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**DERRIDA AND ECONOMICS:**

**The Economics of Depression**

Nicholas Joseph Blincoe

Submitted for PhD in Philosophy

University of Warwick  
Department of Philosophy

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## Derrida and Economics:

### the economics of depression

Derrida and Economics analyses two essays of Jacques Derrida on the Public and Democracy, alongside other essays reflecting these political works. However, Derrida's political thought will be taken seriously by emphasising Economics before Politics. Economics will be viewed as a detour, a detour inflecting every attempt to present a meaningful political position or stable political realm. For Derrida, economics has the force of an oblique ruse.

Derrida and Economics aligns Derrida's view of economics with the Eighteenth Century realisation that a stable society, analogous to the Antique ideal of the *Polis*, is neither a common goal nor a proper object for Political philosophy. Here, Classical economics emerges as an *oblique* attempt to construct the conditions for the possibility of a political body through economic relations. This epistemological 'en passant' is familiar, in Britain, as Adam Smith's 'Invisible Hand'. For Derrida, the equivalent Continental ruse is distinguished by a faith in '*dialectical idealisation*'; a process bent upon securing an idealised political space, but unable to limit its more speculative drifts.

If Classical economics represents an attempt to construct the possibility of the Body Politic, Derrida's political essays *deconstruct* this possibility. His emphasis upon the 'possible' highlights the effects of risk and competition in an economy that could never comfortably be identified with a stable Political realm. For Derrida, economics is not simply an attempt to secure or rewrite more direct Political discourses. As he argues, its every detour is haunted by the possibility of speculative failure. Derrida argues an enthusiasm for economics can also imply a preoccupation with the finitude of the Body Politic. This observation allows him to comment upon the valorisation of death or redundancy in certain political discourses; i.e. those analyses that, in the throes of Depression, remain devoted to the idea of redundancy as though to the object of a renewed political will.

Derrida and Economics  
*the economics of Depression*

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*the dismal science*

Where possible, this thesis has abbreviated authors works though using their surnames followed by a page reference. The following works by Derrida were abbreviated as follows:

D    La différance

DA   La démocratie ajournée

EM   The Ends of Man

## Derrida and Economics

### Introduction

The following thesis takes Jacques Derrida's political work seriously, focusing on his two essays on Democracy: The Ends of Man of 1968 and La démocratie ajournée of 1991. These two are the most obviously political of all Derrida's works. Here, they will be distinguished as pivotal texts in an essentially political oeuvre. This thesis is, primarily, concerned with the kind of political forum enlivened by Derrida's participation. When La démocratie ajournée insists upon the necessity of questioning the future of democracy it does so by emphasising the contours of political debate:

*"The dimension of the 'public' space which, without doubt, attained its philosophical modernity with the Enlightenment, with the French and American Revolutions or discourses like those of Kant which bind the Enlightenment ... to the freedom to make a public use of reason in every domain." [DA 113]*

That is, the contours of each and every domain open to the public, thereby reflecting a common realm of debate and enfranchisement. A public space that, although distinguished by its (Eighteenth century) modernity, remains analogous to the integral *Polis*, the political ideal of antiquity.

This approach might be regarded with suspicion, as it condenses Derrida's wider concerns into a single theme: the Political; specifically, a tradition of Western democratic politics. Here, two points might be made. Firstly, if this suspicion demands an answer,

nothing could dispel the shadow of the *Polis*. A defence depends upon a public forum. This symbiosis might be defused, perhaps through a sense of ironic distance. However, since Socrates' Apology, irony demands a forensic appreciation; it is the stuff of juridical apologies to the broader public. The following thesis asks only how a forum analogous to the Antique ideal of the Political might be articulated; arguing such a space is elaborated through economics rather than a Political or Juridical discourse. Secondly, if this forum is taken to be common to Derrida's 1968 and 1991 papers, this is tantamount to suppressing the differences between these works or the times they were produced. This issue is taken up in the conclusion, but only to emphasise that *Derrida manifests a disquiet at popular politics, a disquiet approached differently at different periods*. Could such an argument be supported? The point, surely, is how it might be received: To whom might one *appeal* with this kind of insight? In an attempt to remain true to Democracy, Derrida appeals to an uneasy or agonistic readership; to a forum that is resolutely non-popular, even marginal. In doing so, he resists any concept of the Popular which does not take the form of a lively and uncertain debate. He resists a popularism that, in effect, surrenders its democratic quality. The conclusion notes only that if Derrida's oeuvre is democratic, the popularism to which he is opposed need not be confused with the idea of popular hegemony, the dream totalitarianism. If Popularism survives without a debate, it need not mean debate is suppressed, only abandoned.

\* \* \* \*

## 1: Political-economics

The major terms of this thesis can be detailed under three headings. In the first instance, perhaps paradoxically, the concept of the Political is taken seriously by denying that an open political forum could be an object, an end or, even, a coherent ground-plan for public discourse. Instead, this thesis argues any attempt to construct the conditions for the possibility of the Political will be cast in terms of the Market. This has been true, in the West, at least since the advent of the Classical view of political-economics. Which is to say, *Economics is the milieu through which the Political is approached or postulated*. Whatever is taken, primarily, as a Political formation, will have been read as the oblique result of economic processes. One striking example of this epistemological *en passant* is Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' which, almost accidentally, provides for the possibility of a social body or a public ethos<sup>2</sup>. Another instance would be Kant's account of the relations forming the milieu of experience. This synthetic element, in its '*commercium*', is reflected upon as a '*tribunal*'. By way of this ruse, a series of economic relations are read as the oblique articulation of consciousness, in general; a human conscience or a political conscience by any other name<sup>3</sup>. Derrida holds the assurity of such a reading is now '*trembling*' [*s'ébranler* EM 161]. When Derrida speaks of the medium of political communication in The Ends of Man he states:

"For something must happen, or have happened, to the diaphanous purity of this element." [EM 132]<sup>4</sup>

Derrida calls this disrupted element an '*oikonomia*' (economy) [EM 161]. In exploiting an hellenic term, Derrida accentuates both the continuing Western philosophical tradition and the ripples distorting its stately passage from antiquity to modernity. The term 'economics', particularly, emphasises a moment of nascent insecurity; the turn associated, here, with Eighteenth century philosophy: Classical Modernity. Through terms like '*detour*' and '*ellipsis*', explicitly economic terms in his work, Derrida can be seen to mark the moment at which Western thought risks an economic *en passant*, alongside its more traditional investment; the concept of a Public ethos at home only within the limits of a Political forum<sup>s</sup>. It might be said such a turn views the Politics *otherwise*, or that it honours the ideal of the *Polis* only in the breach and through the fluidity of the market.

In Derrida's work, this turn is seen *not* as the oblique construction of the possibility of the Political, but the *Deconstruction* of this possibility. Which is to say, the dream of a possible and coherent Politics is both promoted and confounded by virtue of economic processes. Further, these processes, *in their every turn*, now inflect political thought, and every philosophy open to forensic, or Public, debate. In short, as every debate is articulated through economic relations, the 'Political' remains a vague but insistant secret - in every sense, a reserve - of the turn through economics; an ellipse which can itself be highlighted in the copula of 'Political-economics'.

## 2: Depression

In the second instance, this thesis is subtitled: The Economics of Depression; according Depression a special role. La démocratie ajournée argues that in the "absence of a general forum", economic forces tend towards 'depoliticisation' [DA 116-117, cf. below]. This claim will be related to Derrida's earlier work by showing not only the importance of economics in both essays, but also the way in which economic difficulties (the symptoms of depression) are reflected upon in the absence of a general forum.

La démocratie ajournée argues public opinion is, above all, susceptible to any process offering the Public a kind of reification; i.e. to represent its quality of being the element of the socio-political sphere in a more substantial form. In this respect, La démocratie ajournée echoes The Ends of Man, where Derrida states:

*"the process of finding a rapport between differences, this is also the complicitous promise of a common element: the forum can only take place within a medium or, rather, within the representation of a certain transparent ether, in which every participant is necessarily involved."* [EM 132]<sup>6</sup>

As in La démocratie ajournée, this process of representation is the reification of the public milieu, the concretisation of this element in its Economy. In the later essay this possibility belongs, preeminently, to the Media and its ability, in general, to present itself as a public mouthpiece:

*"This techno-economic power allows opinion to constitute itself, and to recognise itself, as public opinion."* [DA 106]<sup>7</sup>

Here, Derrida is speaking of the Media in the sense of newspapers, television etc. He is also, notably, talking about a technology of the Media, *qua* a medium. Specifically, about the possibility of a techno-economic mutation of what had earlier been termed a common 'ether'. By the time of *La démocratie ajournée*, the 'something' that has happened, or must happen, to this element is its "*mediatique*" mutation [DA 117]; a possibility explicitly associated with the '*free-market*' [libre marché DA 115]. There is, however, no cataclysmic turn from the earlier work; Derrida is simply reemphasising certain terms. Notably, the use made of economics in the earlier paper is now inextricably turned towards the Market, and its technology. He is, in addition, accentuating the more worrisome aspects of economics for the public. For Derrida, socio-economic forces tend to "*depoliticise*", according to a logic which, although most clear in the Media, is not "*confined there*" [DA 117].

The following thesis takes the presentiment of Depression, its shadow or its symptoms but also its symptomatic power, to be closely associated with the demise of the idea of the Political. For Derrida, the power associated with the milieu of society, its economic 'element', is no longer wholly democratic, nor even Political, in form. The economy has stranger mutant powers. It is the shadow of the Political. When asked "*What, today, is public opinion?*", Derrida answers:

*"Today? The silhouette of a phantom, the haunting of the democratic conscience."* [DA 103]<sup>6</sup>

Here, the 'Mediation' of the public, an effect reflecting economic relations, is cast as the death of the Political (depoliticisation) and its spectral after-image (the haunting of democracy). Derrida's interest in depressive dispositions, manifest in many papers, becomes indissociable from political-economics; an 'Economics of Depression'. Depression is normally distinguished as the degree-zero of economics, the moment an economy succumbs to inertia. It is also, *a propos* Freud, to be associated with either the drive towards death, or an obsession with the nearly departed<sup>9</sup>. It might, then, be cast as the intuition of the utter hopelessness of any Political dream. Which is to say, depression could not be considered the object of a political discourse in the sense of an end or an aim, but might be thought of as the End of Politics; the bankruptcy of this Ideal. A general interest in the *problem* of depression might also, however, be taken to reflect a sense of political commitment yet haunting the verges of a collective forgetfulness. It will be seen, in the following thesis, that Depression frequently appears as the most imperious and most intractable lynch-pin of political-economic discourses; the nebulous heart of political commitment.

Following the formula of *La démocratie ajournée*, Depression will be understood as the haunting of the democratic conscience; this shadow is a gallow upon which the Body Politick is hung. Through a reading of such concepts as 'the economy of death'<sup>10</sup>, in other essays, Derrida's account of depressive dispositions, like Mourning, will be seen to occur through economics, as a positive critique of the role of Depression in philosophies with political pretensions;

i.e. those philosophies manifesting a devotion to Depression as to a renewed Political will.

### 3: Forensics

Thirdly, the conflation of Depressive sympathies and market forces informs the major heuristic tool of this thesis: a distinction between the shadow of the Political and the fluidity of the market; or, a distinction between the arena where, it is feared, nothing might ever reflect a lively public debate, and the space where a vestigial hope remains to be speculated upon. In locating an aporia, this distinction marks a certain confusion; the fears for the health of a Politics might always be confused with the intuition of economic fluidity, and the deferrals and exchanges common to the market. For Derrida, the term 'Economics', itself, suggests this kind of effect; denoting both the dream of a stable political 'home' and a discourse inflected with symptoms of mourning:

*"That which is, perhaps, trembling today, is it not the security of the near ... such as it inhabits or is itself inhabited by the language of the West, such as it is sunk into its oikonomia, such as it is inscribed or forgotten there in accordance with the history of metaphysics". [EM 161]"*

Here, Derrida refers to the value placed upon the 'near', and its security, in Western philosophy. The conflation of the idea of a secure home with that of a tomb, through speaking of the 'oikonomia' as a memorium against forgetting, is reenforced in his La différence which associates the Greek term for house (*oikos*) with an 'economy of death'<sup>12</sup>. The effect Derrida attributes to such terms as 'Economics' is, here, termed 'Forensics'; conflating the two Antique connotations

of a forum: a public tribunal and a market. The term 'Forensics' is intended to: (i) elaborate the nascent uncertainty associated with the Political ideal of a public forum, the sense of remove distinguished in Classical political-economics, whilst, (ii) continuing to make an issue out of the way the Political forum, or its spectral image, maintains a role in a certain sort of discursive medium; here, one characterised by depressive forebodings. The term '*forensics*' is intended to broach this question; how might one make *Public* a use of reason? and where?

'Forensics' is designed to accentuate the risks underlying the presentation of any formula. As an aporetic term, it cannot assume easy or complacent acceptance. In effect, it cannot hold a debate or articulate a stable position. The Forum receptive to such terms is agonistic. In highlighting the effects of competition and risk, a forensic term exploits uncertainty; as it could not presume to exploit a predetermined advantage. It will, however, have drawn attention to the way a certain position might seek to exploit uncertainty in order to establish an advantage or edge; risks work to the favour of monopolies when those monopolies engender a sense of trust in their favoured positions.

The kinds of aporetic effect denoted by '*forensics*' are widespread, even international. Both The Ends of Man and La démocratie ajournée begin by considering questions upon national and political representation and move into an analysis of economics'<sup>3</sup>. Which is to say, both end by focusing on a milieu which only obliquely reflects political questions. It is in this latter space,

as Derrida says of the 'security of the near', that political integrity is inscribed and forgotten. An economical and cosmopolitan space; it is in the deconstruction of this milieu, as Derrida goes on to say of the value of security in western metaphysics, that political questions are 'reawakened'<sup>14</sup>. Which is to say, in its 'internationalism' economics articulates a process reflecting the forgetting and reawakening of Politics, or a process that both promotes and confounds the dream of a 'homeland'.

It is possible to think of more extreme examples of this same problem: the distinction between the closed, quasi-fascist state and the wholly open market. On the one hand, Fascism seems almost excusable when it becomes an issue alongside the market; when the collapse of an international market is experienced as a National tragedy. How could a slump be experienced *otherwise*? how else might a nation be asked to express sympathy or to pass judgement?<sup>15</sup>. Here, the spectre of protectionism is the shadow of democracy; an international issue must haunt the electorate in order to appear as a national-political issue. On the other hand, the so-called 'free market' will be justified or condemned as it reflects socio-political freedoms. The problem returns - is both promoted and confounded - as a problem concerning justice. If justice is to be thought in terms of a forum, a forum in which a specific citizenry are enfranchised within the terms and limits of a national debate, how might Justice be experienced outside of a national-political structure, within an economy of international relations?

There is another problem. Why does the 'international' bear an uncommon resemblance to the West? How could the West, which is neither a unified nor a unifiable structure, operate as though it were a single entity: a First World. Derrida's occasional emphasis of Jewish terms raises this issue at the level of the nation and national sympathies; insofar as, historically, the Jew has been born outside of nationhood, become the object of vicious xenophobia, been disenfranchised within societies profiting from their industry and been credited with the most effective exploitation of usury<sup>16</sup>. Derrida's constant emphasis upon the West, and 'its' economy, raises this problem at a cosmopolitan level. It may be, indeed, that the figure of the Jew can be made to operate at both levels of this problematic. The dispossessed Jew raises the issue of national justice by remaining, in commerce, at the margins of this idea, the state of Israel exploits a wider margin in a discourse unable to decide whether the 'Israeli issue' is one of politics or expediency; a question of justice or mercenary interests. On the one hand, should Israel be cast in terms of a New World Order, where the idea of international justice might be properly delimited? On the other, will it always be bound to the idea of a Great Satan, where the First World (or its representation as America) exercises a coercive effect everywhere the internationalism of justice is proposed? Israel, above all, is an effect of the explosive mix and the effective exploitation of a discourse that confuses the possibility both of Nationhood and Political oblivion (the Israeli's, the Palestinian's), with an idea of the international which, by rights, is only an economic element.

Unfortunately, this thesis ends not with an account of the New World Order but with a look at the forensic appeal of the formulae bound to such a cosmopolitan view. It ends with an apology, a public justification of the kind of the terms it has chosen to exploit; or rather, an examination of the kinds of apology Derrida makes as he throws suspicion upon the texts of western philosophy and their pretensions. Derrida recognises his negotiation through other texts eludes any popular appeal, due both to the aporetic quality of his terms and the fact he deconstructs the kinds of Forum apparently promoted by those texts. As a teacher and writer, Derrida exploits terms with a more or less divisive appeal, for the sake of a divided public opinion.

*"As it is primarily promoted, this opinion, I scarcely dare to say this fiction, remains that thing in the world best divided."* [DA 124]<sup>17</sup>

Derrida, modestly and apologetically, affirms the ways in which his work eludes a popular ethics. In fact, as can be seen above, Derrida believes the Popular, in the sense of a popular movement or a popular will, is thoroughly suspect. It is better divided. The conclusion to the following thesis will ask if Derrida's suspicion of popularism is either warranted or desirable.

\* \* \* \*

The following thesis comprises a foreword, three chapters and a conclusion. The Foreword introduces the general parameters of the issues raised in the main body of the thesis, as they are found in Derrida's work and as his work redoubles upon an older tradition. It argues that Depression might be taken to reflect a traditional

political problem; the collapse of a Political order or the demise of Sovereignty. However, it also argues that if Depression marks the elision of Sovereignty, its form is such as to both promote and confound a single Political objective. Outside of any politics, the problem of depression opens onto economics.

The First chapter begins to work away at the movement from Politics to Economics characterising both The Ends of Man and La démocratie ajournée. Specifically, it focuses on the aspects of revolution or insurrection touched upon in both papers. Insofar as modern European governments are said to owe their enlightened features to a series of revolutions this chapter repeatedly interrogates the notion of 'revolution' as the fundamentally political act. It will be argued that the significance of any political initiative remains an issue only on the wider world stage and, in consequence, the act commemorating the founding of modern politics has a significance beyond that presupposed by the notion of government, especially national government. It will be argued that, so long as economic ties defuse any idea of the stable political realm, the event commemorated by the 'revolution' remains nebulous, a memorial to the idea of government.

The Second chapter continues to ask what is commemorated as the Political or is recollected as a question of political will. Turning away from the notion of a founding revolution, it suggests political commitment might be reflected through the withdrawn quality of the depressive; those elements betraying only a sense of incipient dereliction. It will be argued that Twentieth Century philosophy is

distinguished by the realisation that insofar as symptoms of depression might command public interest whilst, still, reflecting a sense of the withdrawn, they have a significance that cannot easily be recouped under the notion of the Political. The appreciation of such elements might be claimed to represent the ultimate Political risk; a transcendent end refracted through a sense of political impotence. Derrida, however, provides a positive account of such risks. For Derrida, the presentiment of depression continues to express economic uncertainty before it reflects any sense of the political. This informs his reading of the break between Classical and Modern philosophy, providing the formal denominator underlying the way he casts metaphysical issues into an economic framework.

The last chapter looks at the way a space which only imperfectly reflects an idea of nationality might inspire commitment. Taking the form of a history, it argues the move into a christian or ecumenical worldview has disposed Western philosophy to search for its principles and stability upon a multinational stage; that is, through an economy that insistantly deviates from the ecumenical faith in a world community. This chapter claims that, at the birth of either technologies of credit or the iniquitous exploitation of usury, every international debate takes the form of an economics. Which is to say, the international, multinational or cosmopolitan are economic articulations. By way of illustration, it is noted the status Derrida accords to economics is similar to that held by warfare in Hegel's politics. It will be remembered that Hegel advances the issue of war in order to deny any concept of cosmopolitan peace. The dirty secrets produced through war only make sense within a national context and

the intuition of these secrets could only be alleviated within an understanding Nation. The crucial difference between Hegel and Derrida is that, as Derrida argues, in the fractious arena of the international, a closed political space cannot be appealed to as the substance underpinning the accidents of war. It is not that war generates prejudices working to the advantage of nationalism; rather, all such interests are the stock in trade of economics<sup>16</sup>.

The Conclusion reasserts that the international economy, in the variety of its relations, remains external to the issues it articulates; traversing rather than surrounding the positions it brings into play. If a specific issue seems especially pressing, it does so by virtue of its economic elaboration and could never be determined as a Political position. Which is to say, every issue is immanent only to economics; there is no Political interior, no forum in which a specific issue reflects a general interest. Does this mean, then, that through a process of depoliticisation all sense of the politically relevant is now undone? By way of a reading of the Apology, the conclusion asks how one might express political involvement in the absence of a Forum?

The Apology plunges the possibility of a general forum into doubt. It concerns the relation between a private figure and an unsympathetic public. As a public address, it might be thought to play to its audience; at least, to anticipate a form under which its possibility, as Public, becomes conceivable. The Apology, however, carries no favours. Socrates exacerbates the suspicion his position is more or less redundant as regards the public realm. In effect, he

agitates on behalf of a forum so riven by the appreciation of redundant and private elements, it is unable to close upon the idea of a secure public, thoroughly at home with all aspects of a debate. Derrida resembles Socrates insofar as he refuses to abandon the 'best divided' ground. This site, as will be argued, becomes an inner-limit, a space where marginal positions have a certain public force. Derrida maintains this limit, just so far as he refuses to forgo the question of what is undergone, in Public, through force. Here, economic forces.

Derrida remains on the margins of a nebulous inner-limit, but not on the 'inside' of a closed debate nor, like a spectre filling the air around a graveyard, does he haunt an already doomed debate. He circles Socratic ground without giving way to mourning. He finds, rather, something to affirm; a new force at work. It is always a question of force. Socrates was expected to answer a powerful charge by slaying it off. Instead, he put himself in the way of a force that, as he argued, more powerfully called for his indictment. How might one negotiate a position in relation to powerful interests? How might one appeal, through one's style and the terms one exploits, to a public already absorbed by other interests? How might one exercise a new appeal, against the grain of an already entrenched position? For Derrida, today, this is a question of monopolistic rather than political coercion.

*"It is not only necessary to struggle against 'censure', in the dominant sense, but also against a 'new censure', so to speak, which threatens liberal societies: against accumulations, concentrations, monopolies; in short, against all the quantitative phenomena which effectively marginalise or reduce to silence whatever cannot be measured upon their scale. However, we may no longer petition simply for*

*plurality, dispersion, fractioning, for the mobility of sites of cross-fertilisation or for the subjects disposed that way. For, socio-economic forces may ever be abused through such marginalisations and through the absence of a general forum. ... Thus, the 'new censure' in the force of its stratagems, combines concentration and fractionalisation, accumulation and privatisation. It depoliticises. At its most forceful in the 'audiovisual' (Media), this terrible logic is not confined there." [DA 116-117]'*

La démocratie ajournée turns upon the fear that the Media has come to control public opinion through affording the public a kind of mutant reification. The so-called 'new censure', which is primarily economic and only predominately of the Media, effectively exploits the traditional formulations of the majority, the pleasure of the majority and the appeal of the marginal. Derrida argues this 'new censure' pushes some into silence as into shadows, into "*the night of a semi-private enclosure*" [la nuit d'un enclos quasiment privé DA 118]. Which is to say, Derrida accentuates elements elided by the techno-economic power of the Media; private insofar as they remain redundant within the public, without the cachet to publicise their enfeebled positions. Derrida's texts negotiate what it means to operate from a position of strength or weakness; i.e. they negotiate the question of 'censure'. Derrida's work, as has been seen, does not pretend to *construct* the conditions for its reception nor, as will be seen, to compete where such conditions seem to have been predetermined upon a macro-scale. This does not mean, however, he reconciles himself or his texts to the remaindered bin. He argues the possibilities are heightened. Derrida's analyses continue to insist upon the sense of risk; specifically, the chance of *purchase* or of *leverage*.

"The enfeebled cachet, yet, holds a chance: semi-private, it nevertheless has access to the public space. Between the two, the *samizdat*." [DA 120]<sup>20</sup>

Liberal economics depend upon the possibility that a minority enterprise might promise an edge; a moment of purchase into the Public market. This is only partly Derrida's point. The paradox and the risk negotiated here is that, as the greatest risks attend the weakest positions, so weaker positions promise the greater possibilities. The *samizdat* articulates the 'better divided' option; promising an access, a relation between the public and the private, even as it emphasises an elliptical failure to determine or to anticipate a stable form of public deliberation. The *samizdat* hovers at the margins of the relation binding the powerful to the more or less powerless. It stands out against any monopoly position which, just so far as it is a *maintained* position, virtually silences every extraneous possibility.

What would it mean to trade from a wholly weakened position? A position which eludes any measured scale? To articulate the diffuse or divided possibilities opened only as a *samizdat* becomes an issue; i.e. when a *samizdat* stands in relief against an entrenched position? In the end this form of negotiation depends upon Derrida's texts being resolutely marginal; whatever they offer cannot be the subject of easy or complacent acquiescence. Derrida's work, in effect, depends upon its difficulty, deriving its piquancy from this fact. His writings are directed against a form of popular mass culture which remains inherently passive, irredeemably effortless, or appeals to the broadest common denominator. If something like a liberal

democracy can live through economics, in the absence of a general forum, the 'centrality' of the:

*"democratic forum must not be confused with the mass, with concentration. with homogeneity or with the monopoly" [DA 116]²¹*

This is not to say Derrida petitions on behalf of a cultured elite. Rather, nothing could maintain a popular appeal which also bore the effects of the samizdat's negotiation of the margins of public favour; allowing no single position to decide the "goods in culture's supermarket" [les ventes dans les supermarchés de la culture DA 117]. The samizdat effectively mediates whatever presents an immediate appeal, reinscribes whatever claims a broad appeal, or exercises whatever offers an ingenuous appeal. In sum, where Derrida's appeal remains non-popular, it is less elitist than *tempered*, markedly narrow, uncomfortably haunted by a sense of leverage and aspirant to the more difficult only as to something borne of an uneasy relationship.

This thesis broaches such themes, to address them in the conclusion. All that remains, is to ask what it would mean to abandon Derrida's inner-limit. If this limit reflects the attempt to mark the unregarded chance, what would the abandonment of this access entail? This would, again, not be the abandonment 'of' the Political but, rather, an abandonment that comes with economics. Derrida's attempt to negotiate techno-economic powers leads him to highlight the Media as the clearest purveyors of its logic. This is true both of *La démocratie ajournée* and *The Ends of Man*, which speaks disparagingly

of "cultural, journalistic gossip" (le bavardage culturel et journalistique EM 1611). Derrida has little sympathy for journalists; he has none for philosophers who fail to negotiate the delinquency of economics, who choose instead to affirm the deconstruction of every seemingly stable position; 'naively' missing the way powerful positions might reconvene upon this displacement<sup>22</sup>. More recently, even, than *La démocratie ajournée*, Derrida raises the question of the 'stupidity' of those who, through economics, abandon themselves to the merely gratuitous<sup>23</sup>. Can these, the stupid, the naive, the casual, be grouped together? Certainly not as a stable position, in betraying economic forces they do not themselves maintain a definite position. In their abandonment they do not even remotely reflect older, political positions. However, they may be grouped together insofar as they display an abandonment through deconstruction; or at least, have apparently abandoned the access between the more or less weak and the more or less strong. Both too strong and too weak, abandoned to a weakness for culture's supermarkets and to the strength of currents which bypass the limits raised by Derrida. Perhaps, then, simply popular; repeating profanities indifferently, and producing profane passions indiscriminately.

What is the abandoned inner-limit of deconstruction? How does Derrida resist abandoning this inner-limit; or, how does he resist stupidity as though he were resisting a transcendental evil?

## Foreword: Depression

*"Then I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labour that I had laboured to do: and, behold, all was vanity and vexation of the spirit, and there was no profit under the sun.*

*And I turned myself to behold wisdom, and madness, and folly: for what can the man do that cometh after the king? even that which hath already been done." [Ecclesiastes 2.11-12]*

When all's said and done, what is Depression? perhaps we already know. Deprived of sovereignty and devoid of profit, depression suggests a feeling for death but also a torpidity that evades description. If Depression fails to reflect an invariable objective or dominating principle, it could not be represented as a single, unvarying temper. Outside of this island, the world economy falters according to different dances of depression: now torpid, now indifferent, now morbid. If Depression is so complex, are we looking for interpretation or alleviation? **understanding or relief?**

Understanding and alleviation are not easily separable. If the possibility of relief depends upon understanding, the silence of depression stifles any possible initiative. Perhaps this inability to communicate demands a new sort of understanding; as though one last insight could prise Depression open. It seems, however, that so long as Depression remains hopeless, intelligence is only that quality exacerbated by the problem of Depression. Whatever is promised through insight, this promise lies still-born in Depression.

\* \* \* \*

Freud suggests both that there are varieties of depression and that a common theme links its psychic and economic manifestations. The common element is a kind of involved indifference; an attempt to hold together a variety of disjointed projects, with no question of any initiative nor any expectation of relief. In both mental and economic depressions, the possibility of alleviation is lost; nothing remains but a thoroughgoing devotion to dereliction.

*"When the ego is involved in a particularly difficult psychical task, as occurs in mourning, or when there is some tremendous suppression of affect or when a continual flood of sexual phantasies has to be kept down, it loses so much energy at its disposal that it has to cut down the expenditure of it at many points at once. It is in the position of a speculator whose money has become tied up in his various enterprises. I came across an instructive example of this kind of intense though short-lived, general inhibition. The patient, an obsessional neurotic, used to be overcome by a paralysing fatigue which lasted for one or more days whenever something occurred which should obviously have thrown him into a rage. We have here a point from which it should be possible to reach an understanding of the condition of general inhibition which characterises states of depression, including the gravest form of them, melancholia."*<sup>1</sup>

The melancholic Ego cannot take the chances offered, refusing to take up any energy usefully or react against any stimulus positively. It abdicates its place in the community as it spreads itself throughout the economy. Freud hopes to understand Depression at this point, but even this hope carries a melancholic trace. Freud wrote on depression ten years earlier and, apart from re-emphasising the symptom of indifference, is no nearer an understanding<sup>2</sup>. What is clear is the depressive is not inclined to help itself. In its hopeless positions, the depressive is neither tuned to the possibilities of the economy nor to the protestations of the analyst. However, from Freud's description it should, at least, be possible to recognise depressions.

Ecclesiastes puts Depression at the heart of one of the more widely known discussions of wisdom in the West. In a few beautiful but sick verses wisdom is found to be rank with all the symptoms of Depression: personal, fiscal, social. Ecclesiastes exacerbates the problem of wisdom through its lasting devotion to dereliction. In its commitment to wisdom, there is no chance of alleviation. Ecclesiastes does, however, serve to frame the problem of depression in all its hopeless variety. Below, what is obscurely termed the 'long home' is contrasted with the places, in a city, the social whirl is at its most constant:

*"Remember ... when thy shall be afraid of that which is high, and fears shall be in the way, and the almond tree shall flourish, and the grasshopper shall be a burden, and desire shall fail: because man goeth to his long home and the mourners go about the streets."* [Ecclesiastes, 12.5]

The long home casts a shadow over what the Greek translation of the Hebrew text terms the 'agon' (above, 'streets'), the place of disputation and decision. Here, the clement winter provides no joys and the least thing becomes irrevocable. In these derelict streets there is no further chance of a decision. A few verses earlier it states:

*"A good name is better than precious ointment: and the day of death than the day of one's birth.*

*It is better to go to the house of mourning than to go to the house of feasting: for that is the end of all men; and the living will lay it to his heart."* [Ecclesiastes, 7.1-2]

The injunction to remember, and the reminiscences laden with mourning, is contrasted with the blitheness of those addicted to greed. The depressive lives through memories, memories which anticipate the grave. Memory places the peculiarly depressive cast onto the relation between the house and the streets, and between the house of remembering and the house of forgetting.

The text opens with the speaker remembering when he was king in Jerusalem. Ecclesiastes, then, describes the passage from a certain political order into the mournful aspect that, in remembrance, characterises the social sphere. However, the text elaborates a social Forum. Despite the title 'Ecclesiastes', the speaker is not a preacher but a participatory member of a politicised laity: a jurist, a prosecutor, a proposer<sup>3</sup>. As a secular discussion of wisdom, Ecclesiastes anticipates Kant's view that a juridical understanding is "*freedom from self-incurred tutelage*"<sup>4</sup>. In Ecclesiastes the figure of the Sovereign is only a shadow, the laity has assumed political responsibility in its deliberations. It has, especially, assumed responsibility for those marks or memories which exasperate the understanding without the understanding ever being able to fathom them. Ecclesiastes describes a sense of liberation insofar as the deliberator is released into popular responsibility. Throughout Ecclesiastes it is reiterated there is no end. Although wisdom, the understanding, is the great issue no judgement is expected; at least, not under the sun. There is no temporal hope of relief. This would highlight the pessimism that flows beneath Kant's view:

*"If we are asked 'Do we live in an enlightened age?' the answer is, 'No', but we do live in an age of enlightenment."*<sup>5</sup>

In Ecclesiastes, the weight of a shadow never ceases to press down upon and excite the processes of enlightenment. Yet, Ecclesiastes throws out the hint that wisdom might provide relief. It does so as it offsets the '*long home*' against the streets. The movement from the one to the other, from Death to the place of disputation, is both dialectical and the confusion of dialectics. Which is to say, relief remains an object of speculation but of endless speculation. The old political order,

characterised by Sovereignty, continues to claim every attention of the new popular political order. It should be possible to imagine a moment of reconciliation, a moment when mourning ends and the life of the new order begins. However, in mourning, the commonwealth remains irremediably riven by an attention to the least detail and the most uneasy variety of thoughts. Ecclesiastes is written for a juridical society, a juristocracy, it both promotes and confounds. It delineates a society that could never escapes dereliction. The possibility of relief is raised, but without end. Here, dialectics, as a process of recovery, or a process of raising issues and initiatives, could offer a dream of political liberation. Marcuse stated: "*I believe that all dialectic is liberation ... think of Plato ... think of Hegel ... think of Marx.*"<sup>7</sup> What, all of them? in the same way? Without end?

The dialectical cleavage would be between the late Political order and the mournful deliberation which characterises the Commonwealth; or, rather, the one is to become an issue for the other. The sphere of wise deliberation is found to be riven by the dereliction of depression. The society modelled upon wisdom remains obsessed with the redundant ephemera of its memories. The society attempting to discover some order in its deliberation is contrasted with the society oblivious to such issues, self-satisfied in its greed. In each instance there is a movement from assurity to dereliction, although a movement that remains too various, too pointless and, always, too uncertain. What remains decisive is the belief that understanding has a home and a responsibility towards this home. The imperative, in every instance, is to assume responsibility for the home and for the issues promoted there. Thus, whilst relief is apparently the central issue, no relief is to be accepted. Dereliction is

the only issue. Dialectical resolutions are chimerical, every speculative leap risks compounding or forsaking the nature of the problem. But, what is the problem: Was there ever a stable political homeland or a firm political duty? Was there ever a King in Jerusalem?

The Greek term for home, 'Oikos', provides the root of economics: house-law. It was, however, also used to describe the perfect political order of the City: a synonym for 'Polis', a synonym which brought home the duty owed to the commonwealth<sup>9</sup>. Thus, the use of the term was allusory, an allusion based upon the supposed stability of the home. Ecclesiastes employs the same analogy. However, the home is not Jerusalem, or not the Jerusalem of the Kings, but an organisation reflecting upon an 'older' order. Sovereignty becomes an issue in the city, as the home is its memorial. The image reflected in memory is not simply one of the state; it is rather, an image of the state organisation at its most troubled. The 'house of mourning' is an image of the state on the verge of distraction. Through this painful memory, this image of the state's imminent dereliction, Wisdom, which would be the Understanding of a principled order, necessarily fails. The *Oikos*, or the issue of the 'Oikos', is the site of an understanding so impossible, so cluttered with the many small and large things held there, that any thought of relief remains illusory. Speculative dialectics are the excited effects of such a delirium.

Kant terms the distractions faced by the Understanding in its hopeless speculations a '*dialectics*'. He, also, describes these '*necessary illusions*' of the Understanding in terms of economics<sup>9</sup>. Later, Hegel described the milieu of dialectical or speculative reason as an economy;

this time, as though Wisdom had already discovered the leverage (either the impetus or the chance) needed to triumph over whatever still resisted its attentions or its programme'<sup>o</sup>. As though relief from the suffocating grip of depression were always the First possibility.

The way Depression exercises a thrall has recently been elaborated by the French philosopher of 'deconstruction', Jacques Derrida. Derrida broaches depression through an analysis of the problem of economics. Derrida, chiefly, uses 'Economics' in two ways. Firstly, he means the formal presentation of a problem''. Economics is a means to present a political problem, a way to reflect upon the political 'home'. Here, however, it is recognised that the formal expression of a problem is not necessarily coincidental with the way any such expression excites interest, or betrays the worrying nature of a problem. Economics does not quite frame the problem, it presents a problem but does so as an economics, an imperfect representation. The representation is necessary in order to present a public use of reason but with the representation the presentation, itself, is pushed further away; who of those present understand the representation? who is present when the forum, itself, is problematised through its representation? In speculation, at least, it is believed a cohesive or stable society would understand about politics. Such an order might reflect upon a problem through its representation, but would it recognise the representation itself as problematic? The representation opens out into a space where the Present, those who are present, or those who enjoy a presentation, are becoming all the more remote. This basic idea is found in Ecclesiastes, the 'house of mourning' represents a fallen Political order; simultaneously expressing both current fears and the hopeless commitment to a past organisation.

Ecclesiastes represents a commitment to Sovereignty but does so *otherwise*; in mourning, dialectically and, insofar as its dialectical expressions will never get to the root of its problem, in a way that is symptomatic rather than certain about the nature of the problem.

Secondly, the antique strains apparent in any analogy between the home and the state, or between domestic organisation and social dereliction, nowhere approaches what 'economics' now means. Economics, in its now classical sense, means market economics. Those who champion economics or those who attack its vagaries accept that the issues arising in the normal flow of the market do not reflect upon any socio-political ideal. What is rarely noted is that this was *also* true in Antique thought. The Hellenic term for what now is known as economics is '*khrematikos*'; i.e. money lending, business etc'<sup>2</sup>. Greek philosophy provides a vision and history of Statescraft, of political nous or of its analogy in the term '*oikonomia*', in which politics will always be preferred over business. Behind this cleavage lies the belief that business evades the most urgent issues of State; even, that business promotes an easy sense of relief, which the philosophy of political science has learnt to mistrust. To emphasise the market over politics would, then, be to subvert an important distinction. In short, to promote all those effects which conspire to erase or weaken basic political motifs, which simply means state-wide laws and national government; even, to promote a usurious supra-national effect over the familiar and comfortable proximity to order and intelligibility to which 'politics' is pledged. A pledge residing solely in politics declared proximity to the stability of the familial home.

*Khrema* promotes a dream of fluidity sped on the seas of the world market, drifting in the credit relations of the major clearing houses, awash in the technosphere where the signals from telecommunication satellites are interwoven with the microwaves and gamma rays of the global economic blur. To emphasise fluidity over the corporeality of the Body Politick is anti-wisdom; Ecclesiastes states, "a dream cometh through the multitude of business; and a fool's voice is known by multitude of words." [Ecclesiastes, 5.3]. To *underplay* such a difference, however, is *deconstructive*. Derrida employs such a tactic in White Mythology, where he emphasises 'usury' alongside the supposed propriety of equitable exchange. This strategic 'inversion' is collateral with Derrida's more widely regarded subversion of speech through writing; his emphasis of the way writing seems ineradicably dissolute in comparison to an audibly intelligible presentation<sup>3</sup>. However, an emphasis upon credit and of market forces over any dream of political cohesion has been the distinction of British philosophy for four hundred years. Which is not to say Derrida reworks a British thought, nor that deconstruction is naturally British. It is, only, to note that Derrida heightens the symptoms of distress or delirium that accompany modern economics. Derrida's work conspires to accentuate a break with tradition, and to raise the stakes around this break. Such a break seems both less natural, and more radical, when formulated in a way that renders economics relation to an older tradition uncertain. Derrida's work comes to stress the way in which the modern sense of economics deviates from the antique sense, with the accent upon deviancy. On the one hand, the organisation modelled on political order. On the other, the space of fluid and nonsymmetrical exchanges; either the space of those passions common to writing or the fluid space of market forces. Freud says that

writing entails making a fluid run'<sup>4</sup>. In economics, this fluidity never returns to the home. Freud continues by stating if this fluidity is inhibited, it does so as it assumes "*the significance of copulation*". In economics social intercourse is inhibited as the depressive are abandoned by economics to the dereliction of their various and hopeless affairs, and the belief their position is *either deviant or untenable*.

If it is a question of deviancy, it is also one of a detour from a space of juridical deliberation, into a space of fluid and nonsymmetrical exchanges. What kind of relation is, then, denoted by the 'detour'? Is it that speculation could only become free in escaping from the shadow of the Political? Is it, perhaps, that every attempt at reasonable deliberation remains inhibited? or, is the possibility of fluidity fully organised around depression and, thus, more or less inhibited from the outset? Finally, is all deliberation necessarily inhibited? It has to be said: Derrida relishes a formal commitment to understanding and to deliberation. He believes in fluidity only as in another dream. This does not mean, however, that the significance of depression has to be taken as read. It might be that, as depression remains untenable, it offers a different kind of communication. Derrida remains at the margins of a forum of open and intelligible debate, even as he is sucked into the whirl of economics.

Ecclesiastes represents a political organisation by expressing commitment to the idea of a forum. It does so, however, only as it also elaborates a mourner's inhibitions. Commitment and inhibition, Ecclesiastes evokes an apology for a state that could never contemplate its uninhibited other, represented as '*the house of feasting*'. As an

apology, its style is not constrained by an idea of the home, but habitually loathe to fully abandon them; uncomfortable and unable to leave without losing the grace of commitment. Mourning acts as noose and scaffold. Derrida, too, insists on the lingering symptoms of depression. Without overturning the traditional political limits, he attempts to read the deviancy of this economy in a more responsive way, in a way that promises something less stale than the same, solid organisation, with its one hope of relief.

In sum, Derrida is interested in Understanding before Relief. Specifically, in the variety of ways the possibility of understanding might be raised. Derrida does, however, take the possibility of relief seriously, as an insistant effect and one inseperable from the chances and the necessity of the 'forum' promoted as an economy. His The Ends of Man and La démocratie ajournée are concerned with 'depoliticisation', whether this is a retreat into silence, or a willful ignorance of the problems of the forum. Derrida still hopes for a formal rigor that will broadcast understanding forensically. Here, Forensics refers to *both* the *agon* in which a politicised public takes an effective responsibility and the market in which a commonwealth remains receptive to the distracting possibility of new or stranger symptoms. Finally, 'Forensics' is intended to express the attention to symptoms, specifically to the symptoms of mourning, which habitually exercise a commonwealth in its divisive or elliptical passage between one space and its fluid other. Derrida's strategy is to question the symptoms that promise relief or respite in order to communicate more discrete currents than had been assumed. To see if they might be read otherwise, outside of the same old inhibitions, towards something wiser.

## Chapter One

### *On the successive revolutions which created modern government*

*"The epoch when the masses had no means of improving their lot except by storming the Bastille or the Winter Palace has gone into the past."* Mikhail Gorbachov [The Sunday Observer, July 28 1991]

Within a Democracy, or within the democratic relations reproduced between states, Revolution remains a memory. Now, opinion can be expressed publically; as part of a Public and not an anonymous mass. This is the post-revolutionary age, as Gorbachov suggests. Perhaps the memorial to Revolution lies in the way the anonymous dissolves into the Public; but which is the memorial and which the spirit of the revolution: a space haunted by long past revolutions, or the public space which opens on the day of Revolution? What could be credited to a revolution or emphasised in a valediction? What, finally, is a revolution? If its form allows the dispossessed to force their way into alien or overpowering institutions, the revolution seems only to replicate democratic emancipation, albeit in storms of destruction. As though the Public both precedes and succeeds the Mass. Could Gorbachov have anticipated that a 'revolution' might be distinguished by the defence of an institution; the occupation of Moscow's White House in August 1991, or the occupation of a university in May 1968. Certainly, a series of revolutions lie behind the style of government now enjoyed in the West. Yet a vague anonymity haunts the Public's affairs. Enframed only in memory, the revolution might present a purely nebulous origin. The unfolding of public opinion might obey another law entirely to revolution; a law all the more anonymous as revolution continues to enthrall the public memory.

This first chapter deals with the significance of the 'revolution' as the fundamentally political act. It will argue that the role of the revolution remains vague. The post-revolutionary age is too international to have its origins represented by a single event likened to a revolution. The advantages enjoyed, and the pressures suffered, under post-revolutionary conditions are not Political, as such. This scene might, however, be termed an economy, as it is in Derrida's work. There will be three sections:

(i) A comparison of Derrida's view on revolution, and the origin of democracy, with those of F A Hayek. This comparison is intended to show why the idea of a revolution might be treated with suspicion.

(ii) An account of why the variety of discourses which distinguish a modern, liberal public could be thought of as an 'economics'; as they are in Derrida and Hayek's work.

(iii) A study of the law according to which the economy of public opinion unfolds. A law, so Derrida avers, that sustains greater imperatives than that accorded to the revolution in the work of writers with political pretensions. By way of contrast, Martin Heidegger's appeal to revolutionary action will be set beside the very different appeal of Mikhail Bakunin.

## On suspicions concerning the Revolution

Derrida has twice written on Democracy: *The Ends of Man* of 1968 and *La démocratie ajournée* of 1989 (published in full in 1991). 1968 has become known for 'les événements de mai'; the year Derrida saw the universities "invaded by the forces of social order" at the rector's instigation [EM 135]. *La démocratie ajournée* originally marked the bicentennial of the French Revolution. Both essays have significant dates. However, revolution remains, only, an undercurrent. Both essays insist that to make an issue of Democracy is to distinguish a form of Government. A form that, itself, distinguishes the liberal West'. As Derrida understands the 'form' of democracy, he intends that which guarantees the right of response. For Derrida, to ask about the 'form' is to ask about the conditions for the possibility of response<sup>2</sup>.

Derrida regards enfranchisement as a right, the 'form' of democracy ensures this Right. Democracy is formally distinguished as it raises the issue of representation; particular responses become issues in a general forum as they are 'represented' for the sake of the forum. Derrida also sees this benefit in terms of a duty, stating that the formal conditions of Democracy ought to excite a commitment to the questioning of any given representation, even the questioning of Democracy itself:

*"To take responsibility, is that not primarily to attempt to reconsider it? A philosophical and political task, theoretical and practical, a difficult but also dangerous task because it risks touching the concept of representation itself, the 'idea of representatives' that Rousseau called 'modern'. But is it not the responsibility of a democrat to think the axioms or the foundations of democracy?"* [DA 112]<sup>3</sup>

Here, the imperatives of Democracy are associated with Rousseau's work and, as Derrida also states, with revolutionary enthusiasms. He is not, however, simply binding the issue of representation to that of insurrection. Derrida also considers the Kantian revolution; an event taken to be synonymous with the *Enlightenment*. He is doing so, he states, from a position of "*post-revolutionary modernity*"<sup>4</sup>; as though the form of democracy proceeded from a past event. Thus, Derrida's appeal to a revolution is problematic. It could not *primarily* be a violent break. It seems, rather, to concern a way of thinking and one developed, at least in Derrida's *post-revolutionary* account, through Franco-German relations. Aside from the issue of Democracy, the question of Franco-German relations distinguishes both *La démocratie ajournée* and *The Ends of Man*. If this relation is held to be the central one for the Enlightenment or for Democracy, there is a danger of forgetting other voices. The philosopher F A Hayek is vociferous on this point:

*"It is always misleading to label an age by a name which suggests that it was ruled by a common set of ideas. It particularly falsifies the picture if we do this for a period which was in such a state of ferment as was the eighteenth century. To lump together under the name of 'Enlightenment' (or Aufklärung) the French philosophers from Voltaire to Condorcet on the one hand, and the Scottish and English thinkers from Mandeville through Hume and Adam Smith to Edmund Burke on the other, is to gloss over differences which for the influence of these men on the next century were much more important than any superficial similarity."* [Hayek, p. 335]<sup>5</sup>

Hayek's paper is a resumé of Hume's legal philosophy and its uneven influence. He is at his most vehement when he considers Hume's failure to influence Franco-German thought. In the French vision of democracy, Hayek detects an autocratic slant he later terms "*totalitarian democracy*" [Hayek, p. 359]. This blot upon the age of Enlightenment amounts to the mark of Hume's obliteration.

"The habit of speaking of the *Aufklärung* as if it represented a homogenous body of ideas is nowhere so strong as it is in Germany, and there is a definite reason for this. But the reason which has led to this view of eighteenth century thought has also had very grave and, in my view, regrettable consequences. This reason is that the English ideas of the time (which were, of course, mainly expounded by Scotsmen - but I cannot rid myself of the habit of saying English when I mean British) became known in Germany largely through French intermediaries and in French interpretations - and often misinterpretations. It appears to me to be one of the great tragedies of intellectual and political history that thus the great ideals of political freedom became known on the Continent almost exclusively in the form in which the French, a people who had never known liberty, interpreted traditions, institutions and ideals which derived from an entirely different intellectual and political climate. They did this in a spirit of constructivist intellectualism, which I shall briefly call rationalism, a spirit which was thoroughly congenial to the atmosphere of an absolute state which endeavored to design a new centralized structure of government, but entirely alien to the older tradition which ultimately was preserved only in Britain." [Hayek, p.336]

Hayek's account of Franco-German relations might be used to charge Derrida with implicit prejudice; something to which Derrida is sensitive<sup>6</sup>. Despite his insistence upon Franco-German relations, Derrida manages to echo Hayek's concern. *The Ends of Man* looks at the way German existentialism was systematically mistranslated into French; an event or mis-event that blended into a specifically French strain of post-war philosophy. Derrida is not treating a historical event in a continuous or seamless way. Like Hayek, with his account of the Continental erasure of a thought preserved only in Britain (via Scotland, as it is all but erased by Britain), Derrida takes an interest in the way secret or suppressed currents are developed in other situations.

