Hoerl, Christoph (2014) Do we (seem to) perceive passage? Philosophical Explorations, 17 (2). pp. 188-202. doi:10.1080/13869795.2013.852615

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Abstract

I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve an (apparent) experience of ‘passage’, in the sense at issue in debates about the metaphysics of time. Paul, Dainton and Prosser all argue that this supposed feature of perceptual experience – call it a phenomenology of passage – is illusory, thereby defending the view that there is no such a thing as passage, conceived of as a feature of mind-independent reality. I suggest that in fact there is no such phenomenology of passage in the first place. There is, however, a specific structural aspect of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of movement and change that can explain how one might mistakenly come to the belief that such experiences do involve a phenomenology of passage.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophical Explorations
Publisher:	Routledge
ISSN:	1386-9795
Official Date:	2014
Dates:	Date Event 2014 Published 21 November 2013 Available 2 October 2013 Accepted
Volume:	17
Number:	2
Page Range:	pp. 188-202
DOI:	10.1080/13869795.2013.852615
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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