say that a vivid memory or a powerful image 'strikes me', 'comes to me', 'could be happening here now' - or alternatively, that a memory 'seems distant'. Two points need to be made. First, that de-severance carries hints of
a peculiar temporality; and second, that these cognitive phenomena indicate that the understanding is never far away.

But at this point we need to ask: why speak of this 'space' as space at all? Why not speak rather of the intentional objects of a roaming and guided consciousness? For then we could talk of Dasein as a being which simply ignores or recognizes, at different times and with differing evaluations, certain features of an environment which is tidily laid out in mathematical space. Is not the mere fact that we might describe such a cut as 'being oppressive to us', 'never far from us', 'pushing other concerns out of sight' - in spacial vocabulary - leading us to speak of our concern as some kind of 'space'?

Such a problem at first seems purely nominal. Heidegger's point is something like this: mathematical space, while the immediate basis for science - including the physiology and biology of the human organism - is simply not something with which Dasein normally concerns itself. More importantly, it leads to an ontologically inappropriate grasp of Being-in-the-world wherein Dasein is nothing but the 'thing' which is its body (and perhaps soul). Further, even should Dasein, in a calculative or scientific mood, explore space mathematically, it always does so out of what we have called neighbourhood-space. Now, one can always give a mathematical account of 'familiarity', as if for example the human hand were the robot arm of the production line, but as we saw above, Dasein will not recognize such a description as its own. Dasein's space has a world. What is most interesting is not the relation between these two possible spaces, but their lack of relation, or rather, the radicality of their opposition, which can itself be made to do much philosophical work. The fact also remains that we do use spacial language. Why? What is the significance of this? It may never be possible to fully answer these questions, but they are genuine questions none-the-less.
Yet we have still not answered the query about the space-ness of primordial space. Certainly, we cannot answer this question by simply referring the latter back to everyday space - nor by singing 'Everything you can do I can do ontologically' as if the two were one, differently described. Rather, neighbourhood-space - with which we mean to designate the spaciality (or better, spacing) involved in such concepts as de-severance - is 'space' just because spacial metaphors uniquely work and fit. Yet we can hardly call such language 'metaphorical' in the absence of anything like the literal being even ideally possible - nor can we call such language 'literal' and hope for other possible metaphors. This is a unique situation. Even the paradox of the near and far is anything but a consequence of a loose metaphorical language, for it goes to the heart of the matter very economically.

Another property of neighbourhood-space is directionality, which will help clarify the paradox described above. Directionality draws attention to the fact that the entities around Dasein are not just an assortment, but belong at a place in a region. De-severance brings-close out of a region, which is unified in terms of a certain task or involvement. The region, we said above, is where concern meets abstract space, and bursts it. For the region to be a region - to house an equipmental totality - every entity's place within it must be to-hand, even though those entities may vary widely in their measured distance. Every place in a region, that is, must be close enough to disappear in the distance. We have above used the phrase 'radical distance'; we must clarify this. The paradox of near and far is signalled in Heidegger's very word (and the translators are careful to duplicate this): Ent-fernung. Normally, ent- is a privative prefix, but in this particular word, it also intensifies (as does the 'de-'). Thus de-severance is the bringing-close that makes far - indeed, which in familiarity radically removes from apparent neighbourhood-space altogether.
There are three distinct reasons for this. First, very simply, de-severed objects are already directional - that is, they are already familiar to us. Bringing them close does not make them more familiar, rather, it makes them (as distinct objects) disappear into the task. Second, Heidegger is pointing to the non-coincidence of conscious attention and de-severance. Which is ultimately why neighbourhood space is indeed space. For only if it were some discrete and isolated activity of the subject which distorted space could that ‘activity’ be reappropriated as a mode of the mathematical description of space. Conscious attention would be just a way of viewing the activity of an ultimately mechanical entity. Heidegger, however, insists that Dasein is essentially de-severant, not just now and again. Thus, it is at least possible to give neighbourhood space the ontological and epistemological priority.

Thirdly, de-severance is possible only because Dasein exists as in a structured world, and the world is not a thing which could ever be close. Dasein never encounters an isolated entity and then brings it into its (conscious) world; rather, through directed de-severance will inhabit a region, alongside the entity, and take up a task with it. If the entity is indeed isolated in some determinate way, this is discovered privatively. Ultimately, then, de-severance preserves distance in that it obdurately (though rarely explicitly) reveals world, and not merely an object present-at-hand. By making possible nearness, world implicates distance and no-thingness, and constantly. It is an essential part of this task (or tool, region, proposition, activity, etc.) that there are other tasks, actual and possible, present, past and future. This is another way of saying that any encounter of an entity takes place from out of a task-horizon which ultimately refers to a for-the-sake-of-which (Worumwillen) which exists as a potentiality-for-Being. The essential involvement of the thing carries it and Dasein with it into a necessary outside. To de-sever, then, is to bring close and also make far - a most illuminating paradox, and one which could not be expressed without spacial language.
Heidegger later revises his vocabulary to emphasise transcendence, the stepping over or beyond of beings towards Being and world. Whatever one may make of Heidegger's later texts, it must be admitted both that the spacial language perseveres and that the central set of operative analogies do so also.

Heidegger further explores directionality with the concept of signs (Zeichen). To concern are given signs which function as equipment in the giving of directions. Since a region depends upon its direction, on its 'whither', signs 'keep explicitly open' regions (BT H108). Unsigned, a region would close, would drop entirely out of concern, and would be inaccessible. But what is a sign? A sign, as Heidegger earlier defined it, is 'an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself' (BT H80). Formally, the sign belongs to reference. A piece of equipment, so long as it belongs to an equipmental totality, refers in its 'in order to ...' towards the heart of that totality's structure. The sign, then, is simply the explicit setting forth of equipmental structure and region. The sign does not represent the totality or region, but is a part of that totality as that which makes it accessible in a certain way. Before the sign, the equipment is ambiguous; it is as-yet-unallocated. But it is still ready-to-hand in as much as we can only ever come across it while engaged in some other task within another, along-side or over-lapping region. Many things serve as signs, and they need not have been intended as signs.

The sign, by explicitly revealing totality, grants the next neighbourhood-space in its structure and as such. It is not that space balloons open around the sign relation; Dasein is always already des-severant, directional, and in-the-world. Though Heidegger does not mention this, we must recognise that the sign-structure is the condition for the possibility of Dasein modifying its space and its concern, of Dasein's mobility. Since, however, Dasein's taking over of
possibilities, regional and otherwise, is Dasein itself in its existence, signs also, and in an important sense, grant Dasein as such. But how can this be, if signs are - as we have described them here, at least - a peculiarly human vocation? If, ontically, the phenomenon commonly called 'creativity' is a feature of human behaviour, this is grounded ontologically in the ability of Dasein to sign to itself. For Heidegger, this means that Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists as always already having an understanding of that world. It is thus no accident that the concept of understanding is first introduced in the numbered paragraph immediately following that concerning signs. We can now ask the question which is absolutely fundamental to our entire ongoing project: what is the relationship between spacing and the understanding?
2.2.2. Dasein's Understanding

As we saw above, the discovery of the ready-to-hand in the world is a discovery of its referring to a totality. An entity referred exists in the way of involvement. Involvements drive their way through a total task, in the manner of the 'towards-which': that hammer is for hammering, the hammering drives the nail, the nail makes fast, the making fast provides shelter, shelter for Dasein (Heidegger's example). Involvements circle back towards the 'for-the-sake-of-which' which always bears upon a possibility of being of a being of Dasein's nature (BT H84).

Discovering something as ready-to-hand, then, is a 'letting something be involved'. Heidegger writes, 'to the extent that any entity shows itself to concern - that is, to the extent that it is discovered in its being - it is already something ready-to-hand environmentally ...' (BT H85). But its involvement as ready-to-hand is only possible on the basis of a prior discovery of the 'that-for-which' (Woraufhin), a totality of involvements. And this is to already signal world; the ready-to-hand can not be otherwise than ready-to-hand within-the-world. Heidegger then writes, 'the previous disclosure of that for which what we encounter within-the-world is subsequently freed, amounts to nothing else than understanding the world - that world towards which Dasein as an entity always comports itself' (BT H86). But what does Heidegger mean by world, exactly? It is precisely here, in first discussing understanding, that Heidegger tackles the specific problem of worldhood.

Dasein, in understanding a relational context - or, we might say, grasping a region as region - assigns to itself an 'in-order-to' in accordance with its own potentiality-for-Being. That is to say, Dasein participates 'possibly' in the involved machinery of a totality, and this identically with encountering the ready-to-hand as such. Now, Heidegger says,
'the 'wherein' (Worin) of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself (sichverweisenden) - as the 'on and for which' (Woraufhin) of the letting-entities-be-encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements - is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that, on and for which Dasein assigns itself, is that which makes up the worldhood of the world' (BT H86, translation modified).

Note that we have allowed the translation of Woraufhin to change, even from the previous page of Heidegger's text. This is because the 'that for which' has exhausted itself, as it were, in the question of previous disclosure, and thus disclosed itself as also an 'on the basis of which'. Now, the various relationships of assigning Heidegger calls signifying. Thus 'Dasein signifies itself', inasmuch as 'primordially, it gives itself its Being and potentiality-for-being to understand in regard to its Being-in-the-world' (BT H87).

Already, the understanding's relationship to the spaciality of the world is clear. By belonging to a region, an equipmental totality structures the space opened up previously by concern. Concern is Dasein's, and Dasein always 'occupies' a specific environmental region. The understanding assigns, as a possibility, Dasein within the region, disclosing significance. The understanding, then, is precisely the bringing of Dasein to and indeed as its possible neighbourhood-spaces. Of course, not all things understood will be spacial things: we can understand words and thoughts, for example. If by space we mean left & right, up & down, meters & circumferences then such things are non-spacial. Heidegger's explicit derivation of everyday space is from out of the same ontological structures of space as are used to describe the understanding. We called these structures spacial because such structures are not only constitutive for our ordinary understanding of space but because, conversely, 'metaphors' apparently borrowed from that ordinary understanding seem to be essential and are certainly
everywhere present. The understanding occupies space - or much better: the understanding is spacing. Let us put this differently: the understanding is Dasein's Being-about-itself as Being-spacing - for spacing is the possibility of structure and, perhaps more importantly, is the possibility of possibility.

The understanding, not surprisingly, provides the occasion for discussing possibility. In German, 'verstehen' sometimes coincides in meaning with 'vorsiehen', to manage or preside. To be capable of something, though, is not merely one property of Dasein among others; rather, Dasein is its being-capable. Nor is possibility to be associated merely with some abstract 'free will', since Dasein always already occupies definite possibilities. Dasein is 'thrown possibility'; it has been 'delivered over to itself' but always as Being-in-the-world (BT H144). Understanding is the Being of Being-possible.

But why should the understanding operate with the possible? Because, Heidegger answers, its structure is that of projection (Entwurf). Projection signals the always already of Dasein's essential Being-possible. Dasein is thus more than its factual at-handness; it is its not-yet (and its has-been). Further, projection allows us to see that, for Heidegger, the understanding has nothing thematic or theoretical about it. To understand a situation thematically fails to maintain the possibility as possibility, and rather reduces it to 'given and thought contents [gegebenen, gemeinten Bestand]' (BT H145). Cooks do not function like cookery books, nor snooker professionals like applied geometry textbooks. Heidegger here puns on 'Gemein' (common; also pejorative) to indicate that such a represented possibility is no longer one's own, and thus not a possibility.

Explicit understanding - understanding that is developed (sich auszubilden) - is interpretation. With respect to circumspective (everyday) understanding, interpretation (Auslegung) is a taking apart and laying out (auseinanderlegen). Laying out here means to disclose
the 'towards-which': the entity is something as something. Interpretation is the explicitness of this 'as'. But as we have seen, discovery is always a disclosure. Thus interpretation has its object before-hand; it is grounded in certain Befores. The Befores essentially enumerate the various manners in which Dasein's interpretation is never a pure approach. Fore-having (Vorhabe) indicates our prior Being-in-the-world, where understanding is 'still veiled' (BT H150), but within which an entity is 'taken'. Fore-sight (Vorsicht) - in accordance with the connection we have just developed between interpretation, sight and Articulation - is said to 'commence cutting' (anschneidet, translation modified) at what is held in fore-having. And finally, although a certain conceptualization seems merely the result of definite interpretation, the interpretation will have already decided on a conceptual 'approach' or 'grasp', that is, a fore-conception.

In what way, Heidegger asks, are we to relate the 'as' to the befores? When something in the world is discovered or understood, it has meaning. But strictly speaking, Heidegger says, we discover the entity or Being itself, and never meaning. Rather, he writes, 'meaning, structured through fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception, is the 'upon-which' (Woraufhin) of a projection out of which something becomes intelligible as something' (BT H151, translation modified). Meaning, then, grounds the projection of the as; this is to say, understanding something as in its totality of involvements requires the befores, but the befores have a prior totality: meaning. Meaning belongs to Dasein; only Dasein can be meaningful, that is, can understand, and this 'only so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, through the entities discoverable in it, is 'fillable' ['erfüllbar']' (BT H152, translation modified). Meaning is the fillableness of world-space. Space returns explicitly - though in inverted commas - at the very heart of the discussion of understanding and intelligibility. But space is already there, without the inverted commas. In the above, we have deliberately skipped over the repeated spacialisation of the understanding.
First of all, Heidegger’s use of the verb ‘vorstehen’ to illuminate ‘verstehen’ is surely ironic. Although it is essential that understanding be co-ordinated with ‘capable of’, ‘vorstehen’ also means to stand out or protrude. But Dasein is its capabilities, it does not stand before them as a subject to its objects. The understanding always locates itself - is located - within a space that is prior to any constitution of subject-object space; the constitution of such a space occurs via thematised representation, which however robs the possibility of its character of possibility, making it ‘common’. Neighbourhood space - as a space organized by involvement, disclosed in significance, and modified through reference - is that wherein the spiel-raum of possibility is itself possible - that is, neighbourhood-space is the condition for the possibility of possibility. The standing before of ‘vorstehen’ is meant to imply projection. Only now can we fully understand Heidegger’s phrase that the understanding is the being of being-possible. Dasein, as essentially projective, is as its spacing-understanding.

With this word ‘verstehen’ Heidegger thus draws our attention to a fundamental divergence of his thinking from metaphysical tradition: Dasein’s understanding is so far from a thinking substance that, on the contrary, it is ‘in there’ with entities, alongside them, amidst them, projecting upon them. At issue is not the ‘where’ of understanding but the ‘wherein’. Dasein for example has a brain, but the brain does not exhaust Dasein’s content; nor, with equal vehemence, does the body. Mind-body identity theorists and, somewhat earlier, the behaviourist school, and earlier still empirical materialists, rational dualists, and even Locke, the odd man out, all found themselves making a variety of claims about human identity the consequences of which bulldozed riotously through common sense. The Aristotelian tradition, of which Heidegger in this instance is something of an honourary member, has fewer difficulties here at least: soul as form, as the actuality of a potential ‘raw material’, is thus extended in space and, more importantly, is life itself operating only ever with material in space.
and time. Dasein is not within the world like an entity ready-to-hand or present-at-hand (the brain, the body, etc.); Dasein's difference is to be more radically in its world than any entity. We might even say that Dasein's understanding is coincident with the specific worldliness of entities occupying places within a region. This is what is meant by Dasein being 'meaningful'. Spacing, then, is first accomplished by the abolition of a certain spacing (between mind and matter, for example). As Heidegger goes on to define the word in the couple of years immediately following the publication of Being and Time, 'transcendence' does not indicate Dasein's difference from the world. Rather, Dasein transcends in stepping across isolated things and into world - Dasein transcends a certain naive 'transcendence'.