However, if Hayek is used as the basis of a possible indictment, Derrida can be seen to exploit certain prejudices. Firstly, Derrida is appealing to 'form' in an imperious and, by Hayek's standards,

rationalist manner. Democracy, as the formal instantiation of the right of response is, in *La démocratie ajournée*, apparently guaranteed by some kind of revolution; as though the authority of Democracy derived from the possibility of constructing its formal edifice from scratch. Secondly, Derrida treats democratic liberties as a positive benefit, in *La démocratie ajournée* as the positive effect of Rousseau's influence. Hayek also treats Democracy, in its rationalist guise, as an enthusiasm fired by Rousseau; he, however, derides both Rousseau and the kinds of liberation offered by formally rational structures<sup>7</sup>:

*"the emotionally unstable, unaccountable and half-mad idealist ... it was Rousseau and not Hume who fired the enthusiasm of the successive revolutions which created modern government on the Continent"*. [Hayek, p. 358]

Hayek credits Hume with the insight that:

*"the greatest political goods, peace, liberty, and justice, were in their essence negative, a protection against injury rather than positive gifts."* [Hayek, p. 359].

A negative 'advantage' should not be misunderstood. Hayek, quoting Hume, insists that an active principle cannot be founded on an inactive one [Hayek, p. 344]; the 'negative' could not found positive enthusiasms. Rather, apparently inactive dictums corral or temper over-bearing enthusiasms; the weaker in a society come to be protected as a society begins to be laid out upon weaker lines, around (negative) formal dictums and legal institutions; specifically, around common, secular magistrates rather than around Sovereignty or its simulacrum in the absolutely magisterial personage of a King. Hayek's claim is that *nothing* positive accrues to the state through its institutions; its formal edifices. Certainly not, as Hegel would argue, through the

*aufhebung* of the 'negative'<sup>8</sup>. Hayek's argument is that the State is weakened (even removed, in the state-nationalist sense) by its supposed 'power' structures, not enriched. This would mean, as Hayek seems to have calculated, that it is as redundant to criticise the power of institutions as to affirm them. Whilst Hayek implicitly recognises the legitimacy of a debate that centres upon the question of what is weaker and what is stronger within a state, he argues State power is neither secured nor liberalised through taking its formal attributes (its institutions) as representative of State strength. Power, what is effective in or throughout a State, lies in the processes that communicate, publicise or prosecute the interests and initiatives of more or less weaker figures. The Conclusion to this thesis will look in more detail at this liberal argument; specifically, as it may be cast in terms of the weak and the strong. Here at least, Hayek shows the weakness of the state is by no means terminal. It has become an advantage<sup>9</sup>.

Hayek's attack on Franco-German thought springs from a deep distrust of the tradition trusting in the 'revolutionary' aspect of a reforming Rationality. For Hayek, it is a massive confidence trick to have ever believed that the 'past' of an institution is the sort of effect that may be reformulated anew or, even, overturned, a dangerous piece of foolishness that ends with 'totalitarian democracy'; the belief that the State embodies Reason<sup>10</sup>. Hayek argues institutions are "*grown institutions*"; meaning (paradoxically), they develop artificially and obliquely to personal interests as *current* expressions of social desires. However, as this idea of the growth or, better, the spread of the 'artificial' might be emphasised, so Hayek would communicate with a Continental tradition. The Humean term 'artifice' is the word Kant's

'syntheses' translates. When Kant asks: "*How are synthetic a priori judgements possible*", he has found they already are possible; they are the currency of the *commercium* of experience described throughout the first half of his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant's *Critique* attempts to trace such artifices, to mark them in their possibility and the variety of their functions. As Hayek's 'Humean' tradition is fed through Kant's critique, it might still not depend upon rational constructions. It has, however, come to insist upon showing that Rational enthusiasms and pretensions might be interrupted, or reduced to near-nonsense, by intra-social reflection (i.e. by *critique*: by discourse and communication), as the second half of the *Critique of Pure Reason* shows''. The passage of 'artifices', in every sense (differing terms, translated terms, relations between differences), amounts to a wide and loose social ethos. It does so in two ways: both as a philosophical tradition and an ongoing process. Hayek exemplifies both these effects; a 'British tradition' that includes Kant (and *émigrés* like Hayek) and the persistent effect of this trend to have made a mockery of rationalist pretensions. *Is this not a strength? A strength of weakness?* The term 'artifice' comes to represent the advantage Hayek stresses. Derrida's point, fortuitously, centres upon the way in which the artificial character of developing institutions comes to represent a peculiarly modern advantage. Even, a revolutionary advantage. Speaking of *les événements* he recently said:

"Through both the spontaneity and a certain naturalistic utopianism we undoubtedly became aware of the artificial, artefactual character of the institution. Certainly, we did not need to wait for 1968 to know this - but perhaps, rather, to come to a more practical, more effective awareness: ... since these non-natural, incorporated, historical institutions no longer worked, we no longer found them incorporated at all, incorporated in Right, legitimated. One should add to this the fact that the media and with it the whole of culture took on the forms and dimensions of a total mutation, even as regards the production of the events of 1968. This liberated all kinds

*of questions upon the legitimacy and the origin of knowledge: of assent, of evaluation, of publication, of communication etc."*<sup>12</sup>

Derrida describes an event which finds institutions provoke neither respect nor paranoia. They are not overpowering but, in some sense, weakened. Derrida speculates this realisation takes a revolution, like the events of 1968. It is clearly, however, not a revolution *as such*. Rather, it is the presentiment that institutions have always already been weakened; in some sense, they are *post-revolutionary*. Here Derrida suggests another sense of revolution, one *only* reminiscent of violent insurrection or the philosophical insurrection frequently represented by Kant. That is, Derrida speaks of a revolution that has already produced a shock-wave, a variation, a realisation that initiatives occur in a forensic arena of assent, evaluation, publication *et cetera*.

The first quotation of this section asks: "Is it not the responsibility of a democrat to think the axioms or the foundations of democracy?" Which is to say, it is not something that *ought* to be done, but already a source of disquiet. How might a sense of unease surround the fact that society is not governed through or by a rational 'Form' but, rather, through forms of oblique, discursive relations? How have such anxieties been communicated as though they were discursive issues; that is, forensic issues? It is not a question of a definite revolution, but of the form of *post-revolutionary* uncertainty. Here, despite his residual emphasis on revolution, Derrida is close to Hayek. Certainly, for instance, in that because the issue of Government could provoke either one reaction or another (affirmation or criticism) there is no question of one side finally surmounting the other. A theme of both The

*Ends of Man* and *La démocratie ajournée* is that common political issues are as easily emphasised by the right as by the left and so imply a common or commonly fought over political ground'<sup>3</sup>. However, Derrida more closely resembles Hayek in that social relations cannot be relieved by politically loaded structures. Institutions provoke commitment only to the extent they are both artificial and diversionary; which is to say, they provoke a questioning commitment or a sense of unease.

Hayek has more to say on the conditions for the possibility of any initiative in this artificial milieu; he is also an economist. Derrida too insists economics is the milieu of any venture or any issue. Speaking of the 'democratic' form of the forum of international philosophy in *The Ends of Man*, he accentuates "*the promised complicity of a common element ... the representation of a certain transparent ether*" [EM 132]; a complicity he understands as economical. The economic forum is clearly not a place of stable and equitable exchanges, the Kantian 'tribunal' of Pure Reason where the claims of reason are whittled down through rational analysis'<sup>4</sup>. It is not the self-same forum persisting throughout any discussion. However, in its artifices or in the development of different issues, it is nothing other than a common medium. There is a curious disjunction here: the forum is not the same for everyone but is nothing other than similar for every participant. In its common representation, it might be said to be 'democratic' if a paranthetic style could show the uncertainty of this form. Derrida, however, believes the benefits of this element, the promise that more or less discrete possibilities might be profitably broadcast, is enframed "*outside of political or corporative representations*" ["*en dehors des représentations politiques ou corporatives*". DA 108]. Which is to say, it is represented

away from a Political structure, in another kind of milieu. Specifically, it is enframed as the Liberty of the Press (DA 108). Above, in speaking of *les événements*, Derrida raises the issue of the Media as a mutation. *La démocratie ajournée* speaks of a techno-economic mutation of the Media. The 'adjournments' of the title refer to the kinds of artificial relations characterising the loose, weak ethos of an economy; i.e. a distorting delay accompanying the referring and deferring of differences. It also, however, refers to journals and to the communications Media, the formal representation of this new advantage.

In short, economic processes are everywhere, even to the point their mutant power can be taken as a Political power; insofar as they have come to represent the articulation of public opinion. After considering the place and the effects - the 'economy' - of 'public opinion', it will be necessary to ask again why Derrida stresses the ubiquitous memory of a revolution. It will be found that Derrida is stressing a symptom akin to Revolution; a presentiment that something new has occurred, as something like a Political order has been passed over. That something unwieldy like a derelict institution has been jettisoned. Finally, a sense that once important issues have sunk into silence as public opinion, in its techno-economic mutation, passes lightly over everything.

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On the indifference of post-revolutionary modernity  
and its economic articulation

The Ends of Man and La démocratie ajournée trace the move from a Political ideal, a form of government, into the discursive milieu termed an economy; *a move from politics into economics*, from one supposition upon power into another, at once vague, weakened and less easily formulable. In The Ends of Man this move frames the problem of Democracy as a distinction of the West. Even as Derrida begins by placing his accent on "*form no less than on democracy*" (EM 134), he closes by framing this problem in terms of economics; opening and closing upon the 'West'<sup>5</sup>. La démocratie ajournée treats economics with more suspicion, as a threat to democracy; warning of its "depoliticising" power. Nonetheless, as both papers move away from a notion of the Political, their respective differences are differences within the same movement; an economic movement. As La démocratie ajournée states,

*"It is necessary to maintain a formal rigour, without which no Right is protected, and so to invent more finite institutions, a legislation more differentiated, better adjusted to the techno-economic mutations of the 'free-market'."* [DA 115]<sup>6</sup>

Derrida recognises that only in economics, within its "deviating topology" ["Topologie déroutante." DA 105], could politics still be an issue. It is here the question of political rights will have been both proposed and threatened. What, then, might Derrida mean by 'maintain' or 'protect', as the ability to police Rights cannot be attributed to Political institutions in the way that a critical or conservative philosophy is accustomed to account for political power. If the role of

any institution is articulated by virtue of economics, the institution will not be 'of' Politics but, rather, of the economy as the milieu of all relations; *formal or otherwise*. Why, then, when Derrida speaks of the need to police the market, would he wish to *invent*, let alone *maintain*, something already finite as regards economics? Why reserve the idea of an institution, or linger over an already redundant idea?

The Ends of Man exploits the idea of a "*reserve*" [EM 133], a term intended to broach the idea of what philosophy habitually strives to maintain. The 'capital' to which philosophy aspires. In political philosophy the 'object' of commitment, the subject of the political sciences, would be the socio-political body; a corpus whose integrity is revered as an institution. Derrida implicitly regards such 'reserves' as inhibiting factors. As the title of The Ends of Man implies, such an object represents an 'end' for its proposer; a concrete social body, a proper form of life. For Derrida, the issue 'represented' as politically or ethically desirable redounds upon an idea of 'Presence': an original or eternal 'Present' or an object with a futural tense whose imminent presence only accidentally depends upon its re-presentation in debate. For Derrida, this hypostatisation of 'presence' holds as true for revolutionary thinkers as conservatives. The 'reserve' codes all desires. For Derrida it is never simply a question of jettisoning all reserves. In political thought he criticises a view he terms '*negative politology*'; the view denying that any expression calls for a form of political commitment. Derrida regards this latter strategy as being symmetrically complicitous with its opposite; an attack upon every political representation in careless abandonment to the real terrors of political thought in its death as in its life. In either case, the end of

representation has been predetermined. This leads to a certain blindness, their opposition fails to broach the slighter nuances and differences apparent in debate. In their different kinds of faith, they remain indifferent to discursive currents they nevertheless depend upon:

*"Thus the god of a negative politology may not take the sign of life, of its great day, without a certain **medium**. The **everyday** rhythm, which is essential to it, supposes the massive diffusion of something like a **daily paper**." [DA 106]<sup>7</sup>*

Whatever is said in the end, of the life or death of politology, the underlying assumptions or 'reserve' remains stable. Thus, from the variety of possible critical representations of political forms, Derrida abstracts and opposes the tendency towards destruction promoted in nihilism to the concentration of the Political corpus proposed by totalitarianism. Whilst emphasising that such political 'representations' can only become an issue in the 'element' of public opinion, he insists the 'everyday' currents of this milieu will not tend towards the abstract aims proposed by these warring factions. Such proposals, finally, fail to control 'the massive diffusion' Derrida associates, here, with the power of the media. Hence, Derrida's apparent indifference; the great revolutionary oppositions have become a dead letter. This indifference belongs to the everyday milieu and, as will be seen, to the techno-economic mutations, exemplified by the media, that exploits this indifference. *La démocratie ajournée* lingers over the 'indifference' of any reserve, as over its apparent redundancy:

*"What then becomes of this pool [réserve] of experience, of evaluation and even of determination (styles, tastes, mores) which remains unrelieved by judgement (yes or no) and by representation, in all the senses of this word?" [DA 110]<sup>8</sup>*

The 'reserve' has become a more or less redundant issue, not only in classical revolutionary situations but also around the question of democratic choice (*yes or no*). Derrida's account of the post-revolutionary age, then, is uncomfortable in its indifference to the dawn or the ends of great oppositional positions. He urges caution (*réserve*) as it is in caution, alone, that the redundancy of these older reserves continues to be an issue. This new sense of post-revolutionary modernity recognises the Public is no longer at stake in the accepted way. This does not mean it should be surrendered. As has been seen, Hayek insists the '*enthusiasm of the successive revolutions which created modern government*' should be regarded with suspicion. Derrida cautiously reads these past events in the light of stranger or more diffuse enthusiasms than the idea of '*modern government*' has allowed for, or expressed reservations against. In a similar way to Hayek, Derrida treats the object of suspicion, modern government, as a product of the metaphysical philosophy of France and of Germany. Within the unfolding of an economic milieu it is found that '*modern government*', as the proper representative form for the Public, does not inspire commitment. The similarities between Hayek and Derrida may, then, be amplified. Derrida however, closer to a Franco-German relation, is less prone to abandon the '*metaphysical reserve*'. He attempts to understand in what way, and by virtue of what processes, it might seem a dead issue.

Derrida's '*réserve*' seems irreducible to Hayek's piece; it tempers suspicion with unease, a real sense that the move from Politics into Economics has entrained a process of '*depoliticisation*'. Exercised by a disquiet that escapes Hayek, Derrida introduces this quiet terror into his analysis of indifference. A terror marking, even inhibiting, the

unfolding of indifference. Both *The Ends of Man* and *La démocratie ajournée* talk of risks and dangers. In *The Ends of Man* Derrida contrasts the risk of "autism" with a brutal and blind thirst for novelties; Brutal in its aptitude for discontinuous movement, Blind to the way themes are regulated or repeated in the economy of this element'<sup>9</sup>. Thus, the indifference of autism is contrasted with the risk of becoming blindly indifferent to the artifices of an economy. In *La démocratie ajournée* Derrida evokes 'depoliticisation' in a similar way: political philosophy is mute whilst the Public remains addicted to novelties, to 'passive consumerism' [DA 121]; insistently identifying with everything hyped in an economy in an "accelerating cycle" [DA 118]. Despite a distance of twenty years, these two kinds of depoliticisation bring Derrida's separate papers on Democracy together. On the one hand, the formation of silent or autistic groups either not listening to, or not being reached within, the wiles of any economy. On the other, a blindness failing to express any 'réserve' in its violently accelerating flight. In his attempt to think risks or 'liberties', Derrida is drawn to relate these two instances of indifference. This can be thought through the relation between commitment and expression. Specifically, the necessary commitment to forensic communication and the possible expression communicating a difference or new issue to a forum. As autism is *inexpressive*, so blind addiction remains *uncommitted*, despite its wild flight after every new venture. As always the question concerns the conditions *as well as* the possibilities of communicative relations; the necessary condition of an open forum (as an object of commitment), and the possible chance of a new opening (as the expression of a new venture). As Derrida insists; the problem is one of the necessity (the condition) *and* the risk (the possibility) of any programme.

There is a clear similarity between Ecclesiastes and The Ends of Man, as they work towards, and react to, a forum of general communication: a public space. Which is to say, they both maintain the 'forum' as a kind of essential fall-back position or common denominator in every kind of communication. However, more crucially if less obviously, they each attempt to articulate the way an issue becomes significant or interesting within such a forum. In each work, the implication is that a real sense of the public space (in its general extent) and of public issues (in general, or in every eventuality) are only maintained so long as a certain disquiet inflects the communication of any issue; contributing to a sense of necessity or exigency in every issue risked. Both Ecclesiastes and The Ends of Man come to identify the necessity of the possible (of a risk) with an ambiguous presentiment of finality. Depoliticisation maybe infinite, but the question of what is elided in such a process continues to be insistant, exhaustive and finite (determinable). Here, Ecclesiastes insists upon Death - upon its certainty and its possibility - as Derrida alludes to death insofar as it might represent The Ends of Man. The idea of the already exhausted risk informs the mournful demeanour of much of Derrida's work, particularly his reappraisal of the redundancy of Revolution's promise in the post-revolutionary age. La démocratie ajournée states:

*"The 'liberty of the press' is the most precious benefit of democracy but ... this fundamental 'liberty' remains to be invented. Each day. At least. And democracy with it." [114]<sup>20</sup>*

The exhaustion of this 'liberty' occurs through economics; as economics allows for the possibility of the Media's exploitation of its liberty. However, as Derrida's political papers insist that the move away from the Political is a movement within economics, so he detects in

Economics an insistant appreciation of the urgency of a public problem; the problem of how competing possibilities might be broached under general and social conditions. As Ecclesiastes sought to associate the urgency of this problem, as an imperative, with mourning, so Derrida insinuates a sense of quiet unease into otherwise indifferent economic formulas. His treatment of economics is intended to frame the idea of 'public opinion', as such an idea anticipates both the conditions for the possibility of a public forum and its exhaustion:

*"It is there that we may interrogate the authority of public opinion - not in its restrained content, but in its form of pre-electoral judgement". [DA 110]<sup>21</sup>*

Here, Derrida identifies the way he makes an issue of finitude with a form of 'pre-electoral judgement'. Which is to say, even as the freedom of the press continues to exhaust its right to take 'liberties', there remains a 'pre-electoral' sense of 'reserve' (cautious suspicion). A moment of anxiety standing in relief against indifference, without actually having been relieved. Such 'reservations' might express a respite (adjournment) from relentless indifference. However, this trace of caution cannot be determined by reference to the Political (to the proper 'form' of judgement), insofar as it is articulated by virtue of economics rather than Politics; as an issue, it anticipates the political whilst being uncomfortable only as regards economics. The day of judgement is, as ever, found to have been delayed or distorted but this time through a lapse which also distorts the economic scene. Derrida is not reifying this lapse from indifference. He is certainly not treating post-revolutionary indifference as though it had decided upon a *form* of respite. Rather, he is treating a moment of unrelieved anticipation as a symptom; as a symptom anticipates a decision without being reducible to

it. A symptom marks a sense of disquiet, not a diagnosis. Such symptoms cannot be coded as being 'for' or 'against' the status quo; for conservation or for change. Derrida believes the risks or dangers of liberty are, here, again fermented. It is here he makes a profession:

*"of analysing, without respite, the historical determinations: those which, in 1989, may be delimited and those which may not be." (DA 112-113)<sup>22</sup>*

This is *Deconstruction*, an 'economics' in which the necessity of mutual commitment and the possibility of expression, as these factors are entailed by a forensic form, are strained to the point of distraction. In this distraction, economics begins to express symptoms not yet coded in the the final exhaustion of the Political forum; symptoms that cannot be made to refer simply to the end of Politics. Here, Derrida continues what he sees as the exercise of formal rigour which, if not the rigour of the 'ecclesiastical' court, is neither at home in, nor a respite from, the Market. Here, Derrida aims to communicate the variety of distracting differences, to note how symptoms of public life become issues in their variety rather than in their univocity (i.e. univocally referring to a single form). As Hayek says, the philosophers of the Enlightenment become interesting through their differences; they cannot be represented by a common set of ideas. For Derrida, the question is how differences might be of interest in the absence of commonality; differences which have become almost universally compelling and - more importantly - those whose attractions still eludes analysis.

In metaphysics, Derrida avers, 'differences' are taken as symmetrical; i.e. as mutually supportive and, hence, as exchangeable. For instance, the impetus towards conservation highlights a similar issue as

the impetus towards change. For Derrida, such a view works at the expense of the non-symmetrical or minutely distracting issue. He will not, then, reinvest in the common position as though it were the reserve of every position. There is no elevated position, distinguishable only from its symmetrical opposite, which represents the most desirable object or end. It is not that the desire for an object confers a mark of distinction upon that object. It is wholly different; *objects differentiate desire*. The variety of exchangeable issues in any economy - the variety of analogous commodities, coins, issues etc. - articulate an 'agon' where a variety of desires are in play. The ends of Man are found to be uneven, different and differentially compelling. In consequence, if these issues are no longer of the Political, in its Presence or integrity, they are not *simply* depoliticised. They remain different and compelling; set in relief against a sea of indifference. Some interests may seem both commonly and supremely desirable, but these could never afford a respite from the uncommon attraction of objects that escape all sense of community.

If Hayek's disgust at Franco-German misreadings of Hume's providence could fuel an indictment of continental thought, it is because of the way they symptomise a disquiet that could never be separated from, or relieved within, a process which trades on distortions. In accounting for such issues, it is not a question of finding for one position over another; for Britain against a Franco-German complex. It is, for instance, clear that both Hayek and Derrida have common sympathies. Derrida's insistence on the excitement or the diversions of the economic field are everywhere tinged with the idea that insurrectionary fervour was not only misplaced but, simply, redundant. Likewise, Hayek regards

the revolutionary enthusiasms of Europe as a kind of impotence. He quotes Hume to the effect that where Reason might claim a revolutionary edge, there "*reason of itself is utterly impotent*" [Hayek p. 343]. This might be compared with Derrida's detection of 'autism'. This impotence, however, is said to have obliterated a British tradition; how could a trend become both dominant *and* impotent? Here, there is less an opposition between Hayek and Derrida as the heightening of a disquiet to which Hayek *also* attests; as he communicates in disquiet with Derrida.

Hayek argued that something British is obliterated in Europe. It will be seen that the way a repressed interest returns as an issue is more disquieting than a simple recovery of a lost object, or a promising reserve: a simple recovery of an alien or "*older tradition which ultimately was preserved only in Britain*" [Hayek p. 336]. In effect, 'Britain', or the mood of suspicious reserve associated with Britain, is a symptom articulated by virtue of global economic processes. This amounts to a final sense of the *Post-revolutionary*. If the variety of issues which formally regulate or articulate an economy are not simply indifferent or analogous, if the British character is peculiarly distressing and unnatural, then Britain's tradition could not yet be identified with Britain. Which is to say, it must also be un-British, as it cannot be determined according to a recognised Political entity termed 'Britain'. Being other to Politics, it must be economic; i.e. 'something' articulated by virtue of economic relations. It is this anticipated 'something' that attracts Derrida; and to which his forensic regard attaches as to a symptom.

If, in the wake of supposedly seismic and revolutionary decisions, post-revolutionary modernity fails to offer any respite from this 'deviating topology' (not even the respite of indifference), what can be said of the 'form' of anticipation? for instance, the anticipation of an inhibited British presence? How might a political region like 'Britain' be anticipated in its 'Form', rather than in its restrained or inhibited content? It will be seen that this form of anticipation could not refer directly to a nebulous political entity but, instead, to a movement of 'depoliticisation' which, in its 'form', could no longer be regarded with indifference. For instance, Derrida approaches Jewishness by reference to the form of Law, as judaic law distinguishes the jews; but only insofar as this 'law' articulates a distinction in an intra-national economy, *not* as it represents a determined Political set.

No doubt, Derrida represents modernity as 'post-revolutionary' because France, alongside Continental Europe, has a history of Revolution. It is also, however, because the revolutionary aim - a form of enfranchisement, which would be nothing other than the form of democracy - represents no post-revolutionary respite. No single event finally settles the question of political liberty, or the taking of liberties. The last section of this introduction will deal with the ways in which a revolution remains an object of appeal, the way in which this appeal might lapse into indifference, and finally with the symptoms which distract Derrida's analyses in a way that confounds any revolutionary fervour.

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On two kinds of indifference (Bakunin and Heidegger) and  
the law which anticipates each with suspicion

The Ends of Man and La démocratie ajournée look back to the revolutions of 1798 and 1968, as they analyse the form of democracy; a 'form' which allows for the 'right of response' [DA 121]. After drawing attention to the rights of the colloquial voice, The Ends of Man speaks of '*anonymous necessity*'; a communication without, even, colloquial status. La démocratie ajournée looks at the minority appeal of 'samizdats'. If, in principle, democracy already anticipates such voices, is it necessary to speak of revolution at all? let alone credit it with a preeminent role in the foundation of democracy? The problem, of course, lies in the way such responses might be marginalised, even ignored. Here, at least, Revolution might represent both democracy's failures and a sense of legitimate suspicion of democracy.

The idea that democracy arrives with a revolution might have distinguished Derrida from Hayek. In fact, Derrida's suspicion of revolution brings him closer to Hayek. Derrida and Hayek communicate, in suspicion, even when Hayek believes the political forms sanctioned through Franco-German relations are impotent. Where the revolution is believed to be instantiated, there a kind of illusion is in force. But where, exactly? Derrida and Hayek communicate in an intra-national space. If their suspicions are everywhere, so are the illusions against which suspicion cautions; so, equally, are all the forms of impotence and indifference broached by their caution. Rather than remain fixated upon

the Political, Derrida concentrates on this 'non-space' where the relation between nationalities are articulated. The Ends of Man looks at the space of an international colloquium, where the colloquial is respected insofar as the form of debate entails the "raising and respecting of differences" [EM 132]. La démocratie ajournée is similarly directed at a milieu living outside of Government or its representative forms. An international space, but also an economic medium: The West, in its economy. Here, the revolution will never, originally or ever, have provided a concrete advantage to a specific faction. Neither to a specific country, nor to a determined sympathy. Revolution could never provide a respite from distraction or from coercion. Thoroughly invested with suspicion, revolution remains a kind of distracting disquiet; unrelieved in the public milieu. Where, other than in a Public forum, could the concept of an 'advantage' or a 'respite' become an issue?

Hayek is known as a neo-classicist. If classicism constructs a communications forum where - *in principle*, or under some 'form' of law - new responses can begin to articulate different risks, Derrida is also a neo-classicist. If a law can be presented as an advantage (to the public, to the ruling party, or as a weapon wielded by a specific vanguard) it is because the law, or the rule of law, is open to bids. It has not proscribed in favour of any interest, nor has it determined or dominated any specific site. The law, in its uneasy variety, anticipates variety before it is enforced; i.e. the law conveys the excitement of an imperative through its diversity rather than its directives. Thus, if it is asked, what are the conditions for the possibility of the milieu of Public Opinion (given that, in its deconstructions, it remains a manifold of competing possibilities: or an 'agon') no single revolution could be

ventured as its unifying condition. The law is a negative advantage; it promises no security, nor any clear advantage.

A traditionally enlightened position holds that the rule of law is the liberation from over-ruling enthusiasms. Derrida simply reformulates this tradition but does so incessantly; continually recasting Democracy. Hence, his extraordinary emphasis upon the possibility of the anonymous or the alien. Whilst his interests, always, are reminiscent of the 'classical' philosophy of the Enlightenment, they emerge - always - out of a sense of confused insecurity. As has been seen, Derrida never waivers from a commitment to what remains formally rigorous in a question, which remains a Classical motif. Nor, does he waiver in his suspicion of the grounding and the formation of this form: "*Everyday. At least. And democracy with it.*"

Derrida holds that the concept of public opinion as a "*modern artefact*" [DA 107] could not be taken seriously without the parliamentary model of democracy but also, and more especially, without the concept of representative opinion outside of political representation. In *La démocratie ajourée*, this effect is ascribed to article IX of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man: the representation of free speech in the freedom of the press [DA 108]. It is this '*outside of*' that captivates Derrida. He treats the classical arena as an effect of revolution but places his emphasis upon the moment when such an arena is moved or swayed in non-obvious ways: *in some way, outside of the model of government promising direct representation under a rational form*. The focus, here, is upon the milieu of Public Opinion as the milieu of relations between differences. If this

milieu originates with a revolution, such a 'revolution' could only chimerically or obliquely be attributed to a specific political formations. The milieu of differences, represented as a 'Public' outside of any rational structure, confounds even as it ventures a unifying event, a common cause, a popular will, or any other revolutionary motif. We, in the sense of 'we the public', are '*post-revolutionary*'; the pronoun had no meaning before the vague recollection of 'our' arrival as a representative body<sup>23</sup>. Derrida's point, here, is that a 'recollection' that resists, ever, being traced back onto a 'formal' structure holds out the possibility of utterly reformulating the classical conditions of the Enlightenment; i.e. that which is offered as its determining condition or 'law'. This sense of the law, one produced obliquely as it communicates outside of any definite structure, is apparent in The Ends of Man. There it is found that anything ventured as an issue - even a revolutionary issue - in a particular regional discourse (in for instance, the philosophy of France or of Germany) is both confounded and represented anew in the alchemy of the intra-national<sup>24</sup>. Here, to evoke a 'law' would be to refer to a law which enables international communication. Which is to say, a law that *enables* rather than *determines* discourse.

Before considering Derrida's concept of the law and the enablement of the various discrete voices likened to samizdats, this thesis will consider the worst possibilities of a milieu or non-space that elides any Political form. Although the possibility exists for reformulating Democracy, Hayek and Derrida converge upon the fear of Democracy's eclipse. In Derrida's instance, upon the fear that the reification of public freedom as the 'freedom of the press' has become a 'techno-economic mutation' threatening liberty. In Hayek's case, that liberty is

threatened through 'totalitarian democracy'. Both effects can be associated with the European Democratic tradition and its tradition of violence and indifference. The rhetoric of Democracy is comfortable with violence, despite the near universal approval Democracy now enjoys. Below, the revolutionary aspirations of Mikhail Bakunin will be compared with the very different aspirations of Martin Heidegger. It will be seen that whilst Bakunin exemplifies one kind of indifference - a reckless disregard for any issue - Heidegger exemplifies another. Heidegger's insistence upon national differences includes an impotent inability to question the variety of differential relations.

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Mikhail Bakunin's *The Reaction in Germany: a fragment from a Frenchman* casually exploits mindless indifference. This work, which apparently details the oppositions facing nascent Democrats, was published in the left-hegelian *Deutsche Jahrbücher* between October 17 and 21, 1842. Bakunin signed it *Jules Blyssard* and, for a time, it was taken as the work of a Frenchman. From the first sentence it resonates with the evocations of the 'day' highlighted in Derrida's text: "*Freedom, the realisation of freedom: who can deny that this Word today stands at the head of the agenda [Tagesordnung: day's order] of history?*"<sup>25</sup>. Bakunin's paper is both a genuine Samizdat, and a disingenuous elaboration of Franco-German relations. There are, however, other vague similarities between *The Reaction in Germany* and Derrida's evocation of Revolution's day. Firstly, Bakunin insists that no recognised position could now inspire commitment. Secondly, he states that whilst the day of Democracy is everywhere expressed, no position could ever be equal to it. Unlike Derrida, he does not come to affirm the uncertainties of such

expressions or the communications they might imply, he simply pursues uncertainty with abandon. Bakunin's Democratic enthusiasm is characterised by a contempt for any current position. This would extend even to 'Democratic' positions. However, Bakunin does not see Democracy as one position amongst others but the current appearance of a revolutionary spirit. He notes that the demands of the most poverty-stricken have been recognised in theory, but also that no theoretical or legal redress is possible. In consequence, he urges the *"restless and ruthless annihilation of every positively existing thing."* This, he holds, is necessary. The pleasure of destruction is something no formal position could hope to recognise, or frame. His evocation of violent pleasures, is presented as a surrender to the alien currents of revolution which:

*"derive from new sources quite unknown to us and develop and diffuse themselves in silence ... All peoples and all men are filled with a kind of premonition, and everyone whose vital organs are not paralysed faces with shuddering expectation the approaching future which will speak out the redeeming Word. ..*

*"Let us therefore trust the eternal Spirit which destroys and annihilates only because it is the unfathomable and eternally creative source of all life. The passion for destruction is a creative passion, too." [Bakunin p. 406]*

This seems a pure statement of Nihilism. Where Bakunin still commands a reputation it is as Europe's worst philosopher. His contemporary reputation, although far greater, tended to the opinion that he overcame his natural disingenuity only through his commitment to terrorism<sup>26</sup>. It will be seen that Bakunin does not simply fulfill Derrida's remarks on the 'god' nihilism ventures only through *"a certain medium. ... something like a daily paper"*. He revels in something exactly like a daily paper. The paper runs:

*"Freedom, the realisation of freedom: who can deny that this Word today stands at the head of the agenda of history? Friend and foe must admit it; indeed, no one dares openly and fearlessly to profess that he is an enemy of freedom. But the expression, the profession, does not make the reality, as the Gospel well knows. Unfortunately, there is still a multitude of people who in fact, in their innermost hearts, do not believe in freedom ...*

*There is no profit in speaking with these people: they were never serious about freedom and freedom was never for them a religion which offers the greatest pleasures and the highest bliss only by means of the most extreme conflict, of the bitterest griefs, and of complete, unconditional self-denial."* [Bakunin p. 385]

The way Bakunin exploits both this medium, and the 'redeeming word' which seems so much like a theistic day of judgement, remains compelling. What is clear is that Bakunin recognises the relations between commitment and expression (necessity and possibility), and between Duty and Freedom (responsibility and enfranchisement). He, however, abandons this relation. To be sure, he insists freedom will only be won through grief. This echoes his earlier suggestion, drawn from the Gospel, that the expression and the commitment *must* be thought together; an imperative or responsibility that frames the exigencies behind any attempt to voice the liberating word: no pain, no gain. However, if he holds this to be an imperative, it is one he casually ignores. *Bakunin's point is that no attempt to communicate is worthwhile.* He exploits the distance between commitment and expression: his expressions are wild and deceitful, his commitment is to nothing but destruction. Bakunin abandons the imperatives of forensic communication. Of those who cling to positions, in a parody of conciliation, he approves their derelict world (*"one lives so prettily and comfortably in these ruins, in this irrational rococo world whose air is as healthful for our consumptive souls as the air of a cow barn is for consumptive bodies"* Bakunin p. 399) whilst insisting, of these people, one cannot speak with them.

This refusal to communicate is precisely what Derrida resists. However, as has been seen, Bakunin's attitude is less a refusal to communicate than a contempt for communication; a contempt he casually exploits. The only French term to appear in the paper is '*Juste-milieu*' [Bakunin p. 393], which is cast as the language of conciliation: a language he makes no effort to understand. The lies slip easily from Bakunin's pen. A remark in The Ends of Man would suggest Derrida, too, is oblivious to the line between truth and lies. In summarising his project in that paper he states: "*it will not be a question of falsification*" [EM 148]. Like Bakunin he apparently revels in promoting the diseased babble of the West. Where Bakunin sees Rococo ruins, Derrida suggests Metaphysics, the language of the West, is a house of mourning; plaintively speculating upon its end and the end of man. However, Derrida only resists passing judgements that falsify. His apparent indifference to truth and falsity occurs as part of a project to anticipate discontinuous lines of communication in the breaks and spaces that interrupt texts. That Derrida refuses to falsify positions is not a contempt for truth, but a way of maintaining formal criteria - laws - positively without ever passing judgement. No-one is banished on the grounds they lie, rather their indifference is scanned for any possibility that the law might have been anticipated in a new way. This can be seen in his relations with Heidegger.

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In The Ends of Man Derrida refuses to falsify the startlingly bad rendering of Heidegger's term '*dasein*' as '*human reality*' in France. This mistranslation was used to justify a humanism that nowhere appeared in Heidegger's work. It might be suggested the French thus failed to

approach the *real* issue in Heidegger's work. However, this begs the question of the peculiar benefits Heidegger's work presents, or what a faithful translation might represent. If, in the milieu of communicative relations, there is no assured advantage, it is difficult to see what effects a mistranslation might have. Derrida rehearses this whole scene; not to pass judgement but, again, to promote a practical awareness of the issues anticipated in the whole problematic. The propensity of France to mistranslate, emphasised by Hayek, might also - as Derrida suggests - come to stress the peculiarities of an intra-national discussion. As regards the possibility of such discussions, there is the question of Heidegger's involvement in the 'revolution' of the NSDAP and, thus, his sympathy with an irredeemably nationalistic position.

There are two aspects of Heidegger's involvement in this revolution: his open support for the party, and his espousal of a philosophy that apparently provides a basis for National Socialism. On the one hand, Heidegger campaigned for Hitler in the plebiscite of 1933; itself a democratic expression of what Heidegger saw as '*revolutionary will*'<sup>27</sup>. On the other, in such papers as The Self-assumption of the German University [1933] (known as 'The Rectoral Address') he attempted to express the idea of a German vocation rooted in a sense of struggle. Heidegger's involvement with the party could, perhaps, be distinguished to the extent he reworks current rhetoric. However, such a reworking makes it difficult to avoid the assumption, echoed by his son, that he was more than a '*fellow-traveller*' of the NSDAP: he was personally active in the 'revolution', if not always personally in line with party doctrine<sup>28</sup>. As The Rectoral Address openly recommends the forces of order to the university, such forces were both the more or less ignored

possibilities of philosophy and the (impossible to ignore) condition of National Socialism; as if any distinction between philosophy and the NSDAP were no longer pertinent. The moment of fidelity would be the structure, or order, that both represented and exacerbated a sense of community. Heidegger spoke of a revolution as the production of a formal expression or representation, a '*Bildung*', that brings the '*Will*' to a sense of difficulty, as to a vocation<sup>29</sup>. Like Bakunin, Heidegger exploits the distance between commitment and expression. Unlike Bakunin, he does not do so in order to promote dispersion. Heidegger sees the issues at stake as ones that come to be concentrated, even represented, by a pressing or difficult problem. In effect, he sees the distance between expression and commitment as a taut one; a question of tension and proximity. Through terms like *Bildung* (meaning both, education establishment and picture) or *Lehre* (lesson and warning) he attempted to reach for the sense of difficulty he anticipate in any form of communication. In effect, the difficulties of communication are, here, formally reified; as a revolution, as a lesson and as a terrible warning.

The Ends of Man looks at another 'revolution' associated with Heidegger's work, one central to Heideggerian studies which has come to have political significance outside such studies. Heidegger's early projects, such as his Being and Time, were termed '*fundamental ontology*': i.e. an account of the truth of '*Being*' under a necessary form. At some time in the late 1930's or early 40's an event occurred which has been termed the '*kehre*': the 'turn'. Briefly, this signifies that the attempt to understand the ways '*Being*' might exercise thought is more intractable and more open to mischance than Being and Time had yet been equal; or could ever be equal. The *kehre* signifies a turning away *from* the concept

of the 'fundamental', but also a turning away *of* 'Being'. In this regard, when writers such as Sartre, under the guise of phenomenological-ontology, used Heidegger to justify a form of humanism there is the unhappy implication that Being and Time had itself ventured terms open to misinterpretation. Works seen as being '*post-kehre*' attempt, anew and in the face of such possible wayward motifs, to continue to discover positive traces in this peculiar exacerbation or turn in the advent of 'Being'. In his Letter on Humanism (1946) Heidegger indicates that his early work should not be scanned for references to 'man' in order to affirm a humanist doctrine. Rather, he suggests, the thought of man as 'human' fails to account for the ways in which 'Being' is obliterated by such terms. In his Letter on Humanism Heidegger suggests that the '*humane*' is something peculiar to Roman thought and emerged as a *virtue* in distinction to the culture of non-Roman barbarians, as an attempt to emulate the Greek notion of '*paideia*' (education)<sup>30</sup>.

There is a firm decisions, here; translation suggest nothing of interest. The translations ventured around the term '*human*' detail a sort of history without bearing the experience of history in the form of a 'lesson', the imperatives Heidegger readily promoted during his Nazi period. In 1946 Heidegger still believes a peculiarly forthright sense of 'man' was risked through the Greek understanding of education, an understanding the Roman term obliterates. Thus, any attempt to further a sense of, say, a 'pressing issue' will always take priority over any attempt to communicate through translation, or even a refusal to communicate (as, for instance, between the Romans and their others). However, as The Ends of Man notes, in either case the thought of the 'we' amounts to a 'magnetic attraction' [aimantation]; as regards either the

sense of communicated risk (lesson) or the sort of indifference promoted through intra-national attempts at translation or emulation. When Derrida turns his attention to this marked interest in the 'we' he states: "*the distinction between this or that period of Heidegger's thought, between the texts before and after the so-called Kehre, has less pertinence than ever.*" [EM 148]<sup>31</sup>

There are a series of implications, here. Firstly, that Heidegger's decision to emphasise a sense of exacerbation over mere translation becomes equivocal at this point. Secondly, that this equivocality surrounds a sense of community, and one that fails to become an issue in the way either Heidegger had originally imagined (as the promotion of the 'Kehre' represents a fundamental fidelity to Heidegger's thought) or as he came to imagine (as the 'Kehre', itself, seems a non-issue). Finally, that a distinctive moment, a 'revolution' as that which comes to frame a community, is most equivocal here. These multiple implications all centre upon the concept of an analogy, as this term includes: translated terms, exchanged terms, similar terms etc. The invidiousness of analogies is especially apparent when, by virtue of an analogy, a smooth or equitable exchange - an apparent lack of distinction - becomes an issue. The Ends of Man especially concentrates upon the terms Heidegger uses that imply either 'openness', 'sight' or 'light'; in all cases carrying metaphoric weight and often derived, literally or by analogy, from Greek terms<sup>32</sup>. Similar terms mobilised the thought of the Enlightenment, a movement away from darkness and its anonymity, a movement into a space of light and communication, a liberation of sight and of whatever might be vouchsafed as intelligible in sight. Such terms maintain Derrida's interest in the Enlightenment and the community it

comes to promote. As regards translation and analogies, Heidegger recognised the dependancy of his writing upon both translations and poetic terms (always reminiscent of metaphors) but refused to exploit this dependancy. As a later text by Derrida makes clear, Heidegger always treats analogies as an embarrassment, an effect requiring justification as it suggests no possibility of justification in itself<sup>33</sup>. This fear of translation, evident before, after and during the *kehre*, centres upon an apparent lapse, a moment of indifference. Heidegger is aware that the translation of a philosophical text might conspire to communicate certain lapses in the original; for instance, as a translation impugns a general significance to such terms as 'man' it might be read as a broadening of Heidegger's original work, as though it were enriched by the combination of issues it had yet to come to terms with. Such apparent 'lapses' might, even and insolently, be approached as a series of indictments or recommendations. What Heidegger is most decided upon is that nothing positive comes of this effect. In his Letter on Humanism he suggests the poverty of language provides the lesson for thought, not the way it produces riches from nowhere<sup>34</sup>. As always he urges a sense of exaction that is not evident in translation. In effect, a sense of the pressing that could only be indifferently dissipated by the elliptical movement of translations. Heidegger never came to enjoy the effects which misdirected his work, as France was to, perhaps unknowingly and certainly only briefly. What escapes Heidegger, although not his translated texts, is the strange reciprocity between a community exercised by a single issue and, as in France, a community exacerbated by the translation - and hence multiplicity - of any issue. Which is to say, a community exercised by the thought of Political integrity and an economy where this integrity is open to translation and dissemination.

The obvious criticism of Heidegger is that his suspicion of translation, so much like a fear of contamination through dissipation, amounts to a morbid xenophobia justified by a rampant Nationalism. Derrida point is that he is not nationalist *enough*. In Heidegger's work, at the points Derrida emphasises, it is almost unimportant that his texts are German. Although Heidegger frequently lauded Germanic qualities, it is as though such qualities could, *in principle*, be neutralised in an intra-national forum, the only sort of forum that *could* highlight the colloquial or national voice. If, as Heidegger argues, communication becomes troublesome as commitment and expression are brought together, his arguments would lead to the conclusion that certain difficulties are to be preferred over the difficulties apparent in an international forum. When Derrida reaffirms that communication should be difficult, and should be in order to be 'democratic', he introduces the term '*g ner*': *to worry*.

*"As a declaration of opposition to official Politics is authorised, authorised by the authorities, this means also, that it precisely does not go so far as to trouble the order. It does not worry them. This final expression, 'it does not worry them', can be taken in all its sense."* [EM 134]<sup>35</sup>

The term 'worry' translates something of the imperatives of Heidegger's term *Lehre* but is derived from the Hebraic name for a valley in Palestine: '*gehenna*', *a place of suffering*. In the lesson offered by Heidegger, this insinuated term would cause problems he could never have imagined nor ever come to desire. '*Gehenna*' anticipates an imperative that could only become an issue in intra-national communication. As such a term might become an issue in a 'post-revolutionary' milieu, it would be symptomatic of Heidegger's revolution only to the extent it confounded any thought of a concentrated or localised revolutionary

event. Which is to say, the worriesome nature of 'gehenna' only becomes an issue as the notion of a definite site is disseminated across the economy of world relations. It does not triumph over indifference, but articulates an apparently 'indifferent' realm in a new way.

\* \* \* \*

Both La démocratie ajournée and The Ends of Man attempt to mark issues elided in the completion of a revolution. For instance, in The Ends of Man, Judaism; a clearly political issue in any consideration of the NSDAP. Heidegger's appeal to a formal lesson is found to reverberate to laws it had neither overturned, nor fully excluded nor, ever, broached as a matter for the Will; as the 'Law' is that which distinguishes Judaism. However, Derrida - who was born Jewish and Algerian - emphasises that:

*"I often feel that the questions I attempt to formulate on the outskirts of the Greek philosophical tradition have as their 'other' the model of the Jew, that is, the Jew-as-Other. And yet the paradox is that I have never actually invoked the Jewish tradition in any 'rooted' or direct manner. ... In short, the ultimate site of my questioning discourse would be neither Hellenic nor Hebraic if such were possible. It would be a non-site beyond both the Jewish influence of my youth and the Greek philosophical heritage which I received during my academic education in the French universities."<sup>36</sup>*

If Judaism seems the central issue in his use of 'général', Derrida insists his primary interest is the projection of a 'non-site', a space open to negotiation and committed to the most unusual of expressions. Which is to say, a forum that projects a form of enfranchisement alongside diverting or unexpected currents. Above all, Derrida is committed to the projection of democracy. It is, however, a concern exclusively articulated by virtue of external relations. Which is to say, relations immanent only to an alien- or 'non-site' where Democracy is

anticipated, not determined. In effect, relations immanent only to the milieux of the intra-national in *The Ends of Man* or the media of public opinion in *La démocratie ajournée*. Derrida's continued attachment to this forensic and enlightened space is distinguished by a continuing attempt to emphasise the issues that make an attachment to (for instance) Franco-german Enlightenment 'revolutionary'; in the sense that the imperatives of such a situation have not been predetermined but, rather, are enabled in a more or less unexpected fashion. Derrida, then, has found that the term 'revolutionary' must be more diverse than could be happily elaborated. It could not represent the contours of a political event. If a revolution could open or close the awareness of any political issue, it is not the elaboration of a political formation equivalent to modern France or Nazi Germany that is of interest. If such motifs command attention, they do so as effects of international communication and according to the kind of law which enables such communication.

To speak of the 'law' would seem to emphasise a Political forum over the forum of economics. However, because the 'law' does not *determine* a definite or agreed position but, rather, *enables* the articulation of differences, it is always a question of anticipation and speculation before it is one of the proper site of political commitment. Which is to say, the 'law', as it is detailed above, is too economical to be Political. It seems strange, then, that *La démocratie ajournée* speaks of depoliticisation. Economics, as it articulates a move away from a determined political site, would seem always to be depoliticising.

This question will be detailed in much of the rest of this thesis. However, Derrida's diagnoses of both 'autism' and 'brutality' provide

instances of what a depoliticisation might entail. When Derrida detects a tendency towards autism, this diagnosis is directed at Heidegger. His diagnosis of a 'blind and brutal' addiction to novelties - reiterated in La démocratie ajournée as '*passive consumerism*' - could be directed at Bakunin. In both instances, the way either Heidegger or Bakunin invest in the notion of revolution is seen to all but obliterate the law. Each forsakes a law which enables difference in favour of their respective tendencies towards indifference. Heidegger is compelled to silence, at a certain point (the point of the intra-national). Bakunin remains wholly undiscerning at every point. However, in each instance, Derrida's symptomology is articulated by virtue of economic relations, not political considerations. Heidegger's apparent xenophobia is interesting not as regards National Socialism but, rather, as regards the play of intra-national exchanges, borrowings and loans; what Derrida terms 'credit' [usure]. Bakunin's violent flight could, also, be read as a matter of economics. His work does not differentiate its desires, in all matters but that of utter destruction he maintains an attitude of pure indifference. As though he were tainted by something so monstrously addictive that without it ever becoming an immediate factor, without ever appearing in the rococo slums of political negotiation, it has fully claimed his passions. Such an addiction promotes a disinterested contempt in anything current whilst binding its adherents to the possibility of a lasting and final consummation. An addiction that would see the whole world burn before losing the possibility of a final fix. In many works, of which The Ends of Man would only be a more obvious example, Derrida plays upon the notion of a final end; for instance, the idea of an apocalyptical end and that of a desired end. Insofar as these 'ends' might be both differentiated and exchanged, the belief that the

one is equivalent to the other remains open to renegotiation. Bakunin's indifference abandons all attempts at negotiation.

