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The Emergence and Consolidation of the AKP and Its Impact on Turkish Politics and Society

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Table of Contents

Prologue .................................................................................................................. 7
Abstract .................................................................................................................... 9
Declaration ............................................................................................................... 11
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. 12
Introduction ............................................................................................................ 16
  BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 16
  RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY .............................................................................. 19
  AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY ............................................................ 21
  RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................................... 22
  TERMINOLOGY ......................................................................................................... 24
  THESIS STRUCTURE: CHAPTER SUMMARIES ...................................................... 25
Acronyms .................................................................................................................. 29
Glossary ..................................................................................................................... 33

Chapter 1 Historical and Political Background in Turkey .................................... 37
  1.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 37
  1.2 THE SINGLE-PARTY REGIME: 1923 - 1946 ................................................. 38
  1.3 THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM: 1950 - 1960 ...................................................... 43
  1.4 FRAGMENTATION OF THE MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM BETWEEN THE MILITARY INTERVENTION OF 1960 AND MEMORANDUM OF 1971 .................................................. 46
  1.5 CONTINUED FRAGMENTATION AND THE BEGINNING OF COALITION GOVERNMENTS BETWEEN 1973 AND 1980 ................................................................. 52
  1.6 THE THREE-YEAR MILITARY REGIME: 1980 - 1983 ............................ 58
  1.8 COALITION GOVERNMENT AND EMERGENCE OF THE AKP: 1992 - 2002 .... 65
  1.9 THE AKP AND THE DOMINANT-PARTY SYSTEM: 2002 - 2011 .............. 75
  1.10 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 80

Chapter 2 Literature Review ...................................................................................... 83
  2.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 83
  2.2 TRADITIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE THEORIES AND POLITICAL PARTIES .... 84
  2.2.1 SPATIAL COMPETITION AND PARTY IDEOLOGY ........................................... 84
  2.3 TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEMS ................. 87
    2.3.2 Party Systems: Institutional Factors .............................................................. 93
    2.3.3 Party Systems: Competition Factors ............................................................ 95
  2.4 APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF VOTING BEHAVIOUR .................... 97
    2.4.2 Voting: Retrospective Factors ................................................................. 98
Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework, Methodology and Methods .......... 140

3.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 140
3.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, RESEARCH STRATEGY AND RESEARCH ORIENTATIONS ................................................................. 140
   3.2.1 Theoretical Framework and Research Strategy ...................... 140
3.2.1.1 Lipset and Rokkan’s Cleavage Structure and the Development of the Turkish Party System ................................................. 142
3.2.1.2 The Centre-Periphery Relations Model, Evolution of Turkey’s Social Structure and Development of the AKP................................. 152
3.2.2 Methodology and Research Orientations ................................ 155
3.3 METHODS ....................................................................................... 159
   3.3.1 Semi-structured In-depth Interviews ..................................... 159
   3.3.2 Archival Research Method ..................................................... 165
   3.3.3 Analysis of Quantitative Data and Reliability of Data ............. 167
3.4 ETHICAL ISSUES ............................................................................ 168
3.5 CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 171

2.4.3 Voting: Socio-Psychological Factors ........................................ 99
2.4.4 Voting: Sociological Factors .................................................... 101
2.4.5 Voting: Geographical Characteristics ...................................... 104
2.5 STUDIES ON VOTING PATTERNS, VOTING BEHAVIOUR, TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM AND TURKISH PARTIES ........................................ 105
   2.5.1 Empirical Work on Voting Patterns and Behaviour ............... 105
      2.5.1.1 Empirical Work on Economic Voting Behaviour ............ 105
   2.5.1.2 Empirical Work on Retrospective Voting Behaviour .......... 109
   2.5.1.3 Empirical Work on Voting Behaviour according to Attitudinal Characteristics ......................................................... 110
   2.5.1.5 Empirical Work on Voting along Lines of Social Cleavages ... 114
   2.5.2 Work on Elections and Party Organizations .......................... 119
      2.5.2.1 Work on Electoral Systems: Historical Approaches ........ 117
      2.5.2.2 Work on Elections and Party Organizations ................. 119
   2.6 COUNTRY STUDIES ON TURKEY AND TURKISH POLITICS ........ 120
      2.6.1 Country Studies on Turkey .................................................. 120
      2.6.2 Studies on Turkish Politics ................................................. 126
   2.7 TURKISH LITERATURE ON THE STRUCTURE OF TURKISH SOCIETY AND POLITICAL ISLAM ....................................................... 127
      2.7.1 Analysis of Turkish Society: Application of Western Theories and Models to Analysis of the Turkish-Ottoman Society up to 1980s .... 128
      2.7.2 Recent Turkish Literature on the Analysis of Turkish Society: 1980 to the present ................................................................. 131
   2.8 NON-SCHOLARLY LITERATURE ON TURKISH SOCIETY, ECONOMY, AND POLITICS ........................................................................ 136
   2.9 CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 138
Chapter 4 Social Bases of the AKP ................................................................. 172

4.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 172

4.2 THE PLANNED ECONOMY, AGRARIAN VOTERS AND THE SINGLE-PARTY
REGIME: 1923-1950 ......................................................................................... 173
  4.2.1 Planned Economy and Agrarian Society ................................................. 173
  4.2.2 Agrarian Voters and Single-Party Regime ............................................. 179

4.3 AGRICULTURAL MECHANISATION, PEASANTS’ DISSATISFACTION AND THE
EMERGENCE OF A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM: 1950-1960 ................................. 183
  4.3.1 Economic Developments ...................................................................... 183
  4.3.2 Changes in the Socio-economic Structures ............................................ 185
  4.3.3 Socio-Economic Changes as Reflected in Politics and in Voting
      Behaviour ............................................................................................... 190

4.4 EARLY INDUSTRIALISATION (IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALISATION),
  4.4.1 Economic Developments ...................................................................... 193
  4.4.2 Changes in the Socio-economic Structures ............................................ 194
  4.4.3 Socio-economic Changes as Reflected in Politics and in Voting
      Behaviour ............................................................................................... 197

4.5 EXPORT-LED GROWTH ECONOMIC MODEL, EMERGENCE OF NEW
INTERMEDIARY STRATA AND RISE OF THE AKP IN 2002 .......................... 203
  4.5.1 The Economic Policies and their Impact on the Periphery, Changes in
      Socio-economic Structures and their Reflection on Voting Behaviour during
      the Period 1980-1991 ............................................................................. 203
  4.5.1.1 Economic Policies and their Impact on the Periphery ....................... 204
  4.5.1.2 Socio-economic Changes during the Period 1980-1990 .................... 209
  4.5.1.3 The Impact of the Socio-Economic Changes on the Voting Patterns
      during the Period 1980-1992 ................................................................ 215
  4.5.2 Economic Developments in the 1990s, Emergence of New
      Intermediary Strata and Rising Trend of the RP ..................................... 220
  4.5.2.1 Economic Developments in the 1990s .............................................. 220
  4.5.2.2 Emergence of New Intermediary Strata ............................................ 220
  4.5.2.3 The Impact of the Socio-Economic Changes and the Rising Trend of the
      RP ........................................................................................................ 221

  4.5.3 The AKP Period from 2002 to the present: Social Bases of the AKP
      ............................................................................................................ 226
  4.5.3.1 The Changes in Socio-economic Structures since 1980s and their Impact
      on the Emergence of the AKP in 2002 ..................................................... 227
  4.5.3.2 The AKP’s Feed-back into its Social Bases and the AKP’s Consolidation
      in 2007 .................................................................................................. 234

4.6 CONCLUSION OF THE CHAPTER ............................................................. 242
Chapter 5 Consolidation of the AKP And Significance of Its Electoral Success within Turkish Society and Political Party System

5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 245

5.2 THE AKP’S SOCIAL POLICIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON ITS CONSOLIDATION
.................................................................................................................................................. 246
  5.2.1 The AKP’s Women and Gender Equality Policies: Female Employment on the Axis of Neo-liberalism and Social Conservatism...... 246
  5.2.2 The Social Assistance Policies of the AKP and their Impact on its Electoral Consolidation............................................................... 262
  5.2.3 Policies of Health Care of the AKP and their Impact on the AKP ... 280

5.3 IMPACT OF THE AKP’S RIGHTS-DISCOURSE ON ITS CONSOLIDATION ...... 294
  5.3.1 Changes in Legislations, Reform Packages and Constitutional Amendments 2002-2010................................................................. 295
    5.3.1.1 Impact of AKP’s Rights-Discourse during its First Tenure on its Consolidation in the Legislative Elections of 2007 ............................. 304
    5.3.1.2 The Impact of Democratic Initiatives (for minorities) and Constitutional Amendment on the AKP’s Consolidation in Legislative Elections of 2011.... 315

5.4 THE ROLE OF THE GLOBAL MUSLIM NETWORK (GÜLEN MOVEMENT) ON THE AKP’S POLITICAL SUCCESS ................................................................. 324
  5.4.1 The Gülen Movement: Moderate Islamism................................................................. 325
  5.4.2 The Relationship between the AKP and the Gülen Movement ...... 326

5.5 FEEDBACK EFFECT OF THE AKP’S TEN-YEAR TENURE INTO TURKISH SOCIETY AND THE AKP’S IMPACT ON THE LONG-TERM RESTRUCTURING OF TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM .............................................................. 333
  5.5.1 The AKP’s Entrenchment into the Society and its Influence on the Existing Societal Cleavage Structures........................................ 334
    5.5.1.1 State-Church........................................................................................................ 334
    5.5.1.2 Centre-Periphery ................................................................................................ 339
    5.5.1.3 Land-Industry .................................................................................................... 340
    5.5.1.4 Employer-Worker ............................................................................................... 340
      5.5.2 AKP’s Impact on the Long-term Restructuring of Turkish Party System ...................................................................................... 342

5.6 CONCLUSION OF THE CHAPTER ................................................................................. 348

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 354

WHAT CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURES OF TURKISH SOCIETY EXPLAIN THE EMERGENCE AND ELECTORAL SUCCESS OF THE AKP? ........................................ 355
TO WHAT EXTENT DID LONG, MEDIUM AND SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO THE RISE OF THE AKP? ............................................................. 356
TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE POLITICAL CONJUNCTURE OF THE EARLY 2000s HELP THE AKP TO SUCCED ELECTORALLY IN 2002? .................................................. 357

DOES THE ENTRENCHMENT OF THE AKP IN TURKISH POLITICS SINCE 2002 REPRESENT A SHIFT FROM SECULARISM TOWARDS CONSERVATISM AND RELIGION IN TURKEY? ........................................................................... 365

METHODOLOGICAL AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES ..................................... 367

FINAL REMARKS .......................................................................................... 367

Appendices .................................................................................................... 378

APPENDIX PART A - TABLES FOR LITERATURE REVIEW ......................... 378
APPENDIX PART B - TABLE REGARDING KEY INFORMANTS INTERVIEWED ... 380
APPENDIX PART C - CONSENT FORM ............................................................. 383
APPENDIX PART D - AVAILABLE DATA ON ELECTIONS, SURVEYS, ARCHIVAL SOURCES .................................................................................. 384
APPENDIX PART E - FIGURE REGARDING TURKISH SOCIAL STRUCTURE ...... 389
APPENDIX PART F - FIGURES, MAPS AND PICTURES ................................... 390

Bibliography .................................................................................................... 394
Prologue

While research and writing-up of this thesis was completed months before the recent events in İstanbul and other major cities in Turkey broke out, the reader of this manuscript will realise that, if anything we were not caught by surprise, albeit the extent, the intensity and speed of the events were somewhat unexpected. As I document in this thesis, the AKP has successfully utilised a pro-rights and pro-EU discourse in order to ascend into power in 2002. This discourse coupled with its highly successful economic agenda (a continuation of the IMF programme and an economic mentality that dates back to the early 1980s) allowed the party to associate itself with a highly extrovert, business-minded and export-oriented lower-middle class of inner Anatolia, socially conservative and economically liberal who saw in the AKP's pro-EU policies the prospect for greater economic profit and a replacement of the old elites. Hence, as it is documented in this thesis, the AKP was able to forge a broad alliance of supporters (from liberal-minded pro-EU segments of the society that wanted to limit the military's intervention in public life to more socially conservative lower-middle class entrepreneurs of inner Anatolia) that helped the party to consolidate its power by winning the 2007 elections. Yet, as the research uncovers, AKP's pro-rights discourse has gradually faded and a more authoritarian image has started to appear. As it is demonstrated, this gradual shift towards more authoritarian policies was accelerated after the 2010 referendum when the AKP managed to extend its grasp not only over the presidency but also over the military, the judiciary and the press (the pillars of the old guard, the Kemalist, secular elites that formed the core of the old regime). In fact, this thesis documents a sharp break from AKP's pro-EU and pro-rights agenda which
has now been removed from the party's top priorities. In light of these changes, it is not a coincidence nor a surprise that the AKP's social engineering policies that aspired to impose its conservative worldview on Turkish society (what we call the feedback effect of AKP's consolidation process) were met with increasing resentment and discontent by the segments of the society that felt excluded by AKP's rhetoric. It is exactly this diverse group of people and civil society, that cuts across the traditional cleavages of Turkish politics and includes a wide range of very different segments of civil society (from ethnic and religious minorities to secularists and liberals) that has taken to the street to protest against the AKP's growing intervention in their lifestyles as a part of AKP's vision for society. And while things are still pretty uncertain, it is quite premature for someone to make a sensible prediction about whether those events will signal the beginning of the end for AKP's dominance in Turkish political life, this thesis can certainly offer a systematic and analytical framework that will aid the reader to understand and analyse the evolution of the party-system and of political competition in Turkey in the near future.

4th June, 2013.
Abstract
This thesis concerns the current ruling party, the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party) in Turkey. Its aim is to examine the emergence and consolidation of the AKP, as well as to determine whether or not this has shaped the evolution of the party system in Turkey. This research draws on a qualitative research approach, through interviews with 36 key informants from political parties, NGOs, grassroots organizations and through gathering data in the literature produced by parties and other statutory and voluntary agencies, as well as through the collection of descriptive statistics related to socio-economic structures, migration, occupational categories, macroeconomic indicators and collections of election surveys.

The finding reveal that the AKP did not emerge as an Islamist party, but because of its promises of economic stability and growth, and of further integration into the EU and USA-led global order. The thesis shows that more so than its religious discourse, the AKP’s electoral success was based on the party’s adapting a hybrid, progressive and pro-EU position during its first tenure in government. Second, this research demonstrates how the political conjuncture up to 2002 and long-term economic factors provided favourable circumstances for the AKP’s emergence.

The study’s findings also reveal that the consolidation of the AKP is mainly attributable to its economic and social agenda, and the utilization of the public purse and other state resources (e.g. social and health care benefits) as a means of catering for its target constituencies. In addition, they demonstrate that once AKP’s consolidation was completed (2010) the party’s discourse gradually became more conservative and nationalist, giving way to more authoritarian policies. Nonetheless, as long as economic performance and conditions remain unchanged, the AKP continues to appeal to its social base. Consequently, this thesis demonstrates that the gradual drift in Turkish society towards moderate Islamic and traditional values was not the main factor in the AKP’s rise to power. Rather, this shift can be viewed as the feedback effect of the consolidation of the AKP process into societal structures and norms. Hence, this work highlights the AKP’s impact on the structure of the party-system and the
role of its policies in transforming Turkish society. Lastly, this study contributes to the foundation upon which further research on Turkish politics and the party system can continue, by exploring the dual effect of the AKP’s ruling tenure: factors leading to the AKP’s emergence and its feedback into Turkish society and politics.
Declaration
I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and that it has not been submitted anywhere for any award. In the 3rd Contemporary Turkish Studies Annual Doctoral Dissertation (in London School of Economics), I presented a paper arising out of the preliminary theoretical and methodological sections of this thesis entitled “The Emergence, Consolidation and Significance of the AK Party in Turkey: Theoretical Framework and Methodological Approach”.

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Introduction

Background
In 2008, I obtained my MA in International Political Economy with a thesis on “Islamic Revivalism in Turkey and its Challenge to Secularity: 1950 to Present”. This research afforded a number of insights into the causes of the contemporary phenomenon of Islamic revival in Turkey – one of the most secular countries in terms of the legal and constitutional basis of its political institutions. It also prompted me to further this research in the framework of a Ph.D thesis, entitled “The Emergence and Consolidation of the AKP and its Impact on Turkish Society and Politics”.

The rise of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party), in Turkey through channels of democracy, as a political party with Islamic roots, was an event without precedence in the Islamic world. However, the AKP did not emerge out of blue. Rather, its emergence was the outcome of a long process of socio-economic transformation in Turkish society, especially since the 1980s, through population movements from rural peripheral areas to urban centres. Together with socio-economic transformation, it was also a result of a long political rupture between the secularist state and religious groups.

This process began in 1923 with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey upon the foundation of the collapsed Ottoman Empire. It attained intensity in the second half of the 20th century with the adoption of multi-party system.
Throughout the multi-party system era (i.e. from 1950 to the present) in Turkey, Islamist parties\(^1\) began to be established in the late 1960s, and for the first time, an Islamist party, the MSP, was represented in parliament as a result of the legislative elections of 1973. After a decade without political representation, the Islamist party RP (Refah Partisi - Welfare Party) obtained unexpected success at the local and legislative elections of 1994 and 1995 respectively. Nonetheless, given the strong praxis of secularism in Turkey, the RP was closed in 1998, as it did not meet the requirements of the secular state. The closure of the RP and subsequently of its successor party, the FP (Fazilet Partisi - Virtue Party), gave rise to a reformist movement led by some members of these parties who established a new party, the AKP in 2001. The AKP emerged as the victor, with a moderate and democratic discourse and pro-EU stance, following the legislative elections of 2002. It then went on to reproduce this victory nearly ten years later, in 2011, to form a majority government. Indeed, a series of circumstances such as a shaky period of coalition governments and economic crises made people look for a new start (Çavdar 2008b, p.346-347). The decision of a rather broad segment of the voting population to elect a party with Islamic roots appeared as a case worthy of closer consideration.

In addition to analysing the AKP’s emergence, the nature of its consolidation over the course of its three successive government tenures (2002-2007; 2007-2011; 2011-to present) is another issue of importance for my research. The AKP government achieved a particularly successful economic

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\(^1\) e.g. MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi - National Order Party); the MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi - National Salvation Party)
performance, and also implemented a series of socio-economic policies in areas such as social assistance and health care that directly addressed the needs and aspirations of the electorate. These achievements also ensured the success of the AKP in all municipal and legislative elections during the period 2002 to present. The party also succeeded in placing the military under control and demilitarizing the political structures. On the other hand, some policies that the AKP initiated during its second and particularly third tenure appear to disclose a thus far concealed Islamic agenda. This has led to a deep polarization between the AKP government and its supporters on the one hand, and secular and Alevi segments of the society on the other, and has strengthened the conviction of the latter that the AKP plans to shape Turkish society in line with its Islamic worldview. The AKP government’s recent policies on issues such as freedom of expression, freedom of media, human rights, ethnicity, law and order, foreign policy and education are also attracting increasing criticism. Thus, the possible long-term effects of the AKP’s ruling period on the Turkish society and political party system have been another topic of priority for me. In this regard, I have focused on issues of secularism, religion and the conservative worldview of the AKP in order to demonstrate the deepening cleavages in society which run along the secularism-Islam (anti-secular) and Alevi minority-Sunni majority axis (Toprak et al, 2009, p. 23). These tensions in Turkish society that have sharpened with the emergence of the AKP (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009) illustrate the importance of analyzing this party and its tenure in office in the context of its future impact on Turkish society and politics.
Given its achievements, the AKP has already become a source of inspiration in the Islamic world and a focus of interest for Islamic, western and Turkish scholars, media and political observers. Moreover, the AKP’s tenure continues presently, and is thus a kind of an ongoing political experiment, the outcome of which is not yet known. As is generally the case in politics, nobody can predict whether such a phenomenon ends up in disappointment or takes place as a success story in history. Recent changes in the discourse and policies of the AKP make its future course unpredictable, and all the more worthwhile to follow.

Rationale for the Study

My rationale for the study and analysis of the AKP’s emergence, consolidation and significance in Turkish society and politics is based on the uniqueness of the subject matter. The AKP can be said to be unique since it acceded to power as a political party with Islamic roots via the channels of democracy in a secular state. Besides, its transformation from an Islamic party into a party with a moderate, democratic and pro-West discourse and its acceptance within secular circles and the state (albeit with reservation, if not suspicion) made the AKP unique within Turkish as well Middle East politics. Furthermore, the AKP’s performance in liberating Turkey from military tutelage, through progressive constitutional amendments, attracted the attention of both national and international scholars and observers.

Through this doctoral research, I intend to contribute to the literature by investigating as a case study the impact of political developments and socio-economic factors on the emergence of the AKP and the counter-impact of its
emergence on Turkish society and political development. There are a number of existing works related to the AKP, Turkish politics and the party system in Turkey.

Recently, Turkish politics, society and the AKP have been analyzed rigorously. Yavuz (2003; 2006; 2009) explores the evolution of Islamist parties in Turkey and the AKP’s first tenure in power. Similarly, Hale and Özbudun (2011) make a more updated analysis of the AKP’s tenure and examine the AKP from both political and sociological angles. Furthermore, Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009) look in detail at how society has rushed towards “conservatism, traditionalism and parochialism” over the last two decades. By making an empirical analysis, based on a 2006 survey, they decode the guiding forces of current Turkish society.

My main hypothesis on the AKP’s emergence is that the AKP did not come to power as an Islamist political party; indeed it attracted a majority of voters from various strata due to its promises of economic stability and growth as well integration into the global economic order as favoured by the USA and its allies. I will prove this by analyzing various factors which underpinned the emergence of the AKP in 2002.

Moreover, my second hypothesis is that the AKP did not consolidate its ruling power because of its religious discourse rather because or because of its strong social policies during its ruling tenure. To prove this hypothesis, I analysed different social policy areas and their impact on the consolidation of the AKP’s tenure.
Lastly, my third hypothesis is that the consolidated AKP’s response into Turkish society was based on its spreading of its conservative agenda on various areas. In order to confirm my hypothesis, I examined the feedback of the AKP into Turkish society by investigating tensions AKP’s conservative worldview had caused in society.

**Aims and Objectives of the Study**

The main aim of this study was to investigate the emergence and consolidation of the AKP within Turkish politics, to analyze the reasons behind these developments and explain their significance for Turkish politics and society.

Therefore, I intended to:

i. examine the emergence and consolidation of the AKP and determine whether or not this has shaped the party system in Turkey;

ii. assess whether the emergence of the AKP reflects changes which have taken place in Turkey’s social structure;

iii. Consider whether the AKP’s entrenchment in the Turkish party system has, in turn, impacted on the on-going socio-economic changes which are taking place in the country.

In addition, by the end of this investigation, the following objectives will have been attained:

i. The construction of a socio-demographic profile (disaggregation of electorate according to gender, age, occupational category and geographical distribution) of the AKP’s electoral base;
ii. an analysis of the evolution of Turkey’s economic base and the effects of this evolution on Turkey’s social structure, and how the structural social changes have translated into support for the AKP;

iii. An assessment of the influence of different pressure and interest groups (NGOs, trade unions, employers’ organizations etc.) on the rise and success of the AKP;

iv. An evaluation of the impact of specific economic and political conjunctural developments (e.g. economic crises) at the turn of the millennium which led to the success of the AKP in the 2002 and 2007 legislative elections;

v. An analysis of the impact and significance of the AKP in Turkish society and Turkish party system between 2002 and present.

Research Questions

My thesis aims to answer the following key questions:

i. What changes in the structures of Turkish society explain the emergence and electoral success of the AKP?

ii. To what extent did long, medium and short-term economic factors contribute to the rise of the AKP?

iii. To what extent did the political conjuncture of the early 2000s help the AKP to succeed electorally in 2002?

iv. Is the establishment of the AKP in Turkish politics an indicator of the long-term restructuring of the Turkish party system?
v. Does the entrenchment of the AKP in Turkish politics since 2002 represent a shift from secularism towards conservatism and religion in Turkey?

These questions were answered through an analysis of research data and through the review of the literature on key theories of political parties and party systems, voting behavior theories and Turkish society. After this rigorous literature review on these keys approaches used to analyse Turkish society and politics, I deduced a general theoretical framework in order to guide my research. As seen above in research objectives, my research has a dual side, which tackles both dynamics of Turkish society and politics, party system in Turkey. As a consequence, I opted for two main theoretical models to guide my research and influence my choice of method. Thus, the general theoretical framework being based on Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage structure and centre-periphery approach (Shils, 1961; Mardin, 1973; Kahraman, 2008). I deduced the former by investigating key theories on party systems and parties; I considered the Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage structure as a suitable for analyzing Turkish party system, since Lipset and Rokkan emphasize on the importance of social divisions and their reflection into the party system. Therefore, I opted for Lipset-Rokkan’s structure, rather than other scholars such as Duverger (1964); Sartori (1976) who emphasize institutional and competition factors. Furthermore, I have also considered a more update version of Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage structure (Gallagher et al., 2005), in order to reinforce the theoretical framework when Lipset-Rokkan’s structure becomes insufficient for explaining Turkish dynamics and their translations into the party system.
The latter is deduced from reviewing main analytical frameworks which have been used for the analysis of Turkish society. As a result of this literature review, I deduced the centre-periphery relations model which was initially developed by Shils (Shils, 1961, p.117; Shils, 1975, p.3). The scholar who incorporated Shils’s work on centre-periphery model into Turkish politics was Mardin (1973, pp.183-184). I adopted Mardin’s model on centre-periphery model but with the recent adoption by Kahraman (2008) who took further Mardin’s model by referring to both Gramsci and Gramsci’s class analysis (Gramsci, 1971, pp.202-205, p.366). Kahraman’s (2008) recent adoption was suitable to the analysis of Turkish society since he took into the recent dynamics in Turkish society since 1980s by developing further Mardin’s centre-periphery relations.

**Terminology**

Before moving on to the chapter summaries, the following terms and their definitions need to be taken into account, in order to understand the context in which I use them.

**Social stratum/strata** denote different social layers existing within a society. Within my research, I use this term in order to name different social groups (depending on their occupational categories). Therefore, I have used this term from the perspective of Max Weber, who denotes that social stratifications are not a matter of class or political position but they are based on status. Within this thesis, I define the different types of strata which include upper strata, intermediary strata, and lower strata.
**Anatolia** is a geographical term which comprises the mainland of Turkey. In geographical terms, except for İstanbul and three other provinces (namely Edirne, Kirklareli, Tekirdag), Turkey is situated in Anatolia. Within the thesis, I use this term in order to highlight the Anatolian cities which obtained high growth rates after economic developments of 1980s.

**Anatolian Capitalists (Anatolian Tigers/Devout Bourgeoisie/Islamist bourgeoisie/Islamic Calvinists)** are terms which are used in order to refer to the remarkable growth rates obtained by small and medium enterprises, situated in some specific Anatolian cities after the economic liberalization of 1980s (Demir, Toprak and Acar, 2007). Within this thesis, I use the terms Anatolian capitalists and Anatolian capital, since there is a great deal of controversy in other terms e.g. bourgeoisie and also some of them are used by some media commentators e.g. Islamic Calvinists.

**Thesis Structure: Chapter Summaries**

This thesis comprises five chapters, in addition to the introductory and concluding chapters. **Chapter 1** seeks to answer my first research question on how the political conjuncture, up to 2002, influenced the emergence of the AKP in 2002. It commences with an exploration of Turkey’s historical and political background from 1923 onwards. In addition, through this exploration, it identifies the expression of key cleavages found within Turkish society (i.e. centre-periphery, state-religion, left-right, Kurdish-Turkish) through the different political parties which make up the Turkish party system.

**Chapter 2** comprises a review of the literature, outlining the theories related to parties, party systems and approaches to voting behaviour, as well as
the incorporation of such theories by scholars into Turkish political scientific enquiry. In addition, it reviews the theories and approaches used to analyse Turkish Society, in order to highlight how the particular dynamics of Turkish society prevent a straightforward application of western theories to the Turkish context. Moreover, this chapter reviews recent country studies on Turkey and Turkish politics and specifically the AKP.

**Chapter 3** explains my chosen methodology. I present my reasons for adopting a qualitative approach, and outline my epistemological position in relation to my research. This is followed by a presentation of my methods of data collection, which include in-depth, semi-structured interviews, archival research and the gathering of quantitative data produced by private polling agencies and state institute of statistics. I also discuss some of the problems of data collection encountered during the fieldwork, as well as the strategies I adopted to overcome the barriers.

**Chapter 4** answers the research questions, which ask how changes in the structures of Turkish society explain the emergence and electoral success of the AKP. Chapter 4 is organized according to four main chronological periods (1923-1950; 1950-1960; 1961-1980 and 1980 to the present). Each period is characterized by the main economic programmes in place, societal changes and developments in the party system. In addition, I demonstrate how the emergence of intermediary strata since the 1980s, in Turkish society, contributed to the emergence of the AKP as an electoral force in 2002. I provide a detailed account of how different strata of Turkish society strengthen the social bases of the AKP. Moreover, I discuss how conjunctural events in the economy impacted the
AKP’s emergence in 2002. In so doing, I emphasize that the AKP did not come to power as a result of its Islamic discourse and/or Islamic roots, but because a newly formed audience was attracted to its pro-west agenda which appeared to sit comfortably with its moral framework inspired by Islam.

Besides, Chapter 5 focuses on the response of the AKP to its social base through its social policies and its rights-based political discourse. The AKP used social policies to address the needs of its social base when the economic developments failed to prove sufficient in covering their needs. This chapter therefore investigates the AKP’s policies relating to women and gender (e.g. equality policies in employment) and to health and welfare (e.g. increases in social benefits for disadvantaged groups; marketisation of the health system) in order to demonstrate how they contributed to the party’s political consolidation and entrenchment in Turkish society.

This chapter also examines the rights-based discourse of the AKP and how the AKP appealed to a broad range of ideological groups in society which in turn contributed to its electoral victory in the second legislative elections of 2007. Following an analysis of the AKP’s political discourse, Chapter 5 demonstrates how the Gülen Movement in particular has contributed to the AKP’s success and at the same time infiltrated the state bureaucracy.

Finally, this chapter answers one of the key research questions of this thesis relating to the consolidated AKP’s counter-impact on Turkish society and the Turkish party system in the long-term.

To conclude, my analysis of the AKP may be seen as original, since I did not consider the AKP from one single perspective; rather, I looked at its
emergence and consolidation, as well as its counter-impact on society. Thus, the usage of multiple angles for analysis of the AKP lends originality to the thesis. Moreover, this thesis contributes to knowledge of Turkish politics, the party system and the AKP by demonstrating that the AKP emerged due to its promise for economic stability, rather than as an Islamist or religious discourse. I also contributed to existing knowledge by demonstrating that AKP’s consolidation occurred as a consequence of its social policies (e.g. health care; social assistance) targeting the lowest strata of society.

As a consequence, the originality of my thesis lies in its comprehensive treatment of the AKP by looking at factors which underpinned its emergence and its consolidation. The analysis of AKP’s responses to Turkish society and the party system is a further original element. Such a dual analysis (emergence and feedback effect) is strengthened by the insights gained from the literature on Turkish politics and Turkish society.
Acronyms

AGİAD Anadolu Genç İş Adamları Derneği - Anatolian Young Businessmen Association
AIHM Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi - European Court of Human Rights
AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party
AM Anayasa Mahkemesi - Constitutional Court
ANAP Anavatan Partisi - Motherland Party

Bağ-Kur Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar ile Diğer Bağımsız Çalışanlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu - Social Security Organization of Craftsmen, Tradesmen and Self-Employed
BDP Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi - Peace and Democracy Party
BQ Bloc Québécois - Quebec Bloc
BTP Büyük Türkiye Partisi - Great Turkey Party (Est.20.05.1983 - Closure.30.05.1983)

CDA Christen Democratisch Appèl - Christian Democratic Appeal
CDU Christlich Demokratisch Union Deutschlands - Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
CGP Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi - Republican Reliance Party (Est.29.01.1971 - Closure. 16.10.1981)
CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - Republican People’s Party (Est.09.09.1923 - Closure.16.10.1981; Est. 09.09.1992 - to the present)
CKMP Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi - Republican Peasants’ Nation Party (Est.16.10.1958 - Closure 09.02.1969)
CMP Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi - Republican Nationalist Party (Est.10.02.1954 - Closure.16.10.1958)
CU Christen Unie - Christian Union

DC Democrazia Cristiana - Christian Democracy
Demokratik Parti Democratic Party (Est.18.12.1970 - Closure.04.05.1980)
DİB Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı - Presidency of Religious Affairs
DİSK Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey
DP Democrat Parti - Democrat Party (Est.07.01.1946 - Closure.29.09.1960)
DPT Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı - State Planning Organization
DSP Demokratik Sol Parti - Democratic Left Party
**DYP**  Doğruyol Partisi - True Path Party (Est.23.06.1983 - Closure.28.05.2007)

**EC**  European Community  
**ECHR**  European Court of Human Rights  
**EDP**  Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi - Equality and Democracy Party  
**ES**  Emekli Sandığı - Government Employees Retirement Fund  
**EU**  European Union

**FP**  Fazilet Partisi - Virtue Party (Est.07.12.1997 - Closure.22.06.2001)  
**FGM**  Fethullah Gülen Movement

**GP/CGP**  Güven Partisi - Reliance Party (Est.12.05.1967 - Closure.29.01.1971)  
**GATT**  General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade  
**GP**  Genç Parti - Young Party

**GYV**  Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Derneği - Journalists and Writers’s Foundation

**HADEP**  Halkın Demokrasi Partisi - People’s Democratic Party (Est.11.05.1994-Closure.13.03.2003)  
**HAK-İŞ**  Hak İşçii Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions  
**HP**  Halkçı Parti - Populist Party (Est.20.05.1983 - Closure.17.08.1985)  
**HSYK**  Hakim ve Savcılar Yüksel Kurulu - High Council of Judges and Prosecutors

**ILO**  International Labour Organization  
**IMF**  International Money Fund  
**ISI**  Import-Substitution Industrialization

**İSMEK**  İstanbul Büyükşehir Meslek ve Eğitim Kursları - İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality Vocational Training Courses  
**İŞHAD**  İş Hayatı ve Dayanışma Derneği - Association for Solidarity in Business Life  
**İTO**  İstanbul Ticaret Odası - İstanbul Chamber of Commerce

**KCK**  Kürdistan Topluluklar Birliği - Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan  
**KEİG**  Kadın Emek ve İstihdam Girişimi - Women’s Labour and Employment  
**KIT**  Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsü - State Economic Enterprise  
**KDV**  Katma Değer Vergisi - Value Added Tax  
**KPSS**  Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza - Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
**KSGM**  Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü - General Directorate for the Status and Problems of Women  
**KYK**  Kredi ve Yurttar Kurumu - Credit and Dormitories Foundation

**LDP**  Liberal Democrat Party (in Japan)
MAI Multilateral Agreement on Investment
MBK Milli Birlik Komitesi - National Unity Committee (Est.27.05.1960-Closure.25.10.1961)
MC Milliyetçi Cephe - Nationalist Front
MDP Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi - Nationalist Democracy Party (Est.16.05.1983-Closure.04.05.1986)
MGK Milli Güvenlik Konseyi - National Security Council
MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - National Movement Party
MİT Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı - National Intelligence Organization
MNP Milli Nizam Partisi - National Order Party (Est.26.01.1970-Closure.20.05.1971)
MP Millet Partisi - Nation Party (Est.July 1948-Closure.27.02.1954)
MSP Milli Selamet Partisi - National Salvation Party (Est.11.10.1972-Closure.16.10.1981)
MÜSİAD Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği - Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen's Association

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NP Nasionale Party - National Party (in South Africa)

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHAL Olağanüstü Hal - State of Emergency
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan - Kurdistan Workers’ Party
PNV Partido Nacionalista Vasco - Basque Nationalist Party (in Spain)
PR Proportional Representation

RTÜK Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu - Radio Television Supreme Council

SCP Serbest Cumhuriyetçi Fırka - Liberal Republican Party (Est.12.08.1930-Closure.17.11.1930)
SETA Siyaset Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı - Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
SGK Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu - Social Security Institution
SHP Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti - Social Democratic Populist Party (Est.03.11.1985-Closure.18.02.1995)
SME Small and Medium Enterprises
SNP Scottish National Party
SODEP Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi - Social Democracy Party (Est.06.06.1983-Closure.03.11.1984)
SODEV Sosyal Demokrasi Vakfı - Social Democracy Foundation
SP Saadet Partisi - Felicity Party
SPK Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu - Capital Markets Board of Turkey
SSK Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu - Social Insurance Institute
SYDTF Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Teşvik Fonu - Social Solidarity Fund
SYDV Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakfı - Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation
SYGM Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Müdürlüğü - General Directorate for Social Assistance and Solidarity

TBMM Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi - Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TCF Terakkiperver Cumhuriyetçi Fırka - Progressive Republican Party
(Est.17.11.1924 - Closure.03.06.1925)
TEB Türk Ekonomi Bankası - Turkish Economy Bank
TEPAV Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı - Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
TESEV Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı - Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TİP Türkiye İşçi Partisi - Turkey’s Workers’ Party
TOBB Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği - Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
TRT Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu - Turkish Radio and Television Corporation
TTB Türk Tabipleri Birliği - Turkish Medical Association
TUSKON Türkiye İş Adamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu - Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
TÜRK-İŞ Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions
TÜSİAD Türk Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği - Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
TÜİK/TUIK Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu - Turkish Statistical Institute

UNDP United Nations Development Program

YÖK Yüksekokşştrem Kurulu - Council of Higher Education
YDP Yeniden Doğuş Partisi - Rebirth Party
YTP Yeni Türkiye Partisi - New Turkey Party

WB World Bank
WTO World Trade Organization
WWHR Women for Women’s Human Rights
Glossary

**Abant Platform**: The Abant Platform was established in order to discuss dogmatic issues which have not been discussed in Turkish political life. Throughout this platform, the main principle is based on the democracy’s strengthening throughout “differences being in dialogue”. Throughout this Abant platform, various workshops are being organized in order to discuss various topics such as the Kurdish problem, Islam and Secularism, military coups (Gülen movement, 2009).