Similarly, sight, as Heidegger treats it, is never a looking out into or upon the world; instead, it is the look around from within: an um­sicht. He writes, 'intuition' and 'thinking' are both derivatives of understanding, and already rather remote ones' (BT H147). What adjective is translated here as 'remote'? 'Entfernt' of course. Here again the spacial question (of in the world opposed to above or before it) explicitly crosses tracks with that of conceptual difference (remote derivative). In the understanding of the environment, the former spacing develops into the latter; in the articulation of abstract understanding, the latter reveals itself as always already unfolded within the former; the two are more than isomorphs. Thus philosophy's historical 'getting lost' consists precisely in taking 'lostness' (separation under the guises of transcendental subjectivity and Platonic ontology - which is not necessarily to say Plato) as the first truth of philosophy.

Again, it is no accident that Heidegger uses the latinate verb 'articulieren', and then describes fore-sight with 'anschneiden'. Both of these clearly express the spacial concept of a division, separation, making-space. Both these words, and hundreds like them, philosophy has always taken for metaphors, placed in inverted commas, and eventually
shoved aside in the resumed pursuit of the whole body prior to the anatomist's disclosure. Such terms pollute the vocabulary of academia and common language alike in a manner offensive to many tastes. But in Heidegger, these are no longer metaphors. Space - if by space we mean spacing, that is, a wider phenomenon which comes to language appropriately only in (ordinary) space - no longer serves as a model for the interpretation of the understanding, but rather is the understanding.

It has thus become clear the manner in which understanding is to be removed from its dominant philosophical interpretation, as a juggling with conceptual representations. For Heidegger, the understanding is out there, in the world, projecting Dasein upon its worldly possibilities. But now we are already beyond Heidegger's own explanation of the 'wide-spread' use of spacial language. For Heidegger in the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter, the spaciality which lay behind this language was the spaciality of the ready-to-hand, which is borrowed into the language of the understanding. What Heidegger failed to see was the close relationship which he himself set up between Dasein's spaciality and Dasein's understanding. No borrowing goes on because none is necessary: the understanding is already there.

Heidegger's appropriation of the traditional and philosophically burdened term 'verstehen', then, is not simply bizarre, but rather is designed to point out certain fundamental features of Dasein's Being-in-the-world: key among which is the fact that the hermeneutic circle, which has always been simply a philosophical problem, is first and foremost the condition within which we always reside, even within our most immediate contacts with the world. Thus for Heidegger there are two 'thinkings', two 'Denken's. One, scandalized in Being and Time; the other, valorized in the later writings as poetry's companion. What is the difference between the two but the concept of spacing with which they articulate themselves?
We noted that meaning, for Heidegger, is the formal 'fillableness' of world. That is, Dasein resides in meaning to the extent that the world is such that it can contain entities. This is somewhat artificial: the world is nothing without entities; without entities there would be no world. And yet, Dasein's world has formal structures. In what, then, does the can-be-filled of world rest? Not presumably in neighbourhood-space, for though we describe world with space, we recognise that space is essentially worldly. Nor in the understanding, for the understanding is always an understanding of world. We can only answer that the can-be-filled depends upon existential properties of Dasein. Entities exists as part of a world only because of Dasein's-being-in-the-world. But Dasein always already understands and occupies space.

Heidegger insists that there is no space prior to entities which occupy it. This is no 'nature abhors a vacuum' thesis, but the description of neighbourhood-space as we have here presented it. Yet prior to this space, the world has the can-be-filled. However, the can-be-filled carries a spacial language that cannot be overlooked. It is now clear that neighbourhood-space is not the most primordial level to which we can take our ontological inquiry, but is rather a concrete image of something 'deeper'. (And yet, on every subsequent level, spacing reappears.) A question can now be roughly formulated. What, then, is the spaciality of meaning which precedes and makes possible neighbourhood-space? Meaning is the Woraufhin, the 'upon-which' of a projection. In other words, then, upon what 'existential property' does Dasein grant the neighbourhood-space indicative of care and all its constitutive elements? We all know Heidegger's answer: temporality.
2.2.3. Temporality and Spacing.

Neighbourhood-space is not pure space, whatever that is. In notions like possibility, involvement and projection it shows itself as also temporal. But this is as yet to speak very trivially, as if space and time were something added together to make space-time. Rather, spaciality is first constituted by worldhood, which is structured as the wherein of equipmental involvements. That is, space is opened by that which also reveals temporality. Heidegger, in the second division of Being and Time will propose that the meaning of neighbourhood-space, in all its complexity, is time.

Ideally, we would like to here repeat our exposition of neighbourhood-space in the horizon of time, for this is what Heidegger does with the whole of the analytic of Dasein. Such a task would be difficult and, moreover, redundant. Instead, let us give an exceedingly sketchy treatment of the background to the particular problem of temporality which we will be treating. Some of this material we have already treated in chapter 2.1 above.

What are the basic phenomena which Heidegger uses to disclose time?

Although Dasein never stops projecting itself on its possibilities, for some will always be outstanding, yet possibilities, in future time, become actualities one and all - either actually something or nothing - except for the possibility of death. Dasein cannot be dead in the same way that Dasein can be sick with a cold, be exiting the motorway, or be chef at an Italian restaurant. Heidegger expresses this difference with a vocabulary distinction: Dasein expects possibilities, but anticipates death. Death is Dasein's finitude. In the anticipation of death, Dasein is as a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. This Being-a-whole, as we discussed in chapter 2.1 above, is just the ontological appropriateness of Dasein self-understanding.
Conversely, however, Dasein’s temporality has a ‘past’ and a concrete ‘present’. For Heidegger, Dasein exists as guilty. ‘Guilty’ signifies a lack, or with more ontological appropriateness, a ‘not’. What is Dasein’s fundamental ‘not’? Although Dasein does not, of its own accord, bring about its thrownness, nonetheless it exists as that thrownness, and thus is as the basis for it. This means that Dasein never has - does not possess - power over its ownmost Being ‘from the ground up’ (BT H284). This ‘never’ is a lack or nullity. Further, Dasein’s possibilities are always more or less definite, Dasein ‘is constantly not other possibilities ... not only is the projection, as one that has been thrown, determined by the nullity of Being-a-basis; as projection it is itself essentially null’ (BT H 285). This nullity or guilt is the condition for the possibility of any factual guilt. As Heidegger sees it, interpreted correctly, conscience calls us to face this nullity and not just to accept it but to take it over as our ownmost selves. The call calls Dasein to its Being-factical. Understanding the call means projecting oneself upon Being-guilty, that is, wanting to have a conscience, and thus being ready for anxiety. This constitutes an important reversal on the Christian metaphysical tradition which in this takes its soul from Plato: I am not finite because I am guilty, but am guilty because I am finite. This disclosure of Dasein Heidegger calls resoluteness.

These two temporal aspects merge: authentic Dasein is anticipatory resoluteness. Dasein is as its possibilities; resoluteness is the possibility of Being-guilty which means authentic Being-factical; Being-guilty, however, must involve projecting oneself upon this possibility until the end, that is, unto death. Being-guilty thus demands Being-towards-death, or anticipation. Anticipatory resoluteness means the potentiality for Being a whole factically. Looked at in this way, it is inevitable that Heidegger should give the future precedence - Heidegger would say resoluteness brings itself to anticipation as it brings itself to its ownmost authenticity. For since the beginning of Being and Time Dasein was distinguished as that
entity wherein the whole preceded the parts. Dasein is not whole by way of a summation of its facticity, but by virtue of the anticipation of death. Indeed, only because of this, facticity itself conceived ontologically can not just be the facts about Dasein as 'thing' (factuality).

What is the relation of anticipatory resoluteness to Being-in-the-world as care?

Earlier, Heidegger had summed up Dasein's formal structure in the concept of care: 'ahead-of-itself - Being-already-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)' (cf. BT H317). This summation, then, becomes the obvious place to begin a linking of the themes from the first division (space, understanding, state of mind) with those of the second (resoluteness and anticipation). Thus, in paragraph 65, 'Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care', what is essentially the last stage of Being and Time (in its incompleteness) gets underway. Meaning, as we have explored earlier, is the upon-which or on-the-basis-of for a projective understanding. Thus the meaning of care is that which makes care possible in the projection of its Being which discloses it as it is. This upon-which is temporality.

When we noted above that Dasein is as its possibilities, this Heidegger will now rewrite as the understanding of those possibilities being essentially 'futural'. By futural, Heidegger means existing in that mode of time wherein Dasein's self is allowed to come towards itself, in the sense of Dasein being its future possibilities itself. Similarly, Being-guilty 'signifies being Dasein authentically as it already was' (BT H325). But futurality is the key-stone: it is only by being futural that Dasein can authentically have been; that is, resoluteness must anticipate. Now, time has a third mode, which again is dependant upon futurality, and Dasein a corresponding manner of being: making-present (gegenwärtigen). It is in making-present that Dasein brings itself into the Situation, to which we shall return. The
three aspects of care given above - 'ahead-of-itself', 'Being-already-in' and 'Being-alongside' - are thus exhibited as fundamentally temporal - though, of course, we are not to identify these elements as future, past and momentary present, for that would be to think Dasein's Being as present-at-hand in time.

How do these relate to the key phenomenon of the understanding? Sadly, Heidegger's discussion of the temporality of the understanding is something of an anti-climax. Even more so the brief section on the temporality of space. They tell us little that was not already relatively clear from the first division discussions, and from the first chapter or two of the second division. Still, there are some important clues here. We are in chapter four, paragraph 68.

What retains us here is the shift of emphasis on projection. Formerly, we could be content to understand projection in essentially spacial terms: occupying a region such that its whole 'towards-which', as a possibility, is constitutive for the occupying. Of course, it would be a reduction akin to classical structuralism to treat a region as atemporal. Arising out of the essential futurality of understanding is the authentic mode of making-present: the Augenblick or 'moment of vision' which surveys the Situation. What is vital here, in a discussion which could easily lead directly to mysticism, is the ecstatic character of the Augenblick. This term, of course, would normally mean 'moment' in the sense of 'blink of an eye' or 'glance' - however, Heidegger insists, it is paradigmatic of the nature of sight to act at a distance. The Augenblick 'takes it all in' and is carried away rapturously to its possibilities, but not in the manner of fallen Dasein - carried away into the they-self - rather, in such a fashion as to always be 'held in resoluteness' (BT H338). That is to say, carried away to its ownmost self as an entity that is essentially Being-possible. Thus the temporality of understanding is more radical still; Dasein is not only ahead of and coming towards its Being-alongside, it has-been.
The having-been we have encountered before in the before and in being-guilty. But the before are to be found both in authentic and inauthentic Dasein. The before of inauthenticity are something like momentum in Newtonian mechanics. Resolute having-been is Dasein's individual thrownness into, as Heidegger will make clear near the end of his book, history, which is to be 'repeated'. What is important is to see the seamless character of understanding's temporality. Certainly, one can in an ordinary way 'deal with' time - but such time is no longer constitutive: Dasein would be just 'in' time, rather than being temporal.

Inauthentic understanding closes itself in and off (Heidegger's metaphor, cf BT H339) from this full temporality, but can only do so, of course, on the basis of that temporality. This closing off has the character of deflating time's spaciality, its essential 'stretch' and 'span': Dasein forgets its thrownness, ignores its own death, focuses on what is closest in the World but not as merely 'the closest'. But even this closing off is ecstatic, for it distances Dasein from its own self. In fact, it involves the abandonment of self into the they-self. The more one comes to oneself as present-at-hand, the farther one is away. Thus the ecstasis of temporality and the spacial language of authenticity cross essentially.

With the Situation, as Heidegger admits, there is a spaciality, just as there is with the 'there' of Dasein. The Situation is the environment of concern as disclosed to resoluteness. The spaciality within which Dasein exists arises, as we have seen, from Being-in-the-world. But Being-in-the-world is, in turn, grounded in disclosure. Heidegger then writes,

'Just as the spaciality of the 'there' is grounded in disclosedness, the Situation has its foundations in resoluteness. The Situation is the 'there', disclosed in
resoluteness, as which the existing entity is there' (BT H299, translation modified).

While Heidegger takes pains to distinguish the Situation from any mere present-at-handness, through the key notion of disclosure the Situation is bound to Dasein’s Being-spacial-in-the-world. Resoluteness is never pure (in Kant’s sense) but essentially factual and thus always already care. Furthermore, the notions of neighbourhood-space, emptied of their ordinary-space significations, become notions of spacing, which are very much active here. Let this be our preliminary justification for dealing with spacing on the same terms as temporality. The making-present which brings Dasein into the Situation remains dependent upon futurality and having-been. And yet the spaciality of Situation defies logical gravity, as it were, and creeps up the hierarchical tree as Being and Time moves to a close, unveiling temporal structures in their primordial spacing.

We expect this with respect to the ordinary understanding of time, whether like Bergson we bemoan it, or like Kant we assert its necessity. In Heidegger’s brief exposition of Aristotle’s essay on time in Basic Problems of Phenomenology (pp 237ff.), the definition of time is reread such that what is normally understood as the phenomena of ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ are interpreted as the ‘from’ and ‘to’ of motion. Time is experienced not as but in motion. This motion need not be spacial; it may be a property change, for example. And yet, of course, the language remains spacial: ‘away from something, towards something’. This is because space preserves the past location in the way that substance or matter does not preserve the past property state. Change as motion can be seen, it is a good model.

Yet, as Heidegger notices, Aristotle is not completely happy with describing space with time. For example, if the now is compared with a point on a line, then it follows that in the coming up to this point and going beyond it, there will be a non-analogous pause at the point.
Why does Aristotle think this? We can guess that the answer lies just a few pages previously, in the discussion of place. It is too infrequently noticed that Aristotle does not, in the Physics, talk of space and time, but of place and time. Correspondingly, the place-nature of temporality (i.e. the now-that... rather than just the now) is one aspect that Heidegger draws attention to. Place, for Aristotle, is the shape limit of that which surrounds an entity. But this causes a difficulty which Aristotle treats with only a few words. We say 'the heart is in the body' and also that 'we are in our body'. The meaning of 'in' differs here, since the heart is clearly not 'in' the whole of the body. Rather, Aristotle implies, the heart is in the body as a part in the whole, since the body considered as a place runs continually through us, heart and all. Whereas 'we are in our body' means that there is a discontinuity between our place and the next place. This discontinuity which is definitive of the first and proper sense of place (so Aristotle calls it) is the reason why the point on the line requires the pause which alienates it from time. But as we have seen, it is precisely this discontinuity at the essence of place which Heidegger recognises as being a problem. If we substitute for Aristotle's treatment of place the Heideggerian modification thereof (neighbourhood space), then spaciality aligns itself more closely with time. There would be no pause, time would stretch and its stretching would be world.