*La démocratie ajournée* considers only Franco-German relations, amounting to a single pass through the intra-national market. As has been seen, Derrida's suspicions might entrain more diverse passages and a more global movement. If France is articulated by virtue of an intra-national economy, the French revolution is not simply or finally French. When Derrida considers what is given to be understood through such a movement, he turns to the production and promotion of 'samizdats' (a more or less clandestine communication). It might be thought a samizdat is produced in conflict with the law. However, as Derrida considers what is enabled by virtue of a samizdat, the form of the law is again evoked as the enablement of more or less discrete possibilities. The samizdat remains a disquieting reminder of the way in which something that is given to be understood projects the risks and the uncertainties of communication. The samizdat could not be simply *depoliticising* insofar as it, at least, begins to trace the problems that beset communication as it raises the possibility of its reception. Which is to say, the samizdat makes reciprocity into an issue. Derrida's interests in the risks of reciprocity can be differentiated from the kinds of indifference underwriting the works of either Heidegger or Bakunin: as Heidegger's concentration of revolutionary themes into an exemplary Lesson could be compared with Bakunin's total dispersal of all themes and all objects of commitment. Derrida states:

*"The sole choice is not then: concentration or dispersion. Rather, the alternative will be between the unilateral and the multilateral in the relations of the media to the public, through the 'publics'. The responsibility, of recognising the freedom of the press and before the press, will always depend*

*upon the efficacy of a 'right of response' which allows for the citizen to be more than a fraction (in effect, to be privatised: and to a greater and greater extent) of a 'public' both passive and consuming, and necessarily injured through that. Can there be democracy without reciprocity?" [DA 121]<sup>37</sup>*

It is not a question of the forms promoted by a Heidegger or those exploited by a Bakunin. Derrida's work is marked by a suspicion of any dominant position (a unilateral position), whether concentrated or dispersed. Where an indifference to a variety of similar issues reigns, as in Heidegger's ignorance of translation or Bakunin's indifference to any attempt at conciliatory exchanges, Derrida highlights another effect; the risks preceding any sense of reciprocity. If, in a discontinuous fashion, such a risk emphasises the law it does so through economics; i.e. through the processes which articulate every autistic, marginal or colloquial voice. What remains 'new' in Derrida's classicism is that the imperatives at work in an international forum are not yet determined and, certainly, will not be determined as the same in every instance. The 'law', here, has enabled the articulation of difference. It is the way in which, everyday, Derrida seeks to communicate the multivariety of issues in a 'general' forum, rather than resting on an established position, that makes his neo-classicism both more suspicious and more alert than that of Hayek. The arena is not established as such, neither in its principle characteristics nor in its characteristic inhibitions but continues to be disposed otherwise, everyday.

The chief question, then, to bring to Derrida's analyses is the continuing role of Political motifs in an attempt to address economic problems. It will be found that the way in which Derrida hovers over any question of the Political is predicated on a decision that everywhere

afflicts his analyses; whatever promises an economic respite is a (political) reserve and, thus, an issue for a more suspicious, yet more attuned, negotiation. This means that some economic effects have abdicated economic reciprocity in a way that, compared to the refinements Derrida proposes, could only be described as stupid.

The question of stupidity will be considered in the conclusion. If Bakunin's antipathy to negotiation is, finally, an example of stupidity, it is so because his work is indifferently suspicious, without a trace of the negotiable. Bakunin's position must, then, become the subject of negotiation, even at the expense of dragging it into a forum. As was seen, Derrida did not seek to condemn or to change Heidegger, as such. He maintains a kind of respect for Heidegger, or for what might be given to be understood through Heidegger's works. Derrida sought only to insinuate a new twist into themes that, whilst the subject of negotiation in Heidegger's work, had yet been approached with indifference. In short, Bakunin is always an opponent of Derrida, whilst other philosophers are not. This calls for some comment.

## Chapter Two: *On political-economics and depression*

Effects taken, generically, as symptoms of indifference have been cast as *depoliticising* tendencies. Derrida describes such tendencies as '*techno-economic mutations*'. Where such mutations gain ground, Derrida insists upon a form of reciprocity, a form characterised by its '*rigour*':

*"It is necessary to maintain a formal rigour ... more finite tools, a legislation more differentiated, better adjusted to the techno-economic mutations of the 'free-market'." [DA 115]*

An "*infinite task*", as Derrida later says. A task committed to the projection of socio-political rights alongside the free market in ways that tend towards the social rather than the anti-social; as Derrida asks: "*Can there be democracy without reciprocity?*" [DA 121]. Derrida's '*formal rigour*' is apparently intended to counter the power of the market to *depoliticise*; in effect, to represent a form of political commitment. His formalism is, however, thoroughly engaged with economics; it follows the free-market, an arena in which the Political is by no means assured. The next two chapters argue there is no purely Political realm in the antique sense of a definite socio-political group. There is no cherishable equivalent of the '*Polis*'.

The claim, now, is that no sign of indifference can be directly related to a political object, nor valorised as a revolutionary issue. Neither Heidegger's tendency towards autism nor Bakunin's casual exploitation of communication are chiefly political, or symptomatic 'of' anything political. Neither autism nor naive brutality are attributable to a current lack of politics, nor do they represent a kind of political edge. Derrida, then, wishes to interpret indifference otherwise; neither

as inhibited, nor as dominated by a Political dream. Derrida aims to uncover a variety of discrete issues in apparent indifference. Here, the 'issue' could never be a sense of alienation from the 'Political', but only the multiplicitous character of currents whose force or inhibitions could no longer coded by reference to the Political.

This is comparable to the classical formulation of 'Political-economics'. Derrida is on classical ground. What is elaborated under this rubric is *nothing other* than a socio-political formation but one in which the impossibility of treating the Political as an object of study has become evident. In effect, 'political-economics' is the oblique simulacrum of a politics; through this term the space of social interaction is elaborated, *en passant*, as an Economics. If this represents an epochal decision, a specifically Classical or Enlightenment realisation, it could not simply be termed a revolution. It follows, rather, from the logics of 'disjunction'. Political-economics is *nothing other* than the sort of socio-political space represented by the archaic concept of the 'Political' but is, nevertheless, *not identical* to such a concept'. In its elaboration of another, older site, political-economics weaves the ground of a wider market. The disjunctive relation might be represented through the copula; a movement *from* the one *through* the other, the elaboration *of* the Political *as* an economics. However, through deconstruction, the socio-political problem will be seen to be different than had classically been thought; if political-economics is represented as *nothing other* than a political formation, deconstruction will stress the ways it remains *otherwise* to any politics.

The symptoms Derrida publicises through economics are symptoms of Depressive inhibitions. This chapter details Derrida's abiding interest in depressive states; finally, why it is this question, above all, that provides an entry into Derrida's understanding of economics. It has three sections.

i) An account of the problem of depression in any general formulation of the Social. As the possibilities ventured through political-economics *might* end in depression, this section stresses the 'social' significance of both economic speculation and its failure.

ii) A study of Heidegger's mistrust of speculation. It will be seen that an interest in symptoms of speculative failure is common to *both* Heidegger's anti-speculative philosophy *and* the speculative dialectics of Hegel; or, rather, a symptomology of speculative fears might provide a discrete link between the Modernist philosophy of Heidegger and the classical philosophy he mistrusts.

iii) An account of the different ways in which philosophy becomes interested in economic failure; or, how philosophy comes to highlight every lapse in the smooth functioning of an economy, and to claims these lapses as symptomatic of major social issues. This chapter ends by arguing that the attempt to determine depression as a problem for society, will have failed to appreciate the ways in which an interest in depression also destabilises any predetermined notion of the 'social' (i.e. a notion equivalent to the Political).

## On the formulation of depression as a social problem

Freud's Mourning and Melancholia confuses two accounts of Depression: one providing an aetiology of depression, of its history and its possible relief, the other both promoting and confounding any sense of eventual relief. In the first instance, Depression is understood as a failure of the process of self reflection or self representation termed Narcissism. That the self would wish to continually represent itself, or have itself represented, even when the 'self' is in utter doubt (as occurs in Depression), highlights the importance assigned to the concept of representation. Freud's aetiology implies Depression has fallen foul of the process of representation and its alleviation depends upon the correction of this shortfall. It could be argued that Freud understands the 'self' in terms of the desire for presence, where *presence* denotes the object aspired to in any attempt at *re-representation*. If so, Depression would mark both the loss of this object and the end of all aspiration. The use made of Freud, in this thesis, could be seen as a critique of political representation, insofar as his work betrays a discourse fixated on the Presence of the Political; betrays it utterly once depression becomes apparent. This thesis will, however, re-cast the positive elements of Freud's logic, a logic that is not Freud's creation, as Depression is not simply Freud's worry. Freud does highlight a *public* obsession with self-representation but only insofar as Depression shadows this obsession. Depression is, then, understood from within a discourse upon self-representation but a discourse it only obscurely approximates. Depression, rather, suggests something other to a logic of representation; it is this 'other' form that concerns this chapter.

Freud's other account of Depression is, seemingly, trite; Depressive states are always more like each other than a disposition they markedly fail to resemble. This other account of Depression, as Freud's title suggests, is that mourning has seemed analogous to melancholia; they are, however, to be differentiated. The significance of this fact cannot be overstressed. Within Depressive dispositions a history fails; i.e. an aetiology derived from a formally coherent account of Narcissism suggests the failure both of Narcissism and, in consequence, the recommended aetiology itself. No obvious history or relief programme may be associated with Depression. Further, Depression could not thereby be conceived of, or represented as, a single disposition; where similarities apparently persist, there a series of differences are in force.

This 'other form' is pertinent to political-economics insofar as the hope that economics will return to a sense of the Political might end in indifference. Heidegger's fall into silence or Bakunin's mindlessness are not to be associated with the failure of political paradigms nor could their own similarity be straightforwardly read as a reaction to political exigencies. Through a discussion of Freud the following points will be detailed: Firstly, the social sphere elaborated as an economics is not what 'we' - meaning 'the voices of a socio-political discourse' - have grown to become accustomed. Thus, secondly, the public space in which depressive symptoms are arraigned promotes another view of the 'public' than is suggested by the habit of taking such symptoms as ineffective or indifferent political responses.

Mourning and Melancholia describes the hopeless indifference of depression as a life lived under the shadow of a lost object. The shadow

of a lost object is a Ghost. *La démocratie ajournée* talks of Democracy and its ghost:

" - *What, today, is public opinion?*

- *Today? The silhouette of a phantom, the haunting of the democratic conscience.* " [DA 103]

Derrida's analysis of the public and its relation to democracy has a mournful air; binding Derrida's analyses, in *La démocratie ajournée* and elsewhere, with the problem of Depression. The question of the Public is to the fore in Freud's account of melancholia; the gravest form of depression<sup>2</sup>. In *Mourning and Melancholia* Freud begins by speaking of the object lost to the mourner as a loved one, suggesting a personal or private object. As he passes from mourning to melancholia it becomes clear he is using the term 'object' in a highly conceptual sense and, alongside this conceptual turn, is placing his emphasis more firmly on the public rather than the private arena. When Freud moves from a loss as personal as that of a lover to such objects as "*one's country, liberty, an ideal, and so on*"<sup>3</sup> his 'objects' are clearly conceptual; they are 'objects' in the sense of an end or goal. His economical '*and so on*' elliptically reinforces the fact that such 'objects' have deserted the private in order to maintain their conceptual appeal. His, earlier, *On Narcissism* designated such objects by reference to the term 'Ego Ideal'. The view of objects found in *Mourning and Melancholia* is, in part, a repetition of his previous remarks on the public face of narcissism:

*"In addition to its individual side, this Ideal has a social side; it is also the common ideal of a family, a class or a nation."*<sup>4</sup>

If 'Ego' is Freud's term for the distinctive component of the self, the Ego Ideal is its mark of distinction. Freud finds narcissistic

identification to be beneficial, it is discovered as the "*libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct towards self preservation*."<sup>5</sup>. Without the categorical representation offered by the Ego Ideal the urge towards self-preservation would remain anonymous. However, to treat every conceptual object as representative of the self would be less explicable if the relation between the self and an objectified ideal were as direct as in narcissistic identification. Clearly, another form of relation underlies the extension of the term Ego Ideal into the public realm. The variety of objects which might be represented by the Ego Ideal are general objects with the emphasis upon **General**, they exist only in a general arena. The logic here has been termed a 'disjunctive' relation. The Ego stands in opposition to the way it is cast 'in general' but, at the same time, is to be thought together with its general concept as current, significant or discursive. When Kant speaks of the disjunctive relation he insists the logical connection is **not** of:

*"logical sequence, but of logical opposition, in so far as the sphere of the one excludes the sphere of the other, and yet at the same time community, in so far as the propositions taken together occupy the whole sphere of the knowledge in question."*<sup>6</sup>

Once the emphasis is upon 'community', the status of Freud's various 'objects' can be marked. He is treating concepts as general insofar as they have a General dimension; i.e. are of interest to the general public. Which is to say, objects have meaning only within the community of a commonwealth. This is far from being an abrupt move from logical to social community<sup>7</sup>. Only insofar as certain concepts exclude general intelligibility could it be held that some 'objects' are possible without being necessary; i.e. they may be taken as recurrent ideals whilst escaping the community, *in General*. The community articulated by virtue

of a disjunctive relation is not wholly logical, it might include pockets that remain *in the dark* as regards the community's logical formulation. The community itself might, even, have become wholly deluded, in general, as regards its logical formulation. Which is as much to say, the objects of a community's logic may symptomise dementia; *a logic diseased of its own account*. In *Mourning and Melancholia*, when Freud goes on to speak of 'conscience', it is clear he is speaking both of a general conscience in the logical sense, and a general conscience in the social sense. The end or the lesson of his analysis of melancholic depression is that consciousness might have fallen foul of what is generally conscientiable; i.e. that more or less foul currents can be seen to excite the community without being deemed, in general, conscientiable.

*"What we are becoming acquainted with is the agency commonly called 'conscience'; we shall count it ... among the major institutions of the ego, and we shall come upon evidence that it can become diseased of its own account."*<sup>8</sup>

Freud's objects should be approached via the public nature of conscience; an object always bids for general approval. If an object fails to meet with approval, if it is cast aside, excluded or seen as redundant, it fails the test of conscience. However, the hypostatisation of the conscience as an institution, or its imminent crowning as a Super Ego standing over and above the self, only raises the issue of approval without deciding it. Insofar as redundant objects continue to express a sense of community - through the disjunctive relation - even as they fail the test of conscience, the community cannot be based upon or around an identification with its institutions. Which is to say, even as an object fails the test of conscience, or fails to be recognised in relation to settled institutions, it is redundant only within the

community. *It is entirely possible for an object to be suffered in abjection.* This suggests that underpinning the judgement discounting some objects whilst favouring others is an entirely ambiguous sense of a community. Here, there is no question of either a healthy or a diseased conscience - a conscience with integrity, or one lacking all integrity - but, rather, only a hopeless community; the community elaborated in Mourning and Melancholia, a diffuse community (including segments of mourning as, also, instances of melancholia) but, above all, a community which only fails to be represented by a single, apparently integral, motif. In consequence, depression could only ever offer the *appearance* of a healthy facade, it could never finally be subsumed under such an image. Is this not, however, exactly what Kant avers in his account of the disjunctive relation? The opposition between the whole sphere of knowledge and the specific objects standing against it all the while manifests Community, and does so *even if a manifold of various objects only ever fail to excite general approval.*

Democracy, as the political concept of the many, as a general idea, or as a concept directed at general approval, is entirely folded into the milieu of public opinion. Could Democracy survive if public opinion was unable to valorise anything, even its own concept? If Democracy as an object (an end or goal) never became an issue of general approval. If, with the closure of the political ideal, all that is left is the shadow of redundancy. Depression would be the end of an unhappy situation. A community fully besotted by redundancy could never maintain an object of general approval. Not even a term promoted as the term for a community. A *Political* concept in the sense of a whole *and* unified community; one living not under a disjoint but having, rather, a categorical appeal. As

Depression abandons the thought of political approval, only the shadow of public opinion remains. Democracy, an hellenic term, is assumed to excite general approval because it represents the 'many', the cohesion of the Body Politick. In antiquity Democracy was said to be a *paradigm* and a lesson of political efficacy<sup>9</sup>. With Depression the paradigm is obliterated, the lesson forgotten, whilst public opinion remains enthralled by redundancy. To question public opinion at such a time is not to reify the political body but the moments when it ceases to represent, when its structure seems most arbitrary; to ask about the shadow as the gallow which the body swings upon.

*"A deviating topology. How, now, to identify public opinion? How does it take place? Where does it offer itself to view, and as such? The errancy of its proper body is also the ubiquity of a spectre. It is not present as such in any of these spaces." [DA 105]<sup>10</sup>*

Derrida writes about certain philosophers, such as Georges Bataille, with apparent approval when they affirm the absolute expenditure of the political body<sup>11</sup>. If there is no idea of a unitary Political object, a single political conscience, nor any sense of the Political preserving itself after the fashion of a narcissistic self, why treat the shadow with fear? Why not affirm the headlong rush into abandonment as a luxury rather than a fatal exigency? Why not enjoy the consumption of the Body Politick, rather than enquire after its demands? Here, the question would be: Why is depression so depressing? Could it not be pleasurable? Whilst Derrida understands the affirmation of expenditure as a legitimate possibility he remains enchanted by the issue of representation, even as it fails or falls into redundancy. For instance, so long as the end or closure of the Political continues to exert an insistant effect as an object (end) in the community, the 'end' is an

issue that remains both equivocal and, yet, insistant. In making such an issue *worriesome* (i.e. as something more than a sign, or representation, of redundancy) the possibility remains that representation can become an insistant or worrying issue. Which means political or democratic representation. If it could be tentatively put so: Derrida wants to make Democracy *work harder*. The problem with this formulation being that the value of work is itself in question as the issue of representation is perpetually deferred or '*adjourned*' in the constant sounding of public opinion. Despite the space of twenty years seperating *The Ends of Man* from *La democratie ajournée*, the two papers are agreed upon the fact that the issue of representation, and the failure of representation, are the issues of philosophy. Which here means Classical philosophy.

The issue of representation and its failure is the abiding mark of Classical philosophy. Certainly, for instance, in Kantian critique where - by virtue of the fact that a mooted ideal remains contestable - representation is in question<sup>12</sup>. This may, also, be seen in the work of Adam Smith who, when he speaks of the 'invisible hand', is precisely *not* hypostasising a single representation of the Political but showing how society continues to function in the absence of a single unifying model. Through the invisible hand and despite private egoism, a measure of social cohesion continues *en passant*<sup>13</sup>. For Derrida, in *La democratie ajournée*, the issue of representation is both a Rousseauesque idea and a democratic issue; even or especially when Democracy causes the most worries. In sum, Derrida is for Democracy insofar as Democracy refers to the concept of general representation. His interest in representation is an abiding interest in the possibility of Enlightenment as it was promoted in Classical philosophy.

Democracy cannot be maintained as a general concept except through the vagaries of public opinion it erstwhile represents. Derrida's insight, already apparent in Classical thought, is that for an issue to be seen as a political issue - to be treated *as such* or *in General* - it is, in the first instance, Economical. For Classical philosophy the Political could not be treated as an object preextant *in situ*. The Political has neither the constancy nor the universality to be treated as an object of study. This is clear in the work of Smith; the ethos of the cohesive commonwealth is neither pre-given nor a conscienable goal but develops according to an oblique economy. In the case of Kant, whatever is described as economical is so because it does not instantiate a system - whether political, rational or legal - but is a development in which certain issues (whether political, rational or moral) become of general concern<sup>14</sup>. In short, the path from the Political to the economical is one in which governing principles are only assured to the extent that they are issues, not certainties. The classical science of political-economics, more than any other Classical motif, describes this move. For this reason Derrida's work can be sloganised as a formal account of the detours and deviations effected in the move from the political through the economical.

For anything to become an issue it would seem to be a question of general excitement, of general confidence, of democratic involvement. *Could it be that in every economy the possibility of the General is mistook, mistaken, over-shadowed?* Bakunin or Bataille exacerbate this problem. Other writers have exploited this possibility by identifying what remains vague about the Political with the power of Public Opinion, the arena in which all sense of community could be mistook or dispersed.

Finally, some writers have exploited this possibility to reject the idea of Democracy completely. It is possible, and has been possible, to throw Democracy's ineffectuality open to Democratic deliberation. Under conditions of savage depression, Germany elected to overthrow Democracy for the seemingly firmer or surer commitment to totalitarianism. This was represented as a triumph of will, and a triumph over indifference [Heidegger: "*Noone can remain away from the polls on the day when this will is manifested. Heil Hitler!*"<sup>15</sup>]. Depressive conditions also produced Keynes' *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*. In the preface to the 1936 German edition Keynes offered his work as something essentially in keeping with the rigours of National Socialism:

*"the theory of output as a whole, which is what the following book purports to provide, is much more easily adapted to the conditions of a totalitarian state, than is the theory of the production and distribution of a given output produced under conditions of free competition and a large measure of laissez-faire."*<sup>16</sup>

Depression is the state of public opinion when the objects to which it is wedded appear as inessential or redundant. Both Heidegger's philosophy and Keynes' economics present themselves as attempts to deal with such listlessness. For Heidegger (at some point prior to his *kehre*), as for Keynes (at least in 1936), as theories that recommend totalitarianism. If their attacks upon current lassitude are the least remarkable element of either's work it is so, in each instance, because such lassitude is seen to be *only* apparent. There are forces at work either in an economy or in a society that have been overlooked; it is this failure to fathom the true exigencies of a time, rather than any essential attribute of current thought, which contributes to a presentiment of listlessness [Keynes: "*This is a nightmare, which will*

pass away with the morning. For the resources of Nature and men's devices are just as fertile and productive as they were."<sup>17</sup>). The real work of either Heidegger or Keynes only departs from the current mood, the most pressing objectives of either's work are only provisionally motioned towards by a symptomatic listlessness. For (early) Heidegger public lassitude is termed 'idle talk', suggesting a misplaced or misdirected sense of confidence in public opinion. For Keynes, public lassitude is the result of an utterly misplaced confidence in the classical economics of *laissez-faire*. The most outrageous claim open to any Classicist would, perhaps, be that a society might safely deliver itself into the hands of market forces. Such a faith could not easily claim Smith as its high priest. However, insofar as Smith's project is to elaborate a discrete sense of an ethos his work maintains a measure of confidence in the persistence of social ties, despite the empirical incoherence of a given society; the critical point being that Smith's invisible hand is an epistemological *a priori* and *not* the reification of a social mechanism. A project like Smith's might, however, be confused with what it aspired to critique (i.e. a transcendent ethos), especially if it were to depart from an overweening confidence in the virtues of a momentarily bullish market. It might be assumed that something akin to an 'invisible hand' protects desirable features of an economy. Keynes attack on classical economics centres on the insupportable character of this kind of confidence. Keynes states:

"Let us clear from the ground the metaphysical or general principles upon which, from time time, *laissez-faire* has been founded. It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive 'natural liberty' in their economic activities. There is no 'compact' conferring perpetual rights on those who Have or on those who Acquire. The private world is not so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide. It is not so managed here below that in practice they coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the Principles of Economics that

*enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest."*<sup>18</sup>

Where Keynes' and Heidegger's interests coincide is in their denigration of the confidence associated with the public realm and its elaboration through public opinion. Such confidence has no objective basis and the illusions thus promoted result in a sense of laxity. Keynes, in a remark that seems directly reminiscent of Plato's attack on artists in the Republic, claimed that the markets were thoroughly removed from the realities of productive capital.

*"We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligence to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be."*<sup>19</sup>

He later suggests the disease of speculation could be remedied only through a firm and real commitment to investment:

*"The spectacle of the modern investment market has sometimes moved me to the conclusion that to make the purchase of an investment permanent and indissoluble, like marriage, except by reason of death or other grave cause, might be a useful remedy for our contemporary evils."*<sup>20</sup>

This attack on average opinion is echoed in Heidegger's Being and Time: both in the vapidity of opinion and its transitory, licentious aspects.

*"The groundlessness of idle talk is no obstacle to its becoming public; instead it encourages this. Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own. ... (it) develops an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility, for which nothing is closed off any longer. ... (however) The fact that something has been said groundlessly, and then gets passed along in further retelling, amounts to perverting the act of disclosing into an act of closing off."*<sup>21</sup>

In this last quotation, Heidegger can be seen to be motioning towards the struggle he casts as the central one for 'Being', the sense of difficulty surrounding the task of bringing an image of Being's essence to light. The movement of disclosing and of closing presents a sense of exigency unanticipated in idle talk. However, both his idle talk and Keynes's average opinion are the arenas where a real sense of commitment might be broached, as no sense of commitment is currently enjoyed; nor any measure of confidence either justified or apparent. Keynes hopes simply for a renewed commitment to productive capacity, and a financial structure that would justify such commitment. Heidegger's more extreme hope is that current lassitude, once realised as a crisis, might promote a Will equal to the severity of the crisis. In both cases, the failure of confidence is given, is symptomatic. Derrida looks at these symptoms anew. It is not a matter of creating a new sense of confidence, or a life-affirming struggle around the issue of confidence. Nor is it to aver that totalitarianism is a diseased conscience standing in opposition to a Democratic ideal that ought to continue to enjoy confidence. In so far as all issues are, in the first place, symptomatic, Public Opinion could valorise totalitarisms, or anarchisms, in the same way as other, even vaguer or more idle issues. In short, Derrida does not take totalitarianism seriously. However, he takes the shadow that might also have proposed totalitarianism as it haunts the democratic conscience very seriously. Public opinion might not be wedded to such political ideals but, as social effects, public opinion is never very far from enjoying their influence.

\* \* \* \*

## On symptoms of depression in Heidegger and Hegel

In his political essays, Ezra Pound attacks a spreading laxity, an indifference he directly attributed to the failure to place a commitment to politics at the heart of economics. Pound urges a commitment to the deeper structure of the State and its most dynamic possibilities; the possibilities most threatened by economic laxity. One such essay, For a New Paideuma (1937), begins with a definition of the 'Paideuma':

*"The term Paideuma has been resurrected in our time because of a need. The term Zeitgeist or Time Spirit might be taken to include passive attitudes and aptitudes of an era. The term Paideuma as used in a dozen German volumes has been given the sense of the active element in the era, the complex of ideas which is in a given time germinal, reaching into the next epoch, but conditioning actively all the thought and action of its own time."<sup>22</sup>*

This section asks how the need for the *Paideuma* is sensed, a presentiment discovered only through passivity or indifference. It will be seen that, insofar as it is a question of sense, the symptoms of the necessity of the *Paideuma* must, in some way, be related to the symptoms of the laxity obliterating the *paideuma's* necessity (and justifying its resurrection). Even as the one sustains the promise or the necessity of a revolution, the other bespeaks a growing catastrophe, a fatal indifference. This relation will be highlighted through Heidegger's work. Heidegger, against the backdrop of depression, was one of those German's who sensed the need for a new *Paideuma*. The term '*Paideia*' appears not only in his Letter on Humanism (1946), but also his Plato's Doctrine [Lehre] of Truth, a lecture series of 1935. Chapter One of the present work touched upon the significance of Heidegger's work in the

NSDAP revolution. However, as Derrida argued, where Heidegger would wish to force a specific sense of necessity (human, political etc), there his work sinks into autism. There are, then, a whole variety of symptoms in play: autism and laxity, a feel for the revolution and a fear for the state, the fear of indifference and the presentiment of currents which might shake off indifference. The question, here, is; why, when the significance of these symptoms are considered, is it always *primarily* a question of Politics, of the political form, and of the political form as the forum in which, alone, such symptoms have relevance?

For Derrida, Heidegger's distinction lies in his formal rigour. The Ends of Man states:

*"The attention given to system and structure in its most provocative and strongest aspects ... is a question of determining the possibility of **meaning** (sens) on the basis of a 'formal' organisation which in itself has no meaning (sens)."*  
[EM 161]<sup>23</sup>

Derrida warns this 'form' should neither compromise nor destroy meaning. As has been noted, he wishes to open an understanding of a problem - a socio-political problem - without compounding it; either in concentration or dispersal. Derrida hopes a formal expression of a problem might ensure the possibility of response, without prejudice. In La démocratie ajournée this is termed the Right of response, designating the right to freely express social exigencies. In every instance, the formal organisation neither obstructs nor suggests the proper response. To that extent 'form' is libertarian, liberating the possibility of responsiveness; i.e. 'responsiveness' is *the* issue wherever 'form' is prioritised. Moreover, it would be liberal in the economic sense; the formal framing of a general right of response would allow discrete or

provocative responses to become general issues even (or especially) if the 'needs' they instantiated were previously unregarded; i.e. sustained no market. Such a form, then, must allow for innovations in order to be attuned to the needs or demands found under liberal conditions. However, this thesis has already noted Derrida's suspicion of novelties; without the idea of a general form there is no real conception of need, only of casual acquiescence or indifferent ignorance. Although Derrida states formal rigour should not 'have' a meaning, it is nevertheless a way of distinguishing demand in such a way as to convey a sense of necessity. It seems, then, that freedom depends in the first instance upon a formal framing in order to have the character of necessity. As Pound says of the term '*Faideuma*', its form (as a complex of ideas) arises out of need.

Derrida praises Heidegger's framing of the conjunction of the possible and necessary; even when this occurs through such concepts as *Faideia* or *Lehre*, with their fascistic connotations. He does so because Heidegger's rigour militates against the vague response; as *The Ends of Man* has it, against '*cultural gossip*'<sup>24</sup>. Anything representing a possible response has to broach a real sense of exigency if it is not to be meaningless. *The Ends of Man* reasserts this view; the formal rigour Derrida imagines would not be:

*"either the non-sense or anguishing absurdity which lurks about metaphysical humanism."* [EM 161]<sup>25</sup>

A formal expression must manifest a sense of need. For both Derrida and Heidegger this necessity is broached through the formal framing of a problem; i.e. a question. A question frames demand in an open, attuned way. In the 1930's, Heidegger sees his questions as revolutionary. *The*

*Ends of Man*, however, focuses on 'the formal structure of the question of Being' in Heidegger's earlier *Being and Time* [1928] in order to elucidate the later *Letter on Humanism* [1946]<sup>26</sup>. In the later work Heidegger states "language is the house of Being"; referring to ontology as the formal discourse framing Being ('ontos-logos'). Derrida's use of 'economics' reiterates this dictum, insofar as 'Oikonomia' refers to the law-of-the-house or law-of-the-proper. The term 'proper' translates Heidegger's 'eigentlich' [authentic], the foremost attribute of Being in *Being and Time*, the term 'house' hints at problems raised in his later work; that thinking must learn to dwell<sup>27</sup>. Thus, Derrida's use of economics encompasses the whole spread of Heidegger's work. He praises Heidegger only as 'Economics' names Heidegger's most worrying problem; response and need, supply and demand. It becomes impossible, here, to ignore the forensic dimension of this 'form'. If, at every instant, it is a question of the proper response at different periods only the form of response remains constant. If the 'proper' form of response is Political, it is so only insofar as the proper (authentic) distinguishes itself from the idle or casual response. For Derrida, such differentiations occur through economics rather than, immediately, as a Politics.

The problem denoted by 'economics' - as it refers to Heidegger's work - is that any possible response should not further idle conditions but actively broach the demands of the time. It should be Authentic, although this term is under question, especially in Derrida's re-casting of Heidegger's question. That a form should frame a situation in a questioning way is a Kantian concern<sup>28</sup>. In France, the dominant neo-Kantian tradition is Positivism; a doctrine based upon the question of the 'conditions for the possibility' of any concept. For instance, one -

unheideggerian - way of understanding Heidegger's dictum, "*Language is the house of Being*", would be to insist that language provides the framework through which the concept of '*Being*' becomes meaningful. Here, a history of Being would be a history of the language determining its possible meanings<sup>29</sup>. For Heidegger, language is nothing if it is not cast in such a way that the possibility of Being becomes a demand, a necessity. He views a Question as an original expression that liberates the possible in a committed manner. Hence his antipathy to 'idle-talk', a history of Being only suggests possible contexts of the concept of 'Being'. It does not frame this transcendental concept as an immanent force with its own peculiar character, the character expressing the demanding nature of Being or ensuring this demand is etched onto experience as fate<sup>30</sup>. The form expressing this demand (either the Question or the Paideia, insofar as Derrida focusses primarily on Form) stands in contrast to a loose or uncommitted discussion of Being. Heidegger constantly re-reads Kant, his aim however is to cast Kantian concepts, and their possibilities, in a way that approaches this 'demand'; i.e. qualifies Being's immanence in a committed manner. That gives, even, a sense of natural forces broached through relentless inquiry. His point being that any possible concept must be conditioned; for this to be more than a merely vacuous qualification it will have to sustain a real, even fatal, sense of necessity. In the context of 1933-1936, of Being within the demands of a specifically German fate.

Heidegger's pre-revolutionary Being and Time gestured towards this theme through the meanings attached to *authentic* possibilities and *necessary* conditions (respectively: '*eigentlich-*' and '*Notwendig-keit*'). The authentic qualifies a possibility only if the possibilities ventured

already bear witness to necessary conditions. Here, 'necessity' is an experience: a distressing necessity. Far from being simply desirable as an attribute, necessity is an insistent backbeat, even if it lies forgotten or ignored. As a 'possibility' Being clearly is not a specifiable 'thing'. Thinking is authentic, however, when it is committed to this apparent failure; that is, when it experiences Being's remoteness in language and commits itself to this distressing experience. Thought is authentic when it overcomes the indifference of idle language to discover a sense of destiny in current conditions<sup>31</sup>. *Notwendigkeit*, more than the English 'necessity', suggests a sense of distress in a need or demand. This was clear in *Being and Time* where the question about Being was a commitment to the experience of Being's fate. It was also clear in Heidegger's *Rectorial Address*, where fundamental ontology apparently carries the mandate of the NSDAP:

*"The will to the essence of the German university is the will to science as will to the historical mission of the German people as a people that knows itself in its state. ... they will do so if, and only if, we - this body of teachers and students - on the one hand expose science to its innermost necessity (Notwendigkeit) and, on the other hand, are equal to the German fate in its most extreme distress (Not)."*<sup>32</sup>

Heidegger's project attempts to wrest the positive from a hopeless situation, a situation promising nothing. His project could be summarised as *the overcoming of nihilistic indifference, or 'oblivion'*<sup>33</sup>. However, in its commitment to the overcoming of oblivion, it is also a commitment to the utmost exigencies of oblivion. Here, the forensic context of Heidegger's work cannot be ignored. From the 1930's onwards, his philosophy is couched in a language that, if incredibly tortuous, is not especially opaque. Nor does his political work stylistically differ from his more specialist work; unlike Keynes, for instance, he does not

reserve one language for the public and another for professionals. His attempt to counter indifference (in philosophy or in politics) is, in every essential, democratic; his work is addressed to the 'General' and the expressions he invests with an urgent 'distress' are open to the 'General'. For some French thinkers, nihilism means a proliferating variety of interpretations are possible, whilst no fact could ever be sustained<sup>34</sup>. For Heidegger this would be a side-effect of 'oblivion', an effect current in public opinion. His own brand of public address forces a general consideration of the difficulties of language. In the above quotation, a general commitment to the same experience; on the one hand, a presentiment of the awfulness of the pass to which Germany has sunk, on the other a general presentiment that this slump has already been broached by the forbidding character of his lesson. Thus, it could not be argued that Heidegger's 'ontology' (the discourse upon Being, or the language that frames Being) is distinguishable from his Fascism, insofar as the character of both remains open to the public. It could not be argued that the 'proper' form of *heideggerianism* (if this term is taken to refer to the ontological project of giving an open and questioning response to the demands of Being) was mutilated for the sake of a political project. It could not, finally, be a question of effecting a return to a 'proper' project (like the overcoming of nihilism), but only a return to a form of inquiry; or, a forensic form. As Derrida shows, the central issue is not the 'necessary' qualification of 'Being'. Rather, as the previous chapter suggested, when Heidegger homes in on a single socio-political issue, designated as the most urgent, the ontological aspects of his inquiry ends and only the socio-political 'end' - both in the sense of an objective and a closure - could be emphasised. Further, as these ends continue to reverberate on a wider scene, this scene would

not be ontology 'in general' but the General in the sense of a public; even, as an interest in Heidegger spreads, an international public. That there are no peculiarly great issues for a Public to suffer or to face might be taken as a sign of general indifference. For Derrida, it rather suggests a new form of necessity or another kind of urgency. This could not be designated as the overcoming Nihilism (as the most urgent, distinctive or 'proper' project). Better to say, Derrida recasts positivism. If Heidegger detects a certain vacuity in positivism, a vacuity threatening to overwhelm the proper urgency of any issue, this threat to the public need not return to a Political forum. Oblivion, as a current phenomena, need not be rooted, as depressive indifference is not a purely local phenomena.

A consequence of this reading of Heidegger is there could never be a single most urgent fate. In 1946 Heidegger asked what it would mean to think a single term for Being, and suggested a term from Anaximander '*to khreon*': fate. Here, Being is qualified and is so 'necessarily' by the experience of this qualification. 1946 is certainly post-*kehre*. However, as the significance of the term '*kehre*' recedes because it cannot be attributed to a single revolution but only to a public appraisal, so the singular necessity of '*to khreon*' cannot be fixed: not to 'Being' nor, retrospectively, to the character of Being prior to the *kehre*, nor to Germany at the time of the NSDAP revolution. Which is *not* to say that no experience attaches to the effort to think what is necessary in the qualification of an event, merely that this necessity cannot be maintained as a singular experience, a question of commitment or 'Fate'. Heidegger translates this term, in fact, as '*Brauch*': usage, referring to a sense of enduring and of wearing down. Derrida, in his commentary,

translates the term as '*Maintien*': bearing<sup>35</sup>. The term, however, has the same root as '*khrematikos*': usury. This theme resurfaces in Derrida's White Mythology where the experience of venturing concepts in philosophical usage is described as wearying, but also as usuristic. If this residual sense of '*to khreon*' is ascribed to Heidegger's musing upon Anaximander, there would be a certain insolence; the discovery of possible meanings to which Heidegger's work had never aspired as though this was to the credit of Heidegger's text, a usuristic effect insofar as an appraisal of Heidegger profits from nuances his work had never commanded. However, so long as Heidegger insists upon a singularly pressing issue, or a most urgent issue, the question becomes one of how, in re-reading his work, the most pressing issue could be differentiated from these less pressing, or supplementary, concerns. Even, in fact, how those symptoms marking the qualification of the most pressing in its more or less suppressed state (pure Being, or pure Fate: '*to khreon*') could be differentiated from every other subsidiary or speciously associated symptom of this suppression. Finally, how could the public dimension of the Fate that, before the *kehre*, Heidegger publicly detected in Fascism be differentiated from the fate of loans and debts in an arena of international interpretation.

This is not a sophistical way of suggesting that Heidegger 'forgot' usury when he translated '*to khreon*'; i.e. that he suppressed the wider connotations in order to highlight Fate. Perhaps he did, but as the attribution of massive debts to Germany ensured it suffered the earliest and deepest effects of the Great Depression so Germany seems, in fact or in retrospect, to express the most urgent character of depression. Thus, to highlight Heidegger's 'forgetting' of usury as the central issue would

only be to again rationalise Heidegger's political project as the 'overcoming of oblivion'. This is not what Derrida does. His disingenuous refusal to specify any singular qualification of fate (either the 'original' one of *Being and Time*, or that denoted by the *kehre*, or even that accredited to the NSDAP) is expressed through a preference for reading across such qualifications ('either before or after the *kehre*' EM 148); as though indifferent to any peculiar nuance in his desperate search for a 'proper' form; i.e. the forensic or public form. Derrida's indifference to Heidegger's style, a style which depends upon framing distinctions, conspires to highlight this other symptom of indifference: every nuance is similar to every other nuance, there is no central or primary demand. This is not 'oblivion' as the most urgent problem but only oblivion *as such*, in general and through the General. Here, nothing attains the distinction of the 'most' urgent, whilst an inability to distinguish urgency is itself distinguished. Which is to say, *this other* inability becomes the worrisome quantity in Derrida's re-reading of Heidegger; symptomatic only of the disquieting way forensic issues, in general, become indiscernible. Depression is used here as a generic term for symptoms of public indifference. Depression does not express a singularly effective sense of vertiginous terror either demanding or defeating identification. It is, simply, a name for a common, or public, symptom of indifference.

The greatest insolence in Derrida's relation to Heidegger is his use of Economics. For Heidegger, the idle remains idle when it is understood in terms of values rather than in terms (like '*to khreon*') which strive, once more, to broach necessity<sup>36</sup>. However, through an economic accrediting of themes to Heidegger's work which could never, *originally*,

have been intended, the symptoms Heidegger detects in idle talk are once more positively broached and symptomatised. This insolent attribution of tags to Heidegger's work does not erase Heidegger's 'lesson' but suggests the multiplicity of ways such problems become *effective*; i.e. against the public's interest. Derrida's strategy can be seen in Heidegger's and his own treatment of Kant and Hegel.

Kant's disjunctive relation, a form understood as *Problematic*, suggests that before any judgement settles the issue between the conceptually viable and the redundant, there is an entirely hopeless sense of *community*. Hopeless in that no judgement is ever assured. However, Kant's formal framing of 'community' in the teeth of a hopeless *commercium* of discursive relations anticipates both indifference and a possible form standing over and against this indifference. Thus, Kant's formulation of the disjunctive relation could already be cast as a response to the terrors of communal life. This is Heidegger's position. In his lecture series of 1935-36, published as *What is a Thing?*, Heidegger applauds Kant's formal rigour when he speaks of the Architectonic of Kant's work:

*"Architectonic, the blueprint projected as the essential structure of pure understanding, is as little a mere 'ornament' as the critique is a mere 'censor'."*<sup>37</sup>

That is, just as critical judgement does not merely distinguish the viable from the inutile, so the formal expression of a work is not simply placed on top of the matter under consideration. Heidegger's project in *What is a Thing* is to highlight the form of Revolution which distinguishes the epoch of 'man' termed 'the Enlightenment'<sup>38</sup>. This thesis has taken the Enlightenment and the Classical age as synonymous.

Oddly, this does not wholly stand in contradiction to Heidegger's thesis on history. For Heidegger, Kant's formal questioning did not provoke a revolution in its form, but in what remains intractable by virtue of this form. Which is to say, Kant's work became revolutionary through the dark nature of the problem to which it was formally committed. Heidegger's What is a Thing? is at pains to point out that anything classically entailed by Kant's logic could be worked out by his followers; as indeed, Kant's own logical development could be traced back to his predecessors. However, such a project fails to account for Kant's original or revolutionary aspect. Heidegger is insistent that any such working out amounts to a failure of commitment as regards Kant's formal lesson. Thus, the epoch termed 'Enlightened' was not, yet, enlightened.

*"Contemporaries stood helpless before the work. It went beyond any thing customary by the elevation of its question-posing, by the rigour of its concept-formation, by the far-seeing organisation of its questioning, and by the novelty of the language and its decisive goal. ... Although not understood in its essential purpose, but always apprehended only from an accidental exterior, the work was provocative. An eager tug-of-war developed in writings opposing and defending it. Upto the year of Kant's death, 1804, the number of these had reached two thousand. ... Kant's work remained like an unconquered fortress behind a new front, which, in spite of (or perhaps because of) its vehemence, was already thrust into emptiness a generation later, i.e., it was not capable of generating a truly creative opposition."*<sup>39</sup>

Here, what is crucial is the thought that Kant's work projected an emptiness without it ever being understood to what extent and with what commitment Kant opposed this emptiness. Heidegger goes on to say that future writers either skirted around the problem Kant had brought forward, or leapt over him without ever being exercised by Kant's achievement. That is, his followers perpetuated or symptomatised the sense of abandonment provoked by Kant's questioning without ever

gleaning its essential, and essentially intractable, aspects. It was not seen to what extent logic had been "newly founded and transformed", indeed Kant himself had only a "presentiment of this revolution":

*"Kant has clearly arrived at this insight, but he has not developed it. ... such a task exceeds even the capacity of a great thinker. It demands nothing less than to jump over one's own shadow. No one can do this. However, the greatest effort in attempting this impossibility - that is the decisive ground-movement of the action of thought. ... Hegel alone apparently succeeded in jumping over this shadow, but only in such a way that he eliminated the shadow, i.e., the finiteness of man, and jumped into the sun itself. Hegel skipped over the shadow, but he did not, because of that, surpass the shadow. Nevertheless, every philosopher must want to do this. This "must" is his vocation. The longer the shadow, the wider the jump. This has nothing to do with a psychology of the creative personality. It concerns only the form of motion belonging to the work itself as it works itself out in him."<sup>40</sup>*

That is, the Kantian insight appears only in the fierce opposition to the shadow it casts. This earth shattering catastrophe did not, however, arrive with Kant but with a later collapse in post-Kantian thought. In fact (in 1935-36), a twentieth century collapse. Heidegger's historical thesis might utilise the term 'aufklärung' (Enlightenment) but more clearly breaks down into a division between Classicism and Modernity. This division is uncommon enough in philosophy but recognised in economics (and, coincidentally, in music), Modernity meaning, roughly, the Twentieth century. Heidegger's point is that the force of enlightenment lies in its opposition to the shadow its genesis propels. Without this opposition whatever is termed 'enlightened' is merely vapid. As regards the vacuity of classical philosophy, Hegel is symptomatic only of philosophy's dimmest aspirations. This is in line with Heidegger's earlier and later treatment of Hegel. In *Being and Time* Hegel's 'logic' (always denoted by quotation marks) is treated with contempt. Heidegger states:

"The 'dialectic', which has been a genuine philosophical embarrassment, becomes superfluous."<sup>41</sup>

That is, Hegel's work becomes superfluous with the working out of the real form of the modern Catastrophe. However, Hegel's work also becomes *embarrassing*; it is a sign of the general distress or insecurity that discrete and revolutionary currents have engendered under the smooth facade of the Classical age. Here, Heidegger's treatment of Hegel could seem paradoxical; at times he apparently approves of Hegel's work, at others to detest it. There is, in fact, no paradox; because Hegel is philosophically unsteady, he is symptomologically interesting. If there is a considered development appropriate to Classicism, it is one Hegel formally exemplifies. Behind this, Heidegger avers, there are symptoms of a distressing and abrupt catastrophe that threatens to break with the Classical world. Hegel would exhibit these symptoms *in addition* to anything especially Classical. Heidegger's intercession into this nihilistic pass is effected, at odd if not numerous times, by a certain reading Hegel. However, it is not to read Hegel in a classical spirit but in abjection; as an embarrassment, as symptomatic of the new currents that reach their head when the shadow of the Enlightenment becomes unbearable. However, if the embarrassment engendered by speculative philosophy is symptomatic of a barely suppressed and always imminent catastrophe, how is the presentiment of utter catastrophe to be differentiated from mere embarrassment? How is the feeling that man is finite, and hence Fatal, to be distinguished from the sense of embarrassment accompanying the reading of Hegel?

Derrida's reading of Heidegger departs from this point; from the smooth face of Classicism carrying perhaps minute but always excessive symptoms of discomfiture, troubling as one might be troubled by any excessive outlay in the business of speculation. *Hegel symptomises a crash*. Where Heidegger takes this effect to be a sign of finitude or of fatality, it cannot be distinguished from a fear of poverty. It is Freud who insists that Depression, which at its worst is a 'pure culture of the death instinct' is also a fear of poverty<sup>42</sup>. Heidegger's antipathy to idle talk, or to 'groundless' speculation is as much a presentiment of imminent bankruptcy as an experience of fate resolutely or revolutionarily recast. Derrida's *Of Grammatology* begins with this double sense of indifference; an indifference to the greater 'problems' of philosophy and an indifference that comes with the philosophical and economical ability to speculate on different matters with the same coins or conceptual schema:

*"However the topic is considered, the problem of language has never been simply one problem among others. ... The devaluation of the word 'language' itself, and how, in the very hold it has upon us, it betrays a loose vocabulary, the temptation of a cheap seduction, the passive abandonment to fashion, the consciousness of the avant-garde, in other words ignorance, are evidence of this effect. This inflation of the sign 'language' is the inflation of the sign itself, absolute inflation, inflation itself. Yet, by one of its aspects or shadows, it is itself a sign: this crisis is also a symptom."*<sup>43</sup>

If these symptoms of the imminence of a crash are strange disfigurements in Hegel's work they are also excessive in the crude catastrophe Heidegger sketches between Classicism to Modernity. It is not a question of the 'absolute', whether this is finitude or inflation, but of symptoms current *both* in Classical thought as in its Modern, and 'revolutionary', recasting. In Heidegger's account, Hegel anticipates a

revolution, a revolution delayed until affairs reach their utmost trough. As Derrida treats these symptoms positively, as signs rather than dogmatically determined signs of the absolute (the greatest, the worst etc.), so the revolution is perpetually deferred. In the break between Hegel and Heidegger, and in the differences that are to be accentuated between their work, the revolution is motioned towards, insisted upon, but also - it is suggested - somewhat astray, possibly already settled; as though the Classical face could not be distinguished from its obverse. Then again, the settlement of the argument between Hegel and Heidegger remains as credible as the irrevocability of their opposition. For this reason, for over ten years, Derrida promoted Hegel as though his texts were the exemplary texts of deconstruction. So much more discussion was given to Hegel than either Heidegger or Kant because, despite the incoherency attaching to the massiveness of their themes, Hegel's work is so much the more symptomatic of philosophy than any of his others. As those symptoms suggesting either a measure of discomfiture or an absolute and vertiginous terror are to the fore in Hegel's work, so Derrida re-reads Hegel's texts for the variety of ways in which these symptoms remain unconscionable, uneven, reminiscent of a revolution, and always *deconstructive*: to be read otherwise, both to the logic of the dialectic and to the fall into hopelessness detailed by Heidegger.