**Adil Düzen**: The “Just Order” program was the state-centred Islamic project which intended to establish a powerful state and extensive welfare programme (Yavuz, 2003, p.24 and p.221).

**Adil**: Just, egalitarian

**Aile İrşat ve Rehberlik Büroları**: Family and Guidance Offices

**Alevi**: Alevi belief whose membership was determined by descent which was known formerly as **Bektaşi** and **Kızılbaş**. Alevi belief combines Anatolian folk Shi’ism with Sufi elements of the Bektaşi sect. They represent 15% to 20% of Turkey’s population. However, the Alevi cemaat is ethnically diverse: Turkish, 8-9 millions; Kurdish, 2-3 millions; and Zaza Alevi-Dersimli, 1 million.

**Atatürkçülük**: same as Kemalism

**Aydınlar Ocağı**: Intellectuals Hearth.

**Bag Law/Bag Bill**: amending several laws at the same time.

**Balyoz Harekatı**: Sledgehammer coup plan: It is the name of an alleged Turkish secularist military coup plan in order to overthrow the elected government of Turkey (in 2003) (Bal, 2010).

**Başak Sanat Vakfı**: Başak Culture and Art Foundation: “It aims to carry out various activities to discover, support and promote artistic abilities of poor and/or low-paid young people and to eliminate difficulties they face in building their personal capacity. It is also aimed at orienting young people to be more productive in taking part in the social life as healthy individuals and engaging in scientific research in the field of culture and art” (Başak Sanat Vakfı, 2011).

**Başbakanlık**: Prime Ministry

**Cemaat**: Congregation or assembly usually of a religious community.

**Çemevleri**: Alevi places of worship

**Cumhuriyet Mitingleri**: Republican Rallies

**Danıştay**: The Council of the State

**Derin Devlet**: Deep-State: “The deep state is Turkish shorthand for a faceless faction inside the Turkish state that has, some claim, held the reins of real power throughout the republic’s 84-year history. The deep state is held to be based in the army, but closely linked with MIT (the national intelligence service), the judiciary, and (since the 1960s) the mafia” (Freely, 2007).

**Ergenekon case**: Allegedly, Ergenekon is the name of a criminal “deep-state” organization with connections to state security structures and the army. In the indictment drawn up by the state prosecutor, this organization was accused of
being involved in political crimes, murders and conspiracies with the aim to destabilize the AKP government (Jenkins, 2009, p.10). Force migration is a term which is used to explain “anyone who is internally displaced or who is forced to leave his/her place of settlement, a new life is an “obligation” ” (Kurban et al., 2007, p.6). The forced migration also emphasizes that internal displacement occurring due to concerns for national security in Turkey thereby it was more than an obligatory displacement; it was a displacement by use of force (Kurban et al., 2007, p.6).

Gecekondu: Squatter house established without proper permissions
Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı: Chief of Staff of the Republic of Turkey
Green Card: Green Cards are health care entitlements are issued to Turkish citizens who are not unable to pay for their health services. In order to be entitled to the green card, they have to declare their revenues in a detailed way (Kısa and Younis, 2006, p.766).
Grey Wolves: Youth groups of the extreme nationalist party.
Gülen Hareketi: Fethullah Gülen Movement

Hak ve Özgürlükler: Fundamental rights and freedoms
Halk Evleri: “People’s Houses were initially local educational establishments for disseminating Kemalist message in provincial towns” (Zürcher, 2003b, p.233). It was closed down many times in 1950, 1980. Currently, instead of a Kemalist message, the Halk Evleri has a more socialist approach advocating people’s social rights (such as rights for housing, education; health; woman; disabled; environment and labour rights) (Halk Evleri, 2011).
Hatip: Orator; in Islam a preacher/imam who delivers the Friday sermon

İmam: Prayer leader in Islam.
İmam Hatip Lisesi - Imam Hatip High Schools: In Turkey a secondary education institution where a government employed imam or hatip is trained. Originally they were founded to raise hatips.
İş-Kur: Turkish Employment Agency
İş ve Sosyal Güvenlik Reformu: Social Security Reform

Kemalists: Being a follower of Mustafa Kemal’s ideology. His ideology was based on republicanism; populism; secularity; revolutionism; nationalism and statism.
Kemalizm/Kemalism: The Republic of Turkey was established under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. After the establishment of the Republic, again under his leadership, many reforms regarding modernization and secularization of the state were adopted. The establishment of Republic and reforms were based on six fundamental principles (which are republicanism; populism; laicism; revolutionism; nationalism and statism). Later on, these six principles were considered as pillars of the Kemalism (Akşin, 1999, pp.3-7).
Köy Enstitüleri - Village Institutes: Schools that existed between 1945 and 1954 in Turkey. They were established in the framework of a rural development project and served as co-educational boarding schools.
Medrese: theological school attached to a mosque. Medreses were closed down and the education became uniform under guidance of the Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (Ministry of National Education) based on the Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu (Law of Uniform Education) of 3rd March 1924. This was one of the main reforms and aimed at fight against illiteracy and education of the nation. Milli Görüş: National Vision. The Milli Görüş was the ideological stance of the MSP, and was expressed as an ideology, which was developed by those advocating independence from the West and focus on economic development with a moral emphasis referring to Islam (Mert, 2007, p.108).

Mürit: follower of a sect/an order.

Nakşibendi: Nakşibendi Order belongs to the Sufi tradition of Islam. This tradition focuses on the disciplining the appetite (nefs) by educating the believer about the nature and function of the different faculties of the soul, from the sensual to the spiritual. Its roots came from Turkistan where the founder of the order Bahaeddin Nakşibend of Turkistan was born (1490).

At the last periods of the Ottoman Empire, the order became the most large and influential Islamic order. During the war of Independence, it had a great impact on the mobilization of people. However, during the modernization period, the Republican elites closed these Sufi lodges. Their closure enhanced the radical side of the order and they became rebellious: (Şeyh Said) Sheik Said rebellion (1924) and Menemen rebellion (1930).

Nakşibendi İskenderpaşa cemaati: It is İskenderpaşa branch of Nakşibendi Order.

Net migration rate: Difference between the numbers of immigrants and emigrants at the midterm of a time interval (usually annual) per thousand inhabitants.

Nur (Light) Mouvement: It aims to move from an oral-based tradition to one of print culture.

Nurcu (or in plural Nurcular): The number of adherents of the Nur movement.

Parti teşkilatı: party organization

Positive list defines drugs that are reimbursed by public funds (positive list) (Nguyen-Kim et al., 2005).

Post-modern coup d’etat”: In Turkey, it is used as a memorandum given by the military to a ruling government to denote its do’s and don’ts. The military claims that this is a legal right given to it by the legislature after the 1982 Constitution (Demir, 2007; Washington Times, 2005).

Said-i Nursi: (1876-1960) Said-i Nursi is a Muslim Sunni theologian who stressed the importance of orthodox doctrine as well as the importance of science and technology (Shankland, 1999, p.199; Kurtz, 2005, p.373).

Sosyal Yardımlar ve Primsiz Ödemeler Kanunu: Social Assistance and Welfare Payment Law

Süleymanç: the Neo-Nakşibendi Sufi Order

Sünni: Sunni

Tam Gün Yasası: The full-time employment law.
**Tarikat**: Religious order; sect.
**Teşkilat**: Organization.
**Teşvik-i Sanavi Kanunu**: Law for initiating investments in industry.
**Tevekkül**: Loyalty and resignation to God.
**Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu**: see medrese.
**Türk-Islam Sentezi**: Turkish Islam synthesis.

**Unconsecrated**: all things which are not dedicated to as sacred purpose

**Vakıf**: Religious/charitable foundation, usually created by an endowed trust fund

**Yargıtay**: The Supreme Court
**Yeni Teşvik Yasası ve Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi**: New Enhancement Law and National Employment Strategy
Chapter 1 Historical and Political Background in Turkey

1.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to answer one of my proposed research questions in terms of how far the political conjuncture of the early 2000s helped the AKP to succeed electorally on 13th November 2002. First, in order to answer this research question, I consider the changes in the political party system since the establishment of Republic of Turkey, 1923. From a chronological perspective, it is evident that the party system has been significantly impacted by three military interventions that took place in 1960 (27th May), 1971 (12th March) and 1980 (12th September) respectively, causing rupture to the system. There were also dominant party systems and coalition governments that affected the party system. Therefore, I have analysed 1992-2002 as a separate period, due to the predominance of coalition governments.

Second, the historical changes within party system have been fed by the existing cleavage structures, which are mainly related to centre and periphery. Within my research, I am interested in a political party leaning towards Islam and its impact on the Turkish party system. For this reason, the focus on the cleavage structure, especially that which is based on religiosity (see discussion of church-state cleavage in Chapter 2, section 2.3.1.2) has helped to provide a sociological understanding of the evolution of the Turkish party system by investigating these cleavages (e.g. Islamist - secularist).

Through this historical approach and cleavage-structure model, this background chapter aims to provide an understanding of how the Turkish political party system has evolved in line with the transformation of cleavage
structure and how these developments have impacted on the formation of pro-
Islamic parties, and particularly the emergence of the AKP in 2002.

1.2 The Single-Party Regime: 1923 - 1946

After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the single-
party regime was administrated by the political party called the CHP
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - Republican People’s Party). The CHP, as the
single party governing the young republic, was responsible for formulating its
principles that were compiled under the concept of Kemalism.² The CHP’s
main plan was to create a modern and secular nation while adopting Western
political norms. The founder of the party was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Since
this period, the CHP has considered itself the founder and defender of the
Republic and Republican values.

During the first decades of the single-party regime, many reforms for
the sake of modernization were implemented, such as the adoption of the
Latin alphabet; a change in call to prayer from Arabic to Turkish; adoption of
the Christian calendar; integration of religious schools into the National
Education System (Burdy and Marcou, 1995, p.13). In addition, modernization included the promotion of the political and the social status of
women³ (Ahmad, 1993, p.89).

² Kemalism: The Republic of Turkey was established under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk. After the establishment of the Republic, again under his leadership, many reforms
regarding modernization and secularization of the state were adopted. The establishment of
Republic and reforms were based on six fundamental principles (which are republicanism;
populism; laicism; revolutionism; nationalism and statism). Later on, these six principles were
considered as pillars of the Kemalism (Akşin, 1999, pp.3-7).
http://www.unaturkey.org/dergiler-bulletins/38-say-02-number-02-october-1999-/58-the-nature-
of-the-kemalist-revolution-.pdf
³ Women obtained the vote and equal citizenship during the period 1930-1934 (Çavdar, 2008a,
pp. 368-369).
Furthermore, religion was strictly separated from the state affairs in 1937 and placed under the control of the secular state (Berkeş, 1998, p.19). This constitutional principle of state secularity in Turkey has existed until today, and remains indisputable. Due to strict secular rules and praxis implemented within the single-party regime, religious activities continued to be undertaken in a silent and submerged manner (Yavuz, 2005, p.88).

During this period, the regime was administrated by the CHP. Nevertheless, there were two attempts, in 1924 and 1930 respectively, to shift to a multiparty system. First, in 1924, a party opposing the CHP, called the TCF (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* - Progressive Republican Party), was established. Following its establishment, the groups which were against modernization attempts, state-controlled religion and exclusive emphasis on Turkish as the national language formed the social bases of the TCF. As the TCF provoked both religious and Kurdish rebels (especially from the *Nakşibendi* sect) who threatened national unity and secularization attempts, the party was closed down within six months of its establishment (Yavuz, 2005, p.79). As compared to the CHP’s programme, the TCF advocated liberal economy and religious values and assumed a distant stance with regard to the republic (Zürcher, 2003, p.148).

Later in 1930, another oppositional party called the SCF (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* - Liberal Republican Party) was established. The increasing economic burden due to the 1929 economic depression, together with increasing opposition against the CHP, favoured the establishment of the SCF which advocated liberalism in terms of ideology and right-wing political
ideology in terms of party position. However, the SCF increased the self-confidence and audacity of radical Muslims who supported it as a means of expressing their discontent with the CHP’s modernization and secularisation programmes. Indeed, following the establishment of the SCF, the Radical Muslims under the leadership of a Nakşibendi sheikh dared to kill a young reserve officer, who had the mission to suppress their fundamentalist revolt. Immediately after this event, the party was closed. Moreover, this event demonstrated that the new state ideology and reforms were not yet sufficiently incorporated into society and the fundamentalist circles were looking for an opportunity to challenge the young republic (Yavuz, 2005, p.80; Lewis, 2006, p.474; Mardin, 2007, pp.178-179).

Furthermore, the events of the early Republican era reflect the initial cleavages within Turkish politics and society. The first cleavage is based on the division between religious circles and the secularist state and the second one is based on the Unitarian state and ethnically distinct groups (mostly Kurdish people). Since the Republican era, these cleavages have impacted on the development of the political party system and they will be highlighted throughout this chapter. During the Republican era, the oppositional parties, such as the TCF and SCF reflected the non-secularist side of the cleavage whereas the CHP represented the secularist and Unitarian state.

During this single-party regime, the cleavages were not only exacerbated by secularisation and modernization, but also by the CHP’s economic policies. At the time of the establishment of the Republic, Turkey did not yet have a record of industrialization like that of the Western
countries, which had already accomplished their industrial revolutions in the 19th century. Turkey had, in addition, lost her capitalist class which used to be made up to a great extent of Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities (Mehmet, 1998, p.129).

Therefore, during the history of the early Republic, that is, from 1923 until early 1980s, the Turkish nation-state tried to create its own capitalist class through state-driven policies. The CHP’s state-driven policies were approved neither by the TCF, nor by the SCF that advocated economic liberalism.

Furthermore, the state-driven policies of the CHP were impacted by the Second World War period. During the War, Turkey had to maintain a big army in case of any war threats (Sever, 1997, p.47). Austerity measures taken during war time negatively influenced all the social groups from big landowners or industrialists down to farmers and industrial workers (Pamuk, 2009, p.189).

At the beginning of the Republic, the interests of the bureaucrats and commercial classes coincided. After a certain point, especially after the end of the war, the intersection of their interests broke down. The commercial classes realized that the bureaucratic intervention had to be eliminated in order to implement more efficient economic policies (Özbudun, 2000, p.20). The commercial classes wanted a different political voice from the CHP for implementing the economic policies that they favoured.

In addition to the increasing opposition from the side of commercial classes, another development seemed to make change more urgent. After the
Second World War, which favoured multi-partyism, the CHP government had started initiatives for Turkey’s membership of the NATO\(^4\) (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) which required that Turkey adopt a Western-style multi-party democracy (Özbudun, 2000, p.20). Consequently, the government allowed for the establishment of a multi-party system (Özbudun, 2000, p.19).

The multi-party system was inaugurated in 1946, and this was followed by the first competitive legislative elections in the history of Turkish political parties, giving the DP (Demokrat Parti - Democrat Party) 62 parliamentary seats out of 467. However, open voting and a secret grading system used in these elections caused big tensions and became a source of political dispute in the following years (Çavdar, 2008b, pp.13-14). The period 1946-1950 may be considered as a transitional period to the democratic political system. A liberal and moderate group within the CHP that came to power during this period changed the electoral law by adopting secret ballot and open grading system (Çavdar 2008b, pp.14-15). At the end, this transitional period resulted in the electoral victory of the Democrat Party in 1950 (Özbudun, 2000, p.17). In the 1950’s elections that were held on 14\(^{th}\) May 1950, the CHP got only 39.9% and the DP in turn got 53.3% of the votes (Özbudun, 2000, p.75).

In summary, the one-party era (1923 - 1950) was characterized by the efforts of the CHP as the government party to implement radical reforms for the modernization of the country and to consolidate the established unitary and secular nation state. These efforts were approved by the majority of the

\(^4\) Turkey joined NATO in 1952 (Sever, 1997, p.99).
population, but opposed by the religious and ethnic circles. These oppositions resulted in divisions in society that corresponded to the two classical cleavages that are associated with the creation of nation states: centre-periphery and church-state cleavages. In addition to these cleavages, a division of statism versus liberalism also emerged in terms of the adopted economic policies.

1.3 The Two-Party System: 1950 - 1960

Thus, in 1950 a political party other than the CHP came to power for the first time in the Republican history; and this occurred only four years after the establishment of the multi-party system. When the results of the elections of the following decade (1950-1960) are taken into account, the presence of a predominantly two-party system is observed since the third parties\(^5\) did not attain sufficient power to exert influence on the legislative or electoral developments (Sayar, 2002, p.11). Therefore, it is more reasonable to name this decade a two party-system period.

The DP’s programme was similar to those of previous parties such as the TCF and the SCF that advocated liberalism and right-wing ideology. Hence, the existing cleavages continued, and during the two-party system era; however, they now found expression in political parties such as the CHP and the DP within the party system. Both religious groups\(^6\) (the Nakşıbendi; the

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\(^5\) 1950 Elections: DP: 53.3% (408 deputies); CHP: 39.9% (69 deputies); MP (Millet Partisi - Nation Party) and Independents: 4.8% (1 deputy) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.20)

1954 Elections: DP (490 deputies); CHP (30 deputies); CMP (Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi - Republican Nation Party) (5 deputies) and Independents (2 deputies) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.48)

1957 Elections: DP (424 deputies); CHP (178 deputies); CMP (4 deputies) and HP (Hürriyet Partisi - Liberty Party) (4 deputies) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.69)

\(^6\) Religious groups: the followers of both the Nur movement (followers of religious leader called Said-i Nursi) and the followers of Nakşıbendi Tarikat (brotherhood) (Yavuz, 2003, p.152; Yavuz, 2003, p.133-134).
Nurcu groups) and Kurdish groups (the aşirets\(^7\)) found the opportunity to express themselves within the DP. The DP not only attracted those peripheral groups but also urban business interests because of its promises of liberal economic policies. Therefore, the CHP continued to reflect the centralist and authoritarian nation state, whereas the DP became the voice of both the periphery and urban business.

Due to its diverse social base, the DP implemented multifaceted policies; on the one hand, it targeted urban businesses through mechanisms enhancing entrepreneurship (Buğra, 2010, p.177). On the other hand, the DP tried to please its peripheral social base. Therefore, strict secular rules became looser to an extent and Islam more visible. The change in the call to prayer from Turkish to Arabic; the tolerance for Said-i Nursi\(^8\) and permission to publish his banned works illustrate this fact (Yavuz, 2003, p. 61; Mert, 2007, p.40; Voll, 1999, p.246). By properly addressing the needs and anticipations of its social base, the DP obtained a great victory in both the 1954 and 1957 parliamentary elections (Sayari, 2002, p.11).

In addition, the DP attempted to keep in line with the secular state and the military forces in order to secure its regime. Two cases exemplified this fact. First, in 1959, the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not allow the entombment of a prominent Nakşibendi sheikh in the garden of the Fatih mosque in İstanbul. Second, the DP government did not give to religious leader Said-i Nursi, freedom of entry to Ankara in fear of a very strong reaction from the secular state (Yavuz, 2005, p.91).

\(^7\) Aşiret: big tribal owners especially Kurdish

\(^8\) Said-i Nursi is a religious leader who stressed the importance of orthodox doctrine as well as the importance of science and technology (Shankland, 1999, p.199; Kurtz, 2005, p.373).
Despite such attempts of keeping in compliance with the secular state, the intervention of the military forces was not prevented in 1960. The DP was closed down due to its anti-secular activities that were considered as a threat to the Republic (Yavuz, 2005, p.91; Mardin, 2003, p.218; Özbudun, 2000, p.31).

The reason behind the overthrow of the DP was not only due to its closeness to religious circles, but also due to the urban industrialists’ and organized working class’s dissatisfaction with the DP. The industrialists were discontent with the incoherent policies that resulted in budget deficit and high inflation. Therefore, they asked for more planning in the economy. On the other hand, in the late 1950s, the organized working class was badly affected by high inflation and deprived of any right to strike and to express their discontent with the DP. As a result, the urban industrialists and working class, together with the civil and military bureaucratic groups, cooperated to form an urban coalition of resistance (Sunar, 2004, p.126; Özbudun, 2000, p.32).

Following the coup d’état of 1960, members of the DP were prosecuted and the Prime Minister and two ministers of the DP government sentenced to death at the Military Court (Yavuz, 2005, p.93).

From 1960 until the mid-2000s, military interventions and memoranda (1971; 1980 and 1997) impacted on the development of the political party system in Turkey. After the military intervention of 1960, the military declared *Kemalism* as its main ideology. Therefore, it found the legitimacy to intervene into the parliamentary system, in case of a likely threat to the secular
and Unitarian Turkish state from the side of Islamic revival, ethnic conflict or any political turmoil (Yavuz, 2005, p.94).

1.4 Fragmentation of the Multi-party System between the Military Intervention of 1960 and Memorandum of 1971

The period 1960-1971 was characterized by the constitution that was adopted after the military intervention of 1960. The new constitution’s democratic elements drastically influenced the party system of this decade (Sayarı, 2002, p.12). In addition to the constitutional change, the electoral system which used to be based on plurality formula was revised. After its revision, the proportional representation (PR) was adopted (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002, p.59). As a result of the electoral revision, the elections of 1961 had a more representative side than in the previous decade. Therefore, this period can be considered as a genuine multi-party system since the third parties\(^9\) began to be more effective within the political party system.

The military intervention of 1960 had resulted in the closure of the DP. Nevertheless, some of the members of the DP gathered and established the AP (Adalet Partisi - Justice Party) which carried the legacy of the DP (Mardin, 2007, p.123). The first elections of this period were held in 1961, and the AP

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\(^9\) Increase in the number of parties:
1961: AP (Adalet Partisi - Justice Party) (158 deputies); CHP (173 deputies); CKMB (Cumhuriyet Köylü Millet Partisi - Republican Peasants’ Nation Party (54 deputies) and YTP (Yeni Türkiye Partisi - New Turkey Party) (65 deputies) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.114)
1965: AP (240 deputies); CHP (134 deputies); CKMP (11 deputies); MP (Millet Partisi - Nation Party) (31 deputies); TIP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi - Turkey’s Workers’ Party) (14 deputies); YTP (19 deputies) and Independent deputies (1 deputy) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.152)
1969: AP (256 deputies); CHP (143 deputies); BP (Birlik Partisi - Unity Party) (8 deputies); CGP (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi - Republican Reliance Party) (15 deputies); MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - Nationalist Movement Party) (1 deputy); TIP (2 deputies); YTP (6 deputies) and Independent deputies (3 deputies) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.160)
took an important share of the vote even though the CHP became the majority party of the elections (Sunar, 2004, p.114). The CHP got 36.7%, whereas the AP gained 34.8% of the total votes.

One of the first reasons behind the AP’s high percentage of votes in the first elections after the military intervention was that the envisioned coalition between the army and urban industrialists for the post-coup d’état period did not happen, in spite of favourable conditions. In this context, as soon as the party system resumed its usual situation in 1961, the clientelist-populist AP managed to build an alliance with the urban business and rural middle classes and to emerge as the dominant governing party of the Second Republic.\(^\text{10}\) (Buğra, 2010, p.192; Sunar, 2004, p.128)

Despite all its attempts to eradicate the DP, the military faced, with the rise of the AP, a popular reaction to its intervention of 1960. Even though many people were discontent with the setbacks of the socio-economic policies of the DP government that had followed an increasingly suppressive course in the later stages of its tenure, the majority of the society did not approve the intervention and the trial process of the DP members. Therefore, the AP’s votes were to a great extent due to the electoral base’s reaction towards the hegemony of the bureaucracy-military coalition (Yavuz, 2005, p.95).

The 1960s were characterized by constitutional change. The military intervention, which was launched by the MBK (Milli Birlik Komitesi -

\(^{10}\) The second republic was the period which started after the 1960 military interventions and finished as a result of the military intervention of 1980 (Zürcher, 2008, p.351).
National Unity Council), introduced a new constitution in order to limit any government’s attempts to push for a radical societal transformation and to ensure basic rights and freedoms (Sunar and Toprak, 2004, p.110). In addition, these new guarantees provided a freer atmosphere for both social organizations and political parties (Yavuz, 2005, p.95).

Furthermore, this constitutional reform influenced the development of social cleavages and their translation into the party system. When this period is taken into account in terms of cleavages, the main cleavage between the nation-state and the peripheral forces continued to translate into the party system in terms of the opposition the CHP-AP duality. As with the DP, the AP took a stance against the Republican period and the modernization process. In addition, its discourse on identity referred to religious and historical motifs through right-wing nationalism, as opposed to the CHP’s emphasis on secular national values (Mert, 2007, p.25).

Nonetheless, this existing cleavage’s translation into the party system did not continue in the same way during the second half of 1960s, since the amended constitution permitted the development of new cleavages and thus to emergence of new political parties. The emergence of the extreme-right parties (nationalist and religious) in this period was due to this liberal constitution, but, in part, also to the anti-communist stance of the state (Sunar and Toprak, 1983, p.164; Criss, 2002, p.482). As the subject of my

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11 The MBK comprised 38 top officers and their leader was the General Cemal Gürsel. They were responsible for the intervention. It functioned as the governing body until the elections of 1961 (Çavdar, 2008b, p. 85).

12 As a result of Turkey’s NATO membership in 1952, Turkey took an anti-communist stance (Sever, 1997, p.99 ; Criss, 2002, p.473 and p.482).
thesis is the Islamic-leaning AKP, I will focus on the pro-Islamic political parties rather than nationalist parties in this chapter.

Previously, the religious circles used to translate their political expression into the DP and the AP. However, now in this relatively liberal political environment, the religious circles attempted to establish their own party. Erbakan, a former professor of engineering, assumed the task to accomplish this deed. As a member of the AP and, at the same time, of the Nakşibendi İskenderpaşa cemaati, Erbakan used to oppose the AP’s economic policies that involved only urban and big industrialists and ignored small-sized firms (Ahmad, 1993, p.144).

Because of his opposition, the AP did not allow him to become the president of the TOBB (*Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği* - Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey), despite Erbakan’s success in the presidency’s elections and the support of provincial entrepreneurs for him (Teazis, 2011, p.11). This incident prompted him to break up with the AP. Subsequently, encouraged by the leader of the İskenderpaşa cemaati, he published the ideology of *Milli Görüş*¹³ (National View) and founded the Islamist group of the same name in 1969, and established the MNP (*Milli Nizam Partisi* - National Order Party) in 1970 (Yavuz, 2005, p.281). Initially, the MNP did not obtain the chance to be represented at the parliamentary level, but it is worth mentioning that it was the very first political party with a pro-Islamist agenda in the history of Turkish party system. In addition to the Nakşibendi community’s support for the MNP, the Nur community also

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¹³ *The Milli Görüş* was the ideological stance of the MSP, and was expressed as an ideology, which was developed by those advocating independence from the West and focus on economic development with a moral emphasis referring to Islam (Mert, 2007, p.108).
initially supported the MNP. Nevertheless, the MNP and the Nur community fell out and the latter continued to support the AP (Sunar and Toprak, 1983, p.170; Yavuz, 2005, p.55).

The liberal constitution of 1961 not only helped the burgeoning nationalist and Islamic political parties, but influenced the development of left-wing political parties (Kongar, 2011, p.630). The socio-economic dynamics since 1950s such as agricultural mechanization, employment opportunities in the cities and the rural exodus had influenced the creation of an urban labour class. Nonetheless, this labour class had been unable to express itself politically, especially during the late 1950s since it had been deprived of the right to strike, to demonstrate and any other means of organized expression of resistance during the DP government (Sunar, 2004, p.127). As in the case of the formation of the MNP, this liberal atmosphere of the 1960s resulted in the institutionalization of the trade union, labour organizations and associations.

The establishment of the left-wing organizations subsequently gave rise to the formation of the TIP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi - Turkey’s Workers Party) in 1961 and its electoral success in 1964. For the first time in the Turkish political party history, a socialist party was represented in parliament.

In addition, during the development of both new right-wing parties and left-wing parties, their grassroots organizations were remarkably active. From time to time, there were clashes between left and right ideological groups which resulted in fights and demonstrations in streets, in particular after the eruption of the 1968 student riots. In the late 1960s, this social and political
agitation continued with an increasing intensity. The strong anti-communist stance of right ideological groups was based on the perception of communism as atheism and a great threat to the state. In the same period, the AP came to government after succeeding in both elections of 1965 and 1969. In the early 1970s, the AP could no longer deal with the worsening social agitation. Consequently, in 1971, the military issued a memorandum accusing the government of not establishing law and order in the country.

As a result of this memorandum, law and order were established through a “non-partisan government of technocrats” led by a “neutral” prime minister who had been advised by the military to resign beforehand from his party, the CHP (Özbudun, 2000, p.33). This government remained in office until 1973 without suspending parliament (Criss, 2002, p.480; Özbudun, 2000, p.33). As the new government adopted an oppressive approach against the left-wing groups, parties and organizations, the government received support from extreme right parties (Ahmad, 1993, p.149). Due to the anti-left approach of the new government, the left-wing TIP was dissolved. The MNP was also dissolved according to the Law on the Organization of Political Parties which prohibited the usage of religion for political aims (Sunar and Toprak, 1983, p.165).

In summary, the 1960s, aside from the last few years, and the student riots of 1968, were relatively calm. There were not yet too many open confrontations, and not at the level of violence that was to be observed in the following decade. Economy that thrived throughout the decade also accounted for the somewhat politically stable situation.
The constitution of 1961 enabled the emergence of a democratic environment in Turkey. This gave rise to the establishment of parties that also found accession to parliamentary representation. The traditional parties, the AP and the CHP, continued to dominate the parliament. However, the political spectrum was expanded so as to include the left and right extreme parties. Consequently, the left-right cleavage that now emerged provoked left-right conflict. The church-state cleavage, in turn, received a new dimension with the establishment of the first Islamist party in Turkey.

1.5 Continued Fragmentation and the Beginning of Coalition Governments between 1973 and 1980

The period between 1973 and 1980 differed in many ways from the 1960s. It was characterized by both international\(^\text{14}\) and domestic crises, which as serious challenges, constrained the governments that took office in these years. To begin with, these coalition governments had their own intrinsic problems, but they also had to deal with severe economic and political crises. Moreover, the

\(^\text{14}\) The international conjuncture, in turn, produced two main challenges. First, the 1973 oil crisis broke out as the Arab members of the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) proclaimed an oil embargo as a reaction to the US aid to Israel during the Yom Kippur War (Richards and Waterbury, 1996, p.58; Yavuz, 2005, p.285). This decision resulted subsequently in exuberant increases in oil prices that brought the economical progress in Turkey as an oil importing country to an abrupt halt. A huge deficit in the balance of payments gave rise to the exhaustion of foreign currency reserves and ever increasing inflation rates. With the collapse of economy in 1977, the government was urged to ask for the IMF aid (Zürcher, 2008, pp.385-386).

A second aggravating international event was the Cyprus crisis that, as to be explained below, broke out in 1974 and resulted in the following years in Turkey’s diplomatic isolation and exposure to the US-imposed embargo of arms (Zürcher, 2008, pp.396-397). The Cyprus crisis increased Turkey’s expenditures enormously and worsened its economic crisis further. The economic crises were definitely one of the main reasons of the political destabilization (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 175-177).
period was characterized by continuation, and even an increase of fragmentation within the party system.\textsuperscript{15}

However, there was an important change. As a result of the 1973 elections, the extreme-right wing parties (nationalist and Islamist parties) that emerged as the continuation of their predecessors of the late 1960s now began to be represented at the parliamentary level. The abolished MNP was regrouped as the MSP (\textit{Milli Selamet Partisi} - National Salvation Party) in 1972 (Sunar and Toprak, 1983, p.165). Its ideological stance was formulated in the aforementioned \textit{Milli Görüş}.

The TIP also ceased to exist after 1971. However, the TIP-initiated left-wing movement continued under the CHP, which moved further to the left due to a change in both its leadership and ideology. The TIP’s dissolution and support for the CHP played an important role in increasing the latter’s votes. In addition, Kurdish and Alevi groups also supported the new CHP, due to its new centre left-wing ideology (Yavuz, 2005, pp.98-99; Ahmad, 1993, p.167). Thus, although the official discourse of the party was centre left-wing, it now entailed fractions that were further left.

The ideological change in the CHP, together with the emergence of new parties, reflected the expression of changing social cleavages within the party system. For example, the cleavages which used to exist between the state and

\textsuperscript{15} 1973 Elections: AP: 29.8%; CHP: 33.3%; DP (\textit{Demokratik Parti} - Democratic Party): 11.9%; MHP: 3.4%; MSP (\textit{Milli Selamet Partisi} - National Salvation Party): 11.8%; BP: 1.1% and Independents: 2.8% (Çavdar, 2008b, p.231).
1977 Elections: AP: 36.9%; CHP: 41.4%; CGP: 1.9%; DP: 1.8%; MHP: 6.4%; MSP: 8.6% and Independents: 2.5% (Çavdar, 2008b, p.247).
The existence of new parties and the ideological change of the CHP reflected the changing cleavages within society. The ethnically distinct groups (Kurds); non-Sunni religious sects (Alevi) and working class found the left ideology as a suitable approach to express their views on the prevailing political turmoil and social dynamics of the 1970s.

In the 1970s, this left-right cleavage translated into the party system with the MSP’s relative success as an Islamist party and with the CHP’s electoral success as a centre left-wing party. The elections of both 1973 and 1977 favoured the AP (1973: 29.8% and 1977: 36.9%) and the CHP (1973: 33.3% and 1977: 41.4%) (Çavdar, 2008, pp.210 and 231), the MSP obtained 11.8% of the votes and took its place in the parliament as a third party after the AP and the CHP (Ahmad, 1993, p.159). Despite the high electoral score of both the CHP and AP, neither of them obtained enough votes to form a majority government, and a coalition with the need for the assistance of small parties became an inevitable outcome.

As a result of inter-party negotiations, the CHP and the MSP established a coalition in 1974 (Yavuz, 2005, p.283) and an optimistic political atmosphere prevailed at the beginning of that year due to the initiation of a moderate programme of government\(^\text{16}\) (Ahmad, 1993, p.163). However, the positive political atmosphere created by the coalition government was undermined by the

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\(^{16}\) The programme included an amnesty for those who had previously been found guilty of political offences; the intelligentsia and the workers (Ahmad, 1993, p.163).
Turkish military intervention of Cyprus which took place in July 1974 following a coup in Cyprus that was promoted by the military junta in Greece.

Following the intervention, the CHP’s popularity increased significantly (Yavuz, 2005, pp.283-284). In contrast, the MSP neither support the intervention, nor approved of the CHP’s increasing popularity (Ahmad, 1993, p.167). Consequently, it began to undermine the coalition by deliberately acting against it. Following the tensions with its coalition partner, the CHP tore up the coalition agreement as the party believed that its recent popularity could see the CHP win possible early elections (Çavdar, 2008b, p.242; Yavuz, 2005, pp.283-284).

However, early elections did not favour the CHP as predicted. Instead, the AP scored well and established a coalition government of right-wing parties, which was called “First Nationalist Front” (Çavdar, 2008b, p.242). The predominant right-wing ideology of this government encouraged the armed aggression of extreme nationalists, and their attacks on Kurds and Alevi led to a severe increase in civil disturbances and street fights between left and right opponents. The main party of the coalition government, the AP, was unable to deal with the rising, violent ethnic and ideological massacres which resulted in the AP leader’s resignation and thereby in the legislative elections of 1977 (Yavuz, 2005, pp.284-285).

The legislative elections of 1977 took place under the shadow of violent events (Ahmad, 1993, p.169). Before the legislative election, a rapprochement

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17 These were initiated by some shots on the crowds and aggravated by the following harsh actions of the security forces during the Labour Day celebrations on 1st May 1977. These events that were allegedly planned and executed by the Counter Guerrilla caused over 30 casualties (Ahmad, 1993, p.169).

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occurred between the CHP and the labour union DISK (Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Union). The CHP’s rapprochement with labour unions resulted in a significant increase in the votes of the CHP (41.4% of votes) and its rise as the first party again. Despite its success, the CHP did not get the overall majority, and could not establish a majority government on its own. This prompted the AP to launch the Second Nationalist Front which resulted in the penetration by nationalist groups into various ministries during the AP’s tenure. As in the case of the First Nationalist Front, the government’s predominantly right-wing ideology resulted in an enormous increase of armed assaults groups (Çavdar, 2008b, p.245).

Following the failure of the Second Front government, a new coalition government was established under the leadership of the CHP, and had the participation of the resigned deputies of the AP, independent deputies and deputies of two minor parties (Ahmad, 1993, pp.170-171; Özbudun, 2000, p. 40). Once again, however, the CHP’s success in establishing coalition government was not enough to deal with the aggravated armed assaults and terrorist attacks organized by MHP-affiliated and other extreme-right groups. In particular, the political turmoil which provoked the Alevi-Sunni conflict and which resulted in hundreds killings of Alevis severely stranded the CHP government (Çavdar, 2008b, pp.248-249; Ahmad, 1993, pp.172-173). The Alevi-Sunni divide thus emerged as a new political cleavage (Zürcher, 2008, pp.380-381).