As a model of the experience of time, spacial motion is unique. Which does not lend itself to Bergson’s critique since, as we have been trying to show for tens of thousands of words, such a model of time depends upon properties of space which Bergson chose to ignore. Let us pursue this briefly.

If space is understood as the assemblage of actual empty containers or of possible positions, then of course we encounter the old problem of continuity. Additionally, however, consider the status of a 'from' location or a 'to' location. What are they? From any standpoint, they
are empty or possible positions, like any other. A 'from' location is
only such if someone remembers experiencing the moving thing at that
location. That is, space itself has in no way 'preserved' the past
location, except in an empty sense. But in Kant, space necessarily
contains indexes to other (simultaneous) spaces, and time contains
indexes to past and future times - this is how Kant describes the
second and third analogies. Taken together (as they must be), space
and time, as positions, refer to their whole. Such a 'commercium' is
the easily forgotten contribution of the pure forms of intuition which
persists into the understanding since, for thought to apply to
experience, the categories must be schematised. In an important sense,
of course, this 'commercium' too depends upon an experiencing subject.
But within the experience, space and time themselves refer, and indeed
this makes possible that experience. Similarly in Heidegger, the
'possible' of a location is not an empty logical possibility, but is
referred to and occupied in the mode of absence by entities within a
world. Neighbourhood space, as we have called it, contains 'from's and
'to's not as after-images and fantasies of an observing subject locked
in the now, but as precisely its structure. Thus neighbourhood space
as a model of the ordinary understanding of time is remarkably
fruitful.

But should we expect this spacial language within the authentic
ontological analysis of time? Certainly, since the above ordinary
interpretation, properly seen, is not a different phenomenon introduced
from some elsewhere, but rather a mode of primordial temporality.
Temporality, Heidegger writes, exhibits the properties associated with
the spacial prepositions found in 'coming-towards-oneself' (zu), 'back
upon' (auf), 'Being-alongside' (bei). It is this manner of not being
here, in any traditional sense of here (hier), that leads Heidegger to
write, 'Temporality 'is' not an entity at all. It is not, but it
temporalises itself ... temporality temporalises' (BT H328). Further,
this not-being-here of temporality, Heidegger associates with the Greek
word 'ecstasis' meaning 'standing outside'. Thus 'temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself' (BT H329).

It would be too trivial to appropriate this 'outside-of-itself' to space in any ordinary sense, but the undisguised spacial language makes it clear that what Heidegger is after is also our goal: the primordial event of spacing. We have already and several times discussed why we continue using the word 'space'. Still, using it in connection with time seems nothing less than perverse - and yet what is important to see is that there has been no fundamental change in Heidegger's language or its implicit analogies from division 1, chapter 3 to division 2, chapter 4. What is essential to time is just this same spacing (first exhibited with respect to everyday neighbourhood space) considered most primordially.
2.2.4. History and Resoluteness.

Time is not the realm of the present-at-hand, and does not receive its grounding in the 'now'. Time is always and essentially somewhere else, at a distance. This is to say, a proposition about identity is always (covertly at least) spaced in time, and is thus dependant upon a projective understanding of time - and similarly a proposition about temporal spacing demands the question of ecstatic identity, conceptual clarity and difference, etc. Spacing is primordial because it precedes entities as such; though Heidegger insists that space (ordinary space) only opens around entities in the world, yet the world is capable-of-being-filled, and its capacity, its volume is not abstract mathematical-space/time, but care as temporal - that is, care as spacing. And yet with ecstasis we do not seem to have come far enough; metaphorically, the self can be 'away from home' only if it has a home. We must ask what makes this home possible, to which it is not enough to reply 'ecstasis', for that would be begging the question.

At the beginning of Division two, chapter 5, Heidegger sets out upon a classic and by now familiar philosophical issue: not what makes Dasein Dasein, but what makes one Dasein always the same. That is, in what does the wholeness, connectedness or constancy of the self reside. Heidegger observes that this issue has always been posed precisely in terms of the connectedness of Experiences (Erlebnis), momentary nows within which alone the self is actual. But this is to treat the self as present-at-hand. All other 'locations' are the not-self, and subjectivity is constituted on the basis of a kind of isolation, within which the age-old problem of interaction and interconnection first arises. Heidegger writes, 'Dasein does not fill up a track or stretch 'of life' ... with the phases of its momentary actualities. It stretches itself along in such a way that its own Being is constituted in advance as a stretching-along' (BT H 374). This specific stretching Heidegger calls historizing (das Geschehen). Again, what is important to see is what we already pointed out in chapter 2.1: this is not a new
theme, but occupied Heidegger in various guises since the opening pages of the text. The problem of history is just a further explication of anticipatory resoluteness, that is, an explication of how Dasein can be factically whole.

Heidegger continues: while history is not a sequence of 'free-floating' experiences, equally it is not the connectedness of altering motions in objects, for Dasein itself is the non-objective object of history (BT H 388). Thus, it can only be that 'the historizing of history is the historizing of Being-in-the-world' (BT H388). Entities present-at-hand and ready-to-hand have, in every instance, already been 'incorporated into the history of the world' (BT H388). But Dasein exists, 'proximally and for the most part' as fallen, lost in the they-self; its coming back to itself may be through the route of historizing, the repetition of possibilities that have been, which is the taking over of heritage. Again, Dasein is its self via its not-self. Thus Dasein's authentic existence is accessible only through world-history, for repetition is the essential content of that resolute steadiness which is stretched-along.

How can this be so? Let us speculate. In repeating, Dasein constitutes and discovers itself as historical. But to 'repeat' thematically or representationally would not be to repeat a possibility, and would instead be a form of not being one's self. Dasein must understandingly repeat. Thus historical understanding - what for Heidegger underpins historiology - is revealed as linked to repetition. The understanding, we said, occupies space projectively; but, of course, Dasein's space is an always already understood space. Thus the understanding is thus the disclosure of environmental spacing. Similarly, repetition - as something like historized understanding (notice that the concept of repetition is first introduced in the section on the temporality of the understanding) - is the opening of spacing time (time's particular and always particularised differential stretch) in and for a Situation and within the Augenblick. In
repetition we understand time as the meaning of Being-in-the-world. But certainly not merely blind repetition, for this would not be authentically futural, and in particular would fail to acknowledge the individuation that is the outcome of Dasein's thrownness; nor mere adaptation, for this would be to thematise. One adapts in chronological, everyday time, for at issue is not repetition but the construction of representations and analogies. Resoluteness is not like mere stubbornness, for resoluteness involves the possibility of giving everything up (cf. BT H308). Entschlossenheit, as Heidegger draws attention to especially in 'On the Essence of Truth', is another of those words with an odd privative prefix. Thus the word cannot mean 'closing down' without a 'but remaining essentially open'. Understood by way of an understanding repetition, this is not a paradox: i.e. resolution is only possible from out of temporalities ecstatic wholeness, but of course a most essential property of that wholeness is its indefiniteness.

Repetition, then, by being repetition-with-difference - that is, by moving in and out of Dasein's individualization - establishes a space between the Augenblick, the future as coming-toward, and the having-been. In repetition, time temporalises, spaces itself out. This space is analogous to neighbourhood-space, in that it primordially precedes the mathematical-time of a sequence of nows. History is spaced in a manner fundamentally different from mathematical-time; indeed, chronological time has the old metaphysical problem of continuity to solve, while history must grapple with the much more interesting problem of discontinuity. Just as projective understanding does not actually destroy the free-floating isolation of Cartesian thought, but rather reveals it as a derivative phenomenon, it is not the case that repetition destroys the integrity of the self in its now, but that the self is thereby constituted as ecstatic. Repetition discloses temporality as essentially spaced, that is, as differentially articulated within the horizon of an essential possible wholeness - and thus first shows Dasein its stretch. In understanding time, what we
understand is our own temporality - that is to say, we come into an appropriate phenomenological-ontological grasp of our Being as a whole. Can it still be a surprise if the most essential aspect of Kant's theory of intuition's propriety reappears at the heart of Heidegger's ontology?

And, on the other hand, in understanding ourselves as present, in a special type of radical isolation from the past and the future, we are - as we have seen above - already residing within the peculiar space of subject and object. We are back to our two 'spaces', first discussed with respect to the difference between neighbourhood- and mathematical-space. This difference is repeated within temporality as well. The temporality within which repetition is possible - the temporality which repetition as such discloses - is a temporality with properties akin to neighbourhood-space. Within mathematical-space and chronological time, reference is only possible as representation - that is, as thematic. Consequently, such a self would be removed entirely from possibility as such; its 'objectivity' and 'detachment' would reduce to something like a bland and trivial freedom: choice by way of the negation of concretely realised choices. Repetition, seemingly so reactionary a concept (as, admittedly, it may well have been for Heidegger), instead is that which reveals - via the understanding of Dasein's temporality as ecstatic - Dasein's fundamental being-possible.

However, repetition is only possible with Dasein's temporality as its condition. Repetition does not open possibilities in the way we said - prematurely but suggestively - that neighbourhood-space seems to. For Heidegger, repetition assumes a space within which a peculiar difference/identity is possible. According to Heidegger, Dasein repeats, and thus has history, only because Dasein 'first' has time. Temporality as such has still escaped our grasp.

So, does temporality itself depend upon an essential spacing in the manner we have hinted? Heidegger at least assures us that this grasp-
escaping cannot continue: time must be 'earlier' than any other possible 'early' (Basic Problems, p. 325). But is there a 'temporality itself'? What could this mean, and why is it important? Now the most primordial constituent in temporality's unity is futurality. Dasein's death is its finitude, and this in turn is the condition of the possibility of Dasein's making-present in the Situation, and taking over thrownness as repeating the having-been. Further, although temporality is indeed ecstatic in its essence, it is not one but three, within which the future has a privilege. We have already suggested why the future is privileged - because Being-towards-death grants the possibility of Being-a-whole - but this 'granting' is still unclear. In what way does the peculiar wholeness of Dasein depend upon anticipation? Being-towards-death offers the first spacing: death, the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein, the nothing.
2.2.5. Not-Space.

The fame of the nothing as a theme in Heidegger is all out of proportion to the amount of space it receives in Being and Time, and depends largely upon the later lecture 'What is Metaphysics?' - and of course on Sartre. The nothing, however, provides a clear - and for our purposes, all-important - point of connection between the Heidegger of the twenties and the later Heidegger, although one suspects that he came to be embarrassed by the 'drama', for lack of a better word, of his earlier treatment.

We first came across 'nothing' in our brief discussion of Dasein's Being-guilty. There we spoke of nullity. But this was part of the division two, temporal treatment of the nothingness corresponding to anxiety as developed in division one. In the interests in being systematic, let us look there first.

Anxiety is the state-of-mind in which Dasein is authentically disclosed. Anxiety, Heidegger asserts, is not anxious in the face of (Wovor) entities within the world, for in anxiety the significance of entities disappears entirely. What anxiety is anxious in the face of resides 'nowhere'. But 'nowhere' 'is where any region lies, and there too lies any disclosedness of the world for essentially spacial Being-in' (BT H186). What a fascinating sentence! Thus the uncanniness felt in anxiety, where uncanny is 'unheimlich', is the not-being-at-home among entities in the world.

We can understand this in a quite straight-forward manner: the region, as we have seen, is the wherein of an equipmental totality. Entities, in their involvement relations, bear the possibility of significance, and thus of a 'somewhere'. Thus, in the absence of significant entities - or rather in the absence of entities' significance everywhere and somewhere are nowhere. No-where is no-thing, since a thing is its where. We stated it above, and there innocuously, in
writing 'the world is nothing without entities'. But in what context did we write that? In discussing meaning as the fillableness of world, which we eventually disclosed as Dasein's temporality. What hidden relation does 'nowhere' and 'nothing' have to this issue?

In division two, where death is brought in and moreover revealed as essentially temporal, anxiety is rewritten as the disclosure of Dasein's death as the 'nothing' of the possible impossibility of its existence' (BT H266); accordingly, authentic Dasein anticipates death. As we saw above, the nothing is later redefined - or perhaps only clarified? - in Heidegger's discussion of conscience as the nullity of Dasein's thrown basis; and accordingly, authentic Dasein is resolute. Interestingly enough, Heidegger ends his discussion of nullity by noting that 'the ontological meaning of the notness' still eludes our grasp on the far side of all logic and dialectic (BT H285-6), which again only aggravates our question of the relation between meaning, temporality and the nothing.

Throughout the discussion of the temporality of care, 'nothing' and 'nullity' alike are reserved for the question of guilt. Where has death gone? The last extended mention of the topic comes, not surprisingly, in the section on state-of-mind in the repeated existential analytic. The nothing is, again, the nothing of the world; here Heidegger glosses this as the 'impossibility of projecting oneself upon a potentiality-for-Being which belongs to existence and which is founded primarily upon one's objects of concern' (BT H343). Such an impossibility, though, reveals the possibility of authenticity. Anxiety brings Dasein back to the radical 'that-it-is' of throwness, and thus having-been is constitutive for anxiety; but it does so only to reveal throwness as a possibility that can be repeated. And thus reveals an authentic potentiality which brings Dasein back to throwness from the future as coming towards.
We can suspect, then, that it is death's futurity as the primordial nothing which gives to Dasein's Being-a-basis its nullity as such; that is, without death, anxious Being-guilty would fail to have a factical meaning. This may indeed be how Heidegger thought the nothing of death, which however gets lost as an explicit theme somewhere after paragraph 53. Much later, paragraph 68b, Heidegger asks of anxiety's dependence upon having-been: 'In that case, does not anxiety get constituted by a future? Certainly; but not by the inauthentic future of awaiting' (BT H343). But the reader is left to complete this thought, and say, 'by the authentic future of anticipation of the nothing of death'.

Perhaps, though, we are being overzealous; perhaps our unrelenting pursuit of ur-spacing leads us to look for the one nothing, futural nothing. But what number has nothing, nullity, nowhere? What is significant about nothing is precisely its queer relation to temporality, such that it stands as the other of all that is, which includes Dasein's individuated stretch, and thus first opens the space within which what is is as it is, and in such a way as it may be as becoming. This other makes it possible for temporality's ecstatic unity to be the meaning of the Being of entities, and we could proceed backwards and reconstruct - out of nothing - the whole fabric of Being and Time.