\* \* \* \*

On the value of redundancy for political discourses,  
or the economics of disquiet fluidity

Is Depression the end of Politics? The final possibility of Kant's disjunctive relation would place every element of a society in opposition to its concept. The concept expressing either the constitution of a political realm or a projected form of government might be less than an object of contention; it might have sunk entirely into indifference. Kant's last word, then, would be a hopeless community, its every element redundant or dead to the world. This possibility was broached in Ecclesiastes: "*what can the man do that comes after the king? even that which hath already been done.*"

There are other, Modern, ways to speak of a hopeless society. Kant's disjunctive relation enables the thought of an excremental community, to use Freud's calculus of life and death, gold and excrement. Depression, a culture of death and a fear of poverty, brings these two obsessions together<sup>44</sup>. It is, however, less a question of the proper form of Politics, of its sovereign institutions or its scatological inversion, than a question of the relation between the one and the other. That is, a question of the relations promoting this analogy; revelling in, even as they promise to dissipate, such morbidity. The last section looked at Heidegger's reading of Kant and his project to wrest the positive from an entirely hopeless situation. What is a Thing associates Kant with a deep, intractable shadow, the effects of which are exacerbated the longer they remain obscure. Heidegger's discovery of these dark forces proceeds from his re-reading of Kant, a reading that casts these forces in the

form of a lesson or *Paideuma*; i.e. a framework that puts such forces into question. This framework could be a democratic forum but only as democracy is overtaken by a revolution. In other instances, this form is the disjunctive relation itself, as it becomes the means by which the Will becomes committed to its distress. Here, the disjunctive relation is a mark of distinction for the Society willing to bear its lesson<sup>45</sup>.

Heidegger's account of the 'form' of society has intersected with every theme of this chapter: the question of how a society is habitually given to be understood; the question of how social discourse might be swayed in non-obvious ways; finally, how an understanding of society depends upon wholly intractable elements. In Kant's work, the realm of the Understanding is given only to the extent it confronts the '*noumenal*'; the unknowable. Heidegger's modernism exacerbates this confrontation. From this moment on, unconscionable currents will have flowed through every society. Now, a society will be distinguished only to the extent it faces upto unfathomable currents. The concluding section to this chapter looks, firstly, at the way one might elect to study effects which bypass the Understanding; or how a discourse might mark its failures as the most urgent issues. Finally, it looks at the way Derrida characterises such a discourse: its dreams, its secret effects and the failure of the Understanding to have presided over the effects in which it remains most interested.

For Heidegger the revolution, as a form or a lesson, is a singularly original way of qualifying necessity; or, as Heidegger has it, *Fate*. The previous section stressed Heidegger's view that Hegel ignores the darker side of a society, 'jumping the shadow' without confronting its depths.

This aspect of Hegel is alluded to in Derrida's translation of Hegel's term 'aufheben' as 'to relieve' [relevel]<sup>46</sup>. What is emphasised here, a *propos* Heidegger, is that every speculative synthesis is understood from within a process of alleviation and, in consequence, conspires to minimise all sense of distress. If the possibility of alleviation is always on the horizon, why worry? This is motioned towards, also, in the other meaning attached to the verb 'relever'; that every synthesis has replaced, or stood in for, the element that was originally disturbing. The emphasis upon 'relief' also intimates a criticism of Freud; at least, of Freud as he is reminiscent of Hegel. If the value of a cure is assured, is there any reason to listen to the ravings of a client? any other reason than to confirm the thoughts of the analyst? Derrida's use of 'relever' has one final significance; as Heidegger insists upon the mark distinguishing a society, so he has brought a certain issue into 'relief'. The last section deflated Heidegger's presumption in electing only certain effects as the most urgent. Derrida continues to read texts which betray other, more various, symptoms than those stressed by Heidegger. In short, Derrida's translation of the 'aufhebung' is intended to negotiate a way between the moments of interest in a work by (for instance) Hegel, and its others (such as those of Heidegger).

The Hegelian system, in brief, suggests the concept of a rational, coherent society is only an issue for those discourses exercised by such a concept, *qua* an object of dispute. If it happens that the subject discourse - here, a social 'we' - fails to agree upon its proper political object, the whole of a society might be alienated. Hegel speaks of such a community as an 'unhappy consciousness'. However, every speculative attempt to broach an issue is already a process of relief. In

consequence, the community which remains unhappy in every attempt to understand its concept, might, through a process of re-evaluation, come to identify with the Form of disputation; i.e. discourse itself may become an object, an end, a groundplan. The unhappy community, *in general*, comes to comprehend a proper Political position<sup>47</sup>. From this sketch, it can be seen that relief is always the *first* issue; Hegel's complacency is ripe for embarrassment. The similarity with Freud would be that, insofar as the depressed ego does not have an ideal object, an ideal self or Ego Ideal, it remains absorbed (or overshadowed) by a sense of the hopeless. However, there is a subject discourse - at least the one promoted by the analyst - that could re-present this loss to the depressed patient, if only the depressive could reach out as though it were retrieving a true self or lifting itself out of dereliction<sup>48</sup>. The criticism of Hegel and of Freud would be that, in continually offering a 'healthy' form to an indifferent host, they are complacent as regards the real terrors which beset Depression and blind to the evidence that nothing sanctions their forensic practices.

Derrida's forensic discourse negotiates between Hegel and Heidegger. These, opposed, thinkers are at their closest as they emphasise moments of discomfiture. Derrida emphasises 'excessive' traces in the works of Hegel and Heidegger, moments that are excessive to the extent that, even as they are brought into relief by both Hegel and Heidegger, do not have the same significance in their respective works; i.e. points at which neither begins to communicate, as such points mark their differences and their different interests. To use the language of textual exegesis exploited by Derrida, there are moments *in the text* that signal the closure *of the book*<sup>49</sup>. Here, 'text' would denote a broad discourse in

which the projected closure of a tract (the expression of an important difference) could be ventured only to the extent that elements having no place in such a project are also risked. To suggest such moments are still objects of disputation would mean a sense of commerce persists beyond the differences drawn between thinkers. Derrida, then, reads across the break Heidegger marks between his work and Hegel's and, in negotiating this breach, continues to remark upon the ways this difference exercises a strange, and strangely discursive, effect.

Whilst Heidegger expresses a distaste for Hegel's habit of passing over the most shadowy depths of depression, Derrida's reappraisal suggests Hegel's speculative jaunts stress numerous senses of discomfiture, not one alone; as will be seen. For Derrida, these various dispositions cannot be discounted simply because of the character of Hegel's dialectic (the dialectic itself is a symptom of discomfiture once Hegel's self-assurity is lost). Something *other than* relief continues to occur *outside of* the Hegelian book. Certainly, Hegel ventures the speculative object par excellence, wringing pure profit from disputation in utter indifference to what remains hauntingly unfathomable. However, his work is rich in peculiarly diffuse ways, ways that are not reducible to his own system, or systematic account of what profit looks like<sup>50</sup>. It might be argued that, as the process of relief is always the first issue, Hegel manifests a certain indifference. However, insofar as Derrida's work begins to negotiate different effects in Hegel, this air of speculative indifference will be distinguished in other ways.

In sum, the dialectic can be read as the possibility of many objects but to indulge this reading would be neither dialectical nor Heideggerian.

If Hegel's dialectic constructs the conditions for the possibility of a cohesive Politics, each time a symptom is found to be *both possible and* discomfoting as regards Hegel projected end, his speculations begin to weave other, discontinuous desires; for instance, Heidegger's fear of speculation but also other symptoms which continue to confound the sense of a singularly urgent issue. Which is to say, far from *constructing* the conditions for a Politics, any negotiation with Hegel finds his work *de-constructs* such conditions. For Derrida, the peculiar term, the unwonted turn of phrase, signals the multiplicity of desire. As regards any disposition the question is not 'how is this desire determined?' but, rather; how has desire been differentiated? When he asks "*What differs*" [D 15], he produces the answer '*différance*', a concept - an object - that differentiates desire, rather than having already been determined by reference to a desire for presence<sup>51</sup>. With this concept, which "*one cannot think ... on the basis of the present, or of the presence of the present*" [On ne peut penser ... à partir du présent, ou de la présence du présent D 22], he posits a text or a terrain '*woven of differences*' [D 21]. Here, Derrida's concepts take the form of a judgement; desire has been differentiated. There is, however, no longer a realm whose magisterial dignity remains assured by virtue of its Presence. For Derrida, the object *primarily* differentiates, it:

*"governs nothing, reigns over nothing, and nowhere exercises any authority. ... Not only is there no kingdom of différance, but différance excites the subversion of every kingdom. Which makes it obviously threatening and infallibly dreaded by everything within us that desires a kingdom, the past or future presence of a kingdom"* [D 22]<sup>52</sup>

With this judgement, then, it is not a matter of settling on one side or the other of a differentiation, to be either for or against, for

concentration over dispersal. The judgement cannot settle. Rather, it is a question of allowing the differences in this decision to continue to communicate. These matters will be broached in the Conclusion, here we will detail the political-economic form of this judgement.

The difference between Hegel and Heidegger continues to have a forensic significance. That is, either the embarrassment attaching to Hegel's work or the vertiginous distress associated with Heidegger's are discursive and social effects. As symptoms, they maintain a forensic significance before they are symptoms 'of' a Political catastrophe, a crash or imminent revolution. However, as symptoms they have been associated with Depression insofar as this significance resists representation (under a determined Political form) and insofar as their significance is to have made an issue of indifference. It was seen, above, that Freud suggested depressive states are the volteface of Narcissism; i.e. of the kind of representation offered in Narcissistic identification. It seems that the image of health, on the one side, is ever opposed to its symmetrical opposite: the shadow of health. This was not, however, Freud's final thought on depression. The fall from Narcissistic identification would mean the Depressive lay in shadows as though dead to the world. The evidence is that Depression continues to make itself felt, the shadow has a power. This was seen at the points where Hegel and Heidegger part company. If the diagnosis of depression cannot be identified with any position, what is Depression? Freud states that, at its gravest or most intractable, it remains similar to Mourning. Which is to say, an analogy persists between Melancholia and another disposition; an analogy that must be negotiated and rearticulated in order for Freud to refine his symptomology. In short, where a relation

of similarity persists, Freud begins to differentiate desire. Here, the distinction between absolute depression and mourning is that after a period of time the work of mourning ends and life begins over:

*"although mourning involves grave departures from the normal attitude to life, it never occurs to us to regard it as a pathological condition and to refer it to medical treatment. We rely on its being overcome after a period of time and we look upon any interference as useless or even harmful."*<sup>63</sup>

Freud would not interfere in the work of mourning. It is, however, unclear how mourning works. If the mourner has lost a uniquely personal object of affection, it cannot be suggested that a replicant object is of the same order. Only, perhaps, that the mourner begins again to appreciate the privacy of a personal object. However, such an object could not simply be private but only, as it were, private amongst the public; a public secret. The replicant object must, after all, have been an object 'out there'; an object of communication and exchange. Freud's argument, although not spelt out, appears to be that the mourner indulges in a measure of narcissism in choosing, anew, to relate to objects. If so, the mourner becomes socialised narcissistically. As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, the personal object must have undergone some form of change to be considered, now, as an object in General. What would it mean to become privately and discretely socialised into an arena of commerce and communication? In Depression this commercial aspect is emphasised, at the expense of any unified representation of the General. In *La démocratie ajournée* Derrida states that alternatives cannot be coded either 'for' or 'against', either for a unified form of the social or not. Nor taken to be for this representation of the social (say, the right) or not (its political opposite). Nor even represented as percentages of positions arraigned

around determined issues: 'for', 'against' or some fraction of each<sup>54</sup>. When he speaks of a 'Right of response' he intends something which:

*"allows for the citizen to be more than a fraction (in effect, to be privatised, and to a greater and greater extent)."*<sup>55</sup>

Derrida suggests the way the self is related to a chosen object results in an increasing sense of privacy, and social communication suffers by this. In reading Freud, it seems to be 'cured' of mourning is to be pushed into a new shadow; away from the public glare but within the public domain. The work of mourning lies, on the one hand, outside of the more or less totalitarian decisions demanded in analysis as in politics and, on the other, mourning's ends or aims maintain a discretion below the level of political representation. *All those who engage in commerce outside of the clearly delineated areas represented by government are to be privatised, as they are taken to pursue objectives with a private, even secretive, appeal.*

This, in embryo, is the argument between Keynesians and neo-classicists. The neo-classicist argues that Keynesians, of whatever political shade, have mistook the role and scope of government. Derrida is on the side of the neo-classicist. He shows that Government neither works in the way it is assumed, nor governs through the kind of representation that suits a logic of identification. He, even, detects totalitarianism in the attempt to determine what befits the commerce of the 'publics' by reference to Government. His work shows, for instance, that where Heidegger attempts to forge a firm decision in the face of distressing symptoms, his resoluteness towards such symptoms cannot discount the fact that his embarrassment at idle speculation is also a

symptom. In either instance, Heidegger remains distressed by effects which discomfort the social fabric. Where he promotes a rigour in the face of terror (as an affirmation of the 'public') he also displays discomfiture at the idleness of speculation; as though the work of the markets tended away from a proper political resolve. His attempt to weld the resolute in the teeth of distress is, then, never very far from the NSDAP's exploitation of economic xenophobia for political ends (as in their promotion of the Jew as stateless usurer). In both instances, it is as though the private were also anti-social, anti-government or unpatriotic. Heidegger's work, as much as NSDAP propaganda, profits from autism at a certain point; i.e. the habit of discounting an analogy between the fear for the state and the fear of the market, whilst politically profiting from their similarity.

The neo-classical argument is that commerce is an effect misrepresented by government; to be 'privatised' is not to end all socially valued forms of communication. Communication remains effective at a more or less discrete level and Governmental attempts to interfere in commerce fail to appreciate the kinds of negotiations entrained in private transactions. Freud is right not to interfere in the work of mourning, but is so because no form of communication will have followed the logic of self-assertion on a massively public scale. However, while obscure currents or objectives play a part in the commercium despite being unsusceptible to political framing, the question remains what being 'privatised' or becoming private in the public domain means. If it is simply anti-Government as anti-totalitarian, neo-classicism will have failed to account for the ways the public might come to depend upon the secretive nature of commercial affairs. Derrida's distinction is to

remain with this problem, to think a form in which such processes remain communicative in their obscurity, as they differentiate themselves in obscurity. It would be disastrous to simply release great commercial passions into the public realm in such a way as to command all of the commercium in secret. Here, the privatisation of utility and communication monopolies can be compared with prohibition in narcotics; the privacy with which such deals are effected continues to excite a society, on increasingly broader scales and in ways that enforce unreflected, determined responses. In ways that ensure either passive consumption or passive acquiescence to an official judgement. Derrida is far from being anti-government. He does not wish to sink into privacy as into autism, nor to allow discrete responses to be entrenched in a way that ensure the same responses are replicated on wider and wider scales. He applauds a form attuned to different sorts of issues, alongside the recognition that such issues might remain obscure even as they are publicised in a variety of ways.

Symptoms are ever brought into social relief and are so discretely, what remains intractable in the symptom is its communicative effect; as their effect seems so much like an indifference to communication, or a failure of communication. What is significant in mourning is not that it is self-curing, this would simply mean that as it slipped into semi-privacy it ceased to be significant. Nor is it supremely significant that Depressive indifference is deathly; an utter disregard for the self does not imply self-extirpation, so long as Depression remains insistent. Depressive dispositions are distinguished through indifference and are further differentiated despite this indifference. In Freud's analogy from Mourning to Melancholia it can be seen that Narcissism is not an issue.

As both Mourning and Melancholia display an indifference to the self this is to be interpreted, on the one hand, by the fact that Narcissism cannot represent depression and, on the other, that the symptom of indifference cannot be associated with an indifference to a speculative or arbitrarily imposed Ideal object. It is, then, the other form of depression that is of interest. Freud's analogy between mourning and melancholia suggests that forensic distinctions are communicated through similarities. However, the difference between the one disposition and the other becomes an issue - an object for forensics - in ways that defer any absolute similarity.

The virtue of Economies is to deal in similar objects, only by virtue this fact could economic transactions be effected. It has become a truism of economics that cash is like any other commodity, its basis being that, in general, commodities are becoming like any other form of cash. Here, Keynes's critique gathers force. Firstly, as he notes that cash is all anyone could desire, at the expense of other commodities:

*"Unemployment develops ... because people want the moon; - men cannot be employed when the object of desire (i.e. money) is something which cannot be produced and the demand for which cannot be readily choked off. There is no remedy but to persuade the public that green cheese is practically the same thing and to have a green cheese factory (i.e. a central bank) under public control."<sup>56</sup>*

As money is all anyone might desire, so money might be anything. As can be detected from the tone of the above quotation, Keynes has come to despise an ethos which wallows in the indifferent similarity of cash. Like Heidegger, with his discounting of all analogies, Keynes regards the easy translatability of any form of currency with disquiet. Elsewhere Keynes states the desire for money is a desire for liquidity, the desire

to be abruptly and freely mobile in all commercial decisions<sup>57</sup>. He argues money might promote a sense of free-floating liquidity but does not deliver it. The above quotation comes from a section on interest-rates. Keynes's analysis is designed to show how expectations surrounding demand for money incline to set high rates of interests. As money is the general commodity of exchange, its interest rate dominates any other form of interest, and - as Keynes argues - is always higher than any other form of interest<sup>58</sup>. The demand for money, and the extortionate interest rates determined through this demand, cripples an economy and produces the liability of unemployment. Amidst this general and indifferent property of money, then, Keynes detects pernicious effects. The surprise of his thesis lies in his detecting other forms of interest in addition to those applying to money.

Thus, secondly, Keynes insists that different commodities be distinguished in their economic action, an action articulated around the different rates of interest applying to every commodity ('Interest' meaning the quantity of any commodity that, on a futural date, would have to be produced to be credited as equal with a given commodity at the present time: in effect, a calculus of delivery schedules). Keynes answer, as in the above quotation, is to control money so, as its distinctive interest rate comes to dominate an economy, it does not exert an impossibly upward pressure on other interest rates, to the detriment of investment in production. What is distinctive in Keynes's analysis is the way a variety of demands are distinguished through the single desire for fluidity. This ends with him acknowledging that, in desperate times, there will be ways in which the desire for fluidity will have no positive economic effect but, in a way that remains intractable

to analysis, will continue to sway an economy. Which is to say, desire will not cash out simply as a demand for money, ending with the discounting of other demand schedules. Rather, the ways in which money flows after the redundant will never reflect upon the possibility of financing a productive enterprise. Here Keynes economy gets dark, even black<sup>69</sup>. What is of interest, as in other Modernists, is his realisation that deathly effects, dead-money, inertia, continue to have a social if secret effect, to the detriment of the idea of a stable social sphere.

The great similarity between Keynes and Heidegger is the way they place the whole of their mistrust, although not the weight of their respective analyses, upon speculation and the blind faith that economic relief is the first issue. They both argue that speculation has somehow conspired in a general mood of indifference. Further, that the uncommitted or free-floating must finally be overtaken by a greater sense of commitment. For Heidegger, by a public commitment to the imperatives of Fate. For Keynes, by an utter commitment to the espousal of any stock, until death. Insofar as the interest of their respective works hinges upon the 'deeper' issues they differentiate, issues which undermine 'classical' forms of exchange, there remains the question of how these issues are elided in speculation and, even, how these issues are negotiated in such a way as to maintain their essential difference from 'mere' speculation. These, apparently, secondary concerns remain disquieting when it is realised that the call of Being might, sometimes, be similar to the call for economic protectionism, or that a commitment unto death might be more or less like the purchase of a stock, as green cheese might be similar to money. Keynes and Heidegger can only communicate and differentiate the issues they hold to be the most

pressing through indifferently exploiting the effects of analogies, a logic they have affected to despise, or regarded as an embarrassment.

It has been noted, above, that Derrida reads speculative dialectics positively, as a discourse in which positive effects become current. Derrida is not following speculation but, rather, treating speculation as a discourse entraining positive effects (effects brought into relief). Derrida reads the way that such effects interfere in an economy not as unsocial effects, which Heidegger and Keynes are wont to, but as effects which suggest another form to the social sphere and the kind of communication at work there. He is, then, taking the modern element of other philosophers - their attention intractable elements - but recasting it as symptomatic of social discourse rather than the presentiment of a final crisis. As he states:

*"différance maintains our relationship with that which we necessarily misconstrue" [D 21]<sup>60</sup>*

The distinction of such writers as Keynes, Freud and Heidegger is to analyse effects that upset an economy. Their analyses falter when they consider the realm they believe differs from such effects. Often, both Keynes and Freud treat the redundant or unconscionable as a reservoir of unregarded matter: as a pool from which unsocial effects are drawn. Even as intractable matter that could be reclaimed, set to work differently, cured. Keynes in fact, treats the whole economy as though it had a margin of such matter; a margin it could, possibly, occupy. In this regard Neo-keynesians are more consistent, if less ambitious. As they treat an economy as a manifold of industries they regard margins as appropriate to separate industries. It is certain that separate

industries work at less than full-capacity<sup>61</sup>. Keynes's mistake lies in his attributing a margin of potential to a country. A country does not 'have' an unproductive margin. If productivity increases it has not drawn upon a reservoir, nor turned inutile matter into utile. A similar mistake is evident in Freud. When the 'ego' is apprised of new objects, it has not drawn these objects from a reserve at 'its' disposal. It could not, then, depend upon an ability to such objects to good effect<sup>62</sup>.

A postulated margin of utilisation clearly will be conflated with the redundant. If a modern virtue is to treat the intractable as intractable, even as it works to upset the economy, this silent effect will be confused with the merely unutilised from which an economy draws its next breath. These different margins will be conflated because they are not oppositional. If the economy is never the same, it works as it is upset and works anew as it is upset. Heidegger learnt to live with this problem. His post-kehre work insists whatever is unfathomable should remain so, for the sake of an economy or a way of dwelling which was never the same through this effect<sup>63</sup>. This, if not to the extent it is stressed, remains a Kantian problem. In his First Critique Kant, suggests the framework which gives the conditions for the possibility of experience is always under duress. In effect, the realm of the Understanding is exercised in a way which escapes or remains 'excessive' to its proper economy. Here, Kant speaks of an island of the Understanding surrounded by an unfathomable ocean. Speaking of 'the territory of pure understanding' he says:

*"This domain is an island, enclosed by nature itself within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth - enchanting name! - surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther*

*shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion. Before we venture on this sea, to explore it in all directions and to obtain assurance whether there be any ground for such hopes, it will be well to begin by casting a glance upon the map of the land which we are about to leave, and to enquire, first, whether we cannot in any case be satisfied with what it contains - are not, indeed, under compulsion to be satisfied, inasmuch as there may be no other territory upon which we can settle; and secondly, by what title we possess even this domain, and can consider ourselves as secured against all opposing claims."*<sup>64</sup>

Heidegger's distinction lies in his realisation that philosophy is riven to the core by effects it only fails to appreciate. Whatever remains secure, fails to approach the strange currents that impress upon its 'fate'. Where 'we' are, or understand ourselves to be, continues to be troubled by such effects. What Heidegger understands as 'dwelling', emerges from this confrontation with the sea. However, what Heidegger fails to appreciate (and Kant only hints at in his last clause), is that the home is articulated by virtue of the sea. Heidegger's problem, as ever, is his failure to communicate this difference: on the one hand, his home and that other home, 'the native home of illusion'; on the other, the currents which exercise 'his' home and the currents which, through their fluidity, elaborate other and differing homes. What he continues to resist is the possibility that every issue is immanent only to the sea, in its economy or in the fluidity of economics. In fact, that his homeland is articulated by virtue of an economy, in its every inflexion, rather than 'of' the home or the desire to maintain its habitual status. Here, it is not a question of determining a common desire (or demand) as a proper or final position, to the exclusion of another. It is not that desire distinguishes certain objects as representative of a mooted ideal; rather, the variety of issues within an economy differentiate

demand. The form of desire is the free-market. The question is, how to maintain this freedom in a way that tends to differentiate, rather than reenforce the same, repetitive habits?

\* \* \* \*

Hegel's work attempts to rationalise the unknown; it might be read as an attempt to negotiate a path through an economy. On the one hand, Hegel constantly identifies the experience of the unknown with the occupation of the unknown; his unhappy consciousness is both symptomatic of effects disfiguring an economy and an agent capable of changing the face of an economy. Both the Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Right recognise, even enfranchise, unhappiness as it fills a useful role; i.e. misery becomes a mark of self-sacrifice in favour of the State. However, on the other hand, what is unusual in Hegel is not that he conflates the potentially utile and the redundant but that he also distinguishes such motifs in increasingly distinctive ways. Certainly, the Phenomenology provides a rationale for the Statist prejudice through the motif of the dead. However, if Hegel describes a community absorbed by dead or redundant elements, such elements do not become productive. The dead represent a margin of inutility, but a margin that could never be occupied. Hegel's thesis suggests an economy is maintained only through a massive investment in dereliction<sup>66</sup>. The dead or the derelict are adopted as objects of care; as dead sons, consigned to death as to a destiny. In the Phenomenology the relations between women and men are given as both effects of inutility and of inhibited communication. Women, excluded from the work of an economy, lend that economy an air of lost yet, possible cohesion through the influence they exert in mourning the dead or highlighting the family; a possibility that again suggests

dialectical relief. Similarly, men are useless in the home but the resentment they feel in leaving their homes for work continues to be symptomatic of an economies forsaken order<sup>66</sup>. Hegel highlights motifs of redundancy, insisting these motifs exert an effect in excess of their determination as inutile, forgotten or decrepit. Derrida attempts to think a more elliptical or wandering form around these signs, the symptoms Hegel's dialectic promotes, and exploits as sign-posts on the way to a fully stable and coherent society.

Derrida's other form is termed an Ellipse. The immediate connotation, drawn from writing, is the mark of punctuation; the sign that a sentence has skipped a beat. If the sentence continues to make sense, it does so 'economically' through its brevity. The other connotation is geometrical. An ellipse has two focal points feeding their respective arcs into the other's trajectory but, also, eliding the completeness of their own arc as well as that of their other. The first focal point might be termed Hegelian or Heideggerian, insofar as they have begun to communicate or have seemed to share similar concerns; at least, that Politics is the primary issue in economics. If this first position promotes a society absorbed by dereliction, its opposite would be a wholly dissolute economy; a sea of indifference. The Ends of Man speaks, on the one hand, of the "*occidental orb of metaphysics*" and the sense of political closure found there whilst, on the other, speculating upon an alien place this 'orb' is aware as though of a "*mirage*". The detour through this mirage, as the connection between the near and the far focal points, would "*as much as perceiving philosophy ... consist in perceiving the desert. For this other space is neither philosophical nor desert-like, that is, uncultivated.*"<sup>67</sup>

In White Mythology Derrida forms an ellipse between the speculative work of Hegel or Plato, on the near side, and the work of Bataille or Nietzsche, on the other<sup>68</sup>. This passage looks back to From a Restricted to a General Economy which negotiates between Hegel and Bataille; a closed economy reliant upon excessive symptoms of redundancy, versus, a General economy where any excess has ceased to bear the weight of this closure. This movement from a sense of absorbed closure to indifferent fluidity is described, in textual terms, in the short paper Ellipsis:

*"Here or there we have discerned writing: a non-symmetrical division designated on the one hand the closure of the book, and on the other the opening of the text. On the one hand the theological encyclopaedia and, modelled upon it, the book of man. On the other a fabric of traces marking the disappearance of an exceeded God or of an erased man. The question of writing could only be opened if the book was closed. The joyous wandering of the graphein then became wandering without return. The opening into the text was adventure, expenditure without reserve. And yet did we not know that the closure of the book was not a simple limit among others? And that only in the book, coming back to it unceasingly, drawing all our resources from it, could we indefinitely designate the writing beyond the book."*<sup>69</sup>

Here 'writing' carries those traces which communicate, elliptically, between a form of Political closure (i.e. social cohesion, in every discourse) and non-Political indifference. Ellipse insists the difference between the book and the text is a difference in the text. Thus, that the difference between a sense of closure and the opening of fluidity is a difference in that opening; i.e. in an open and fluid economy. Every differentiation is immanent only to the fluid relations between terms which Derrida, here, describes as 'text'.

The Ends of Man compares Heidegger's homely obsessions with the kinds of indifference it associates with Nietzsche's Zarathustra:

"He burns his texts and erases the traces of his steps. His laugh will then burst towards a return which will no longer have the form of a repetition of metaphysical humanism, nor no more, of a 'beyond' of metaphysics, that of a memorial or of the guard of the meaning of being, that of the house and of the truth of being. He will dance, outside the house, that *aktive Vergeszllichkeit*, that 'active forgetting' and that cruel (*grausam*) feast of which the *Genealogy of Morals* speaks. No doubt that Nietzsche called for an active forgetting of Being; it would not have the metaphysical form imputed to it by Heidegger." 69 70

This passage resembles those verses of *Ecclesiastes* where the house of mourning is opposed to the house of feasting, or the 'long home' to the *agon*. The Nietzschean dances outside the home, indifferent to its shadow. However, from Derrida's passage, it is impossible to tell if this dance occurs 'in' active forgetting, or *outside* of active forgetting (as active forgetting is *within* the feast). The point is that a sense of closure - of the inside and outside - remains *open* but only elliptically. A sense of closure does not determine a definite region or locale but continues to be insistant in the economy which opens in indifference. Which is to say, in a pure and fluid economy where every object is similar (or similarly like cash). The passage, above, ends with the question 'who, we', a question this ellipse is intended to frame as an "economy of the eve"<sup>74</sup>. Here, the discourse of a society is found to circulate around, rather than be contained by, definite national or local boundries. The symptoms bearing the uncertainties of the Political, like a sense of civic mourning, are communicated through an economy which escapes all sense of closure. This sense of text, in its economy, is referred to in *La Différance*:

"So the text of metaphysics is *comprehended*. Still readable, and to be read. It is not surrounded but traversed by its limit, its insides marked by the multiple furrows of its margin. At once promoting the monument and the mirage of the trace, the trace simultaneously traced and effaced, simultaneously living and dead, as always living also through

*the simulation of life in its guarded inscriptions. A pyramid. Not a boundary-stone to be vaulted, but stone-like, upon a wall, to be deciphered otherwise, a text without a voice."*<sup>72</sup>

This passage is markedly similar to Kant's account of the island of understanding and its other. It is reminiscent, also, of Heidegger as the pyramid represents both a home and a tomb; i.e. it refers both to dwelling, and dwelling upon man's finitude. It is, finally, reminiscent of Hegel as the pyramid reflects the hierarchy of the dialectic, or the elevation of the Political over the economic. The difference between the state and its dereliction, between the Pit and the Pyramid, is to be read otherwise. The law of the land will be found to open with the experience of fluidity, which by virtue of its elliptical form is less absolutely fluid or utterly dissipated than always differentially compelling.

Kant's image of the land and the sea teaches the difference between understanding and experience; a shifting, mirage-like experience. The stability of the understanding will always be threatened by the vagaries of experience. Here, Derrida is asserting that the difference between the understanding and experience is itself an elliptical effect; which is to say, an experience. The difference between the intelligible and the legible is a difference in the legible; legibility being an almost pure experience of the unintelligible<sup>73</sup>. Finally, as the next chapter will show, the difference between nations and commerce is a difference in commerce. A difference saturating every opening into commerce.

### Chapter Three: *On a world economy*

*"Fascio: a thousand candles together blaze with intense brightness. No one candle's light damages another's. So is the liberty of the individual in the ideal and fascist state." Ezra Pound: Visiting Card ('1942')*

Ezra Pound wrote his Visiting Card in Italian to his adopted countrymen. As a greeting, or an introduction, it remains obscure. The Visiting Card contains thirty-three short sections with no obvious or intended order. Pound's earlier ABC of Economics (1933) contained this aside:

*"I am not proceeding according to Aristotelian logic but according to the ideogramic method of first heaping together the necessary components of thought."<sup>2</sup>*

The Visiting Card, in conformity with the 'ideogramic method', is a more or less derelict variety. Nevertheless, certain things remain clear. Firstly, through a visiting card, Pound wishes to communicate. Secondly, this aim is to be opposed to usury. Pound quotes Berlin wartime radio:

*"The revolution, or the revolutions of the nineteenth century, defined the idea of liberty as the right to do anything that does not injure others. But with the decadence of the democratic - or republican - state this definition has been betrayed in the interests of usurers and speculators."<sup>3</sup>*

The Visiting Card promotes a framework that remains with the unknown ("We think because we do not know."<sup>4</sup>) as it resists imposing pre-ordained solutions. The Fascio remains faithful to the idea of liberty by standing out against an ethos which exploits and betrays openness and liberty. Pound suggests the conflict between liberty and usuristic exploitation reflects upon a deeper structure:

*"We find two forces in history: one that divides, shatters, and kills and one that contemplates the unity of the mystery"<sup>5</sup>*

The Fascio maintains this mystery, in its unity; as though it were an imperative. The Fascio discovers unity, as it resembles the dereliction of an ideogram rather than division and death *per se*. Usury merely exploits division. Pound's treatment of usury never varied, even after he ceased identifying its enjoyment solely with English bankers or a 'judaeocracy' (*"The war in which brave men are being killed and wounded ... began - or rather the phase we are now fighting began - in 1694, with the foundation of the Bank of England."*<sup>6</sup>). He later stated:

*"Usury, a charge for the use of purchasing power, levied without regard to production, sometimes without regard even to the possibility of production."*<sup>7</sup>

When it comes to production, usury is nowhere. The conditions for the possibility of production could only be a social form; like the Fascio. The Fascio determines the possibility of production openly, without distorting its 'true' nature. The Fascio, in its variety, maintains both production and what Pound terms the 'increments of association'<sup>8</sup>. The justice of the Fascio does not *simply* refer to a socially equitable distribution; it is an image of various, distinct components maintained in a working form. The term 'Fascio' refers to the sceptre - a bundle of twigs wrapped around an axe - which signalled the opening of a roman court.

In *La différance* Derrida slips from this image into economics. Deconstruction has been understood through this move; from a political form to its other. Here, Derrida exploits a French term derived from the same root as 'fascio'; 'faisceau' [sheaf]. Derrida depends less upon this image than upon its wider elaboration in writing, as writing; provides

the trace of any image; becomes inhibited in its fluidity as it ventures such a trace; finally, promotes secret effects around a specific image, across its *other* pages or in-and-out of its *multiple* folds. Here, 'writing' is an example of a deconstructive effect. It is when Derrida accounts for the term 'oikesis' that the distinctiveness of this move is elaborated, as an economy of Mourning:

"... the difference is not heard, it dwells in silence, as secret and discrete as a tomb: *oikesis*. Let us then mark, in anticipation, the place, the familial residence and familiar tomb where the *economy of death* is produced through *différance*." [D 4]<sup>9</sup>

The silent difference is the one Derrida omits to make; there is no connection between the Greek term for the home (*oikos*) and the tomb. Derrida, however, speculates upon this connection only through an analogy, he says 'as a tomb'<sup>10</sup>. *La différance* exploits the analogy, and the silence of the analogy. This silence would be like the one between the Fascio and the economy of death. The silence of an impossible representation of the perfect forum is likened to the silence associated with death or redundancy. Or, the disequilibriums which might silently undermine the just distribution of the Fascio is likened to another order where secret disequilibriums are always already in effect. It is the secret of the movement from the one to the other that interests Derrida; not the obscure effects locked within either the Fascio or the tomb. Derrida is writing of the economy of silence rather than the silence 'of' the forum or its end. An economy wherediscrete effects become insistant but cannot be placed.

These effects, as economic effects, disturb Pound. He remains anxious that production be maintained in such a way that its providence is

evident, its intensity never dimmed. Like Keynes, Pound does not believe production ends when it ceases to be evident, only that if it is not maintained in such a way, it will tend towards pure dereliction (Keynes: *"This is a nightmare which will pass away with the morning"*<sup>1</sup>). Pound worries, like Keynes or Heidegger, that unregulated speculation, promoted without regard to the form of a social need or demand, allows production to slip out of the light. Neither Pound, nor Keynes nor Heidegger consider any form of association other than the one represented as a social forum. Pound, above all, worries that as the separate components of such an association become dimmed these components - in short, people - lose the benefits of the collective advantage. He is anxious that countrymen, and even whole countries, could be forced into redundancy as though they were disenfranchised. *Which is to say, he is exercised by an economic problem but represent this problem under a Political form.* He is not simply anxious that one person's light might suffer privation within a forum but, also, that whole forums might be passed over in a usuristic attitude which only fails to be impressed by the imperatives of the Fascio.

Pound wrote his Visting Card as an alien; it is already an intra-national communication. He intends, however, that the relations it offers should be dissociated from usury, as usury is an anti-social or alien affection. He insists his Card is less a communication than an unexpected service; stating he could perform no *"more useful service"* than to lay an ideogram before his hosts<sup>2</sup>. The quality of the ideogram has been given as a loose connection of components; Pound's surprise missive similarly inhibits easy interpretation. He forces his audience to abjure anything smacking of usury. As the form of an ideogram is not

pregiven, no speculative solution could be equal to it. The ideogram only demands silent consideration. Pound, then, exploits a breakdown in communication in order to spring a surprise. Despite comparing the Fascio to an ideogram, he insists the form of neither resembles anything borrowed from another source. He does so as he appeals to a forum without hope of profit, whilst hoping that the analogy between the Fascio and the ideogram should strike a chord; on the one hand, the 'heap' of the ideogram, on the other, the perfection of the Fascio. Here, there are a whole series of strange analogies and dissociations. Whilst the Fascio is dwelt upon in silence, usury spreads its poison in near secrecy. To understand the Fascio, it must be distinguished from usury. It should also, however, be compared (in its perfection) with a sense of dereliction, even though usury also symptomises division and death. The Fascio, finally, is an international possibility, elaborated through analogies and comparisons; but chiefly through the inhibition of such relations, through division and through a commitment to division. Here, international possibilities mean nothing, convey nothing, neither borrow nor lend anything. The Fascio is an economic problem, concerning economic relations and their failures, but is represented as Political problem; a question of political justice within an association of loose, but bound, peoples.

The outline to a contemporary problem will be seen, here: are we to valorise a New World Order modelled upon an open forum, either an open market or the United Nations? Are we to cure economic problems through the political ideal of an international forum? Would a New World Order excuse or perpetuate economic's secret genius for distributing profit almost arbitrarily? A great genius, possibly an evil genius; a genius

known, in parts of the world, as *The Great Satan* and identified either with the socio-political grouping termed 'America', or that other, less tangible set, called the West. This problem has a history. The idea of a world order does not predate Christianity. It will be argued that the spread of the church has depended upon a kind of economic logic. Further, that the church promotes an analogy between politics and economics but approves only those conclusions which resemble the Political. These claims will be broached in the following three sections:

- i) An account of the relation between credit and faith in the growth of the ecumenical church and the spread of economic markets. The argument being that faith is sanctioned as it resembles credit, and credit is attacked as it is associated with infidelity and usury.
  
- ii) A study of the benefits associated with a Political order in the economy of world relations. It will be argued that the providence of a State is articulated by virtue of external trading relations; i.e. economic relations. Further, such benefits are neither 'of' the State, nor are they *sustained* by economic relations. Rather, the Economic is the site of the dispersal of providence, distributing certain benefits as it withholds others; promoting suspicion as easily as any sense of assurity.
  
- iii) A brief study of the conditions informing the origin of anti-trust laws. It will be argued that, now, it is *generally* taken to be a virtue of economics to communicate a sense of disruption and suspicion alongside every economic trend.

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## On the virtues of credit in the economy of world relations

Derrida's account of deconstruction often focuses on writing. An account of the spread of ecumenical society, in step with Derrida's work, could begin with incunabula. The Franciscan, Luca Pacioli, published the first Western account of an Arabic innovation in bookkeeping: double-entry. Fra Pacioli owes a great debt to the infidel. The sections quoted, below, concern credit. Pacioli will be seen to bind the ideal form of the 'universal' - represented by the catholic Church - with the sphere of usury, in general. It might be thought the championing of credit relations, through an analogy with catholic Faith, would have been recieved with shock. The enjoyment of usury, forbidden to the faithful, remained restricted to the infidel. This restriction, although it did not survive the spread of banking technology in the fifteenth century<sup>13</sup>, remains a tendentious problem. Keynes cites the Schoolmen's attempts to distinguish a form of credit which reflects and bears the needs of a community from other types of interest. After admitting he had once seen such distinctions as "*jesuitical attempts to escape from a foolish theory*"<sup>14</sup>, Keynes argues the distinction is sound. This is Pound's position; for him, the Fascio represents the attempt to provide for a form of social credit over anti-social usury. Pound, whilst applauding the wisdom by which "*sodomy and usury were seen coupled together*" and hoping that any rebirth of the Church, both "*one and Catholic*", would once more abjure these two, similar, crimes against nature<sup>15</sup>, held banks modelled after the Medici *Monte dei Paschi* provide the conditions for the possibility of civilisation, as they provide for a form of social credit<sup>16</sup>. Pacioli's introduction to accountancy begins:

"As is known, three things are necessary to one who wishes diligently to carry on business. Of these the most important is cash, or any other substantial power, without which the carrying on of business is very difficult.

It has happened that many, entering business with nothing but good faith have yet carried on big business; and through their credit, faithfully served, they have attained to greater wealth. In our conversations with persons throughout Italy, we have come across many of these; and in the great republics the word of a good merchant is considered sufficient, and oaths are taken on it saying: 'it is the word of a real merchant'. This cannot be admiration, as catholically everybody is saved by faith, without which it is impossible to please God.

The second thing looked for in business is to be a good accountant and sharp book-keeper and to arrive at this, as we have seen above, we have regular rules and canons necessary to each operation, so that any diligent reader can understand all by himself. If one does not understand this well, the following would serve him in vain.

The third and last thing necessary is that all one's affairs be arranged in good order so that one may get, without loss of time, all particulars as to the Debit and also the Credit of all of them, as business does not deal with anything else. This is very useful, because it would be impossible to conduct business without due order of recording; for without rest, merchants would always be in great mental trouble." Pacioli (1494)<sup>17</sup>

Before turning to the necessity of cash, the foundation of the system, it is as well to note Pacioli's lesser two necessities. He claims certain, generally intelligible, rules enable any reader to conduct business in an acceptable way; in fact, that the rules and canons of accountancy enable all kinds of business to be approached in a similar fashion. At one level, Pacioli's enthusiasm for geometric rules only promotes the contemporary view that geometry, in its divine proportion, provides a universal framework for vastly different ventures: painting, architecture, music, philosophy and, now, business. This faith in the universality of geometry informs a kind of emancipation; geometric paradigms free, rather than restrict, thought. They enable the promotion of different abilities in a generally intelligible way; they are catholic

in the secular sense. A Platonist holds geometry is already known to all peoples. Instruction in its paradigms only makes this property of the human intellect self-evident. At this level, Pacioli elaborates a community of the *diligent* insofar as everyone is diligently schooled. However two other points might be emphasised. *Firstly*, Pacioli addresses a literate, secular society through a printed book. Writing is not itself geometrical, nor do geometrical patterns dominate the kinds of communication made possible through writing. The Platonist argues geometry is universal, *literacy patently is not*. When Plato revealed a slaves innate knowledge of geometry, this pathic had first to become impressed by a graphic representation standing in flat contradiction to the universality of geometry; geometric figures are eternally present, their traces in the sand are lost in an instant'<sup>8</sup>. *Secondly*, with the inclusion of Arabic numerals into Hellenic geometry the idea of the geometric paradigm is transmuted. In double-entry, sums are balanced as they are cancelled at zero. The zero is not a figure in the Hellenic sense, it is not a material quantity as compound integers are; it is, decidedly, not susceptible to squaring and cubing as a physical component of space. Both these points raise questions upon the translatability of geometric paradigms into other, differing ventures. If translation *does occur*, rather than geometry itself being the sole true basis of every venture, it would seem the currency of geometry lies in its being applicable in analogous ways in differing situations. In short, that the *translation* of geometry takes priority over its paradigmatic virtues. Further, that translation, or transliteration, is the currency of universality, not geometry itself, in its immediacy. Is Pacioli's lesson, then, primarily on writing and translation? With the infiltration of the zero into his systems this line of thought becomes ineluctable; the zero

marks and fills a space that would not otherwise be apparent and signals an equalisation that would not have occurred without the adoption of Arabic double-entry. The metaphorisation of geometry becomes clearer as it is realised the stability reached with zero - with the cancelling of equal quantities - is not geometric stability in the Greek sense. It is a *speculative* stability given *literal* credence through the zero but entailing change; growth: '*greater wealth*', Debit and Credit.

Pacioli third necessity lies in 'good order', necessitated through the premium placed on time. Pacioli believes credit enables capable but financially disadvantaged members of a community to become valued participants in commerce; in effect, to be enfranchised. As Pacioli talks of the substance and chiefest power of business he also speaks of the necessity of rest and the possibility of anxiety, as though these were accidental or supplementary symptoms. Interest on credit is calculable on the basis of time. A usurer grows richer with every period a debt remains outstanding. Pacioli's suggestion that organisation and rest help business is far from platitudinous, there exists a real source of anxiety. Pacioli's argues that so long as business is conducted in a time-conscious manner then any interest due will reflect the 'real', rather than accidental or unhappy, aspects of any enterprise; he promotes a sense of freedom, a freedom enjoyed with the diligent observation of business mores. If business is both sound and capably run, there is no need to fear credit, far from inhibiting business the extension of credit reflects its soundness and the acumen of its operator. There is, clearly, an obverse side. Alongside the liberation promised in a time of open, incrementally increasing but essentially *Just* business there remains the spectre of a time when anxiety reigns.

Which is to say, when time is smothered in shadows and the freedom from *self-incurred* debts would be a freedom from the cares of business. The dream of liquidity like the dream of inertial death.

The lesser two necessities for business, as has been, concern rules and reckoning. In each instance, something akin to cash might be emphasised; i.e. something with the property of universal translatability that may, also, articulate the time of business. Thus, of the three things necessary in business the foremost is Cash: the language of the community Pacioli describes. If the language is, univocally, fiscal, it is so because it is expressed as a single, substantial power; as credit-cash, and any other commodity could be substituted so long as it carries the virtues of credit. Pacioli speaks of the catholic sphere as one in which everyone is redeemed through Faith, but also of a similar community; wider than Italy, encompassing other republics and, presumably, the known world. This conflation of the one Ecumenic faith with the Economic use of credit, vouchsafes the propriety of credit. World integrity arrives with the extension of credit relations. Whilst one might express admiration for a merchant, believe in their abilities as in a virtue or deal with others in an air of mistrust, such concerns remain accidental so long as the power of credit lies in its universality. Credit is a principle of universality. Through this, it can be seen that the conflation of Faith and Credit is far from specious, it carries a sense of legitimacy. This legitimacy depends upon identifying the real *work* of credit, or of faith, in distinction to its *apparent* objectives. It is a question of distinguishing between expression and commitment. Faith is understood to express commitment but, *crucially*, a commitment to an unknown object: otherwise it would be knowledge rather

than faith. Thus, faith will have been articulated through the representations it ventures of an object; not, immediately, by that object. It is only in the variety of its expressions that faith *works*; i.e. elaborates a community of the faithful as those who give credence to expressions of faith, and to other credit-users.

Whilst the one, true, objective of faith imparts an aura of univocity to the language of the faithful, the community that lives through such a language is various and disjointed. The language of faith promotes a sense of communal inter-change, whilst differentiating this community, in its life or work, from the commitment maintained by the church or its peculiar rites. Schleiermacher later exploits the difference between commitment and expression:

*"The religious self-consciousness, like every essential element in human nature, leads necessarily in its development to fellowships or communion; a communion which, on the one hand, is variable and fluid, and on the other hand, has definite limits, i.e. is a church."*<sup>19</sup>

Schleiermacher juxtaposes the fluidity of the life enjoyed through communal relations with the rigid limits represented by the Church. The Church expresses the transcendent form standing over and against the immanent and fluid passions of an erstwhile community. The language of faith works through this kind of difference, a difference that could legitimately see the church as just another expression, to be exchanged for other or multiple objects of commitment as the variety of ways in which city life might be enjoyed are differentiated; or represented by different institutional forms: through the town hall, the legislature, the city bank. The difference between the transcendent *object* and the immanent *life* of a community stands at the basis of christianity; an

"*economy of the flesh*": Cyril of Alexandria's term for the communion<sup>20</sup>. Through this economy the commitment to christ's corpse is expressed in the continuing life of a community; the 'meaning' of communion lies in the recovery from death, but also in the community's failure to fully comprehend the death to which it remains committed. For Schleiermacher this economy is one of "*regenerate individuals*" which he sees as an immanent system of "*mutual inter-action and co-operation*"<sup>21</sup> and also as the transcendental "*justification of man*"<sup>22</sup>. There is, again, a tension between a time in which the universal is enjoyed in equanimity, and a time disrupted through insistant presentiments of death; a time when noone knows where the body or the treasury reserves are buried.