18 The two communities were distant to each other throughout the history in Turkey. But atrocities on Alevis had almost only been committed by the state. However, as the Alevis assumed politically a left-orientated stance, they became the new target of the right-extreme
The CHP, therefore, failed to repeat its electoral success in 1979s. The AP came out once again as the first party in the by-elections of 1979. Although the CHP put pressure on the AP to jointly establish a coalition government, the latter refused and instead preferred to form a minority government with the support of the MSP, thus remaining in power until the military intervention of 1980 (Özbudun, 2000, p.40; Yavuz, 2005, p.285). The failure of the two to come to an agreement in the pending presidential election aggravated the existing political turmoil (Özbudun, 2000, pp.42-43). This chaotic period in the Turkish political history ended with the military intervention of 12th September 1980.

In summary, as mentioned in the introductory remarks of this section, the Turkish economy fell into deep crisis due to the international conjuncture during the 1970s. This was in itself sufficient for a political destabilization of a country. However, the economic crisis was joined by a number of domestic factors that aggravated political developments and shaped the political party landscape of the country.

In this respect, of prime importance was the establishment of the Islamist and nationalist parties in the late 1960s. Each of these parties found a rather strong social base that enabled them to access parliamentary representation. On the other, these parties received those votes that would have otherwise gone to the AP. Thus, their emergence prevented the AP from getting the majority of votes necessary for establishing a strong one party-government.

The CHP with its new leader and ideology was without doubt the prominent political party of this decade. But out of some reason, it also steadily

wing that had mostly member’s Sunni origin (Çavdar, 2008b, pp.249-250; Zürcher, 2008, pp.380-381).
fell short of the necessary majority vote. Moreover, the CHP’s rise in the political arena, its close connections with labour unions and the support it received from the Alevis, Kurds and left-wing circles, i.e. the TIP was apparently perceived as a threat by the state. A left-orientated party was barely tolerated by the Turkish state and its NATO allies in those days of the Cold War. Their concerns about a possible deviation of Turkey’s course towards the socialist block likely contributed to the violent conflicts that occurred at that time. Turkey had to be kept at any cost in the Western alliance. Thus, under the influence of external and domestic factors, the left-right divide became in the 1970s the main cleavage in Turkey.

1.6 The Three-Year Military Regime: 1980 - 1983

The intervention of the 12 September 1980\textsuperscript{19} was followed by a whole line of oppressive measures, i.e., abolishment of the parliament, closure of political parties, detention of people, trials, executions, and prohibition of every kind of democratic activity.

Following this military intervention, democracy was not to be established until 1983. In 1982, the junta allowed a new constitution to be adopted (Özbudun, 2000, p.58). As compared to the previous constitution of 1961, the 1982 Constitution restricted the nation’s free voting rights and the right to

\textsuperscript{19}The military intervention of 1980 differed in many respects from the intervention of 1960. The latter was a rather spontaneous revolt of mainly middle-rank cadres of the army against the DP government for the reasons explained above, under the section 1.2. Aside from the severe traumatisation of society by tribunals and the execution of the DP leaders, it left behind at least a democratic constitution (Çavdar, 2008b, p.270; Çavdar, 2008b, p.110; Kongar, 2011, p.199; Zürcher 2008, p.388). The military coup of 1980 was, in turn, the last step of an apparently insidiously designed scheme that was systematically executed by the general staff. The army had been for years inefficient in getting the ongoing armed conflict under control despite its full authority due to the martial law (Zürcher, 2008, p.401). However, the violence stopped immediately after the intervention. Thus, the military now strangely gained credit for restoring law and order in the country and placing blame on the civil government it overthrew (Zürcher, 2008, pp.405-406).
establishing civil society associations. Its aim was allegedly to guarantee law and order in the country, but in reality was to create an apolitical society. It also provided the junta members with immunity against any future prosecution and the president great powers. This new constitution worked together with a new state programme which aimed to depoliticize the coming generations of citizens restricting freedom of speech and political participation (Yılmaz, 2009, pp.54-56).

The military also transformed the Higher Education system into an apolitical institution under the control of the president, since it regarded the universities as the main centres of ideological conflict in the 1960s and 1970s (Szyliowich, 1994, p.154). In spite of all the efforts in the following years, Turkey could not dispose of this constitution until today.

Furthermore, this period was characterized by a rise in state-supported political Islam since the military government saw Islam as a remedy for the existing ideological and ethnic problems (Yavuz, 2005, p.100). To do this, it introduced the Turkish-Islam synthesis as the new state ideology, which has affected state policies and education to this day. By adopting this approach, the military government claimed to promote the unification of nationalist and religious movements in the country (Akin and Karasapan, 1988, p.18; Öniş, 1997, pp.749-750). In addition, the Turkish-Islam ideology has moved the

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20 Thus, all political activities were prohibited, and university staff and students allegedly involved previously in such activities were dismissed and/or detained. The universities were brought under the control of YÖK (Yüksel Öğretim Kurumu - Council of Higher Education), as established in the framework of the 1982 Constitution (Freely, 2012, p.57; Zürcher, 2008, p.403).

21 Turkish-Islam ideology: It aimed to “combat communism and left ideologies the military attempted to strengthen the role of Islam” (Rabase and Larrabee, 2008, pp.37-38). It was initiated by a group of conservative scholars (Aydınlar Ocağı/Intellectuals’ Hearth). The main idea was an attempt to reconcile nationalism with Islamic values (Ümmetçilik-Milliyetçilik).
political atmosphere of the country closer to the right-wing of the political spectrum (Mert, 2007, p.32).

On the other hand, the military government strictly followed the economic programme that had been already adopted before the intervention (24th January 1980 Economic Decisions) (Ahmad, 1993, p.183). This was obvious because the technocrat minister who was in charge of economy in the military government was also the progenitor of the neoliberal economy programme, approved on 24th January 1980. Indeed, this programme became decisive in the establishment of neoliberal economy in Turkey.

In summary, the third military intervention was far more than an intervention with its agenda on re-structuring of social, cultural, political and economic systems of the country. It primarily aimed at the eradication left-wing movement in Turkey. However, that was one of the two main aims. The other hidden aim was to create an apolitical, obedient and above all devout society, with Islamic values. The following legislative activities of the military government served these ends. The constitution of 1982 was an anti-thesis to the constitution of 1961; it replaced the state ideology of Kemalism with the Turkish-Islam synthesis. In short, the society was subjected to social engineering so as to ensure the alliance of Turkey, in line with the Cold War concept of the NATO because Islam was regarded at that time as a remedy against communist expansion.

“The military by fusing Islam and Turkish nationalism hoped to create a more homogeneous and less political Islamic community and thus to insulate the population from the influence of left-wing ideologies” (Rabase and Larrabee, 2008, pp.37-38).

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG726.pdf

Under the rule of 1980s, religious education was made a compulsory subject in all schools. Qur'an courses were opened and state controlled more and religious education was promoted (Eligür, 2010, p.125).
1.7 The Restoration of Democracy: 1983 - 1992

After three years, the military government allowed the transition to a civil government. This transition in 1983 was under the military government’s strict control. The military government allowed only 3 parties out of 17 new established parties to compete in the legislative 1983 elections. Since the previous parties had been closed and their leaders banned from political activity, new parties had to be founded in 1983 (Yavuz, 2005, p.108).

At the elections of 1983, the ANAP (Anavatan Partisi - Motherland Party) took the majority of votes (45.1%) and became the main party until the early 1990s (Kaynar et al., 2007, pp.174-175 and 181). From the beginning of its term of office, the ANAP opportunistically supported the military’s ideological stance, as its success was based on the dissolution of the other parties. It managed to gather members of the dissolved closed parties irrespective of which direction.

Thus, it claimed to have reconciled four different political tendencies: social democracy, nationalism, conservatism and liberalism. Due to its hybrid ideology, it took the opportunity to address the corresponding constituencies and came into prominence as a mass political at both the 1983 and 1987 elections. The charismatic leader of the ANAP, Turgut Özal, remained in the absence of the banned political leaders without a serious political challenge.

\[23\] The military had allegedly acted in line with its traditional mission of intervening in case of a likely threat to the secular Unitarian Turkish state as in the previous intervention of 1960 and 1971 (Yavuz, 2005, p.94) Now, since the threat was eliminated, it could step back to its own mission claiming that the army had never been in aspiration of civil power (Kongar, 2011, p.330). Whether this was the only reason for this decision is not known. However, it is likely that external pressures and exigencies from the side of NATO allies and European also accounted for this decision and the acceleration of the return to civil government.
As compared with previous right-wing parties which had conservative and nationalistic characteristics, the ANAP’s predominant ideology was similar to that of the DP and the AP, that is, it cherished conservative/religious values and advocated liberal economy. This conservative character helped the ANAP to keep close ties with the cemaats such as Nakşibendi and Nur (Mert, 2007, p.55). Furthermore, the leader of Nakşibendi tarikat Mehmet Zahid Kotku, a former advisor to Özal, strongly supported the ANAP’s liberal and market-based economic agenda (Yavuz, 2005, p.191).

Regarding the economic agenda, the ANAP government adhered consistently to the 24th January Economic Programme, which helped the liberalization of Turkish economy. Consequently, this decade witnessed the burgeoning of SMEs which had not been able to develop in the previous decades (Uslaner, 2006, p.391). The export-led growth model contributed to the development of provincial entrepreneurs as new opportunities emerged for them (Gümüşçü, 2010, p.5). The ANAP government’s most important contributions were the economic liberalization reforms and its support for provincial entrepreneurs.

On the other hand, in implementing the liberal economic agenda, the ANAP government did not prevent any concomitant increase in corruption, featherbedding or favouring clientelistic networks in take-over auctions (Yenal, 2010, p.137). Towards the end of the 1980s, the economy began to falter severely with the doubling of inflation and the reduction of purchasing power of

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24 For more details related to the impact of economic liberalization on the SMEs, please see Demir, Acar and Toprak (2004).
25 (Özaslan, 2005, p.122)
people, and in particular, of disadvantaged classes. The increase in inflation especially overshadowed the ANAP’s initially successful projects.

In addition to the economic recession of late 1980s, the removal of restrictions on banned political leaders affected the votes of the ANAP at the elections of 1989 (Tanör et al., 2011, p.81). Moreover, once the political leaders of the 1970s had resumed their political rights, each leader established a new party. For instance, the ex-leader of the AP established a new party called the DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi - True Path Party). The ex-leader of the MSP established the RP (Refah Partisi - Welfare Party). On the left of the political spectrum, two new left parties were established as the CHP was not re-established until 1995. These new parties were the DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti - Democratic Left Party) and the SHP (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti - Social Democratic Populist Party) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.274). The establishment of new parties under political leaders of the 1970s caused fragmentation within the party system, and significantly diminished the ANAP votes in the elections of 1989.

As pointed out at the beginning of this section, the state ideology had moved in this period closer to the right. Concomitantly, the eradication of the left ideology had occurred at two different stages.

First, organizations with left-wing ideology (e.g. labour unions; trade unions; associations) had ceased to work properly, due to the arrest of their

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26 The so-called election economy in 1987, that is, expenditures to address the voters, in part accounted for an increase in inflation. On the other hand, the influx of foreign credits that had first boosted imports, investments and economy had later on given rise to a large external debt stock; repayments of credits and their interests also constrained the economy, and this was also reflected in an increase in inflation rates (Zürcher, 2008, p.412; Yenal 2011, pp.134-141).

27 Ex-leader of the CHP, Bülent Ecevit established the new political party DSP (indeed Bülent Ecevit’s wife established the DSP as the ban on the leader of Bülent Ecevit had been removed up until 1989) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.278). The CHP was established in 1992 with its own original name (CHP) in 1992 (Bilâ, 2008, pp.329-330).
respective leaders and members; the suspension of their activities; or due to their complete closure. Consequently, the suppression of political expression at the associational level broke the link between the left-wing parties and civil society organizations (Özbudun, 2000, p.59). Thus, it weakened their organizational framework and the grass roots organizational level of parties. As a result, this weakness in organizational framework resulted in the inability of left-wing parties to reach the masses that had migrated from the rural areas out of economic and political reasons. In the 1960s and 1970s, the left had been able to understand the needs of newcomers to cities through its labour organization and associations. In the 1980s, due to the lack of this official network, the deprived masses fell into hands of informal networks; e.g. Islamist circles.

Second, the entrenchment of right-wing ideology was facilitated due to the establishment of the Turkish-İslam synthesis that prepared the ground for the growth of political Islam through the opening of numerous new İmam-Hatip high schools and Islamic associations. The shift towards right-wing ideology was fed by the neoliberal economic agenda which increased income inequality between poor and rich. As a result, in Turkey, political Islam usurped the role of the left-wing that once used to be the voice of the poor (Zürcher, 2003, p.304).

The entrenchment of right-wing ideology at both political institutional and organizational level; the electoral failure of the ANAP in 1989 due to structural issues (e.g. removal of the ban of party leaders) in the political system; and the ANAP’s inability to deal with a worsening economy and corruption

To conclude, the discontinuity imposed by authoritarian regimes, e.g., military governments, but also periods of dictatorships, leave behind wounds in the political party system that are not so easily healed in the following recovery periods. Such periods of transition are, in general, characterized with weak, intimidated civil society, top-down created parties, electoral volatility and loss of party allegiance of voters (Markus, 1998, p.3). As explained above, all these features seemed to hold for the period under the ANAP governments (1983-1992). This hybrid party was the product of military intervention, and after the re-emergence of the closed parties, it disintegrated because its constituting fractions went back to the parties of their own ideology. This might be interpreted as the continuation of the existing cleavages and party ideologies, despite the military intervention.

In addition, a socio-political environment suitable for the rise of political Islam had been promoted by the military. These changes in party landscape would be considered to be the main reasons behind the formation of Islamist-secularist cleavage in the 1990s.

1.8 Coalition Government and Emergence of the AKP: 1992 - 2002

The decade between 1992 and 2002 witnessed the electoral victory of a pro-Islamic party, the RP, for the first time in the history of the Turkish political party system. However, the RP’s tenure did not last long, since it was suppressed

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The left parties (e.g. the SHP) did not become successful during the local elections of 1994. Its failure was due to its corruption scandals during its term in office (1989-1994) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.328).
as a result of the 1997 post-modern coup d’état. In addition, the political party system of this decade was characterized by coalition governments up until the emergence of the AKP in 2002.

The first half of the 1990s was marked by the local elections of 1994, which resulted in the RP’s victory, while the ANAP lost its leading position and gave way to the RP (Mert, 2007, pp.129-130). The RP’s electoral victory in the two metropolitan cities of İstanbul and Ankara demonstrated the replacement of both the left and right-wing political parties by political Islam (Yavuz, 2005, pp.289-290 and p.310). In this economically and socially turbulent environment of the early 1990s, the RP’s “adil” and “temiz” discourses which advocated welfare assistance and moral principles of the charity led it to reach the disadvantaged social strata living in the squatter areas of those metropolitan cities. In these urban areas, tradesmen, craftsmen and new migrants with low incomes and no social security constituted the social base of the RP (Bakirezer and Demirer, 2010, p.158).

The RP’s strongest point was not its Islamist discourse, but its ability to reach the masses by means of grassroots organizations and to establish solidarity networks and social services campaigns through municipalities (Bakirezer and Demirer, 2010, p.158). As a result of the launch of solidarity relations and social campaigns, the RP succeeded in establishing concrete links with deprived social

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29 “Post-modern coup d’état” in Turkey is used as a memorandum given by the military to a ruling government to denote its do’s and don’ts. The military claims that this is a legal right given to it by the legislature after the 1982 Constitution (Demir, 2007; Washington Times, 2005).


30 Adil: just; egalitarian
31 Temiz: clean
strata (e.g. through strong neighbourhood links, woman branch and youth branch) (Yavuz, 2005, pp.289-290 and p.310). Furthermore, these concrete links remained unchanged, despite the changes in the party’s institutional framework (e.g. RP’s closure).

The RP’s success in the local elections of 1994 was followed by its victory in the legislative elections of 1995. The main reason behind the success of the RP at parliamentary level was “its cross-coalition of winners and losers of economic reform”. The “winners” were the peripheral segment of the capitalist class that was formed by SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) (Gülalp, 2001, p.444). This rising bourgeoisie benefited from process of globalization as a result of export-driven and free-market economy (Öniş, 1997, pp.748-749). Nevertheless, its exclusion from the traditional, long-established elite class drew them to the RP (Öniş, 1997, pp.748-749).

In addition, the transformation of the RP from a marginal political party into a significant political movement was a phenomenon paralleled by the growing power of Islamic business in the Turkish economy and society in the 1990s. To be more specific, the rise of the RP reflected the growing aspirations of the Anatolian capitalists, which wanted to consolidate its positions in society and to achieve elite status, as well as to obtain a greater share of public resources (Öniş, 1997, p.760).

On the other hand, the “losers” represented the masses which had suffered from economic liberalization and now believed in the RP’s “Adil düzen” programme as a remedy to their socio-economic ills (Öniş, 1997,

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32 Adil düzen: The “Just Order” program was the state-centred Islamic project which intended to establish a powerful state and extensive welfare programme (Yavuz, 2003, p.24 and p.221).
This alliance between the “winners” and “losers” constituted a challenge “towards both the left and right-wing political parties of the established secular political order” (Öniş, 1997, pp.748-749). Therefore, the electoral victory of the RP led to a decrease in the votes of both left and centre-right parties.

When this decade is examined from the perspective of social cleavage structures, the predominant left-right cleavage appears to have become obsolete, and to have given place to the secular-Islamist cleavage. In the political arena, this cleavage was played out with the left-wing parties defending secularism, whereas the RP principally supported Islamists.

In addition, left and right divisions gave way to another cleavage between secularists and Islamists. In the 1980s, the right-wing ideology was fed significantly from the international setting of the post-Cold war, where the political Islam became predominant in the Middle East. Therefore, while the left ideology lost its strength on the ideological ground, the right ideology began to be characterized by political Islam (Zürcher, 2008, p.416). As a result of this dual ideological transformation, in the late 1990s, left-right division led to a new cleavage between Islamists and secularists (Zürcher, 2008, pp.418-419 and pp.424-425).

This cleavage took different forms in the early 1990s when the Kurds, who were allied to left-wing parties in the 1970s and 1980s, attempted to establish their own political parties, and as a result, gave birth to a new cleavage: that of Turkish and Kurdish nationalism. The Kurdish ethnic groups began to establish their own political parties (e.g. HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi -
People’s Democracy Party) instead of being represented by left-wing political parties. However, in the 1990s, those parties advocating Kurdish nationalism did not manage to gain representation in parliament due to the 10% electoral barrier.\(^{33}\) In addition, in the early 1990s, the division between Kurds and Turks became more apparent due to the ongoing armed conflict between the Turkish army, and since then, it has continued with a rising intensity (Zürcher, 2008, pp.452-457).

The deepening of the cleavages related to ethnicity and religiosity, together with the constitution of 1982, led to the fragmentation of the electorate and, thereby, of the party system\(^{34}\) (Başlevent, Kırmanoğlu and Şenatalar, 2004, p.310). Thus, in spite of the RP’s electoral success (21%), this did not suffice in establishing a majority government and ended up in making a coalition agreement\(^{35}\) with the DYP (Kongar, 2011, pp.274-275).

The DYP-RP coalition government did not please the MGK (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu - Army’s National Security Council), which disapproved of the RP’s radical policies and practices against secularism. Hence, at its meeting on

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\(^{33}\) In order to be eligible for the electorate elections a party should get 10% out of 100 % of the votes.

\(^{34}\) 1995 Elections: The ANAP: 19.7% (132 deputies); the CHP: 10.7% (49 deputies); the DSP: 14.6% (76 deputies); the DYP: 19.2% (135 deputies) and the RP: 21.4% (158 deputies) (Çavdar, 2008b, p.331).

\(^{35}\) As mentioned in 1.5, in 1970s, there were four main political parties that remained steadily in the parliament. Three of them were right-wing parties (the AP, the MSP and the MHP) and the fourth was the left-wing CHP. There were also two parties that emerged by splitting of some dissident fractions from the CHP and the AP, but they could not survive long. In 1990s, however, due to the 10% electoral barrier, there was no representation of small parties (with votes less than 10%). For example the CHP remained out of parliament in legislative elections of 1995 (Kongar, 2011, p. 270). Moreover, even parties such as the CHP (in 1999 legislative elections) and the MHP (in 1994 legislative elections) remained out of the parliament because of this restriction (Kongar, 2011, p.270; Bilâ, 2008, p.357). Besides, the HADEP remained also under the 10% election barrier (Kongar, 2011, p.307).

These results showed clearly that the 10% barrier imposed by the military government (Özbudun 2002) with the pretext of establishing a stable parliamentary party system did not render the anticipated results, as soon as the political restrictions were lifted in 1987.

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28th February 1997, the MGK issued a list of directives that the leader of the RP was obliged to sign (Kongar, 2011, pp. 285-286). At the same time, the MGK cooperated with the AM (Anayasa Mahkemesi - Constitutional Court of Turkey) which launched a case requesting the RP’s closure. As a result of the court’s decision, the RP was closed down in 1998 (Akarca and Tansel, 2007, p.638; Stepan, 2000, p.51). However, despite the RP’s closure, the parliament was not suspended. Therefore, the process which started under the directives of the MGK was called a “post-modern” coup, as it was carried out quietly behind the scenes. The 1997 post-modern coup d’état impacted severely on the political and economic conjuncture up to 2002, which resulted in the AKP’s emergence.

As seen above, from the first military intervention in 1960 until this post-modern memorandum (1960; 1971; 1980 and 1997), the military interventions and memorandums36 impacted the development of political party system in Turkey. After the military intervention of 1960, the military has considered the Kemalism as its main ideology. Therefore, in the case of Islamic revival, ethnic conflict or any political turmoil which threatens the secular and Unitarian Turkish state, the military has found legitimacy to intervene in parliamentary politics (Yavuz, 2005, p.94).

36 The history of the Turkish political parties has been rich in military interventions and their variety. Aside from the two conventional interventions of 1960 and 1980, there has been a coup by memorandum in 1971, a post-modern coup in 1997 and as to be explained below e-memoranda in 2007. The last three can actually be designated as “light” interventions because they have not aimed at dissolution of the parliament and/or changes in legislation, but rather at overthrowing the government. As aforementioned, the clauses in the constitution of 1961 have been the reference for the following interventions, providing the necessary legitimacy (Yavuz, 2005, p.94).

The aim of the post-modern memorandum was directly the RP and as the deputy general staff of that time formulated, “the fine adjustment of politics” in the country (Birand, 2012). This statement holds for the other two memoranda as well.

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/15-years-ago-today-we-smashed-into-a-wall-while-fine-tuning-.aspx?pageID=449&nID=14787&NewsCatID=405
Following the post-modern coup d’état, the members of the closed RP went through a learning process (Tanıyıcı, 2003, p.474) and its leaders and members realized that votes for the extreme-right parties had increased as a result of dissatisfaction with the centre-right parties (Yeşilada, 2002, p.74). This fact led them to an awareness of the necessity for a more moderate party ideology and political tactics if they wished to reach a broader voter base (Öniş, 2010, 264; Yavuz, 2005, p.335).

As part of this moderate agenda, and as a means of seeking accommodation with the established secular system, they considered moving closer to Western style party and state institutional democracy on the one hand and EU membership on the other hand (Tanıyıcı, 2003, p.475). This ideological change was adopted by the successor political party to the RP, the FP (Fazilet Partisi - Virtue Party) which adopted a party programme emphasizing western democracy, human rights and freedoms (Öniş, 2004, p.8).

However, the change in the discourse of the FP was not enough to satisfy the requirements of the constitutional court and this time, the FP was closed down because it was thought to be still too anti-secularism. The court decision was based on the entrance of an FP deputy to the parliament with an Islamic headscarf following the elections of 1999 (Atacan, 2005, p.188; Yeşilada, 2010, pp.62-63).

The closure of the FP did not solve problems related to the rise of political Islam, but it did contribute to a transformation in the positions of the political Islamists and led to their reconciliation with and their integration to globalization processes. This, in turn, first influenced the emergence of a
reformist branch within the FP and later the establishment of the AKP in 2001 (Uzgel, 2010, p.12). The FP’s main ideological stance (Milli Görüş) continued to be expressed within the party called the SP (Saadet Party - Felicity Party) (Dağı, 2005, p.29). In terms of discourse, even though the SP had a less reformist approach than the AKP, both claimed to support Turkey’s potential EU membership in anticipation that this membership would contribute to the development of human rights in Turkey (Tanıyıcı, 2003, p.479).

In addition to the political implications, the post-modern memorandum impacted on the support given to the Islamist parties by the Islamist provincial capitalists. As a result of the 28th February 1997 decisions, the SPK (Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu - Capital Market Boards of Turkey) made 131 official complaints and launched a campaign against the Anatolian capitalists began (Teazis, 2011, pp.121-122). Consequently, the Islamic holdings faced severe restrictions which prevented them from entering into state auctions, thereby taking share from privatization pie (Doğan, 2010, p. 299).

During the closure processes of the RP and the FP in the years 1998 and 2001, the relationship between the RP/FP and the Anatolian capitalists was thus constrained. The military knew that the Anatolian business circles were the main financial source of Islamist parties. Therefore, as mentioned above, the military brought them under pressure, and restricted the activities of their representative association, the MÜSİAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği - Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association). Thus, the Anatolian entrepreneurs realized that they could not reconcile with the state and take part in processes such as globalization with the RP’s vision (Uzgel, 2010, p.17).
Therefore, they looked for an alternative political movement which would not be in conflict with the state and the EU and Western democratic values. The reformist group that emerged in the RP/FP now presented such a solution. The troika of this reformist group, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç, the so-called late group of the “Milli Görüş”, having adopted a pro-Western stance and pro-globalization were received with enthusiasm and supported by the Anatolian capitalists (Kuru, 2005, p.272). The Islamist bourgeoisie, in some respect, contributed to the transformation of the Islamists/Islamist parties. The reformist group also gained the support of the Gülen Movement, a very powerful Islamic network that also advocated the principles of moderate Islam and neoliberal market economy (Kuru, 2005, pp.272-273).

On the other hand, the reformist movement that broke up with the National Vision ideology did not want to limit its supporter groups to provincial capitalists and religious circles. Instead, it aimed to reach a broader group in order to further the transformation of state-civil society complex. The liberal intellectuals and the NGOs also received the moderate Islamists with compliance, as they saw the AKP as a tool to minimize the state’s dominance and speed up integration into the EU (Uzgel, 2010, p.38). These circumstances promoted a rapid organization of the reformist group, resulting in the establishment of the AKP in 2001.

The AKP also managed to get to its side the strong grassroots networks of the RP/FP at the local administration level through municipalities (Bakirezer

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37 The liberal intellectuals played an important role on the formation of new political party. On the other hand, the TÜSİAD (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği - Turkish Industrialist and Businessmen’s Association) played a role in the background (Uzgel, 2010, p.27).
and Demirer, 2010, p.158). The RP’s success in the 1994 local elections had continued to exist despite its closure. For instance, despite the FP’s decrease of votes in the legislative elections of 1999, the FP’s votes at the local elections of the same year increased (Bakırezer and Demirer, 2010, p.158). This successful social help framework for underprivileged people that operated through the local administrations was now inherited by the AKP. Therefore, the strong mobilization and networks at the local administrations level also contributed to the AKP’s electoral success as well (Bakırezer and Demirer, 2010, p.159; Öniş, 2006, p.130).

Finally, the emergence of the AKP in 2002 was the product of the pre-2002 political and economic conditions, in particular severe economic crises of 2000 and 2001 (Çavdar, 2008b, pp.346-347). These economic crises had influenced whole segments of Turkish society, not only the disadvantaged masses, but also all the strata: “rich, poor, educated, uneducated, urban and rural” (Öniş, 2006, pp.130-131).

In such a desperate economic context, the AKP’s party programmes, with its emphasis on social justice as well as neoliberal economic policies, attracted not only the disadvantaged masses but also business groups which had been looking for stability in both economy and politics and importantly, room for carrying out business without any state intervention (Öniş, 2006, p.130; Özcan and Yavuz, 2007, p.131).

In the legislative elections of 2002, the electorate punished all the parties that took part in either the outgoing or still earlier coalition governments that had been in office since the late 1990s. The AKP obtained 34.2% of the votes
(equivalent to 363 deputies), which resulted in a new period in the Turkish political party system, as well as Turkish society (Sayarı, 2007, p.198).

A decade of coalition governments and a fragmented party system was over. The main (single) opposition party had become the CHP with 19.4% (178 deputies); the independents followed with 1% (9 deputies) (Sayarı, 2007, p.198). Due to the 10% electoral barrier within the party system, 45.3% of the voters had failed to be represented in the parliament (based on an interview with a high-ranking representative of the TÜSİAD (Rıza, Appendix Part B, Table 1)).

An analysis of the votes revealed that the AKP had come out of the legislative elections of 2002 not as an Islamist party but as a centre-right political party (Yavuz, 2005, p.348). Obviously, the AKP would not have obtained such a capacity to attract votes, had it only relied on its main religious base and not attempted to reach the masses (Öniş, 2010, p.266).

1.9 The AKP and the Dominant-Party System: 2002 - 2011

Following the legislative elections of 2002, the AKP continued to implement the previous government’s programme which resulted in stabilization and consolidation in the country’s economy. The AKP government also made efficient use of rather suitable international financing facilities for emerging market economies and of the world economy that had gained a momentum and entered a process of further expansion in the early 2000s.

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38 The AKP was in a rather fortunate position to have found such a good economic programme at its disposal. The programme was actually the product of the fundamental economic reforms implemented by the previous coalition government formed by the DSP, the MHP and ANAP in 1999 (Öniş, 2010, p.270). This government had also courageously implemented the initial demanding political reform packages related to EU membership. However, their political achievement was overshadowed by chronic inflation, economic recession and the very severe economic crises of 2001 and 2002 (Çavdar, 2008b, pp.346-347). Actually, these problems had been the outcome of the inconsistent policies of 1990s. However, the electorate had not taken notice thereof and punished the coalition government in the elections of 2002. The credit for implementing the programme in turn only went to the AKP.
(Uygur, 2010, p.7; Macovei, 2009, p.10). However, the AKP government does deserve credit of having made the best of these circumstances with very efficient governance and strict fiscal discipline that helped to bring the chronic high inflation under control and attain sustainable economic growth.

In addition to its neoliberal agenda, the AKP presented itself as a conservative democratic party with a neoliberal market economy agenda. The AKP emphasized its difference from the RP/FP’s party tradition; rather, it advocated its ideological position as a conservative democracy (Çıtak and Tür, 2008, p.462).  

With this new ideological stance, the AKP followed the EU membership process and continued to implement reform packages that were aimed at integrating Turkish legislation into EU legislation. It adopted a strong pro-EU stance and discourse of human rights and democracy. It also lifted the OHAL (Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği - Regional Governorship of State of Emergency) that had been in effect for almost two decades. This decision was important for the Kurdish citizens who suffered significantly from antidemocratic policies of the governorship and increasing security problems (TESEV, 2008, p.22).

Moreover, the AKP’s attempts to gain EU membership and to remove military tutelage from the government were appreciated by liberal journalists and policy makers. These efforts were finally rewarded by initiating formal negotiations with the EU in 2005. However, the AKP’s relations with the EU

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39 By stressing on its ideological position, the AKP aimed to demonstrate its distinction not from the RP/FP but also from the previous centre-right political parties (Çıtak and Tür, 2008, p.462).
41 TESEV (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı - The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/5b5a17ea-c2db-4d25-ad8f-54652ef2c80/Kurt%20Sorunu%20Cozum%20icin%20Yol%20Haritasi.pdf
soured in 2006 because “the EU Council froze the opening of eight chapters over Turkey’s rejection to open its ports and airports to Greek vessels and aircraft” (Avcı, 2011, p.412). Countries such as France, Germany, Greece and Cyprus have rejected opening of various other chapters. Currently, the AKP government has moved to a “passive activism towards the EU, and is making a significant effort to remain in the negotiations” (Avcı, 2011, p.419).

Following the first tenure in government, the AKP’s popularity was tested during the presidential elections in 2007. As has been pointed out, with the constitution of 1982, the president was endowed with unusually legislative, executive powers. Moreover, he symbolizes the secular republic. In 2007, the

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42 Another source of disappointment for the AKP was the confirmatory decision of the EHRC on the issue of headscarf ban (Aydın and Aydın, 2004). http://bianet.org/english/english/38027-echr-rules-for-turkish-headscarf-ban

43 Article 104 Duties and Powers of the President of the Republic

a) Those relating to legislation:

“to deliver, if he or she deems it necessary, the opening address of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the first day of the legislative year, to summon the Turkish Grand National Assembly to meet, when necessary, to promulgate laws, to return laws to the Turkish Grand National Assembly to be reconsidered, to submit to referendum, if he or she deems it necessary, legislation regarding amendment of the Constitution.

to appeal to the Constitutional Court for the annulment in part or entirety of certain provisions of laws, decrees having the force of law, and the Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the grounds that they are unconstitutional in form or in content, to call new elections for the Turkish Grand National Assembly”.

b) Those relating to executive functions:

“to appoint the Prime Minister and to accept his or her resignation, to appoint and dismiss Ministers on the proposal of the Prime Minister, to preside over the Council of Ministers or to call the Council of Ministers to meet under his or her chairmanship whenever he or she deems it necessary, to accredit representatives of the Turkish state to foreign states and to receive the representatives of foreign states appointed to the Republic of Turkey, to ratify and promulgate international treaties, to represent the Supreme Military Command of the Turkish Armed Forces on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, to decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces, to appoint the Chief of the General Staff, to call the National Security Council to meet, to preside over the National Security Council, to proclaim martial law or state of emergency, and to issue decrees having the force of law, in accordance with the decisions of the Council of Ministers under his or her chairmanship, to sign decrees, to remit, on grounds of chronic illness, disability, or old age, all or part of the sentences imposed on certain individuals, to appoint the members and the chairman of the state Supervisory Council, to instruct the State Supervisory Council to carry out inquiries, investigations and inspections, to appoint the members of the Higher Education Council, to appoint rectors of universities” (Anayasa, 2001, pp.35-36).


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AKP’s nomination of Abdullah Gül for the presidency was not approved by the CHP, the constitutional court and the military (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, p.120).

Moreover, the general staff manifested the discomfort with the e-memorandum that was published in the general staff web site on 27th April 2007 (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, p.120). The fact that this memorandum was published online brought this new term to the political terminology. The e-memorandum was one of the first major challenges to the AKP’s consolidation. However, the AKP overcame this challenge through its resolution and immediate call for early legislative elections, which resulted in a clear victory for the party.

Thus, the AKP obtained 46.5% of the votes (341 deputies), exceeding its electoral victory of 2002 (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, p.130). As it will be demonstrated in next chapters (4 and 5), this success was clearly the outcome of economic stability (e.g. decrease of inflation, fiscal discipline, sustainable economic growth and establishment of TL as a valuable currency) and efficiently initiated social policies (reforms within health care system, social security as well as housing projects) launched in the AKP’s first tenure.

In the legislative elections of 2007 (22th July 2007), for the first time in Turkish political history, a Kurdish political party DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi - Democratic Society Party) was successful in becoming represented in parliament. Instead of entering into the elections as a party, the DTP managed to by-pass the electoral barrier with independent deputies.44 The CHP obtained

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44 Compared with the previous low representation in the parliament in the previous legislative term after the elections of 2007, 87% of voters were represented (Bulut, 2007). http://www.e-akademi.org/makaleler/nbulut-2.htm
20.9% (112 deputies), the MHP gained 14.3% (71 deputies) and independents\(^{45}\) 3.63% (25 deputies) (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, p.130). Thus, in 2007, the AKP consolidated its position within the party system.

Following the legislative elections of 2007, Abdullah Gül was re-nominated and elected in August 2007 as the president in the new elected parliament, despite the CHP’s boycott of the election. Moreover, the AKP further counter-challenged the army’s e-memorandum which stopped it from contesting the presidency in April of that year, by calling a referendum\(^{46}\) on the direct election of the president by Turkish voters. The referendum was carried with 68.95% of voters in favour of reform of the presidency.

The year of 2008 was also a challenging year for the AKP, because of the constitutional court’s closure case against the AKP (Sevinç, 2010, p.264). However, unlike its decisions of the 1990s, the constitutional court did not vote for the closure of the AKP.