Now, Heidegger says Dasein is constituted as the stretching-between of birth and death, the between of 'two' nothings. We noted above that repetition, as that which stretches, is founded in temporality. But it can only do so if temporality is spacing, the formal space within which ecstatic stands out and repetition resolves. Stretching is not in the abstract, though, as we necessarily considered it above, but always a stretching between. But not between two definites, i.e. two events which would make possible a synthetic discursive unity (as in Leibniz's complete concept) and thus reveals the stretched entity as a was, is or will-be present-at-hand. Rather, a stretching between precisely
indefiniteness - and thus no-thing(s) generates Dasein's space as a possible-space. (cf. Heidegger's comments on the indefiniteness of Resoluteness and Death at H258, H298 and etc.) Above, we briefly noted how neighbourhood-space makes possible the possible, precisely in allowing the understanding to operate authentically. But Dasein does not float above its possibilities; it exists always within a determinate possibility, but still as a possibility. Now clearly, the nothing leads Dasein to anticipatory resoluteness; but the nothing also generates that possibility, through the limit of guilt and the finitude of death. How?

Without-limit is also without differentiation. That which is extended without limit (I do not say infinite, for infinity has numerous species) can have no organs, thus no organization. For its parts would either be unlimited themselves, and their relation to the whole always indeterminate, or else numerically finite, and their relation null. Entities could only ever be present-at-hand, unrelated, isolated. That is to say, mathematical-space necessarily presents quantitative limits within an undifferentiated without-limit. It is nonsensical to think of mathematical-space as organised - it is empty, and ideally so.

Nothing, then, as the essence of all limit and in the guise of nullity and again as death's nothing is precisely Dasein's actuality as Being-(finitely thrown)-in-the-world, granting the possibility of involvement and neighbourhood-space - that is, of world. The nothing gives this place its site, its location, in a manner only a co-ordinate system could do for mathematical-space/time; a co-ordinate system that first gives content to the word 'arbitrary'. Possibilities become possibilities in becoming differentiated from out of the whole not-nothing. Because of the indefiniteness of the limit, a whole is made possible from within which possibilities open up, which themselves remain indefinite (because always referring back to this whole for their place), and even in the anticipating resolution, however
determinate they become, remain possibilities. All space, then, and all time is not-space, provided only Dasein inhabits it.'

Of course, this is nothing new at least to the extent that Heidegger had already linked the nowhere of anxiety to the condition of possibility for regions and spacial world-disclosure in general, as early as paragraph 40. Thus the 'nothing and nowhere' (Nichts and Nirgends) stands behind both temporality and spaciality in their as-suchness - the 'nothing and nowhere' is spacing in itself and as such. Dasein, then, is constituted by nothing, and - to the extent that it exists as care - is continually so constituted.

Still, so far as a faithful reading of Being and Time is concerned, all this is speculation - and has been speculation indeed since this chapter first coined the term neighbourhood-space and linked it to the understanding. A certain retroactive justification of our reading (or rather, our extrapolation) is to be found in later texts of Heidegger, as well as the texts of those who have found him both interesting and challenging, albeit in very different ways; namely, Jacques Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer. One move, however, is so obvious that we can make it immediately, and so round out this chapter. That is, to Heidegger's infamous essay 'What is Metaphysics', post-dating Being and Time by only a couple of years. 'Infamous' because, for some, this lecture corresponds to the moment wherein Heidegger perfects his always apparent ability to write sheer nonsense - or, for the less sceptical, wherein Heidegger retreats from the relatively patient, rigorous and analytical mood of Being and Time. Against these odds, it seems entirely unlikely (and for other reasons undesirable) that our search for intelligibility will be assisted by a reading of this text. But that, of course, is the challenge.

The question Heidegger here poses as the first question of metaphysics - 'Why are there beings at all and not rather nothing?' (WM, Basic Writings, 112, translations mine) - bears (on one interpretation) a
resemblance to the slightly more traditional question raised and dismissed in *Being and Time*: ‘Does the external world exist in reality?’ Beyond the ambiguities of ‘world’ in the question, Heidegger argues (paragraph 43a) that it answers itself in the asking, since Dasein is Being-in-the-world, and since world must exist for entities, whether real or not, to be disclosed. Thus there can be no question of the ‘reality’ of ‘the world as the ‘wherein’ (Worin) of Being-in’ (BT H202-3). Being-in must have a wherein, yet Being-in is precisely what gives content to any concept of ‘reality’ with which the sceptical question is asked. This ‘wherein’ and its spaciality are here our clues. The world, as we have seen, is fillable, it exists as potential-space - that is, as primordially spaced - which just means it exists as the real site of the potentially extant. Primordially spaced, however, by what? Heidegger gives us the answer as care, and beyond that, temporality itself. (And behind that? Well, nothing.)

In the lecture, this similar question is raised again in the context of science. Science is concerned with what-is, with entities, and beyond that nothing else. The passage is familiar enough to us all, if not from this version then from 1935 and *Introduction to Metaphysics*. The ‘nothing else’, Heidegger argues, even in our everyday phrases and off-hand remarks, serves to demarcate the totality of entities - and in demarcating, to grant them as a totality and as entities. Heidegger finds this odd, that at the very point where science should be most certain - its subject matter and task - it must ‘speak of something other’ (97, tr. mod.). Heidegger gives a preliminary definition of the Nothing as ‘the complete negation of the totality of beings’ (99). Does, then, Nothing follow and depend upon negation? That is, do we encounter Nothing by negating everything that is? For Heidegger, something like the opposite is true. The argument - for there is, oddly enough, something like an argument here - runs roughly as follows.
Negation is always a negation of something, thus negation as a possible operation cannot precede the existence of at least one entity. But since Nothing, on the logical account, is the negation of totality, this 'at least one' must be the totality of entities. But comprehending the totality of entities (in order then to negate them) is impossible, though everyday we necessarily experience entities as a whole. (Heidegger is distinguishing between his two uses of 'Ganz': 'totality of' and 'as a whole'. Here, Heidegger unfortunately glosses over this distinction but, fortunately, Kant has made it perfectly clear for us already.) But entities as a whole also cannot be negated, because this wholeness (as opposed to the totality of things) is not a thing which could be negated.

Negation, though, is also always a negation of something definite. But entities-as-a-whole only are as that definite collection of entities which they are, if certain entities are not other entities. That is, if there are differences and contrasts between entities. Heidegger writes, 'negation does not conjure the 'not' from itself as means for making distinctions [Unterschiedung] and oppositions [Entgegensetzung] in whatever is given, inserting itself, as it were, between what is given' (107). That is to say, differentiation through negation could only be a duplicate, thrusting its second 'not' between already differentiated and definite entities. Thus negation must proceed from the not.

Although this argument is both incomplete and dubious, as arguments go - of course, it was never Heidegger's intention to produce a 'good' argument - at least it lends a certain clarity to the issues. Further, this not is already linked to spaciality: 'Unterschiedung' and 'Entgegensetzung' mean, literally, 'separating the beneath (from above)' and 'setting up against'. The 'this is not that' already operates, it would seem, within a space. And a time, too: for Heidegger writes that negation always comes 'too late' for Nothing (104). What first opens this space? We know Heidegger's answer, for
it is the same answer we found at the heart of Being and Time, underlying even the structure of Dasein’s temporality: the nothing. This not (between entities) which organises entities as a whole is only possible, as we argued above, on the basis of some limit. This limit is the nothing, which stands in constituting opposition to entities as a whole - but not as their negation, since they are not yet ‘there’ to be negated. And again not as some kind of limit in the sense of a border on a prior empty and infinite space. Kant had already shown this to be unintelligible in the Antinomies - which we here echo in saying that entities as a whole are not themselves an entity. Nothing grounds the not. Entities (as a whole) from out of the nothing, give themselves space and wrap it around themselves.

The operation of the nothing is primarily spacing. This is clarified by Heidegger’s afterword, written some fourteen years later in the middle of the war (which may explain the rather disturbing emphasis there on sacrifice). The afterword is something like a self-appropriation of the earlier text, and accordingly it picks up on precisely those points of continuity in Heidegger’s thought we spoke of above. For now, let us briefly mention them. Nothing is hitched to Being itself as precisely indicating the otherness of Being to beings (‘this Nothing ‘west’ (appears, presences) as Being’); that is, the primordial radicality of the ontic-ontological difference. This first spacing generates the clearing (Lichtung) within which entities appear as such. Heidegger writes, ‘Courage knows, in the abyss of terror, the scarcely tread space of Being, out of which clearing every entity first turns back to that which it is, and is able to be’. Similarly, Heidegger asserts that with respect to the Nothing, we should ready ourselves for one thing: ‘to experience (erfahren) in Nothing the vast space of that which gives to every entity its warrant to be’. After all this, can we still think of the spacial language here as ‘merely’ poetry? It should be noted that this last quote says nothing different from the end of the 1929 lecture, where the first priority of the philosophical ‘leap’ is to ‘allow space for beings as a whole’ (112).
The nothing is neither thing, place or phenomenon, but is spacing - here and first, the spacing of difference between Being and beings within and indeed as which Being 'presences'.

In the middle of 'What is Metaphysics?' we read the following: '...the nothing makes itself known with beings and in beings expressly as a slipping away of the whole' (104). This is important because it indicates the basic immanence of nothingness within both beings and their as-a-wholeness. How are we to understand this? One possible interpretation is suggested by Heidegger himself, but judging by its rarity, it is not an interpretation he was entirely comfortable with, at least exclusively. In 'On the Essence of Truth', Heidegger counterpoises truth - which is, for this essay, the free acceptance of the standard of the as-suchness of beings within the free open space of the worldly disclosure of beings - with untruth. Untruth is the necessary concealing within any disclosure. Just as with the nothing, untruth makes possible an experience (here named 'mystery') which brings man to his Dasein (as Heidegger is now in the habit of phrasing it). The within of concealing corresponds to the 'with and in' of the above quotation. Here, though, Heidegger makes an attempt to explain what he means: 'Precisely because letting be always lets beings be in a particular comportment which relates to them and thus discloses them, it conceals beings as a whole. Letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a concealing' (132).

The point is simple: our taking up a particular relationship to a particular region of entities necessarily masks our (nonetheless transcendental) relationship to beings-as-a-whole (Being). We transcend beings toward Being (the worldhood of Being-in) and in returning to beings, in the only possible mode of return which is care, that first constituting transcendence is erased. Thus Heidegger can write, expressing a by now familiar paradox: 'The human being is a creature of distance!' Why should this be? Expressed another way: The nothing as spacing grants the possibility of an open space or
clearing for entities-as-a-whole (the clearing which is also the lighting/appearing of Being) - and also grants the possibility of the concrete not which organises this whole such that determinate entities might show themselves (neighbourhood space). What is the connection between these two spaces such that the not erases the nothing? The particular comportment, the return to beings, the concrete not - all of these are the necessary falling of finite Dasein. The comportments, the beings, the 'nots' all themselves take over the task of explaining themselves in their Being. Why?

The best one can say is that modes of interpretation and thus of experience are determined from within the origin - perhaps Heidegger's most sustained meditation on this 'within' lies in Introduction to *Metaphysics*. In any case, the results, Heidegger implies, are - on the thematising plane - various instances of psychology, physics and logic or epistemology, and on the everyday plane, the various modes of Being alongside the world, wherein Dasein understands itself back from out of a filled world. Because of this taking over of the task in falling, the necessary and persistent comportment towards Being, even within the comportment to beings, is erased and forgotten.

All of this, however, is imaged spacially, and must be so imaged. Why? Space is the one constant, from the chatter of everydayness itself, to the phenomenological analysis of everydayness, to the ontological/temporal characterisation of authenticity, to the furthest reaches of the thinking of Being. Space, as a cluster of significations, alone guarantees the comprehensibility of ontology. And this, in turn, must be so because the understanding performs or occupies a certain spacing which contains, as a part or mode, the everyday experience of space. Finally, everydayness (lostness, fallenness, etc.) is the necessary and constant position from within which ontology addresses itself to Being. Why, however, should it be that spacing has space and not time as its most constant expression? Bergson’s thesis about the imaging of time as space is only half the
answer. As Heidegger argues, even the everyday understanding of time never goes so far as to eliminate 'timeliness' - and yet space is again the constant. Ontically, then, a simply answer: space-language can designate space itself, or also time, difference, relation, etc. Time only designates itself, it exhausts itself in the attainment of the everyday concept of time. This is insufficient as an answer, but does carry some weight.

Is space dominant then because it, as a phenomenon, contains (at least: analogies to) something 'profound' for thought? or because spacial language is what we use from out of our most thoughtless and trivial activities which are ceaseless? The important thing is to see both these answers as the same: space is the most constant expression of the way in which Dasein is always metaphysical, from the cradle to the grave and every kitchen and colloquium in between - and the way Dasein is always everyday, from the colloquium and back to the kitchen. Spacial language, then, is precisely the way in which the erasure of the transcendence of Dasein to Being and world is never entirely successful or permanent - but also the way in which, in every ontological thought, Being is the Being of beings, and world is filled. 'In order to exist,' Heidegger writes, 'everything genuine needs semblance' (Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 212). It goes without saying that such a proposition must necessarily modify accordingly what we mean by 'genuine' and 'semblance'.

Heidegger continues this analysis of the spacing operation under a baffling number of conceptual guises. Virtually every few years we find a completely new vocabulary at work. (As we have already suggested, the spaciality of that vocabulary is nonetheless one constant.) Among these vocabularies one (or rather one certain series) stands out. Because of the way a work of art (even poetry) is an individual thing, at an individual location in space and time, because of the way at least some works (here especially poetry) call forth by signifying things and locations, and finally because of the way the
work of art demands an approach, view or perspective both literally and 'figuratively' - because of all these elementary facts, the question of the relation between everyday space and spacing, and thus the question of what ontologically is spacing, is raised most clearly and decisively in Heidegger's thinking about art. Which will be our next and last step.


3. And futurality is precisely what tradition should offer. At the end of 'The Principle of Identity' Heidegger writes 'Tradition prevails when it frees us from thinking-back to a thinking-forward, which is no longer a planning' (41).

4. As we shall see in 2.3 the question is not of number but of 'the nothing of...', of belonging.

5. Heidegger would prefer 'individuation' to 'actuality', but is it any surprise that Aristotle should return, if briefly, at this point? Kant too, of course, and in more detail.

6. Cf. the discussion of the spatial model of time above.

7. Heidegger agrees with Aristotle that 'actuality is earlier than possibility' but, the former adds, only because possibility is 'higher'. What does this mean? In Aristotle, things are pretty clear: no actualisable (possibility) with an actuality to form and effect it. Heidegger then continues by arguing that it is nonetheless the essential destiny of every actuality to actualize. Or, in transcendental language, the condition for the possibility of any actual extant thing are its actualisables.

8. Presumably, of course, one can argue about the actuality which belongs to these entities. Descartes' evil genius is a possibility, but what has to be recognised is that what the genius is giving us is nothing but a real world.


2.3

The Cite of Situation

2.3.0. Introduction.

Like Kant, Heidegger privileges art and especially poetry (in both the broader and narrower senses). For Kant, the aesthetic judgement (which has art as its cultural and historical object) completes and unifies Critical Philosophy both as a system of thought but more importantly as a programme for the advancement of society. The 'faculties' at war, which must be brought to a peace, are not just university faculties, but are also both political bodies and discernable activity regions of the human mind. Art reveals how all these faculties, origins and ends ought to relate one to the other.