Schleiermacher, like Pacioli, attempts to establish a form enfranchising the individual into the general enjoyment of corporate life. That the language representing this Body is, pimarily, univocal is guaranteed through the singular commitment to the same kind of society, represented through the Church (whatever church; Cyril, Pacioli and Schleiermacher are not of the *same* Faith). Those who enjoy such a language are gathered together in their Faith, as faith articulates a forum open to all believers; i.e. everyone who recognises the meaning instantiated by the Church or the Host. Through the sort of equivalences exploited by Pacioli and Schleiermacher that which is represented as *meaningful* (a society), and that which is *enjoyed* (communicative relations) are held to be the same. They are, nevertheless, different; or, at least, only disjunctively related. This relation is, moreover, one of deferral. It is held as credible, even as the sole source of credit, that the idea of a community and the commerce through which the community is elaborated are seen as identical but this relation is always already to

be deferred. Derrida terms this action a '*detour*'. He recognises that the object of commitment is not *carried* but *defused* through the way its representation is elaborated, the meaning attributed to any representation is to be thought of as imminent if, momentarily, misplaced. In a passage from White Mythology he speaks of philosophy as the apologist for a metaphysics of presence, a way of thought which views the value of identity from within an economy of metaphoric or analogic translations: an "*economy of the proper without irreparable damage, a certainly inevitable detour but also a history with its sights set on, and within the horizon of, the circular reappropriation of literal, proper meaning*"<sup>23</sup>. An economy, Derrida insists, that never becomes comfortable with its elliptical manoeuvres. As will be seen, below, Derrida analyses credit through distinguishing between analogies and metaphors. In anticipation of this positive account of economics, it can already be seen that Pacioli intimates an economy is articulated by virtue of analogies (cash, or any other analogising power), but that the distinction of any economy is to be regarded *as though* it were Catholic; i.e. metaphorically, the *same* as the church.

Pacioli suggests a potentially capable member of a community might enjoy a role in society through the extension of credit relations. These economic relations are read as though they referred to the ecumenical or Catholic church. Pacioli promotes the assurance that an identity between the commercial community and the community welcoming the speculator is imminent. As a speculator borrows from a given community (or its bank), that society twice receives increments from the borrower's effort; both through the interest levied and an increase in trade. In securing credit the speculator enjoys a benefit akin to enfranchisement; becoming

assured of a community that, in principle, is attuned to the work of speculation. Whilst no-one possesses a crystal ball and no-one can be wholly sure their efforts will be profitable, it is entirely possible (i.e. legitimate) to speculate on the expectation that business ventures will be recognised through the opening of credit-relations. The imminent identity between the debited and the credited community exists only to recognise the possibility that a security (the speculator's abilities or, in bankruptcy, his shirt) can find a market.

The communal enjoyment of business, through the increments of association, will come to be read as a political possibility. Political in the sense that a community, similar to an Antique city (the *Folis* or *Fascio*), frees a speculator from poverty as it secures a people in its folds. However, if this is represented as a political possibility it suggests no political *commitment*. Noone is bound to an investment house through eternal ties but, only, through speculation. In consequence, the possibilities ventured may return home or even have as their object the speculator's home. There is no reason to finally depend upon the identity between a community enjoying the benefit of its own bank and the community supporting the interest schedules of that bank. The universality of credit relations might link different communities within the same country, or entirely different communities across a manifold of countries. From London to Lisbon (the EEC), Taiwan to Detroit (the car industry), Rotterdam to Baghdad (oil) or Manhattan to Barbados (banking), communities of debtor and creditor need not occupy the same space nor the same benefits from communication. Nor, crucially, need credit be identified with any space to excite speculation or acquiescence across the surface of the world. A lender exploits a marked disymmetry

in the legitimacy of speculation by discounting speculative failure in their favour. As speculation might fail, a community might be submerged, rather than assured, through credit; a community securing only its bankruptcy as it admits the possibility of credit relations.

Pacioli states: *'catholically everybody is saved by faith'*. What happens when salvation is deferred? The intuition of elements whose salvation remains remote may be represented as margins to be closed or widened. Such margins might be relied upon as they represent either a sense of openness or the intuition that competing elements have been forced into privation. Such feelings might, in wild xenophobia, be taken to represent the fact that alien elements have passed through the openings of a society, stitching up every god-fearing member. The work of a credit economy is heavy with anxiety; either the hope of respite, or the continued and obsessive pressure of a time warped through credit relations. When economic margins seem wholly remote or perpetually deferred, symptoms of anxiety are assigned to the presentiment of ghosts or corpses. As this happens, an economy comes to seem either like an economy of mourning, hoping for a sense of respite from its impossible devotion, or a depressive economy drawing ever closer to its end. Or, will seem so, if symptoms expressing the intractable are taken to have a significance only as they represent a sense of community: the community 'of' the mournful, the community 'of' the depressed.

The difference between the familiar and the unfathomable is a difference within economics. In consequence, the possibility exists for an economy no longer exercised by the familiarity or foreignness of its investments; in effect, for an economy indifferent rather than wearied

by the distribution of the elements it articulates. This possibility would resemble the time of rest or of peace promoted by the Christian church but would be catholic in a secular - which is to say, economic - sense. An economy that has ceased to be exercised by the significance of the distance between an expression and a commitment, or between the boundaries of a home and the elaboration of the ecumenical sphere. Such an economy, indifferent even to its own distinctions, would be purely fluid. If indifference were a final end (akin to the end promoted by the church), it could be taken to represent the 'desire for fluidity' Keynes ascribes to the desire for money, or the groundless desires Heidegger associates with the idle. However, it makes little sense to represent 'fluidity' as the aim of a desire; the contention is simply that the quality of fluidity is to be associated with those discourses immanent to business or commerce, fluidity is not itself a transcendent aim. If commercial desires are fluid, desire does not achieve significance with the possibility of satiation (in fluidity, desire remains indifferent to satiation). For Keynes and Heidegger, desire becomes significant only as it is inhibited; i.e. when its object, like an object of faith, remains remote<sup>24</sup>. What is significant about economic fluidity is not 'its' desire, but the way in which desire is articulated, riven, or weakened. As has been seen, Heidegger and Keynes depend (at least provisionally) upon the fluid in order to draw a significance from elements that are elided or submerged through its otherwise indifferent flows (a significance they immediately attribute to Political concerns). In fact, the dynamics of fluid are inseparable from economics. Hume's critique of mercantilist Nationalism used hydraulics as a model when he insisted that money could not artificially be protected within borders; it would flow until it found its own level, its current equilibrium<sup>25</sup>. Here, economic

equilibrium is not a respite but already a kind of dynamism: new resources erupt or spring from wells, mines or colonies as other reserves evaporate. If economics are entirely fluid, so the way fluidity is changed or inhibited is economic. The logic of Economics is alchemical in its condensations or rarefactions, in the way money vanishes or is spirited away, in the way it forms solidified reserves and does so in the ephemeral flickers of a VDU.

Derrida, as has been seen, suggests the move from a political ideal to the spaces where such ideals are opened out as though into a fluid space of exchange can be formalised. With terms like 'Ellipse', Derrida ventures ways of casting the shadow of political concerns; of opening out their logic. His White Mythology does this through an analysis of Metaphor. Here, Metaphor is taken to act on behalf of a process termed 'interiorisation'; i.e. metaphor is "*elaborated in order to assure harbours of truth and propriety*"<sup>26</sup>. In brief, the attempt to *reappropriate* the fluid within proper borders. Insofar as metaphor stands in for this process, whatever is ventured metaphorically is read as being similar to that which is instantiated by definitive limits; e.g. as Schleiermacher read the 'variable and fluid' community *as though* it were a definite set of communicants. For Derrida the work of metaphor lies in its standing in for (*relieving*) the process of interiorisation.

Derrida's account of metaphor, as will be seen, confounds as it resembles the process of interiorisation. Which is to say, he acknowledges that metaphor invites suspicion. Derrida gives two definitions of 'Metaphor'. Firstly, metaphor is a movement of dialectical idealisation<sup>27</sup>. Which is to say, metaphoric 'idealisation' replaces those

desire associated with the interior, it dissembles a process of reappropriation as it 'relieves' the desire for a foundation:

*"What is fundamental corresponds to the desire for a firm and ultimate ground, a terrain to build on, the earth as the support of an artificial structure."*<sup>28</sup>

Secondly, Derrida says, this movement allows *"to be called sense that which should be foreign to the senses."*<sup>29</sup>. Intuitions like: the light of Reason, the body of christ, the taste of the soil (or their alien obverses); possibilities that remain meaningless without metaphoric representation. However, as such ideas are real contentions, the struggle to interpret them as legitimate or illegitimate will be played out through the economy promoting their possibility. As has been seen, it is the distinction of economics to exploit the difference between the seemly and the unseemly, the habitual and the outlandish. In fact, the distinctiveness of such intuitions is maintained by *exacerbating* the sense of the unknown or alien as an economic effect. This means the 'foreign' is no less legitimate than the familiar; economics brings either into 'relief', even as it becomes indifferent to the difference between the foreign and the familiar. In sum, economics is a secret in every breach of the law. Economics elaborates, even as it breaks, the law-of-the-home. Economics betrays any sense of rootedness.

Derrida's account of metaphor differentiates metaphor from other figures of speech; for instance, from analogies. Which is to say, he provides a positivistic account of a difference<sup>30</sup>. This section has repeatedly stressed that economics work by virtue of analogies (for instance, through cash or any other commodity provided it replicates the virtues of cash). It now seems this formula should be tightened:

economics works by virtue of analogies, but what remains distinctive in economics is metaphoric. Further, metaphor owes its distinctiveness to the way it resembles another process: the desire to appropriate a firm support in order to establish the propriety of the interior. However, what is found to be finally distinctive in this process of 'relief' is the similarity between the homely and the outlandish. Derrida account of metaphor manages to stress the ways in which that which is elaborated by virtue of economics is taken to owe its distinctiveness to a transcendent form (the Ecumenic), but - also - to take this distinctiveness as another economic effect, another analogy. That is, again, whilst it might have been Schleiermacher's distinction to emphasise a Metaphor, Derrida brings this kind of distinction into relief as simply another analogy (the business community is like a set of communicants). White Mythology states that, *within philosophy, "analogy is metaphor par excellence"*<sup>31</sup>. Which would seem to say; analogy is brought into relief only if it is read as metaphor; or, economic processes are interesting insofar as they seem to refer to a definite community. Derrida, however, also stresses the reverse; he makes analogies distinctive where other philosophers profit by having already pronounced upon the metaphoric quality of this significance. Derrida brings this judgement into relief as a new analogy, an unregarded analogy, and still an economic effect. Or, where he makes a distinction between two figures (the homely and the foreign), he elliptically (economically) *makes a difference*; a difference to speculation, and a difference to any apologism for the Political. He produces another difference where the significant difference has been settled, via metaphor, in favour of the form of interiority (or, in Heidegger's case, where metaphor has been discounted as too wayward to voice an exacting

difference<sup>32</sup>). The distinction of White Mythology lies not in claiming that economics work metaphorically, but that metaphor in use ('usure') is entirely economic. It remains the case that any hope relieved through metaphors, becomes distinctive through the fluidity of an economy that is not metaphorical. Fluidity is not metaphorical, metaphors have become fluid; fluent in the shadowy language that promotes apparently Political effects, or purely fluid in the economics that shadow, surround and breach every attempt to instantiate the Political realm.

Economic events are represented as political issues; why? At one level the answer is obvious: to believe otherwise would be to abandon any scope for government. This is to be contrasted with the view that economics is an immutable law of nature, an inescapable force of oppression or, simply, a dangerous contagion. As Derrida continues to affirm Democracy, so he emphasises the ways in which one might 'make a difference' within a speculative discourse; this apparently 'political' response to economic problems will be dealt with in the conclusion. The remaining sections of this chapter continue to look at the history of economics, a history in which economic problems are always represented as Political. It will focus on two symptomologies: firstly, hydrophobia in Ancient Greece, or the attempt to determine every benefit articulated by sea-trade by reference to the State, whilst discounting every unfortunate aspect of the sea as an effect encroaching upon the land. Secondly, necrophilia in nineteenth century France, or the awareness of economic redundancy as though it were an object of political commitment, consigning the State to the enjoyment of death as to a vocation.

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On the external character of economic relations  
and their dispersal: or *Hydrophobia*

*Strepsiades: This interest - what kind of animal is it?*

*Creditor: What else but the fact that the money one owes gets constantly more and more, month by month and day by day, by the effluxion of time.*

*Strepsiades: Quite correct. Now then, do you think that the sea is at all bigger now than it used to be?*

*Creditor: Heavens, no, its the same size; it would be against the laws of nature for it to be bigger.*

*Strepsiades: In that case, you miserable fool, if the sea doesn't get any bigger with the influx of the rivers, what business have you trying to make your sum of money bigger? Will you kindly chase yourself away from the house. Aristophanes: The Clouds<sup>33</sup>*

The Clouds concerns a fool's life in the big city and his attempt to cope with the debts a city-born wife and extravagant son have lain up. The following section deals, like The Clouds, with the role of credit in Antique thought and the modern interpretation of this thought. In the first instance, in Athens at the turn of the fifth and fourth century. The points raised, here, will be the providence of Athens and its distinction in the Antique world. As will be seen, this distinction lay in a monopolistic advantage, an edge over its nearest competitors. The central texts will be the two orations on Athenian democracy ascribed by Thucydides to Perikles and Plato's Republic, the latter read as a response to Thucydides' History. It will be seen the overriding concern of the Republic is to set Perikles' lesson on democracy onto firm ground. *Democracy is the form of politics most closely menaced by trade-routes and their fluidity.*

Aristotle argued that tragedy presents a sense of integrity; condensing the inexorability of fate into a single, real-time dramatic

event<sup>34</sup>. *The Clouds* enjoys this sense of integrity but only in abandonment. The action takes place, in an almost tragic time-scale, on the non-day between the new and old moon. This day, the 'old-and-new-day', was the date upon which interest schedules were calculated. If the relevance of tragedy lies its presentation of fate, this distinction is already dissipated in Aristophanes comedy. The time of fate and the tragic instantiation of togetherness, are set loose in the fluidity of night and in the shifting light of the sea; in the *khrematikos*. The day of reckoning, in credit-relations, is simultaneously a doubling and a condensation of time. At this moment, perhaps a full forty-eight hours, there is too much time, and time is all the more pressing. From its subject matter, the seductions and stresses of city-life on a man born into a rustic small-holding, *The Clouds* is clearly a political play, but it describes credit-relations. The idea of Politics, the representation of all people, or all city-dwellers, as Politicians - i.e. as Democrats - is Athenian<sup>35</sup>. Aristophanes follows the way this central idea is opened to the pressures of economics. Such a manoeuvre raises and confounds the Athenian ideal of political integrity, and the thought of the many.

In the speech of Thucydides' *History* known as the '*Funeral Oration*' Perikles argues Athenian Democracy is a paradigm. Which is to say, Athens' constitution articulates an ethos distinctive to only one city and separating that city from any other.

*"We have a constitution which does not seek to copy the laws of our neighbours: we are an example (paradeigma) to others rather than imitators of them. The name given to this constitution is democracy, because it is based not on a few but on a larger number. For the settlement of private disputes all are on an equal footing in accordance with the laws, while in public life men gain preferment because of their deserts, when anybody has a good reputation for anything: what matters is not rotation but merit."*<sup>36</sup>

Perikles' view is modified a few stanzas later when he states Athens, in its distinctiveness, is a lesson (*paideusis*) to other cities. That is, whilst he would still claim that, constitutionally, Athens is committed to its proper (or ownmost) form, the significance of this model is also that it communicates a difference to other nations.

*"To sum up, I maintain that our city as a whole is an education (paideusis) to Greece; and I reckon that each individual man amongst us can keep his person ready to profit from the greatest variety in life and the maximum of graceful aptability. That this is not just a momentary verbal boast but actual truth is demonstrated by the very strength of our city, which we have built up as a result of these habits."<sup>37</sup>*

In this passage, Athens' distinction is said to lie in its variety. In consequence, no single desire, distinguished as an ideal object through its representation as a paradigm, could be associated with Athenian life. Rather, a multiplicity of desires are differentiated through the different objectives current in the city's life, and beyond. As an event, a political oration on the occasion of an Athenian victory, Perikles' funeral oration punctuates the series of Wars between Athens and its rivals, chiefly Sparta. However, war has not yet acquired the kind of significance it later has, Athenian sons may have died but the grace of Athenian life continues. *The Clouds*, too, is set against the Peloponnesian Wars. However, the war is alluded to only when Strepsiades regrets he cannot beat his slave. Runaway slaves were not returned if they crossed enemy borders in wartime. On Aristophanes' account war has a significance only as it inhibits trade. Specifically, when the relations of trust are broken and the relations between states are opened to unusual competition, even the possibility of a slave opting for life in Sparta<sup>38</sup>. If war is diplomacy by other means, it is also an

economic effect; a time when market conventions are subject to unusual stresses. From the foregoing it is difficult to see how either the form or the lesson of Democracy implies any sense of cohesive strength. It is Perikles' second speech that appeals to a sense of communal cohesion.

Perikles' second speech comes at a time of plague and defeat. Now the advantages, the grace or the variety of graces, associated with Athens, have become Tyrannical. Perikles argues that, in the attempt to preserve the city, Athens commands a greater distinction; it is suffered as a form of extortion. Again, this is not easily attributable to War.

*"Your fathers secured this empire not by inheritance from others but by their own efforts ... You now possess the empire like a tyranny, and, though it may be considered unjust to have acquired it, to renounce it would be dangerous. If men who thought like that persuaded the rest, they would very quickly ruin their city, even if they lived on their own somewhere and had no ties with Athens. Avoiders of trouble are not safe unless ranked alongside men willing to act. That is a policy fitting not for an imperial city but for a subject city, which through this policy is enabled to live safely in slavery."<sup>39</sup>*

It is not war but Athens' quality as an inheritance that makes the city cohere around a sense of duress, a tyrannical shadow. There are two points here: firstly, the providence of Athens is something to which one succeeds and, secondly, it is by no means clear what Athens is. As has been seen, if it is a paradigm, it is not by that a single and ideal object. The issue exploited by Perikles in this second speech is that Athens has begun to *feel* like a single object; an object exerting terrible pressure onto what otherwise would be held as a variety of different interests. A few lines earlier Perikles had more closely detailed this sense of oppression. Athens is not succeeded to in any tangible way; its providence does not lie in its site, its buildings, its

concrete form. Athens is not even a place. Only the currency of Athens, or the current forebodings always associated with it, remains tangible. Here Perikles is forthright, Athens is built on the sea, it lives outside of itself or its constitution. It continues to live through the sea and through the shadows its political body hangs upon.

*"You think that you are rulers simply over the allies. I shall demonstrate, however, that of the two elements available for men's use, land and sea, you have total mastery of the whole of the second ... No one neither the [Persian] king nor any other race ... can prevent you from sailing with the naval force at your disposal. This power is not the same as the use of your houses and lands, the loss of which you regard as a great blow. It is not reasonable to take that deprivation to heart: you should rather think of those possessions as a pleasure-garden or adornment of your wealth in contrast to your naval power ... those who become subject to others are apt to lose even what they had before."<sup>140</sup>*

The dominance of Athens depends upon relations sketched across the sea and trade-routes. Athens is that which is distinctive in every relation across the eastern Mediterranean. Athens was a trading city with a fortified dock, the Piraeus, situated six miles outside Athens but connected to the city by double walls along the road leading to its displaced commercial heart. The issue here is commerce, not war. As Athens dominated the sea, so it maintained an interest in every venture across the world. In effect, what was provident in Athens were the increments gained through monopolising the sea routes. Every venture bore the stamp of Athens, every passage was to the credit of Athens and its every 'ally' was taxed in order that each might enjoy the rights of commerce. Athens, then, both dominated and profited from dissymmetrical relations throughout Greece and the world. It maintained its distinction, its edge, so long as it elided its own site; stretched over the fluid space of 'Greece' and beyond. Athens, at its height, was not a place but

a monopolistic relation, it was maintained so long as the relations between it and the world were repetitive, repeatedly emphasising a kind of interest, a desire, known as Athens<sup>41</sup>.

This is where the Republic opens. Not in the forum or agora where Philosophy is traditionally plied but in the commercial forum outside Athens. The Republic - as its given title (*Politeia*) emphasises - is concerned with the Political. In the platonic style it seeks to isolate the Political. In the Piraeus, the Political could only be appreciated in its absence. The City could not, above all, be 'of' the sea. Plato is insistant upon this issue; the Idea of the city, of the political, has meaning only in and through the Political sphere. Plato's argument is clearly with Perikles, the *Political* is of the city, not of the way a city is repeatedly emphasised in alien situations. More than this, however, the Republic is also a history of post-Periklean Athens; in fact, of Athens' later providence. Plato's history is a sequence of five stages. Two of these, that of Periklean Athens and its immediate successor, were known as Democracies. In his History Thucydides states that when Athens was overseen by Perikles it was known as a democracy, but was in truth rule by the foremost man<sup>42</sup>. Plato's historical sequence is as follows: *Aristocracy*, which would be the height of Periklean rule; *Timocracy*, the period succeeding Periklean rule and the time at which the Republic is set, although only in its final days; *Oligarchy*, the period commonly known as the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, rulers the Republic introduces as profiteers and business men; *Democracy*, which is the democracy responsible for the death of Socrates, Plato's mentor and chief interlocutor in the Republic. The Republic was, itself, written at some later time during this penultimate period. It is distinguished,

however, by its apocalyptical foreboding of a final time: *Tyranny*<sup>43</sup>. At the time the Republic was written the walls around the Piraeus had been dismantled on the orders of a victorious Sparta<sup>44</sup>. In consequence, the opening of the Republic, at a festival in the Piraeus to an alien moon goddess, is underscored by premonitions of Athens' later dereliction. Dereliction at the hands of the sea, which Plato hates with an open rabidity. In the Laws a philosopher is asked to provide a blueprint for an ideal community. When he is told the community is to be built by the sea he argues the sea drives people mad, destroying every city that enjoys its debauching influence<sup>45</sup>. Sparta never attempted to build a shipping empire like Athens'. That the Republic opens in the Piraeus is the more significant as the greater part of Athens is there, enjoying a festival to a Thracian moon goddess; in effect, beside themselves in their enjoyment of foreign and lunar influences. One of Socrates' indictments, as given in the Apology, is that he promoted gods foreign to the state. The Republic shows a time when strange gods were current.

The Republic argues the final justification of the city depends upon a general willingness to think the idea of the City. The whole aim of the Republic is to elaborate this central and constitutional idea. Plato, more than anyone else, is the forefather of Totalitarian Rationalism, as despised by Hayek. Heidegger quotes from the Republic at the close of his Rectoral Address, and appeals to its view of education [*paideia*] in his Plato's Doctrine of Truth [1935]. For Heidegger the importance of the Republic lies in its commitment to thinking; to *dwelling*. Heidegger's is by no means a misreading of Plato. In Plato's Doctrine of Truth Heidegger argues the model promoted by Plato could be taken as a value, a form to be emulated. Heidegger insists the history of metaphysics

begins with the evaluation of such models. Against this view Heidegger insists the lasting distinction of the Republic lies in its commitment to the terrors of the processes of formation, even to thinking the currents that come to mis- or mal- form such a necessity<sup>46</sup> This echoes his earlier Rectoral Address which translates a line from the Republic as: *"All that is great stands in the storm"*<sup>47</sup>

It is rarely noted the Republic is not anti-democratic, as such. It is, rather, opposed to the time in which the role of the city is constantly evaluated or reevaluated; a time which, for Athens, was democratic and implied free and discursive exchanges. As the Republic is written in a democracy and looks back to the first, or Periklean, Democracy, it is concerned with the ways in which a city might best be maintained rather than with how democracy might be deplored. What Plato, ideally, wishes to describe is the providence of Athens, as it is enjoyed politically by politically-minded citizens. He identifies the suffering of Athens with the way this providence is transmuted at each of the times leading to the current Athenian democracy (i.e. the one in which the Republic is written, not the one in which it is set). This is elaborated in the Republic through the idea of inheritance, an inheritance forcing the issue of Politics; as Thucydides said: *"Your fathers secured this empire not by inheritance from others but by their own efforts ... You now possess the empire like a tyranny"*

The Republic begins with two fathers: Ariston and Kephalus. These two characters are representative of different Athenian fates; i.e. the one with the virtues of an aristocrat, the other with the virtues of a self-serving oligarch<sup>48</sup>. Ariston, although highlighted in the book's

first sentence, is never seen; his providence, although worthy to be held as a paradigm, is only so as it becomes provident. The other, Kephalus, is treated with restrained respect; Kephalus is thoroughly entrained in *krematisamenoi*, the art of business. When Kephalus leaves the scene of the dialogue, and goes down to the sea to make lunar sacrifices, only the sons are left; left to Socrates' influence. The theme of inheritance gains momentum as the Republic progresses. By the stage of (the final) Democracy the permutations of the relations between father and sons have wholly loosened, *degenerated*. Fathers have begun to dress like their sons, sons have begun to idly pursue any model that promises an instant profit. The issue is nothing other than wealth: capital. Kephalus, when asked about the source of his wealth describes the passages it went through before he succeeded to it: the fortune amassed by his grandfather dwindled under the care of his own father, his bequest to his sons - he hopes - will be a little more than he himself received (and he has three sons)<sup>49</sup>. Filial ties have become speculative, aiming at the replication and augmentation of an estate. Plato argues providence is not to be enjoyed in the vagaries of its communication but in its essential, virtuous order; the order standing as the fundament and end of the city and of the citizens who enjoy political life. There is, in consequence, a significance to be found in Plato's work between the family estate and Death, as only a death could make the estate an issue. In fact, only a death could make the *oikos* an issue. A family, in the sense of a continuing and distinguished family, and its estate, was termed an *oikos*<sup>50</sup>. Of greater significance, the City itself was beginning to be described as an *Dikos*, as what was held to be provident in the city came to be identified with the city-fathers. Plato's innovation here is to note that as the estate becomes an issue, a pressing concern, it

is an object of thought and debate; an idea. Plato is concerned by the urgency of the idea of the estate in both its elaboration and the commitment it enjoins. It is, above all, a forensic issue. The other charge laid against Socrates, perhaps the weightiest, was that he exerted an unhealthy influence on the city's children; that is, he displaced their natural fathers. Plato will argue that there is nothing unnatural in the substitution of Socrates' affections for those of the natural father. In a forensic dialogue with Socrates the sons of Athens can begin to express the basis of their filial commitment. In Plato's view this basis has an eternal, rather than a shifting, form. Above all, it has a Political form as any expression of the provident could only become an issue in a social discussion and no other social framework than that of the City will be considered.

Plato's idealism, in the Republic, depends upon his insistence that the relation between generations should not be thought of in term of credit; i.e. of augmentation, of filial debt and future succession. Insofar as such relations are provident to the City, as a whole, the philosophical task is to elaborate the ideal form under which providence is understood as an issue for the City; i.e. as a variety of ideas relating to the one central idea of the integral political community. However, as the Ideal city remains remote the community is distinguished as much by its willingness to devote itself to the problem of the derelict state as to the mooted Ideal. The providence of the father, the perfect father or perfect statesman, is distinguished by a willingness to maintain the dereliction which accompanies his remoteness or his passing away. Plato, in sum, elaborates a devotion to dereliction, a city whose concrete form is dismantled by alien influences. It is this aspect

that later influences Heidegger; the anxieties associated with the speculative project, the symptoms (of dread or of embarrassment) that accompany philosophy in its difference from the vapidness of market-inspired speculation. In both Heidegger and Plato, fears for the State, in its dereliction or distress, remains a question of commitment. However, this fear of dispersal is also articulated through trading relations and economic speculation. In fact, the fear for the State, in Depression, cannot be separated from hydrophobia. The State, as an object of contention, is also a symptom of open rabidity; a fear of fluids.

\* \* \* \*

An obsession with dereliction, at the end of the dream of eternal riches, is the stuff of tragedy. When Creon reads the lesson of Sophocles' Antigone he states:

*"For any man who acts rightly within his household (oikeiosis) will also be seen to do his duty in the City."<sup>51</sup>*

when to have behaved 'rightly' is to have maintained a respect for the dereliction of the family, as to the state in the depths of its depression. Hegel's Phenomenology exploits this mood. His reading of Antigone insists the state is maintained in devotion to its dead; that is, the state lives by observing mourning. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, Derrida has a continuing appetite for Hegel's style of philosophy, devoting Glas to the sections of the Phenomenology dealing with Antigone and the various presentiments accompanying the forgotten importance of the family in a State's public life. The already quoted line from his essay La Différance, where the home is analogised with the tomb, appears to be drawn from the dictionary Estienne. However, and by

this, it is *also* a reference to Antigone. Sophocles' tragedy is cited in support of the dictionary's equivalence.

"My home the eternal vigil of the grave."  
 ["o kataskaphes (rock-hewn-sepulchre) oikesis (home)  
 aeiphrouros (of eternal vigilance)"]<sup>52</sup>

Here, the relation between the home and tomb is poetic; it fits the one scene - Antigone being walled into a cave - whilst referring back to her fatal decision to keep vigil for her brother. The line works but is, after all, only one line in a single play. Why should it hold such an interest for either Estienne or Derrida? The dictionary raises an analogy between the home and tomb through citing Antigone; in turn, the allusion is re-enforced through other conjunctions of the two ideas. As the relation between the home and death refers to the family estate and as this unremarkable conjunction is found in a variety of Greek texts, Estienne's choice of texts is significant; only texts promising a hint of mysticism are given, none where the conjunction refers merely to property inheritance. The Estienne entry ends with a reference to Diodorus Siculus<sup>53</sup> and the LXX translation of Ecclesiastes. In both cases the wording is close; respectively: 'aionion oikesis' and 'oikos aionos'; eternal home. Diodorus refers to actual Egyptian burial practices, describing the idea behind these burials (the preservation of life-in-death within a home that will last for eternity). The LXX citation is a translation of the hebrew 'Beth olamó': long home. Estienne seems to have wished to uncover a belief in eternal transcendence in the preservation of a finite body in a stable home. Further, as the 'long home' of Ecclesiastes, or its 'house of mourning', will be associated with the Church and its officers, this transcendent significance is attributed to the ecumenical community through its representation as the body of

the ecumenical church; a sort of life-within-death. Despite Fra Pacioli's view that faith becomes a form of currency (a principle of universality, a necessary sense of credibility), perhaps the more faithful view would be to maintain the death that frames the relations between believers as a Mystery; that is, the economy of death should learn to dwell upon a sense of the intractable.

Estienne's co-option of antique imagery is exploited only as the various issues in the older works become analogous to the central issue, or the central mystery of christianity: Christ's death. The mystery of Christ's death becomes an impossible issue for thought but, nevertheless, an impossibility which weds believers to the mystery of communion and the espousal of faith. However, through the Arian heresy or through death's variety (Antigone's or Socrates', the King of Jerusalem's or Christ's, the father's or any of the faithful) the whole economy of death could be reversed. That is, it could be that death, in its variety, primarily gives significance to the family estate and family ties. A Nineteenth century history of civilisation, La cité antique by Fustel de Coulanges, takes this second view; that a community lives without the appearance of cohesion as each of its aggregate households dwell exclusively on their own deaths. Fustel promotes the extreme view that a community does not live through social ties but in the divisions that different families set up between themselves through death. In brief, Fustel's thesis exploits the idea of the universal community made possible by Christianity, and exploits it through its destruction. The community he envisages is not joined by a single and over-arching 'house', the church, but separated by its individual houses:

*"Let us first take the hearth: this altar is the symbol of the sedentary life ... the hearth takes possession of the earth, it stands out from the earth, it makes the earth its own, its property."<sup>54</sup>*

Here, Fustel insists on the relation between the hearth and tomb:

*"For the tomb the law was the same as for the hearth: it was no more permitted to unite two families in the same sepulchre than it was to unite two domestic hearths in a single house. It was equally impious to inter a corps outside the tomb of its family as to place in its tomb the body of a stranger. The domestic religion, in life as in death, separated each family from all the others and gravely dispersed all appearances of community."<sup>55</sup>*

Fustel's thesis that civilisation rests on the cult of ancestral tombs is largely indefensible. It, nevertheless, has two notable defenders: Momigliano and Morris<sup>56</sup>. However, Momigliano and Morris are primarily interested in the way burial rites articulate hierarchies, differences and distinctions. In fact, they are interested in the semiological relations underlying the arrangement of burial sites. In Morris's case, in order to understand the life of ancient societies. In Momigliano's case, because of the relevance such a project holds for a history of the socialisation of capital. Neither attach any significance to Fustel's central claim, only his project. In the case of Athens, Fustel's thesis clearly falls apart. Burial occurred in municipal cemeteries, not in the home. Morris studies public burial sites, not private ones, he interprets the distribution of family sepulchres in a public space or, to put this another way, he interprets the public face of private relations. Fustel's mistake, as Morris suggests, lies in the common practice of placing signs on public highways as memorials. These were not tombs but did relate the familial estate to its outside through a very public sign of commemoration. It is, again, a matter of the semiology of town

planning: not its '*grave dispersal*' as Fustel would claim. The most detailed criticism of Fustel is S C Humphreys<sup>57</sup>. Fustel's attempt to trace the dispersal of a community, in pursuit of his claim that dispersal represents the strength of ancient civilisation, is only significant as regards the way a community communicates. Humphreys argues the general practice of familial burial only occurred with the advent of the Greek Polis as an imperial power. Thus, with an increase in wealth throughout society a practice restricted to the wealthy became a common feature of Greek life. In short, Humphreys argues familial burial is a social institution that obliquely expresses commonality within city. Humphreys point may be amplified, the relative wealth of the average Athenian, a wealth enjoyed through the monopolisation of trade routes, was not only expressed in large scale public works (the Athenian walls, its every edifice) but more significantly in the institutionalisation of burial as an oblique expression of the position enjoyed by Athens throughout the world. Burial practices are an echo or a shadow of the relations expressing Athens' current prominence.

Despite the problems associated with his thesis Fustel succeeds in accentuating the feature of economics that obsessed Pound, or even Thucydides; the sense of duress or tyranny to be associated with dereliction. The shadow, the providence, of the City weighs upon its members. The community lives in the shadow of dereliction; that is, the social sphere is exercised by its *grave dispersal*, its presentiment of destruction, its depression. The significance attributed to death is nothing other than the fact that the City is known *only* in the elaboration of credit relations and, in consequence, is subject to the vagaries of the sea or the wars that might - at any time - shatter its

enjoyment of the monopolies perpetuating its claim to exist. Fustel claims there is no analogy between the home and death, they are identical; that is, insofar as the law is the same for each, they are virtually the same. Fustel supports this suggestion through a very doubtful footnote, attributed to Eustathius:

*"This ... belief is related by Eustathius, who says that the home is the end of the hearth."<sup>58</sup>*

This footnote would better suit Derrida's deconstruction of the objectivity of the 'end', elaborated throughout his *The Ends of Man*, than the argument that the hearth has brought the presence of death into a home. As Derrida might say, the 'end' is one metaphor too many. The double meanings (admittedly, very different meanings but, nevertheless, analogous meanings) attached to the single term 'end' begins to exert a usuristic effect and, even, to wear away at the central issue ventured by Fustel. However, as Fustel finds no analogy between the thought of the home and death, so he detects a single and imperious sense of duty. A sense of duty which obliquely benefits the City in its derelict state. Which is to say, the dispersed community lives through the enjoyment of death and through its autistic dedication to mourning. This theme, the necessity underlying a sense of fatal dispersal, finds strong echoes in Heidegger. The way a sense of community is exacerbated by death, or its silence, calls for a certain resoluteness, not speculative solutions. Fustel's *La cité antique*, more clearly an economic thesis than anything written by Heidegger, shares other similarities with Heidegger's work. The first chapter to the present work noted Heidegger's mistrust of analogies, metaphors and translations. Fustel's thesis is an attack on the view that wealth is the kind of substance that can be expressed

analogically: i.e. in differing commodities but especially in terms of differing values for labour. He insists work is not a value. In fact, he attacks the christianity - which here would be the christianity of Fra Pacioli - that holds the value of a person's labours could elaborate a meaningful concept of wealth within the world or a community. For Fustel, value is nothing if it is not immovable, intransigent, deathly:

*"Wealth is immovable, like the hearth and the tomb to which it is attached."*<sup>59</sup>

For Fustel, whatever is of value maintains an appearance of disintegration whilst, in some strange or mystical way, being equal to the currents that threaten civilisation. Here, Fustel's polemical work is intended to meet a current problem. Humphreys provides a careful account of this problem; the dispersal and exchange of property and the speculative market surrounding it<sup>60</sup>. Humphreys emphasises the anxieties associated with the status of property in Nineteenth century Paris. Pointing to Phillippe Ariés *L'homme devant la mort*, which contains a lengthy account of a certain Girard's recommendation of burial on private property, Humphreys adduces some comments of Chateaubriand. Conservative opinion had been outraged by the desecration of burial sites during the Revolution. Chateaubriand, in the midst of this outrage, suggests the privatisation of death, with a consequent liberation of municipal cemeteries. This measure would change the face of Paris by stabilising property and ensuring a measure of community growth; families would be more inclined to maintain a home containing their ancestor's remains, whilst the space afforded by the closure of municipal cemeteries would grant Paris new, workable land. The question is the value of the land, and the work to which it is put. The creation

of dead spaces (more or less private spaces) would be balanced by the liberalisation of previously dead spaces (spaces enclosed by municipal cemeteries would be opened to the municipality). Competition over the value of land takes many forms. Whilst *communaires* desecrate their own (i.e. public) sites, the forces of reaction attempt to consolidate the privacy of every site. In each case, a mood of anxious disarray surrounds the hopes or values pinned upon property and its creation.

The fight over the basilica of the Sacred Heart at Montmartre is remembered as a fight over the value of land. This struggle, which had begun when Fustel published his *La Cité Antique*, took place between the left and right over the power which lay consecrated in public spaces<sup>61</sup>. Montmartre became an issue with the fall of Paris to the Prussians. A siege may be interpreted as one national force facing another. With Montmartre it becomes clear the effect of war is to break the sense of trust a society places in its proper land. The homeland or city-scape is opened to bids as its value begins to differentiate different desires and different interest groups. Neither the left nor the right confronted this final possibility, the City is indefensible on its proper site. As Thucydides shows, the shadow of the community and fluidity of the sea are indissociable; the City has no terrestrial foundations. Fustel's attempt to staunch what could only come to be seen as a final nihilism - the City reduced to nothing - is predicated on the idea of immovable and intractable value. Property privatised for ever.

The positivist response to Fustel's thesis would be to note the changing view of public spaces and to construct the conditions for the possibility of this view of the City. Derrida has noted, through his

study of the analogy between the home and death, that death continues to have a forensic significance. Which is to say, the tomb is loud; it is an issue in the kinds of discussion Humphreys discovers in nineteenth century France or an issue in the sense that the familial estate was an issue for Plato, a political issue insofar as the Political was the only forum Plato recognised. Finally, however, it is an economic issue as the value of Mourning, like Depression, continues to have an economic significance. Economic relations apparently pertain between analogous terms; i.e. analogous commodities or commodities which might, in principle, be regarded as analogous. The chains of apparently analogous terms will not be broken by identifying one terrible limit to any sequence, nor one singular or terrible form of dispersion.

As the dispersal of economic relations continues to elaborate an economy, Derrida resists the idea of an absolute and deathly mystery transcending every economy. He does not seek to overcome the destructive or speculative currents that, it is suggested, could only end in the depressive inability to valorise any specific, or especially distinctive, term. An idea or sympathy might claim a special or essential distinction but this distinction will have been articulated by virtue of economic relations. Where it might be argued no analogy exists between the home and the tomb, because they are the same and demand an attitude equal to this awful fact, Derrida continues to aver an analogy is at work. This would, perhaps, be a metaphorical attempt to resalvage the City as the space of dispersal; i.e. the proper or habitual space of all dispersal. It is, frequently, a metaphorical attempt to turn the intractability of elements within a mooted city-space into a limit against the outside world by insisting such elements are the responsibility of the city, of

its own finitude and, obliquely, of its eternal, transcendent dimension. This view exploits what it claims to respect (i.e. the dead), insofar as such elements maintain a strange or autistic communication in a wider discourse, or with the wider world. As Derrida continues to mount an analysis of signs, even mysterious or funereal signs, there is a positive element to his work<sup>62</sup>. His insistence that silence is an issue, and one that remains to be exploited analogically, serves to highlight the positive effects of whatever is deemed unfathomable. He does not remain with the silence of the tomb, but the way such silences begin to sketch intra-social communication: albeit a communication gravely dispersed.

Derrida, however, is not quite a positivist, he sketches an utter recasting of positivism. The possibilities ventured in every attempt to express the dereliction of a political sphere do not *continue* to imply an urban space, as Fustel insists. Such expressions, in their concentration or dispersal, could not provide the condition for the possibility of any or every city. There is no longer a necessary or predetermined condition equivalent to the city, or equivalent to the distress 'of' a city (even as the stable city or the derelict city are more or less analogous). That which is exercised by such effects is an economy and not a politics. Derrida does not simply promote an attempt to reterritorialise the Political space in the gaps between Fustelian homes (i.e. within their grave dispersal). Rather, he looks at what continues to be positive in these silences. This will not imply the construction of the possibility of another city but, rather, the deconstruction of the Political in the fluidity of economics.

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## On the conditions informing anti-trust

The Lesson offered by either Heidegger or Pound, the form of a 'Paideuma', smacks suspiciously of xenophobia. In articulating this suspicion, a certain distinction becomes critical; a form reminiscent of xenophobia has been cast as two differing dispositions: Hydrophobia and Necrophilia; two similar affections, insofar as the Fascist vision of Politics indicates both, two differing states insofar as the Fascist Lesson is reopened through this distinction. What would it mean to be impressed by this difference? to feel a difference has been made? Derrida insists the distinction is worrisome. Where he insinuated a trace of 'Gehenna' into Heidegger's Lesson, it promised less a vision of utopia, than a place of suffering. It seems, *in suspicion*, Derrida escapes Heidegger, only to discover a new source of disquiet.

Two points can be made about Heidegger's lesson. Firstly, if his lesson had been taken to heart, it might have meant the end of democracy; to accept the force of Heidegger's lesson would have been to settle an issue, to have finally made a decision. Secondly, if Heidegger's lesson continues to be worrying, the sense of worry closest to Heidegger has now evaporated. This new worry could not presume upon the same kind of forum once receptive to Fascism. Both these points hint at loss; the presentiment of loss indicates Mourning. It has been seen that Fascism is distinguished by an air of dereliction. The sense of mourning here, however, is irreducible to Fascism. The issue of mourning, as it is raised here, is itself lost as Fascism exploits dereliction in the cause of Politics. Mourning, here, is not attributable to the Political as it is

promoted in Fascism, nor could it owe its distinctiveness to any Political form as such. Mourning, here, is articulated through economics; it cannot be recouped under a political form. Thus, two further points can be made: firstly, to raise mourning, as a distinctive issue, is to mark a difference; secondly, to raise such an issue is to defer a decision upon the Political. This, double, work of *difference and deferral* is broached through Derrida's neologism '*différance*'. '*Différance*' publicises effects at work in the economic space; across its old-and-new-day. Primarily, however, '*différance*' publicises mourning as an issue. A sense of deferral, or adjournment, could mean a respite. If this were so, the sense of respite would seem to indicate the lesson had lost all its force. However, in '*différance*', this continues to exercise an effect, a suspicion that the form of respite remains unsettled.

Derrida's fear of '*depoliticisation*' has already been noted. *Depoliticisation is an effect of economics, even of the deconstruction of politics*; picturesquely, the *nomoi* (articulating laws) have already deviated from any sense of the *oikos* (the home or what is habitually represented as the Political). Derrida's works are intended to draw attention to the punctuation and elisions at work in the deconstruction of politics; that is, to attend to the form of this deconstruction rather than simply enjoying the dream of fluidity. Above all, his work *makes a difference*; it raises an unregarded motif as an issue; a forensic issue. Thus far, the form of deconstruction has been given as an 'Ellipse'; in the following pages this form will be articulated through the term '*Différance*'. Primarily, through '*différance*', the 'elliptical' will be stressed as a kind of symptomatic gap, a silence, a sense of Mourning. Mourning is a form of inhibition; an inability to act beyond a certain

point, a feeling that certain things remain unfathomable. It could be that a forensic Form of Government (a form of *debating* government, like democracy) is necessarily inhibited; certainly Heidegger or Pound bank upon a sense of inhibition as they exploit the intimation of the intractable for political ends. Here, mourning will not be taken to further a sense of Political closure; as it is raised, mourning will be exploited as an opening, not a closure. However, if mourning could be exploited, a sense of inhibition remains; mourning could never be wholly erased, nor recouped in a new venture. This is the problem: what does mourning offer as it opens onto a new vista but, also, as it remains radically dislocated from any sense of ease or profit upon this vista?

Derrida's account of deconstruction is *virtually* universal, or catholic; it centres upon the West, upon its genius and its perpetuation in the metaphysical writings which, following Heidegger, Derrida terms '*Ontotheology*'. Derrida examines the systematic claims to universality promoted in ontotheology and the philosophies that, together, form a Western 'system' in its economy; as though a commitment to the West, as regards its universality, tended towards the elaboration of a peculiarly Western thought, in its oblique economy. For Derrida, any Western claim to dominance, by virtue of its universality, is already defused though the differences and deferrals at work in its various apologies; i.e. by virtue of '*différance*' in its economy. The term *différance* first appeared in *Of Grammatology*<sup>63</sup>. This work, as has been seen begins by referring to economics. *Of Grammatology*'s very last sentence speaks of the *economy of différence*. Thus, the opening and the closing of the book of 'grammatology' are traversed by economics. The ostensible reason for the essay *La différence* is as a footnote to the earlier work. Derrida first

explains what happens through this neologism; i.e. the fact that there has been a substitution of one letter by an other. He says:

"I recall then, and in a quite preliminary way, that this discrete graphic intervention, which neither primarily nor simply aims to shock the reader or grammarian, came to be formulated in the process of writing upon the question of writing. Thus and, as I would say, through the facts, it is found that this graphic difference (a instead of e), this marked difference between two apparently vocal notations, between two vowels, remains purely graphic: it is read or it is written but cannot be heard. We cannot attend to it and we will see how it escapes the attentions of the understanding. It promotes itself as a mute mark, as a tacit monument, I would even say as a pyramid, thus imagining not only the form of the letter as it is impressed in upper-case or as it is capitalised, but - by this - the text of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* where the body of the sign is compared to an egyptian pyramid. Thus, the a of the difference is not heard; it dwells in silence, as secret and discrete as a tomb: *oikesis*. Let us thus mark, in our anticipation, this place, the familiar residence and familial estate where the *economy of death* is produced through *différance*. This stone is not far from announcing the death of a dynast, provided we know how to decipher its legend." [D 4]<sup>64</sup>

Derrida, here, makes an issue of an analogy; i.e. an economic phenomena. It is, however, an analogy of a peculiar kind. The French pronunciation of 'difference' would not be able to distinguish the substitution of the letter 'a' for an 'e'. The analogy is sonic: a pun. In writing Derrida is able to emphasise differences, such as puns, lost to spoken language. If writing is capable of creating such a *distinction*, it could be argued that it is incapable of emphasising something yet more subtle, the moment when the vocal inflexion is lost. Derrida forcefully argues this is not the case. In the instance of a pun, its written form not only indicates the difference the pun passes over, but also the loss of the pun. In writing, the pun, or the voice of the pun, is insistantly deferred whilst the difference upon which the pun turns is emphasised. That is, both difference and deferral become an issue. This is the

moment at which Derrida's exploitation of writing gains force, the difference will have been needed before the pun works, just as the moment of deferral is needed before the vocally similar words slide perfectly over each other. Writing, despite its self-effacement, its inhibitions, gains a certain piquancy from the loss of the vocal inflexion. It produces an effect alien to the voice. The lesson here is that writing introduces a new, possibly earlier, meaning into the voice. Or does so when *différance* is precociously raised as an issue.

The rebuttal will always be: How serious are puns? How serious is a mark introducing the moment of punning without being able to effect the pun? A pun is, after all, somewhat indifferent to meaning; the mark introducing the possibility of indifference whilst, yet, deferring it may seem insidious. A waste perhaps, which - in effect - it is, writing emphasises its modesty, its inability to capitalise upon the effects it produces. Like mourning, writing produces an additional and only apparently indifferent effect from the loss of its objective; i.e. here, the meaningful, there, the State. In White Mythology Derrida promotes a pun upon 'ontology' and 'anthology', a good pun in French<sup>65</sup>. In the instances Derrida chooses to emphasise writing destroys philosophy - and everything Heidegger would hold dear - when it introduces the possibility that an anthology is indistinguishable from a book of ontology. A moment as indifferent to the concentration implied by an ontology as to the dispersed distribution implied by an anthology. However, writing also produces an effect in excess of the destruction of philosophy, of the fear that philosophy might be destroyed, or the belief philosophy must be defended in its essential structure.

