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A political economy of the separation of electoral origin

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Buisseret, Peter (2013) A political economy of the separation of electoral origin. Working Paper. Coventry, UK: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economics research papers series (TWERPS), Volume 2013 (Number 1021).

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Abstract

Political constitutions frequently separate the roles of proposer and veto player in policymaking processes. A fundamental distinction lies in whether both offices are subject to direct and separate election, or whether the voter instead may directly elect the holder of only one
office. In the latter case, the voter constitutionally forfeits a degree of ex-post electoral control. Why should she benefit from such a relatively coarse electoral instrument? When politicians' abilities are private information, actions taken by one agent provide information to the voter about both agents' types. A system in which the electoral fate of these agents is institutionally fused reduces the incentives of the veto player to build reputation through the specious rejection of the proposer's policy initiatives. This can improve the voter's inference about the types of politicians and her welfare, relative to a system in which the survival of the veto player is institutionally separated from that of the proposer.

Item Type: Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
J Political Science > JC Political theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Policy sciences , Democracy, Political science, Economics -- Mathematical models
Series Name: Warwick economics research papers series (TWERPS)
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication: Coventry, UK
Official Date: 2013
Dates:
DateEvent
2013Published
Volume: Volume 2013
Number: Number 1021
Number of Pages: 51
Status: Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version: Open Access

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