Lerman, Hemdat (2010) Non-conceptual experiential content and reason-giving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.81 (No.1). pp. 1-23. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00353.x ISSN 0031-8205.

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Abstract

According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements - content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer's version of the argument, I show that it rests on a questionable assumption - namely, that if a subject can recognize the normative bearing of a mental content upon what she should think and do, then this content must be the result of the actualization of conceptual capacities (and in this sense conceptual). I argue that considerations regarding the roles played by experience and concepts in our mental lives may require us to reject this assumption.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
ISSN:	0031-8205
Official Date:	July 2010
Dates:	Date Event July 2010 Published
Volume:	Vol.81
Number:	No.1
Number of Pages:	23
Page Range:	pp. 1-23
DOI:	10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00353.x
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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