In *La démocratie ajournée* Derrida insists it is no longer a question of concentration or dispersal; it is, rather, a question of multilateralism and reciprocity; and of a formal awareness that protects reciprocity. This sense of the reciprocal is engendered through the term *différance*. *La différance* begins with the line:

*"I will speak, then, of a letter.*

*Of the first letter, if the alphabet and the greater part of the speculations ventured through it must be believed."*<sup>66</sup>

Here, Derrida highlights both the alphabet and the expressions ventured wherever this system holds sway. In accentuating its leading letter, he emphasises an order of understanding, a system that enables intelligibility. This opening shot, both at order and speculation, would reflect upon Hegel's philosophy. Derrida follows this allusion to the alphabet with a remark upon the pyramids, apparently referring to the hierarchical structure attributed to the dialectic in *The Pit and the Pyramid*. Derrida, in short, analogises from one system of intelligibility (the alphabet) to another (Hegel's). He does this through the 'a' of *différance*: the first or foremost letter, the letter which resembles a tomb or an hierarchy. It is, nevertheless, only an analogy. Hegel never said a letter, any letter, resembles the pyramids. He simply states:

*"the pyramids although astonishing in themselves are just simple crystals, shells enclosing a kernel, a departed spirit, and serve to preserve its enduring body and form."*<sup>67</sup>

Hegel, as is usual in his system, finds a current use for the archaic 'significance' of the pyramid. A use that, in Derrida's work, will be taken to intimate or symptomise something other than Hegel's system of recoupment\*. When Hegel comments upon Egypt and the value of letters, his remarks actually concern hieroglyphs:

*"hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing."*<sup>68</sup>

Hegel's claim is that writing cannot depend purely upon its graphicity, the element Derrida particularly emphasises. Through 'différance' Derrida looks at the introduction of silence into language, despite Hegel's claim that "*intelligence expresses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking*"<sup>69</sup>. Derrida wonders how silence might become obvious, or how intelligence might become effective through the deaf or the dumb. In *La différance* such silences are not attributable to a predetermined dependancy upon the alphabetical system of writing but to the way this system, in its economy, begins to express other issues in silence. Here, Derrida's emphasis upon the breath of the vowel begins to intimate those persons or peoples who enjoy the stifling quality of an unbreathed Betagam; like the semitic races, in their diversity. Thus, in silence, Derrida emphasises the moments when Hegel's speculative manoeuvres also draws attention to other elements, differing symptoms. These symptoms would supplement Hegel's eurocentric view of the alphabet and, by extension, the providence of Greek philosophy. For Derrida, this is not a way of capitalising upon a reading of Hegel. Rather, and in the places where the economic virtue of promoting different analogies holds sway, Derrida begins to detect ways in which different passions or sympathies might be distinguished. Which is to say, differences might emerge where only speculative equivalences (similar silences, similar systems) had been evident. Derrida terms this emergence of difference 'catachresis'; i.e. a more or less violent publicisation or exploitation of difference<sup>70</sup>. It is not, however, the violence that entralls him but the possibility of reciprocity, even a law of reciprocity, that emerges through such effects. Which is to say, a new law of communication

emerging out of the deconstruction of the West. This 'lawful' effect will be discussed, below, through comparing a recent quotation from Derrida with a passage from Hegel upon economics, war and the State:

*"'deconstructions', which I prefer to speak of in the plural, has certainly never named a project, a method or a system. Above all, not a philosophical system. In short, and by metonymy, it is one of the possible names designating the awareness of a certain dislocation within contexts that are already very determined. A dislocation which, in its effects, regularly recurs; which, in its passing, comes to pass or fails to, and does so everywhere there is something rather than nothing. Certainly, and for example, in that which is classically termed the texts of Classical philosophy, but also in the whole 'text' in the general sense of the word I have attempted to justify; which is to say, simply in experience, in the social 'reality': historically, economically, technically, militarily etc. The event called the Gulf (War) (du Golfel, for example, is a spectacularly powerful and tragic condensation of these deconstructions."71*

Derrida, here, can be seen to insist upon a kind of positivism against any evocation of nihilism ('everywhere there is something rather than nothing') and to insist upon the empiricity of his work ('simply in experience'). In fact, he is concerned with the experience of disparate relations, syntheses or artifices that, here, have been termed 'economics' and, above, Derrida terms the 'social reality'. In the last two sentences Derrida, admittedly, adduces more effects to 'deconstructions' than simply the economic. However, the fact that even the term 'deconstructions' could only be emphasised by metonymy indicates that every experience (historical, economical, technical, military) is articulated by virtue of economic relations. Which is to say, the economic continues to flow, even around the violent and condensed disruption termed - by metonymy, in short or for economy - the Gulf. The, above, passage continues by proposing a sense of the Law, of international law. This is particularly reminiscent of the current Social

Reality; i.e. of War and the ubiquitous hope for a New World Order. The conditions for the possibility of perpetual peace were championed by Kant<sup>72</sup>. Hegel is scathing about any hope of perpetual peace, as he is of those that fail to discern the significance of War in the way it exercises a community. In a passage that begins in the style of Ecclesiastes, he affirms the effect of War.

*"War is the state of affairs which deals in earnest with the vanity of temporal goods and concerns - a vanity at other times a common theme of edifying sermonizing. This is what makes it the moment in which the ideality of the particular attains its right and is actualized. War has the higher significance that by its agency, as I have remarked elsewhere, 'the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institution; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone 'perpetual' peace.' This, however, is said to be only a philosophic idea, or, to use another common expression, a 'justification of Providence', and it is maintained that actual wars require some other justification."*<sup>73</sup>

Hegel claims war unsettles the vain, or light, enjoyment of goods; i.e. of chattels and commodities. More surprisingly, he claims that war has no higher - and, hence, requires no other - justification than this distinctive property. Whilst it might be held that the role of war is to preserve the Idea - as opposed to the current appearance - of a State, it is the way War upsets everyday commerce that represents its final role. Certainly, in his next breath, Hegel retreats to the view that: *"successful wars have checked domestic unrest and consolidated the power of the state at home"*. This political justification, however, bears only an accidental relation to his primary insight; Wars break up the repetitious forms that give the appearance of comfort, of vanity, of business being taken too lightly. He claims the apparent inertia of fluids produces dreams of stability, of the perpetual or the eternal.

Hegel never ceased to rail against the theory of inertia. His claim being that inertia is not primarily a property of nature but a *provisional* suggestion of Mind<sup>74</sup>. Hegel identifies inertia as the projection of mental habits, and of the habitual and deathly inertia of those minds as yet uncommitted to their highest form and, thus, alienated from themselves as from Nature. The virtue of War, in short, is to inhibit the fluidity of the sea and bring to the enjoyment of goods a proper sense of gravity, the property commerce habitually forgets. Hegel might retreat to the idea that a definite State is buttressed through armed conflict. However, the distinction of the above analysis lies in his remarks upon the way economic fluidity is articulated through warfare, and this is the only justification war requires.

Derrida is entranced by effects of catachresis in the apparent, or vain, enjoyment of analogous commodities and their currency. He does not, however, affirm the violence of War; i.e. its pure violence or overwhelming violence. Hegel's account of war suggests war is justifiable only as a differential articulation of economics. Which is to say, as a **Form** of articulation, it is a question of the Law rather than of War as a violent consummation of nihilism. It has been seen that monopolisation depends upon dyssemmetrical relations. Where various ventures are possible, the chiefmost possibility is taken to be the repetition of the same type of experience over and over; for instance, the repetition of Fra Pacilio's catholic vision, or the imperial power of Athens as the major issue or interest in every relation across the world. In the disruption of such monopolies, Derrida identifies Law where others have accentuated War. Here, what is formal, or lawful, is the communicated experience of the repetition of differences or of disruptions (even

modesties, inhibitions, *différences*) rather than any attempt to promote the repetition of the same; i.e. the monotonous or the hegemonic. Finally, as it not a question of the eternal repetition of the Ideal of perpetual peace, nor of the perpetuation of definite states, it is - *neither* - a question of jettisoning the hope of law; specifically, *inter-national* law. It is a formal problem, the formal communication of the repetition of difference rather than the repetition of the same. For Derrida, it remains a formal problem; one distinguished through its infinite and exhausting character. A question of international law as the way in which all 'deconstructions', in general, become formally articulated (if silently or in discretion), as they become a part of general experience:

*"The event called the Gulf, for example, is a spectacularly powerful and tragic condensation of these deconstructions. The cloven genealogy of all the structures and all the foundations of which I have spoken tremble in this conflagration, this upheaval: The West and the history of philosophy which binds it, on the one side, to several great and irreconcilable monotheisms (whatever one says) as, on the other, to natural languages and national sympathies, to the idea of democracy and to the theologico-political; but finally, to the infinite progress of an idea of international law, the limits of which appear more clearly than ever. Not simply because of those who represent them or irrationally exploit them to the profit, always, of determined hegemonies and thus only inadequately approach the infinite, but also because of what is founded (and through being limited) upon the concepts of modern european philosophy (nation, State, democracy, democratic relations between states, whether these latter are democratic or not, etc.)"*<sup>78</sup>

In this analysis of the Gulf war (still current at the time of speaking) Derrida reaffirms the forensic quality of the Gulf qua upheaval. Which is to say, he reaffirms the ties which bespeak intra-national communication, democracy and the law rather than the so-called 'irrational' aspects; i.e. the affirmation of the laws failure. For Derrida, it could only be a kind of law, a kind of general enabling of

communication, that articulates the problem termed the Gulf; even if it is a law observed only in the breach. The irrational view would simply work to the benefit of hegemonies; i.e. the kind of monopolistic effect that perpetuates the same sympathies, the same ties, the same blocs in every dispute. In sum, Derrida refuses to allow the 'depoliticising' tendencies of 'deconstructions' to remain, as he refuses to allow such deconstructions to remain unarticulated, more or less at ease in silence. The problem of accentuating the extent and variety of non-symmetrical relations, rather than allowing any single such occurrence to gather force as a mooted world-view, is denoted by the term 'infinity'. It is, as can be noted from the above passage, an infinity which fails ("*through being limited*"), which passes over its failures, or which communicates in eliding failure. Derrida spoke, above, of "*a certain dislocation which, in its effects, regularly recurs; which in its passing, comes to pass or fails to.*" To read the infinite ways each recurrence might be differentiated is seen to be formal rather than war-like. It could be said, Derrida replaces the even repetition of a marching beat with the uneven tempo of jazz drumming. In any case, he argues it is a question of the Law and its articulation rather than War and its inexorable passage. He has, in short, understood war in a different way, in a weaker way, a way he understands - insofar as in its effects it continues to be communicative - as the slips and beats of a Law existing in and throughout any national arena. It can now be seen this law is perpetually troubled, a law which is never quite the same. However, as this law is a weaker simulation of war, in the sense that it promotes debate rather than conflict, this weakness becomes a strength. In its every nuance, the law remains differentially compelling, those who ignore it could only facilitate the enjoyment of hegemonic pleasures.

*"These violent deconstructions are current, they happen (ça arrive), without waiting for what has been achieved in the philosophico-theoretical analyses I have come to evoke in a word: these latter are necessary but infinite and the reading such fracturings make possible will never be able to drop down over the event: they simply intervene there, they are inscribed there."<sup>76</sup>*

In this last quotation Derrida again promotes the piquancy of writing. It is a piquancy which inscribes or intervenes in the violence of any conflagration. Such interventions continue to broach the kind of secret communication ignored in the violent passage of the 'current', which never waits (*attendre*). In such passages, and in the violence of such a passage, writing is necessary to the extent it articulates that which has *happened*. Which is to say, writing inscribes the ways in which the current has passed, or become past. It is in this respect that writing resembles the work of mourning. Mourning is, traditionally, represented as a disposition devoted to the derelict and inhibited or repressed rather than the potentially stimulating; the open chance, the current venture. With the phrase, '*ça arrive*' Derrida uses the French term for the unconscious: the *id*. Rather than regarding Mourning as inhibited as regards the conscious or intelligible and stultified by a devotion to inarticulable or unconscious desires, Derrida accentuates the way in which unconscionable desires might be articulated; raised as issues or as symptoms. Here, the work of mourning, like writing, has begun to communicate different symptoms as the objects of forensic analysis, but in such a way as to disrupt or subvert the indifference that identifies them; or identifies them as, in some way, analogous (like currency). Mourning is differentially compelling insofar as it is symptomatic of varying currents and inscribes these symptoms with a peculiar, forensic significance. In short, neither writing nor mourning

represent the *essentially* inhibited (as the Political must represent the *essentially* inhibited, in order to represent an internal limit). For Derrida, the current passion for destruction betrays a flicker of modesty every time it is represented, communicated or differentiated.

Inscriptions publicised as effects of mourning break the indifference of economics; in its currents or in its currency. Where the property of being analogous, which is the virtue of any economic commodity, might come to underwrite monopolies, the forensic communication of mourning introduces effects which disrupt this general inertia, or the enjoyment of this inertia. This property of mourning is similar to the one Hegel ascribes to warfare; a grave articulation of whatever has been idly promoted as the same. As has been seen, war for Hegel is war between states. Its end is the integrity of a Political whole. However, war, which is a disruption and articulation of economics, cannot then be made into a recoument of the State. The work of mourning inscribes the passing of states. Whilst it remains forensic, its forum could not come to be represented as a Political whole, nor have a significance only in relation to local precepts. As mourning remains differentially compelling, it cannot be resettled locally; *it could only fail to represent the same locale, even as it makes this failure an issue for forensics.*

The representation of the law through the Fascio was designed to denote the way differences might be maintained by the same structure. This was seen in the work of Ezra Pound and, by extension, in the 'form' or '*paideia*' promoted by Heidegger. As has been noted, *La différence* exploits the term *faisceau*; sheaf. This insinuation of a term similar to

'fascio' could, by analogy, be taken to invoke the kind of structure vaunted by the Italian Fascists or German Nazis. It might be argued that the term ventured, here, is nothing other than the form proposed by various apologists of totalitarianism. This would, in a very certain sense, be an illegitimate accusation. Certainly, through this translation, as through his promotion of writing, Derrida moves from one representation of the law to another. However, through this move, there is no sense that the law 'of' the State is recouped. Which is to say, from a representation of the law's authority Derrida moves, through translation, into a space where the integrity of the fascio begins to unfold. In short, he treats the form or the authority 'of' the law with suspicion and has done so by virtue of another kind of law; a law of suspicion. In moving from the presence of authority (re-presented by a sceptre: *fascio*) to a kind of writing which negotiates with authority, in suspicion, Derrida promotes a form of law which is not given as *such* but, in general, remarks upon 'a certain dislocation'. Here, through his championing of writing, Derrida again suggests Rousseau but, as ever, to the unfolding of Rousseau's popular contracts in an arena which cannot be identified with the State, with the State's authority, or with a predetermined form of government<sup>77</sup>.

Further on in La différance, Derrida asks how Heidegger has sealed the providence of difference (here, to *khreon*). Here, he draws his audience's attention not simply to writing but to the seal which represents the closure of the sheaf; i.e. its legal import<sup>78</sup>. This strategy is designed to replicate the closure of forensic discussion under the jurisdiction of a court. Derrida, again, simulates the kinds of expression indicating a closure, a sense of final commitment, but

continues to promote other and different expressions at the end of any such closure; i.e. at the bankruptcy of any final expression of commitment. As always, this is an economic effect. The effect which allows the 'reserve' to be metaphorically represented as a place, a site, a political institution. Such a 'reserve', in its simulation, rather denotes suspicion. This effect, as has been stressed, continues to be a forensic problem but not one identified with a specific forum or the authority it represents. The way of writing does not constitutionally preserve any sense of a final objective, it weakens such commitments. As the political significance of war is not the preservation of territory but the breaking up - articulation - of different regions, so writing continues to frame the way regions are broken, reopened, passed over or continue to communicate. It is weaker than whatever power might be represented in war, but is insistently (even irredeemably) forensic in the way it continues to record such effects. After writing, or any effect raised as a forensic issue (either the trace of writing or the symptomatic trace of mourning), the differences current around regional or colloquial voices will never be identified with any one region claiming political integrity. This, for Derrida, is the infinite progress of the idea of international law; a progress he records through the skips or elisions apparent in its formal scoring.

It is, above all, a recognisable effect, a recorded effect which becomes an issue only in its forensic appreciation. Modern states are based on anti-trust laws; both internally and in the relations passing through each. Here, in an ethos of anti-trust, suspicion becomes generally intelligible; i.e. does not imply a loaded or predetermined position (a reserve) but, rather, in its suspicions (reservations) allows

commerce to continue. The revolutions that formed the modern state come to be elided in this perpetual breaking of trusts, of monopolies or idealised recipients of credit. In a sense, the revolutions that formed modern government never happened because no Popular Will, in the sense of a definite *populace*, could ever enjoy a definite space consecrated as their own. As regards the revolution, it **happens** (*ça arrive*), but all that is enjoyed through its memory is the differential desires of an economy; an economy always recurring, and recurring differently in its every passage. What Derrida has come to highlight is a certain formal or legal providence; monopolistic dynasties or monopolising tyrannies can be read otherwise, can lawfully be read otherwise. The 'law' does not determine the property or the rights of a certain nationality or national sympathy, rather the law is that which enables the communication of different sympathies and alternative positions. Thus, the memory of the revolution, the faint memory of a revolution cast in laws that dissipate its popular image, has come to suggest a new idea of freedom; i.e. the idea of freedom as making a difference, through expressing a reservation. The conclusion addresses the tradition with which this idea may be associated.

Conclusion: *An inside where 'We' are? An Apology for the West?*

The Ends of Man uses one word for the First World, *Economics*; or rather, its Hellenic root: *Oikonomia*. The preceding thesis has elaborated this difference; the difference between an object of political commitment - the *oikos*, or the home of a unified people - and the discourse elaborating this commitment *otherwise*: fluidly, economically or in passing. Economics is a detour, an invisible hand writing the text of a politics without a proper, familiar end. It would seem, then, the concept of the Political ought now to be consigned to the past of Economics. This would imply the detour through economics has a history; a moment at which it becomes obvious the Political has neither the constancy nor universality to be treated as a conscientiable goal and, hence, must be constructed through the ruse of economics. Whilst there is neither an 'origin' nor a 'prehistory' to economics, this thesis has suggested a possible '*history of economics*' through marking the closure of Politics at different times. The history of economics is 'elliptical' insofar as the State lies forgotten in every opening into economics.

The power of any 'Political' unit is never, then, an internal matter but the result of external relations. Such relations, *immanent only to economics*, emphasise the continuation of an idea only as a symptom of a monopolistic power, not a Political project; such ideas, for instance, as Athens or the Church. In the Second chapter, it was seen how depression - the failure of business - might be represented as a means to re-order economic phenomena under a Political form; hence, the analogy between the gallows of depression and the shadow of fluidity. A discourse taking Politics as its end - its object or rationale - might be distinguished

by: (i) an obsession with mourning and the remoteness of the objects closest to its heart, and (ii) an inability to close its account or to settle upon a theme because, as a political discourse, it remains fixated upon relations lying outside its vaunted terms; the highest of which would be the Body Politick and its idealised integrity. *Politics, wrapped in the shadow of Depression, remains all at sea.*

This would seem to be the theme of The Ends of Man. There, Derrida characterises philosophy as an apology for the metaphysics of Presence; i.e. for a transcendent ethos characterised by stability and integrity. His brief account of the "language of the West", argues its philosophy stays this ethical idea only in dereliction; its Oikonomia now a graveyard of hope [EM 161]. The Ends of Man ends with the question "But who, we?" [EM 164]; like Fra Pacioli's businessmen, it seems 'we' are always in a great deal of mental trouble. As the Foreword suggested, we already understand depression, suffering from our awareness as though this were the result of providence; of an original Hellenic fate ('to *khreon*') or of mercenary expedience (*khrematisenoi*). Philosophy enjoys an obsession with dereliction as it emphasises dereliction at every turn. If it is admitted that economics could never elaborate a closed, stable realm, is it a matter of fate or expediency that 'We' who enjoy its benefits are neither comfortable nor secure? In this turn, or through this detour, *is it possible to say anything other than a Political ethics is more or less similar to a mournful demeanour?* In effect, that 'We' remain locked within a problem that, if never the same, retains a depressing sense of exigency? A quotation from Derrida's Ellipsis, noted in the Second chapter, suggested the idea of an 'inside', an inner-limit to every problem, continues to exert an imperious effect:

"And yet did we not know that the closure of the book was not a simple limit amongst others? And that only in the book, coming back to it unceasingly, drawing all our resources from it could we indefinitely designate the writing beyond the book."

Which is to say, the sense of 'our' ethos depends upon the inner-limit of the 'book' (of its contents or its ethical content) as upon a reserve or a capital-reserve. This thesis, however, has insisted that the difference between the inside and outside of the 'book' is a difference in the 'text'; i.e. is immanent only to external relations. In the Third chapter Derrida was seen to state that 'text' is, finally, another term for the "*social reality*". Derrida might resemble those philosophers intent on remaining within the confines of a stable Political form but cannot be said to haunt an '*inside where we are*'. Rather, he haunts the (outer) edge of a virtual inner-limit; a limit articulated by virtue of economic processes. Whilst he might resemble more traditional thinkers, his dissemblance is distinctive in *other ways*'. For Derrida, the 'reserve' is not an essential fall-back position but a trace of doubt, a question mark. If this suspicion is raised at the moment the difference between the inside and the outside of a State becomes an issue, it will not finally be a question of the seemly or unseemly, of the true coin of State or its counterfeit. Everything, here, depends upon artifice.

This thesis assiduously exploited the term 'forensics'; referring to a closed Political forum and an open market. The term was designed to broach these questions: "Where is democracy without reciprocity?" *Where?* Where might one make a *public* use of reason? Not within a determined forum. If Derrida focuses upon the West, he does not attempt to justify its integrity. When The Ends of Man speaks of this 'inside', it states:

*"A radical trembling can only come from outside."*<sup>2</sup>

If Derrida accentuates the irredeemably oblique character of economics, why does he continue to insist upon an inside? If he no longer haunts a carefully demarcated forum, why does he resist abandoning this nebulous inner-limit? This thesis has, at best, indicated why Derrida's work should be taken seriously as an economics; as a rigorous account of what is at stake in Classical political-economics. Here, classical economics has been understood as an attempt to establish an ethos like that of the older Polis. Perhaps, speculatively, a ruse designed to recoup a forgotten ideal. Rather than constructing the conditions for the possibility of the Political, Derrida's discourse is deconstructive. This discourse has been linked to neo-classicism, with the emphasis upon the New (although, here, there were problems; Derrida is suspicious of novelties, of accelerating cycles of hype). Deconstruction does not return to bolster a definite position. With such ideas as the 'strategic bet', Derrida clearly has no designs upon a position offering a broad or wide appeal; i.e. with the appearance of a popular ethics. In fact, he affirms the way in which a monopoly position, a more or less stable or generally enjoyed position, might be subject to elisions or to *tremblings*. As has been seen, it is as much a virtue of the West as a cause for mourning that certain positions fail.

The term neo-classicism came some way towards describing Derrida's resistance to abandoning a seemingly Political inner-limit. The term helped to express Derrida's dual sense of 'reserve'; both an ideal that calls for re-presentation and an object of suspicion, an object drawing attention to differences rather than uniformity. From the First chapter

it was seen that the origin or foundations of government need not be subject to approval. Government might, in fact, be treated with open suspicion, by virtue of its artificiality or the fact it is articulated through stranger, more elliptical relations than had been supposed. The Second chapter argued the break with Classicism, the distinction of Modernism, need not be taken as read. The Classical optimism that a stable ethos is always on the horizon was treated with utter suspicion by various Modernists. Through deconstruction, it was found that Modernism continued to negotiate with Classical doctrines, in economics or philosophy, and did so across the break established as the basis of the one's suspicions or the other's shortcomings. The third Chapter saw that intra-national relations need not depend upon an all encompassing faith; there continues to be ways to negotiate in an atmosphere of general, even international, dischordancy. Indeed, it was argued that with the ascendancy of an ethos valuing anti-trust laws and the inhibition of monopolies, there is a greater virtue in emphasising the fractitious dissemination of relations than their regular and stately continuation. It has become the virtue of economics to crack the face of monopolistic relations. The world market no longer dances to the same tune but to a multiplicity of rhythms offering different appeals.

To accentuate this virtue already implies an ethical dimension; another story. As will be seen, Derrida speaks of his fears for liberalism. Hayek, a self-proclaimed liberal, identifies liberalism with anti-rationalism (Hayek p. 337). Here, Hayek is not referring to *irrationalism* but to an attitude that remains alien to the rationalist, constructivist pretensions of Franco-German philosophy. Derrida, as has been seen, constantly strives to read Hegel's dialectic otherwise. It

might be thought that, schooled in French philosophy, he remains closer to such prejudices than Hayek. Certainly, he seems to worry more. However, if constructivist pretensions continue to exert a power, they could not do so as Political projects. Derrida recognises their force as an economic force, a monopolising power, when he states:

*"Misconstrued, treated lightly, Hegelianism only extends its historical domination, finally unfolding its immense enveloping resources without obstacle"*<sup>3</sup>

This explains Derrida's emphasis upon the West and its philosophy. The West is not a cohesive political group and could only dissemble such a group. The 'West' is agonistic, articulated by virtue of a variety of competing affections. It could never retain a stable providence in every instance, nor ever suffer as a single ethos. The question, then, is two-fold: is it a blessing of the West that, far from representing a distinct set of sympathies, it is elaborated through the deconstruction of relations remaining alien to any vaunted position? Or, is it to 'our' shame that something like the West remains dominant throughout every deconstruction; i.e. that the West retains the power of a monopoly position? *The Ends of Man* broaches this problem: the idea that the West is not continuous, its clutches remain uncertain. In every instance, the fragility of the West and the insistency of its domination is to the fore. The inner-limit to Derrida's discourse is not that of an ethos secure within its own precincts. It is, rather, a question of power; of what it means to be more or less weak, or powerful, through every deconstruction. The West is either fractured by strong suspicions, or strong insofar as it sustains only weak suspicions. It is not, however, a question of concentration or dispersal; of reconvening upon the West's more or less weakened state or exploiting the weaknesses in an

otherwise strong state. This inner-limit, rather, reflects upon the suspicions between relative strengths and weaknesses. If Derrida returns 'unceasingly' to this inner-limit, it is because the possibility of reciprocity is endangered here; the virtues of the West might be exploited in favour of new hegemonies, or ignored despite the western weakness for allowing monopolies to extend their domination without any sense of limit. Certainly, Derrida provides an apologism for Western, liberal democracy. He does so, however, by highlighting power relations and the possibility of reciprocity. The inner-limit to his debate is a question of deconstruction and of dominance.

In sum, Derrida does not act as an apologist 'of' the West in its nature or its integrity. He identifies an inner-limit to western discourses; to their power and their weaknesses and to the way the issue of the more or less compelling is always under suspicion, in the course of deconstructions. It is difficult to speak of Derrida, straightforwardly, as a neo-classicist. The term, applied frequently to Hayek, was here used to stress a similarity between Hayek and Derrida; the fact that Hayek, in his extreme *anglophilia*, exemplifies a liberal tradition in which Derrida is, at least, steeped. However, it may be argued that, as Derrida resists abandoning a certain feature of this tradition, he develops a definite philosophical tradition anew. This conclusion ends with three last sections:

(1) An account of Socrates defence in the Apology. Socrates attempts to make a public use of reason whilst casting doubt upon the concept of a stable political forum. Despite highlighting the way economic pressures destabilise a Political realm, Socrates continues to claim a distinctive,

public role. Like Derrida, Socrates remains at the virtual inner-limit of a discourse which, if not Political, conspires to resist the more powerful economic pressures.

(ii) An analysis of the way Derrida continues, in a style reminiscent of Socrates, to highlight the death of the Political space. It will be seen that his own attempts to make a public use of reason are folded onto what he terms a '*new physiology*'; a techno-economic mutation of the Public realm.

(iii) An analysis of Derrida's attempt to affirm a style of negotiation which is not simply obsessed with the death of the Political; i.e. is affirmative rather than mournful. A negotiation which, like Socrates', implies a sense of economic resistance. In effect, Derrida affirms a similar limit to that of Socrates. This section concludes with a brief analysis of what it may mean to abandon this 'reserve' or 'resource'; i.e. the virtual inner-limit of an intelligent and liberal ethics.

\* \* \* \*

Socrates Apology: on the margins of an antique forum

As has been seen, Plato's attempt to think the immutable core of the *Polis* was determined less by a passion for 'transcendent truth' than economic factors. Business has no firm basis in the City, as Perikles was aware. For Plato, the denial of this core, something both immutable and essentially 'of' the City (in its ideal integrity) is tantamount to treason. The Republic opens in a port, awash with alien influences and dead to the inherent attractions of the city. *Here, treason has become second nature.* Plato's later Laws argues a maritime city is condemned to delinquency, to false money and inflation. As in the work of Aristophanes, or even David Hume, the vagaries of a credit economy are associated with the wiles of the sea; the fluidity of currency is in thrall to the debauching sea and market forces. In consequence, Plato's idea of the city remains aloof from the credulous market. The clarity of the position in the Republic might lead to a retrospective attribution of similar themes to his, earlier, Apology. However, this work is startling in its contrariness, the Socrates of the Apology goes with the flow.

The Apology revolves around a simple dialectic: the city is the sum of its parts. This equivalence, never directly alluded to, is the subject of repeated insinuation. After opening his apology by stating:

*"observe and pay attention just to this, whether what I say is Just or not, for that is the virtue of the judge, and an orator's virtue is to speak the truth."*<sup>6</sup>

Socrates arrives at a variety of versions of this dialectical equivalence. His elliptical route to Justice proceeds by cross-

questioning the prosecutor, Meletus. If Meletus's virtue is to recognise Justice, Socrates' questions are designed to confuse. He asks Meletus about the general and the particular, and the relation between the two. Specifically, he asks if it is possible to have a general conception of the human without believing in any particular human<sup>6</sup>. The issue, here, is that a general concept of citizenry remains vague if nothing could be subsumed under it. It is, above all, the virtue of Political Justice to enfranchise a citizenry. However, only by virtue of its citizenry is the general extent of a *Polis* maintained. For Socrates the maintenance of the City is crucial, a matter of life or death. As Socrates is arraigned before the citizenry, it is the responsibility of the citizenry to assess his defence and to pass judgement. Athenian Justice was juridical, any judgement passed upon Socrates depended upon it being assessed by his peers against a context of general, and generally intelligible, laws. This, according to Thucydides, is one of the central issues for Perikles, the greatest defender of Athens and of its constitution:

*"The name given to this constitution is democracy, because it is based not on a few but on a larger number. For the settlement of private disputes all are on an equal footing in accordance with the laws."*<sup>7</sup>

Socrates' questions are designed to problematise the relation between a general concept of juridical justice and a particular indictment presented within a juridical forum. If Meletus cannot judge the relation between the general and the particular, how can he prosecute a particular offence under a general form of law?

Socrates insists the relation between a general concept of citizenry and the profession of a particular kind of knowledge is uncertain. His

first example is the farrier; an apt job for a citizen, without there being any reason for everyone to know the farrier's art. Socrates quickly moves from an example entailing the care of horses to the care of men; i.e. a more 'General' concern. One indictment of Socrates claimed his profession corrupted the youth (i.e. was treasonous, debauching). As the love of wisdom is held to be a virtue of the Athenian<sup>6</sup>, so the probity of the relation between the general scope of 'Knowledge' and any particular piece of pedagogy ought to be a subject upon which an Athenian is capable of passing judgement. Which is to say, the ability to recognise the proper relation between wisdom and education ought to be second nature. If this relation remains uncertain, Justice becomes a difficult enterprise. Socrates' Apology, in essence, argues Meletus never appreciates the difficulties of Justice or even the nature of the enterprise. Socrates' strategy is to show that the rarefied province of the general, whose defence is so assiduously prosecuted by Meletus, is a dream. The general, shorn of its sense of difficulty, is an empty core.

The example of the farrier is one example amongst many. As a trade, however, it focuses upon the everyday business of a state. In the Apology Socrates makes two contradictory references to the business of trade and the virtues of a state. In the first instance, he states:

*"virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things to man, both to the individual and to the state."*<sup>9</sup>

The idea that Virtue, or Justice, ought to be separate from everyday preoccupations and, moreover, the security of the citizenry's everyday life depends upon its having properly assessed its priorities, is the ethical idea. Justice is not to be coerced, nor perverted by worldly

considerations. In the speech following the Funeral Oration, Perikles calls for a defence of the City on the basis of its houses and lands being "*a pleasure-garden or adornment of (its) wealth*". Which is to say, the quality of Athens remains so much more intangible than mere wealth, as though its defence were the defence of a higher ideal. Socrates, however, later states that the Athenian citizenry know no higher duty:

*"what most men care for, money-making and property, and military offices and public speaking, and the various offices and plots and factions that come up in the state."*<sup>10</sup>

In the first instance, the whole City (the sum of its parts) is essentially maintained by Justice. In the second instance, the extent of the whole is practically determined by the business relations elaborating 'its' everyday life. Which is to say, the ethical transcendence of the city has not determined its immanent character. The ideal City is derailed everytime something akin to the City is the object of speculation. Athens is determined by relations which remain external to any essential ethical quality or sympathy. Hence, whilst Thucydides has Perikles appeal to the dream of a Polis secured by its inherent virtues, he nevertheless insists Athens is secured by virtue of the power it wields across the seas of the known world ("*This power is not the same as the use of your houses and lands, the loss of which you regard as a great blow. ... you should rather think of those possessions as a pleasure garden or adornment in contrast to your naval power*"). A power which, although apparently military, is in practice commercial:

*"Because of the size of our city, everything can be imported from all over the earth, with the result that we have no more special enjoyment of our native goods than of the goods of the rest of mankind"*<sup>11</sup>

Thus, when Socrates disrupts the casual, immediate relation Meletus would maintain between the General (and its juridical form) and the particular (the jurors), he does so because the General is *only* virtual. It has no separate, transcendent status other than those ascribed to it through '*money-making, plots and factions*'. In consequence, Socrates positions himself at the margins of the City, at its exterior but always close to its inner-limit. There are two ways to read Socrates' 'marginal' role. On the one hand, if the 'inside' is elaborated through commercial relations, everyone (in 'their' relations) is external to the city. Socrates is as much like an Athenian as any other, either those who wear their citizenry with factious greed or those who suffer its coercive effects. On the other hand, Socrates' style of philosophy affords little earning potential; it does not easily offer the illusion that he enjoys the life 'of' a city and 'its' offices. The word he uses to describe his position now looks like serious self-condemnation, *idiot*<sup>2</sup>. In fact, as it refers to a demeanour of private intransigence, it was already to be condemned. Thucydides states, above, that 'private' disputes should be opened to public settlement. When Thucydides records Perikles' enumeration of Athenian virtues, he writes:

*"The same men accept responsibility both for their own affairs and for the state's, and although different men are active in different fields they are not lacking in understanding of the state's concerns: we alone regard the man who refuses to take part in these not as non-interfering but as useless."*<sup>3</sup>

Socrates remains resolutely idiotic, knowing his refusal to enter the affairs of state is indictable. He accepts - in principle - the indictment not just of Meletus but of Perikles. His only hope is his apology should be judged to be not wholly dissimilar from the affairs of

state and, in this more or less dissimilar state, accepted as a cause for continuous concern rather than immediate indictment. Thus, even as Socrates remains at some remove from the central concerns of the city, he accepts he cannot simply be viewed as non-interfering (only if his lessons were in vain would he have been innocent). *He is an interference, he has interfered with Athens' sons.* However, as he is not a part of the 'inside' of the Polis, he has no use in the city. Here, in conformity with Thucydides, he shows why his redundancy might be indictable; it has an effect, remaining a thorn in the side of *real politicks*. More than anyone else, he disrupts the secure illusion of being on the Inside; of particular citizens everywhere reenforcing the general extent of the City. He insists upon all the trouble he goes to, even as he resists abandoning this inner-limit; he keeps himself somewhere in the frame, albeit at the margins. Is this virtual inner-limit simply the nebulous heart of an appeal to collectivity? Is it an invidious appeal for a hopeless form of political will? As will be seen, below, the inner-limit of Socrates' apology is a calculus of the weaker and the stronger.

It has been said, above, that the Apology devolves upon this dialectical equivalence; the whole is equal to its parts. That is, a commitment to the forensic form, in general, is equivalent to public deliberation, in its every particular. However, Socrates does not inhabit the centre of a forensic debate; he puts himself firmly at the margins of this question, without abandoning its imperatives. In undertaking his apology, Socrates identifies two different kinds of indictment. The central charge is preferred by Meletus, that Socrates believes in alien gods and subjects the Nation's youth to unwonted influences. Socrates insists this charge is unconvincing, it is not the stronger charge

(although he accepts that being 'alien', or useless, and engendering unwonted passions, or interfering, is commonly held to be indictable). The stronger charges have unfolded over the course of Socrates' life, accusations that have grown through whispers without, ever, having an identifiable source. In answering this charges, Socrates is:

*"compelled, in making my defence, to fight absolutely with shadows and to cross question when nobody answers."<sup>14</sup>*

As the Nation unfolds through the commerce of its everyday relations, so the strongest impression of Socrates' culpability rests with these vague and shadowy processes. The impression of indictability has no direct source, Socrates cannot face his accusers within a definite forum. He can only indirectly respond. He can, however, address Aristophanes' The Clouds. This play would be the source of some of the popular conceptions about Socrates, about his idiosyncracies, and his teachings. It is often assumed that Socrates and Aristophanes were opponents. However, whilst the representation of Socrates in The Clouds is a comic figure, it is not malevolent. In fact, when asked to teach Strepsiades the weaker and the stronger arguments he simply introduces the two arguments, the good and least persuasive argument and the bad and most compelling argument. Socrates allows Strepsiades to judge which argument is the more suitable<sup>15</sup>. The good argument finally surrenders itself to the audience and the commerce of everyday power relations. Strepsiades choice is simple; the 'bad' argument, in its shadowy and devious turns, is the more suited to Athenian life. In sum, the Socrates of The Clouds does not seduce Strepsiades into nefarious commerce, Strepsiades is already seduced; his seduction is complete when the good argument surrenders its claims and joins Athenian life.

The Clouds argues the ability to judge is the ability to judge between the more or less effective argument. The Apology is a tribute rather than attack on The Clouds, making its argument the most pressing one of Socrates' defence; the issue he takes the most pains to accentuate. The Apology argues the stronger arguments are the most popular and the more nefarious and asks that this truth be judged, as it is the judge's virtue to recognise what is Just in the orator's truths. Above all, the Apology is a tribute to what has been given to be understood through The Clouds. In repeating its claims, Socrates respects the power and the themes of that work and rearticulates these in another framework; in a court rather than theatrical forum. Finally, he draws a juridical conclusion that could only indirectly be alluded to in The Clouds; if the Public is commonly subjected to the stronger, the most assured or least risky arguments, to be subject to the more risky argument is - paradoxically - to be free to make the most singular judgements. In short, Socrates finds a strength through weakness, the freedom to overturn popular decisions.

The way the Apology becomes tuned into Aristophanes' themes, and the way it repeats these themes in a more or less juridical form, requires closer analysis. The Clouds argues that the expansion of Athens has entrained figures like Strepsiades into its every dealing. When The Clouds opens, Strepsiades weeps for the 'mouldy and unswept life' enjoyed in his farm home, remote from Athens' influence (i.e. in a family farm and the 'oikonomia' that implies<sup>6</sup>). His seduction by his wife and his wife's seduction by avarice, have resulted in him becoming Athenian. Here, being Athenian means being subject to a credit economy and fully condemned to indebtedness. In repeating this theme, Socrates forces the

issue of Justice in a specific way; i.e. that Justice must now be concerned with the strong and pernicious influence of the discourses making Athens so compelling, so seductive.

It is again, a question of what Socrates' has been given to understand, as he elaborates this understanding within a forum. A forum that has come to seem like the market-place where Socrates is commonly found. Here, certainly, there is a move from the Ideal forum to the market forum. There are, however, other resemblances at work; as the Apology elaborates the juridical forum as an event entrained by market forces, so it also emphasises stranger - comic - effects in the market. Which is to say, Socrates rearticulates the effects that a work by Aristophanes has given to be understood. He does so as he insists that Justice could, yet, become interested in such effects. Socrates' comic strain is to the fore when he enters the juridical forum only to elide its central concerns. He represents his marginality by insisting he is a rustic (like Strepsiades). As a rustic, he insists he knows nothing, that he is powerless to interpret the due processes of the law<sup>7</sup>. Socrates adopts Strepsiades' crafty, peasant cunning but highlights this cunning's central feature; despite its non-linear character it remains useless in a commercial setting. It seems especially at home when the home is idealised as a City-state; i.e. is at home insofar as it is marginal to the ethical core of the ideal city. However, in its exceptional tortuousness, it elides even the oblique advantages of market forces, the maintenance of a monopoly. Which is to say, it remains marginal even to the commercial wiles of Athenian life. In sum, it has a commercial flavour, but is commercially disastrous. Strepsiades' commercial failings nevertheless have an effect, exerting a kind of

interference. Whilst Strepsiades remains marginal, even redundant, as regards any successful enterprise he continues to exert a comic effect within the market. How might a general concept of Justice, based on a general concept of juridical ability, come to judge the particular effects denoted by Strepsiades? If Strepsiades is so marginal as to be useless, is it just to indict him (as redundant) because he is commercially maladroit? If, in fact, Strepsiades ought to be disenfranchised because he is not at home in Athens, is it possible his disenfranchisement could become a juridical issue; i.e. a thorn in the side of the court? If such a figure, despite its shortcomings, continues to interfere in juridical processes, could this become the object of a juridical deliberation?

Socrates raises such issues insofar as he represents what Aristophanes has given him to understand. Which is to say, Socrates speaks the truth as he understands it and asks that this 'truth' be subjected to Judgement. He does so, above all, by respecting what might be termed the "gift" of Aristophanes' drama. As a gift is offered without the expectation of commercial gain, Socrates repeats only commercially disastrous effects. He, then, asks that such effects be judged by his peers, even when such effects elide the kinds of discourse that distinguishes his peers, commonly or in general. He respects what Aristophanes has given him to understand a second time, he does not simply repackage *The Clouds* for public consumption; in fact, he comically fails to do this. In sum, Socrates emphasises what has been given to be understood, given in the sense that it cannot be the object of profit. This 'gift' is emphasised insofar as it is not a commercial exchange. Its comic effect is that it is not a commercial exchange.

Socrates fails to articulate a popular position. He does so through insisting (effectively, comically) that no position could be stable when one attempts to represent what one has been given to understand. Any such representation is a risk. It is, further, a salutary risk. Salutary, insofar as it reminds one of the impossibility of maintaining a stable position; hence, the suspicious nature of any appeal to such a position. An insistent risk, insofar as it cannot be assured. The risk cannot be lessened by appealing to a dominant position, nor can the risk work to the advantage of any apparently stable position, as a monopoly position is apparently stable or less risky. In highlighting the shortcomings of any risk, Socrates asks whether such a risk could become an issue. Which is to say, whether one might enjoy the effects of a more or less weak discourse in a way that continues to be an issue; a forensic issue, an issue circulated throughout a forum.

At the end of his apology, Socrates abandons the guise of a marginalised rustic, or idiot, in order to adopt the language of citizenry; he addresses the forum as though he were amongst peers<sup>10</sup>. As has been seen, at the close of *The Ends of Man*, Derrida adopts the ruse of speaking of a 'we', and of an 'inside where we are'. In effect, both finally come to ask if they have *communicated* the kind of risk they sought to raise. As such an issue only resembles a juridical issue, their right to citizenship depends upon the risks they take being generally appreciated. This risk was represented, by Socrates, through a comic discourse that failed to capitalise on its issues. Socrates, however, drops other clues to his real interests. The *Apology* constantly adds the rhetorical flourish 'more or less' to many of its formulas; thus emphasising the inner-limit of its discourse, a calculus of the more or

less powerful'<sup>9</sup>. In Greek, the phrase can carry a trace of political positions; the 'less' is the root of the term 'oligarchy'. If the many, Democracy, is opposed to the fewer, Oligarchy, which is the more powerful? The 'few', bent on maintaining their leveraged position with few risks, or the 'many' continuously subject to greater risks and weakened through that subjection? Socrates, as is rarely appreciated, is a democrat, he is interested in the many, in all its hues. To be subject to the weakening effects of a variety of interests (in all their risks), is to negotiate the singular effects of a multivarious discourse, circulated without coercion or monopolisation.

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**The Samizdat: a salutary reminder**

The Apology turns an unwonted effect into a public issue. La démocratie a journée exploits the term 'samizdat' in pursuit of a similar effect. What is a samizdat? A Russian word, it refers to self-publication; a personal enterprise in the public's service. Whilst in no way suggesting vanity publishing, it could neither be considered a real business. The samizdat describes an underground system, aimed against the *status quo*. Derrida exploits both sides of the samizdat: its marginality and its system. For Derrida, the samizdat is an 'access', a relation lying between those elements pushed into privacy and those others enjoying popular approval. To understand the samizdat, it is necessary to look again at this distinction.

Popular approval has been discussed in terms of monopolies; the enjoyment of a mass movement as though it were a stable position. Derrida credits philosophy with a pivotal role in the preferrment of monopolies; referring, specifically, to those thinkers who approve an appearance of stability as though this reflected a faith in a transcendent world. Here lies the mystery of the monopoly, the possibility that heterogeneous expressions might sway to a rhythm taken, in faith, to be one of stately continuation. To this extent, a metaphysics aiming chiefly at concentration, censures a dispersal it never quite resists; pursuing the mass as though it represented a respite from the movement by which it is animated. This suggests certain thinkers conspire with the promotion of monopolies. However, as

the monopoly carries away the mood of conspiracy; the monopolising force is of chief interest.

Derrida speaks of monopolisation as though it were corporeal, as though its logic inflamed a Body like a desire. This thesis has flirted with the term *Body Politick*. Although archaic, the term recalls an age of practical politicking, *Real Politicks*; using the alibi of steering the ship of State to excuse every operation upon its crew, wielding the scalpel as though disaffection were symptomatic of a cancerous body rather than cabin-fever. The French presaged Classical economics in viewing the State, in its economy, as an organism running along mysterious but self-regulatory lines, tending towards equilibrium. Adam Smith provides a critique of the Physiological School insofar as his system is no longer natural but synthetic, operating as though by an invisible hand, and hence only as though there were a real Political Body. Derrida folds such syntheses onto a new Body; a mutant physiology. As he elaborates the delinquency of this new body, he preserves a relic of the older view. The spectre of the *Body Politick* is found reanimated through the mutant power of techno-economics; in its "*real eclecticism and its liberal facade*". If its 'terrible logic' is not confined to the Media, it seems most real there and:

*"Too, too clear in what we call the 'cultural' press (arts, literature, philosophy etc) and in the 'fine' distinctions which, being superimposed and overdetermined, do not immediately tempt public opinion like a political judgement or electoral decision. Each time a Mediating Institution (institution médiatique) commands aspects of the market upon a massive scale, it siezes and censures just as massively; it dogmatizes. Such is its real eclecticism or its liberal facade, its virtues or vices, as it captivates or bores, as we find it distinguished, vulgar, or both at once. However one rates this or that of its talents, when a lone judge, here or there, sees itself entrusted with a monopoly of discernment, of dissemination, of exposure on the grand opening day, it*

determines the goods on sale in culture's supermarket." [DA 117]<sup>20</sup>

Here, Derrida broaches a conspiracy of complacency, and the force of a new censure which "*menaces liberal societies*" [*qui menace les sociétés libérales*, DA 116]. This is not, immediately, a question of censure in the old, political, sense of being judged appropriate or not as regards the Political realm. The new censure reflects, in general, the ephemera of a commercialised culture; or, a media utterly turned onto a new commercial Body. He then speaks of the private - or newly semi-private - elements missed in this broad, petty, movement:

"It is then, far from the forum, towards the night of a semi-private enclosure, that a work suffers relegation as it fails to satisfy the conditions of visibility in the broad belittling mirror which fascinates in deforming, which filters and diverts towards itself so much energy, interrupts conversation, turns the social body and gaze onto a new physiology, which finally throws the last icons of national culture to outsiders. Today, on this scale, a book must sell itself and, let us note, open itself in upwards of ten thousand instances to seem nothing other than semi-private, as though it were a confidential correspondance. The Result: works termed 'difficult', rebelling against stereotypes of depiction or narration, are excluded from view, barely registering against the cultural norms thereby represented in the 'average' (in the singular, 'opinion' always means 'average'); blackened, starved of *exposure* (du jour). In consequence, we judge them more and more 'obscure', 'difficult', seeing them as 'unreadable' and so they become, just as we say they are and want them to be: inaccessible. The cycle accelerates." [DA 118]<sup>20</sup>

However, Derrida says: "*let us not oversimplify*" [*Mais ne simplifions pas, là encore*. DA 119]. In dispersion there is heterogeneity, breeding the taste for new ventures; differentiating desire and enabling new expressions. The power exemplified by the Media is not unlimited:

"It also, day by day, finds itself evaluated by a public not always silenced. Heterogeneous, it might also, at times, criticise itself; from one side to the other of its broad body. Has it not, finally, judged upon too great a time-scale?

according to criticisms which remain necessarily indecipherable? If it contributes to a mass success we forget the following month, does it not also run across the forgotten? Whatever is untimely in its promotion, slipping the bounds of visibility, might one day impose itself without possible contestation. In the paths towards a work, as one knows, the quality of ten readers may sometimes play a more determining role than the reality of ten thousand purchasers. What would our great mediating machines make of a Rimbaud or Lautréamont, of Nietzsche or Proust, of a Kafka or a Joyce in 1989? They were saved chiefly through a handful of readers (the minimal asking price), but which ones! Perhaps, alas, this analogy already suffers from an anachronism, for without doubt the internal history of these ventures were turned onto their outside and, whether one denies it or not, to a structure that from now on is out of date as regards the 'public space'." [DA 119-120]zz

Here, Derrida runs through a series of possibilities. For instance, marginal positions can become uncontestable which, it is implied, is to the good. But why? Derrida talks in terms of an asking price, as though a certain minority might find the right price; the cash or credibility. There is the spectral suggestion this leads only to the establishment of new orthodoxies. Derrida, however, skips this criticism to emphasise the anachronistic. The Public is pure expiration; out of date as it opens onto the milieu of relations on its outside. Any science of relations remains an immanent critique only insofar as relations remain external to their terms. Throughout this milieu (call it 'text', call it 'social-reality') every issue is immanent only to the commerce of relations. Derrida, however, hovers over a reliquary; a reserve whose continuing life is defined by a transcendent concept of worth. He moves from an issue articulated by virtue of economics towards a concept whose virtue is proposed only through a speculative commitment. Derrida suggests his faith seems outmoded. Where he conjures this most passé of concepts, the self-unfolding Body, the Body whose every turn emanates from a predisposition to the qualitatively 'better', he banks upon a samizdat.