On this point at least, Heidegger follows Kant, and in two ways. First, art as a phenomenon requiring thought is precisely also that phenomenon which reveals what thought is in its essence. Second, art is never a private or momentary experience, but always an historical and community experience. That is, art always plays a role in delivering a historical community over to itself. These important areas of agreement between the two philosophers is at the highest level of abstraction, and this ignores particular and constitutive items of agreement (also, of course, disagreement - however, since the latter are so obvious, the former is the more interesting thesis to uphold). Since the philosophy of art holds such a central but unusual role in the work of both these thinkers - a role which exhibits the importance of spacing - then if such agreements can be found, it will be one confirmation that our long exposition of the concept of spacing has set off in the right direction. This will further suggest that an extension of this exposition beyond the work undertaken here must be possible - unless, of course, it is possible to entirely ignore both Kant and Heidegger.
The obvious place to begin is the middle-period essay 'Origin of the Work of Art', though we will find it useful to range quite widely. This extraordinary text is often the first Heidegger students read - and often too the last. Certain passages display Heidegger at his most 'occult' and incomprehensible. Coming to this essay from out of Heidegger's earlier work we hope to emphasise the continuity. We will go so far as to claim (often without adequate demonstration given the magnitude of that task) that what has changed since Being and Time is not so much the content or even the method as something possibly more important: the mood. Heidegger early on borrowed from Phenomenology the sense of science, here a science of Being - though he never attributed to his work the foundational role claimed by Husserl. This attempt at rigour, however, was at odds with its intended object - we saw some of the reasons for this in chapter 2.1. The mood, mind-set or attitude which thinking must take is prescribed by (none of these words Heidegger would approve of) the discovery (or rather emphasising) of the relation between language and Being. This problem just simply never worried Heidegger for prolonged periods prior to the 1930s.

Recognising this continuity should help us recover Heidegger's more difficult moments. But recover for what, at whose will and in what form? There are essential reasons why such a recovery, in order to be a recovery, must also be a betrayal, and more essentially than ever a recovery. Perhaps there is a way out of this bind, but we are not clever enough to find it. Or perhaps within the betrayal, there is couched an illumination (however ghastly and dim). It is enough of a chance, and a risk entirely without risks, since what consequences would pertain? We might also expect that this recovery/betrayal will allow us to carry our problem about spacing directly into the later work.
2.3.1. Earth and Nothing.

One feature we neglected to discuss in the previous chapter is Heidegger's apparent assertion that Nothing belongs. Such a phrase seems patently oxymoronic - what could it possibly mean?

Heidegger writes in 'The Origin of the Work of Art' that poetic projection 'never comes from Nothing in that what is projected by it is only the withheld vocation of the historical being of man itself' (OWA, 76). Similarly, in 'Introduction to Metaphysics' written a few months earlier, Heidegger writes, 'For that nothing is not an entity does not prevent it from belonging to being in its own way' (TT, 111). The nothing must have a kind of articulation all its own: this can only mean that the nothing is nothing with respect to a world, and as such belongs to that world and the world to it. Four points need to be made which recall our discussion in the previous chapter: first, with respect to that world, the nothing is the possibility of delimitation, and thus of the rising up of particular beings as worldly; but second, the nothing is also the concealment to which the pre-ontological understanding of Being and world returns in the coming-back to beings; third, the nothing is the lostness of insignificant or unactual beings to always particular comportment; finally, the nothing is the distance to which equipmental beings are sent in everyday activity. All of these are essentially linked in the happening that is the clearing of the space for beings to present themselves. Being is nothing in a fifth and broader sense: no-thing, Being is no thing in any mode of extantness, possible, actual, past or future. This much more radically empty sense of nothing has to be distinguished from the above four - for the above are rather belonging modes of not being a thing. Only if nothing belongs in some way does it make sense to speak of four (or five) different modes of nothing. Being, we said above, lies in the dynamic and eventful relationship between world and nothing.
What we wish to arrive at is some way of correlating Heidegger's language in the *Being and Time* period with the language of *The Origin of the Work of Art*. Accordingly, we assert: Nothing as the moment of untruth which belongs to and indeed makes possible the essence of truth, is what Heidegger means by earth in its opposition to world. To repeat our 'four points': 1) Earth is the source of the 'that it is' of particular beings. 2) Earth is the self-concealing shelter and ground of beings in their significance, that is, in the understanding's coming back to beings. 3) Earth is the 'Sich-ver-schliessende' (OWA, 47), the self closing-off from itself; and earth enters the work 'because truth occurs only by installing itself within a particular being' (OWA 69). 4) Earth is (thought here roughly as material) the closing-off from equipmental comportment, i.e. the move from use to what grounds use. The belonging of earth and nothing is indicated, for example, when Heidegger writes that, with respect to a particular historical community, the earth is not the earth but 'its earth' (OWA, 75). But in the work, Heidegger claims, both the earth and the world of a historical people are opened for the first time. Therefore, the belonging of nothing and earth must be particularly and perhaps originally present in the work of art.

This interpretation will be contested. Earth is not nothing; but then, Heidegger insists, nothing is not (absolutely) nothing too. There is a more serious objection: Heidegger develops the world/earth distinction by taking the matter/form distinction back to its roots. And he continues to discuss earth via examples of base matter (for example, and especially, stone). No one would want to equate earth and matter - but it does seem possible to equate earth with thingliness as such, as Heidegger seems to do on OWA, 69. As far as it goes, this we do not deny: for the thingliness of a thing is not itself a thing, it is nothing, but of a particular mode. To borrow a concept: thingliness has not been formed, which means brought to a world. But this interpretation is too easy. Heidegger also writes:
All things of earth, and the earth itself as a whole, flow together into a reciprocal accord. But this flowing-together is not a blurring of their outlines. Here there flows the stream, restful within itself, of the setting of bounds, which delimits everything present within its presence. (OWA 47).

The earth is not thingliness, here, but things, with their own quiet, self-subsisting articulation. But earth, Heidegger elsewhere asserts, is also 'ground'. Thus he writes, '[Phusis] clears and illuminates, also, that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We call this ground the earth.... In the things that arise, earth is present as the sheltering agent' (OWA 42). Further, earth is that which has 'its own law' (OWA 63).

Thus the issues complicate themselves. Earth is not earth because of particular things, or thingliness in general; rather the reverse, only because of earth as the essentially self-concealing nothing (law and ground) and thus as a moment of truth itself, can individual things arise and appear, and can any interpretation of thingliness assert itself. In equating earth with thingliness as stuff or matter, we made the ludicrous error of ignoring the whole movement of Heidegger's essay away from traditional theories of thingliness. In equating earth with things, or things as a whole, we ignore the concepts of the sheltering of things, the ground for things, etc. This latter equation, indeed, wants to bring earth/world into alignment with the ontological difference. But if there is one thing we hoped to point out by the end of our previous chapter, it is that this difference cannot be thought as a conceptual distinction, but is itself an event, a happening. Thus, what Heidegger is doing with earth and world is not to clarify conceptually (by analysis) what Being is with respect to beings, but rather to indicate how Being (as self-appearing appearance) comes to
beings, as the very possibility of their extant appearance, and always in the form of history.

Earth or nothing (and world as well of course) are moments within the more fundamental and eventful nothing of the spacing of the rift or strife (which spacing is the happening of Being itself) which brings earth to world and world to earth, and always in a decisive and historical manner. We call both the moment (defined by its opposition) and the event (in its originality) 'nothing' because they correlate with how Heidegger uses the term 'nothing', as explained in the last chapter and immediately above.

The space between world and earth, what Heidegger calls the 'Riss' or rift, which is also a kind of strife or conflict, is an originating space. Only by drawing attention to the belonging itself - that is, beginning with the rift-space - can we say that world and earth as separate moments both belong one to the other, that 'the opponents raise [heben] each other into the self-assertion of their natures' (OWA 49). To think in the reverse direction - to claim that world and earth, by their orientation one to the other from within the one, first create a rift - we are in danger of thinking of nothing as some kind of absolute possibility-space, of some kind of thing or substance. Of course, this could not be further from Heidegger’s intent. Rather, earth and nothing must be thought in their event-character, as aspects of the happening of truth. To speak of earth and world separately, as components of the phenomenon of thingliness, is to ask for ingredients.

What does event or happening mean here? Must we understand it in opposition to thing or substance in the permanence implied therein? That is, oppose the two sets as moment is opposed to duration? Or is this to make the same mistakes outlined above in our discussion of alternate interpretations of 'earth'? In particular, should we understand the happening of truth in the work of art as something correlating to an aesthetic experience? We know in advance that this
is certainly not what Heidegger means, but he still remains stubbornly unhelpful, and certain passages are particularly so: 'To submit to this displacement means: to transform [verwandeln] our accustomed ties to world and to earth...’ (OWA, 66). This is unequivocally the language of momentary event, of a singular or collective experience and, in and from out of that experience, an inauguration. The problem seems to be that Heidegger is no longer explicitly dealing with time in these later works - thus we no longer know quite how to take a concept like 'happening', though we can guess.

One obvious place to begin is with the event-like temporal phenomena discussed in Being and Time: the 'Augen-blick' or the 'repetition', perhaps. We have treated these themes above. The important thing to remember is that such 'moments' take place as articulations of anticipatory resoluteness; i.e., against the background of a temporal phenomenon that is rigorously non-'momentary'. Anticipatory resoluteness was rather a kind of closure towards openness (that is, a 'determination' to exist as possibilities - and indeed as one's ownmost possibilities - and not in or alongside actualities, opinions or ahistorical legislations). Anticipatory resoluteness, as such an open closure, endures (in a peculiar way, of course) through the indeterminate stretch of a Dasein's existence, which stretch is characterised by thrownness and death. More exactly, the indeterminate stretch just is anticipatory resoluteness in its authenticity. Thus, if the Augenblick or the repetition are momentary, they are not. But equally, to say that such phenomena endure in a way even analogous to the way material substances endure is equally mistaken. What is important is the openness, or in other words, the being-constantly-at-issue of existence itself, or in still other words, Being-in-a-world. Things (and here Heidegger obviously includes animals) do not have a world, which is to say that whatever ontic freedom or determination might in fact pertain, ontologically such things do not exist as possibilities of themselves. Their existence is closed off in a certain way: either closed off into and for the duration of
reliability, or into an ahistorical and unprojective will, or closed off as self-closing to self and world itself.

On this model, the happening of truth does not correlate with anything like an aesthetic experience. The ‘transformation’ in the passage quoted above is not an event like the dying or bleaching of cloth a different colour - nor does the ‘submit to’ mean a temporary aberration in one’s weakness or strength. The concept of ‘preservation’ is Heidegger’s most explicit attempt (in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’) to detail the temporality at issue. The work is essentially that which is preserved, even if it is not in fact preserved at all in some moment or stretch of time. And, we might expect, the work is essentially that which is preserved even when it, in its familiarity, has become an object of everyday banter - and is thus in some way overpreserved. Preservation of the work, as the word (at last) suggests, is a way of existing with the work as work, and not as a series of possible or actual experiences, nor even necessarily beginning with some one experience as epiphany. The peculiar constancy of preservation is alien to the notion of mere experience, and in precisely the ways we suggested above. But this constancy is also other than any enduring being-alongside a thing: for preservation constantly comes back to the work, ‘feeds’ on it Heidegger tells us (OWA 67) - preservation is how one lets the work be in every instance at the origin of the opening and holding open of one’s world. Not surprisingly, it is immediately after introducing preservation that Heidegger makes a brief mention of ‘resoluteness’ from **Being and Time**.

Moreover, the temporality of this preservation carries an index to the belonging of earth and nothing. Only a phenomenon with such a fundamental temporal characterisation can be a constant relation not only to an individual work as a present thing, but to the sustained event of the coming-to-appear of that work (out of the earth), and of its setting back into hiddenness (within the earth). In other words, the temporality of the preservation-relation allows the belonging of
the nothing of earth to its world and world-opening work such that the belonging is eventful without being momentary, and yet sustained without being substantial. What does this mean? It means that the earth, belonging to the world it supports, makes possible in the case of the work a peculiar extantness, or 'that-it-is.'
2.3.2. That-it-is.

According to Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses, and from the early days of his career, the that-it-is of things - which is just the becoming-explicit of the fact of their existence - is ordinarily hidden. We just deal with things, do things, ignore or pay attention to things, and so forth. Implicitly, of course, there is some recognition of existence in its various modes - but the mere that-it-is does not draw attention to itself. In Being and Time, Heidegger allows that the that-it-is announces itself in the privative of ordinary experiences. For example, in the break-down of equipment, or in its simply being out of place or altogether missing. In each of these cases, the mere presence-at-hand of the thing shows itself, and indeed shows itself as precisely that which refuses itself as such (in its proper worldliness) - but always from out of the horizon of the ready-to-hand.

But in the work of art, Heidegger now tells us, the that-it-is of the work is foremost, and yet not in the mode of the privative with respect to any object ready-to-hand. How is this possible, and what are its implications?

Heidegger writes,

In fabricating equipment - e.g. a stone axe - stone is used, and used up. It disappears [verschwinden] into usefulness. The material is all the better and more suitable [geeigneter] the less it resists perishing in the equipmental being of the equipment. By contrast, the temple-work, in setting up a world, does not cause the material to disappear, but rather causes it to come forth for the very first time and to come into the Open of the work’s world. (OWA, 46)
Later, this 'material' aspect is equated with the 'is and as it is' (earth and nothing). The same theme is expanded in this passage.

But in contrast to all other modes of production, the work is distinguished by being created so that its createdness is part of the created work. ...createdness is expressly created into the created being, so that it stands out from it, from the being thus brought forth, in an expressly particular way. ...the simple 'factum est' is to be held forth into the Open by the work: namely this, that unconcealedness of what is has happened here, and that as this happening it happens here for the first time; or, that such a work is at all rather than is not. (OWA 64-5)

It should be asked how Heidegger moves from createdness - which, we like to think of as one species of 'having come into being', and in particular we might wish to talk about concepts like will - to the mere 'that it is'. Heidegger speaks of the creation of a thing always having an eye to the release of the produced thing into its own self-sufficiency. Thus, the aloneness of the 'that-it-is' must not be seen as contradicting the producedness of a thing, for the thing is produced precisely in order that it might then stand alone without its producer. In fact, Heidegger claims, the self-sufficiency of the work is of a more radical nature than that of equipment, and resembles rather the un-producedness of the mere thing - though still marked as a created thing, as requiring creators. For the piece of equipment is only self-sufficient by being created into a certain task-environment (usefulness); only the task-environment allows it to appear in itself as something.

But above, we asserted that what was distinctive about the work was that it did not happen within the context of equipmental being. Are we not contradicting that statement here in speaking of createdness and preservedness? On the contrary, if there is some hierarchy to be
found, it will place equipment as arising explicitly only within the horizon of the world opened by the work. 'In the work of art the truth of an entity has set itself to work' (OWA 36). The createdness of the work has this unique property: the that-it-is properly removes itself from all extant relations in order to open and illuminate a world specifically its own. Here there is no task-environment, nor any implicit or explicit conceptual grasp of the extantness of the extant. The self-sufficiency of the work is, ideally, absolute.