Furthermore, in 2010, the AKP obtained a majority vote in the parliament to amend the constitution of 1982. The AKP government put this parliamentary decision to a referendum in order to get the electorate’s support for legitimating the amendment. The referendum\(^{47}\) held on 12\(^{th}\) September 2010

\(^{45}\) 20 out of 25 independent deputies were the Kurdish Representatives (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, p.130).
\(^{46}\) Until 2007, the President was elected by parliament. The 2007 referendum proposed a number of reforms to the presidency apart from election of the president by direct popular vote. The other reforms consisted of reducing the presidential term from 7 years to 5; holding general elections every 4 years instead of 5; and reducing the quorum needed for the parliamentary decisions 284 (İkinci, 2007).
\(^{47}\) The amendments included clauses for further extending economic and social rights, as well as individual freedoms; abolishment of the legal protection of the coup leaders of 1980. The changes under the heading judicial reforms in turn were strongly opposed by the CHP (Head, 2010). They brought higher courts under polity control, since their compositions was to be determined mainly by presidential appointments. Finally amendments allowed every citizen to
resulted in the approval of the constitutional amendment by the majority of the society. This referendum was also a test for the third legislative elections, which were held in 2011 (Cameron-Moore, 2010). The AKP once again successively increased its votes and obtained 49.9% of the votes; followed by the CHP (26%); the MHP (13%) and independents (Kurdish votes) (6.6%) (Çarkoğlu, 2011, p.48; Esen and Ciddi, 2011). Thus, as of 2011, the party system was split into two parts: the AKP and the others.

1.10 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have given a historical account of political processes that resulted in the emergence of the AKP. As a pro-western, conservative democratic political party with Islamic roots, the AKP is the first of its kind in the world. Its emergence and then consolidation in the Turkish political party system is, at the same time, an example of how special circumstances can lead to a unique historical development.

Here, not only its founders’ proved to be decisive in its emergence; but also the socio-economic and historical environment as well as conjectural developments at the turn of the century played a significant role. It is of importance to note that this event occurred in Turkey, a secular state, in which some socio-economic structures of the Ottoman Empire remain preserved. The Anatolian entrepreneurship is such a structure, with a tradition that has roots deep in history. A devout, yet
open minded group of businessmen, the “so-called” Anatolian capitalists, advocated adopting a free-market economy in the country. Hence, they became one of main supporters that enabled the AKP to emerge, as the party included a neoliberal economy agenda in its programme.

Another traditional structure which the AKP made use of the system of religious grassroots organizations and solidarity networks, all originating from the Ottoman era, which helped the AKP to gain connections with the disadvantaged segments of the society. This system had already been extended by the AKP’s predecessors, and the RP and FP were inherited by the AKP.

With a particular programme that emphasized democracy, human rights, neoliberal market economy and pro-western stance, the AKP was, if not fully accepted, at least tolerated by the secular state. Conjectural developments were also helpful. The country that had just come out of two severe economic crises and had a decade of economic recession behind it saw in the AKP a chance of a new start. Not least, the EU desired that a potential member had political stability and a government which would share the same values with the community. The AKP’s founders made use of these circumstances very efficiently in establishing, promoting and consolidating their party.

Centre-periphery and state-church type cleavages also contributed to the AKP’s emergence, which in some respects was a synthesis of the dialectic between the fronts of these cleavages. Thus, not only did the dynamics of the Islamist parties that preceded the AKP play a role, but also the guidance of the secular state. Finally, it is noteworthy that Islam was deliberately promoted by the Western world during the Cold War in order to contain the expansion of communism.
Nevertheless, this policy gave rise after the Cold War to the emergence of radicalism in many places in the Islamic world. Despite the same kind of promotion, the political party system in Turkey produced, in the AKP’s example the very anti-thesis of radicalism and violence.
Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

In this research, I will pursue my analysis of the AKP in the framework of the Turkish party system. To this effect, a review of the theories related to party systems is a requisite. To do so, I first plan to look at parties and the way that the competitive, institutional and socio-historical factors frame party ideology. Then, in examining theories related to the party system, I take into account Ware’s (1996) classification of the party system, according to the three main factors above. Taking into account these factors, I briefly discuss the relevant theories as well as the way that they have been developed by various scholars 1950s. This part of the literature review helps to make a link between the development of Turkish party system and the main party system models.

Second, I consider the main factors that influence the voting behaviour, and how the latter produces voting patterns. I categorize these factors under four main groups: economic, retrospective, sociological and socio-psychological. These sets of factors have been the subject of extensive studies. This part, similar to the party system models, is important in discussing party developments from the point of view of voters. I have looked at various factors which can be relevant to the voting behaviour of Turkish voters.

Third, I review the empirical studies that have made use of these different theories of voting, in order to analyse Turkish voting patterns, the Turkish party system and Turkish parties. These studies fall into four groups, on the basis of economic, retrospective, attitudinal and geographical characteristics. I will also consider empirical work on the cleavage structure in Turkey.
Fourth, I discuss country studies on Turkey and Turkish politics that have been published since the emergence of the AKP in 2002. I review these studies from a historical perspective of modernization, secularism, democracy, and/or political Islam. This part helps to investigate the reasons behind the emergence of the AKP as well its impact on the society and politics from different angles.

Following this review of Turkish politics, I elaborate on the theories and the dual models mainly used by Turkish scholars in their analysis of Turkish society. I pursue a chronological approach, rather than one based on the changes that Turkish society has undergone during the Republican period. The subsequent survey of work on the emerging Islamist bourgeoisie and economy will finally be followed by my review of non-scholarly literature on voting patterns and behaviour (pre-election polls; post-elections commentary reports) and the reports of international NGOs on important policy areas (gender; welfare and EU accession process of Turkey). Finally, I will continually appraise this information in the context of the emergence and consolidation of the AKP.

2.2 Traditional Political Science Theories and Political Parties

2.2.1 Spatial Competition and Party Ideology

This approach attempts to explain voting behaviour in terms of social choice\textsuperscript{50} theory. In the related theory of spatial competition,\textsuperscript{51} Downs (1957) as cited in Ware (1996) elucidates how the politicians, aspiring to get elected, position themselves “near the set of policies favoured by the median voter”. Similarly, party ideologies are positioned along the lines of main cleavages: that

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\textsuperscript{50} It belongs to the theory of microeconomics. For more information, see Arrow (1962)

\textsuperscript{51} For more information, see Hotteling (1929)
is, in a somewhat similar way to the set of policies favoured by the median voter. The idea of the political spectrum that comprises the left-wing; the right-wing and the intermediate positions illustrates such a positioning (Ware, 1996, p.18).

This can be linked to the Turkish party spectrum of 1970s. The Turkish political party spectrum of 1970s may exemplify the arrangement of the parties along the left-right axis: the CHP (centre left), the AP (centre right), the MHP (nationalist) and the MSP (Islamist) as extreme-right. In this system, the CHP and the AP were the parties favoured by the majority (or the median voter).

Contrary to the spatial competition theory of Downs (1957), who has taken into account a single ideological spectrum, Budge et al. (1987) as cited in Ware (1996) have extended the impact of “one dimension relating to economic issues with a dimension on lifestyle/personal values” (Ware, 1996, p.20).

2.2.2 Institutional Approach to Party Ideology

The institutional approach considers the parties as institutions which are based on deep-rooted beliefs and values (Ware, 1996, p.21-22). The differentiation of party ideologies and actions is thus based on their origins, and not their positions within a spatial dimension. This is arguably a deterministic approach, favoured by the school of political sociology, which is inclined to conceive of institutions, and parties, as products of environmental constraints, and to underestimate their autonomy (Marcus, 1998, pp.1-2). The school of political institutionalism, in turn, is inclined to give the primacy of politics directly to institutions and to “the actors’ logic” (Marcus, 1998, p.2).

Thus, party ideology is not “merely an aggregation of the policy preferences of its members, but an institution or force that governs the party
programme by appealing to the norms, values and beliefs of its members” (Hindman, 2006, p.8). The institutional approach thus enables a more appropriate comparison of party ideologies than the spatial model, as it views party ideologies as distinct entities rather than mere references on a spectrum of political preferences and stances (Hindman, 2006, p.5).

Klaus von Beyme (1985, p.23), who developed the above approach, has provided a classification of European political parties based on this version of party ideology. He classifies nine major party groups or “familles spirituelles” which can be seen in European democracies (Beyme, 1985 cited in Ware, 1996, p.22). Ware (1996) investigates whether party families are still sharply differentiated from each other. He concludes that except in the United States, all liberal democracies have parties from more than one ‘family’ (Ware, 1996, p.45). In each case, party differences have their roots in the political and socio-economic history of these countries.

A more recent classification categorizes 15 party “species” into their proper “genera” on the basis of three criteria: 1. the nature of party organization (e.g., elite- or mass-based); 2. the programmatic orientation of the party (e.g., ideological or clientele-orientated); 3. pluralistic (democratic) versus proto-hegemonic (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p.167).

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52 These nine major groups are as follows: liberal and radical parties; conservative parties; socialist and social democratic parties; Christian democratic parties; communist parties; agrarian parties; regional and ethnic parties; right-wing extremist parties and ecology movement (Klaus von Beyme, 1985 cited in Ware, 1996, p.22).

53 Gunther and Diamond (2003) refer to von Beyme’s overview of the emergence of European political parties on the basis of their ideological and programmatic orientations and its resemblance to theirs. However, they point to “the organizational features and behavioral characteristics that (they additionally) regard as of considerable importance” (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p.196).
2.3 Traditional Theories of Political Party Systems

Ware (1996) classifies party systems according to three main sets of features: these are sociological; institutional and competitive features (Ware, 1996, p.8; Appendix Part A, Table 1).

2.3.1 Party Systems: Sociological Factors

The role of sociological and environmental factors has already been mentioned above. The theories of the party system, on the basis of sociological factors, aim to explain political phenomena mainly in terms of the social events that trigger them. However, as also mentioned before, explanations of political events from a purely sociological angle disregard the role of institutions in socio-political developments (Ware, 1996, pp.8-9).

2.3.1.1 Almond’s Approach

Ware (1996) argues that the usage of the sociological factors for political analysis became important in the 1950s for two reasons. First, both Marxists and non-Marxists scholars considered “class as the primary cleavage in industrialized societies” (Ware, 1996, p.185). Second, a typology of party systems was formulated by Almond (1956) based on sociological concepts (Almond, 1956 as cited in Ware, 1996, p.185).

Almond (1956) grouped political party systems under four main categories: “the Anglo-American groups54; the Continental European groups55; the pre-industrial, or partially industrial political systems outside the Euro-American area and the totalitarian political party systems” (Almond, 1956 as cited in Ware, 1996, p.185).

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54 This includes some members of the British Commonwealth of countries ” (Almond, 1956 as cited in Ware, 1996, p.185).
55 This excludes the Scandinavian and Low Countries which possess similar characteristics as the Anglo-American ones ” (Almond, 1956 as cited in Ware, 1996, p.185).
cited in Ware, 1996, p.185). He derived this typology from the Weber-Parsons tradition in social theory (Ware, 1996, p.185). Hence, he was using a Weberian concept of class rather than a Marxist one.

Almond’s classification was based on sociological concepts. It defined the political system in terms of how institutions and norms affect citizens’ voting behaviour (Almond, 1956, pp.392-393). His model was a simplified scheme, comprising the most common, but not all political systems (Almond, 1956, pp.392-393). The classification may not hold in our time, but the tools are still relevant for our modern classification of political system. In particular, his description of the Continental European system displays features which have resemblance to the Turkish system. Thus, it is based on a fragmented political culture, political subcultures of diverse origins with divisions such as semi-secular and anti-secular, left and right (Almond, 1956, p.406).

2.3.1.2 Cleavage-structure

In a similar way to Almond, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) made use of Talcott Parsons’s four-fold scheme as a starting point in developing their four dimensions of cleavages. As a result of the transformation of Talcott Parsons’ concept, they obtained their scheme from four types of conflict: centre-periphery; state-church; land-industry and owner-worker (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p.47).

56 The four-function scheme was based on the “four basic dilemmas of orientation in the roles taken by actors in social systems: (on the categorization of situational objects) universalism vs. particularism; performance vs. quality; (on the attitudes to objects) specificity vs. diffuseness; affectivity vs. neutrality” (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p.7).
• Centre-Periphery

This type of division is the result of the previous centuries’ impact on European countries (especially the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). The main debate in this conflict between centre and periphery centres on the choice of religion and language was made by society (Ware, 1996, p.186).

According to the cleavage concept, the centre-periphery dualism demonstrates the struggle between the centre of society (composed of the ruling elite (e.g. bureaucrats; military officials) which aims to create the nation-state and the periphery which comprises ethnically, linguistically or religiously distinct groups that resist against the homogenization of the country for the sake of creating a nation-state (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p.14). The tension arises also from the resistance of conservatives and liberals against state administrative centralization and cultural standardization (both in terms of religion and language) (Caramani, 2007, p.321). Consequently, this type of cleavage gives impetus to the emergence of political parties that represent the centre versus the periphery. They advocate either a centrist state ideology or translate demands based on religious or ethnic divisions.57

• State-Church

The idea of the conflict between the State and the Church draws its inspiration from the French Revolution of 1789 which resulted in a closer relationship between the state and its citizens. As a result, the state began to control its citizens by assuming the responsibility of education that was conceived until that time within the scope of authority of the church. Since the

57 For instance, Caramani illustrates her view with reference to the SNP (Scottish National Party) UK, the BQ (Bloc Québécois) (Canada) and the PNV (Partido Nationalista Vasco - Basque Nationalist Party) in Spain (Caramani, 2007, p.321).
state represented at the same time secularity, the division between the church and the state deepened and, in the course of time, turned into a division between religious and secular voters (Ware, 1996, p.187).

In the European context, there was no typical way in which the nation-state was established, given the differences between European countries. The ways in which Scandinavia and Britain dealt with the problems arising from this type of cleavage were not the same as those in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. In turn, France, because of its national Revolution of 1789 and subsequent radical break from the Church, represented a very particular case (Ware, 1996, p.186). In conclusion, the church-state cleavage resulted in the emergence of parties which addressed the voters on either side of this divide.\(^58\)

- **Land-Industry**

While the cleavage between the state and church was predominantly a conflict that influenced the development of parties with distinct ideologies and electorates, the new conflict which arose in the nineteenth century during the Industrial Revolution was due to differences between agricultural and industrial, 

\(^58\) Parties that have emerged on the basis of the state-church devide are common in the Continental European party system as pointed out by Almond (1956), as exemplified by the parties that deliberately indicate their religious background in their names. (See for examples the CDU (*Christlich Demokratisch Union Deutschlands* - Christian Democratic Union of Germany) in Germany and DC (*Democrazia Cristiana* - Christian Democracy) in Italy or CDA (*Christen Democratisch Appèl* - Christian Democratic Appeal) or CU (*Christen Unie* - Christian Union) in Holland (Parties and Elections in Europe, 2012).

http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/

These are the parties to which the AKP makes reference whenever it is reminded of its Islamic origin. On the other hand, the CHP, as the founder party of the Republic of Turkey, has been identified with the state. This feature of being the founder of a state makes the CHP a unique case. The CHP can perhaps be compared in this respect with the KPSS (*Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza* - Communist Party of the Soviet Union). The latter is known as the founder of the world’s first socialist state (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1939). http://www.marx2mao.com/PDFs/HCFSU39.pdf

The CHP’s state party character has changed in the 1970s with its adoption of social democratic stance. In Chapter 1, further information was provided over these parties and other political parties as well as their origins.
interests, and the main reason for conflict\textsuperscript{59} was the rise of agricultural tariffs and “the freedom for industrial enterprises” (Ware, 1996, p.187). For instance, for Britain, the interests of agriculture and industry came together in long-term. However its variant, in the form of urban-rural divisions continued to be a serious problem during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century for the most of Europe (Ware, 1996, p.187).

In short, social (in particular, center-periphery, state-church and left-right) cleavages have given rise to the emergence of a myriad of political parties in the course of the last two hundred years in Continental Europe. It may be claimed that since the beginning of the multiparty system, nearly the same social cleavages have led to the emergence to a variety of political parties also in Turkey.

- Employer-Worker

The last social cleavage, according to the Lipset-Rokkan, is based on the owner-worker relationship. They consider the Russian Revolution of 1917 as the most critical event in the evolution of this cleavage since it gave rise to two new distinct lines of the cleavage, each with its own direction: one of them became committed to an international revolutionary movement and the other one to the national polity (Ware, 1996, p.188). The parties which arose from this conflict were communist parties, some with an internationalist and others with a nationalist outlook.

The more moderate expression of the owner-worker cleavage in political parties was the rise of Socialist parties (or the so-called labour movement

\textsuperscript{59} due to compromise approach on the tariff on corn products.
parties) in European countries, following the beginning of industrialization (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p.21).

Following on from these four types of cleavages, it is important to gain an insight into their expression within political party systems. Lipset and Rokkan take into account these four conflicts in society and link them to the development of political party systems. They claim that at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, once (male) citizens obtained the vote, the existing cleavages (especially long-established ones) began to be reflected in the emergence of different parties (Ware, 1996, p.188).

Moreover, they conclude that social conflicts shaped the political parties more than political institutions (such as electoral system). Consequently, they argue that the different political party systems and related electoral systems may be explained by taking a sociological rather than an institutional approach (Ware, 1996, pp.188-189).

More recently, Gallagher et al. (2005) have analysed social cleavages and their relationship to the development of the political party system. In their work, they revise the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage structure and point out three requirements in order to update the definition of a ‘cleavage’ (Gallagher et al., 2005 as cited in Mair, 2006, p.373).

The first of these requirements places emphasis on distinctiveness. Cleavages have to be based on distinctive aspects in terms of key social characteristics, (i.e., culture, ethnic and/or social background, status, and religion). According to the second requirement, the members of cleavage groups should be aware of their collective identity; in other words, they should behave
and act collectively, i.e., farmers, workers, Catholics, women’s movement. Third requirement stipulates an institutional formation (e.g. “a political party, a trade union, a church or some other body” (Gallagher et al., 2005 as cited in Mair, 2006, p.373)) that brings together individuals in a group positioned on either side of a specific cleavage (Gallagher et al., 2005 as cited in Mair, 2006, p.373).

2.3.2 Party Systems: Institutional Factors

Some political scientists argue that in comparison to sociological factors, institutional factors carry significantly more weight in the development of party systems and moreover that political events are interceded by the institutional setting in which they occur (Ware, 1996, p.9). For instance, Duverger points to the influence of institutional factors, in the form of electoral systems, on the type of party system which emerges. He derives his argument from the institutional impact that Britain’s electoral system had on the development of its two-party system (Ware, 1996, p.190). Thus, “the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system” (Duverger, 1964, p.217). Duverger conceives of this factual relationship as a consequence of two effects: a mechanic effect and a psychological effect.

First, the single ballot, majoritarian electoral system works in favour of parties which obtain the majority of votes, and against parties which take fewer votes (mechanical effect) (Dunleavy et al., 2008, p.3). Second, voters are psychologically oriented towards parties that get more votes since they do not want to waste their votes (Dunleavy et al., 2008, p.3). In the example of the Turkish political party system, this argument (Duverger’s law) holds only for the multi-party system during period 1950-1960. During this period, the electoral
law provided for plurality voting. As a result, the three elections of this decade (1950; 1954 and 1957) resulted in a two-party system (dominated by the DP and the CHP) (Sayarı, 2002, p.11). When the electoral law was changed, electoral results changed as well, impacting on the structure of the party system.

In addition to the law on single-majority voting and two-party system, Duverger put forward another argument according to which “proportional electoral systems tend to enhance multi-partyism” (Duverger, 1964, p.245). Compared to Duverger’s law, this second argument is mostly considered as a hypothesis by Riker (1982) since proportional representation (PR) does not give the same conclusive results in different party systems.

Thus, Duverger’s hypothesis is not applicable to all cases in the Turkish political party system. For instance, after the adoption of proportional representation in 1960, the number of parties in the Turkish parliament increased considerably. However, in the 1980s, an electoral barrier of 10% which worked to counter the effects of PR, aimed to reduce the number of parties and prevent minority parties, was introduced. In the 1990s, contrary to Duverger’s hypothesis, proportional representation, despite the electoral barrier, gave rise to multi-partyism (Sayarı, 2002, p.28). Similarly, the elections of 2007 held under proportional representation, despite the continuation of the 10% barrier, also resulted in multi-partyism. When Riker (1982) criticizes Duverger’s hypothesis, he asserts that multi-partyism is indispensable, due to regional politics. The results of the 2007 elections marked the entrance of Kurdish deputies from the South-East region into the parliament, and seemed to support Riker’s (1982) counter-argument to Duverger’s hypothesis, at least in the Turkish case.
Like Riker (1982), Sartori (1976) also criticized Duverger on the basis that Duverger’s law and hypothesis show only extreme cases to be consistently true. Sartori asserts that except in some extreme cases, real world situations exist somewhere between plurality and pure proportional representation systems. Therefore, he suggests “two intermediate arrangements - the majority premium and the clause of exclusion\(^{60}\) -” to match them to the real world (Sartori, 1976, pp.98-99).

2.3.3 Party Systems: Competition Factors

The third factor of ‘competition’ is considered to be an alternative to the institutional factor. The party systems classified according to competition factors differ from those classified according to institutional factors, in that they are analysed solely in relation to the institutions that express and foster party competition. Above all, the competition approach can be applied to the liberal democratic regimes. Individual political parties as institutions begin to compete with other parties, and thereby, the party system reflects this logic of competition (and co-operation of parties) (Ware, 1996, p.9).

These competitive interactions within the party system are also pinpointed by Sartori with his analysis on party fragmentation and the ideological distance held by parties within a system. The party fragmentation variable depends on the number and relative size of parties in legislatures, and the latter represents the ideological distance between parties in terms of left-right division (Ware, 1996, p.168; Appendix Part A, Table 2). According to Sartori’s

\(^{60}\) “The clause of exclusion, or Sperrklausel, consists of establishing a threshold for admission to representation. Thus while majority premium aims at encouraging maxi-fractions and at rewarding the larger fractions, the clause of exclusion aims at eliminating the minifractions” (Sartori, 2005, p.88).
model, the lower the party fragmentation, the smaller the ideological distance, the greater the tendency towards two-partyism. In the reverse case, there will be polarized multi-partyism (Sartori, 2005, pp.154-158). When party fragmentation and ideological distance are between two extremes, the party system tends towards moderate multi-partyism (Sartori, 2005, pp.154-158). Moreover, when party fragmentation is high but ideological distance is small, the party system is called segmented multi-partyism (Ware, 1996, p.168; Appendix Part A, Table 2).

When Sartori’s model is applied to the Turkish political party system, as pointed out in the chapter 1, the party system of 1960s up to 1980s may be seen to have had a more moderate side; hence the party system was called the moderate party system (Esmer, 2002a, p.2). In 1975, “the political and economic crisis deepened in Turkey” due to increasing social conflict (Sayari, 2002, p.14). Thus, this reflected into party system and the party system moved progressively from moderate multi-partyism to polarized pluralism or polarized multi-partyism.

In the 1990s, the party system obtained a more polarized position. As pointed out in Chapter 1, at the legislative elections of 1995, the pro-Islamist party, the RP, took an important number of votes (Tachau, 2002, p.43). The fragmentation within the party system was high, according to Rae Index. The parliametary fragmentation was 0.83 and fragmentation in terms of votes was

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61 In polarized multipartyism, there is polarization between left and right parties where the centre is weakened due to lack of alternatives. Polarized multipartyism (pluralism) is a situation in multi-party (or also two-party) system in which moderate views is replaced by highly polarized view that make the system dysfunctional (Sartori, 2005, p.88).
0.77 (Özbudun, 2000, p.77). 62 Hence, the fragmentation was high. In addition, the ideological distance was high at the elections of 1995, since both secular and pro-Islamist parties existed at the same time within the party system. Thus, the party system of 1990s was a polarized multi-partyism, without a dominant party (Esmer, 2002a, p.4)

2.4 Approaches to the Analysis of Voting Behaviour

In this section, I will consider the main factors that influence the voting behaviour by relating them to Turkish voting behaviour. It is important to review these theories in order to analyse the voting behaviour of the Turkish voters since in chapter 4, links between voting behaviour theories and Turkish voters will be analysed.

2.4.1 Voting: Economic Factors

The impact of the economy as one of the core reasons that influence one’s voting behaviour has been discussed and analysed thoroughly by scholars (Lipset et al., 1954; Downs, 1957; Converse, 1958 cited in De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath, 1995, p.999).

In addition, when the economy affects political behaviour, it means that one’s rational expectations and forward-looking position result in one’s political decisions. Therefore, the economic theory of political behaviour is considered as a rational choice theory in the literature. Voting, according to economic factors, is based on self-interested and rational characteristics. Therefore, according to economic voting behaviour, “people vote for the party whose policies will bring

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62 According to the Rae index, the more the value approaches to 0; it means dominant party system. If the value approaches to 1, it means that each seat represents one party. If there are two parties and they obtain equal number of seats then it means that the fragmentation index is close to 0.50 (Özbudun, 2000, p.77).
them the greatest utility in the future” (De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath, 1995, p.999).

As mentioned before, the factors affecting voting behaviour overlap each other, and this overlap can be seen as an impact of the rational and self-interested political behaviour on class voting. According to this logical link, it is claimed that “class voting can be explained on the grounds that people in lower social classes have an interest in redistributive policies, which are typically espoused by left-wing parties, while the members of higher social classes have an interest in opposing such policies” (De Graaf Nieuwbeerta and Heath, 1995, p. 999).

Rational choice voting may also be observed in the Turkish political system. Business circles and petite bourgeoisie have traditionally been the supporters of centre-right (or right-wing) parties on the basis of their free-market policies. The farmers also vote for right-wing parties because of the subsidies provided by them. On the other hand, the labour class has, in general, voted for the CHP on the basis of the social democratic stance that it adopted in 1970s and accordingly policies aiming at an equitable distribution of resources.

2.4.2 Voting: Retrospective Factors

Voting behaviour may also be based on previous socio-economic gains or losses which have happened under the rule of an incumbent party (Hazama, 2006, p.3). Even though retrospective voting includes economic elements, it cannot be considered as economic voting behaviour (Hazama, 2006). Since the economic voting analysis is not backward looking, it is considered as rational voting behaviour (Lockerbie, 2008, p.4). As a result, I consider the retrospective
voting behaviour as a separate group. The retrospective voting model was originally developed by Fiorina (1981) as cited in Hazama (2006). In this model, he takes American national election data from 1956 to 1976 and shows that retrospective estimations “not only had a direct effect on voting decisions but also an indirect effect on party identification, concerns with issues and future expectation” (Fiorina, 1981 cited in Hazama, 2006, p.16).

This model is exemplified in the Turkish political party system by the situation of the CHP, which is seen as associated with all setbacks of the one party regime (1923-1950) and in part with those of the 1970s. This has been (and is) exploited by the competing parties (and now deliberately by the AKP) for discrediting the CHP of today in people’s minds. Retrospective voting also contributed to the ANAP - the DSP - the MHP government’s defeat in the legislative elections of 2002 (Hazama, 2006, p.2) (see also section 2.4.3.1).

2.4.3 Voting: Socio-Psychological Factors

Harrop and Miller (1987) distinguish three models of voting: psychological, economic and sociological. However, in the literature on voting behaviour, expressive voting behaviour which reflects one’s expression of political identity through interaction with others, exists (Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 1985, p.9). As expressive voting involves both attitudinal and sociological characteristics, I consider it as voting behaviour according to socio-psychological factors.

The attitudinal characteristics can demonstrate one’s developing ties of identification with political parties. These ties are various; they can be economic if voters consider that a specific party represents their economic interests.
Voters’ attitudes originating from religion, ethnicity and ideology can affect their political behaviour too (Campbell et al., 1960).

In the literature on voting behaviour, there exist different voting behaviour models which are based on those attitudinal characteristics. Anderson (1998) develops the protest-voting model, which demonstrates the dissatisfaction with the old parties where drastic changes in social and economic conditions prevail. Protest-voting involves economic voting and also psychological reaction of voters to parties associated with economic crises (Anderson, 1998 cited in Ayata and Ayata, 2002, p.137).

Closely related to protest-voting, Lipset’s relative deprivation hypothesis illustrates the tendency of voters towards extreme-right wing parties, due to the voters’ unfavourable socio-economic conditions (Lipset, 1960, pp.63-64). The common point between protest-voting and relative deprivation hypothesis is the change in the attitudes of voters towards established, mainstream political parties and their shift towards extreme-right parties and other parties for which they have not voted before. In addition, both the models demonstrate that the worsening of the economy is the main reason behind their changing political behaviour.

A fairly good example of the overlapping effects of mechanisms on voting behaviour is provided by the devastating defeat of the coalition parties, the ANAP, the CHP and the MHP; in the legislative elections of 2002, following the economic crises of 2000 and 2001. In these elections, aside from aforementioned economic interests, retrospective evaluation and protest motivation Lipset’s deprivation reaction also seems to have played a role. That
the AKP, a brand new party with Islamist roots, came out of these elections with victory strongly supports Lipset’s deprivation hypothesis. Moreover, the outcome of the 2002 elections indicates that voting behaviour is a complex, multifactorial phenomenon that can only be explained in terms of the actions of different interrelated mechanisms.

2.4.4 Voting: Sociological Factors

Voting, according to sociological factors, is mostly based on class and links the social class of individuals to their voting behaviour. Western democracies and politics have been analysed in terms of class-based voting behaviour. Lipset (1960) claims “that politics is the democratic translation of the class struggle” (Lipset, 1960 cited in Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, p.99). Moreover he argues that “during the post-world war II period, in Western industrialized nations, there is a positive relationship between a person’s class position and this individual’s ‘right’ wing preference. One current explanation for this is “economic self-interest” (Lipset, 1960 cited in De Graaf and Ultee, 1990, p.110).

As with Lipset (1960), Pulzer’s study of British politics (1968) argues “that class is the basis of British politics while all else is embellishment and detail” (Pulzer, 1968 cited in Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, p.99). Similarly, Butler and Stokes (1974) from their analysis of the 1964 and 1966 British parliamentary elections argue that the most important factor affecting party commitment was the notion of class (Butler and Stokes, 1974 cited in Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, p.99).
Contrary to these scholars defending a class-based approach, Crewe et al. (1977) and Dunleavy (1979) assert that the class notion has lost its strength, due to the class dealignment which implies weakening in the correlation between social class and voting behaviour (Crewe et al., 1977 and Dunleavy, 1979 cited in Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, pp.99-100).

As with Crewe et al. (1977) and Dunleavy (1979), Rose and McAllister (1986) argue that class dealignment results in a change in the social psychology of the voter, who in turn bases his/her political vote on current issues and government performance rather than on the basis of traditional allegiances (Rose and McAllister, 1986 cited in Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, pp.99-100). Franklin (1985) also considers that the decline of class resulted in a radical change such as the Liberal Party in 1974 (Franklin, 1985 cited in Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, p.100).

Crewe et al. (1977), Franklin (1985) and Rose and McAllister (1986) base their arguments of class dealignment on sociological explanations through which they claim that “sociology of class; rising living standards and the spread of affluence” has taken away working class values (Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, p.100). Besides, they assert that together with the decline in the class allegiance, upward social mobility has destroyed class solidarity. Thus, it has resulted in emergence of more individualistic and self-interested voters (Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, p.100).

On the other hand, Przeworski and Sprague (1986) and Heath and Evans (1988) consider the decline in class-based voting as a political phenomenon that is due to changes in electoral strategies of the main parties (e.g. targeting
different social groups) which have undermined the class-based voting behaviour (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986 and Heath and Evans, 1988 cited in Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, p.100).

In the literature on class-based voting behaviour, there are also works which take into account the relationship between one's current social class and one’s voting behaviour, by considering mainly social mobility. As a general concept, class position affects political preference, and a person has a tendency to vote similarly to other people occupying the same class position (Clifford and Heath, 1993, p.51). Nonetheless, people are socially mobile and they can change their voting behaviour according to upward and downward mobility. Lipset and Bendix (1959) argue that “although the upwardly mobile tends to conform to the patterns of their class of destination, the downwardly mobile tends in contrast to retain the patterns of their class of origin” (Lipset and Bendix, 1959 cited in Clifford and Heath, 1993, p.51).

As a result, they illustrate their argument by asserting that “majority of the men who rise to middle-class status become politically conservative (more in America than in Europe but still a majority on both continents), while a large minority of those who are reduced to working-class status in the United States, and a majority of men mobile downward in Europe, remain adherents of conservative movements” (Lipset and Bendix, 1959 cited in Clifford and Heath, 1993, p.51).

It is argued that the main reason behind this asymmetry is the downwardly mobile desire to return to the higher class, and thus retain the values and behaviour patterns of their class of origin, whereas the upwardly
mobile are assimilated (more readily in American than in Europe, but to some extent in both continents) into the social networks and culture of their class of destination (Lipset and Bendix, 1959 cited in Clifford and Heath, 1993, p.51).

Moreover, Weakliem (1992) links this social mobility and voting behaviour to the theory of status according to which “the greater social prestige of the higher classes [which] leads both downwardly and upwardly mobile people to seek to follow higher class behaviour” (Weakliem, 1992 cited in Clifford and Heath, 1993, p.51).

2.4.5 Voting: Geographical Characteristics

The literature on voting behaviour looks at “what a person is”. Electoral geographers look at voting choices from geographical angle and link voting choices to where a person lives (Taylor and Johnston, 1979; O’Loughlin, Shin and Talbot, 1996). Similarly, Agnew (1996, p.132) argues that “the role of place, or the hierarchical-geographical context”, is critical in understanding this connection and analysing the differences that appear between one location and another” (Çarkoğlu and Avci, 2002, pp.115-116).

Geographical characteristics can hardly be appraised without considering ethnicity, religion, culture and history of the population living in a certain region. The so-called electorate maps of Turkey illustrate this relationship rather nicely. By way of illustration, the AKP is seen in the legislative election map of 2011, in 66 out of 81 provinces as the victorious party.

However, the remaining 15 provinces reveal a distinctive distribution. Thus, seven out of these provinces are located as a block in Turkey’s south east corner where the Kurdish party; the BDP, was the winner. Seven other
provinces where the CHP was the winner are in turn located along the Aegean coast and in Thrace (or European part of Turkey). These western and coastal provinces are populated by the most western-minded, secular and affluent segments of Turkish society. These societal segments are mostly constituted by the descendents of individuals who had to flee from their home countries in the Balkans during the Balkan Wars or of those who came from Greece and settled in these regions in the framework of the 1923 Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey (Zürcher, 2008, pp.243-245). A single province in Eastern Turkey right within the AKP dominated block, Tunceli, also voted for the CHP. The Alevi votes accounted for the CHP’s electoral success in this province.  

2.5 Studies on Voting Patterns, Voting Behaviour, Turkish Party System and Turkish Parties

2.5.1 Empirical Work on Voting Patterns and Behaviour

2.5.1.1 Empirical Work on Economic Voting Behaviour

After 2002 legislative elections in Turkey which followed the economic crisis of 2001, Turkish voting behaviour has been comprehensively analysed from an economic angle. Analysing the 2002 parliamentary elections, Çarkoğlu (2002) find out that at the elections of 2002, AKP voters are more religious, young and are shantytown dwellers that do not support EU membership. Başlevent et al. (2005) investigate specifically the relationship between party preferences and economic voting. They present similar arguments to Çarkoğlu’s (2002). As a result of their investigation, they assert that the electoral base of the AKP is formed by the relatively younger males who had been negatively

63 (See Appendix Part F, Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)
influenced by economic developments. Those who are against EU membership and against the abolition of the death penalty are more likely to vote for the AKP. Moreover, they claim that economic voting exists in Turkey in the sense that incumbent parties are punished.

Furthermore, Çarkoğlu (2008) looks at Turkish voters’ preferences in the election of 2007 concerning the question of ideology versus economic pragmatism and he attempts to find out which of these competing influences carries the most weight among Turkish voters. In his analysis, he looks at the voting preferences according to centre-periphery relations. From the centre-periphery angle, he considers the centre as the old elites of the Republic that are less religious and socio-economically better off and the periphery as the rural and conservative masses of the society. Using the framework of centre-periphery relations, he analyses the 2007 parliamentary elections, adopting a quantitative approach and using logistic regression.

As a result of his investigation, Çarkoğlu (2008) finds out that younger voters tend towards the AKP whereas older ones towards the opposition parties. He also asserts that women are more likely to vote for the CHP and not for the MHP. While keeping the ceteris paribus, women tend to vote for the AKP rather than to vote for the MHP. Thus, MHP fails in attracting women to its party.

Regarding education level, Çarkoğlu (2008) finds out that education is an important indicator to differentiate party constituencies. Keeping all the variables constant, groups with lower education levels tend to vote for the AKP whereas groups with higher educational levels tend to vote for the CHP and the MHP.
Furthermore, regarding Alevism, he mentions that it is not significant variable in looking at non-demographic variable. On the other hand, Kurdishness seems to keep away votes from the CHP and the MHP and it orients voters towards more independent deputies. Çarkoğlu (2008) adds that the fact that Kurds are not attracted to the CHP and the MHP does not mean that they are necessarily attracted to the AKP. Çarkoğlu (2008) finds that the AKP’s constituency is more attracted by favorable economic conditions than ideological tendencies. Çarkoğlu (2008) considers that the economic voting behaviour of the AKP’s constituency has positive implications for Turkish democracy since the AKP attracts 47% of the electorate due to its economic agenda. Hence, the AKP does not mobilize its constituency around a core ideology. In other words, he has a rather sceptical position towards AKP’s ideological repositioning especially towards conservatism (e.g. headscarf in public sphere).

While Çarkoğlu’s works (2002, 2008) take into account specific elections, Akarca and Tansel (2006) carry out a longitudinal analysis of elections. By taking examining Turkish parliamentary and local election results between 1950 and 2004 (25 Turkish elections), they find out that “Turkish voters take into account governments’ performance but they do not look back beyond one year”. They also realize that Turkish voters “seem to vote strategically” especially in local and parliamentary by elections” (Akarca and Tansel, 2006, p.77).