His cachet has expired but, he argues; "*this feeble cachet holds a chance: semi-private, it nevertheless has access to the public space. Between the two, the samizdat.*" [DA 120]

The samizdat relates the untimely to its possible reception. It is, as has been said, a system. However, *outside* of any *intrinsic* sympathy between producer and consumer, it remains outmoded; more or less redundant, as it is more or less unappreciated. As such, Derrida's evocation of the samizdat can be folded upon two other positions which it seems to resemble. Perhaps, on the one hand, in emphasising the samizdat and its proper audience, Derrida disassembles those who apologise for a metaphysics of presence in the hope that the intrinsically worthy will come to be generally appreciated, within the bounds of a forum already predisposed to such values. He does so, however, only as his sympathy for such philosophies tends to fail, to slip into senescence. Through the samizdat, Derrida reserves only redundancy, claiming no special dignity. Perhaps, then, he rather resembles Socrates as he raises the more or less marginal as a public issue; thereby giving such effects to be understood, as one might give the itch to be scratched. This second resemblance is the more problematic. Is it that Derrida petitions for the same kind of forum, the same kind of Public, as Socrates?

Whilst it is not the aim of this thesis to present this kind of analogy as a conclusion, it is impossible to fully ignore. In a way, *The Ends of Man* gambles upon misinterpretation; there, Derrida hopes for another space even though he knows this hope seems purely speculative. He suggest that, although such a space appears as a mirage, it need not necessarily be underpinned by a desert ('inculte': uncultivated, a

wasteland) [EM 133]. By 1991 these gambles clearly take place alongside the Market, but a market that would more closely resemble the political ideal of a just forum; a market that remains attuned to the claims of the weakest ventures, the 'underground' of the samizdati. What does this mean? That Derrida takes his chances alongside other speculative ventures, like any liberal entrepreneur? Offering, always, a new venture; or new to the public to whom it remains unwonted. Offering, always, the most feeble of ventures; reminiscent of philosophies that seem increasingly redundant or, beyond these, Socrates' feeble apology (an apology that failed to assure his own life). New and old, different but reminiscent; this is the whole problem. How might something be given to be understood in such a way as to reflect the untimely; moving across the old-and-new-day of an increasingly commercialised Public, insisting upon a kind of hope, without hope of profit?

There are two distinct ways in which Derrida elaborates the opening of the old-and-new. Only one, however, is appropriate to this thesis. On the one hand, this might be articulated through a theory of productive intuition. Here, the 'intuitive' would not be a reservoir from where intuitions are safely drawn upon as required. It is rather, a theory of the production of disturbances; effects which are not anticipated and, hence, might be represented as alien to the body which suffers them. This theory occurs in The Pit and the Pyramid as a positive account of the production of disturbances, an account that disassembles Hegel's dialectic<sup>29</sup>. Here Derrida looks at the way discomfiting effects arise when there is no question of their alleviation in the form of a dialectical interiorisation; i.e. their 'relève' or 'Aufhebung'. Here,

Derrida talks of this kind of production as a machine, an early reference to the machine-like physiology of his *La démocratie ajournée*:

*"if the relève of alienation is not a calculable certitude, can one still speak of alienation and still produce statements in the system of speculative dialectics? Or in dialectics, whose essence is encapsulated by this system, in general? If the investment in death cannot be integrally amortised (even in the case of a profit, of an excess of revenue), can one still speak of a work of the negative? What might be 'negative' that could not be relève? And which, in sum, as negative, but without appearing as such, without presenting itself, that is, without working in the service of meaning, would work? but would work, then, as pure loss?"*

*Quite simply, a machine, perhaps, and one which would function. A machine defined in its pure functioning, and not in its final utility, its meaning, its result, its work."<sup>24</sup>*

The dialectic is, here, seen to be racked with effects that relate to a machine outside that 'encapsulated' by the dialectic, or its death-obsessed body. However, this positivistic account of a process is not viewed as a result. It will not, then, be offered as a conclusion. In its 'pure functioning', this machine less highlights the unwonted effect than pursues it in a mood of general delinquency. Whilst the physiology promoted by *The Pit and the Pyramid* raises the issue of the alien (those elements represented as being dead to the world, or the system bent upon encapsulating the world), it relates such effects to a process now seen as pernicious; a mutant physiology. Derrida now wishes to suspend the awareness of such effects, rather than pursuing a position that folds easily onto the new physiology. For this reason, this thesis will detail another account of the old-and-new-day. One reminiscent of Socrates but only as it is given to be understood. Which is to say, only in the giving, as it resembles a gift. In presupposing a recipient, a Gift seems to anticipate an audience intrinsically disposed to accepting an offering in good grace. However, a Gift is not given in order to capitalise upon

its reception. A gift ought not to predetermine a response. In fact, a gift in no way presupposes an event. This peculiar thesis can, again, be illustrated through Hegel.

In his Right, Hegel represents a gift as the prehistory of contract. As it implies no history, a Gift could not trace the contours of an historical event. A gift proper, as Hegel argues, is a moment of utter alienation entailing nothing in return<sup>25</sup>. An exchange proper, a contract, succeeds the gift. Exchange entails a story, a process, an anticipation of reflexivity. However, for Hegel, perfect exchange is zero-sum exchange; the zero indicating contractual equivalence. Again, there is no real history; zero-sum entails no economic growth and so, nothing in the way of a process. Hegel then proceeds to show how the exchange of one thing (working time) for another (wages) entails controlled productivity. This thesis has shown how such an event entails double growth; if work-time is cast in the form of debt, production occurs twice over; both through an increase in goods produced and an increase in interest-payments. An economy, clearly, depends upon the profit margin on a product exceeding the margins of a debt-schedule. If this happens, the machine more than pays for itself (do not forget, with every crank of its prop-shaft, a machine produces its own dereliction), whilst the bank is kept sweet. Profit, then, is the production of a 'surplus' with respect to a given margin. This margin, as Keynes or Pound held, is the object of state management; the equitable maintenance of this margin (its being discounted at an appropriate rate) will distinguish social-credit from anti-social usury. There would be no value in production if this supplement did not exist; or, to put it another way, production aims at a

social 'surplus'; the production of a capital-reserve. For Keynes and Pound, State management aims to express a country's potential.

There are a series of peculiarities in this general account of a 'surplus' that are not immediately apparent. For instance, how might a Government determine a 'fair' interest rate. In devoting his General Theory to this problem, Keynes redefines interest so that it applies to 'use' in general; i.e. every piece of capital-equipment has its own-rate of interest defined in relation to what it would have to produce in order to pay for itself (i.e. a difference between the amount it wears-down, and the amount new equipment is expected to cost at a futural date)<sup>26</sup>. If the bank reduces its interest rates, investing in new machinery would seem less expensive. Hence, the old machinery could balance the margin over its incipient dereliction, without necessarily increasing productivity. If this surge of cheap cash induced a healthy market, a consequent increase in productivity would reap a surplus value. Here, capital-equipment has two 'redundant' margins; a capacity it has not yet reached and a dereliction it pursues with every production cycle. The latter is erased as the former is increasingly diminished in the filling of new, profitable orders. The own-rate of interest, apparently intrinsic to a machine, is opened up through expanding production in a growing market. What of a State? If a proportion of its work-force are redundant, do they represent spare capacity or are they discarded through every cycle?<sup>27</sup> A given industry has a margin of spare capacity, and a margin of dereliction it can discount so long as, in principle, it might be covered by the value of productivity. A country has no such margins. It if attains to greater wealth, this happens through the opening of commerce. If this brings people off the dole, it does not

mean those on the dole are, in principle, a *source* of labour. If they refuse to be taken as a reservoir, are they necessarily slack?

What is the capital reserve of a country? To what potential can a given 'surplus' be referred, in its management? The spectre for Keynes is of a time when stability rules<sup>26</sup>. When the prop-shaft turns evenly, but its every turn suffers an unaccountable attrition. The production of 'surplus', as in Hegel, is designed to erase the inertia of the equilibrium position which returns, like the repressed, to haunt every business venture hovering at the margins of dereliction. The pure, wearying, equilibrium position - the dead body of the State - is never '*integrally amortised*' but alleviated only in the opening of new markets and the employment of hitherto unregarded capacity (which might not, even, be national; as, later, it might be argued those in employment are guest-workers who now should be repatriated). If one looks behind the tension of a time when only interest-schedules matter, one might suppose 'profit' belongs to a country as a pure bounty; a gift of nature. Both Pound and Keynes look behind the Great Depression in the belief that men's ingenuity and the forces of nature are as plentiful as ever. However, on Hegel's account this gift of pure potentiality does not refer to anything; it has no story and could not then be made to underpin economics. Once, perhaps, in a fairy-tale time, the land spread out like a bucolic mirage, but what could be said about it? Now, anxiety rules and the dream of plenty is folded into the shadows of debt-schedules and the possibility that production might never find a market.

A country's potential can only be mythically represented, beyond economic processes and the story they tell of the state and its

anxieties. Potential will be represented as belonging to a prehistory, before the contours of the state were opened up through economic relations. The attempt to represent profit as belonging to a country will fail. In erasing the anxiety of staying one step ahead of equilibrium, the fear closest to the Nation, the market that enjoys profit is turned onto a new physiology, outside of the dismal Body Politick. Profit will never be integrally amortised, it lives outside the creeping attrition of the State. However, if profit is on the outside, so is the general wearing away of capital-equipment. Attrition cannot be represented as a source of new potential; as much as profit, dereliction eludes representation as a country's own resource. When the anxieties represented as being closest to a State return, they too are folded onto the new physiology.

The question Socrates addresses is how a citizen might be represented within a political forum? Both The Ends of Man and La démocratie ajournée similarly address the question of political representation. In The Ends of Man, in an international philosophy colloquium. In the later work, through democracy and its parliament. How might such structures represent the potential of the public, benefiting from their participation as they are given a representative voice. This is the business of government, a business that, in France especially, might be cast in terms of a social contract. It seems, now, the only contract promising equality and stability is the zero-sum of contractual exchange. An equilibrium position that, erased through every business venture, returns in anxiety on the sea of economics. If, in its successes as in its failures, the public is folded onto this sea-scape, what becomes of the idea of the forum? Both Socrates and Derrida argue the

Public is best represented through a new physiology, which will not be the Body Politick. For Socrates, this occurs through whispers across the city's old-an-new-day. For Derrida, through the ephemera of the Media. This would include the samizdat, which is also a media organ and is, similarly, on the outside. Here, however, the samizdat exercises a negligible role; failing the newly commercial body.

However, four points might be raised as regards the samizdat. *Firstly*, it reflects the way certain elements are occluded upon the new body. If these blackened or redundant elements provoke an effect, the new body will never be at ease in Profit. Neither can these discomfoting effects be simply consigned to dereliction as to an old or anachronistic body. Every element is folded onto the mutant, and hence mutable, physiology. Here, when Derrida resembles or dissembles older metaphysics, he apologises for them in the sense that he stakes out their concerns on a new ground, showing the attempt to think an older Politics prophetically returns upon the new physiology. *Secondly*, the samizdat articulates relations between the strong and the weak. As regards the techno-economic forces associated with this new physiology, the samizdat is just another enterprise. It is, however, an irreducibly weak effect and, hence, relates to stronger forces as though they occupied same space, even though this 'same' broad band is no longer strictly Political, or ever represents a form of status quo. *Thirdly*, the samizdat acts as a salutary reminder of the way the representation of the Public becomes a non-issue across the old-and-new-day of the new physiology. The samizdat carries a trace of the ethical idea that a minority might become a public issue without weakening a State (as such a state has already passed). Finally, Derrida appeals to the role of the

samizdati as the critic of Government. In its criticism, the samizdat reflects upon the failure of Government. In doing so, the samizdat attacks either a phantasm (a structure reflecting a public or its potential that, as regards the new physiology, has long past) or a non-representative ideal (as Government never succeeds in representing a potential bound to a new physiology). Thus, the samizdat tackles an issue which has seemed only transcendent, mediating the ways its critical representation might yet be understood. Which is to say, it gives what had seemed the most prehistorical idea (pure bounty, the public's pure potential) to be understood. The samizdat negotiates the giving, not the gift itself. Derrida is not speaking of a Gift but the mediation of that which philosophers could only represent as a mirage or a transcendent ideal. The samizdat provides an access for what remains a necessarily untimely idea.

Derrida has said: "*the sole choice is not: concentration or dispersal*". It is not a question of the concentration of a Body, even at the risk of dereliction, nor the dispersal of the Body in the delinquent pursuit of any or every venture. Derrida talks instead of reciprocity. Through the variety of suspicions surrounding the representation of the Public body, Derrida raises issues which resemble the doubtful relics of older philosophies. Such issues, like the samizdat, negotiate the forces caught up in the dereliction or delinquency of the Body, across its old-and-new-day. Above all, such effects reflect a kind of reciprocity; a public access. It might be said, Derrida resembles other philosophers by insisting upon their relics, as upon the moments they lapse into quiet. It could be that such philosophies have nothing left to offer, Derrida nevertheless mediates their forlornness<sup>29</sup>. He is, however, more closely

reminiscent of Socrates in hovering over a reliquary which, although elaborated by virtue of economics processes, cannot be consigned either to a history focusing exclusively upon the State, nor to one that only pursues its dispersal. He hovers over this untimely space where the idea of a gift might possibly be found. As has been said, there is a problem with this marked similarity between Derrida and Socrates; they resemble each other in the giving, they do not replicate the Gift. This problem devolves upon Derrida's work of 1968 and 1991; they are similar, not the same. Only the suspicions surrounding the Public, and what counts as popular are constant, and then only in the giving. In both works, he makes obscure, seemingly spurious, effects into matters of some concern.

\* \* \* \*

**Abandoning the inner-limit: On gratuity**

The Foreword included a passage of Freud's on Depression; an intense, general inhibition, like that experienced by a speculator bound to failed investments. Derrida's sympathy towards the relics of older philosophies might resemble a form of depression. In the Apology Socrates associates himself with the city's failures, but in humour rather than sadness. His affirmation of forensic processes lies in humour, not political failure. Derrida too exploits humour. After claiming metaphysical humanism in France defined the political discourses of both the Right and Left<sup>30</sup>, The Ends of Man talks of a 'strategic bet', a laugh:

*"His laugh will then burst towards a return which will no longer have the form of the metaphysical repetition of humanism nor, without further doubt, the memorial or the guard of Being's meaning, of the house or the truth of being, 'beyond' metaphysics."<sup>31</sup>*

If 'humanism' is the modish reference point for every political position, laughter bear witness to the trembling of this haven. The laugh does not reaffirm the 'inside' of a political space, its transcendental delimitation or its dereliction. It bets on the outside track. Socrates' technique, often viewed as ironic, has been read as a humorous attempt to bring a form of communal reciprocity into play when every common reference point seems, at best, sterile. For Derrida humour is, similarly, a way to open out reciprocal relations; not for profit, but neither to consign the city to its derelict memorial.

Derrida's evocation of the samizdat might seem overly mournful. Better to say, the samizdat suspends the problem of political failure.

'Suspend' might be synonymous with 'adjourn', in the sense of suspending a judgement but also bringing a form of judgement into play without having settled it. The samizdat suspends the problem of that which fails to get a hearing whilst, also, bringing an unlikely effect into play; a quirk as much as a common problem. Through suspending a problem, Derrida resists abandoning the inner limit of a forensic discourse; the idea that an issue could be generally appreciated. The samizdat, a relic of the idea of an immediate and general sympathy, remains hovering; provoking the possibility of mediation.

La démocratie ajournée couches this in terms of the need for reciprocity. The samizdat brings a 'need' for reciprocity into relief, without determining it. When the alternatives seem to be those of concentration or dispersal, the samizdat provides another access, a reciprocity that suspends the twin dangers of mute concentration and blind dispersal. In the First chapter, Heidegger was used to exemplify the problem of concentration. He was seen to view the relation between commitment and expression as a close one; casting experience under a taut rather than groundless, floating form, as was seen in his expressions of commitment to the State. His, post-kehre, The Anaximander Fragment continues this theme as it translates 'to khreon' (fate) as 'brauch' (use). 'Brauch' is not a literal translation. It could not be termed a '*circular reappropriation of the truth*'<sup>32</sup>, although it does attempt to express something latent in the older term. It does so by expressing a continuing commitment to the singularity of the Greek word. The term 'Brauch' does not secure 'fate'; it rather represents a commitment to the way an early promise might fade. This, too, would be 'of' fate, even as fate slips away.

The Anaximander Fragment is somewhat inhibited, having no hope of profiting from its terms. Heidegger's Letter on Humanism, of the same year, insists upon the poverty of language<sup>33</sup>. When The Anaximander Fragment offers "*the early trace*" (*die frühe Spur*) of Fate as 'Brauch'<sup>34</sup>, it addresses this poverty whilst remaining committed to the singularity of the trace; or whatever remains of it in its dereliction. Derrida has maintained a startling sympathy for Heidegger; resisting, always, an attack on his central predilections but, rather, choosing to heighten a sense of discomfort around Heidegger's minor themes. As was seen in the First chapter, Derrida does not attack Heidegger's appeal to the 'we' of the political forum but, instead, reads this appeal in relation to Heidegger's discomfort at both speculation and translation. In consequence, when Derrida writes upon The Anaximander Fragment, he replicates Heidegger's modesty but also, with humorous flourishes, exacerbates Heidegger's fear of poverty; the fear of being, speculatively, over-extended. If the promise of '*to khreon*' is so faint, why relate to it in one way only? Why not increase one's presence in the market?

In translating Heidegger, Derrida gives '*die frühe Spur*' as both "*la trace matinale*" and "*la trace précoce*"<sup>35</sup>. Is the Greek term to be referred to as 'matinale', or as 'precocious'? That is, early in the sense of being of the morning, but not so early; it could have arrived before morning. Or is it precocious? too mature for its years, or too prodigal to be simply a trace? Perhaps, even, delinquent (overly precocious) or deranged (*dementia praecox*)? and so tending to be dispersed. Derrida brings a humour to his translations. Heidegger's commitment precludes humour. As his translations are questionable, so the business of raising questions remains serious. Derrida brings the lapse between commitment

and expression back into play, modestly offering several ways to relate the earlier term. Heidegger once, without a trace of modesty, believed Germany's vocation lay in the public affirmation of a radically unique Fate; in bleakly hilarious language:

*"The German people has been summoned by the Führer to vote; the Führer, however, is asking nothing from the people. Rather, he is giving the people the possibility of making, directly, the highest free decision of all: whether the entire people wants its own Dasein or whether it does not want it"*<sup>36</sup>

When Heidegger begins to exhibit a kind of 'reserve', a kind of modesty, Derrida introduces other uncertainties in translation. Here, Derrida knows that his uncertainties, his own inhibitions, reflect upon Heidegger's central anxiety; here, a concern about speculation and about poverty. However, Derrida's concern is not simply identifiable with Heidegger's; it differentiates other interests as it defers any, final, similarity with Heidegger. In effect, Derrida conveys a way in which Heidegger's texts might continue to negotiate, outside of their singleminded compression of every theme into singular lessons. Certainly, in negotiation, the term 'reserve' is doing a double work, conflating inhibitions about communication, or about the possibility of communication, with the ground of communication; a forum, as a demarcated enclosure. However, in suggesting this, the term also begins to exhibit wayward connotations which are not finally determinable; reflecting upon this forum only in humour, in play.

Against concentration is dispersal. *The Ends of Man* speaks of 'journalistic responses' and of 'naivety'. In *La démocratie ajournée*, the Media is seen to enjoy a mutant power; exacerbating a mood of casual indifference. Here, delinquency has become second nature, a new body.

Bakunin was used to exemplify this trend. His diffuse, expressionistic style talks of principles and commitment but enjoys only dispersal. He speaks of Spirit as though it were a principle of universality, but pursues universal destruction. He insists destruction is a luxury, an addition: *"The passion for destruction is a creative passion, too"*.

In a system where oppression depends upon time, there is no possibility of saying 'No'; resistance is not viable. In such a system the oppressed are committed (in the sense of being consigned) to suffering. This poverty-stricken theme, exploited by Heidegger, is still best voiced by Pacioli; *"without rest, merchants would always be in a great deal of mental trouble."* To dream of profit, would be to dream of escape; a time when no one had to suffer so. How, then, to represent the possibility of transformation? the movement away from grinding dereliction? when the path from unhappiness to plenty remains a mystery, wrapped in shadows. Bakunin's affirmation of the luxury of destruction seems to reify this mystery. He cuts through the whole problem by moving straight into the shadow *as though into a conclusion. For Bakunin, Destruction alone is free, is pure freedom. Without a trace of modesty or, even, pausing to reflect upon the ends of any process, he luxuriates in the vagaries of the transformative process.*

*In the original German, Bakunin's destructive passion is expressed through a peculiar typographical quirk which allows 'lust' (passion) and 'luft' (air) to be written in identical form. Like a preacher, he calls on those who would resist the 'premonition' of revolution by stating:*

*"Even in Russia, in this endless snow-covered kingdom which we know so little and which perhaps a great future awaits, even in Russia dark clouds are gathering, heralding storm. Oh, the luft*

*is sultry and heavy and filled with lightning. And therefore we call to our deluded brothers, Repent, repent, the Kingdom of the Lord is at hand! ... The luft for destruction is a creative passion, too."*<sup>37</sup>

Bakunin's call to revolution conflates two forces, an imperious necessity (earlier termed, a "redeeming word"), heavily suggestive of redemption, and another force which drives directly into destruction as into a new creative possibility. Bakunin leaps into the shadow by insisting the premonition is already the madness of revolution. Bakunin dreams have ceased to presage change, they have become immediate, expressionistic and destructive passions. There is no reason to wait, to hesitate; destruction is free. Bakunin exploits the relation between commitment (to the "redeeming word", the sign of revolution) and expression (to revolution, immediately in creative passion), even when he denies it by affirming the shadows of the sultry air as an immanent desire cut loose from any necessity.

There is something of the ironist in Bakunin's style; insofar as irony means saying one thing whilst promoting another. This style of detour is the one by which economics is explained; i.e. the offer to elaborate the political through the ruse of economics. Bakunin's twist, here, lies in his indifference to any relation between commitment and expression. Only insofar as he ironically conflates the immanent expression and the transcendent sign does a relation persist; the link that allows the weight of a shadow to be read as a sign, but affirmed as pure delinquency. Derrida, it must be assumed, would focus on this relation as an access; suspending the process by which a principle of universality (an imperative, the Word) is enjoyed only in its dispersal. Where Bakunin is indifferent to this relation, or the way it might

somehow reflect upon a determined position, Derrida's difference from Bakunin can clearly be seen; firstly, in that the indifferently slewed words are accredited to Spirit as to a new physiology of desire and, secondly, their dispersal takes place under a single sign, a sign taken to be both 'universal' and, in its indifference towards any end, infinite. Here, for Derrida a monopoly or popular position extends and accretes without being marked; exploiting the limits of irony without allowing these limits to be a debated, communicated issue.

The idea that Bakunin conspires with the formation of monopolies seems strange; Bakunin's affection to ignore any stable principle is his most anarchic statement. Derrida, it must be thought, is providing a warning. To differentiate the trace of irony is to distinguish a limit; in pursuing infinite dispersal, one misses the way in which the limit slides or gives. Derrida argues that to ignore this trace works to the advantage of determined hegemonies; arguing that the promotion of an undifferentiated band as though it were a popular view leads to: "*Nixon's 'moral majority', Bush's 'main-stream', etc.*" [DA 106]

If Derrida treats Heideggerian 'necessity', in both its pre- and post-kehre forms, with some wariness the sense of a pressing issue continues to inspire his sympathy. If they are not seen as *peculiarly* distressing, they nevertheless traces a peculiar effect; a communicated effect, a humorous effect. This may be illustrated by reference to two literary styles: tragedy and romance. Tragedy, the more imperious, depends upon the catharsis of a singularly public shock. Romance is both more modest and more private; bringing an unusual piquancy to a delicate issue. It may now, no longer be possible to feel fully at ease with

either style. As their pretensions are deflated, their effects seem the more doubtful. In communicating their themes humour becomes unavoidable; ironically representing the tragic, humourously reworking the romantic (black comedies, romantic comedies). These two derelict forms, then, are folded onto a new 'physiology', a surface which could only elide their true, or original, significance. However, this need not fatally undermine their forensic representation. Humour, certainly, signals a growing suspicion, a frisson of doubt but, as has been argued, the breaking of trusts is not necessarily anti-social. If a trace of humour creeps into a representation, an effect that could not have been banked upon becomes insistant, bringing a different edge to prematurely senescent forms. It might be said, outside the book of romance or tragedy, humour provides the access that animates their continued circulation. Humour introduces suspicion but not necessarily the suspicion that either tragedy or romance are entirely comfortable upon the new physiology; suspicion can be lighter, weaker, and still peculiarly haunting.

What would it mean to abandon either tragedy or romance without, ever, communicating anything reminiscent of their peculiar power. For instance, in Melodrama. Melodrama unreflexively dissembles the two other styles, piling up catharses in ridiculous piles, whilst treating the fragile with a relentlessly heavy hand. It might be said, Melodrama is both too weak and too strong. Where, it seems, a certain force is required, melodrama substitutes the repetition of effects which never quite go far enough. Where a certain restraint is called for, melodrama rushes blindly ahead. In effect, melodrama abandons the questions that, still, haunt either tragedy or romance to gratuity. The only clue to the way Derrida might engage with Melodrama lies in his apparent sophistry.

As has been seen, the strategy of emphasising side-issues in the work of other philosophers is less a question of artistry than an attempt to relate anew to the themes more commonly credited with being central. In consequence, it must be thought Derrida would pursue a similar strategy in a reading of melodrama; painstakingly suspending its gratuity in order to highlight the way it reflects upon more difficult or compelling issues. How else might one engage with something that is simply gratuitous, abandoning itself to an unreflexivity that - it can be said - is stupid? Derrida began his *Of Grammatology* by referring to 'ignorance'. He recently approved the term 'stupid'; referring not to the process of dissembling, nor to passing off a dissemblance as the 'real' thing but, precisely, to an unreflexive gratuity<sup>39</sup>. This bears comparison with his previous castigation of the naivety of journalists; in effect, a distinction between philosophers (those who make a 'public use of reason') and those who mindlessly pursue the public beyond reason. The journalist Dr H Thompson exploits a loose, melodramatic style:

*"Most smart people tend to feel queasy when the conversation turns to things like 'certain death' and 'total failure' and the idea of a 'doomed generation'. But not me. I am comfortable with these themes."<sup>40</sup>*

The word 'comfortable' betrays Thompson's abandonment. Not an abandonment of the Public, or of Public ideals (his terms all refer to the Public), but an abandonment that publicly pursues delinquency. A casual abandonment. On this basis, upon the distinction between good philosophers and mere journalists, the question of stupidity is open; how?

The appeal to a broad band as though it reflected a popular position is clear in the term 'Moral Majority' or 'Main-stream'. This anonymous

band is taken as both a medium and a ground-plan. Here, an hegemony extends its appeal because its terms evade question; its limits are circulated only in order to censure the vociferous and never as these limits also bear upon the right to appeal to silence in order to reflect upon a public issue, an issue of democratic representation. Derrida, who is neither for the vociferous nor the silent (whether these are representative of majorities or minorities), stresses the access between the two. The access negotiates relative strengths; as a silent majority might be vociferously represented through the media, or a minority over-represented through the same media. The access, the samizdat, bears upon the notion of representation even when this notion seems, finally, to have lapsed in favour of a monopoly.

The 'Monopoly' refers to the pretension to regard the breadth of the techno-economic milieu as a reflection of a stable position. As though the Media reflected both the 'main-stream' and the principle authority. As though, for instance, the West were really the First World. What of this new physiology, not in its monopolisation, but in its abandonment? The force of the Gratuitous or Stupid lies both in its weak indifference and in its utterly compelling nature. This double movement raises the question of the bad or stupid. Whatever is stupid will (i) obscure any trace of a relation reflecting upon the relative force of any position (the access between the weak and the strong, the public and private, the majority or minority) and (ii) obscure any suspicion reflecting the uncertainty of this relation. Whatever is stupid betrays a weakness that fails to register any position and a strength that brooks no lingering doubts. The stupid are twice-damned, being too gratuitous to register uncertainty qua 'trace' (as, above, the trace of reserve, its limitations

and inhibitions) and being so thoroughly abandoned as to consolidate the dark qua 'shadow'. Derrida believes in stupidity as in a transcendental evil; those abandoned to weakness in registering nothing, those abandoned to strength in the ease with which they ignore every position.

With terms like 'reserve' Jacques Derrida resists abandoning the hope for a transcendental Politics. In the first instance, the role of such terms, is to amalgamate differing senses of the same word; the capital reserve and the reserve symptomatic of depression. This conspires to draw certain parallels; e.g. a concern for the State and a concern about poverty. However, in the second instance, the role of such terms is also to differentiate desire. Here, the hopes and fears for the State are not conflated but, rather, folded onto a new topology. Upon this surface, the primary issue is not the failure of the State, or its representation, but the awareness that such ideals might continue to be mediated, pressed or negotiated. Thus, in critically relating to moribund ideals, Derrida allows for other, differing ways in which such ideals might inspire debate. Is this how he will be remembered? or for providing the contours of an opening abandoned to stupidity; an opening he reflects upon as though, in its delinquency, it conspired towards every evil? Here, again, the work is double. In this opening, the stupid betray all hope of a coherent politics and betray all trace that their indifference is negotiable. Derrida laughs at such betrayals, but continues to worry. The view that Derrida fails as a philosopher ignores his deep sympathy for philosophy and for debate (whether this is philosophical or political). Nevertheless, perhaps the time has come for another kind of philosophy, if only to report from the abandoned heart of that which other, smarter people, remain queasily aware.

1. "La dimension de l'espace 'public' accède sans doute à sa modernité philosophique avec les Lumières, les Révolutions française ou américaine ou des discours comme ceux de Kant qui lie l'Aufklärung ... à la liberté de faire un usage public de la raison dans tous les domaines." DA 113.
2. The 'invisible hand', rare in Smith's work, appears once only in Wealth of Nations [IV ii 9] and Theory of Moral Sentiments [IV 10]. It is, however, a response to Hume's economics. Hume argues, against Mercantilist protectionism, that "it is impossible to keep up money, more than any fluid, beyond its proper level" (Of Money 334) That is, a national currency is articulated by economic relations that do not begin and end upon a specific locale, upon a Nation. In consequence, the State, a Political unit, could only be obliquely constructed as regards economic relations. Smith goes further, giving a practical account of an ethos sustained by virtue of economic relations, rather than through immediate ethical or national sympathies: "By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, (the entrepreneur) intends only his own security; and by directing the industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which is no part of his intention." [Wealth of Nations]
3. The exergue to The Ends of Man quote's Kant: "Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. He must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end." [Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 428] That work also states: "Whatever has reference to general human inclinations and needs has a market price ... but that which constitutes the conditions under which something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, i.e. a price, but has an intrinsic worth, i.e. dignity." [434-435].  
That is, there is a distinction between one general space of arbitration, the economy of relative ends, and another, the tribunal of intrinsic ends. Derrida highlights the vacillating meaning of 'end' in his chosen passage, as it is the distinction of man, and of every rational being 'in general' (although Man might be the only possible example); but also in the 'economy' of ends, where ends may be exchanged (which they may not be, once accorded a dignity). A distinction, then, between Economics and Justice; a distinction upon which the Critique of Pure Reason depends. Kant, at many moments is prepared to think of his science of relations (syntheses) an economy; even terming it a 'commercium'. In reflecting upon this economy, however, he states the task of the age is to institute a tribunal which will: "assure to reason its lawful claims ... This tribunal is nothing other than the critique of pure reason." [Critique of Pure Reason A xi-xii]; which is to say, Critique is Political in the sense adumbrated in this thesis.  
This thesis argues that economics are taken to reflect a Politics. Derrida talks of this strategy as both a ruse and a detour. Although Derrida's work cannot be conflated with that of Gilles Deleuze's, Deleuze's Kant's Critical Philosophy states: "The supreme ends of Reason form the system of Culture ... Reason's

defining characteristic is rather a particular way of realising the ends shared by man and animals. Reason is the faculty of organising indirect, oblique means; culture is trick, calculation, detour." [p. 1]

4. "Car il faut bien qu'à la pureté diaphane de cet élément il arrive ou soit arrivé quelque chose." [EM 132]
5. The term 'ellipse' first appears in Ellipsis where it refers to Derrida's characterisation of Metaphysics and its relation to its 'other', however this looser simulacrum of metaphysics is characterised. Ellipsis refers, amongst others, to From Restricted to General Economy and the relation between Hegel, as exemplar of metaphysics, and Bataille. The 'ellipse' of this latter essay is emphasised in White Mythology, explicitly in the last few paragraphs of White Mythology where the relation between Hegel and Bataille is termed 'elliptical' [Margins of Philosophy 270-271]. The term 'detour' also appears in this essay, which is a work upon the role of usury in an economy that aims at profit only via a detour through usury, the over-used and the expendable. The point, here, is that all such economic terms will be read in the context of Derrida's political work. They will be regarded primarily as economic terms, rather than terms that Derrida has borrowed from economics and exploited for the sake of a different science: either Hegelian logic, or semiology.
6. "la mise en rapport des différences, c'est aussi la complicité promise d'un élément commun: le colloque ne peut avoir lieu que dans un médium ou plutôt dans la représentation que doivent se faire tous les participants d'un certain éther transparent" [EM 106]
7. "Ce pouvoir techno-économique permet à l'opinion de se constituer et de se reconnaître comme opinion publique." [DA 106]
8. "Aujourd'hui, qu'est-ce que l'opinion publique?" "Aujourd'hui? La silhouette d'un fantôme, la hantise de la conscience démocratique." [DA 103]
9. In his The Ego and the Id (1923), Freud describes depression as a "pure culture of the death instinct" (XI p. 394). He also, there, associates the institution or concretisation of this instinct with the formation of the super-ego, which has become a "tyrant". This thesis will approach the Political through this tyranny, the government and the culture of an ethos fully absorbed in its own finitude. For a discussion of Freud in this thesis.
10. It could be argued that Derrida is obsessed by mourning. Economics, at least since his essay La différance, has been thought in terms of an economy of death. His most detailed work on Hegel, Glas (funeral bell), uses the motif of mourning to discuss themes raised by Hegel's politico-juridical work. A recent work, like his Mémoires: For Paul de Man, reemphasises the importance of mourning for Derrida (cf. David Farrel Krell: Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing). However, Derrida also draws upon mourning as a socio-cultural obsession. Here, the question is; how might those elements of a society that seem dead to the world, maintain a form of social desire or express a social need? Which is to say, what is the continuing value of death, its economic significance?
11. "Ce qui s'ébranle peut-être aujourd'hui, n'est-ce pas cette sécurité du proche, ... telle qu'elle habite et s'habite elle-même dans la langue de l'Occident, dans son oikonomia, telle

- qu'elle s'y est enfoncée, telle qu'elle s'est inscrite et oubliée selon l'histoire de la métaphysique". [EM 161]
12. "Let us, then, mark, in anticipation, this place, the familial residence and familiar tomb, where the economy of death is produced through différance." "Marquons ainsi, par anticipation, ce lieu, résidence familiale et tombeau du propre où se produit en différance l'économie de la mort." [D 4]
  13. La démocratie ajournée commemorates the French Revolution. The Ends of Man begins by stating "Every philosophical colloquium necessarily has a political significance. ... Nevertheless, when the philosophical colloquium also announces itself as an international colloquium, this - essential and general - political import weighs upon philosophy's a priori, it both aggravates it in some way and determines it." "Tout colloque philosophique a nécessairement une signification politique. ... Essentielle et générale, cette portée politique alourdit néanmoins son a priori, l'aggrave en quelque sorte et le détermine quand le colloque philosophique s'annonce aussi comme colloque international." [EM 131]
- Derrida goes on to state that "the general political implications of our colloquium" (*des implications politiques générales de notre colloque*) concern the form of democracy [EM 133-134]. One of the ways in which this implication is aggravated is the problem of representation; i.e. what significance might the presence of one foreign national represent within the international? For Derrida, the international is an economic problem. The problem of democratic representation is again broached in La démocratie ajournée. There, Derrida follows Rousseau in stating that the "idea of representatives" is modern ("l'idée des représentants" que Rousseau disait "moderne.") [DA 112]. The problem arises, in "post-revolutionary modernity" [DA 113], when the act which founds representative structures cannot itself be represented. As the revolution has sunk into memory, the imperatives it comes to represent might, now, have only the force of a spectre. The spectre which, as Derrida argues, has come to have its own techno-economic agenda.
14. "it reawakens through the deconstruction of ontotheology". "elle se réveille par la destruction de l'onto-théologie". [EM p. 161]. Derrida's own translation of destruction is used here, as the passage refers to Heidegger's elaboration of the 'destruction of onto-theology' in Being and Time. The point being, for Derrida, that even in the 'destruction' of value, as Heidegger adumbrates this process, an economy continues to function, and will function even as untenable values succumb to death as to redundancy. Hence, Derrida's insinuation of construction into destruction. Derrida describes Heidegger's project as 'deconstruction' on the following page of The Ends of Man.
  15. Who can say exactly why anyone voted for Fascism? Nevertheless, as Fascism in Germany was presented as a revolutionary alternative, it must be supposed that the Great Depression seemed to call for a revolutionary solution. John Maynard Keynes suggested that the prescriptions of his General Theory were best suited to the conditions of totalitarianism (1936 preface to The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money). There is a suggestion, here, that democracy is unequal to the economic problems of a modern, world economy. Could this explain Germany's

- thinking? (Keynes and Heidegger will be discussed in the second chapter of this thesis). Derrida recognises the problems facing democracy as a 'techno-economic mutation'; a problem to which democracy is, apparently, unequal. He is explicit that democracy will not be saved by traditional democratic positions, by the Right or the Left [DA 113; cf. the same indifference in EM 138].
16. "I often feel that the questions I attempt to formulate on the outskirts of the Greek philosophical heritage have as their 'other' the model of the Jew." [Derrida, speaking to Richard Kearney in Dialogues With Jacques Derrida, 107].
17. "Dans sa première édition, cette opinion, j'ose à peine dire cette fiction, reste la chose du monde la mieux partagée." [DA 124]
18. In a passage from La démocratie ajournée, Derrida explicitly criticises the left-liberalism of, for instance (as he says), Habermas when he considers the international aspects of the techno-economic Media: "Since the end of the First World War, above all in Germany, the crises which radio might introduce into the traditional space of democracy have given rise to grave debates ... These debates are outmoded: who would think the immediately international effects of tomorrow's television upon a public opinion taken, primarily, as national." "Dès la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale, surtout en Allemagne, les crises que la radio pouvait introduire dans l'espace traditionnel d'une démocratie parlementaire ont donné lieu à de graves débats ... Ces débats ne sont pas périmés: pensez aux effets immédiatement internationaux de la télévision de demain sur une opinion publique qu'on tenait d'abord pour nationale." [DA 114].
- Analysing Derrida's relation to leftist thinkers is problematised by his insistence, for instance, that Marx represents a deliberate 'lacunae' in his work [Positions 62]. NB., also, his frequent insistence on 'reading from left to right and from right to left' [cf. note 15, above]. However, in the above quotation on Habermas, he does demonstrate a Marxian view, that Capital is international, it cannot be comprehended on the basis of the State. Cf. Engels; Letter to Cuno 24/1/72: "Bakunin maintains that the state has created capital, that the capitalist has his capital only by grace of the state. ... the state above all must be abolished; then capital will go hell of itself. We, on the contrary say: Abolish capital, the appropriation of the means of production in the hands of the few, and the state will fall of itself." Here - we must note - Derrida is closest to Marxism when Marxism most resembles classical thought [cf. note 2, above]. This is also clear in Positions, Derrida resembles Marxism in that both are engaged in Critique against a form of 'naivety' [Positions 66]. Which is to say, if Derrida has a reading of Marx, it resembles most an explication, and least a break, with the Classical thought of the Enlightenment.
19. "Il faut aussi lutter contre les effets de 'censure' au sens large, contre une 'nouvelle censure', si je puis dire, qui menace les sociétés libérales, contre les accumulations, les concentrations, les monopoles, bref, tous les phénomènes quantitatifs qui peuvent marginaliser ou réduire au silence ce qui ne se mesure pas à leur échelle. Mais on ne peut pas non plus plaider simplement pour la pluralité, la dispersion, le fractionnement, la mobilité des lieux de filtrage ou des sujets

qui en disposent. Car des forces socio-économiques pourraient encore abuser de ces marginalisations et de cette absence de forum général. ... Or la 'nouvelle censure', c'est la force de sa ruse, combine concentration et fractionalisation, accumulation et privatisation. Elle dépolitise. Plus sensible dans l' 'audiovisuel', cette terrible logique ne s'y confine pas." [116-117]

20. "Mais le faible tirage garde une chance: quasiment privé, il a néanmoins accès à l'espace public. Entre les deux, le samizdat." [DA 120]
21. "la 'centralité' du forum démocratique ne doit se confondre avec celle de la masse, de la concentration, de l'homogénéité ou du monopole." [DA 116]
22. EM 162-163, quoted at length in Chapter One, cf, note 19 to that chapter
23. In Given Time: The Time of the King Derrida reflects upon themes that will be broached in this thesis; e.g. the 'metaphorical' quality of currency (sovereigns, sovereignty etc). He also broaches a kind of stupidity that comes through economics; quoting Baudelaire: "*To be mean is never excusable, but there is some merit in knowing that one is; the most irreparable of vices is to evil out of stupidity.*" Where the stupidity arises from a gratuitous act. Cf. also, Of Grammatology [p. 6], which speaks of an ignorance that comes through economics.

#### Notes to Foreword

1. Freud: Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxieties (1925), p.241
2. Freud: Mourning and Melancholia (1915)
3. 'Ecclesiastes' translates the hebrew 'kohleth', which has the secular connotations to which the text alludes. A careful discussion of this question occurs in the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
4. Kant: What is Enlightenment?, p. 3
5. *ibid.*, p. 8. Ecclesiastes seems to describe a form of mourning and of liberation. Cf. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: the 'unhappy consciousness' enjoys misery as a form of liberation. There, Hegel describes the one who mediates the relation between misery and freedom, towards a form of eventual relief, as a 'priest'. Paragraph 228, Phenomenology of Spirit.
6. Freud: The Ego and the Id, p.394
7. Marcuse: Liberation from Affluent Society, p. 175
8. Liddel and Scott's Lexicon provides scores of references to the home as an analogy for the state, cf. Chapter Three. Plato thinks the city, and its sovereignty, by reference to the family and its patriarch. The immediate connotation is that they are similar. Plato, however, *exploits* rather than depends upon this similarity. As Socrates was indicted for corrupting Athen's sons, Plato will show that fidelity to the ideas Socrates teaches is of a different order to the fidelity owed to a father. However, by referring to the similarity between state and father, Plato profits by *both* exploiting, and discounting, a similarity. It is such processes that Derrida sees as distinctively philosophical; cf. White Mythology. In that work, Derrida exploits a pun (a sonic analogy) between 'use' and interest-schedules (i.e. 'usure', in English, use is the old word for an interest rate), when he states of analogies that they seem: "*to involve the usage of*

- philosophical discourse in its entirety ... the usage of natural languages as philosophical language.* *Margins of Philosophy*, p. 209.
9. Kant describes ideogenic effects as both necessary and dialectical; i.e. as 'necessary illusions of pure reason': "We have already entitled *dialectic in general a logic of illusions*" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A 293), where logic refers to the formal, or necessary, truth in an otherwise specious development. The exemplary 'Idea', Kant's chief example, is the Republic; the idea of a Political order. This idea, whilst not a pattern, nevertheless exerts a beneficial effect upon discourse; i.e. whilst not a realisable goal, it maintains a regulative effect upon philosophical discourse *qua* a Just discourse (*ibid.*, A 316-317). There is a difference, here, between the way in which discourse works, and the way in which discourse is adequate to justice. When Kant criticises the assumptions of Descartes idealistic proof of god he shows the argument is effective only as it is economical. Economics is not, here, an arbitrary metaphor. In order to show that an assumption is both erroneous and necessary, Kant shows the necessity of counting upon an assumption as upon a debt: "The attempt to establish the existence of a supreme being by means of the famous ontological argument of Descartes is therefore merely so much labour and effort lost; we can no more extend our stock of insight by mere ideas, than a merchant can better his position by adding a few noughts to his cash account." (*ibid.*, A 602)
10. Derrida highlights the way Hegel thinks of his work as an economy. In The Pit and the Pyramid he asks, of Hegel's 'theoretical element' (i.e. the dialectic), "What is meant by this medium?": "In the Encyclopaedia (Sec. 458) Hegel express his regret that in 'logic and psychology, signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix, without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and systematic place in the economy of intelligence.' [*The Margins of Philosophy*, p. 71]
- One of the main contentions of this thesis (cf. Chapter Two), is that deconstruction is a positivistic account of general economic exigencies; as such, it begins with a critique of the selective economic advantages of Hegel's dialectic; i.e. the fact that for Hegel the possibility of relief is always on the horizon. Hegel rather than Kant most interests Derrida at the time he speaks predominately in terms of economics. Although Derrida repeatedly sidelines Kant in collections such as The Margins of Philosophy, he is careful to note points at which: "[Hegel's] debate with Kant resembles most an explication and least a break." (*ibid.*, p. 79).
11. Derrida commitment to formalism is clear in The Ends of Man: "The attention given to system and structure, in its freshest and strongest aspects ... is a question of determining the possibility of meaning on the basis of a "formal" organisation which in itself has no meaning". "L'attention au système et à la structure, dans ce qu'elle a de plus inédit et de plus fort ... Il s'agit plutôt de déterminer la possibilité du sens à partir d'une organisation 'formelle' qui en elle-même n'a pas de sens". [EM 161]
- The Ends of Man is concerned with the problem of political disquisition; i.e. the Political Forum. In consequence, as a formalist, Derrida insists upon speaking of "the *form* of democracy". However, he immediately states: "And this is also why I proposed to place the accent on *form* no less than on democracy." "C'est ce que je proposais de faire porter l'accent sur *forme* non moins que sur *démocratie*." (*ibid.* 135, p. 114). This accent is well placed. Derrida

- finds that the form of democracy depends upon what he terms the 'oikonomia' of the West.
12. Economics and politics do not mix. This idea can be credited to laissez-faire positions. However, economic processes have been seen as antithetical to Political justice since antiquity (cf. Chapter 3). In consequence, the liberal position is simply an affirmation of a hitherto derided strategy. Furthermore, if liberalism is to be opposed to interventionism, the contention remains the same: Politics and Economics do not mix. The one side insists this distinction be respected, the other argues some intervention invigorates otherwise dissolute developments.
  13. In both instances, Derrida is highlighting the way in which the 'proper' is subverted in more or less discrete ways. On the one hand, usury emphasises that property cannot be both stable, workable and profitable; in order to be all three it must be something other entirely. On the other, a proper name cannot be both stable, discursive and authoritative; in order to be all three, it must have already admitted some form of doubt (cf. his Signature Event Context). If property represents an investment - in the voice, in the home or for a state - it must also be a form of anxiety. Writing casts doubt as the market-price of interest-rates might devalue any security.
  14. Freud: Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxieties, p. 240

## Notes for Chapter One

1. In The Ends of Man, the question of the 'form' of Democracy finally turns into one on the economy of the West [EM 161]. La démocratie ajournée reflects, in very general terms, upon "the functioning of liberal democracy, if not its principles" ("le fonctionnement de la démocratie libérales, sinon sur ses principes" DA 109). It could only be a western generality, as it seems to owe its origins to western revolutions.
2. The Ends of Man praises form as it "determines the possibility of meaning" without predetermining the meaningful [EM 161]. Derrida is, here, concerned with 'anonymous necessity'; i.e. a response to or of need. La démocratie ajournée associates the form of democracy with the 'right of response' [DA 121]
3. "Faire preuve de responsabilité, n'est-ce pas d'abord essayer de les reconsidérer? Tâche philosophique et politique, théorique et pratique, tâche difficile mais aussi dangereuse car elle risque de toucher au concept même de représentation, à l' "idée des représentants" que Rousseau disait "moderne". Mais un démocrate n'a-t-il pas la responsabilité de penser les axiomes ou les fondements de la démocratie?" [DA 112]
4. "For the future of democracy is in question. The dimension of the 'public' space no doubt gained its philosophical modernity with the Enlightenment, the French or American Revolution or discourses, like Kant's, which bind the 'Aufklärung' - the Light of progress and the day - in every domain, to the freedom to make public a use of reason ... In this post-revolutionary modernity, the techno-economic mutation of the media represents another break." "Car il s'agit bien de l'avenir de la démocratie. La dimension de l'espace "public" accède sans doute à sa modernité philosophique avec les Lumières, les Révolutions française ou américaine ou des discours comme ceux de

*Kant qui lie l'Aufklärung - le progrès des Lumières et du jour - à la liberté de faire un usage public de la raison dans tous les domaines ... Dans cette modernité post-révolutionnaire, la mutation techno-économique des médias marque une autre scansion.*" [DA 113]