Thus Heidegger writes, 'the artist remains inconsequential as compared with the work, almost like a passageway that destroys itself [vernichtender Durchgang] in the creative process for the work to emerge' (OWA 40). Does this mean that the artist and the world of the artist can be safely ignored in the encounter with the work? Not at all, for the great artist only negates him or herself in the always historical (and always incomplete) transformation of the world - the artist is not removed from historical world-disclosure but rather overrun by it. We say 'always incomplete' because, again, preservation always remains to be accomplished. The earth and the nothing jutting through the new world in this case means: the entities, significations, values and above all decisions that were not but could have been. These necessarily belong to the world of the work as precisely that which gives it its definition. The essential point is not that the work at any time exists outside all prior or subsequent relations (which is just silly) but rather that the work, precisely as the strife which it is, is constantly lifting itself into a new originality.

Thus the that-it-is of the work is other than the mere extantness of a thing. Or rather it can be, since the work is also a mere thing (as the object of conservation, for example), and also a piece of equipment (in the art market, and indeed in any market where art is valued in general) - and it is important to recognise these possibilities. However, not only does the mere thing not draw attention to its that-it-is, but its event-character is limited by its particular mode of
being-present. The proper that-it-is of the work is not to be distinguished from the happening of truth in the work. But can we describe this happening from the point of view of the that-it-is?

Such a happening is the emergence of world-destroying and opening truth and untruth which Heidegger describes as, again, the rift between world and earth on the basis of their belonging to each other. This rift is Grund- and Auf-riss, into which the particular being is brought. But, Heidegger tells us, the rift comes to the thing, meaning the thing created only becomes a work as the happening of truth, when the rift sets itself back into - entrusts [anvertrauen (OWA 63)] itself to - earth. What does this mean? To trust the self- and essentially-concealing earth means to lay the happening of truth in those hands. That is, to allow openness to be given from within closure, but this means also that closure comes into the open precisely as the place and outline of truth. Only in this way, Heidegger asserts, does the rift appear (in stone, paint, words) as the figure of the work, the figure being the site where the materiality or thingliness of the work considered as an object meets the happening of truth. Again: what does this mean?

The earth is the moment of self-closedness, closedness off from itself and from world. This closedness only ‘appears to be’ [aussieht] (OWA 64 and again at 69) like materiality, for materiality is interpreted (according to the tradition) as the necessarily undisclosed no-thing of formlessness - but since in our essential falling we must also and without exception also treat the work as a thing, this appearing to be materiality must belong to the earth-moment of the work as a possible everyday encountering of it. To continue: if the open disclosure of the truth of what is is set back into earth, this means that the openness must be closed off in some way. But there can be no closing off from appearance altogether (that is, from historical Dasein), or from the happening of truth (since the work remains a work), but rather from all ‘our accustomed ties to world and to earth’ (OWA). But this
is just the meaning of the work's that-it-is: namely the cutting off from prior world, in order to make possible a release for a self-opening world. For, in addition to the closing of openness there is a certain opening of closure: The self-concealing nothing of earth is set out and forward as that which supports shape and figure, which Heidegger calls the fixing into work of the truth of a newly opening world. In this way the work achieves its purpose of being-an-origin.

Similarly in Introduction to Metaphysics: 'the overpowering as such, in order to appear in its power, requires a place, a scene of disclosure' (IM, 163). This 'place' is Dasein, as the entity which has world, i.e. as the entity to whom things appear. The violence of the bringing-being-to-appearance can only be partially successful; the site of this partial success is the thing, opening up always before man and always in his world. The thing is both thingly and historical precisely because of this partial success. If in turn the thing took this 'partial' and held it out before itself, then it would be world opening work.

These lines of thought have important consequences. In the introduction to this chapter, we alluded without explanation to the dangers involved in attempting to 'recover' or 'translate' Heidegger's later work back into the concepts of the earlier period - or vice versa, of course. One reason why this should be risky has now been discovered. Because the particular manner in which the nothing, in its transcendental role, belongs to the appearing things it brings about, then any language capable of calling forth this nothing (as the world or Being of the thing) must be tied in particularity to the appearing thing. Thus Heidegger's language in the later work is just the opposite of systematic. At the end of the 'Addendum' to 'The Origin of the Work of Art' Heidegger writes, as if in afterthought:
There is an unavoidable necessity that the reader, who naturally comes to the essay from without, neither at first nor for a long time perceive and interpret the state of affairs [Sachverhalten] from out of the reticent domain of the source of what is to be thought. For the author himself, however, there remains the necessity of speaking each time in the language most opportune [günstigen] for each of the various stations on his way' [OWA 87, translation modified].

Similar disclaimers can be found, for example, at the beginning of 'The Question Concerning Technology', or in throughout Heidegger's lectures on language from the late 1950s. Similarly, this passage from 'Introduction to Metaphysics':

... Most people [hearing this lecture] listen in the wrong direction and become entangled in details. True, even in lectures on the special sciences, it is the context that counts. But for the sciences the context is determined directly by the object, which for the sciences is always in some way present. For philosophy on the other hand, the object is not present; what is more, philosophy has no object to begin with [IM, 85].

The object is Being, which is not present but must be made present by way of beings (texts, meanings, descriptive passages, examples, whatever). For Being is always the being of beings. We must 'look completely through' - to borrow a concept from Being and Time - the things in order to make Being manifest, to even make the question of Being as an object intelligible. But what is looked through cannot be simply transparent - if it were, then it would not matter what was looked at in order to look through it, and Being as the Being of beings would be a generic concept. Thus what is made manifest must belong to what was first looked through.
In the first quotation, the odd word is 'gunstig' meaning opportune or favourable, which has unfortunate overtones. As if Heidegger would admit that his language were in some way utterly contingent. The word comes from 'Gunst' meaning goodwill or even patronage. This seems closer to what Heidegger must be after: from each station and each state of affairs, a certain language only will as it were receive a blessing. The language in fact is something like an endowment of or from an authentic comportment to the phenomenon. Now of course there is no guarantee that these languages will not in fact coincide - but also no guarantee that they will do so.

This puts the present commentary on difficult ground. But in fact what we are trying to do is explain just how and why it is difficult - this may be paradoxical but is at least honest. And in fact, there must be a certain ground, though not exhibitable as such: namely, the pre-ontological understanding of Being, which Kant would have called a priori. This opens up the Hermeneutic circle (and what else has been under discussion here?) without also flattening it out. To continue:

The work of art is not just a disclosure of entities in their truth - for the truth of the shoes is known, and most properly indeed, by the woman who wears them. She needs no painting to go about her tasks in the fields, to use the shoes as they are. If the painting is this and nothing more, it has no work to do. For 'If anything is questionable here, it is rather that we experienced [erfahren] too little in the neighbourhood of the work and that we expressed the experience to crudely [grob] and too literally [unmittelbar - perhaps 'too directly' or even 'too soon']' (OWA, 36). Heidegger says the work does not tell us what a piece of equipment is or does, but rather brings equipmentality itself to appearance (OWA, 36).

But similarly, if the work is just the disclosure of world-historical existence, Heidegger lists several other types of events which do the same (OWA, 62). The essence of art must be something more or
different. And indeed, Heidegger immediately after writes, 'Where [the] bringing forth expressly brings the openness of beings, or truth, that which is brought forth is a work' (OWA, 62). The work, then, is the explicit disclosure of entities as disclosed. But in what way 'explicit'? For it is contrary to the being of equipment that they should become explicitly (i.e. thematically) disclosed as still be as equipment. And it is contrary to the being of mere things that they should ever be explicitly disclosed, except as precisely that which keeps itself undisclosed. Certainly, according to Heidegger, the painting helps us to understand what the shoes are, but not merely as pieces of equipment themselves - for that we would need to wear them and experience, or rather not experience, their particular reliability. Nor did the painting bring them to us as mere things, under any interpretation of thingliness. Rather, the work disclosed the world within which the shoes were equipment - it disclosed the fundamental meaning of equipmentality for the world of the peasant woman.

We thus interpret this 'explicit disclosure' as the disclosure of disclosure itself. This means, the disclosure of not the strife (which is the opening world, which can be experienced as nothing but the appearing in significance of things) but the striving (which is the world-opening, the originating and which can be experienced as originating). It is the work of art, Heidegger tells us, which first brings us into contact with what truth and world and Being are, and thus first brings them to thought. More then than the site of world-opening, it is the citing of that site, rousing preservers towards a comportment to a new world of significance and towards a thinking comportment to the phenomenon of newness itself - not then just towards the origin but towards origination. The work is the site and the cite of situation.

Art then is the most privileged of world-opening phenomena since it also opens opening. For this reason, art - and all art, Heidegger claims, is essentially poetry - is neighbour to thought. The work
accomplished by the work is the setting of the question for thought; the work accomplished by thought is the preserving of the work as question, i.e. the preserving of art in its essence.

The question now is how are we to understand or at least think through the 'intimacy' of the 'rift'.
2.3.3. The Form of the Fourfold.

Consider the following passage from Heidegger's 1951 lecture, 'Bauen, Wohnen, Denken':

The producing [hervorbringen] of ... things is building. Its nature consists in this, that is corresponds [entspricht] to the character of these things. They are places [Orte] that allow [verstatten] spaces. This is why building, by virtue of erecting places, is an endowing [Stiften] and joining [Fügen] of spaces. Because building produces places, the joining of the spaces of these places is necessarily also accompanied [kommt mit ... in] by space, as 'spatium' and 'extensio', into the thingly structure [gefüge] of buildings. But building never shapes [gestaltet] 'the' space. Neither immediately nor mediately. Nevertheless, because it produces things as places, building is closer [naher] to the nature of spaces and to the origin of the nature [Wesensherkunft] of 'the' space than any geometry and mathematics. Building erects places that space out a site for the fourfold. From the simple oneness [Einfach] in which earth and sky, divinities and mortals belong to each other, building receives [empfängt] the direction [Weise] for its erecting of places. From the fourfold, building takes on [übernehmen] the standard [Mass] for all traversing [durchmessen] and each measuring [ausmessen] of the spaces that in each case are spaced out by the endowed places.  

Let us begin by noting some peculiarities. First among these must be the absolute saturation of the above passage with a spacial vocabulary - and why not, since Heidegger is talking of space.
'The producing ... of things is building': 'to produce' here translates 'hervorbringen' which might also be rendered 'to bring out in front'. Two paragraphs later Heidegger will make this literal meaning explicit. Again, 'Things are places that allow spaces': 'to allow' translates 'verstatten' which is related to the noun 'stätte' used by Heidegger a few lines below, and translated 'site'; were it not overelaborate, we could thus translate this sentence as 'things are places which allow spaces to be situated'. 'Immediately' and 'mediately' are involved in roots that mean not merely the means, as in means to an end, but also the middle or between of a spacial stretch. Then, the suggestion of spacial movement in 'come with' [kommen mit] (here: 'accompany') should be heard. And so on and so forth.

And what is the space discussed here with almost every word? Is this space Newtonian space, the container of objects? Certainly not: that would be 'the' space. Is it Leibniz' relational space, such that essentially non-spacial intelligible entities exhibit certain relations between them as space? For building never shapes 'the' space, and produces space in producing things. And yet, again, not: for how could such spaces be joined, situated, endowed? Is it then Kantian space, on the ordinary understanding of Kantian space, such that space is indeed a priori, but not in the transcendental thing, but rather as a form of relations for all outer intuition? But Heidegger does not mention the subjectivity of the subject, or the distinction between things in themselves and phenomena. We are left with a space - or let us say a spaciality - that is not to be distinguished from things, but is to be distinguished from 'the' space. Things are spacial in that things are places, but things (in being erected) allow spaces to be situated, endowed, joined. What does this mean?

A thing is a thing neither primarily because of its intelligibility, nor because of its extension. Rather, a thing is a place [Ort]. Ort is very often used like 'locale', to refer particularly to villages or towns. We might say similarly that 'Kenilworth is a quiet place' or
'In this town there are pubs all over the place.' Place as Ort is linked to dwelling in a very ordinary sense. In erecting locations, Heidegger says, spaces are endowed and joined. The word translated as 'endow' is 'Stiften', which can mean two very different things: pin, tack, pen, etc.; but also 'endow', 'charter', 'found', 'grant'. Many associations come to mind: the pen which signs the charter; the nail which attaches a decree to the door, and also the nails which hold together the public door or building itself, etc. The sense of Stiften is of an act which founds an important entity. Not surprisingly, the word behind 'joining' has similar associations. Fügen can mean either to join, to fix or put in place; or also to decree, to ordain. Even the word 'errichten' to erect, has etymological associations with 'recht', meaning law or right; through these, errichten also carries figuratively the meaning 'to establish.' For Heidegger, spaces and places are always significant, and thus always at the origin of the identity of a community; if not, it is not merely that they would not be noticed or perceived, but they would not be places or spaces at all.

We must clarify a four-way distinction: between Ort, place; Raum, a space; Raum, 'the' space; and Stätte, site. It would be nice if we could effect a sort of transcendental management buy-out and say: places allow sites which endow spaces which necessarily let in 'the' space. Unfortunately, this would not be appropriate. The management just doesn't have that kind of clout. We can, however, at least say this: spaces are endowed and joined within the same gesture as the erection of a place. The erection of place means (perhaps among other things) the endowing of spaces. Further, 'the' space must be considered either a secondary phenomenon, or a completely other phenomenon. Finally, the site, has a meaning complicated by the appearance of the word 'verstatten' as we observed above. But site, wheresoever it fits in, is always used in conjunction with the Geviert: site of, site for, etc. To anticipate: site is place and space considered ontologically as where the happening of truth 'takes place'. 
We are now confronted by the concept of the Geviert. This is an old word in German which has three main meanings: first, it simply means rectangle or square, for example, buildings standing in or forming a square; second, it means a crib or cribbage in mining, a square wooden or metal structure for reinforcing the stone of a mine shaft - an interesting partial reversal of Plato's cave; third, it means a quad or quadrat, a piece of metal used in typesetting to form the blank spaces between words. All of these usages have two things in common: first, trivially, that they are four-sided, rectilinear objects; second, most importantly, they are things which support or hold open empty but protected spaces. For these reasons and others, I do not like the word 'fourfold'. The form of the word Geviert seems to suggest a noun made from a verb, a verb such as the non-existent 'vieren', to four. The four, earth, sky, divinities and mortals - the four four, in the same way that Heidegger elsewhere says that space spaces, time times, or world worlds. We might translate 'Geviert' as 'the enclosing four', or as 'the opening square'. The link between Geviert and Lichtung is certainly clear.

How does the concept of the Geviert function in the passage we have quoted? If the four are four, we ask, how can they be one? Because, Heidegger tells us, they belong to each other: zueinander gehören. The relation of gehören to hören, to listen, is evident. The four listen to each other essentially and from the first. 'On the earth' Heidegger writes a few pages previously, already means 'under the sky', before the divinities, and with men. Provisionally, we are not here interested in the content of these four 'categories', which are at once mythological and phenomenological (as if that difference could be maintained) and in some sense cosmological. In particular, we do not want to be too hasty in identifying the two 'earths'. Rather, we are interested in the structure or form of fouring. No doubt the two interests cannot be separated in such a fashion, as if the four were just any four; thus, we must speak provisionally. In any case, the whole context of Heidegger's text forces us to identify the world-
opening event of the intimate striving between world and earth with the fearing of the four.

