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Bumrungsuk, Chutamas (2012) Essays on international trade policy. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.
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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2677756~S1
Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters of independent studies.
In Chapter 1, I develop a finite two-stage game model where consumers in
new export markets lack information about their own valuation for the quality of
a new product. The model is then used to examine firms' quality choices. With
asymmetric information, the need to establish a quality reputation may not be
sufficient to induce firms to choose high quality. The likelihood that a firm
will choose to export a high-quality product rather than a lower-quality variant
increases with the number of experienced consumers. However, it decreases
with the number of competing firms. A policy of subsidising exporters can
encourage firms to select high quality and promote consumer experience, and
thus establish an independently viable high-quality export market. Nevertheless,
this will only work if the subsidy is conditional on quality choice. That is, the
administrative monitoring of quality is required. Beside, the government may
temporarily limit the number of competing firms. If consumers in new export
markets possess information about their own valuation, it may be possible to
promote the transition to a viable high-quality export market by competition
policy alone.
In Chapter 2, I employ a simple take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with
two-sided asymmetric information to reconcile the theoretical results with ob-
servation. With two-sided asymmetric information, the probability of bargaining
failure is positive. The likelihood that the domestic and foreign firm will collude
increases with the probability of a high-type foreign firm but decreases with
the bargaining power and concentration level of the domestic firm. The small
number of private settlements indicates the inefficient outcome of the bargain-
ing game with asymmetric information rather than evidence of the antidumping
measure being less misused as a collusive tool.
In Chapter 3, I examine the behaviour of firms after the implementation of
an FTA by paying attention to the impacts of rules of origin on preferential
trade
ows and economic activities within the FTA region. It is found that
a tightening of the rules of origin increases the volume of final goods import
from RoW but decreases the volume of intermediate goods and raw material
import from RoW, given the dominance of the final goods rules of origin effects.
However, if the intermediate goods rules of origin effects dominate, the volume
of intermediate goods import from RoW turns to increase, rather than decrease.
These imply that preferential trade
ows and economic activities among the
member countries of an FTA may increase or decrease when the rules of origin
are tightened. The findings, inter alia, suggest that the product-specific rules
of origin that impose the restrictive rules to final goods but the loose rules
to intermediate goods are more efficient in promoting preferential trade and
economic activities within the region and also inducing investments from outside.
Item Type: | Thesis (PhD) | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HF Commerce | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | International trade, Commercial policy | ||||
Official Date: | March 2012 | ||||
Dates: |
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Institution: | University of Warwick | ||||
Theses Department: | Department of Economics | ||||
Thesis Type: | PhD | ||||
Publication Status: | Unpublished | ||||
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: | Perroni, Carlo | ||||
Sponsors: | Thailand | ||||
Extent: | v, 171 leaves. | ||||
Language: | eng |
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