Gómez, Natalia González (2012) Three essays on bargaining : On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution. On inter- and intra-party politics. A bargaining model with strategic generosity. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

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Abstract

This dissertation is a collection of three essays that share one common
feature: all three of them relate to the literature on Bargaining. The first
and second essay are joint work with my supervisor, Professor Andrés
Carvajal.
In our first essay we investigate the testable implications of the Nash
bargaining solution. We develop polynomial tests of the NBS under
different hypothesis about the default levels. For instance, with, and
without observation from the outside econometrician of the levels of
utility that the individuals would have obtained outside the negotiation.
We use the Tarski-Seindenberg algorithm to characterize rationalizable
data as those that satisfy a finite system of polynomial inequalities.
In our second essay we introduce a new equilibrium concept for games of
political competition. We model electoral competition within each party,
assuming inner-party members have somewhat conflicting preferences.
By using the bargaining protocol à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989) we
explicitly model party members’ strategic interactions, their incentives
and their decision of whom to elect. Our equilibrium concept attempts to
model each member’s decision as if each player were uncertain about, (i)
the faction that will eventually dominate the decision made by the other
party and (ii) the faction that will dominate in the party’s nomination.
In the last essay I focus on one of the classical problems in bargaining: the divide the dollar problem. In our framework we assume players’
utility functions mirror selfish and Rawlsian preferences. We derive the
set of subgame perfect equilibria for different arrangements of player
types and study why strategic generosity emerges under the bargaining
protocol we assume.

Item Type:	Thesis or Dissertation (PhD)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Collective bargaining, Negotiation in business -- Mathematical models, Equilibrium (Economics), Game theory
Official Date:	October 2012
Dates:	Date Event October 2012 Submitted
Institution:	University of Warwick
Theses Department:	Department of Economics
Thesis Type:	PhD
Publication Status:	Unpublished
Supervisor(s)/Advisor:	Carvajal, Andrés M.
Extent:	146 pages.
Language:	eng

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