As with Akarca and Tansel (2006), Genç et al. (2005) examine the period 1950-1991. Compared to Akarca and Tansel, they analyse in the specific impact of economic conditions at the time of particular elections (the so-called voter’s
myopia) and their results demonstrate that the Turkish electorate is not myopic and does keep the socio-economic and socio-political incidents that occurred during the ruling periods of previous governments in memory despite successive governments’ attempts at influencing elections. Hence, Turkish voters are not influenced by short-term issues, and do not have a narrow minded position when it comes to elections.

In a more recent work, Akarca and Tansel (2007) look at 1995 parliamentary elections by adding the impact of the shift of the votes from the incumbent party due to economic reasons and the impact of the location (urban-rural) and conservatism on the parliamentary elections.

Moreover, Başlevent and Akarca (2008) looked at voting patterns from a different angle; they investigated how inter-party vote movements affected the elections of 2002. By looking at the inter-party movements, they studied how voters in 2002 transferred their choices from the incumbent parties to the AKP. While analysing inter-party movements, they examined whether or not demographic factors and/or economic factors contributed to the shifts from incumbent parties to the AKP. They use regression methods and find that, during the 2002 elections, the electorate punished the previous coalition governments due to corruption allegations and poor economic performance. In the 2002 elections, they found that the “AKP captures almost all of the votes for the former FP, about half of those of the ANAP, the DYP and the MHP, two-fifths of those of the DSP and one-fifth of those of the CHP” (Başlevent and Akarca, 2008, p.10). Similar to Çarkoğlu (2008), they argue that AKP’s non-Islamic discourse attracted various segments of society around the AKP. Similar to
Çarkoğlu (2008), Başlevent and Akarca (2008) attempt to make predictions regarding the future discourse of the AKP and the party leader Erdoğan. Thus, they claim that the more economic, pragmatic discourse and the less ideological position discourse of Erdoğan would play a greater role in this regard. Hence, they too are more sceptical regarding the party leader’s future discourse.

In more recent work, Başlevent and Akarca (2010) applied the same methods for the analysis of the 2007 elections. In their paper of 2010, they found that Turkish voters are voting according to economic factors. In addition to economic votes, they find out that “less educated voters of most parties, pro-EU supporters and males of the pro-Islamist SP and the relatively rich of the pro-Kurdish party constituted new supporters of the AKP” (Başlevent and Akarca, 2010, p.9).

As a consequence of their work, they have also tested the rational voter hypothesis through which voters are voting for the party which will bring the most utility in the near future.

2.5.1.2 Empirical Work on Retrospective Voting Behaviour

Hazama’s (2006) work on retrospective voting merits a mention. Contrary to the existing literature on rational voting behaviour which takes into account the future as a reference point, Hazama (2006) investigates the impact of retrospective voting on electoral outcomes. His initial hypothesis was that in emerging democracies retrospective voting plays a more important role than cleavage voting. To do this, he uses a logit model in order to discuss retrospective voting.
He looks at the parliamentary elections of 2002 and investigates whether prospective evaluation was more important than evaluation of the party for the household and/or national economy and other socio-political conditions. Hazama (2006, p.15) concludes, “Evaluation of the past was more important than the evaluation of the future for the household economy. Evaluation of the future was more important than evaluation of of the past for the national economy”.

2.5.1.3 Empirical Work on Voting Behaviour according to Attitudinal Characteristics

Another important approach to voting behaviour is linked to Turkish voters’ attitudinal characteristics such as ideology, religiosity, sectarian division and ethnicity. A number of scholarly works seek to understand how these characteristics influence the Turkish voting behaviour.

Mardin (1973) argues that where the centre-periphery cleavage is concerned, the centre votes for liberal/left-wing parties, whereas the periphery prefers conservative/right-wing parties. Ergüder (1980-1) shows that the more-religious voters supported the AKP, while the CHP was favoured by less religious voters and ethnic groups (Mardin, 1973; Ergüder, 1980-1 cited in Özcen, 1999, p.507). Kalaycıoğlu (1994) indicates that “while type of settlement and socio-economic status have a weak impact, gender, formal education and religiosity have a critical role in determining party preference” (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994 cited in Özcen, 1999, p.507).

Regarding class as a determinant of electoral behaviour, Özbudun and Tachau (1975) argue that in Turkey, modernization catalyses class conflict which results in class-based voting (Tachau, 1975 cited in Özcen, 1999, p.507).
Ayata (1993) as cited in Özcan (1999, p.507) considers “class and religion as the major determinants of electoral behaviour in Turkey”. However, Kalaycıoğlu (1994) shows that politics do not work along social class lines, since owing to the “decline of support for centre-right and centre-left parties, there is a trend of radicalization which increases as one moves from western to eastern regions” (Kalaycıoğlu, 1975 cited in Özcan, 1999, p.507).

Çarkoğlu (2005) investigates the Alevis’ party choices and assesses (through empirical research) the repercussions of the sectarian Alevi-Sunni divide in Turkish politics. Çarkoğlu (2005) finds that given religiosity has a prominent impact on party preferences, and this means that highly religious voters will tend to vote for parties which are predominantly Sunni. On the other hand, parties that advocate secular norms will mostly attract Alevis. Thus, his arguments reveal that in the political arena, the secular-pro-Islamist cleavage is also linked to the Alevi-Sunni divide.

Çarkoğlu (2007) analyses Turkish voters’ behaviour on a left–right ideological spectrum and examines the nature of the left-right cleavage in the Turkish context. He finds that the scale used for measuring the left-right dimension does not reflect a “fine-tuned grading”, but instead, he categorizes “determinants of self-placements on a conventional one-to-ten left-right scale” according to left, centre and right (Çarkoğlu, 2007, p.253).

He further argues that even though the scale does not give exact results, there is a consistency regarding the nature of the L-R dimension. Thus, “the left attract tolerant, democratically oriented, progressive change-seekers with low

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64 The sectarian divide between which Alevi groups and Sunni Islam
religiosity, some degree of economic complaints, and a low level of interpersonal trust, while the right is more trusting, happy but conservative, religious, and seeks maintenance of the status quo with some degree of authoritarianism and lack of tolerance” (Çarkoğlu, 2007, p.268).

Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007) investigate the impact of religiosity and protest behaviour in Turkish election. A noteworthy conclusion to this work is that Islam in Turkey strives for power through conventional channels of political participation; religiosity exerts a moderating, dampening effect on protest potential. Thus, protest is expressed through votes and not through actions (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, pp.83-113).

Contrary to their previous work, Kalaycıoğlu (2008) takes a more macro approach to Turkish voters’ behaviour by examining how Turkish voters are drawn towards political parties based on their parents’ party political choices, religiosity, ethnicity and economic satisfaction. In this work, Kalaycıoğlu (2008) adopts a logistic binary regression and finds that ideology appears to play an important role for the psychological orientation of voters who are attached to the CHP as compared with the AKP or the MHP. He further argues that party identification does not seem to work for the AKP since there is a confusion about its antecedents. Thus, the AKP does not represent a specific centre-right party that existed in the 1960s or in the 1970s. He also argues that because of the same confusion, “the AKP does not represent the previous centre-right parties to the electorate; it is considered to be a right-wing political party bringing together a coalition of conservative-traditional Sunni Islamic voters on the one hand with
the liberalization of the economy in market capitalism on the other” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, pp.311-312).

In addition to the impact of ideological, religious and sectarian values on voting, I consider the deprivation factor as part of the attitudinal characteristics since it has important outcomes for behaviour and attitudes in terms of political choice. In section 2.4.3, the relative deprivation factor was mentioned as a part of Lipset’s deprivation hypothesis. In studies on Turkey, Akgün (2002) uses Lipset’s hypothesis in order to analyse voting behaviour in respect of nationalist political parties in Turkey. He compares nationalist parties with Islamist parties. He first compares the discourse of both parties (the RP and the MHP) according to their ideologies, their perceptions of the Kurdish problem, religiosity and foreign relations. Then, using correlation analysis, Akgün argues that “old middle-class voters (self-employed small business people, farmers, artisans and craftsmen) tend to be radicalized by the general process of concentration and centralization65 and by specific economic crises”.

Contrary to Akgün (2002), Esmer (2002) finds that the deprivation factor is less effective than the ideology factor. Esmer (2002a and 2002b) looks at the impact of location (urban or rural/an area with positive or negative migration), level of education, degree of conservatism and religiosity on elections. Esmer tests two main hypotheses (protest vote and rise in Islamism hypotheses). Through his analysis, he finds that ideology, here related to the rise

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65 The concepts “centralization” and “concentration” are being used in order to reflect the channelling of the economic resources to the big business and industrial circles. While the big business and industrial circles were being in advantageous position, the Anatolian petty bourgeoisie was not integrated to these modernist centers.

2.5.1.4 Empirical Work on Voting according to Geographical Location

Turkish voting behaviour has also been analysed according to voters’ geographical location. Özcan (1999) takes into account voting preferences in İstanbul. He draws attention to the importance of previous voting preferences and religious attitudes on the general elections of 1987 and local elections of 1989. Compared to Özcan (1999), Çarkoğlu and Avcı (2002) examine party politics over time (1950-1999). In addition, they explore party politics by emphasizing ideological party families and geographical voting. As a result, they identify geographical regions with different ideological tendencies. Çarkoğlu and Avcı (2002) extend the work on the relationship geographical regions and ideological tendencies and find in line with Turkey’s electoral maps (see above 2.4.5 and Appendix Part F, Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) a differentiated geographical distribution of votes. Regional factors play a greater role in electoral support for the CHP, the BDP (the former DTP) the MHP than for the AKP (Turkey’s Local Elections of 2009, 2009).66

2.5.1.5 Empirical Work on Voting along Lines of Social Cleavages

In addition to the analysis of voting patterns, the relationship between cleavage structures and political development has been thoroughly investigated in the literature. The driving theoretical framework for these works has mainly been Lipset-Rokkan’s four axes of conflict. Many scholars suggest changes to the Lipset-Rokkan four-fold cleavages model. Kitschelt (1992) argues that the

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66 (Turkey’s Local Elections of 2009, 2009)
four axes of conflict fail to give a sound explanation to the political development of Eastern and Central European countries. Therefore, he suggests a three-fold model which is based on negotiations over the preservation of status quo. His model is formed by three cleavages: (1) libertarian/cosmopolitan politics versus authoritarian politics; (2) political redistribution (equality of living conditions across individuals) versus market allocations (liberal free-market agenda); and (3) universal citizenship versus particularistic citizenship. Throughout this three-fold model, he considers that this ‘status quo’ model is more suitable for political systems that have not been fully established (Kitschelt, 1992 cited in West, 2005, p.502).

Moreover, Kitschelt (1992) bases his argument on the lack or weakness of social cleavages in these countries. He offers, based on his considerations, a political party system comprising, “liberal parties (secularism, tolerance, civil liberties, mild decommunization, free-market orientation, cosmopolitanism and integration with the West); christian-national parties (authority, social order, collective morale, hard decommunization, populist corrections of market legitimacies and national authonomy); and post-communist parties or social democrat parties (liberalist concern for social libertarianism, mild support for economic populism” (Kitschelt, 1992, cited in Hristova, 2010, p.3). Kitschelt’s arguments, however, do not seem to hold for the situation in Hungary, due to its “over-implification and lack of differentiation” (Markus, 1998, p.7). Similarly, his thesis “according to which economic liberalism in post-communist societies are accompanied by political liberalism (double liberalism) has only partially
been confirmed in the case of the Republic of Macedonia” (Hristova, 2010, p.12).

On the other hand, Secor (2001) makes adjustment to both the Lipset-Rokkan model and the Kitscheld cleavage model for a different analysis of the Turkish parliamentary elections of 1995. Through this adjustment, he splits cleavages into four categories: (1) Western versus Eastern orientation; (2) secularism versus Islamism; (3) collectivism versus pluralism and 4. market economy versus political redistribution of resources (Secor, 2001 cited in West, 2005, p.503). Secor uses this approach in order to analyse the Turkish political system.

Compared to Secor (2001), Hazama (2003) uses three social cleavages which are represented by Sunni religiosity as opposed to secularism, Kurdish ethnicity as opposed to Turkish nationality and Alevi sectarism as opposed to Sunni religiosity. He investigates the relationship between the social cleavages and electoral support by using the model to analyse type of voter volatility and swing in votes (Bartolini and Mair, 1990 cited in Hazama, 2003, pp.362). Hazama (2003, pp.378-379) concludes that despite the intervention 1980, repeated elections after the transition to democratic regime have strengthened the ties between the political parties and and cleavage groups and reduced electoral volatility. Thus, he assumes that social cleavages and the party system seem to come together in Turkey.67

67 Convergence of party system and social cleavages: When the social cleavages are deep-seated, powerful and exist for a long-term, then the electoral behaviour and electoral volatility would be reduced.
2.5.2 Work on Parties and Party Systems

2.5.2.1 Work on Party Systems: Historical Approaches

Özbudun (1981) provides general information on the Turkish political party system, especially by looking at its historical evolution. Tachau (2000) considers the evolution of Turkish political parties since the beginning of the multi-party system in terms of the impact of social changes on society. Tachau (2000) attempts to predict the future of democracy in Turkey. He argues that there are still risks regarding the role of the military but considers that the fact that there has not been a military intervention in the last two decades to be a good sign. Regarding Turkish voters and their aspirations, he argues that peasants and the urban lower classes are aware of competitive elections as a powerful tool in order to express their socio-economic needs and economic interests.

Tachau (2002) discusses party fragmentation between 1961 and 1999, arguing that the parliaments between 1990 and 2002 had a high level of fragmentation since the proportion of votes going to the largest parties declined, along with their number of seats in the parliament (Tachau, 2002, p. 42). As a conclusion, he asserts that these fragmented coalition governments could not produce effective economic and social policies, thus, it led to an increase in dissatisfaction among voters.

Sayarı (2002) mainly discusses the evolving party system in Turkey, providing an historical account of the Turkish party system by referring to fragmentation in the party system. An article by Sayarı (1973) highlights the significance of fragmentation and polarization as in the Turkish party system at
the beginning of 1970s. Later, Sayarı (2002) argues that developments in the Turkish party system reveal both fragmentation and polarization that have had opposite effects on governmental changes in predominant party systems. Sayarı (2002) offers three assumptions about the future of Turkish political parties. First, that the AP gets further power within the party system; second, that the party system will become more competitive due to increases in CHP votes; and third, that the political party system will be interrupted by military intervention.

Sayarı (2007) examines the impact of the 2002 parliamentary elections on the Turkish party system. He discusses whether, upon the AKP's emergence, a two-party system will replace past coalition and minority governments. After examining the changes regarding the party system, he discusses the possibilities for its future development. Similar to Sayarı (1973), Sayarı (2007) attempts to make a prediction regarding the future of the party system in Turkey. He stresses the emergence of a bi-polar party system in which only two parties—the AKP and the CHP—win seats in the parliament. He makes a further prediction regarding the future of the party system in Turkey. He argues that due to the asymmetrical powers between the CHP and AKP, there is a higher chance for the continuation of single-party majority governments. As a second option, he considers the risk of having coalition governments in the case of increased fragmentation.

In addition, depending on the distribution of seats among parties, he also predicts coalition governments of the CHP and other small parties in order to prevent the AKP from further entrenching its position in Turkish politics. Özbudun (2000) examines the democratic experience of Turkey from an
institutional angle. He examines the impact of military interventions, changes in the party system and constitutional changes on the democratization process in Turkey.

2.5.2.2 Work on Elections and Party Organizations

İncioğlu (2002) attempts to find out if there is a parallel between local elections and legislative elections in Turkey by looking at the local elections of 1994 and 1999 and at the legislative elections of 1995 and 1999. Through her investigation, she shows how voting behaviour has evolved in local elections and whether or not it differs from that occurring at parliamentary elections.

Sayarı (1978) examines party membership and the educational level of party members in regional and local party organizations in order to find out the main features of Turkish political party organizations.

Yeşilada (2002b), meanwhile, considers how party organization and electorate remained intact in the RP/FP despite the change in party in the years 1997 – 2001. He claims that the general political shift towards right and weakening of centre-right parties have contributed to the RP/FP retaining voters’ strong allegiance. In addition, the deference of RP/FP voters towards the party leadership, i.e., N. Erbakan, initially played an important role in retaining their commitment. However, as Erbakan was banned from politics and the new leadership that took charge of the FP turned out weak, the reformist movement obtained the chance to grow fast, and establish the AKP. He asserts that these three reasons significantly improved the prospects of the renewed party to inherit the strong institutional order and constituency base of the RP/FP’s.
Kalaycıoğlu (2002a) investigates the ANAP's party organization, its rhetoric of four strands, its charismatic and its place within the party system. He highlights the reasons behind the decrease in the ANAP's votes at the end of 1990s.

As with his previous work Yeşilada (2000b), Yeşilada (2002a) investigates how, despite the closure of Islamist parties, the organizational structures of dissolved parties and political elite groups remain intact by taking into account the RP/FP tradition. He looks at the party leadership, organizational strategies and tactics of the Islamist parties (the FP) to reach his conclusions. He concludes that the weakness in party adaptation occurred especially in terms of their party leader. He argues that due to lack of a strong leader in the FP, the reformists could establish their own party.

2.6 Country Studies on Turkey and Turkish Politics

2.6.1 Country Studies on Turkey

Recently, there has been an increase in the country studies on Turkey. Most of these studies focus on the AKP, Islam, democracy, secularism in Turkey. It is necessary to review this literature on country studies in order to understand how my stance related to the AKP is original.

Among this relevant literature, Yavuz (2003) considers the evolution of Islamist political parties from the perspective of the development of Islamic movements (Nur movement; Nakşibendi Sufi Order) in Turkey. In addition, he highlights how the Islamic movements have found expression in the political

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68 RP/FP tradition: As pointed out in the contextual chapter, the pro-Islamist party RP advocating Millî Görüş was closed down in 1997 as a result of the post-modern memorandum. Later on, the FP was established by asserting a more reformist stance than the FP. However, later on in 2002, the FP was closed down too. As both of them advocated Millî Görüş it is called the RP/FP tradition.
sphere since the beginning of the multiparty system in the 1950s. For instance, he analyses the Nakşibendi movement and how it influenced the formation of the MNP and the MSP in the 1970s. Moreover, he demonstrates how the ANAP was approved by the Nur movement in 1980s. Lastly, he links the emergence of the AKP in 2002 to the transformation within the Islamist movements, especially the Nur movement (or in other words the Gülen Movement). Throughout his book, he argues that social movements can be useful agents for a more democratic and pluralistic society.

Furthermore, in conducting his analysis, he does not overlook Islamic parties’ discourse that focuses on economic issues and problems in Turkey (e.g. development of small-medium-size provincial business owners in the Anatolian provincial cities and the petite bourgeoisie in the larger cities due to the economic liberalization of the 1980s).

He further highlights how, throughout the 1990s, this Anatolian bourgeoisie used its economic power for other purposes such as in the political arena (e.g. the MÜSİAD, the RP as a political party) and social arena (e.g. education, media). Hence, the main argument of Yavuz (2003) regarding is that the emergence of the AKP is a consequence of the growth of Islamic social movements as a protest against the authoritarian and secular state since the beginning of the multi-party system in Turkey, in 1950.

As compared to Yavuz, my main argument is not based on the impact of Islamic social movements on the AKP’s emergence; instead, I consider the emergence of the AKP as a result of changes in socio-economic structures especially since the 1980s. In addition, in terms of theoretical framework, Yavuz
(2003) adopted an amalgam of three approaches (essentialist; contextualist and constructivist) for his analysis of Islamic social movements and their political repercussions. Instead, I adopt the cleavage structure of Lipset-Rokkan (1967) as the underpinning theoretical framework. I locate the AKP on this four-fold cleavage structure and analyse further the AKP’s emergence and consolidation within the party system.

In his edited book, Yavuz (2006) gives an account of the AKP's first tenure of government from two main angles: first, ideological (which includes an examination of the AKP’s identity) and second, the policy-based angle. He examines the military-civil society relationship; the economic, gender, and foreign policies of the AKP. In considering Yavuz (2006), it is important to look at Öniş (2004), which is cited by Yavuz (2006). Similar to various empirical works mentioned above, he argues that the corrupted centre-right parties of the 1990s, the economic crisis of 2001 and the AKP’s EU discourse contributed directly to the emergence of the AKP. Similar to Öniş (2004), I argue that the main driving force was the economic crisis of 2001. However, I further demonstrate that the driving factor for its victory is not only the economy pre-2002, but also also socio-economic changes which have impacted the whole of society since the 1980s.

I analyse the social changes from 1923 until 2010 in order to demonstrate how things have evolved in society and in order to demonstrate differences between social strata in the 1920s and social strata in the 1980s and 1990s. While keeping the longitudinal analysis as long as possible, my thesis provides a broader perspective since it demonstrates how social changes reflected into the
political arena over time. For instance, if the AKP existed in 1950, it would not have made such a difference to society because the majority of society was agrarian and their aspirations and their needs were completely different than the new intermediary strata of 2002.

In addition, it is also important to add that Öniş’s work focuses only on the emergence of the AKP. As compared to Öniş (2004) and other articles cited in Yavuz (2006), I extend my historical analysis further and I discuss the two terms of the AKP (2002-2007) and (2007-2011). Thus, this comprehensive analysis gives a broader picture of the ruling tenure of the AKP. While Öniş (2004) points out that the EU would be a positive anchor for Turkey’s democratic and economic development, in my thesis, I demonstrate that the AKP government has lost its momentum regarding the negotiations after 2007.

As with Yavuz (2006), Hale and Özbudun (2011) make a more updated analysis on the AKP's tenure and examine the AKP from both political and sociological angles. They provide an analysis of the AKP's ideological agenda, its social basis and the party's performance in public policy, political reform and cultural, economic and foreign policies. In their analysis, I want to emphasize their discussion related to the AKP’s social bases and highlight how it differs from my analysis. They trace the social bases of the AKP back to previous Islamist parties’ social bases, looking respectively at the social bases of the MNP, MSP and RP in order to understand the AKP’s social bases. However, they look at voting behaviour according to attitudinal factors (e.g. conservatism, religious practices, ethnicity, secularism) rather than the socio-economic characteristics of the social bases. As compared to Hale and Özbudun (2011), I
did not look at the attitudinal characteristics of the electorate because my initial point was the changes in socio-economic structures and how they impacted upon social stratification in Turkey. Hale and Özbudun (2011), similar to Yavuz (2003), overlook the impact of the emerging intermediary strata in Turkey since they do not consider the AKP’s emergence as a sociological phenomenon.

Yavuz (2009) carefully investigates the first tenure of the AKP (2002-2007), focusing on the secularism-democracy axis. While doing this investigation, Yavuz (2009) deals with various issues such as political participation, economy, foreign policy, the Kurdish question and the sovereignty of civilian government. As compared to Yavuz (2009), I look at the AKP’s rights-discourse during both ruling tenures of the AKP (2002-2007; 2007-2011). This longer historical approach provides strength to the analysis since the AKP’s second ruling tenure was completely different than its first one when various factors (e.g. civil-military relations, control of media, Kurdish and Alevi initiatives) are taken into account. In addition, if the third ruling tenure is considered, it will be observed how authoritarian the AKP government has become since 2011.

Aside from Yavuz (2003, 2006, and 2009), Hale and Özbudun’s (2011) works which adopt specifically a party-based approach, Cizre (2007) in turn focuses on the phases that the AKP’s political discourse has undergone. She first analyses the AKP’s initial reformist discourse with emphasis on fundamental rights during its first three years in office; then she demonstrates how the AKP’s reformist discourse has shifted to an inward-looking conservative and nationalist

69 AKP’s reformist discourse is based on its pro-Western, pro-EU and democratization. As it will be demonstrated in chapter 5, the AKP made necessary amendments which were required by the Copenhagen criterion.
position. Cizre (2007), in her analysis of the AKP stresses mostly the impact of the international context, such as US policies; the relationship with the EU as well as the global forces of Islam. She brings an international outlook to the AKP’s changing political discourse. As compared to Cizre’s (2007) international level analysis of the AKP, I focus on the internal dynamics, the rights discourse and the EU discourse of the AKP. The main stance of Cizre (2007) is similar to that of Hale and Özbudun (2011); they view the AKP phenomenon as a democratization of Muslims and a new political formation against the Kemalist, secularist regime. However, in their stance, they omit the way in which Turkish society has evolved, especially since the 1980s; the way in which society has developed new aspirations and new demands and the way in which the AKP has answered those needs. For instance, Hale and Özbudun (2011) and Yavuz and Cizre (2007) omit the impact of social policies through which the AKP has consolidated itself by targeting its main constituency’s core needs. Thus, my main contribution to the existing literature is to go beyond this monolithic analysis of the AKP from its emergence until its consolidation in 2007 by looking at both the AKP itself and its constituency.

Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007) make a broader analysis of political parties and elections and investigate the democratic process since the beginning of the multi-party system. Moreover, in the light of the Islamic-leaning AKP’s ten-year tenure, scholars question which way Turkish society will go in the future.70 They predict that Turkish society in voting terms will move further

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70 The alternatives can be considered as two extremes like secular, western-style democracy and a country which is governed by Shar’ia law. In these two extremes, Turkey has become a more conservative during the AKP’s ten-year tenure. Similarly, people wished a country governed by
towards the right on the axis of ideology. In my thesis, I look at the impact of the AKP’s entrenchment into Turkish politics and how it will impact the longer-term restructuring of the party system. I first look at the structural changes in society under the cleavage structure. Then, I attempt to predict the structuring of the party system. Thus, as compared to Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007), I look at the issue from a party-system perspective.

Furthermore, Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009) look in detail at how society has rushed towards “conservatism, traditionalism and parochialism” over the last two decades. By making an empirical analysis, based on a 2006 survey, they try to decode the guiding forces of current Turkish society. As compared to Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009), the main driving point in my thesis is the impact of the structural factors together with the conjunctural factors on the emergence of AKP. Similar to their work, I also discuss how the entrenchment of AKP’s position in Turkish society represents a shift from secularism to conservatism. However, as compared to their positive stance, I take an interpretive epistemology in order to analyse this religiosity-secularism cleavage.

2.6.2 Studies on Turkish Politics

In addition to country studies on Turkey, there are various works on the historical development of Turkish politics and modernization in Turkey. As I have used them in writing the contextual chapter, I will refer to this chapter for further details. In short, Ahmad (1977 and 1993) examines Turkish politics by emphasizing democratization attempts and military interventions. Zürcher

(2008) provides a broad account of Turkey from the end of the 18th century up
until the beginning of the 21st century by investigating modernization and
democratization attempts. As with Ahmad (1993) and Zürcher (2008), Çavdar
(2008a and 2008b) provides an account of Turkish political history (19th century
up to 2007) by emphasizing on the attempts for democratization and the military
obstacles. Kalaycıoğlu (2005) looks at the historical evolution of Turkish politics
by taking into account both socio-economic change (e.g. urbanization;
industrialization; migration to cities) and political factors (e.g. relations between
military and civilian governments to control the state).

Tanör et al. (2011) examine the history of Turkey in terms of political
events, economic history and left-wing, Islamist and nationalist movements.

In addition to the history of Turkish politics, works on individual Turkish
parties have been of importance in order to grasp the evolution of Turkish parties
in the period 1923 – 2010. Kaynar et al. (2006) provide a detailed history of
political parties since the Republican era (1923-2010), by giving useful
information on all parties’ establishment, closure, percentage vote and number
of seats. Mert (2007) looks at the history of the centre-right in Turkey. She
analyses numerous centre and extreme right-wing political parties, including
nationalist and Islamist parties. Her analysis presents useful information on the
similarities and differences between the parties examined.

2.7 Turkish Literature on the Structure of Turkish Society and Political
Islam

The way in which Turkish society is analysed/should be analysed has
been an important and controversial subject since the beginning of the Republic
(1923). Kongar (2008) explains the different approaches to the analysis of Turkish politics and society in his book called *Social Change in Turkey* (2008). It is important to look at it for my thesis since it demonstrates main theories used for the analysis of Turkish society. Since I investigate the changes in social structures of the AKP as a research question, it is crucial to review theories related to the Turkish society.

2.7.1 Analysis of Turkish Society: Application of Western Theories and Models to Analysis of the Turkish-Ottoman Society up to 1980s

Turkish society is the heir to that which existed during the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, for a thorough analysis of Turkish society, it is argued that one needs to look at its past; i.e. Ottoman society (Kongar, 2008, p.318). The analysis of Turkish-Ottoman society has been undertaken using two main approaches. The first approach considers that the development of the Ottoman social structure was similar to the development of Western societies. The main scholar using this approach was Kıray (1969) as cited in Kongar (2008, p.323).

The second approach considers Ottoman social structure as an original variety, distinct from its Western European counter parts. The scholars who have adopted this point of view are Mardin (1968); Sencer (1969); İnalcık (1970); Divitçıoğlu (1971); Cin (1978); Berktay (1980), Kılıçbay (1982) as cited in Kongar (2008, p.324). As scholars who adopt the second approach are unable to differentiate the Turkish-Ottoman example from the classic western class development models, they apply specific dual models to their analysis, as will be mentioned below (Kongar, 2008, p.325).
These dual models are based on the division between the state and the people. During the first years of the Republic, this duality continued as a division between rulers and the ruled. Mardin (1973) considers the division in terms of a centre-periphery dichotomy. The centre is constituted by the state and its representatives, while the periphery is formed by the rest of society (notables, rural masses, merchants, tradesmen) (Kongar, 2008, p.320).

Furthermore, Karpat (1973) emphasises this dual model and claims that during the creation of the nation-state, there was a need for a proper leader and his representatives who formed the statist/ruling groups. It is important to mention that this group was different from the middle-class existing in the Western European societies (Karpat, 1973 cited in Kongar, 2008, p.320).

Similarly, Kongar (1985) as cited in Kongar (2008, p.321) explains his own dual model which is composed of two fronts: the statist/elitist front and the traditionalist/liberal front. The former represented authority and had an elitist and statist approach, whereas the latter represented defenders of the religion, Islam and the Ottoman tradition (Kongar, 2008, p.321). In the 1970s, due to shifts which had taken place in Turkish society (e.g. migration to big cities), scholars began to analyse Turkish society from two different angles: the ecological (spatial) angle and the class angle (Kongar, 2008, p.326). I will discuss spatial and class in turn and then, move to more recent literature.

First, ecological analysis is also referred to as a spatial analysis in relation to the rural-urban space occupied by shanty towns. Ozankaya’s work on the political structure of villages (1971) and Sencer’s work (1971) focus on rural areas (using a combined ecological and class approach) and are considered as the
main works on rural social structure (Ozankaya, 1971; Sencer, 1971 cited in Kongar, 2008, p.330). Tonguç’s analysis (1967) as cited in Kongar (2008, p.333), in turn, is considered as a good assessment of the Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri), schools that existed between 1945 and 1954 in Turkey. They were established in the framework of a rural development project, and served as co-educational boarding schools.

In addition, the ecological approach takes into account the division between urban and squatter areas. One of the main works on urbanization is that of Yavuz et al. (1973) as cited in Kongar (2008, p.331). Kongar points out that there is a considerable work on urbanization and city squatters such as Gökçe (1971) on the youth living in city squats and Erder’s (1982) work on squatting (Gökçe, 1971; Erder, 1982 cited in Kongar, 2008, p.331).

Kongar argues that squatting is often mentioned in the literature on urbanization; the main reason for this is related to the high level of movement of populations in urban squatter areas, which reflects their disclosure to social change (Kongar, 2008, p.329). In previous decades, social networks in squatter areas helped newcomers “to find land and construct ‘gecekondu’ and also access informal income opportunities, and ultimately to integrate into urban settings (Buğra and Keyder, 2003).

The second reason is that the analysis of Turkish society was an important issue in the 1970s, due to increasing dynamics such as migration to urban areas from rural areas. In the literature, no appropriate analysis of Turkish society from a class-based approach has been conducted (Kongar, 2008, p.329). Nevertheless, some studies emphasize social structure from the perspective of

2.7.2 Recent Turkish Literature on the Analysis of Turkish Society: 1980 to the present

While the analysis of Turkish-Ottoman society was based on dual models due to its difference from West European societies, it is argued that Turkish social structure began to change after 1950 and that a class structure similar to that of western societies began to emerge. As a result, the usage of class analysis of society became possible (Kongar, 2008, p.340). The changes in Turkish society have continued with greater intensity since 1980 as Turkey entered a phase of radical transformation in both demographic and socio-economic terms. Given this dynamic society, models and theories for societal analysis also changed. Below, I review recent literature, while focusing on the dual centre-periphery model.

Mardin’s centre-periphery (1973) approach has been a key in analysing Turkish politics in the 1970s. As mentioned in 2.6.1, Mardin’s centre-periphery approach demonstrated the division between the centre and the rest of society. Throughout the Ottoman legacy, this division in society was quite distinctive. Later, during the first modernization period of the 19th century, attempts to modernize and secularize the state made this separation deeper. As a result, the centre found a suitable environment to flourish, whereas the masses found themselves isolated in their conservative milieu (Mardin, 1973). Contrary to Mardin, Boratav (2005) states that the ruling class, in terms of the centre,
received greater status than normal. Instead, he asserts that the ruling class is formed by civil servants, therefore, they have to be analysed from a class-based analysis.

Despite the debate on the model for analysis, the centre-periphery relations model still retains its importance. In addition, in the recent literature, Kahraman (2008) suggests another approach to Mardin’s centre-periphery relations. He refers to the centre as the historical bloc (army officials, intellectuals and bureaucrats) which has played a great role in modernizing the state from the 19th century to 1950. In his analysis, he refers to Gramsci’s concept of ‘historical bloc’ (1971) which is used as a tool to explain the formation of historical coalitions between different actors to achieve different gains (Kahraman, 2008, p.123).

Kahraman’s revised version of the centre-periphery approach is important, as he takes into account socio-economic and political changes since the 1980s. He asserts that due to the dynamic structure of Turkish society, centre-periphery relations have to be examined. In addition, he refers to Gramscian class analysis, in order to explain the rise of new economic and political classes (Kahraman, 2008, p.139).

In consequence, he elaborates on the basic centre-periphery model by adding two sub-concepts: ‘the periphery at the centre’ and ‘the centre at the periphery’. The former (the periphery at the centre) seeks to explicate the cleavages between people living in the centres of big cities and people living in the shanty towns around the centres of big cities (e.g. Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Antep and Mersin). The latter (the centre at the periphery) refers to the new
devout/religious bourgeoisie, which has emerged in the provincial cities since the 1980s and which has become a new centre at the periphery of the Turkish nation-state (Kahraman, 2008, p. 187 and p.235).

In addition, he seeks to explain the differences and the similarities behind these new sociological blocs: the periphery at the centre and the centre at the periphery. He emphasizes changing patterns outside of the historical bloc for instance; recently, the periphery (both the periphery at the centre and the centre at the periphery) has begun to be represented politically by the AKP.

In addition to Kahraman, Tuğal’s (2009) analysis of the AKP is worthy of mention. He looks at the AKP’s term in office in the light of Gramsci’s ‘passive revolution’ notion, and concludes that the AKP has contributed to the “free-market”/neo-liberal economy’s deep entrenchment in society. In addition, through its conservative and pro-Islamic discourse, the AKP has gained the support of a unique segment of society (‘the Islamist/conservative’) which has been against neoliberal economy. As a result, the existing system has absorbed the capitalist economic model and the neoliberal economic model.

2.7.3 Studies on the Emerging Devout Bourgeoisie and on the Development of Turkish Society and Economy

Due to huge changes in Turkish society, recent literature has focused on the rise of the Islamist bourgeoisie in the 1990s. Öniş (1997) has considered the emerging devout bourgeoisie as an economic class which has benefited from the 1980’s economic policies. He considers this class as winners of the liberalization, arguing that they were the main supporters of the RP in 1990s. Similar to Öniş, Gülalp (2001) investigates the social basis of the RP. These
studies on the RP have been important, as the social basis of the RP is similar to that of the AKP.

In more recent literature, İnsel (2003), Demir et al. (2004) and Yavuz (2006) argue that the emerging Anatolian capitalists is related to the transformation of political Islam, and thereby the AKP's emergence. Considering the AKP as an actor of neo-liberal transformation, Uzgel (2010) argues that the Islamist bourgeoisie has been a catalyst for the transformation of political Islam in Turkey. Gümüşçü (2010) specifically analyses the Anatolian bourgeoisie in her work. In addition, as a non-scholarly research, ESI (European Stability Initiative) in 2005 analysed the Islamist bourgeoisie and named it as Islamist Calvinists due to both their hard work and their religious lives.

As with the above authors, Teazis (2011) argues that the emerging Islamist capitalists have contributed to the emergence of the AKP. However, he looks at the AKP's evolution from its historical roots, and demonstrates how the AKP’s rise marked a break in the Republican ideology which had been dominant since 1923. In addition, he uses a theoretical framework based on Marx's historical philosophy and Weber's sociological teachings. Contrary to scholars who argue that the Islamist bourgeoisie has been an important factor in society, economy and politics, Buğra and Savaşkan (2010) take a more critical approach towards the emergence of the Islamist bourgeoisie. They evaluate the economic impact of this Islamist bourgeoisie, and question how strong it is within the economy. They conclude that despite the improvements in Islamist bourgeoisie, the main big industrialists and businesses still remain powerful.
In addition to studies on the Islamist bourgeoisie, this thesis relies on studies which look at the Turkish economy and society from a historical angle. Pamuk (2009) and Yenal (2010) give a historical account of the Turkish economy since the end of the Ottoman Empire up until the current decade. They provide useful material which allows one to understand the changing economic policy landscape over time; for instance the period 1930-1950 is characterized by state-oriented policies. Mehmet (1998) compares two different countries, Turkey and Malaysia, from the perspective of their economic evolution. The latter constitutes a useful source of information on the main economic breakthrough periods in Turkey (e.g. Turkish statism of the 1950s; import-substitution of 1960s etc.). Koç (2010) examines the working class in Turkey, taking into account labour unions, legal changes, and socio-economic changes. He uses a chronological approach.