For Heidegger, the task of dwelling is to preserve the Geviert. Preserve translates ‘schonen’: to care for, spare, look after. This is a different word than bewahren, also translated ‘preserve’, in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. There, the semantic incentive was the ‘wahr’ (true) in bewahren. The etymological link of schonen with schön (fine or beautiful) should be noted, and helps us to make the transition between the earlier and later texts. Heidegger writes at length on the meaning of preservation, concluding that it means to free a thing to be what it is. To preserve the Geviert would be to let the earth be earth, the sky sky, etc. We preserve the four by cultivating and building in accordance with the four. Building, Heidegger says, takes on the standard from the four in the expanded sense of assuming responsibility for the four. Not quite, though: Heidegger says building receives the direction for its erecting not from the four but precisely from the oneness of the four. Authentic building, then, must take responsibility for the one-in-four. What does this mean?

Is the building-preserving a kind of event, the unity of which collocates the four as vectors into one (one here being a different kind of counting from the four)? Surely, though, this would make of the Geviert something more contingent than Heidegger would like. It hardly needs to be said, however, that what would certainly be a mistake would be to think of the four as individual or self-identical, the interrelationships among which are either contingent or internalized properties of their identity. One does not preserve the four as one in the same way four are one in mixed fruit preserves of such and such a recipe. And further, is it not precisely the oneness which grants to such a building-event its signification as a (temporal) event? An event would not be an event if it did not signify from out of the one; it would be a heap of incidents in the mathematical and disjointed understanding of time. The building ‘instantiates’ the one
in four in the sense of housing or sheltering the one in four within a particular entity. But this also means to bring about the presencing of the oneness of the four as such, i.e. to free them to be, which means to come to appearance. We should remember that Heidegger only comes to the fourfold by way of an analysis of building as dwelling. This housing forms the eventhood of building, which is the preparing of a site for the fouring of the four.

Since it is of the essence of the four to belong or listen to one another, preservation of the four must be preservation of the one-in-four. If preservation means to let be in its being, then it is the being of the four not to be four but to be one. The four are one before they are four - and yet their fourness is not a disintegration of the one, nor an analysis or dismemberment or abstraction or contextualisation. Similarly, in the erecting of a building, spaces are joined and yet are not spaces prior to the joining. The direction by the Geviert means that the places and spaces are directed outside themselves - are important and noticed: listened to. Heidegger writes a few lines below our quotation that 'genuine buildings give form [prägen] to dwelling in its presencing [Wesen] and house [behausen] this presence.' Places and spaces are directed outside but before there is such a thing as an inside or an outside. Thus inside and outside cannot here be imaged in terms of purity. To put it another way: the very issue of a pure inside cannot be raised or recognised except on the condition of a dis-purity.

What is this, such that the one is prior to the four, and yet the four are, have being, are not 'quarters of'? Shall we put this question into a slightly different language: What is this, we now ask, such that the whole is prior to the parts, and yet the parts are not merely portions of a whole? We immediately recognise such a question as essentially the same as we encountered in our passage through Kant, but here given explicitly and indeed celebrated.
2.3.4. Mirror-play and the Form of the World.

One of Heidegger's most elaborate discussions of this event of fouring occurs in the essay 'The Thing' - which usefully for our purposes concerns itself both with the being of things and of nearness. We will find innumerable new ways to express and finesse the basic concepts given above.

It should be noted that the notion of the fourfold seems to have been a brief fling of Heidegger's - but to say Heidegger 'moved on' would be hard to maintain. Therefore we remain with the fourfold, even to the detriment of a sustained and explicit discussion of what many consider Heidegger's chief 'concept' of the later work: Ereignis. Nevertheless, Ereignis is what we have been thinking through all along.

At least four relatively new vocabulary items appear here: 'nearness', 'mirroring', 'ring'. Many formulas, each as meaningless as the next, can be used to interrelate them provisionally. One such might be: nearness means the ring which joins the four together in that each mirrors and plays to the other, and in so doing first brings itself into its own. Not very helpful - the question is, can we use the new words, put together with such obvious care, to arrive at an enhanced understanding of the worlding of the world? The appropriate way to ask this question is by going through a different question, namely: in what way these new words call the phenomena?

The word 'spiegel', right back to its latin word 'speculum' refers to sight, just as 'hören' and its family referred to hearing. But the odd reversal characteristic of mirror images pertains: one looks at something, to see one's self. In the mirror, one's self becomes at once both more familiar and more alien by joining a public image-space. Indeed, imagine (if one can at all) the cribbage or fourfold with four walls as four mirrors. Are there four mirrors now, or only one? There is only the light, endlessly travelling, without ever forming an image.
But if the mirror or mirrors do not form an image, then there is no sight, no looking at. And the reverse: if there is sight and looking at - i.e. if something appears there - then the image is a product only of all four mirrors, at once, coming together in a particular manner. Of course, we are only speculating about some possible factors lying in this word.

'Spiel' comes from an old word meaning dance, which no doubt suggests 'Reigen' (Round-dance) a page later. One is also reminded of phrases like 'spielraum', which referred to the open space which Dasein's understanding of Being opened and held open so that beings and their ontic relationships might appear. What seems pertinent in the ordinary concept of play, whether in theatre or in the sense of a game, is that which parallels our treatment of 'mirror'. In play, there is a certain free forfeit or risk of identity in favour of an identity constituted from out of a mutual play-environment. In play, one is a player in a game made possible by the other players - even in solo play, since there is always an implicit protagonist and antagonist (the dice, the cards, the rules) with which and against which I identify myself as player. '...Each of the four plays to each of the others' (TT, 179). Playing forms, and does so explicitly, its own miniature world. Similarly with dance: dance, as Yeats might say, is always a dancing in a unity with others and especially with the music.

This is even more emphasised when we notice that, in its first use in the essay, play is not just 'Spiel' but 'zuspielen' - to play to, as to pass the ball to another player. And again, not just 'zuspielen' but 'sich zuspielen', to pass one's self to another. The four become the four within the game through passing themselves each to the other. Just like the mirrors, the game becomes everything, and its world the only world. But just as with four as mirrors there could be, from themselves, no image - so here, in the endless passing around and through the players or the dancers, there may be world, but there is no game as such. For the game to begin, it must be entered in a
determinate manner, the endless passing gathered together into a certain configuration and made tranquil and sustained. In old German, tranquillity was 'hwila', the root for Heidegger's 'weilen' or 'verweilen' (to stay, but here in the sense of: to bring something to a stand so that it stays). Thus 'the gift of the outpouring [of the jug] is a gift because it stays [verweilen] earth and sky, divinities and mortals.... Staying appropriates [ereignet]. It brings the four into the light of their mutual belonging [Eigenen]. From out of staying's simple onefoldness they are betrothed, entrusted [zugetraut] to one another' [TT, 173]. The eventful essence of the jug, the ability to keep the water or wine and pour it out in gift, is also the event of the appropriative presencing of the fourfold. In a similar fashion, we saw above how the building made possible the as suchness of the fourfold - their coming to appearance. Even more than in 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking', we notice here how the whole issue of the fourfold is introduced from out of the question of the jug. Thus to 'stay' the four in the thing means to realise the oneness of the fourfold for possible appearance as the very worlding of world.

'Ring' shows up in many different words throughout the passage. It first shows up unannounced, as it were, on the first page. Heidegger is talking about the levelling off of all distance by modern technology and attitudes towards things. Heidegger writes, 'Nearness does not consist in small measures of distance. What stands in the smallest distance from us, with respect to the measurement that distance - through the image on film, or the sound on the radio - can remain distant from us' (TT, 165, translation modified). What I have translated as 'small' is the word 'gering'; Heidegger also uses 'Verringerung' meaning reduction. The root word here and the ring (meaning circular form or object) used later have no etymological connection. The gesture towards the old meanings of 'ring' that Heidegger makes are in fact a gesture towards the first root, not the second. It does not matter if Heidegger was careless or misinformed. For the important connection lies only in Heidegger's project of
reappropriating language to an authentic experience of Being. Therefore, in line with the explicit attempt to recover a meaning for nearness outside the concept of measurement, his point would be that the real meaning of 'small', 'modest', 'slight' or 'close' is the ring of the fourfold in the worlding of the world.

Indeed, having prepared the ground fifteen pages earlier, in the context of the latter meaning Heidegger even goes so far as to make up three new words. The first is the transitive verb 'ringen' - such a verb exists but means to wring (one's hands) or wrest (something away from someone). Here it presumably means 'to join into a ring'. The second is the deliberately ambiguous noun 'Gering'. He writes, 'The gathered presence of the mirror-play of the world, becoming joined in a ring, is the Gering' (TT 180). How are we to understand this, as linked to the meanings small or slight, or to the meaning circle? Clearly both. Only on this condition does Heidegger feel authorised to return back (on the next page) to the question of nearness. Finally, Heidegger uses the word 'das Ringe' clearly equating it on the basis of his brief etymology with 'Fügsam', translated 'compliant'.

An additional but illuminating complexity is found in Heidegger's use of the verb entringen (to wrest something away from something). Here, however, there is no 'from'. The mirror-play wrests not from but to: to the ownmost compliancy of the one-in-four (TT 180). There is no essence before the wrestling, no 'from' where the four lay beforehand, the wrestling to or for (the becoming joined in a ring through mirroring) is all.

There is no need to analyze the word nearness [Nahe]; we have our answer already. Nearness means allowing things to arrive from out of the worlding of world.

However, one element is conspicuous by its relative absence in Heidegger's late descriptions of the fouring of the four. As we have
seen, the four are explicitly identified with the concept of world. Where, then, has (in the language of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’) the earth gone? Earth is the concealment — indeed, self-concealment — necessary for spacing out the space of unconcealment as the essence of truth. In the language of the essay ‘The Thing’, we might construe this as the farness or remoteness [Ferne] from out of which nearness, as event, brings near — and which, of course, makes possible any kind of bringing near. In fact, only half a paragraph is devoted to this notion — a notion which, as we argued above, was absolutely central for Heidegger in the twenties and thirties. This is the passage:

Nearness brings near [nähert] the far [Ferne] and indeed as the far. Nearness preserves [wahrt] farness. Preserving farness, nearness presences in its bringing-near [Nähern]. Bringing near in this way, nearness conceals its own self and remains, in its own way, nearest of all (TT 177-8, translation modified).¹⁴

Notice here that Heidegger has used ‘wahren’ for preserve, as in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ — and we realise the inner connection which makes that not at all surprising. What Heidegger fails to do in this essay is to remain with this theme and show it at work within the complex structure of the fourfold. Only one sentence hints as this. A few lines above Heidegger had written: ‘Staying, the thing brings the four, in their remoteness, near to one another’ (TT, 177). But above we said the wrestling, the bringing to the joining ring, was all. What, then, are the four ‘in their remoteness’? This apparent self-contradiction is one unfortunate consequence of Heidegger’s distancing himself from the theme of concealment.

But if nearness is not a measure of distance, then farness too is no measure, and is consequently no place. Farness is the no place and nowhere discussed in Being and Time. Remoteness, then, is nothing in the sense of being remote from the realm of possible sighting.
thinking, knowing. The remoteness of the four is not, then, some sovereign and absolute state wherein the four rest beyond all playing and mirroring. Rather, remoteness belongs to the possible appearance of the authentic thing as its possibility. And the play between near and far is, literally for once, spacing.

Now we read that nearness brings near as the far. Even in arriving at the particular thing, even in being 'housed', 'gathered' or 'stayed' there, the four maintain themselves in their remoteness. This means they maintain their transcendental aspect, and make possible the appearance not merely of this entity, but of this entity in a world. Only if there is a difference between thing and world - and the most radical difference: between appearing and concealing - can the thing appear as it is. World must here be understood differently from in 'Origin of the Work of Art'. Here, the worlding of the world names nothing else than the Being of entities, which in the earlier work corresponds to the struggle for appearance as the struggle between 'world' and earth. World, considered with respect to the full phenomenon of truth, as the essential and historical directions of decision and thus of all possible actions, significances and appearances, is that nothing to which any individual appearance necessarily gestures by virtue of its appearance.
2.3.5. World and Art.

We have apparently moved far from the realm of art. First to building, where there is little suggestion that by building Heidegger means great architecture. Then just to things like jugs - and again not just fine ceramics.

In one sense, all we are doing is recognising the relative emptiness and uselessness of a concept of 'art'. Not for the reason, however, that modern art has so expanded the concept as to nullify it. And also not for the reason that analysis has demonstrated that art is historically and ideologically imbedded and thus anything but distinctively liberating (in the ordinary sense of that word). Heidegger suggests another reason: as phenomena of the worlding of world, art objects are (almost by definition) of secondary importance. In the very act of preservation, the world-opening work of art necessarily withdraws in the face of things. Indeed, it opens world for things, so that things might be able to take a stand in and create a site for the fourfold. If works of art are origins, they are preserved and celebrated not in contemplating the spring but in drinking the water.

But in another and simultaneous sense, art remains in force. It might be useful here to interpret in some depth Heidegger's late lectures on language - but there is no real need to proliferate interpretations. A single passage will suffice:

If we must, therefore, seek the speaking of language in what is spoken, we shall do well to find something that is spoken purely rather than to pick just any spoken material at random. What is spoken purely is that in which the completion of the speaking that is proper to what is spoken is, in its turn, an original [anfangende]. What is spoken purely is the poem. ('Language', 194).
This seems clear enough. It thus turns out that, if art is understood as essentially poetry (as it already was in ‘Origin of the Work of Art’), the movement between 1935 and 1950 is not an emptying of the concept of art, but a heightened enthusiasm for the possibilities of mere things and thus of the language of things. Though less obvious, this enthusiasm was already present: for example, in the assertion in Introduction to Metaphysics that ‘Language is the primordial poetry in which a people speaks being’ (IM, 171). Again, what has happened is not so much a broadening and emptying of the concept of art or poetry, as a recognition of the intimate mutual relationships between Art, world, things and nothing. Of course, it will always remain difficult to think of nothingness as ‘intimate’. We have attempted to explain what this means above.

Heidegger continues the passage from ‘Language’: if what is at issue is the very speaking of language, then we require not merely a pure speaking but a pure speaking which addresses itself to this issue. This opens Heidegger to one of two oft-repeated charges: 1) Heidegger construes all poetry as itself about poetry; 2) Heidegger ignores poetry that is not itself about poetry. These accusations begin at the place Heidegger abandons, namely with the thesis that language in its essence (rather than contingently and when misunderstood) represents things, and thus can be considered in complete separation from things. Thus, it would be better to say that, for Heidegger, all (great) poetry is indeed itself about poetry not because it implicitly or explicitly addresses itself to its own language and art; but rather, insofar as it not only opens up an encounter with what-is in its world-site, but opens ‘anfänglich’. That is, brings the origin out into the open as origin: opens the world-site and cites it. In this way Heidegger indicates the role of art. As a phenomenon of significance, it is one worldly thing among others. However, as a phenomenon of the citing of originating site, art (as poetry) is both neighbour to thought: and vital for the happening of the history of Dasein.
Further, as we have seen, what the earlier, middle and later work all make clear is the elaborate and mysteriously structured spacing (between the near and the far, the present and the absent, the open and the closed, beings and nothing) which makes this siting and citing possible. The appearance of worldly things is the happening of this spacing.