5. Hayek: The Legal and Political Philosophy of David Hume
6. It might be said that the fate of deconstruction is to leave a trace of uncertainty (which, *qua* a trace, is itself determined, or very certain) in the relations articulating other texts. This thesis argues Derrida exploits this possibility. In leaving traces that could otherwise only be forgotten, there is a definite sense in which Derrida resists, or exposes, prejudice.
7. Rousseau is not usually termed a rationalist, Hayek is conflating rationalism and irrationalism; not to be confused with Humean anti-rationalism. Derrida, however, makes similar judgements. The difference, he says, between rationalism and irrationalism is symmetrical; i.e. mutually supportive. As is the one between Rationalism and Nihilism [The Principles of Reason: the university in the eyes of its pupils p. 15].
8. Hayek quotes Hume to the effect that secular magistrates replace the idea of the King as supreme magistrate (Hayek, p. 355, cf. also p. 359). For Hegel, this transformation is dialectical: the replacement of a Sovereign's power by another, abstract, formulation will have tended to draw the truth out of the earlier form; i.e. the abstraction becomes a more closely rational expression of *basically the same idea*: "*When a nation begins to acquire even a little culture, its customary law must soon come to be collected and put together. Such a collection is a legal code, but one which, as a mere collection, is markedly formless, indeterminate and fragmentary. The main difference between it and a code properly so-called is that in the latter the principles of jurisprudence in their universality, and so in their determinacy, have been apprehended in terms of thought and expressed*" [Right 135]. Which is to say, it is nothing other than sovereignty which is rationalised as a Political institution.
9. A negative advantage, not predetermined by relative strength. If competition between different interests is economical, legally the interested parties are regarded as of potentially equal in merit; until the market expresses a free choice. Thus, this question arises: If the 'law' suspends the relative strength of any single interest; what is the form of the arena where this suspension occurs, as it is no longer takes the form of the national state *as such*. cf. Chapter 3, the question of anti-trust laws and their international character.
10. Hayek is describing the possibility of the death of liberalism in "*the approach to totalitarian democracy*" [Hayek, p. 359]. An approach of which Hayek is very aware, leaving his native Austria for England with the approach of Nazism. Hayek's critique aims to dispel an idea which already has come to enjoy a kind of force or dominance (ibid p. 358). Whilst it might be held that an institution should be reified as the embodiment of the State, Hayek argues that nothing is *effectively* embodied in this way. In this respect, Reason is impotent (ibid p. 343). Two questions arise: (i) as Hayek critiques the approach of totalitarianism, of what necessity and of what force is someone *like* Hegel, as Hegel symptomises a kind of anxious delusion; either the dream of totalitarianism, or the dream of formless fragmentation [Right 135], as both delusions express fear for the State. cf Chapter Two. (ii) as the public, or the market, eventually decides upon every venture (having, in some way,

- negotiated the possibility of unfair trading practices) to what extent can the Market be *justly* equated with a court? This question specifically concerns Derrida.
11. In retrospect, the 'General Problem' of Kant's First Critique is cast thus: "*How are synthetic a priori judgements possible?*"; a question he associates with Hume [B 19]; especially upon the delusions of reason, and their oblique effectivity as an 'artefact' (cf. Hayek p. 343). Kant's First Critique is divided in two: 'The Transcendental Analytic' and 'The Transcendental Dialectic'; the transcendental form ascribed to the former will depend upon the transcendental psychology articulated in the latter: i.e. experience depends upon human, or rational, psychology. Whereas Hume has shown Reason's chief possibility is delusion [B 19], Kant asks how a possible delusion may be *necessary*; a dialectical illusion. 'Critique' formalises such experiences as nonsensical or paradoxical relations (paralogisms and antinomies); i.e. will give a formal role to psychic effects which, thereby, are not *merely* impotent but also, or obliquely, effective through judgement.
  12. "A travers le spontanéisme et un certain utopisme naturaliste, on prenait sans doute conscience du caractère artificiel, artefactuel des institutions. On n'a pas attendu 68 pour le savoir, certes, mais peut-être pour en prendre une conscience plus pratique, plus effective: ... parce que ces institutions non naturelles, historique, fondées, ne marchaient plus, on ne les trouvait plus fondées en droit, légitimes. Ajoutez à cela le fait que les medias et avec eux toute la culture prenait des formes et des dimensions qui marquaient une véritable mutation, jusque la production même de l' "événement" 68. Cela libérait toute sorte de questions sur la légitimité et l'origine des pouvoirs: de sanction, d'évaluation, de publication, de communication, etc." Magazine Littéraire March 1991, p. 24]
  13. Cf., notes to introduction: 5, 18.
  14. The claim to 'whittle down the claims of reason through rational analysis' is Hume's (Hayek p. 358). It may be applied however to Kantian critique, insofar as Kant also asks where such criticisms occur, i.e. in Public, in a tribune or forum.
  15. After having spoken of the 'oikonomia' of the West, Derrida speaks of the "inside where 'we are'" ("dedans où 'nous sommes'") [EM 162]; i.e. the inside of the West, or the forum for 'we westerners'.
  16. "Il faut maintenir la rigueur formelle, sans laquelle aucun droit n'est protégé, et donc inventer des dispositifs plus fins, une législation plus différenciée, mieux ajustée aux mutations techno-économique du 'libre-marché'." [DA 115]
  17. "Or, ce dieu d'une politologie négative ne peut donner signe de vie, au grand jour, sans un certain médium. Le rythme quotidien, qui lui est essentiel, suppose la diffusion massive de quelque chose comme un journal." [DA 106]
  18. "Que devient alors cette réserve d'expérience, d'évaluation et même de détermination (les 'modes' les 'goûts', les 'mœurs') qui ne relève pas du jugement (oui ou non) et de la représentation, à tous les sens de ce mot?"
  19. "1. To attempt an exit and deconstruction without changing terrain ... the risk here lies in confirming, consolidating or relieving without end a depression more stubborn even than that which one claims to deconstruct. The explication progressing towards the opening, risks sinking into the autism of the closure; 2. To decide to change terrain, in a discontinuous and irruptive manner, through

*installing oneself brutally on the outside ... language, simply and practically, without end, reinstalls the 'new' terrain upon the oldest ground. Through numerous precise examples one might show the effects of such a reinstallation and such a blindness.*" "1. tenter la sortie et la déconstruction sans changer de terrain ... Le risque est ici de confirmer, de consolider ou de relever sans cesse à une profondeur toujours plus sûre cela même qu'on prétend déconstruire. L'explication continue vers l'ouverture risque s'enfoncer dans l'autisme de la clôture; 2. décider de changer de terrain, de manière discontinue et irruptive, en s'installant brutalement dehors ... la simple pratique de la langue réinstalle sans cesse le 'nouveau' terrain sur le plus vieux sol. On pourrait montrer sur des exemples nombreux et précis les effets d'une telle réinstallation ou d'un tel aveuglement." [EM 162-163]

20. "La 'liberté de la presse' est le bien le plus précieux de la démocratie, mais ... cette 'liberté' fondamentale reste à inventer. Chaque jours. Au moins, Et la démocratie avec elle."
21. "C'est là qu'on peut interroger l'autorité de l'opinion - non pas dans ses contenus, mais dans sa forme de jugement pré-électoral"
22. "d'en analyser sans répit les déterminations historiques, celles qui, en 1989, peuvent être délimiter et celles qui ne le peuvent pas"
23. "But who, we?" ["Mais qui, nous?" EM 164]. As will be seen, *The Ends of Man* refers to the 'we' as a 'magnetic attraction'.
24. Derrida wonders how the colloquial might be represented within an international colloquium; or how his political interests might be represented when "*the philosophers present here do not assume the official politics of their country*". He goes on to note however, "*It would be illusory to believe that political innocence is restored.*" "les philosophes ici présents n'assument la politique officielle de leurs pays ... Il serait illusoire de croire que l'innocence politique est restaurée" [EM 134]
25. Bakunin: *The Reaction in Germany* p. 385
26. Secondary work on Bakunin is characterised by either embarrassment or dismissal. Studies of Russian thought find him unphilosophical, but decisive in any account of the westernisation of Russian philosophy. Studies of labour find he suffers in comparison to Marx. His contemporary reputation was blighted by an ugly struggle with Marx for the leadership of the IWA, by his alleged authorship of the 'Catechism of the Revolutionary' and by his influence upon terrorists. There is no evidence of direct terrorism on his part. He was, however, one of the most famous philosopher of his day, and the most widely travelled upto that time.
27. *New German Critique* p. 104-107.
28. "[Heidegger] never denied his entanglements in the movement of the time ... But he was neither an uncritical fellow-traveller, nor an active party leader" Hermann Heidegger p. 469 (an introduction to the *The Rectoral Address*). Heidegger fils refers to the judgement of the post-war trials that Heidegger was a 'fellow-traveller' with the NSDAP. Insofar as *The Ends of Man* refers to the 'magnetic attraction of the 'we', this would refer to the necessity of such indictment, to response to a juridical indictment (like Heidegger fils), as to Heidegger's wish to campaign on the NSDAP platform, either for Hitler or as an NSDAP sympathisers.
29. "We have the new Reich and the university that is to recieve its tasks from the Reich's will to existence. There is a revolution in Germany, and we must ask ourselves: Is there a revolution at the

- university as well? No ... through the new life-culture [durch die *Bildung neuen Lebens* in the work camp and the educational association as well as at the university, the latter has been relieved of educational tasks to which it till now has believed it had an exclusive right. ... It is a battle for the *Form of Teachers and Leaders at the University*. [ein Kampf um die *Gestalt des Lehrers und des Führers an der Universität*.] [New German Critique p 99-100, translation modified]. The form of Teaching and Struggle is the theme of The Rectoral Address. At all times, Heidegger insists that Education, Form and Culture [*Bildung*] and Warning, Doctrine and Lesson [*Lehre*] should be thought in terms of the active participation in Revolution. '*Lehre*' and '*Bildung*' are thought by reference to a ground-shaking movement in the history of thought in his Plato's Doctrine of Truth and to the will to understand the force of Revolution in his What is a Thing?.
30. Letter on Humanism p. 200. This letter was solicited as a response to Sartre's Existentialism is a Humanism. Heidegger's contention is that he never produced a 'humanist' doctrine, did he then intend a more revolutionary lesson? As his Letter on Humanism takes the thought of '*paideia*' to be that which is covered up in Humanism, is he still striving for a revolutionary form of education? His pre-*Lehre* Plato's doctrine of Truth discusses the Platonic form of truth as a '*Lehre*' and the Platonic form of education (*paideia*) as '*Bildung*'. Hence, any attempt to think a difference between his pre- and post-*Lehre* work is complicated, if it is a political question. As will be seen, Derrida exacerbates such problems by speaking of the 'magnetic attraction' of the 'we'.
  31. "la distinction entre telle ou telle période de la pensée heideggerienne, entre les textes antérieurs et les textes postérieurs à ladite *Kehre*, a moins de pertinence que jamais." [EM 148]
  32. "the prevailing value accorded to the phenomenological metaphor, in all the varieties of *phainesthai*, of shining, lighting, clearing, *Lichtung*, etc., open onto the space of presence and the presence of space, understood in the opposition of the near and the far" ["la prévalence accordée à la métaphore phénoménologique, à toutes les variétés du *phainesthai*, de la brilliançe, de l'éclairement, de la clairière, de la *Lichtung*, etc., ouvre sur l'espace de la présence et la présence de l'espace, compris dan l'opposition du proche et du lointain." EM 158]
  33. That analogies have the effect of erasing distinctions is the subject of White Mythology. Derrida states: "This explains the distrust that the concept of metaphor inspires in Heidegger." [p. 226].
  34. This is the subject of the very closing paragraph of Letter on Humanism.
  35. "Qu'une déclaration d'opposition à quelque politique officielle soit autorisée, autorisée par les autorités, cela signifie aussi que, dans cette mesure même, elle ne trouble pas l'ordre, elle ne gêne pas. On peut entendre cette dernière expression, 'elle ne gêne pas', en tous ses sens." [EM 134]
  36. Kearney: Dialogue with Jacques Derrida p.107
  37. "Le seul choix n'est donc pas: concentration ou dispersion. L'alternative serait plutôt entre l'unilatéral ou le multilatéral dans les rapports des médias au 'public', aux 'publics'. La responsabilité, à savoir la liberté de la presse et devant la presse, dépendra toujours de l'effectivité d'un 'droit de réponse' qui permet au

citoyen d'être plus que la fraction (privée, en somme, et de plus en plus) d'un 'public' passif et consommateur, nécessairement lésé par là même. Y a-t-il démocratie sans réciprocité?"

### Notes for Chapter Two

1. Derrida describes the 'magnetic attraction' of the 'We' through the logical relation of 'disjunction': "One sees then that Dasein, although *not man*, is nevertheless *nothing other than man*." ("On voit donc que le *Dasein*, s'il n'est pas l'homme, n'est pourtant pas autre chose que l'homme." EM p. 151); i.e. the 'given' (dasein), although not man, will have been represented to 'us' as 'us'.
2. Freud: Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety p. 241
3. Freud: Mourning and Melancholia p. 252
4. Freud: On Narcissism p. 96
5. *ibid* p. 66
6. Kant: Critique of Pure Reason A73, my emphasis.
7. In La démocratie ajournée, Derrida's claim is that Kant's distinction is to have made 'public a use of reason in every domain'. Only through the disjunctive relation could the 'tribune of pure Reason' be nothing other than the general sphere of knowledge, whilst also making public the distinctions between one particular domain or sphere and another.
8. Mourning and Melancholia p. 256
9. Thucydides History Book II, 37.2 and 41.2
10. "Topologie déroutante. Comment identifier ici l'opinion publique? A-t-elle lieu? où se donne-t-elle à voir, et *comme telle*? L'étrange de son corps propre, c'est aussi l'ubiquité d'un spectre. Il n'est *présent comme tel en aucun de ces espaces*."
11. Derrida: From Restricted to General Economy
12. For instance, Kant's criticism of the Idea of the Republic in the Critique of Pure Reason. The point being that such an ideal may be 'followed up' "and, where the great philosopher leaves us without help, to place it, through fresh efforts, in a proper light, rather than to set it aside uselessly" [A 316].
13. "By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security ... in this he is led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention" [Wealth of Nations IV ii 9]. The 'invisible hand' describes the process by which this selfishness ends in a social ethos, a process which nevertheless will have to be analysed in its particulars. In this instance, 'friction' explains much of the entrepreneurs preference for local trade; i.e. the concept of wasted time, wasted costs, in travel. If we live in a frictionless world, now, will the invisible hand continue to work? Can the invisible hand work without wastage?
14. For Kant, Descartes 'ontological proof', like Plato's idea of the City, calls for a "following up". However, his criticism of Descartes finds Descartes adds nothing new to our idea of God other than a sense of weariness; it is "so much labour and effort lost; we can no more extend our stock of insight by mere ideas, than a merchant can better his position by adding a few noughts to his cash account" [Critique of Pure Reason, A 602]. Which is to say, it adds nothing new but conveys a wider sense of speculation, of perceived profit,

- and failure. This is not an isolated metaphor; cf. Grounding for the Metaphysic of Morals, discussed in notes to introduction; 3, above.
15. Heidegger: Address of November 11 1933 p. 104
  16. Keynes: General Theory of Employment Interest and Money p. xxvi.
  17. Keynes: Essays in Persuasion p. 135
  18. Keynes: The End of Laissez-faire p. 312
  19. Keynes: General Theory of Employment Interest and Money p. 155
  - 20) *ibid.*, p. 160
  - 21) Heidegger: Being and Time H 169
  22. Pound: For a New Paideum p.254
  23. EM 161, quoted in french Notes to Foreword; 11, above.
  24. EM 161
  25. "le non-sens ou l'absurdité angoissante rôdant autour de l'humanisme métaphysique" EM 161
  26. As is being emphasised here, Derrida reads across the 'kehre', not in indifference to its content but by way of highlighting the ways in which the 'same' form (here, a demand; for whatever) might be reflected in Heidegger's work as that work raises different, pressing issues. Hence, Derrida reads the Letter on Humanism, with its questioning of the way the lesson or 'paideia' has been forgotten in the history of humanism, through Heidegger's thoughts upon the form of the question in Being and Time. EM 148-153.
  27. 'eigentlich': properly, really, authentic. This word, used throughout Being and Time, comes from 'eigen': own. cf. also 'eigenschaft': property. Derrida is concerned with a discourse upon the proprietarial which whilst clear in Heidegger's work is assumed rather than 'worrysome'. In common with the work before, after and during the kehre, Heidegger is obsessed with the idea of 'dwelling', of securing a home, or of bearing feelings of the 'unheimlich'. cf. "Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells." [Letter on Humanism 193]
  28. The 'Problematic' is defined by Kant as being purely formal, concerning the "value of the copula in relation to thought in general" [Critique of pure Reason A 74]. What concerns this thesis is the form of 'community', which Kant defines as 'disjunctive' [*ibid.*, second edition B 112]. The disjunctive relation has a value in judgement, but a wholly problematic value when its copular function (its relation to the General) is disjunctive, a relation of separation/exclusion.
  29. This brief account of positivism is intended to stress that a critique of Concepts, if this is a Critique of the Understanding, may take the form of a semiological critique of the way in which signs are formally articulated; i.e. attends to their positive value for a semiology rather than their transcendental status for Man, for Politics or for Mind. Derrida's rejection of this path, whilst stressing his sympathies with it, is seen in The Ends of Man. When he affirms Heidegger's formalism, he does so because it falls into neither 'cultural gossip' or "*in the best cases, into the purest 'structuralist' tradition of metaphysics.*" ["dans le meilleur des cas, dans la plus pure tradition 'structuraliste' de la métaphysique." EM 161]
  30. Fate or destiny (Schicksal), in German, has the connotation of being 'fitting' or 'proper'; i.e. an inheritance and a vocation ["*in (Schicksal) Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited yet chosen.*" Being and Time H 384]. In Being and Time, Dasein becomes known on the basis of the possibility of death, even the fact that death has left a trace for

- Dasein: "The deceased ... has been torn away from those who have remained, and is an object of 'concern' in the ways of funeral rites, interment and the cult of graves" [ibid. H 238]. There is a clear sense in which Dasein's fate (as opposed to sequential history) depends upon it dwelling upon death. This theme and the cult of graves is covered in Chapter Three, as is the fact that there is a view of the Stately that is committed to redundancy as to a vocation.
31. "anxiety can mount authentically only in a Dasein which is resolute. He who is resolute knows no fear; but he understands the possibility of anxiety as the possibility of the very mood which neither inhibits nor bewilders him. Anxiety liberates him from possibilities which 'count for nothing' (nichtigen), and lets him become free for those which are authentic." [Being and Time H 345]
  32. Heidegger: Rectoral Address, p. 471, German edition p. 11
  33. cf. note 31 above, the possibilities which 'count for nothing' are to be overturned with the Dasein's ascension to its authentic possibilities. It is at such moments that nihilism and Heidegger's account of a 'fallenness' or an 'oblivion' become associated.
  34. Descombes: Modern French Philosophy p. 117.
  35. 'to khreon' (destiny), translated as 'brauch', [Anaximander Fragment 52]. Heidegger argues that 'to khreon' is the trace of that which was distinctive between Being and beings, thus the trace of their disjunction and the oblivion that comes with this disjunction [ibid. 50]. cf. La différance p. 26.
  36. In Plato's Doctrine of Truth Heidegger anticipates his Letter on Humanism by ten years when he says of humanism that its form, or its form of forgetting, is such that: "man ... esteems everything real according to values." p. 191
  37. Heidegger: What is a Thing p. 121
  38. ibid p. 112
  39. ibid pp. 57-59]
  40. ibid pp. 150-151
  41. Heidegger: Being and Time H 25]
  42. Freud: Mourning and Melancholia p. 256
  43. Derrida: Of Grammatology p. 6, p.15 of French edition; my emphasis.
  44. Freud's account of the valorisation of inutile, obsessive behaviour is elaborated by reference to 'anality'. Hence, Bataille's use of Freud, cf. 'The Pineal Eye' (Visions of Excess). Here, the seat of Reason is conflated with the anus: the site of expenditure. Bataille questions the institutionalisation of 'value'; asking about the status of non-value (anti-capital, anti-matter) and its bearing upon economics. This informs Bataille's reading of Hegel where Sovereignty (or Capital institutions, the places where value is secured and produced) are taken to be similar to the machinery producing non-value: excrement, redundancy etc.
  45. The Anaximander Fragment asks about the disjunctive relation insofar as 'to khreon' is the 'early trace of this distinction' (p. 51). Having identified it with a Kantian term, and having translated it into German as 'brauch', the question becomes one of the peculiar distinctiveness of 'to khreon'.
  46. For an exposition of Derrida's translation of the 'aufheben' cf. translators notes to Margins of Philosophy, pages 19 (note 23), 43 (note 15), 88 (note 16). Derrida states: "Aufheben is relever, in the sense that relever attempts at once to say relieve, displace, elevate and promote, in one and the same movement" ("Aufheben, c'est relever,

- au sens où 'relever' veut dire à la fois déplacer, élever, remplacer et promouvoir dans un seul et même mouvement." EM 143). This thesis is highlighting 'promotion', in the sense of bringing something into relief, or forcing an issue.
47. The allusion, here, is to the unhappy community, in general, as '*The World of Self-alienated Spirit*' *Phenomenology of Spirit* para. 487-537. This 'world' is established earlier (para 477) when Hegel states of the Political order: "*The universal being thus split into a mere multiplicity of individuals, this lifeless Spirit is an equality, in which all count the same*". The truth of Politics will be found in the form of the reconciliation of the unhappy to their contentious position; i.e. self-sacrifice. Here, the Political self and the alienated self are conjoined as "*The reconciling Yea, in which two 'I's let go their antithetical existence*" (para 671). This last quote, from the *Phenomenology*, is a more spiritual reconciliation than Political. However, cf. note 66 below, the same form of self-sacrifice is replicated in his *Philosophy of Right*.
  48. As has been noted Narcissistic identification has a beneficial role as "the libidinal complement of the urge to self preservation". However, this role is found through the analyst and the analytical discourse which Freud himself warns, suggests "*a crippling dependance upon his helper in need*" *On Narcissism* p. 96. Freud's solution is to elevate the Form of discourse over the position of the analyst *qua* new love object (*ibid.*)
  49. Derrida: *Ellipsis* p. 295
  50. Hegel aims at pure profit by insisting that the Form of disputation (*qua* dialectics) is the Form of secured profit (a process of sure-fire relief); as emphasised in *The Pit and the Pyramid* and *White Mythology*. Derrida reads the dialectic otherwise, as a system which also involves loss. That this other reading is a positivism is signalled in the former work where the dialectics is read as a process "*Quite simply, a machine, perhaps, and one which would function. A machine defined in its pure functioning, and not in its final utility, its meaning, its result, its work.*" (*Margins of Philosophy* p. 107)
  51. Derrida states: "*This will not budge from Aristotle to Hegel. The prime mover, as 'pure act', is pure presence. As such, it animates all movement by means of the desire it inspires. It is the good, and the supremeley desirable. Desire is the desire of presence*" *Quasia and Gramme* p. 52, my emphasis.
  52. "Elle ne commande rien, ne règne sur rien et n'exerce nulle part aucune autorité. ... Non seulement il n'y a pas de royaume de la différance mais celle-ci foment la subversion de tout royaume. Ce qui la rend 'evidemment menaçante et infailliblement redoutée par tout ce qui en nous désire de royaume, la présence passée ou à venir d'un royaume." [D 22]
  53. Freud: *Mourning and Melancholia* p. 252
  54. Derrida: DA 110, 116.
  55. DA 121
  56. Keynes: *General Theory* p. 234
  57. *ibid.*, p. 170
  58. *ibid.* p.230-235
  59. Keynes gives a variety of ways in which money might be dead money: when it is poured into redundancy, or into living when redundant. But also in speculation, in the pure desire for liquidity, in idleness. These would have to be differentiated, but there are

overlaps; e.g. when idle money (savings, the speculation on interest) indirectly causes unemployment. Keynes counters the problem of redundancy by recommending large-scale public works [ibid, p. 119-131]. He argues it might seem foolish to bury money in bottle in the ground, for others to retrieve; but it isn't if it stimulates more productive demands [ibid., p. 121]. Here, he comes close to thinking an economy based on waste, he cites the building of the pyramids twice as an example of large-scale public works that had the oblique effect of maintaining an economy [ibid., p. 130, p. 220].

60. D 21
61. cf. Josef Steindl: Stagnation and Growth, a post-Keynesian work on the production of stagnation but within a manifold of competing industries, not a 'general' economy *per se*.
62. In La différance [D 21-22], Derrida is careful to read Freud without reserve; i.e. the most sympathetic reading possible (this practice, the strengthening of arguments, and its effect is discussed in the Conclusion, section 1). Freud often uses term drawn from hydraulics; often as though the unconscious were a reservoir from which cathexes flowed and returned. In French, cathexes are described as investments; hence, there is a strong sense in which Freud exploits reservoirs and capital reserves, fluidity and the fluidity of cash.
63. Heidegger's post-kehre work seems to suggest the utter remoteness of Being, in language, is itself a gift of Being. Dwelling, then, remains forever an uncanny (unheimlich) dwelling upon the alien.
64. Kant: Critique of Pure Reason A 235-236
65. "Human life, distinct from juridical existence, existing as it does on a globe isolated in celestial space, from night to day and from one country to another - human life cannot in any way be limited to the closed systems assigned to it by reasonable conceptions. The immense travail of recklessness, discharge and upheaval that constitutes life could be expressed by stating that life only starts with the deficit of these systems ... It is only by such insubordination - even if it is impoverished - that the human race ceases to be isolated in the unconditional splendor of material things." Bataille: The Notion of Expenditure p. 128. Here, material splendour includes excrement; its local flavour (juridical/ political impoverishment) and its celestial splendour.
66. The sections alluded to are para 444-483, 'The Ethical Order' in the Phenomenology; i.e. the sections directly preceding the 'unhappy world', acting as its reserve, its base, its ethical reservoir. These sections are discussed in Derrida's Glas. Also, Hegel's Right where patriotism (a form of self sacrifice, in favour of the 'substantive unity' and 'subjectivity' of the state, para 260) is defined as "the sentiment which, in the relationships of our daily life and under ordinary conditions, habitually recognises that the community is one's substantive groundwork and end" p. 164 [note to para 268]. Hence, what was previously (and still is) recognised as uncomprehending, lonely drudgery, finds a higher, Political, form of sacrifice.
67. "Au-delà de ces frontières, ce que j'appellerai le mirage philosophique consisterait aussi bien à percevoir de la philosophie - une philosophie plus ou moins constituée et adulte - qu'à percevoir un désert. Or, cet espace n'est ni philosophique ni désertique, c'est-à-dire inculte." EM 133
68. White Mythology characterises the 'detour' through economics as a 'heliotope'; i.e. a turn of the sun. Again an ellipse. The relation

between, for instance, Hegel and Bataille is a 'heliotrope'; a detour between the sun and its other, or the institution representing the light of Reason and its other.

69. Derrida: Ellipsis p. 295
70. "Il brûle son texte et efface les traces de ses pas. ... Il dansera, hors de la maison, cette *aktive Vergeszllichkeit*, cette 'oubliance active' et cette fête cruelle (*grausam*) dont parlé la *Généalogie de la morale*. Nul doute que Nietzsche en a appelé à un oubli actif de l'être: il n'aurait pas eu la forme métaphysique que lui impute Heidegger. EM 163
71. EM 164
72. "Le texte de la métaphysique est ainsi *compris*. Encore lisible; et à lire. Il n'est pas entouré mais traversé par sa limite, marqué en son dedans par le sillon multiple de sa marge. Proposant *a la fois* le monument et le mirage de la trace, la trace simultanément tracée et effacée, simultanément vive et morte, vive comme toujours de simuler aussi la vie en son inscription gardée. Pyramide. Non pas une borne à franchir, mais pierreux, sur un muraille, autrement à déchiffrer, un texte sans voix" La différance p. 25
73. It will be noted, here, that text is taken as synonymous with economics; in brief, if the virtue of signs is to be exchangeable, this is an economic virtue. If it is the distinction of writing to become an issue (to stand in relief) in Derrida's work, then this is a distinction articulated by virtue of economic relations. Hence, writing is an economic issue, economics is not simply a form of script (only cash is a script) cf. next chapter.

#### Notes for Chapter Three

1. Pound: Visiting Card p. 276.
2. Pound: ABC of Economics p. 209.
3. Pound: Visiting Card p. 276.
4. *ibid.*, p. 304.
5. *ibid.*, p. 276.
6. *ibid.*, p. 278. Mention of '*Jewish poison*' and a '*Judaecocracy*' occurs on p. 290 and p. 292, respectively.
7. Pound: Gists p. 325.
8. Pound promotes 'social credit', as opposed to 'usury', in terms of the '*increments of association*'; i.e. the just enjoyment of the collective advantage cf. For a New Paideuma p. 258, p. 264.
9. Derrida: La différance p. 4, this passage is quoted in full in section three.
10. The primary difference here is the one between the 'e' of '*différence*' and the 'a' of Derrida's neologism '*différance*', a non-apparent difference cf. below, section iii to this chapter. The analogy Derrida omits to stress, between the 'home' and the 'tomb' occurs in the theological lexicon Estienne where it is ascribed, falsely, to Sophocles' Antigone, cf. below.
11. Pound's ABC of Economics echoes Keynes (cited in section 1, Chapter Two) when he asserts both nature and man's ingenuity remain as plentiful as ever. cf. p. 203-204.
12. Pound: Visiting Card p. 302.
13. cf. Jacques le Goff: Your Money or Your Life, an account of the way conceptions of guilt and death are articulated by virtue of views of

- credit and, in consequence, how the spread of banking technology changes the face of death.
14. Keynes: General Theory p. 351.
  15. Pound: Selected Prose p. 235.
  16. *ibid.*, p. 240.
  17. Taken from Summa de Arithmetica, Geometria Proportioni et Proportionalita Fra Luca Bartolomeo di Borgo Pacioli, Venice, 1494. Pacioli, a friend of Leonardo da Vinci's, wrote his Divine Proportion [1496] under the influence of Pierro della Francesca. cf. Dizionario Enciclopedico dell Letteratura Italiana, ed., Petronio, Laterza & Figli, Bari 1509. Summa translation from: Johnson: Christy Malry's Own Double-Entry.
  18. Plato: Meno 81e - 86d. Here, Socrates stirs the memory of the pathic by supplying suggestions to him, like a drug-supplier (cf. use of 'narkesas'). NB. Derrida's use of 'pharmakos' in Writing and Difference.
  19. Schleiermacher: The Christian Faith p. 26, my emphasis.
  20. Cyril of Alexandria, cf. F M Young From Nicae to Chalcedon p. 252.
  21. Schleiermacher, p. 532.
  22. *ibid.*, p. 478.
  23. Derrida: White Mythology, Margins of Philosophy p. 270.
  24. Keynes states: "Thus the rate of interest at any time, being the reward for parting with liquidity, is a measure of the willingness of those who possess money to part with their liquid control over it." General Theory p. 167. Which is to say, 'interest' is an expression of the inhibition of a certain kind of freedom. But, also, an expression of commitment to another economy, one where liquid freedom is not the central issue.
  25. Hume: Of the Balance of Trade, "it is impossible to keep up money, more than any fluid, beyond its proper level" p. 334. Here, Hume appeals to a sense of equilibrium, however as Keynes states: "Hume began the practice amongst economists of stressing the importance of the equilibrium position as compared with the ever-shifting transition towards it, though he was still enough of a mercantilist not to overlook the fact that it is in the transition that we actually have our being." General Theory, p. 343 (note, 3).
  26. Derrida: White Mythology, p. 244. 'Interiorisation', or the value placed upon the interior is given at the beginning of White Mythology, when Derrida states that he examines "Metaphor in the text of philosophy" (*ibid.*, p. 209). However, if metaphor is understood to suggest the 'reappropriation of the interior', or the assurity of a proper harbour, it does so by enabling a sort of short-cut (detour); it illustrates the other process by dissembling it. Hence, metaphor 'in' philosophy economically (in abbreviation) suggests another process, but also the fall from that process or its counterfeiting. It fails the interior (of a book, of the City-harbour) insofar as it moves to the exterior, opening out into fluidity.
  27. *ibid.*, p. 226. cf. p. 253 "metaphorization: idealisation and reappropriation"
  28. *ibid.*, p. 224
  29. *ibid.*, p. 228
  30. *ibid.*, p. 220. Here, Derrida makes a move Heidegger does not make, he provides a positive taxonomy of differences (or at least, starts to). However, this is recognised as being both Aristotelian and, also, an immanent structural account of how differences work (a propos de

- Saussure). Hence, Derrida's incompleteness of this taxonomy (as is seen, metaphor and analogy are distinguished insofar as they are similar): (i) illustrates Heidegger's indifference to some distinctions (ii) shows that indifference infects a diachronic structure. Derrida insists this continues to be economic as he argues: (i) Aristotle's is an economic account (i.e. of reappropriation), (ii) the usury, or specious credit, of metaphor is itself an economic effect.
31. *ibid.*, p. 242.
  32. cf. The Retrait of Metaphor [1978]. White Mythology only mentions Heidegger in passing, it does however set out from the suspicion of metaphor, manifest by Heidegger: (i) ignoring it as an embarrassment (ii) criticising it insofar as he criticises dialectics *in general* (of which Metaphor would be a single and *over-extended* example). This later essay seeks to fill out the gap made by Heidegger, or the indifference exhibited by Heidegger as a kind of fear.
  33. Aristophanes: The Clouds 1287-1296
  34. Aristotle: The Poetics. However, another version of the idea of a dramatic expression given an integral form would be that a society becomes committed to its 'political' experience through the communal experience of a dramatic expression. For instance, Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy. These early Nietzschean works (nationalist works) are the ones Heidegger particularly emphasises.
  35. Aristotle: The Politics Bk 1.1 p. 28, famously states 'Man is the Political animal'. The argument here is that the thinking of Man as someone committed to the Athenian Polis is argued by Thucydides, and becomes the basis of Plato's Republic; specifically, that Man is committed to elaborating the form of the Athenian Polis.
  36. Thucydides: History Bk II, 37 18-24
  37. *ibid.*, 41 1-3
  38. "Damn you, war, War, damn you on a hundred counts, when it's not even possible for me to punish my slave" The Clouds (lines 6-8). cf. Sommerstein's notes to this edition.
  39. Thucydides, 62 3 - 63 3
  40. *ibid.*, 62 2-3
  41. cf. Victor Ehrenberg: From Solon to Socrates. Chapter on Delian League, pp195-196.
  42. Thucydides 65 16-19.
  43. Plato: Republic Bk VII
  44. cf. Ehrenberg p 332, also Xenophon Hellenica II, 2, 23.
  45. "it lies nearer the sea than it should, and you say that it is rather well off for harbours, which makes matters worse ... for a country to have the sea nearby is pleasant enough for the purpose of everyday life, but in fact it is a 'salty-sharp and bitter neighbour' in more senses than one. It fills the land with wholesaling and retailing, breeds shifty and deceitful habits in a man's soul, and makes the citizen distrustful and hostile, not only among themselves, but also in their dealings with the world outside." Plato: The Laws, 703-712, Penguin trans. Saunders.
  46. Heidegger is drawing on the difference between Bildung and Bildungslosigkeit, or between the formed and the falling-from-form (or educated and uneducated). Bildung for Heidegger, is a translation of Plato's use of the term Paideia in the Republic. Plato's Doctrine of Truth p. 178.
  47. Heidegger: The Rectoral Address p. 480, Republic 497d

48. In fact, there are three fathers in the Republic; also Aristonymos. Only mentioned once, his name appears to be a conflation of *Aristos* and *Tymos*; i.e. the first two ages of Athens.
49. Republic Bk I, 331
50. Morris: Burial and Ancient Society. Cambridge 1987.
51. Sophocles: Antigone line 661, trans. Brown.
52. *ibid.*, 892. trans. Jebb,
53. Diodorus Siculus 1, 93
54. "Prenons d'abord le foyer: cet autel est le ymbole de la vie sédentaire ... le foyer prend possession du sol; cette part de terre, il la fait sienne, elle est sa propriété." La cité antique p. 64
55. "Pour ce tombeau la règle était la même que pour le foyer: il n'était pas plus permis d'unir eux familles dans une même sépulture qu'il ne l'était d'unir deux foyers domestiques en une seule maison. C'était une égale impiété d'enterrer un mort hors du tombeau de sa famille ou de placer dans ce tombeau le corps d'un étranger. La religion domestique, soit dans la vie, soit dans le mort, séperait chaque famille de toutes les autres et écartait sévèrement toute apparence de communauté." *ibid.*, p. 67, my emphasis.
56. Momigliano: Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography, Morris: Burial and Ancient Society.
57. Humphreys: Family Tombs and Tomb Cult in Ancient Athens.
58. "Cette ... croyance est rapportée par Eustathe, qui dit que la maison est issue du foyer" La cité antique p.66.
59. "La fortune est immobile comme le foyer et le tombeau auxquelles elle est attaché." *ibid.*, p. 78.
60. Galbraith identifies such a market as the basis of the American crash of the nineteen-twenties; i.e. the Florida bubble [The Great Crash of 1929]. The state of the housing market is closely entwined with the depression in Britain.
61. Harvey: The Urban Experience
62. The root of semiology, 'sema', is commonly a funereal sign in Hellenic literature: a tombstone or memorium. Perhaps this explains the mix of positivism and morbidity in Derrida.
63. The term 'différance' actually first appeared in Writing and Difference, however, it appeared in essays written after the completion of Of Grammatology, cf. Alan Bass introduction to Writing and Difference.
64. "Je rappelle donc, de façon toute préliminaire, que cette discrète intervention graphique, qui n'est pas faite d'abord ni simplement pour le scandale du lecteur ou du grammairien, à été calculée dans le procès écrit d'une question sur l'écriture. Or il se trouve, je dirais par le fait, que cette différence graphique (le *æau* lieu du *e*), cette différence marquée entre deux notations apparemment vocales, entre deux voyelles, reste purement graphique: elle s'écrit ou se lit, mais elle ne s'entend pas. On ne peut l'entendre et nous verrons en quoi elle passe aussi l'ordre de l'entendement. Elle se propose par une marque muette, par une monument tacite, je dirais même par une pyramide, songeant ainsi non seulement à la forme de la lettre lorsqu'elle s'imprime en majeur ou en majuscule, mais à tel texte de l'Encyclopédie de Hegel où le corps du signe est comparé à la Pyramide égyptienne. Le *a* de la différence, donc, ne s'entend pas: il demeure silencieux, secret et discret comme un tombeau: oïkésis. Marquons ainsi, par anticipation, ce lieu, résidence familiale et tombeau du propre où se produit en différence l'économie de la mort.

- Cette pierre n'est pas loin, pourvu qu'on en sache déchiffrer la légende, de signaler la mort du dynaste." La différance p. 4
65. "no language can reduce into itself the structure of an anthology. This supplement of a code which traverses its own field, endlessly displaces its closure, breaks its line, opens its circle, and no ontology will have been able to reduce it" White Mythology p. 271
66. "Je parlerai, donc, d'une lettre. / De la première, s'il faut en croire l'alphabet et la plupart des spéculations qui s'y sont aventurées." La différence p. 3
67. Hegel: Philosophy of Mind p. 363
68. *ibid.*, p. 218
69. *ibid.*, p. 218.
70. Kearney & Derrida: Interview with Jacques Derrida p. 123.
71. "'déconstructions', que je préfère dire au pluriel, n'a sans doute jamais nommé un projet, une méthode ou un système. Surtout pas une système philosophique. Dans ces contextes toujours très déterminés, c'est l'un des noms possibles pour désigner, par métonymie en somme, ce qui arrive ou n'arrive pas à arriver, à savoir une certain dislocation qui en effet se répète régulièrement - et partout où il y a quelque chose plutôt que rien: dans ce qu'on appelle classiquement les textes de philosophie classique, bien sûr et par exemple, mais aussi dans tout 'texte', au sens général que j'essaie de justifier pour ce mot, c'est-à-dire dans l'expérience tout court, dans la 'réalité' sociale, historique, économique, technique, militaire, etc. L'événement de la guerre dite du Golfe, par exemple, est une puissante, spectaculaire et tragique condensation de ces déconstructions." Derrida & Ewald: Une 'folie' doit veiller sur la pensée: interview with Jacques Derrida. Magazine Littéraire p. 26-27.
72. Kant: Perpetual Peace; however, in his Critique of Judgement he is able to appreciate the sublimity of War.
73. Hegel: Philosophy of Right, p. 210.
74. Hegel writes on inertia in Philosophy of Nature; of the physical world and mental habits. Cf. his History of Philosophy where Isaac Newton is subject to a vicious attack for his misunderstanding of the significance of inertia for Reason. This identification of 'habit' and 'inertia' is given through his concept of Duty in both the Phenomenology and Right; i.e. habit has to be subject to a sense of uncomfortable exigency in order to be recognised as Duty. cf. para 278-280 in Phenomenology. Here, inertia is not a law, it always falls outside of a law because it expresses no sense of the difficult or problematic. Which is to say, pain is found to have a significance for Reason and its laws which pleasure casually elides. The conflation of pleasure (or elision of unease) and inertia occurs in Freud: "*Since we have a certain knowledge of a trend in physical life towards avoiding unpleasure, we are tempted to identify that trend with the primary trend towards inertia [i.e. towards avoiding excitation]*" Instincts and their Vicissitudes p. 117, translators note, from the Project. Here, the pleasure principle is closest to being a Nirvana principle, or a death drive; death being either pleasurable, or a mindless avoidance of 'good' pain.
75. "L'événement de la guerre dite du Golfe, par exemple, est une puissante, spectaculaire et tragique condensations de ces déconstructions. Dans la même conflagration, dans le même séisme tremble le généalogie clivée de toutes les structures et de toutes les fondations dont je viens de parler: l'Occident et l'histoire de la philosophie, ce qui la lie à plusieurs grand monothéismes

- irréconciliables (quoi qu'on dise) d'une part, à des langues naturelles et à des affect nationaux à l'idée de la démocratie et au théologico-politique d'autre part, au progrès infini d'une idée du droit international, enfin, dont les limites appaissent mieux que jamais: non seulement parce que ceux qui le représentent ou s'en réclament l'arraisonnent toujours au profit d'h'eg'emonies déterminées et ne peuvent d'ailleurs que s'en approcher inadéquement à l'infini, mais aussi parce que qu'il est fondé (et par là limité) sur des concepts de la modernité philosophique européenne (nation, Etat, démocratie, rapports de démocratie parlementaire entre les Etats, qu'ils soient ou non démocratiques, etc.)" Une 'folie' doit veiller sur la pensée, p. 27.
76. "Ces déconstructions violente sont en cours, ça arrive, cela n'attend pas que soit achevée l'analyse philosophico-théorique de tout ce que je viens d'évoquer d'un mot: celle-ci est nécessaire mais infinie et la lecture que ces lézardes rendent possible ne surplombera jamais l'événement; elle s'y intervient seulement, elle y est inscrite" *ibid.*, p. 76.
77. cf., Derrida Violence of the Law, where he affirms writing as contract writing. The idea of the Rousseau 'social contract' seems, in the end, to be the primary reason for Derrida's highlighting of the written. Tying in with his introduction of the written, in Of Grammatology, with a reading of Rousseau.
78. La différance p. 26.

#### Notes for Conclusion

1. Derrida's recent book, Donner le temps, includes a reading of Baudelaire's Counterfeit Money. This has been translated as: Given Time: The Time of the King. As an essay on ethics, setting out from economics, it covers many of the themes of this concluding section. Here, the significance is that a question of Ethics cannot depend, for Derrida, solely upon the question of the authentic or counterfeit. As has been seen, Derrida himself dissembles other philosophers, whilst 'economics' confounds the difference between the homely and the foreign. In consequence, it is the question of 'suspicion' and the suspicious gift that concerns Derrida in his reading of Baudelaire. Baudelaire's essay concerns the propriety of giving a beggar a counterfeit coin [Given Time 187].
2. "Un ébranlement radical ne peut venir que du dehors." EM p. 162
3. From Restricted to General Economy p. 251
5. Plato: Apology 18a
6. *ibid.*, 27b
7. Thucydides: History 20-23
8. *ibid.*, "We are lovers of wisdom without softness"
9. Plato: Apology 30b
10. *ibid.*, 36b
11. Thucydides: History 38 11-14
12. Plato: Apology cf. 31-33, e.g. idioteyeis 32a
13. Thucydides: History 10-12
14. Plato: Apology 18d-e
15. Aristophanes: The Clouds
16. cf. Xenophon's Oikonomia; a practical guide to house and farm management.
17. Plato: Apology 17d-18a

18. *ibid.*, 35d onwards, here Socrates recognises the populace as his judges.
19. *ibid.*, 19d, reflecting on 'oi polloi' and upon the 'more and less'. This reflects upon discussion of his behaviour under an Oligarchy (32c), and upon his final recognition of another virtue in the 'more' as judges.
20. "C'est trop évident dans ce qu'on appelle la presse 'culturelle' (arts, littérature, philosophie, etc.) et dans ces évaluations 'fines' surdéterminées, surcodées, qui n'induisent pas *immédiatement* l'opinion publique comme jugement politique ou décision électorale. Chaque fois qu'une institution médiatique commande des phénomènes de marché à une échelle massive, elle confisque et censure aussi massivement, elle dogmatise, quels que soient son éclectisme réel ou son libéralisme de façade, ses vertus ou ses vices, qu'elle captive ou ennue, qu'on la trouve distinguées, vulgaire, ou les deux à la fois. Quand un seul juge, quoi qu'on pense de tel ou tel de ses talents, se voit confié ici ou là un monopole d'évaluation, de filtrage, d'exposition au grand jour, il détermine les ventes dans les supermarchés de la culture." DA 117
21. "Une oeuvre alors est reléguée loin de la cour, vers la nuit d'un enclos *quasiment privé*, si elle ne remplit pas les conditions de visibilité dans ce grand petit miroir qui fascine en déformant, filtre et détourne vers lui tant d'énergie, interrompt la conversation, plie le corps et le regard social à une nouvelle physiologie, projette enfin à l'étranger les dernières icônes de la culture nationale. Aujourd'hui, à cette échelle, un livre doit se vendre et, distinguons, se lire à plus de dix mille exemplaires pour être autre chose qu'une correspondance confidentielle et *quasiment* privée. Résultat: les recherches dites 'difficile', rebelles à la stéréotypie de l'image ou de la narration, peu soumises aux normes de la culture ainsi représentée dans sa 'moyenne' (au singulier, l' 'opinion' signifie toujours la 'moyenne') sont exclues de la scène: occultées, privées du *jour*. *Par suite, on les juge* de plus en plus 'obscur' 'difficile', voire 'illisible' et elles *deviennent* ainsi ce qu'on dit qu'elles sont et veut qu'elles soient: inaccessible. Le cycle s'accélère." DA 118
22. "Elle se trouve aussi évaluée de jour en jour par un public qui n'est pas toujours silencieux. Hétérogène, elle peut parfois parfois se critiquer elle-même, d'un lieu à l'autre de son grand corps. N'est-elle pas finalement jugée sur un temps plus long et selon des critères qui lui restent nécessairement indéchiffrables? Si elle contribue à des succès de masse qu'on oublie le mois suivant, ne court-elle pas aussi à l'oubli? Les avancées intempestives qui échappent à sa grille de lisibilité peuvent un jour s'imposer sans contestation possible. Pour le cheminement à venir d'une oeuvre, on le sait, la qualité de dix lectures joue parfois un rôle plus déterminant que l'actualité de dix mille acheteurs. Nos grandes machines médiatiques, que feraient-elles de Rimbaud ou de Lautréamont, de Nietzsche ou de Proust, d'un Kafka ou d'un Joyce de 1989? Ils furent d'abord sauvés par une poignée de lecteurs (taux d'écoute minimal), mais lesquels! Peut-être cette analogie souffre-t-elle déjà d'anachronisme, hélas, car l'histoire *intrinsèque* de ces aventures fut sans doute liée à son *dehors* et, qu'on le dénie ou non, à une structure désormais périmée de l' 'espace public'." DA 119-120
23. The Pit and the Pyramid p.78,79.
24. *ibid.*, 107

25. Hegel: Right, Hegel's theory of zero-sum equilibrium begins his discussion of the first section of Right; i.e. the basis of Ethical life.
26. Keynes: General Theory, Book IV, Chapter II.
27. As has been noted - Chapter Two, note 61 - post-Keynesian's do not speak of a country as a delimited region, but as an aggregate of industries. 6.
28. Keynes: General Theory, p. 343, Here, in a footnote, Keynes expresses his fears, and his reservations about the ubiquitous idea of equilibrium.
29. Derrida, most recently in L'autre cap, lingers over the idea of regions long past their height. That work considers 'Europe'. Works like Glas discuss society through the motif of the funeral bell.
30. "ainsi défini, l'humanisme ou l'anthropologisme était à cette époque une sorte de sol commun des existentialisme, chrétiens ou athées, de la philosophie, spiritualiste ou non, des valeurs, des personnalismes de droit ou de gauche, du marxisme de style classique."
31. "Son rire alors éclatera vers un retour qui n'aura plus la forme de répétition métaphysique de l'humanisme ni sans doute davantage, 'au-delà' de la métaphysique, celle du mémorial ou de la garde du sens de l'être, celle de la maison et de la vérité de l'être." [EM 163]
32. The term '*circular reappropriation of the truth*' describes the work of metaphor in White Mythology. A work Heidegger regards with suspicion.
33. The admonition to dwell on the 'poverty of language' ends Heidegger's Letter on Humanism
34. "die frühe Spur" The Anaximander Fragment
35. La différence p. 25
36. Address of November 11, 1933 104-105.
37. Bakunin, the original appeared in the Jahrbuche of 1842, cf. Chapter One.
40. Hunter S. Thompson; Generation of Swine, Gonzo Papers Volume II. This phrase is the blurb on the book's cover.

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