Compared to previous works, Kongar (2011) gives a historical account of the societal structure of Turkey since the end of the Ottoman Empire. While looking at the importance of the socio-economic transformation, he takes into consideration both political and historical changes.

In this section, I demonstrated how Turkish society is currently analysed in Turkish scholarly literature. Mainly dual-models such as centre-periphery have been used, since a class-based analysis fails to fit the Turkish society. I have looked at those theories in order to understand changes in social structures in Turkey. Therefore, I have looked at theories from the Republican era to the present, in order to find out the suitable theoretical framework.
2.8 Non-scholarly Literature on Turkish Society, Economy, and Politics

In addition to the scholarly literature on Turkish politics and Turkish society, I have used an important amount of non-scholarly work. For the analysis of changes in Turkish socio-economic structures, I have collected reports from various research organisations. For example, a 2002 pre-election survey by A&G Araştırma (Research) looks at the evolution of the distribution of votes from 1999, as well as voter profiles (A&G Araştırma, 2002). The pre-election survey results relate to voter expectations about Turkey’s future. Similarly, a 2007 pre-parliamentary election survey examines voter profiles according to education; occupational category and geographical region (A&G Araştırma, 2007a).

A further report, commissioned by a left-wing political party71 (A&G Araştırma, 2010) looks at voter profiles, and categorises them as nationalist, secular, religious and Kemalist (Atatürkçü72). In addition, it presents voters’ opinions on the global economic crisis of 2009, the ruling party’s performance and on lead media headlines of January 2010. Finally, the report investigates voters’ political tendencies according to family party orientation or party tradition.

71 The DSP: the Left-wing political party.
72 Kemalist (Atatürkçü) is an individual who adopts and advocates the six founding principles of the Republic: republicanism, nationalism, statism, secularism, revolutionaryism, and populism. Since these are at the same time the principles of the state-founding party CHP, a Kemalist is normally also a member or adherent of the CHP. A Turkish nationalist in turn regards Islam as part of the Turkish identity. This is the fundamental difference between them, since the Kemalists are strict secularists. The Turkish nationalists are the members or adherents of the MHP.
Furthermore, *Konda Araştırma ve Danışmanlık* (Konda Research and Consultancy) have also conducted similar surveys. The Konda Araştırma carried out a detailed pre-election survey before the 2007 elections, through which they identified voting according to gender, age, education, household size, employment, income and place of residence (Konda Research, 2007). Moreover, they looked at changes in voting patterns between the elections of 2002 and 2007. In addition, I have used Ağırdr’s (2007a) commentary on the finding of Konda’s pre-election survey of 2007. In further work, Ağırdr (2007b) makes a broad analysis of Turkish politics after the elections of 2007, which he considered as mould-breaking.

In addition to surveys on voting and voter profiles, further research reports have dealt with related subjects such as that of deprived shanty town dwellers. For example, one report demonstrates the demographic characteristics of shanty town residents, their political preferences, lifestyles, values and opinions on Turkish politics (Ağırdır, 2008).

The Turkish Institute of Statistics also produces important survey data among which data on provincial social indicators (TÜİK, 2004) and national census data (e.g. 1980, 1990 and 1995) has proved useful (TÜİK website).

While surveys have provided invaluable empirical data, other non-scholarly sources of information include reports and policy papers published by international organisations such as the World Bank and the UNDP, political parties and various Turkish state agencies. For example, the World Bank reports on gender policies and the position of women in Turkey (Acar et al., 2003) and

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73 Konda Araştırma also provided to me the raw data of the survey conducted in 2007. In chapter 4 and 5, I made some regressions to prove my evidences.
on the Turkish labour market (World Bank, 2006); a policy paper, in collaboration with the Turkish state planning agency, (World Bank, 2009a); or a UNDP report on new poverty and Turkey’s changing welfare regime (Buğra and Keyder, 2003) have been used to inform chapter 5 of this thesis.

Similarly, another policy paper on Issue Histories Turkey discusses the evolution of equality policies from a historical angle (Acar et al., 2007).

Furthermore, reports and works prepared by foreign research centers have also been used in the writing of this thesis. For instance, the Pew Research Centre’s Global Attitudes Project on Muslim views worldwide was helpful in understanding Turkish views on various topics as compared with views from other Muslim-majority Countries (namely Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Turkey and Pakistan) (PewResearchCenter, 2012). The International Policy Analysis Unit’s work on Turkey’s attempts at EU accession has also helped in understanding EU processes and issues relating to the European economy, social interest groups (minorities, women, civil society organizations, trade unions, and media) and political landscape (Aslan, 2006).

2.9 Conclusion

The literature on parties, party systems and voting behaviour has revealed that there are different theories and models which can be applied to the Turkish party political system and voting. Certain theories are also helpful in making sense of why Turkish voters have decided to vote for the AKP since 2002 and how the AKP has consolidated itself within the party system. Empirical works on voting patterns in Turkey and party politics have contributed

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74 Institute for Human Sciences Vienna QUING (Quality in Gender and Equality Policies)
to the reinforcement of my arguments related to AKP’s emergence and consolidation. Furthermore, country studies on Turkey demonstrate how the literature on Turkey and the AKP has increased in parallel to the interest in Turkish politics amongst Western and Turkish scholars, media and political observers. The presence of a ‘pro-Islamic’ government party that possesses hybrid socio-economic characteristics pursues new approaches in Turkish foreign policy, and more importantly, displays rather impressive performances that very likely account for this increase in interest.
Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework, Methodology and Methods

3.1 Introduction

This thesis investigates both the development of the Turkish political party system and the changes in the socio-economic structures which have worked in favour of the ruling AKP. Therefore, the research approach is underpinned by two different theoretical models. Within this dual-theoretical framework, I have adopted a qualitative methodology to guide my research process. In order to elaborate my research process, I first discuss this supporting theoretical framework. I then clarify my research strategy in detail, by including ontological and epistemological positions. Afterwards, I present my research methods which are based on in-depth interviews; archival research and analysis of quantitative data. I also discuss the data collection process, data analysis and the problems I encountered during the data collection process. Lastly, I look at the ethical considerations.

3.2 Theoretical Framework, Research Strategy and Research Orientations

3.2.1 Theoretical Framework and Research Strategy

The process of data collection, analysis and interpretation needs a framework to be designed in order to complete the objectives of the study. For my project, I have not chosen a unique theoretical paradigm to lead my research, due to differentiation among research objectives. However, I have adopted two main theoretical models to guide my research and influence my choice of method. In Chapter 2, I looked at the literature on the main political parties and the scholarly work on Turkish society and politics, as one of the aims of this
study is to investigate the impact of both political developments and socio-economic factors in analysing the emergence and success of the AKP. I draw upon two theoretical models from this literature to guide my research strategy and methods.

Consequently, the general theoretical framework is based on both the cleavage structure (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) and the centre-periphery relations (Shils, 1961; Shils, 1975; Mardin, 1973 and Kahraman, 2008).

The former theory is deduced from Talcott Parsons’ paradigm of societal changes (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, pp.7-10). When the Parsonian paradigm is traced back further, it is seen that Parson used a thoroughly Weberian class analysis in his works (Tribe, 2007, p.222).

The latter, the centre-periphery relations theory, was initially developed by Shils (1961, p.117; Shils, 1975, p.3). Mardin (1973, pp.183-184) was inspired by Shils’s work on centre-periphery and adopted it as a tool to analyse Turkish politics and society. In recent times, Kahraman (2008) further took into consideration Mardin’s centre-periphery approach by referring to both Gramsci and Gramscian class analysis (Gramsci, 1971, pp.202-205, p.366, p.377 and p.418). Furthermore, he expanded the concepts related to the centre-periphery relations, in order to incorporate the recent dynamics in Turkish society into his model. As with the cleavage structure’s roots, the centre and periphery relation also has its roots in Weber’s class analysis.

Moreover, when the cleavage-structure (Lipset and Rokkan) and centre-periphery relations model are traced back in terms of theoretical lines, it is observed that both of them originate in the Weberian class approach. The two
models mentioned above underpin the mainly qualitative methodology of this research. Below, my intent is to develop these theoretical models, explain how they function in my study and how they influenced my choice of method.

3.2.1.1 Lipset and Rokkan’s Cleavage Structure and the Development of the Turkish Party System

Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage structure is well suited to answer the research questions relating to the impact of the general political conjunctures of the early 2000s on the electoral victory of the AKP.

Political developments in late Republican era up to the present have been shaped by the dynamics and tensions between numerous political parties (e.g. left-wing vs. right-wing; Turkish nationalist vs. Kurdish minority nationalist; pro-Islamist vs. secular). Therefore, the theoretical framework for these research questions rests on a theory demonstrating the evolution of the political party system, rather than a party theory which relates to a single party (e.g. spatial competition; institutional party approach to ideology (Ware, 1996, p.18 and p.21).

As mentioned earlier in the first section of Chapter 2 (2.1), the main theories on the political party system are classified by Ware (1996) according to sociological, institutional and competition factors. Among these three main theories of the development of political party systems, Lipset and Rokkan argue that social conflict shapes political parties rather than political institutions, and therefore they claim that the explanation of different political party systems and related electoral systems is possible only through a sociological approach (Ware, 1996, pp.188-189).
This cleavage structure emphasises the importance of sociological factors suits the analysis of political developments in Turkey. In particular, because Turkey has not yet reached the same stage of economic and political development as western democracies, I argue that Turkish political developments have been mostly led by the dynamics of society or through the social cleavages in terms of the Lipset-Rokkan theory. Consequently, I consider that the suitable theoretical model for the analysis of political developments, as well as the analysis of the AKP, is the Lipset-Rokkan’s cleavage structure.

As was pointed out in detail in 2.1, the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage structure is based on the four divisions which are respectively centre-periphery; state-church; land-industry and owner-worker. I incorporated them into my research frame in order to investigate both political developments in Turkey and analyse the AKP within the Turkish political party system. Below, I discuss how I incorporated these four cleavages into the Turkish political party system. I started this discussion first with centre-periphery division, and then I looked at the state-church one. Third, I moved to the land-industry, and lastly I looked at the employer-worker cleavage.

First, conflict in terms of centre-periphery divisions is created in order to demonstrate the struggle between the centre of Turkish society which favours the nation-state on the one hand, and ethnically, linguistically or religiously

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75 Owner-worker: I considered that the term employer would be much more suitable than the word ‘owner’. Therefore, as compared to literature review chapter 2, I will use the word “employer” while incorporating it into Turkish party system.

76 Nation-State: It is also important to mention the national bourgeoisie during this nation-state making process. In the early Republican era, State supported business circles in order create its own national bourgeoisie (Der Spiegel, 2008; Insel, 2012) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/spiegel-interview-with-orhan-pamuk-i-m-for-europe-democracy-and-freedom-of-opinion-a-584586-2.html
distinct groups (periphery) which resist the homogenization\textsuperscript{77} of the country on the other hand. Even though this cleavage is developed as a tool to explain European party systems (Ware, 1996, p.186), it is possible to apply it in the Turkish context. First of all, following the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Turkey’s political system implemented numerous reforms aiming to standardize language, religion and education in order to control sub-national or peripheral units. The exclusive emphasis on Turkish as the national language of the country; the unification/centralization\textsuperscript{78} of the school system and the imposition of state-controlled religion\textsuperscript{79} illustrate these attempts to homogenize the country.

In addition, the introduction of reforms during the period 1922-1937 were conceived by the Kurdish minority as a threat to its linguistic and cultural differences and by religious circles as to their freedom of expression and practice of religion.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{77} Ware (1996) emphasizes the homogenization of the country when he analyses the centre-periphery division of Lipset-Rokkan. Throughout homogenization, this means cultural homogenization and the ethnic assimilation of the country. As a result, the minorities should not use their own languages. The different sects such \textit{Alevi}s should not practice their own religious rituals, but only the Sunni-Islam.
\item \textsuperscript{78} centralization/unification: After the establishment of Republic, the religious schools ("medreses") were closed down and the education became uniform under guidance of the \textit{Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı} (Ministry of National Education) (formerly \textit{Maarif Vekaleti} (Ministry of Education), based on the \textit{Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu} (\textit{Öğretim Birliği Yasası}) (Law of Uniform Education) of 3th March 1924. This was one of the main reforms and aimed at fight against illiteracy and education of the nation.
\item \textsuperscript{79} State-controlled religion: After the establishment of Republic in 1923, religious activities in public began to be subordinated under the \textit{Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı} (Presidency of Religious Affairs) that appoints preachers ("imams") and other religious officials as state personnel.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The conflict in terms of language and religion is a useful frame in which to explain political developments in Turkey while taking into account the feedback effect of problems related to religion and ethnicity into political party system. However, as I consider the religion issue with state-church cleavage, this cleavage is mostly useful tool to explain the impact of minority groups (e.g. Kurdish) on the AKP’s electoral victory.

Second, the state-church cleavage emerged due to conflict between State and Church which existed in Western European countries. This conflict demonstrates a parallelism with the confrontation between the centrist state and religious circles. Hence, I am using the western conception of state-church cleavage to explain the traditionally Kemalist state and the religious groups in Turkey.

Ware points out that after the 1789 Revolution in France, the French state, over a period of time, imposed the duty of loyalty of the citizens to the state and therefore it spent an incredible effort in educating citizens in a way which achieved a secular state system. Similarly, the Turkish state has imposed a secular education system through which the aim was to control the relationship between the nation-state and the individual citizen (Ware, 1996, p.187; Burdy and Marcou, 1995, p.13). As mentioned before in chapter 1, the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923. Later, in 1937, religion was strictly separated from state affairs and was put under the control of the secular state (Berkeş, 1998, p.19).

Even though the predominant religion in Turkey is Islam rather than Christianity, the political divisions between the state and Islam are likely to
mimic the state-church cleavage of the West. The commonality between the Church and Islam can be explained by looking at Durkheim’s theory of religion and conflict (Giddens, 1971, p.107). Durkheim argued that the Church was not only related to the western societies, but to any society, since all the religions are composed of ritual prescriptions and prohibitions which enforce a radical separation between what he called the profane (i.e. anything that is unconsecrated\textsuperscript{80}, impure and not concerned with religious purposes) and the sacred (all that is worthy of respect, reverence and related to religious purposes).

In accordance with Durkheim’s theory, the state-church cleavage structures political developments in Turkey related to the tension between the secular and pro-Islamic groups, especially after the emergence of the AKP in 2002. Therefore, this cleavage can be used to analyse and understand the pro-Islamic past of the AKP, the electoral success of the AKP and its conservative world view.

A further important division is the land-industry division. While relating this conflict to the Turkish context and how it impacts on the Turkish political party system, it is important to mention that Turkey has never had a post-industrialist period, and has never had a stable political party system either. This has led some scholars to point out that there is no close correlation between economic development and the development of the Turkish party system (Ayata, 2002, p.138).

However, industrialist groups, irrespective of whether they are state-supported or are beneficiaries of economic liberalization (like in the 1980s),

\textsuperscript{80} Unconsecrated: all things which are not dedicated to as sacred purpose.
have had an impact on the creation and/or development of liberal oriented parties (e.g. creation of the state bourgeoisie with the help of the CHP (from the 1923-1950); the DP and its liberal oriented policies (1945-1960) or the pro-Islamic parties such as the RP, the FP and the AKP (i.e. the rise of new Anatolian capitalists\textsuperscript{81} since 1980s) (Keyder, 1989, p.97; Kahraman, 2008, pp.233-234).

In consequence, Ayata’s argument cannot be entirely accepted, since there was to be a close mutual relationship between the Turkish political parties and the economic development. Therefore, I utilize the land-industry cleavage in order to understand the impact of economic development on political parties in Turkey and as political party systems’ contribution to industrialist or landed interest groups.

Furthermore, while making this link, I take into account a definition of cleavage developed by Gallagher et al. (2005). Their definition of cleavage emphasizes the distinctiveness of the group, common conscience and institutional existence (Gallagher et al., 2005 as cited in Mair, 2006, p.373).

The last two notions (common conscience and institutional existence) make most sense in the Turkish context. The interest groups’ awareness of their

\textsuperscript{81} Throughout the research, I have witnessed different words to explain the Anatolian capitalists. First of all, the name “Anatolian” is used to identify these Capitalists, since these business and industrial circles are mostly located at the inner Anatolia and at Anatolian provincial cities (Map on Appendix Part F, Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). Hence, the majority of them are not located at the metropolitan cities such as İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir and Adana. In addition, as compared to other scholars Gümusçu (2010) and Yavuz (2010), I have not used the term “bourgeoisie” in order to qualify the capitalist groups. However, since there is still on-going discussion Pamuk (2009); Buğra (2010) and İnsel (2012) on the usage of term bourgeoisie, I have used the term “Anatolian/Provincial Capitalists” to qualify these new business and industrial circles at the provincial areas. Moreover, some scholars such as Gümusçu (2010) used the adjective “devout” in order to differentiate them from the big businessmen and industrialists of metropolitan cities who have secular and modern lifestyles.
common belonging can be seen in the rise of the devout/provincial bourgeoisie in Turkey. Among the variable of this cleavage (land and industry), I solely took into account the pressure groups which are related to the industry and I did not look at the land side. I chose only the industry divide because I considered the industrial pressure groups, as a more important group in the country as compared with the pressure groups related to the land or agriculture. As a consequence, the political and institutional expression of their place in this specific cleavage (industry) is considered in the establishment of the AKP.

The final cleavage is that between owners and managers of land/industry and workers. In Turkey, the factors which have influenced the conversion of the employer-worker cleavage into political parties are not similar to those prevalent in European countries. First of all, the establishment of left-wing parties is based neither on an industrial revolution, nor on the growth of a working class. The creation of worker strata or classes is not based on a class bottom-up process.

As Kongar points out, in Turkish politics, the Left was built up in a rather artificial way (Kongar, 2011, p.635). Therefore, the declining path of the Left parties and the shift of the votes from the Left to the Right parties after the military intervention of 1980 is not surprising, since the Left had been previously built from a top-down approach through political efforts and ideological guidance. As will be seen in the chapter 4, the State itself supported the establishment of trade unions and associations for workers in the 1960s (Kongar, 2011, p.635)

In consequence, the class of workers and peasants in Turkish society has never had a great impact on the economic system which was originally
dominated by the bureaucrats and the corporatist bourgeoisie (Keyder, 1989, p.107). In addition, the Left has been structured through political orientation, and not through a labour movement. Therefore, the employer-worker cleavage does not fit the Turkish context, and does not explain the development of the political party system in Turkey very well.

On the other hand, this cleavage makes more sense with Lipset’s relative deprivation hypothesis, which illustrates the tendency of voters towards extreme right-wing parties due to the voters’ unfavourable socio-economic conditions (Lipset, 1960, pp.63-64; Akgün, 2002, p.31). Even though the AKP cannot be considered as an extreme right party, this hypothesis suitably explains the voting behaviour of the disadvantaged masses. These disadvantaged masses living in the squatter areas of the metropolitan cities have predominantly voted in favour of the AKP.

Under the guidance of this theoretical model, namely Lipset-Rokkan’s cleavage structure model, I adopted qualitative research methods for the collection of data. The qualitative methods that I used are those of semi-structured, in-depth interviews and archival research, and are designed to achieve my research objectives related to the impact of the political conjuncture on the electoral success of the AKP. In addition to this main cleavage structure model, Gallagher et al’s recent definition of cleavage and Lipset’s relative deprivation hypothesis are used as supporting concepts.

This fourfold theoretical model guided my choice of methods, and directed the sample of and recruitment of interviewees and the types of archives to be consulted. Firstly, I used the centre-periphery relations cleavage as a tool to
explain the impact of minorities (Kurdish in Turkish context) on the AKP’s electoral success. For this reason, I selected interviewees who were able to give information on the Kurdish problem (e.g. representative of the BDP in İstanbul and representative of the AKP in Diyarbakır).

As pointed out in chapter 1, since the 1980s, the Kurds have had more identity-based claims. Thus, the Kurdish problem was mostly based on the restriction of use of Kurdish and education in Kurdish; on their demands for lifting of these restrictions, for cultural rights and more autonomy from the Turkish State. Regarding Kurds’ main voting behaviour, when the last decade is taken into account (2002-2011) their main preference has been either the AKP or BDP.

As a consequence, my main questions to these members of the AKP members from South-eastern region (e.g. Diyarbakır) was how/why Kurds voting behaviour have shown differences according to the regional characteristics (e.g. metropolitan cities vs. South-Eastern region). The main themes I hoped to discuss were the economy and socio-economic issues impacting Kurds’ voting behaviour. For the members of the BDP, my main questions were related to the democratization during the AKP’s tenure and how they have found AKP’s democratic initiative for Kurds. I hoped to discuss themes such as democratization, minority rights and pro-EU discourse of the AKP with these interviewees.

Secondly, I made use of the state-church cleavage in order to investigate the pro-Islamic past of the AKP and its effect on the electoral success of the AKP. Thus, I identified key informants as the representative of the SP, the
representatives of the CHP (woman; youth branch) and the representatives of the AKP (local; headquarter; youth; women branches). During my interviews with these key informants, I hoped to get answers related to the questions on the emergence of the reformist branch within the FP after the closure of the FP in 2001 and questions on the differences/similarities between the AKP and its RP/FP.

Thirdly, I incorporated the land-industry cleavage to explain the impact of political and economic interest groups on the emergence of the AKP. I identified key informants as the representative of NGOs\textsuperscript{82} and trade unions\textsuperscript{83}. The themes I discussed with them were the AKP’s general economic policies; the AKP’s relationship with the Anatolian capitalists and the AKP’s relations with the EU.

Fourthly, I considered the employer-worker cleavage as a way to explain the deprived masses’ tendency to vote for the AKP. Thus, I recruited interviewees from NGOs which are located in the city squatter areas of the metropolitan cities. As mentioned in the theoretical framework above, I did not consider the employer-worker cleavage in order to discuss the relationship between workers and employers during the AKP’s tenure. Therefore, I did not make interviews with trade unions to investigate this cleavage but mostly to understand the land-industry. As a result, I asked to representatives of trade

\textsuperscript{82} NGOs: The NGOs I have chosen were the TÜSİAD, the TOBB, the MÜSİAD and the İTO (İstanbul Ticaret Odası - Istanbul Chamber of Commerce) (even though they were called as NGOs, they were established by the main political and economic interest groups) and the representatives of some companies and banks (such as Eczacıbaşı, TEB (Türkiye Ekonomi Bankası - Turkish Economy Bank).

\textsuperscript{83} The trade unions were the DISK (Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - The Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey) and the HAK-İŞ (Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions).
unions questions on the AKP’s neo-liberal economic agenda, its social policies and its relations with the EU.

Furthermore, the cleavage structure guided another stage of qualitative method, namely the archival research method. For instance, the state-church cleavage guided the choice of types of documents; in this regard, I looked for the party programmes; party brochures of the pro-Islamic parties and secular parties. Details of this archival research will be presented in the section on methods further below.

3.2.1.2 The Centre-Periphery Relations Model, Evolution of Turkey’s Social Structure and Development of the AKP

Of the four cleavage models presented above, I used the centre-periphery relations model in order to achieve the objectives of this study related to the impact of changes in the social structures of Turkey and short-term and long-term economic factors in the emergence and electoral success of the AKP.

As mentioned earlier in section 2.2, Kahraman (2008) expanded both centre and periphery concepts which are parts of Lipset and Rokkan’s overall cleavage model by taking into account socio-economic dynamics in Turkey since 1980s. He developed two new concepts, namely ‘the periphery at the centre’ and ‘the centre at the periphery’. By extending this social structure scheme, Kahraman took into account the dynamic structures specific to Turkish society.

Consequently, this extended version of the centre-periphery relations model reflects three main current categories of Turkish society: ‘the centre’; ‘the centre at the periphery’ and ‘the periphery at the centre’ (Kahraman, 2008,
pp.176-178). The centre symbolizes the bureaucrats, the intellectuals and the army officials who guided the modernization and secularization of Turkey since the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Kahraman calls this coalition “the historical bloc” by referring to Gramsci’s historical bloc\textsuperscript{84} concept (Gramsci, 1971, pp.202-205 cited in Kahraman, 2008, p.124).

In addition, Kahraman considers the ‘centre at the periphery’ as the devout Anatolian bourgeoisie and the ‘periphery at the centre’ as the masses which live in the city squatter areas of the metropolitan cities (Kahraman, 2008, pp.174-177). Thus, the development of ‘centre at the periphery’ is due to industrial development while the ‘periphery at the centre’ has developed due to migration from outlying areas into cities.

This three-fold social structure picture was used in order to explain the changes in socio-economic structure in Turkey and the reflection of these changes in the AKP’s electoral success. I used Kahraman’s conceptual schema to guide my research process for two reasons. Firstly, Kahraman took into account recent social dynamics in this analysis of Turkish society. For instance, when he identified the centre at the periphery as composed of the devout bourgeoisie, he did not disregard the impact of the liberal economic policies of 1980s on this recently emerged bourgeoisie.

\textsuperscript{84} Gramsci’s concept of historical bloc: “An historical bloc refers to an historical congruence between material forces, institutions and ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different class forces politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and coherence to its constituent elements. Moreover, for a new historical bloc to emerge, its leaders must engage in conscious planned struggle. Any new historical bloc must have not only power within the civil society and economy, it also needs persuasive ideas, arguments and initiatives that build on, catalyze and develop its political networks and organization – not political parties such” (Gill, 2002, p.58; Gramsci, 1971, p.137).
Secondly, the way he approached the centre-periphery relations is more linked to sociological and geographical divisions. For instance, he argued that the initial division between centre and periphery was based more on an ideological/political separation. For instance, as pointed out in chapter 2, Mardin (1973) and other scholars who adopted a dual approach, considered this division between centre and periphery as a division between ruling elites and rest of society. Hence, the ruling elites administrated the state whereas the rest of society did not have any involvement in those state issues. Moreover, as compared to the ruling elites’ secularist side, peripheral circles that were pious practiced their religion.

However, he then went on to argue that after the 1990s, this division became a geographical and sociological division (Kahraman, 2008, p.226 and p.232). In consequence, the ‘centre at the periphery’ covered mostly the inner Anatolian capitalist whereas the ‘periphery at the centre’ covered the lower strata at the squatters of the metropolitan cities and big cities.

Based on Kahraman’s scheme, I used a qualitative research method (including analysis of quantitative data and in-depth interviews) in order to achieve my research objectives. Initially, I investigated the changes in Turkey’s socio-economic structures by five chronological periods (1923-1950; 1950-1960, 1960-1980; 1980-1992 and 1992-2002). After each period, I attempted to understand the voting behaviour, by looking at those changes in socio-economic structures. The last two decades (1980-1992 and 1992-2002) helped me to analyse how these changes are reflected in the social bases of the AKP. In order to do the latter, I looked at pre-election and post-election surveys, statistical
yearbooks and empirical scholarly work which provided data on voter profiles by income; gender; age; education; occupational category and place of residence (urban as opposed to rural).

I also obtained data from the in-depth interviews that I conducted with the members of economic institutions, NGOs and companies. The interviews helped me to obtain tacit information that I could not find in the surveys. The details on the usage of methods will be given in the section 2.3.

3.2.2 Methodology and Research Orientations

In this section, I explain why my research methodology should not be considered a mixed research methodology in spite of the fact that some quantitative data has been used. In addition, I analyse how the ontological and epistemological positions of the research oriented the research methodology.

While I opted for both quantitative and qualitative approaches to data collection (Bryman, 2004; Bryman, 2006) (Deacon, Bryman et al., 1998), in order to maximise the breadth and depth of my results, the main scope of my research is evidently based on qualitative research methods, namely in-depth, semi-structured interviews and archival research. Nonetheless, I used existing quantitative data in order to analyse the socio-economic structural changes in Turkey. This data only contributed to the study as a development function (Greene, Caracelli and Graham, 1989, p.255); that is, it aimed to provide a better understanding of the sociological changes since 1980s to the reader, and to inform her/him about the development of the Turkish economy and social structure over a period of time.
Each piece of research was oriented by initial positions to guide the research process: “There is an interrelationship between the core concepts of social science “ontology, epistemology, methodology and sources” (Grix, 2002, p.175) (Bryman, 2008, p.21). This direction and logical link had to be coherent during the whole research process.

I chose a qualitative research methodology, which directly influenced my ontological and epistemological positions. My ontological stance is constructive, as I look at the social phenomena from the eyes of social actors or, in more sophisticated terms, I take into account observations of social actors who construct their own realities. Given that the social world is formed by multiple realities (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003), as a social scientist, I gained access to people’s common-sense thinking and their social world from their point of view (Bryman, 2008, p.16; Schutz, 1962, p.59). Hence, my research position was constructive, since my main research interest lay in the actors’ constructions and interpretations of their social world (Silverman, 2001).

This constructivist ontological stance guided my epistemological position as a researcher. My epistemological position is interpretive, given my attempt to understand the social world from the people’s actions and their point of view (Bryman, 2008, p.16; Bryman 2001, p.13; Grix, 2002, p.178). The social actors had different points of view regarding the political party I investigated. For instance, representatives of NGOs (such as Başak Sanat Evi and Halk Evleri) based their arguments on the AKP from a different perspective than party members and representatives of NGOs, since they worked at field level. Similarly, the representatives of oppositional parties (e.g. the CHP, the BDP, and
the SP) had different attitudes towards the ruling party than the representatives of the AKP. Due to their oppositional positions, they perceived socio-economic implications of AKP’s projects in a more objective way. Due to this epistemological stance, I had the opportunity to examine their actions and their own interpretations and thereby to extract solutions for them.

Initially, I adopted a general theoretical framework, in order to guide my data collection process. As discussed previously, it consisted of the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage structure and Kahraman’s refined centre-periphery relations model. After the data collection, due to my initial ontological and epistemological positions, I followed an inductive approach for the analysis of my data. As a result, I did not impose theories on my data but I built theories after my data analysis (Bryman, 2008, p.11). Another important issue, as pointed out by Glaser and Strauss (1967, p.3) (Silverman, 2005, p.78), as I did use an inductive approach to the research, the data analysis helped to build up theories (Bryman, 2008, p.6).

Therefore, I used grounded theory; in the sense that research data helped me to reach theories rather than that I imposed a general framework like in positivist research (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992, p.19). Then, I tried to work on theory building which was the delicate part of the work and it helps to reflect, think, match and blend theories. To be more concise, in chapter 4, I first looked at the changes in social structures. Then, by looking at these changes, I tried to understand the voting behaviour during these five different periods mentioned above. Initially, I thought that voting behaviour would be linked directly to the

85 In terms of actions, for instance, the Halk Evleri had a more activist stance.
86 The representatives of the AKP had a tendency to market their own accomplishments whereas other oppositional parties were more realistic and critical about the AKP’s accomplishments.
changes in social structures thereby; I expected that the class-based theories would be the suitable approaches. However, after analysing the data, I realized that due to dynamics existing in Turkish society, I realized the necessity of building up different theories other than usage of class-based voting theories (e.g. rational and expressive).

When I analysed the impact of the socio-economic structures on the electoral success of the AKP, there were many variables to be taken into account: changes in socio-economic structures and changing voting behaviour. In particular, I needed a theory to link socio-economic transformation to the voting behaviour. In building theories under the influence of my data, I adopted Weberian class analysis in my research. The main reason behind this choice that Weberian theory was more suitable for the analysis of changes in socio-economic structures in Turkey. As demonstrated in section 2.7, Turkish societal structure is often analysed by dual models (which are based mostly on status) rather than class models. Thus, Weber’s Class analysis allows for more complexity due to his emphasis on non-class social attributes such as status and group power as represented by political parties.

To be more specific, the Turkish context has seen the emergence of a vast numbers of wage-earning, white collar workers (e.g. in the banking, finance and insurance sectors, public and private service sector etc) due to the changes in the economy and society since the 1980s. On the other hand, there is another middle class or intermediary strata (e.g. self-employed craftsmen, tradesmen or “petty bourgeoisie”) whose income depends on their performance and ability to sell the products of their labour directly to consumers.
Due to the differing characteristics (such as education and social background), these two middle classes (non-manual wage earners and small, self-employed craftsmen and traders) cannot be assigned to the same middle class category. Therefore, I need to take into account Weberian class theory and assign the newly emergent strata, as well as the strata of tradesmen to different social strata according to their status. I have therefore used the term “intermediary classes” (For an illustration of these different strata, see Appendix Part E, Figure 1).

Even though I argue that I use grounded theory in my data analysis, I also took into account the initial general theoretical framework (i.e. Lipset-Rokkan and centre-periphery relations models) while looking at the consolidation of the AKP within Turkish society. In doing so, I considered concepts such as centre-periphery relations or historical bloc in order to analyse my data. Consequently, it is important to point out that the relation between theory and data analysis is not a clear cut process for qualitative researchers.

3.3 Methods

3.3.1 Semi-structured In-depth Interviews

In the previous section on the methodology, I explained how the general theoretical framework guided my sample and recruitment of interviewees.

Given the importance of the in-depth interviews in the qualitative research strategy, I interviewed 36 actors in total. During the field research, I encountered a few obstacles to gaining access to some of the participants, especially high-ranking political party members. I got accessed them mainly
through well-placed gatekeepers – for example through by academics, by personal acquaintances.

Moreover, as a result of contact with interviewees through gatekeepers, trust was established with interviewees much more quickly. In interviews where the gatekeepers were not used, I had to set up a trusting relationship between myself and the participant. In these cases, I gained access to them by developing a personal relationship. Depending on the amount of trust built up in a particular relationship, I was introduced to further potential interviewees, for example, others within a particular party or institution. For this reason, snowballing interview techniques helped me to complete the recruitment of participants (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992, p.33).

Another important issue was related to the time frame for fieldwork. I scheduled and completed my interviews between December 2010 and the end of June 2011, which coincided with the pre-election period. Therefore, the election period caused slight difficulties in getting access to political party members, as they were required to participate in various meetings. On the other hand, due to the elections, the chances of finding party staff at any time of the day in their party offices was high and the interviewees were quite enthusiastic about their party politics and their own party vision. Ironically, this timeline helped me to reach many people, due to their workload and preparations.

87 In those cases, I sent emails to the interviewees. In case I did not get an answer from them, I called the party or the NGO. Then, they oriented me to reach the representative I was looking for and after I talked to this representative on the phone, they were asking me to send to him/her an email about my project. Then, they were calling me back or I was calling them in order to arrange an appointment. In some other cases, I visited local branches (for the parties), I presented myself and then I talked about my research. After a short conservation, I was telling them that I would like to make interviews with representatives of their institution. In consequence, I got accessed to them by establishing a personal relationship with him/her.

88 The parliamentary elections occurred on 12th June 2011.
Moreover, I had the opportunity to collect many party leaflets and brochures from the parties as well as from the street stands to add to the archival research. Hence, on the one hand, the election period postponed completion of the interview list, but on the other hand, party members were present in their offices, and they were mostly keen about their work and their party strategies.

The interview process led me to reach concealed information regarding the AKP. The interview sample was created by different categories of informants (including ones who were critical of the AKP). Therefore the interviews did not only provide positive views of the AKP, but also critiques of the party. The majority of interviews took place as one-on-one, face-to-face semi-structured interviews. My questions were both general open-ended questions and more specific. For instance, I started with general questions such as the main circumstances which led to the emergence to the AKP in 2002. Then, depending on the interviewee, I asked questions regarding the economy during the AKP’s tenure, the AKP’ social projects, the AKP’s relations with the EU. Regarding timing; interviews lasted between half an hour and three hours, depending on the participants’ time constraints. Furthermore, I had some problems during the interview stage, when some of participants did not want to sign the informed consent form because they were afraid for unknown reason to sign any paper. I tried to explain to them that informed consent was to protect interviewees. In cases I failed in getting signatures, I did not make interviews with these representatives.

In addition, I did not record all the interviews, as the participants did not approve the usage of a voice recorder. Therefore, only 16 out of 36 interviews
were recorded. Since most of the participants did not give their consent for the use of the voice recorder, I had to keep careful notes during those interviews. As pointed out by many scholars (Hannabuss, 1996; Seale and Silverman, 1997; Wellard and McKenna, 2001; MacLean, Meyer et al., 2004), the transcription of recorded interviews is an important stage of the qualitative research method, because it was the initial stage before finding out main themes of the thesis. The main obstacle mostly occurred due to the lack of voice recorded data which would have enabled me to use more direct quotes in the analysis chapters.

The qualitative data obtained from 36 interviews (details related to profiles of interviews can be found in Appendix Part B, Table 1) had to be organized to extract data for answering research questions. As mentioned in earlier section 3.2.2, I adopted an inductive approach to data analysis. In this way, I obtained the possibility to build theories according the data I obtained (Hannabuss, 1996; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Bryman, 2008). My analysis was also backed up by scholarly material on voting behaviour and empirical research on voting patterns and behaviour in Turkey. In the previous section, I discussed the way I built up theories out of data; therefore now, I will present the way in which I classified, evaluated and interpreted this semi-structured interview data.