The same notions of spacing are given here as were present in Kant's thinking about the forms of intuition, and in Heidegger's early thought concerning what we have called 'neighbourhood space': the primacy of difference and span over position, of wholeness over parts and collections of parts, of exteriority over interiority, of possibility over actuality, of surface and field over representation, and so forth. As if such lists ever accomplished much, or as if such a list were a list of all that was 'good' over all that was 'bad'. One could just as easily turn the list upside down and talk about the primacy of position over difference, etc. Indeed, no doubt one could deconstruct the poles of this list, showing elaborate structures of cross-pollination. But this would accomplish nothing more that what Kant had already done in the first Critique. Nobody here ever claimed that difference was not a concept, or that it later became one - or that position was not an intuition in the sense of a way of seeing. At issue are Being-characteristics, nothing more. If such lists help prop up for the duration our (initially arbitrary) historical inquiry - or if they put a practicable edge on the tools of Kantian and Heideggerian Critique - then so much the better.

Initially, we would have liked to take up these tools and questions, and take them to contemporary European philosophy. Certainly, we intended it to be obvious all along that this was the direction the work was moving. However, the limitations of space and time prevented this. This is work for the future. Now, the task is to briefly access the region we have crossed.
Notes

1. We should hurriedly note that closure and openness here mean something different (almost in fact the opposite) to what they meant in Kant.

2. The more Heidegger here sounds like Gadamer, the more astray we are lead. Which is nothing against Gadamer, of course, merely that his interests carry a different emphasis and language.

3. It is valuable to note just how Kantian this is.


8. Heidegger, p. 149.

9. Heidegger, 149.


11. Heidegger, p. 159. The notion of 'genuine' is as troubling here as in Being and Time.

12. This is perhaps what it means to evaluate Heidegger. From a completely argumentative philosophy in Kant, wherein certain shadows were cast across the arguments and their form, in Heidegger we find these same shadows brought to a certain kind of light. To the extent that such a 'finding' is possible in Heidegger, we can properly conclude that he is engaging productively in the history of philosophy.

13. Cf. Heidegger 'The Principle of Identity'. The leap out of representational thinking risks the abyss, unless it rediscovers the 'ground' of identity in Ereignis. The risk is never merely apparent.

14. This is of course the flip-side of Heidegger's opening question from within the modern: 'What is nearness if, along with its own failure to appear, remoteness also remains absent?' (TT 166).
Inconclusions.

In part at least, this work has been its own conclusion. As an investigation attempting an historical reconstruction of a problem and the implications of that problem, the reconstruction should suffice to itself.

Yet of course this essay has been not one but two reconstructions. We have forged links along the way, attempting to make the two sounding boards for each other - which in the author's development of these ideas they certainly have been, although it is entirely possible that this may not be apparent. We suspect the above work still looks like two shorter essays run arbitrarily together, each perhaps with 'its own conclusion.' To make the two one would have meant either a) violating the code with which we began - i.e. the code requiring of us a certain fidelity to the inner movements and language of the author discussed; or b) writing a thesis called 'Kant and Heidegger', which has been done, several times, and well.

This text has been named 'Kant, Heidegger and Spacing'. It is both thematic and doubly historical, and must bow to both genres. The former demands that the subject be unified and the inquiry completed. The latter demands respect for difference - though of course history can be made a theme. At the end of such a hybrid, what does one do when coming into conclusion? The only option is to write about spacing.
2.4.1. Worlds.

Let us broaden our discussion, but stay with the full notion of world with which we ended the previous chapter.

Kant sometimes uses the word ‘Welt’, in contrast to ‘cosmos’, to mean not just the whole collection of existent things, but the laws governing their existence (that is to say, governing their appearance). Heidegger would describe such a world as the realm of everyday comportment and ontic science. What he means by world is something different to Kant - and yet, as we have seen over and over, that difference is none the less inscribed in Kant. Heidegger means that different form of wholeness (entities as a whole, which essentially means the possibility of entities being as a whole - rather than the mere totality of entities) which makes possible the appearing in significance of the thing, but is not itself thingly, and precisely because of this cannot appear with the thing.

In Kant, this other ‘world’ would precisely describe those a priori and transcendental forms which we have discussed in part 1. These include: Space and time as forms of intuition, the propriety of which we have discussed at length, but which necessarily appear to the understanding as extant, empty, measurable containers. We have also seen that it matters even for discursive knowledge that intuition should be so formed: this form describes both the possibility (in our analysis of the Principles) and the limits (in the notion of schemata as models) of such knowledge. Further, such a ‘world’ would include apperception as the form of consciousness, which has many formal features in common with the forms of intuition, both in its presentation function and in the way it makes possible the ‘I think here/now’ of full self-consciousness, and which is necessarily encountered as the synthetic, continuous and ‘stretched’ production of the global ‘I think’. And finally the Ideas of Reason, considered as the carrying back of syllogisms not just to their totality of conditions but to what makes
possible that totality in its wholeness. Such ideas are encountered as illegitimate application and potential metaphysical illusion, but which precisely because of this distinctive 'carrying-back', nevertheless regulate and guide the understanding to its proper end.

All of these moments in Kant, then, appear or are encountered as part of the world in Kant’s sense, but for which it is at least possible, from within that everyday world, to point out the paradoxes (starting with incongruent counterparts, and ending with the peculiar law-likeness of the beautiful) which suggest a different realm and laws. We explored in what way such a world was revealed by the phenomenon of art on Kant’s interpretation - i.e. in what way art made possible an encounter, and thus a peculiar understanding of, the supersensible. Indeed, it is only on the basis of phenomena like art that the ‘supersensible’ ever shows itself to be transcendental for experience, rather than just empty hypotheses of pure reason. Thus, for example, the odd status of Kant’s teleological proof for the existence of God. These limit-transcendental elements thus form, in Heidegger’s sense, the world.

But the first characteristic of such a world, for each philosopher and in every instance and element therein, is spacing.
2.4.2. Spacing.

Startling is the prevalence of the language and concepts of space in describing (or rather intimating) the propriety of this 'other' to things. From the moment that Kant, only pages into the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B7-8), starts talking about the foundations of building, about the circle of experience, or about doves attempting to fly in a vacuum, the spacial analogies take over. Of course all ordinary things are spacial. But what is important in the metaphors of building, dove and circle are not buildings, doves and circles as things, but precisely the way they relate to space. Thus, they are not just any metaphors which happen to use objects in space, but rather are explicitly spacial metaphors.

It does not, however, take much effort to show that these analogies are inconsistent even with each other. In the analogy of building, the value is support to remain motionless; in the analogy of the dove, the value is support to make advance and progress; in the analogy of the circle, the value is of safety against outside threat. These are not all the same value, although they are all important to Kant. Of course, this itself proves nothing except that Kant was not a tremendously talented or careful writer. It at least suggests, however, that from beginning to end Kant envisaged all philosophical problems in terms of space - even against the strict logic of the analogies themselves. Numerous are those who would tell us how much an unfortunate and rather sloppy mistake all this was for Kant - but what if it was not a mistake, what if in fact it was an implicit recognition that the phenomenon we have called spacing is an important factor in all processes and components which are transcendental for experience?

Take the most famous analogy, that of building.¹ Let us think it through as Heidegger might have done. Contrasted with the image of building one's building on a firm and in advanced secured foundation is the image of building without foundation at all, which is presumably
impossible. But Kant's analogy then forces him to say 1) not that such building is impossible, but that such building is a sham; 2) it is not the building but the inspection into building itself which is dangerous. The analogy thus seems to be very imprecise. But we have not yet been generous enough. Suppose Kant meant to imply not that building is only possible on a foundation (which results in the analogy being strained to bursting) but that building a place to live securely is only possible on a firm foundation. Then, 1) sham building means to build a house not fit to live in and 2) inspection is dangerous because not because it reveals the 'house' for what it is, but because it brings the house down.

But this interpretation depends upon several other factors: 1) that 'living securely' means to live within the house: such that the structure of the house is part of one's life; 2) 'living securely' also means living freely: there is no part of the house which cannot be inspected; 3) 'living securely' however also means living freed: one can inspect any part of the house, but there is no need to, one can move on to other things - or rather, the moving always 'within the house' on to other things (continuing to build) just is the free inspection of foundation. To build securely then means, in Heidegger's language, to dwell.

This somewhat bizarre interpretation would have no credibility if it did not in fact point to some essential elements in Kant's thought. There is an illusion, fostered by Kant himself at times, that Critique as transcendental science is something Kant did, or could have done, once, and which could be left behind precisely as the secure foundation. But at B25 Kant tells us that searching for such an 'organon of pure reason' would be 'demanding a great deal'. Thus rather than organon, we have Critique, which presents merely the idea of a science - an idea among, it must be noted, other regulative ideas. Kant, despite his basic optimism, does not underestimate the ingenuity
of pure reason. Further, the continuation of Kant's work, the filling in of the architectonic, has certain limits of its own:

No one attempts to establish a science unless he has an idea upon which to base it. But in the working out of the science, the schema, nay even the definition which, at the start, he first gave the science, is very seldom adequate to the idea. For this idea lies in reason like an embryo [Keim], in which lie hidden all the parts, still undivided [einwickeln] and barely recognisable even under microscopic observation. [A834=B862]

Thus, not merely at first but perpetually must the reference of the working-out of the science refer itself back and adjust itself to reason. Naturally, this requires also a certain critical vigilance such that these references back do not force an adjustment to an improperly understood whole. The work of critique is thus never finished, and must in fact be nothing other than the authentic and secure work of the individual sciences. Our interpretation of Kant's analogy of building has thus indeed indicated essential lines of Kant's thought. And even here the spacial analogies - and analogies of developing life which, as we have seen, Kant thinks through in terms of space.2 The phenomenon we have called spacing - always couched in spacial language - appears here as the ultimate rational condition of the possibility of critical science, but also of the limits it necessarily places upon itself.

At this point it is worth pursuing further the link we have forged between the aesthetics of Kant and Heidegger. Despite the very different conceptual languages and approaches at work, nevertheless there are some striking parallels. Two of these we mentioned above in the introduction to chapter 2.3. These are first the manner in which the phenomenon of art helps to indicate the proprieties of thought, and
second the manner in which this propriety makes a necessary reference to an historical and alterable community.

A third parallel consolidates the connection. In Kant, the beautiful representation-in-me draws attention to itself, the mind is drawn to it by pleasure, even against its will, Kant says. The disclosure of the beautiful is a disclosure which cannot be ignored, but only interpreted away by the understanding. But precisely that which draws the attention (the pleasure itself) is the form of the representation which functions, as we said above, like a will, and which at the same time resists the understanding’s proper synthetic functions, but without becoming nothing. The beautiful, in Kant, is that which pleases (draws attention) in and through resisting in a certain manner. Thus, we might say that the beautiful representation is that which is distinctive and draws attention by closing itself off (residing within itself) in such a way that the drawing attention (cognitive harmony) is an opening for other realms of meaning (i.e. aesthetic ideas of the supersensible).

But as we saw above, for Heidegger too the self-sufficiency of the work, which is so striking and prominent, is other than the self-closure of a mere thing. The self-closure of the mere thing is never obdurate, except privatively. Rather, the self-sufficiency of the work must be carried forward to the ability of the ‘solitary’ work to ‘transport us out of the realm of the ordinary’ (OWA 66). Thus, the beautiful in Kant lies in strict parallel to the distinctive and world-opening that-it-is of the work of art in Heidegger. We should hear in the ‘unbridged entry’ Heidegger describes in ‘The Principle of Identity’ (33) an echo of the possible/impossible bridge Kant explicates in the introduction to the Third Critique. Heidegger’s occasional polemic against aesthetics as a theory of institutionalised subjective experience among paintings hung with value-added tacks on museum walls - this is a polemic not against Kant but against a certain Kant, that is, a whole interpretative tradition.
But this 'strict parallel' is in fact a moment of the dependency upon the idea of spacing which is to be found in the aesthetic writings of both Kant and Heidegger. It is spacing which conditions the distinctive mode and efficacy of the work of art. In Kant, we found that the form of the organism is described in the same terms as the intuition of space. The former is then used to describe what Kant means by self-subsisting cognitive harmony, and can be used to explore the relation Kant may have intended between symbols, aesthetic attributes and ideas - and also to explore the excess to thought of this relation. Both the language and the idea of space are preserved in this chain. In Heidegger, the analysis of neighbourhood space found in *Being and Time* not only becomes the model for the analysis of time and nothingness, but also of the coming to appearance of both thing and work. Earth and World, and the Geviert are both sets of moments within a primordial spacing which borrows from Heidegger's phenomenology of space all its essential content. In both cases, spacing is the clue to both the possibility and the necessary self-effecting withdrawal of the experience of art.

Spacing comes to language and thought as space. This is not because ordinary space has some kind of transcendental priority, but perhaps because of exactly the reverse: ordinary empirical space is that last 'empirical' element which cannot be eliminated. For both Kant and Heidegger, the most fundamental law of philosophical inquiry is that one always inspects, destroys and builds from within the house. Kant calls this 'Critique', Heidegger calls it 'the struggle against appearance' (*Introduction to Metaphysics*). And, as we have seen, even this law must become a law of spacing.

Since the everyday conceptions of time, as we said before, exhaust themselves in their objects, they only relate to essential time through spacial models and metaphors. Thus, in the Sisyphean climb 'out of' the empirical, even primordial temporality has to take space on its back. It is not necessarily the case the time is thereby compromised.
in its primordiality but rather that, since time temporalizes only for Dasein, it can have no proper voice of its own. As we are falling back from the highest point, space is the only language to express what has been glimpsed.
Chapter Notes

1. This analogy, and some of the others, is dealt with much more adequately in John Sallis, *Spacing*.

2. And which are continued and expanded a page later.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviations Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BT Heidegger, <em>Being and Time.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAJ Kant, <em>Critique of Aesthetic Judgement.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPR Kant, <em>Critique of Pure Reason.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTJ Kant, <em>Critique of Teleological Judgement.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW Leibniz, <em>Philosophical Writings.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT Heidegger, ‘The Thing’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WM Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Black, Max. Models and Metaphors.


Fichte, J. G. Science of Knowledge. Trans., Peter Heath and John


Milmed, Bella K. "'Possible Experience' and Recent Interpretations of Kant". In Beck 1969.
Parsons, Charles D. "Infinity and Kant's Conception of the 'Possibility of Experience'". In Wolff 1967.


Scott-Taggart, M. J. "Recent Work on the Philosophy of Kant". In Beck 1969.