Moreover, as soon as I finished the interview, I arranged my notes so that later on, I was able to write them properly especially converting the key words to comprehensible sentences. I transcribed 12 voice recorded interviews in the computer as the voice recorder was a digital one. Regarding the language of interviews, I conducted my interviews in Turkish, transcribed them and did my analysis in Turkish. Due to time concerns, I did not have opportunity to translate all the transcribed interviews from Turkish to English. When I found useful quotes or important notes afterwards I translated them from Turkish to English and used them in the suitable sections (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992, p.153).
For the classification of the data, I did not follow a rigorous coding technique, such as usage of software to analyse the data. Initially, I immersed myself into the data, in order to identify and differentiate the main issues and themes. Because my interviewees were already divided into different categories, the task of identifying issues, themes and subthemes was made easier. I then reflected on which interviews and themes would be useful for which chapter. For instance, my interviews with members of the trade unions and business associations were mostly useful for Chapter 4 as I looked at the social bases of the AKP and the impact of the economic factors on development of AKP support. However, it was not a clear-cut process since some interview data was also useful for Chapter 5 where I considered the political discourse and consolidation of the AKP.

Furthermore, manual coding was made easy on account of the different political positions of the interviewees toward the party. Opposition party members and NGOs had a more critical and distanced approach toward the AKP whereas the AKP members were committed to the marketing of their own political party and concealed many of the drawbacks of their party. Therefore, the predetermined interview categories helped me to be more critical towards the data analysis. While manually coding the data, I was not guided by the stories glorifying the AKP since I also heard the other side of the story. In this way, as pointed out by scholars writing on the data analysis processes (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994, p. 173), at the data analysis stage, the data should be split into pro-topic and anti-topic ones.
In my case, as pointed out earlier, the cleavage-structures already provided me the opportunity to possess somewhat this dual quality. For instance, given that the Halk Evleri had a more oppositional approach, towards the AKP, I had already known that this interview could be grouped as anti- the subject of the thesis. On the other hand, since the interviews I conducted with the representatives had more glorifying stories, I considered them as ‘pro’ the subject of the thesis. Due to this initial divide, it was easier to code and interpret these different views on the subject, and thereby develop more critical concepts and themes for the analysis of my data.

Regarding the data analysis, it was to an extent useful to immerse oneself into it but this rich data was so attractive that in the early stage of analysis, I had a tendency to use most of it for the thesis, rather than being selective. Consequently, initially my research began to be guided by my data rather than my research questions. I was, to an extent, being guided by this cumbersome data which has been referred to as an “attractive nuisance” by some scholars (Miles, 1979 cited in Bryman, 2008, p.538). This so-called attractive nuisance led me to add key policy issues to Chapter 5. The theme of policy issues emerged frequently during my interviews and so it was incorporated into Chapter 5, on the consolidation of the AKP.

In addition to immersion in the data, another technique helped me to reflect on my research: that of keeping a fieldwork diary or field notes. While I did not keep a meticulous fieldwork diary, I made notes after each interview on my experience in order to record my own thoughts relating to the whole of the interview process, including my relations with the interviewee and the interview
content (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992, p. 33). For instance, compared with male interviewees, the female participants were more intimidated by the use of the voice recorder and wary about giving informed consent. Before arranging an appointment time, they were more concerned to obtain information about my research topic as well as my educational background.

3.3.2 Archival Research Method

Archival research was another stage of the qualitative research of which a part was carried out in tandem with my in-depth interviews, especially where “grey literature” collection was concerned. As mentioned in the previous section, after each interview, I asked interviewees if they had any brochures, leaflets, reports or other publications to give and many were willing to provide me with such sources of information. As the interviews took place during an election period, I had the opportunity to collect numerous brochures, leaflets, and other publications from the party stands in the streets.

As far as non-scholarly sources are concerned, I looked at the newspapers, periodical press including national and international sources. Among the national newspapers, I looked at Radikal, Hürriyet, Hürriyet Daily News, Milliyet, Zaman, Yeni Şafak, ODA TV, TV 24 and Today’s Zaman. Among International newspapers and periodical press, I have looked at the Guardian, Le Monde, Economist, BBC and Der Spiegel (See also Appendix Part D for more detailed information on sources).

In addition, I looked at the scholarly research. They are mostly books in both Turkish and English. As mentioned out in Literature review, there is a great amount of country studies related to Turkey. In addition, there is also great
number of articles in journals. The journals I used were various since I looked at different policy areas while looking at the AKP’s social projects. Therefore, I looked at different types of journals.

Moreover, I used at internet based resources for instance, SGYK sources, WWRH, World Bank, IMF, KEİG, Resmi Gazete, Başbakanlık, İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, Halk Evleri, Diyanet, TBB, İş ve Sosyal Güvenlik, SETAV, Eurozine, Silk Road, TEPAV, Stratfor, Washington Institute.

The archival research did not concern only party publications, but also newspaper and periodical articles, papers from political seminars and so on. For a social researcher, any source can be a source of inspiration for data interpretation. In a way, I believe such grey literature provides can “turn lights on” in the researcher’s mind.

Following the data collection, I organized material according to different themes, issues, topics. My data was obtained from the NGOs in city squatter areas, brochures from various parties and booklets from political seminars. Categorization, classification and filing of this data constituted an important process. Initially, I classified this material according to the institutions concerned. Later, I realized that this was not a good analysis technique since I had a tendency to describe the data as it was. Afterwards, I classified material according to themes in order to reach a better analytical framework. Therefore, each document was filed according to theme rather than a specific institution or party. For instance, the leaflets taken from the women’s branches of the two main political parties, the AKP and CHP, and from feminist organizations were placed under the category of the gender relations.
The documents I received from the institutions were useful to support participants’ views and interpretations.

3.3.3 Analysis of Quantitative Data and Reliability of Data

I used quantitative data in order to provide a better understanding of economic developments and socio-economic transformations in Turkey from 1923 to 2002 (as mentioned above through five different chronological sections). Access to this data was unproblematic, given that most of the survey data and reports were freely available from the websites of survey companies and the Statistical Institute of Turkey. In order to obtain the required quantitative data which was not available online, I directly approached research organisations and survey companies or obtained them through well-placed intermediaries or gatekeepers.

Firstly, I used post-elections and voter profile surveys, in order to demonstrate the sociological profile of the AKP’s electoral base. In addition, I took into account empirical work on the socio-economic bases of Turkish political parties carried out by scholars. Moreover, a number of the scholarly works that I consulted were written by Turkish authors. Some of these were useful in providing partial information on the social classes in Turkey, particularly during the period 1960-1980.

In addition to survey data and scholarly work, I used the data from Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). The main obstacle that I encountered was the unavailability of data on socio-occupational categories before 1988. I therefore visited the library of the institute in order to learn how to obtain alternative data. For instance, I was advised to consider data for employed
people in agriculture, industry and in the services sectors since 1923. I also used TÜİK data on regional social indicators which provided a local and provincial picture of socio-economic transformation.

Furthermore, for the analysis of the quantitative data, I used data from the Turkish Statistical Institute that is available for the period 1923-1988. This data is not based on population census or labour surveys, but on a data revised by Bulutay (1995) according to specific restrospective techniques. This is the only data related to labour characteristics of Turkey during this period. Even though it is a revised data by Bulutay (1995), it should not be considered as an unreliable source. Important scholars such as Pamuk (2009) and Kongar (2011) have used this data comprehensively in their works. It is also important to add that Pamuk is a leading scholar in the economic history of the Ottoman Empire, Middle East and modern Turkey. In his work, where he analyses “Intervention during the Great Depression, Another Look at the Turkish Experience”, he uses the data prepared by Bulutay (1995) (Pamuk, 2009, p.171).

3.4 Ethical Issues

This research has been designed and conducted in accordance with the University of Warwick’s statement on the ethical conduct of research. As a social researcher, I was aware of potential risks to my safety. Therefore, during the design and conduct of research, I took into account issues related to my safety, and I adopted precautions in order to minimize exposure to any risk. For instance, before the meeting with any interviewee, I informed people close to me about my interview location.
Before the beginning of the interviews, the informed consent form (see Appendix Part C) which stated the aim of the research and the care taken over data storage and usage was distributed to the interviewees. Hence, the interviewees were able to decide whether or not they wanted to participate in the study. In addition, I made sure that the research participants’ physical, social and psychological well-being was not influenced negatively during the research process, due to my trustworthy relations with informants.

Nonetheless, I encountered quite a few problems in gaining informed consent as some of participants did not want to sign the forms. Even though I explained to them that the informed consent forms protected the interviewee, they were afraid to sign any document. However, the majority of participants signed the informed consent. It is noteworthy that high-ranking party members were comfortable in giving their signatures; whereas the low-ranking ones (e.g. neighbourhood leaders) were not willing to sign any papers and felt that they needed to ask permission from a high-ranking member. In such cases, I gave up interviewing the person. This experience demonstrated the strict hierarchical relationship between low-ranking members and high-ranking party members. In the case of informants from the NGOs and trade unions, they were not unwilling to sign the paper. However, it is also important to mention that the interviews I conducted with representatives of NGOs and trade unions were from the high-ranking members of the NGOs, and they did mind signing informed consent.

I also encountered obstacles to the usage of the voice recorder. Many of the interviewees preferred to talk about politics and society without leaving any trace of what they said.
In these cases, I respected participants’ wishes and I kept the notes instead of using voice recorder.

In addition, in establishing contact with interviewees, many were more willing to receive phone calls rather than emails. This also related to many interviewees’ fear of leaving any trail of statements. A number of interviewees looked upon my research as part of a journalistic report, rather than an academic project.

Throughout the interview process, I was aware of the importance of respecting the anonymity and privacy of research participants. The data obtained from them was anonymised and stored securely thus ensuring that the confidentiality of the participants was protected. Moreover, the gaining thrust and recruitment of interviews was influenced by the insider-outsider dilemma. As a student carrying out research in a British university, and hence as an outsider, it was easier to gain access to interviewees. During the interviews, many representatives were keen to learn about the university I studied at and my educational background, as well as my supervisors’ research areas. As a Turk, and hence occupying an insider position, it was easy to find gatekeepers as compared to non-Turkish people. Other than this, it did not help me particularly.

Finally, one high-ranking party official that I tried to reach through a gatekeeper wanted to learn not only about my research project, but to have a list of my interviewees. In this case, I informed the gatekeeper that I would not share such information with third parties, and therefore did not carry out the interview.
3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed my reasons for adopting a qualitative methodology in this study, and despite usage of some quantitative data, it demonstrates why the methodology is remained as qualitative methodology and not mixed methodology. I also discuss the reasons of my research orientations; my epistemological stance and ontological position. This stance and positions are important, as they influence the data collection process before and during the fieldwork. To collect my data, I conducted in depth, semi-structured interviews with 36 key informants. I also collected data from survey companies and a statistical institute. Regarding archival research, I collected brochures, leaflets, party programmes, party manifestos, trade union booklets and parties’ annual reports. Negotiating access to the informants sometimes proved difficult without gatekeepers; in these cases, it was more demanding to reach them (e.g. time to get access to them; developing a trusty relationship). In the next two chapters, I will discuss the findings of my research.
Chapter 4 Social Bases of the AKP

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, my aims are to demonstrate the evolution of the Turkish economy, to explore the changes it has undergone and to show how these economic developments have impacted upon social stratification and voting behaviour in Turkey in the course of the eight decades following the establishment of the Republic. Turkey has had four main periods of industrialization: 1923-1950; 1950-1960; 1960-1980 and 1980 to the present.

I adopt this industrialization scheme in order to highlight the impact of these different periods on the socio-economic structures in Turkey. Any changes in socio-economic structures should have, in turn, influenced the voting behaviour of different professional groups, and thereby led to changes in political party preferences.

I will firstly look at the period 1923-1950 and analyse whether the implemented economical policies had any impact on the socio-economic structures. Secondly, I will highlight the period 1950-1960 by discussing the impact of the agricultural policies and changes in the socio-economic structures on voting behaviour. Thirdly, I will highlight the period 1960-1980, characterized by early industrialization policies (import substitution policies) as well as the emergence of concomitant working class movements. Fourthly, I will look at the neoliberal restructuring since 1980 and its impact on the new intermediary strata, in order to understand the voting behaviour of the emerging social categories and the subsequent victory of the AKP.
4.2 The Planned Economy, Agrarian Voters and the Single-Party Regime: 1923-1950

In this section, I first discuss the main industrialization attempts during the period 1923 – 1950. Then, I examine how this period’s economic programme impacted on the socio-economic structures, and in turn, influenced the politics in specific voting behaviour.

4.2.1 Planned Economy and Agrarian Society

As mentioned out in Chapter 1, at the time of the establishment of the Republic, Turkey did not yet have a record of industrialization like that of western countries which had already accomplished the industrial revolution in the 19th century. Turkey had in addition lost her capitalist class which used to be made up, to a great extent, of Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities (Mehmet, 1998, p.129). Therefore, during the whole history of the early Republic, that is, from the very beginning, in 1923, until the early 1980s, the Turkish nation state tried to create its own capitalist class through state-driven policies. During the 1923-1950 period, as the country was ruled by a single-party regime, the state managed to establish several SEEs (State Economic Enterprises)\(^{90}\) in order to create its own industry and capital: in short, its national economy (Ahmad, 1993, pp.98-99). The sectors which were promoted and run by the state were mostly agriculture, textiles, food plants (such as sugar cane factories), mining (especially minerals), railways, shipping, steel, physical infrastructure, banking, manufacturing, tobacco and tourism (Ahmad, 1993, p.97; Mehmet, 1998, p.130).

\(^{90}\) The state aimed to boost the private sector and carry out the economic venture which could not be done by the private sector (Ahmad, 1993, p.97).
Nonetheless, it is argued that the extent of industrialization achieved in this period was exaggerated, and the SEEs contributed to the urban and national economy only in limited measure. The main reason behind this was the inability to attain a high level of growth, with about twenty industrial plants\textsuperscript{91} in a country with a population of 18 million (Pamuk, 2009, p.173). Therefore, it has been argued that the main reason behind the successful growth rate observed during the period 1929-1930 was not due to industrialization but to both the surpluses of agricultural sector\textsuperscript{92} and protectionist\textsuperscript{93} policies, with tight fiscal and monetary policies (Pamuk, 2009, pp.177-178).

Consequently, despite attempts at industrialization during this period, Turkey remained a rather agriculturally-based economy, and substantial changes in the socio-economic structures did not materialize.

The attempts at rather minor outcomes of industrialization, therefore, did not enhance social mobility within the rural population towards big cities. It was pointed out that during this first period, urban workers remained part-time farmers, and did not quit their villages completely but remained attached to their native environment (Pamuk, 2009, p.188; Koç, 2010, p.117).

The fact that the country remained an agricultural economy is exemplified by employment levels in three sectors (agriculture, industry and services) during this period. In spite of industrialization attempts, employment

\textsuperscript{91} A law (Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu) to subsidize industry was accepted in 1932 and many SEEs were established during the 1932-1939 period (Pamuk, 2009, p.173).

\textsuperscript{92} Due to its prioritization, agriculture became the main sector that contributed to the economy in Turkey. Consequently, Turkey had become a wheat exporter by the end of 1930s (Pamuk, 2009, p.177).

\textsuperscript{93} Protectionist policies such as the restriction of imports contributed drastically to powerful fiscal performance in the 1930s (Pamuk, 2009, pp.177-178).
remained very high in the agriculture sector (Figure 1). The constancy of employment in non-agricultural sectors can be also seen in Figure 2, where construction has been omitted from industry data. Thus, the data in the Figures 1 and 2, as well as in Figures 3 and 4, indicate that the change in employment rate has been very low, and inconsistent in the non-agricultural sectors.

Figure 1. Employment by Sector Type during the Period 1923-1950 in thousands (Raw Data: Construction added to the Industry\textsuperscript{94}) in thousand
Source: TÜİK

\textsuperscript{94} There are two different approaches to calculating the industry. According to the TUIK, construction is excluded from industry. According to the DPT, construction is included in the industry.
Figure 2. Employment by Sector Type during the Period 1923-1950 in thousands (Raw Data: Construction not added to the Industry)
Source: TÜİK

Figure 3. The Change in Employment Rate by Sector during the Period 1923-1950 (Construction added to the industry) as a %
Source: TÜİK
Figure 4. Change in Employment Rate by Sector during the Period 1923-1950 as a % (Industry without the construction)
Source: TÜİK

Employment data thus demonstrates that the impact of changes in the economy on Turkish social stratification was minor during this period.

Figure 5. Share of each Sector within Total Employment as a %
Source: TÜİK
Furthermore, the labour force was dominated during this period by unskilled occupational workers, mostly manual workers and farmers. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the share of each sector within total employment during the period 1923-1950. Although a slight reduction takes place in the share of agricultural sector, the latter still remains high (on average contributing to the total employment rate 87.08%) along with a slight increase in the share of industry sector (with construction 2.17%\(^95\) and without construction 1.74%\(^96\)). The services sector (which includes financial, insurance, real estate and business services) seems to have remained constant at a very low level, with an average of 5.84% contribution to the total employment figure.

As pointed out in the chapter 1, austerity measures taken during war time adversely influenced all the social groups from big land owners or industrialists

\(^95\) Demonstrates average increase in share of industry sector with construction.
\(^96\) Demonstrates average increase in share of industry sector without construction.
down to farmers and workers, due to heavy taxes (Pamuk, 2009, p.189) leading to a general discontent over government policies.

There emerged though some groups among tradesmen and industrialists (which constituted a minority group of the society) who benefited from the war years owing to both the informal market and inflation. Hence, they constituted the war profiteering of the tradesmen and industrialists (Çavdar, 2008a, p.447). In addition to the “war profiteer” group of tradesmen, the big land owners and medium-sized farm owners also made a profit during this period. However, due to the new “land reform” policy of the CHP (not least, in order to attract small farmers without land to its side), the big land owners also withdrew their support from the CHP (Çavdar, 2008a, p.448).

During the war, the main economic burden was laid on workers, small farmers, small tradesmen and craftsmen. As a result of the economic restrictions, the CHP had also lost the support of small and medium farmers (Pamuk, 2009, p.197). In addition to these economic restrictions, workers’ rights and welfare were rather ignored, since the regime did not want the propagation of left-wing policies due to anti-communist state ideology. The policies were thus more for the sake of the state than that of the workers and farmers. Thus, the CHP’s policies resulted in a loss of support of workers too.

4.2.2 Agrarian Voters and Single-Party Regime

By the time\textsuperscript{97} Turkey adopted the multi-party system; social strata had almost formed a coalition front against the CHP. However, the CHP continued to keep its strict stance towards basic freedoms: that is, human rights, freedom of

\textsuperscript{97}Turkey adopted multi-party system in 1946, hence, after the Second World War.
expression of organization, and of thought (Çavdar, 2008a, p.448). Consequently, as mentioned previously in chapter 1, the coalition of big landowners and industrialists, as well as other social strata, moved to the DP.

While analysing the relationship between the Turkish voting behaviour and change in socio-economic structures during the period 1923-1950, it was not possible to establish a direct causal link between them in a way that was similar to that which existed between the voting behaviour and class identity and awareness present in the Western democracies (Alford, 1964, p.36). As may be seen from figures 1-5, the majority of employment was in the agricultural sector (on average 87%). Thus, the society remained highly agrarian during the period 1923-1950. Despite attempts at industrialization during this period, it failed to impact significantly on the socio-economic structures of Turkish society.

Indeed, it is rather unlikely to claim that a different type of social stratification took place as a result of industrialization efforts during the period 1923-1950. Rather, it is possible to talk about an initially unaltered socio-economic structure, which later on, due to war economy, became distorted with the emergence of underprivileged social strata (e.g. small farmers who even lost their land, due to lack of essential means for farming (Pamuk, 2009, p.211)) and social strata (e.g. tradesmen, industrialists, big land owners) which had benefited from the distorted war environment. Nonetheless, this change did not have any drastic impact on social mobility, as occurred in western countries. Thus, the social strata remained more or less the same, i.e. contained their own strata (Figures 4 and 5 provide us with a picture of the change in the employed categories). Consequently, the economy policies of the state did not result in
any noteworthy change in socio-economic structures, and therewith, related voting behaviour during this period.

Indeed, institutional characteristics did not allow reflexion of changes in of the existing voting behaviour: During the period 1923-1946, the Turkish political party system was dominated by a single-party regime, and the opposition groups against this regime did not have institutional channels of democracy for expressing themselves.

In summary, an industrial revolution or a strong industrialization did not happen in Turkey during the period 1923-1950, as compared to European democracies. Moreover, the war economy impacted adversely each stratum of society. Lastly, the institutional characteristic of the single party system during this period did not allow institutional channels for democratic expression to function. Hence, due to these peculiarities of the political regime, it is difficult to appraise the political tendencies of the population caused by the socio-economical policies of the state in this period. Rather, the discontent of social strata over the regime and rising requests for a change as main (pressure) factors gave rise to a process that ended up in the adoption of the multi-party system. Hence, it is not surprising to see the formation of an initial opposition group right within the CHP at the end of the war. This opposition group was the initial expression of social bases’ demands in terms of an institutional expression, and led subsequently to the establishment of a multi-party system. Because of the subtle coalition which used to exist during the single-party regime among the bureaucrats, the army and the bourgeoisie broke up after the war (Özbudun, 2000, p.20; Çavdar, 2008a, pp.446 - 448).
The beginning of the political party system in 1946 did not yet result in any immediate change in the ruling political party. Indeed, the anticipated success of the DP did not materialize in the first multi-party election because of the presence of hidden traps in the existing electoral law for the newcomers.\footnote{In the elections of 1946, secret grading and open voting occurred whereas in the elections of 1950, secret voting and secret voting happened.}

As I initially remarked, the lack of class politics makes the respective analysis of the Turkish political party system during this period somewhat irrelevant. However, such an analysis becomes possible for the following period if the establishment multi-party system. It may be argued that in the Turkish political party system, disparate social strata only obtained an alternative to translating their class interests after 1945 (Alford, 1964, p.37). Four years after the democratic channels opened up, the social strata were finally able to express themselves through the democratic elections. Consequently, the legislative elections of 1950 resulted in a strong success of the DP, which gained 55.2% of the vote, while the CHP only obtained 39.6% (Kaynar et al., 2006, p.56).

To conclude, the institutional factors seem to have outweighed the socio-economic changes in terms of their impact on the voting behaviour during the period 1923-1950, and consequently in this first period of the Republic of Turkey with its both socio-economic and institutional distinctions, a direct causal link between the change in the socio-economic structures and the voting patterns was missing.
4.3 Agricultural Mechanisation, Peasants’ Dissatisfaction and the Emergence of a Two-Party System: 1950-1960

In this section, I now analyse the changes in the economy and how these changes influenced the society during the period 1950-1960. To undertake this analysis, I firstly examine the economic developments which occurred under four categories: agriculture; infrastructure; foreign trade and commerce; continuation of the state economy. I then look at how economic development impacted upon society and how changes in social structure influenced the voting patterns.

4.3.1 Economic Developments

After its electoral victory of 1950, the DP focused mostly on the agriculture sector. Given that the farmers, industrialists and landowners were the main social bases of the DP; the prioritization of agriculture was not surprising. The DP government’s main concern was the production of agricultural goods and minerals. As a result, industrialization was to some extent neglected during the DP government (Ahmad, 1993, p.115).

Improvements in the agricultural sector were achieved through the mechanization of farming, which was based on the import of cheap farm machinery. The import of farming machinery was facilitated owing to the Marshall Funds. Consequently, Turkey became for some years a wheat exporting country. Nonetheless, this boom in agricultural production was not sustainable, and in the second half of 1950s, Turkey began to import agricultural products again (Ahmad, 1977, pp.134-135).

99 After World War 2, Turkey joined NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and tried to keep close ties with the Western Allies especially with the US. The US’s most important contribution in this period took place through the Marshall Funds (Ahmad, 1977, p.135).
In addition to developments in agriculture, important progress was achieved in building up the infrastructure (e.g. highways) within the country. As with the progress in agriculture, the progress in infrastructure was financed by the foreign aid. In consequence, due to the extension in the road network remote villages in Anatolia became linked to the urban world (Ahmad, 1993, p.115).

The DP government aimed to maximize gains in the short-term. The foreign trade was already liberalized in 1946 by the CHP government, and the DP itself also advocated a liberal economy. However, it pursued unplanned, populist economic policies based on political, rather than economic considerations. These policies inevitably led to deficit financing and foreign trade deficit, and the implementation of the rather ambitious programmes launched by the DP needed a great amount of imported commodities. This policy resulted in the course of only a within few years to liquidation of the gold reserves: high inflation and a severe debt crisis were the consequences due to deficit financing of imports. In consequence, the DP government was beset by a huge foreign debt which became hazardous for both industry and trade (Ahmad, 1977, p.138).

Before its electoral victory, the DP had promised to implement liberal capitalism in Turkey (Ahmad, 1977, p.129). However, there were no private firms willing to participate in the privatization of the SEEs (Ahmad, 1977, p.130). Therefore, the DP returned back to policies, with emphasis on statist economy, contrary to its initial promise to liberalize the economy and even further, expand the SEEs for the sake of populist outcomes (Mehmet, 1998, p.135). Under the statist scheme of the DP, many enterprises were inaugurated
despite high production costs (e.g. cement) or despite the lack of a justified need (e.g. sugar cane) (Mehmet, 1998, pp.135-136). The mismanagement in the SEE sector led to unprofitable results and the state enterprises began to be run by clientelistic and nepotistic networks that were dominated by “featherbedding and favouritism” due to unnecessary and unsuitable personnel appointments of party adherents (Mehmet, 1998, p.137).

4.3.2 Changes in the Socio-economic Structures

Thus far, we have seen the main changes in the economy during the period 1950-1960. I now seek to analyse how the changes in the economy were reflected in the socio-economic structures in Turkey. First, I will look at the changes in employment opportunities in the rural areas, demographic patterns and the income of social strata. Second, I will discuss the impact of these changes on the voting patterns by the end of the 1950s.

Taken as a whole, the DP government brought about many positive developments in agriculture, with the introduction of mechanization, improvement in irrigation, usage of fertilizers and through the highway network construction (Yenal, 2010, pp.106-107).

In addition, for the first time in the history of the country, these policies embraced the masses rather than small privileged groups. Therefore, the DP government’s policies drastically influenced the whole of Turkish society. Despite these positive developments, they also brought a number of negative outcomes which have affected Turkish society until present. A major negative outcome was the aggravation of unemployment in rural areas, since the agriculture shifted from labour-intensive strategy to the capital intensive
strategy. The rural unemployment which was always a problem in Turkey (Ahmad, 1977, p.136) got worse and the traditional rural labour market distorted (Mehmet, 1998, p.135).

When figures 7 and 8 are taken into consideration, the employment of people by agricultural sector followed a smooth path during the first post-war decade. After 1956, employment in the agriculture sector decreased and did not resume an upward trend until 1960.

![Figure 7. Change in Employment Rate by Sector during the Period 1950-1960 as a % (Construction component added to the industry). Source: TUIK](image)

According to Figures 7 and 8, employment rates in the services sector exhibit peaks during the first half of the decade followed by a decline towards the end of the decade. The industry sector also shows also a peak in the first half of the decade, with a decline and subsequent fluctuations during the second half
of the decade. The slight fall in the agricultural sector by an average 1.9% through the decade, and fluctuations in the industry, might reflect the shift of the labour force in agriculture to the industry sector as workers. During the period 1946-1961, the income of industrial workers was higher than that of small farmers or small land owners: hence this might have yielded an increase in employment in the industry sector (including construction) (Koç, 2010, pp.137-138).

While considering Figures 9 and 10, the share of services sector in total employment demonstrates a slight, but gradual increase during this period. New job opportunities became available during this period; for instance, the banking sector developed and recruited more employees (Koç, 2010, p.140). However, the supply of the skilled labour force being really low might have prevented a faster increase in employment in the services.

Figure 8. Change in Employment Rate by Sector during the Period 1950-1960 as a % (Industry without the construction)
Source: TÜİK
The mechanization of agriculture is considered to have enhanced the mass migration from rural areas to towns and cities which occurred in the 1950s (Koç, 2010, p.136). From 1950 to 1960, the population of big cities increased by about 10% each year. More than one million people quit their land; hence migration affected the whole country. Migration was not new, but the type of the migration was different. In previous decades, the farmers were still attached to
their villages, but in the 1950s, they completely relocated in order to find jobs in the recently emerged industry branches. Nonetheless, the capacities of the industries were just too low to recruit these unskilled labour forces. As a result, only a minor part of the migrants had the opportunity to find a permanent job in industry. The majority became temporary workers or street sellers (Zürcher, 2008, p.330).

Even though demographic and employment problems arose due to rural unemployment and the rural exodus, the economy as a whole witnessed rather high growth rates. The increase in GDP was reflected also in the wages. Hence, during the period 1946-1961, almost all the social strata\textsuperscript{100} in the country became better off, as compared with the war period (Koç, 2010, p.174). However, the social group which benefited most were the big landowners, due to the increase in mechanised agricultural production (Zürcher, 2008, p.330).

In addition to the big landowners, urban workers also benefited from economic progress. Their real wages increased, together with an improvement in their working and living conditions (Koç, 2010, p.174). In the cities, profits grew faster than wages and salaries: hence merchants and the industrialists constituted the occupational category which benefited most in the cities. The economic progress was, however, hampered from 1955 on by the acceleration of inflation\textsuperscript{101} which mostly affected the wage earners. Nonetheless, when the situation of different social strata are compared with the World War II time, their

\textsuperscript{100} Including the displaced agricultural workers

\textsuperscript{101} The reasons behind the inflation included the DP’s policies on “cheap farm credits, huge subsidies for agricultural goods, and virtual tax exemption for farmers” which resulted in a class of wealthy farmers and brought dynamism to the country side. This rural prosperity enhanced consumption, and created a demand which the economy could not meet. This high demand drastically increased food prices and “created an inflationary trend which dislocated the entire economy” (Ahmad, 1977, p.117).

4.3.3 Socio-Economic Changes as Reflected in Politics and in Voting Behaviour

As mentioned in the chapter 1, the 1950s were dominated by the majority government of the DP. At the legislative elections of 1950 and 1954, the DP obtained 52.67% and 57.61%, respectively, whereas it witnessed a decrease in its votes to 47.87% in 1957. The CHP’s votes were rather constant: 39% in 1950; 35% in 1954 and 41.1% in 1957. Lastly, the DP was closed as a result of the military intervention in 1960. In this context, I analysed whether the socio-economic changes during the decade underpinned the voting behaviour and politics in Turkey. For this analysis, I look at changes in society, working class and party system, respectively, and discuss how voting behaviour during this decade occurred.

First, as demonstrated in section 4.3.2, the changes in socio-economic structures did not yield a radical increase in employment in industry and the service sectors. Thus, despite improvements in economy and mechanization of agriculture, the country remained an agrarian society. As a result, peasants continued to vote for the DP during this decade. The peasants’ strong support for the DP in the 1950s is also backed up by an interview that I conducted with Abdullah, representative of the AKP. Abdullah argued that:

....At that time, in the 1950s, if we have to talk about sociological class division, we should talk about rural and urban blocs as two main types of class in Turkish society of 1950s. Menderes gave the way to the agrarian people so that they also played a distinctive role within the system. He allowed them to vote. In addition, their vote
(referring to agrarian people) allowed them to have power in the state administration (Abdullah, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Thus, as seen from the quote from Abdullah, in the early 1950s, after a long period of suppressive single-party regime where there was no political alternative, the DP was considered as a political party which would finally answer to the needs of agrarian people.

Second, when the DP came to power, it promised to bring new rights for the working class. However, the only concrete change was the establishment of the Trade Union Türk-İş (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions) in 1952 (Kongar, 2011, p.627). Otherwise, the DP did not bring other rights to working class, as mentioned in section 1.3; the working class was deprived of the right to strike to express their discontent with the DP government in the late 1950s. Given that the rights of working class were not fulfilled, the working class stopped supporting the DP after the elections of 1957 (Taş, 2004).\(^\text{102}\)

Third, the elections of this decade did not occur according to proportional representation. Therefore, the existing electoral rule did not allow for the expression of oppositional voices in the parliamentary level. Due to lack of proportional representation, the main oppositional party CHP, despite its votes that remained at a reasonable level of about 40% in all three legislative elections, barely had the opportunity to challenge the DP at parliamentary level. Thus, the main opposition reflected the centre of the society which is formed by ruling elites (military and civil bureaucrats). Moreover, the DP’s majority in the political system allowed the party to restrain the rights of oppositional groups.

\(^{102}\) (Taş, 2004)

http://www.mevzuatdergisi.com/2004/04a/02.htm
(e.g. workers, intellectuals). Given the increasing authoritarian stance of the DP, urban industrialists, working class, civil and military groups cooperatively established an opposition front. As a result, the military intervened in 1960 on 27th May.

When I analyze the voting behaviour throughout this decade, I notice that the DP, despite setbacks in its policies and its increasingly autocratic way of ruling, had managed to keep its votes at a level of about 48% in the legislative elections of 1957. This showed clearly the rural segment of the population that constituted the bulk of the electorate (periphery) still supported the DP.

Despite this rather impressive electoral support, the DP government was overthrown only three years later by the military, following a contentious period with the CHP, and student and worker protests against its policies that resulted in casualties. It is noteworthy that the circles (i.e., students, workers, and university staff) that went in open conflict with the DP government represented only a small segment of society. However, being highly influential pressure groups, they managed to create a wide public opinion against the DP government in prompting military intervention.

Furthermore, it is of importance to note that plurality voting emerged, despite relatively close percentages of votes of the DP and the CHP (48% versus 41%) in the elections of 1957. Previously, chapter 2 explained why the dual models were appropriate for the analysis of Turkish politics (Kongar, 2008). As seen the political party system of 1950-1960, the centre and periphery model is a more a suitable approach in analysing the Turkish party system, rather than class-based theories. Thus, the ‘centre’ of the model (the ruling elites of the
Turkish society) expressed its voting in the CHP whereas the ‘periphery’ expressed itself in the DP.

Furthermore, due to plurality voting, 48% of the DP led to 424 parliamentary seats and 41% of the votes resulted to 178 seats of the CHP. This unjust outcome due to plurality voting was certainly a main cause of the political tensions. It gave the DP a political power that was not proportional to its percentage of votes. Misuse of this power by the DP and provocative actions of the opposition party, the CHP, together led to severe political tensions, and eventually to the first disruption in the multiparty regime.

4.4 Early Industrialisation (Import-Substitution Industrialisation), the Urban Working Class and Multi-party Politics: 1960-1980

In this section, as with previous ones, I will first demonstrate the development of the Turkish economy during the period 1960-1980. Secondly, I will look at the change in employment in different sectors in order to understand if there is a significant shift among the sectors to indicate changes in socio-economic structures. In addition, I will look at other indicators such as the constitution of 1961 and increase of trade unions as pressure groups to understand those changes in the socio-economic structures. Lastly, I will analyse whether these socio-economic structural changes underpinned the voting patterns of this period or otherwise.

4.4.1 Economic Developments

During the period 1960-1980, the economy continued to be guided by the planned economy, and more specifically the ISI (Import-Substitution Industrialization) regime (Mehmet, 1998, p.137). On the other hand, as
mentioned in the previous section 4.3, the coalition between the urban industrialists; the civil and military bureaucracy and the working class which had been effective as pressure group in the closure of the DP had drifted apart after military intervention. Thus, when the political system and its normal multi-party structure were restored, the industrialists resumed to be a supporter of the AP which was ideologically the follower of the DP (Sunar, 2004, pp.128-129).

During this period, the ISI economic model was adopted as a development strategy, and the Turkish capitalist class continued to thrive under the sway of the state, or rather the AP government. Due to the state’s protection, the industrialists obtained more power and joined the same line as “the centrist political, bureaucratic and military elites” (Mehmet, 1998, p.137). Thus, the period 1960-1980 was characterized by state protection and state subsidies until the military intervention/resolution of 24th January 1980.

4.4.2 Changes in the Socio-economic Structures

When employment according to sectors is taken into account, most people began to work within the services sector (Figure 11). It is argued that this increase complied with the plans of economic development and the bureaucrats of those years tried to implement a growth model by supporting the sector of services (Kongar, 2011, p.529). Thus, due to employments under the services sectors, new urban worker strata began to emerge during this period.

Meanwhile, employment in agriculture in real terms remained almost unchanged, in contrast to changes in the services and industry. Figure 12 also demonstrates the constancy in agriculture in comparison to services and industry, showing important fluctuations during this period.
Figure 11. The Employment by the Sector Type during the Period 1960-1980 in thousand (Raw Data)
Source: TÜİK

Figure 12. Change in Employment Rate by Sector during Period 1960-1980 as a %
Source: TÜİK

Another important indicator is seen in the Figure 13 according to which agriculture’s share within total employment dropped significantly during this period. The shares of services and industry in turn increased smoothly during this period. The decrease in agricultural employment and increase of
employment in both industry and services demonstrate that Turkey began to shift from being an agrarian economy to an economy slightly closer to that of industrial countries.

![Graph showing employment distribution from 1960 to 1980](image)

**Figure 13.** The Share of each Sector within the Total Employment as a%

*Source: TÜİK*

The decrease in the share of agriculture and increase in the share of industry and services also serves to explain the continuing migration patterns that began in the 1950s. Migration to urban cities also continued to increase in this period. The urban population rate increased from 45.3% in 1960 to 63.3% in 1980 (Kongar, 2011, p.530). This change in urban population also reflected, aside from a decrease in rural labour force, an increase in urban strata, which was mostly formed by occupational categories such as technical staff; sales personnel or trade staff; self-employed; entrepreneurs; managers; administrative staff; domestic workers and those who worked in personal services (Kongar, 2011, p.530).
Moreover, the socio-economic structure was strongly affected by the constitutional changes of 1961 which provided more freedom to political views within society. As mentioned in chapter 1, due to these changes, workers, students found opportunities to express themselves through trade unions and/or student associations. It is seen that there was a high increase in workers with trade union adherence (1963: 296,000 and in 1980: 1,300,000).

When the ratio of trade union adherents to all wage earners is analysed, the ratio reached a peak in 1975, with 42.8% during this same period. The working class during this period was highly active politically peaking, and together with the students, they organized many strikes and demonstrations, and developed a collective action mentality (Kongar, 2011, p.630).

On the one hand, political liberation and the establishment of new firms resulted in the emergence of new urban intermediary strata. On the other hand, industrialists kept close ties with the AP. Nevertheless, as emphasized in chapter 1, the AP’s policies, targeting only metropolitan industrialists, did not satisfy small-sized firms of provincial areas, mostly Inner Anatolia (Yavuz, 2003, p.209). Therefore, their discontent was reflected in the formation of a new institutional framework.

4.4.3 Socio-economic Changes as Reflected in Politics and in Voting Behaviour

An analysis of the post-1960 political system through the perspective of voting behaviour, as used for the analysis of the Western societies, is difficult to adopt in the case of Turkey. The main reason behind this difficulty is the 1960-coup d’état, which disrupted the democratic regime and its normal evolution in
Turkey. It interrupted not only the democratic continuity of the political party system, but also brought it off its course.

Even though the military intervention had aimed to eradicate the DP with the support of the opposing social bases, the legislative elections of 1961 (where the AP obtained a high level of votes) demonstrated the backlash of this intervention. It turned out that despite discontent with setbacks in terms of the socio-economic policies of the increasingly suppressive DP government, the majority of society did not approve of this intervention. The legacy of the DP still continued under a new political party, the AP, which obtained 34% of the votes in the first legislative elections after the 1960 military intervention. The rather high level of votes of the AP votes in these elections demonstrated the reaction and/or unchanged political view of a certain segment of society.

In addition to military intervention as a distorting aspect, another factor which complicates my analysis is the mismatch between the class categories as formulated by Western scholars and class categories which exist in Turkish society. Contrary to voting patterns in Turkish society, as emphasized in chapter 2, the most important factor affecting party commitment was the notion of class (Butler and Stokes, 1974 cited in in Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, p.99). Despite this mismatch, between Turkish society and western societies’ class structures, voting behaviour according to sociological factors is observed due to two main factors namely the socio-economic dynamics and the liberal constitution of 1962.

First, the socio-economic dynamics since 1950s such as agricultural mechanization, working opportunities in the cities and consequently, rural
exodus were no doubt the triggering factors in the creation of an urban labour force. Nonetheless, this labour force was unable to express itself during the late 1950s, due to the authoritarian DP government. In addition, even though it wanted to express its concerns about the late 1950s’ inflationist policies, it was deprived of the right to strike, demonstration and any other means of organized the expression of opinion.

Second, as pointed out in the background chapter 1, the constitution of 1961 proved to be decisive in the burgeoning of the labour class, and thereby labour parties, since it entailed clauses enabling opening of trade unions, right of strike, right of organization for workers. From 1961 until 1980, the number of members in trade unions, as aforementioned, increased drastically (Kongar, 2011, p.630).

Therefore, voting behaviour during the post-1960 period was rather closely related to the changes in socio-economic structures. Thus, the socio-economic changes in the 1950s appeared to have initiated a process that gave rise to the formation of a proper labour class in Turkey in the following decade.

Consequently, the TİP success in the legislative elections of 1964\(^{103}\) showed that a political party which defended the rights of workers found a corresponding base in the electorate. Moreover, the transformation of the CHP into a centre-left political party in the 1970s should be considered in the light of social dynamics since 1950s.

To analyse the labour force and transformation of its interests from the point of voting behaviour theories based on the class mobility, voting behaviour

\(^{103}\) Representation of TİP as independent deputies
in Turkish society does not reveal the voting behaviour of class mobility, as class mobility cannot be attributed to the creation of urban jobs as a consequence of an industrial revolution.

Upward mobility seems to have occurred mainly due to agricultural mechanization which distorted the economic balance in rural areas and forced rural labour force to migrate to big cities. Hence, the social dynamics such as rural migration did not occur because of the abundance of occupational opportunities in urban areas but rather because of lack of available jobs in rural areas. Thus, upward mobility in Turkish society arose due to different dynamics as compared to societies that had an industrialization experience.

Aside from this specific side of urbanization and economic transformation, upper mobility occurred, in the sense that once people moved to the cities, they became wage earners and able to move to the upper social classes. As a result, the 1960s and 1970s’ political success of the left parties can be linked to these available upper mobility opportunities in Turkey. For instance, the CHP’s electoral success in the legislative elections of 1973 reflected the changes in socio-economic structure and their effect on voting behaviour. The analysis of the support basis of the CHP in the early 1970s indicated that it was formed “by the working class and the poor living on the peripheral areas of cities (hence migrants from rural areas); market-oriented small peasantry which increased their living standards since 1960s and young urban professional middle classes” (Ayata, 2002, pp.104 -105).

As a result, the ideological shift towards the left-wing and a discourse along the lines of social democracy and welfare economy found their answer in
the new emerging strata within Turkish society, which flourished a result of socio-economic transformation since the 1950s. Moreover, as mentioned above, other factors such as adherence to trade unions contributed to voting for the CHP. It has been argued that the unionized groups in the manufacturing sector became the leading force for activism of the CHP (Ayata, 2002, pp.104-105).

When the voting behaviour of newly urbanized intermediary strata and the working class are analysed, it may be argued that they had a higher tendency to vote for the CHP, due to a class perception or social adherence to CHP. Therefore, the voting behaviour in favour of the CHP during this specific period can mostly be explained by the expressive theory, which considers voting more as a social than as an instrumental act (Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 1985 cited in De Graaf and Nieuwbeerta, 1995, p.999). I argue that the electoral preference for CHP fits better into the expressive theory, because newly urbanized intermediary classes as members of trade unions found better opportunity to express themselves in the CHP of the 1970s.

The argument that expressive theory explains the voting tendency towards the CHP is supported by the fact that the CHP members were, in general, also members of trade unions. Hence, as has been pointed out with the expressive theory, members were linked to each other by a culture of shared class (Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 1985 cited in De Graaf and Nieuwbeerta, 1995, p.999).

As pointed out above, small merchants of provincial cities were not satisfied with the AP’s prioritization of the big industrialists. Thus, they looked for another political party that could adequately address their economic needs, in
line with the provisions of the self-interest theory. Hence, these small merchants and tradesmen anticipated more support from the MSP that openly declared to do so. Therefore, from 1973 on, the MSP also took a share of right-wing votes in the legislative elections.

When the voting behaviour in favour of the extremist parties (e.g. Islamist) is analysed, the driving force towards the MSP seems to be better explained in terms of a self-interest theory (as emphasized by De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath (1995, p.999)) than a class-based theory. The petty bourgeoisie of Anatolia could not find its place in the late 1960s under the AP; moreover, they were mostly discriminated against by state elitists. Thus, the voting behaviour in favour of the MSP in the 1970s can be explained by the self-interest theory, since the party's social basis (petty bourgeoisie of Anatolia) expected that the MSP would bring more opportunities to the economic arena.

In addition, there were two more parties in this period: the AP and the MHP. The AP continued to attract the votes of rural groups and also big industrialists and businessmen; in other words, conservative centre-right wing votes.

In considering these two decades, we may see that the society of this period provides a case that is more suitable for class analysis than the previous periods. This class-based voting behaviour already emerged in the 1970s as a consequence of the social transformation. Therefore, I argue that in the society, class notions began to flourish in Turkey in the 1970s and to affect voting decisions. Nonetheless, the social bases of the newly urbanized intermediary classes were drastically deteriorated through the military intervention of 1980

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104 I did not look at the MHP as it was beyond my research.
and the following military administration (1980-1983) and the turbulent years of the 1980s.

4.5 Export-led Growth Economic Model, Emergence of New Intermediary Strata and Rise of the AKP in 2002

In this last section of chapter 4, I investigate how economic developments in the early 1980s combined with the conjunctural changes to voting behaviour in the last three decades. For the reader’s convenience, the section is split into three consecutive chronological periods: 1980-1991, 1992-2001 and 2002-2012. In the first period, the post-military intervention decade is evaluated through an investigation of changes in the economic policies and their impacts on society as well as on voting behaviour. Second, the decade of the 1990s is analysed in order to understand further the forerunner of the AKP, that is, the RP and its electoral success in the 1994 local elections as well as in the 1995 parliamentary elections. Third, the decade of the AKP is considered.


In this section, I firstly demonstrate the neoliberal restructuring of 1980s in the Turkish economy. I also take into account the main macroeconomic indicators in investigating the reflections of the adopted economic model on the general economy during the decade. Then, I look at employment by sectors, as well as the evolution of occupational categories from the period 1980-1990, in order to assess how the economy impacted socio-economic structures. In analysing the change in socio-economic structures, I also look at the migration
from rural areas to big cities, in order to identify the impact of the dynamics of the era related to socio-economic structures. After this analysis, I discuss how these changes in socio-economic structures translated into politics, and more specifically into voting behaviour.

4.5.1.1 Economic Policies and their Impact on the Periphery

In the 1980s, the developing countries were strongly advised to adopt an export-led growth model, by virtue of the economic success of Japan, Korea, Singapore or Taiwan that were the champions of this model (Gibson and Ward, 1992, p.341). Turkey, also as a developing country, was expected to follow this new growth strategy. Therefore, in order to implement the corresponding transformation in her economy, Turkey went through a series of stabilization programmes with the support of the IMF and WB (Yenal, 2010, p.131; Saraçoğlu, 1994, p.63).

With deep economic problems with very high inflation rates, as well as a big foreign trade deficit, Turkey adopted this global model of economic development through export-led growth with a parliamentary resolution on 24th January 1980, as pointed out in the chapter 1. Through these policies, the export of goods and opening up of Turkey to foreign markets became the central issue. Over the last 30 years, Turkey’s economic system has been guided by these resolutions, which were subsequently reinforced by the coup d’état of 12th September 1980.

As a result of this export-led growth model, many SMEs were established in the following period, in accordance with the fact that their scale
and labour-intensive production system could easily integrate with global markets (Gümüşçü, 2010, p.7).

As shown in the previous sections, industrialization was not a new concept in Turkey. During the period 1950-1980, cities such as İstanbul, Bursa, Kocaeli, İzmir, Ankara and Adana (See Figure 14) had, indeed, achieved the necessary transformation and become the new industrial centres (Pamuk, 2009, p.276; Tuskon, 2011).

Figure 14. The map which illustrates the industrial cities, established during the period 1950-1980

The number 34 indicates İstanbul; the number 35 indicates İzmir; the number 41 indicates Kocaeli; the number 16 indicates Bursa; the 6 indicates Ankara and 1 indicates Adana.

Pamuk considers these industrial cities as the first group, that is, the first generation, of industrial cities (Group I). They were followed by Tekirdağ, Kırklareli, Sakarya, Balıkesir, Eskişehir, Manisa and İçel as Group II industrial cities which took the advantage of their proximity to the primary industrial cities (Group I) (Pamuk, 2009, p.276) (See Figure 15).

105 (Baydın, 2012)
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9b/MapTurkishProvincesNumbers.svg
Figure 15. The map which illustrates the industrial cities, close to the first group of industrialized cities
Number 10 indicates Balıkesir; the number 45 indicates Manisa; number 39 indicates Kırklareli; number 59 indicates Tekirdağ; number 54 indicates Sakarya, number 33 indicates İçel and number 26 indicates Eskişehir.
Furthermore, Pamuk considers the cities which bourgeoned due to the export-led growth in the 1980s as Group III (Figure 16). These emerging cities also had social dynamics.

Figure 16. The map which illustrates the main industrial cities, established after 1980 due to export-led growth
Number 20 indicates Denizli; number 42 indicates Konya; number 38 indicates Kayseri; number 44 indicates Malatya; number 46 indicates Kahramanmaraş and number 27 indicates Gaziantep.
As has been argued, the rise of these cities in Anatolia\textsuperscript{106} has led to the establishment of a rather strong Anatolian bourgeoisie in Turkey, and at the beginning of the 2000s, this growing bourgeoisie constituted an important class which, together with the changing political arena, provided the basis for the political rise of the AKP (Teazis, 2011, pp.122-123). I will return to this group while discussing the social bases of the AKP.

In addition to the development of SMEs, important developments occurred in the whole economy following the resolutions of 24\textsuperscript{th} January 1980. The liberalization of external trade, currency exchange and capital markets resulted in the opening of the Turkish economy to the global economy and participation in global competition (Yenal, 2010, p.131).

The economic programme resulted in a remarkable improvement in Turkey’s economic situation; the most striking feature of the economic recovery was the dramatic growth in the export of goods and services (Saraçoğlu, 1994, p.75; Pamuk, 2009, p.277). The ANAP ruling period (1983-1991) brought dynamism to the Turkish economy (e.g. privatization of the SEE; liberalization of the credit market and establishment of a capital market in real terms) and contributed to the exposure of the economy to global competition (Yenal, 2010, p.136).

Furthermore, the neoliberal restructuring of 1980s initially brought many positive developments to the Turkish economy. However, the macroeconomic

\textsuperscript{106} Anatolia is the mainland of Turkey. According to maps above (Figures 10-13), cities such as İstanbul, Kocaeli, Bursa, Tekirdağ and Kirklareli are considered as the cities which belong to Marmara region. Cities such as İzmir, Manisa and Denizli belong to Aegean Region. Cities such as Ankara, Kayseri, Konya and Eskişehir belong to the Inner Anatolia region. Cities such as İçel, Adana and Kahramanmaraş belong to Mediterranean region. A city such as Gaziantep belongs to South-Eastern Anatolia region. A city such as Malatya belongs to Eastern Anatolia.

207
indicators began to give negative results in the second half of the 1980s and inflation increased from 30% in 1986 and to 1988 to 68%.

Due to continuous inflation, the wages continued to increase and as a result, public expenditures consumption increased drastically, and public investments declined (Yenal, 2010, p.137). This negative change was also observed in government fiscal deficit and external trade deficit. The inflation phenomenon which drastically affected Turkish society in the 1990s was not solved until the mid-2000s (Figure 17) (Mehmet, 1998, p.206).

![Inflation Average Consumer Prices](image)

**Figure 17.** Inflation Average Consumer Prices 1980-2010  
*Source: IMF*

In addition to inflation, unemployment has been another macroeconomic indicator which has affected, and still affects the whole of society. The unemployment rate as a percentage of the total labour force displayed throughout the 1980s and 1990s a rather fluctuating course, at a level of about 8%, and an elevation to a level of about 10% in the 2000s, with a peak value of 14% in 2009 as an aftermath of the global financial crisis and following the recession in Turkey (Figure 18).
Figure 18. Unemployment Rate as a Percent of Total Labour Force 1980-2010

Source: IMF

4.5.1.2 Socio-economic Changes during the Period 1980-1990

An analysis of this decade according to changes in rate of the employment in the main three sectors reveals (Figure 19) a constant (no change in rate) course in the first half of the 1980s in the employment rate in agriculture, followed by fluctuations at the end of the decade. The rate of employment in the services sector demonstrates in the 1980s a rather stable annual increase of around 4%, followed by annual fluctuations after 1988 which still remain at around 4%. The rate of employment in industry, with and without construction, in turn displays through the first seven years of the decade annual increases of around 3%. In the last three years of the decade, the rate of employment in this sector declines slightly, but resumes in early 1990s a strong upward trend, reaching a growth of nearly 7% in 1992.

In addition to the percentage change in these three sectors, it is important to look at the share of each sector within the total employment as it provides a better insight into the dynamics of employment within the country (Figure 20).
This approach reveals that in the period from 1980 to 1992, a consistent and gradual decrease occurred in employment in the agricultural sector.

Concomitantly, a reverse trend was apparent in the sectors of services and industry, with a gradual increase over the same period. In addition, the increase in the share of services within total employment turned out to be higher than that of the industry sector. Even with inclusion in the construction, the industry’s share within total employment remained below the share in services. Thus, the services became, over time, the main employer, followed by industry and agriculture as a reflection of the marked changes in the labour market (Figures 20 and 21).

**Figure 19.** Change in Employment Rate by Sector during the Period 1980-1992 as a %

*Source: TÜİK*
Above, I have demonstrated the changes in the employment patterns according to different sectors during the period 1980-1992. It is also important, however, to look at the employment according to occupational categories to assess better changes in socio-economic structures.
Thus, the share of employment in the agriculture sector as compared to total employment declined during the period 1980-1992 from around 53% to 45% (Figure 20). As emphasized above, services have an upward trend throughout the era. To be more specific, workers in trade, sales and crafts increased their share within the total employment. Similarly, the professionals, administrative and clerical workers also increased their share during this same timeline. On the other hand, share of industry and manufacture workers remained constant. As a result, Turkey started to turn into a services-based economy. Among the services, especially the employment of salespersons and craftsmen started to increase during this period. As will be explained in the next section, this increase
in services reflected the development of intermediary strata that is formed by various different areas of services (e.g. craft, trade, sales, and service).

As pointed out in the previous sections 4.2 and 4.3, migration had already started in Turkey in the 1950s, with agricultural mechanization. In the years after 1980, migration to the big cities continued to increase and contribute to the population increase of metropolitan cities. However, the reasons behind migration had changed. Whereas in the 1950s, migration to big cities was a consequence of agricultural mechanization, in the 1980s, it was due to the increasing conflict in South-Eastern Anatolia. Thus, people of Kurdish origin were forced to leave their rural homes and they moved to other places, especially metropolitan cities in Western regions, i.e., İstanbul and Mediterranean and Aegean coastlines (Antalya, Mersin (İçel)) (Sağlam, 2006, p.42).

As may be seen from table 1, the population in these metropolitan cities increased significantly during the period 1985-1990. All of these cities showed nearly the same increasing trend in population between 1985 and 1990. The main reason behind the increase in population of these cities was due to the increase in migration.

By way of illustration, the figure 22 demonstrates the net migration rate\textsuperscript{107} to İstanbul during the period 1975-2000. As can be seen from this figure, there was a significant increase in net migration rate between 1985 and 1990. All of these cities showed almost the same pattern of immigration between 1985 and 1990 (Table 1 below). However, even though the ethnic dimension was

\textsuperscript{107} Net migration rate: Difference between the numbers of immigrants and emigrants at the midterm of a time interval (usually annual) per thousand inhabitants.
important in this period, forced migration,\textsuperscript{108} aside from the urban appeal, was not the only reason behind people moving into the cities. Another push factor was the decrease in employment opportunities in the rural areas due to decline in agriculture production’s share within the total economy (from 24.8% in 1980 to 16.8 in 1990, then to 14.8% in 1995 and to 13.4% in 2000 (TÜİK statistics).

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
\textbf{Istanbul} & 3.904 & 4.741 & 5.842 & 7.309 & 10.018 \\
\textbf{Kocaeli} & 477 & 596 & 742 & 936 & 1.206 \\
\textbf{Bursa} & 961 & 1.148 & 1.324 & 1.603 & 2.125 \\
\textbf{Ankara} & 2.585 & 2.854 & 3.306 & 3.236 & 4.007 \\
\textbf{Antalya} & 669 & 748 & 891 & 1.132 & 1.719 \\
\textbf{Izmir} & 1.673 & 1.976 & 2.317 & 2.694 & 3.37 \\
\textbf{Icel} & 714 & 843 & 1.034 & 1.266 & 1.651 \\
\textbf{(Mersin)} & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textbf{Table 1.} Population of 7 Metropolitan Cities during the Period 1975-2000  
\textit{Source: TÜİK Census Data}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{net_migration_rate_to_istanbul.png}
\caption{Net Migration Rate to İstanbul during 1975-2000  
\textit{Source: TÜİK}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{108} Forcible migration is a term which is used to explain “anyone who is internally displaced or who is forced to leave his/her place of settlement, a new life is an “obligation”” (Kurban et al., 2007, p.6). The forced migration also emphasizes that internal displacement occurring due to concerns for national security in Turkey thereby it was more than an obligatory displacement; it was a displacement by use of force (Kurban et al., 2007, p.6). 
4.5.1.3 The Impact of the Socio-Economic Changes on the Voting Patterns during the Period 1980-1992

After the military intervention of 1980, the party system was engineered by the military government. Thus, the closed parties of the previous decade were not allowed to enter into the elections up until 1987. As mentioned in the chapter 1, under such restrictions, the ANAP’s electoral victory marked the beginning of its tenure for the rest of the decade. The two other parties that were allowed to participate in the legislative elections of 1983, were the HP (the *Halkçı Parti* - the Populist Party) and the MDP (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi* - Nationalist Democracy Party), founded by a retired general under encouragement of the junta, but which did not prove to politically viable in long-term. The legislative elections of 1987 were held shortly after the constitutional referendum, allowing for the removal of the ban on political leaders.109

In the previous section 4.4, I discussed how the voting behavior was shaped by new social strata of that era, and voting behaviour is related to class-based voting and social mobility. When this decade is analysed from the point of view of voting theories, it may be observed that the main centre-left party, the SODEP, continued to address the lower strata (workers, urban strata services workers, civil servants of that era). Nevertheless, the other major centre-left party (the DSP after removal of the ban on parties)110 did not repeat the CHP’s electoral success of the 1970s.

109 The constitutional referendum was held on 6th September 1987. The changes (lifting of the bans) approved by a tight difference: 50.2% (for) versus 49.8% (against). The referendum outcome prompted Prime Minister Turgut Özal to call for early legislative elections that were held on 27th November 1987.

110 As the ban on political parties was removed, each leader of the previous decade established its own political party. Thus, at the political party level, three centre-left political parties emerged
In the literature, voting behaviour changes may be seen to be based on two factors: class dealignment and partisan dealignment. Class dealignment refers to one’s loose attachment to one’s occupational category and weakened voting tendency towards the party representing one’s own social/occupational group/category class (Crewe et al., 1977 and Dunleavy, 1979 cited in Evans, Heath and Payne, 1991, pp.99-100). Partisan dealignment, in turn, refers to the gradual decline in the attachment to one’s own political party (Crewe, 1983, p.193). Partisan dealignment may explain the decline in voting behaviour towards centre-left parties in the 1980s, and later on, in the 1990s in Turkey. However, the main reasons in the Turkish case were the military intervention of 1980 and attempts to eradicate left-wing ideology. Thus, as mentioned before in chapter 1 and previous sections of this chapter, the social strata which used to constitute the basis of the centre-left parties were detached from their previous parties, since the necessary links (e.g. trade unions) between them were disrupted.

On the other hand, as pointed out in chapter 1, the ANAP’s electoral success was due to its hybrid discourse, which attracted votes of different strata which had been deprived of their representative parties. The ANAP’s liberal economy discourse of the ANAP mostly attracted the big urban industrialists and urban businessmen and new urban professional strata, and in particular, small medium enterprises owners in Anatolia (the burgeoning Anatolian capitalists).

and competed for the same constituency until the 1990s. The outcome of the legislative elections of 1987 was as follows; the ANAP 36.4%, the SODEP 24.6%, the DYP 19.1%, the DSP 8.5%, the RP 7.2%, and the MHP 2.9%. It should be noted that despite the short period of time that was available for the banned leaders to get their new parties reorganized, they proved to be rather competitive and brought down the ANAP’s electoral support to a modest to modest level of 36% in these elections.
In the oppressive political atmosphere of the 1980s, voting behaviour was mainly characterized by the economic interests of the new social strata which wanted more integration to the global economic system. As pointed out before, the ANAP responded to the needs of capitalists who wanted to expand their businesses and integrate into the market economy. Özal himself was the technocrat who implemented 24th January Parliamentary Decisions aiming at the liberalization of the Turkish economy. The argument regarding the ANAP’s response to the needs of new emerging social strata is also emphasized by the high-ranking member of the AKP:

Later on, Menderes’s bringing the political system to agrarian society also manifested when Özal became prime minister. So, at that time (1980s), in fact, a class differentiation in sociological terms did not occur like in the 1950s as urban versus rural classes, but class differentiation was mostly based on upper, middle class and lower class. Thus, following the footsteps of Menderes, Özal aimed at providing ethnically, ideologically and culturally distinct groups with opportunities similar to those ones that the elites used to enjoy (Abdullah, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Thus, Özal’s advocating of the free market economy addressed the anticipations of the businessmen and tradesmen, and thereby, the intermediary strata and upper strata of the country. The economic theory of political behaviour (Downs, 1957 cited in De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath, 1995, p.999) claims that people vote for the party which, they expect, will be of greatest value to them in the near future. In consequence, the voting behaviour in terms of Downs’ “rational and self-interested” aspirations (Downs, 1957 cited in De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath, 1995, p.999) explains the main voting preference of the intermediary and upper strata’s voting towards the ANAP.
Furthermore, the ANAP came out of the legislative elections of 1987 as the first party despite competition from the political leaders of the 1970s who had returned to active politics. The ANAP’s second electoral success appears to be related to the lasting support it received from the upper and intermediary strata of the society. As emphasized in chapter 1 and the beginning of this section, the ANAP government opened the Turkish economy to international economic order and brought the economic opportunities to the periphery. During my interview with Mehmet from the TEB (Türk Ekonomi Bankası - Turkish Economy Bank), he asserted that the ANAP government was by far the most reformist government in terms of its economic policies, which resulted in the integration of the Turkish economy after opening up the global economic system (Mehmet, Appendix Part B, Table 1). In addition, as mentioned above, during this period, export levels increased significantly, and new industrial branches and SMEs emerged, extending and diversifying the industrial output.

In summary, the ANAP consolidated its regime, since it addressed the anticipations and needs of its main electorate basis (mostly small medium enterprises, shop owners, services and also white collars from urban areas). Therefore, the preference for the ANAP on the part of voters in the 1987 elections was based more on the self-interested aspirations of these strata.

However, the ANAP went into decline after the local elections of 1989 and later, in the parliamentary elections of 1991. I pointed out in chapter 1 the structural reasons behind this decline. In brief, this was due to removal of the ban on the leaders of the closed parties terminating the unchallenged position of the ANAP; Özal’s, the ANAP’s charismatic leader’s election to the presidency
(leaving behind in the party a leadership vacuum); a deterioration in the country’s economic performance with increasing inflation and unemployment; and an increase in terror activities, with a subsequent, almost unmanageable rural migration.

Aside from these dynamics, as Mehmet has argued, the ANAP’s prime minister’s move to the presidency and his retreat from an active political role and later on his death resulted in disruption to the country’s upward pace in the economy, and in a decline in support for SMEs. Mehmet calls this period, ‘the lost decade in Turkey’ (Mehmet, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Therefore, the upper and intermediary strata of Turkish society that had benefited from the ANAP’s supportive SME policies and its infrastructural projects seemed to withdraw their support for the ANAP after the prime minister’s election to the presidency. Thus, the ANAP seems to have lost its main social bases (upper strata and intermediary strata), due to loss of its visionary leader and economic recession\(^\text{111}\) (e.g. inflation; unemployment). As a result, the voting behaviour of the ANAP’s electorate seems to be based on self-interested motives, as stated by Downs (1957) (Downs, 1957 cited in De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath, 1995, p.999).

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\(^{111}\) There were two additional factors which contributed to the decline of the ANAP: increase of corruption; featherbedding, clientelistic network, priority to the circle of friends for the take-over of auctions (Yenal, 2010). Moreover, the economy had begun to recess: the inflation rate had doubled in the second half of the 1980s and reduced the purchasing power of many people. This was perhaps one of the main reasons behind the withdrawal of support from the ANAP. As a result, the party lost first the 1989 local elections and then 1991 parliament elections (Tanör et al., 2011, p.81).
4.5.2 Economic Developments in the 1990s, Emergence of New Intermediary Strata and Rising Trend of the RP

In this section, I first discuss the most important developments related to the economy during the decade. I then analyse the changes in socio-economic structures as a consequence of the economic developments of the period. Following this, I will analyse how the changes in socio-economic structures underpinned the voting behaviour during this decade, and more specifically, voting for the RP.

4.5.2.1 Economic Developments in the 1990s

The 1990s were characterized by high inflation (see Figure 17), depreciation of TL and a fragile financial system. Moreover, the period was characterized by depreciation in the TL and dollarization. People in Turkey, in order to prevent their investments and savings from depreciating, began to buy foreign currencies, especially dollars, in order to safeguard themselves.

4.5.2.2 Emergence of New Intermediary Strata

During this period, employment according to different sectors demonstrates similar pattern as previous decades: while the share of employment in agricultural sector continued its declining course; share of services within total employment kept on increasing. Industry’s share within total employment remained as in the previous decade unchanged. In addition, as seen from Figure 23, in 1999, shares of agriculture and services within total employment intersected. Thereafter, a share of employment agriculture in employment kept on decreasing whereas services became (and have remained) the predominant sector of employment.
This decade was thus marked by the further decline of employment related to agriculture and the further increase of employment in services, while employment in industry continued to be constant. In the next section, my aim is to link the economic changes and the change in occupational categories to politics in specific to the rise of the RP.

4.5.2.3 The Impact of the Socio-Economic Changes and the Rising Trend of the RP

As mentioned before, this era was characterized by the emergence of RP, with its successful performance in the local elections of 1994, as well as the legislative elections of 1995. Meanwhile, this period witnessed, aside from the emergence of the RP, the decline of centre-left and centre-right parties. I will discuss how aforementioned changes in socio-economic structures, together with the institutional changes (e.g. decline of left-wing parties), contributed to the rise of the RP.
First of all, as seen in the previous sections 4.5.2.2 and 4.5.1, this period is mainly characterized by drastic changes in the economic conditions of the deprived masses (such as inflation; purchasing power parity; high unemployment level; the welfare disparities (Öniş, 1997, p.751; Figures 17 and 18)). In a sense, the economic developments of the 1990s resulted in a continuous crisis, and the state was unable to deal with aggrieved people. Hence, the unprivileged masses withdrew their support from the nation state, which had been unable to protect them from the unfavourable consequences of neoliberal restructuring.

Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section 4.5.1, mostly due to increasing terror events, the cities received massive migration from rural areas during the period 1985-1990. As a result, the peripheral sides of big and/or metropolitan cities received an important flow of people during the late 1980s. However, in addition to the net migration rate, due to the much higher birth rate of people who came from rural areas, the urban population increased steadily through time. Thus, the urban population reached 59% at the beginning of the 1990s; 65% at the beginning of the 2000s and 75% in 2008 (Koç et al., 2008, p.20).

Consequently, as pointed out in chapters 2 and 3, in Kahraman’s terms (2008); the ‘periphery at the centre’ was created. Hence, in big cities, new peripheral circles which had already been formed in the 1950s continued to expand in the 1990s. These new peripheral circles, which were established at the ‘centre’ accommodated people who arrived from rural areas and began to work in manual labour. Thus, unlike the established and organized working class that
was close to the core through formal links with the state, this segment of the deprived masses or in other terms, manual lower strata, had a greater tendency to be guided by non-mainstream political movements. As pointed out in chapter 1, the efforts of pro-Islamist RP to mobilize a mass-based movement through a populist propaganda answered the aspirations of this social segment. Thus, the RP’s social bases were formed by this lower stratum, which comprised the working classes that were unable to find secure employment and were engaged in marginal activities (Gülalp, 2001, pp.444-445).

These deprived people were, apparently, better understood, especially by the RP. They were supported by members of the RP, and found themselves better served not through formal ways, but through RP-operated informal neighbourhood networks. The RP understood the expectations of the masses and they had more aptitude to reach them. The neighbourhood links and informal links were almost solely in the monopoly of the Islamic circles. Hence, political parties, like the RP, had much more opportunity to reach the masses than the others. In addition, as pointed out in previous sections, the centre-left associations and trade unions failed to reach those deprived masses as they used to do in the 1970s (Zürcher, 2003b, p.304 and pp.310-311).

Analysis of the voting behaviour of this lower stratum reveals that it first had a partisan dealignment (Crewe, 1983), due to lack of attachment to their previous parties (e.g. CHP and previously TİP). In this context, voters’needs (or voters of CHP and other left-wing parties in 1970s) were better addressed by the Islamic networks. Thus, to explain this phenomenon, the lower stratum did not act according to a class-based, but rather to a rational choice model. This lower
stratum (formed by marginal workers etc.) was not blindly attached to a political party, since it was aware that left-wing parties were not anymore able to meet its needs. Therefore, the members of this stratum directed their votes towards the RP, which better addressed their aspirations and provided services in their interrelations with their municipality, and also neighbourhood services.

As pointed out by Himmelweit et al. (1993, p.107) who emphasize on party’s credibility related to their ability to realize their policies, in the case of the voting behaviour towards the RP, it can be argued that the RP’s discourse played an important role for voters to canalize their votes towards it. Thus, the lower strata’s voter patterns seem to be oriented by both economic factors (unemployment) and socio-psychological factors (credibility of the RP’s discourse, *Adil Düzen*).

In summary, the vacuum created by the failure of the left (Zürcher, 2008, p.416) was filled by the RP’s policies, based on its populist discourse *Adil Düzen* (Just Order). Therefore, it is not possible to explain the voting behaviour of lower strata towards the RP in terms of social mobility theories. The RP answered the needs of the deprived strata by providing them with social assistance and support, but the party did not give a promise for significant social change.

The support that the RP received was not only from the lower stratum, but also from tradesmen and craftsmen, whose number and power steadily increased throughout the decade (Figure 21). As a result, the RP’s electoral support was based on a cross-strata coalition, since the RP also obtained support
from small farmers, blue collar workers, tradesmen and craftsmen (Gülalp, 2001, p.445; Özbudun and Hale, 2010, p.48).

As Figure 21 reveals, there emerged new intermediary strata formed by people whose occupational categories were related to services, trade, and crafts. Indeed, the social bases of the RP were, in part, formed by urban segments, mostly tradesmen and craftsmen living in the squatter districts of the metropolitan cities constituted the social bases of the RP (Bakirezer and Demirer, 2010, p.158).

Furthermore, the alliance of the social bases did not concern only the deprived masses and urban craftsmen, tradesmen but as well the peripheral segment of the capitalist class which was formed by small and medium scale, mostly provincial businessmen (Gülalp, 2001, p.444). This pillar of the RP was also called the Anatolian capitalists which began to flourish due to the free-market policies and globalization trend of the 1980s (Öniş, 1997, p.748). Nevertheless, this group felt excluded as it was not considered as a part of the real elite in the society (Öniş, 1997, pp.748-749). This upper capitalist strata used to support the ANAP.

Furthermore, Özal’s move\(^{112}\) to a politically passive role as the president of the Republic resulted in the standstill of the economic reforms that had been of great benefit to this emerging bourgeoisie. Seeing its source of financial interests being closed, this emerging bourgeoisie apparently withdrew its support from the ANAP, which under new leadership rapidly diverged from Özal’s visionary policies. Thus, this group began to look for alliance with other parties,

\(^{112}\) It is also emphasized that the ANAP took a more liberal political party after the 1990s (Mert, 2007, pp.33-34).
especially the RP (Teazis, 2011, p.123). Actually, Erbakan, the RP’s leader himself had also been a greater supporter of the Anatolian capitalists and SMEs.

It is important to follow the shift of the emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie from the ANAP to the RP, since it shows that the upper strata acted according to their self-interest. Therefore, this group’s voting preferences for the RP in the 1990s can best be explained on the basis of rational choice theory.

With the support of these three main strata (upper; new intermediary and lower strata) the RP obtained successful results in the local elections of 1994 and legislative elections of 1995. However, the RP’s further entrenchment into party system was blocked by the blow to the political system delivered by the postmodern memorandum of 28th February 1997 that resulted in the closure of the RP and put the Anatolian capitalists under the secular state’s guidance.

Therefore, especially, after the military memorandum, the upper strata (small and medium provincial capitalists) began to look for a new conservative, but moderate political party that was ready to pursue neoliberal free-market policies, and to further the integration of the Turkish economy with the global economic system. This party should create a socio-economic environment for further expansion of the Anatolian capital. The Anatolian upper strata found what it looked for in the reformist branch of the National Vision (movement that became later on the AKP).

4.5.3 The AKP Period from 2002 to the present: Social Bases of the AKP

The previous section demonstrates the main economic developments, the changes in socio-economic structures of Turkish society and how they underpinned voting behaviour during the period 1923-2001. This section will
now look at the period 2001-to present in order to understand how the change in socio-economic structures since the 1980s has contributed to the emergence of the AKP in 2002, and later on, its consolidation throughout AKP’s tenure. To do this, I first demonstrate how the economic conjuncture of the early 2000s impacted the socio-economic structures and how in turn they contributed to the emergence of the AKP in 2002.

4.5.3.1 The Changes in Socio-economic Structures since 1980s and their Impact on the Emergence of the AKP in 2002

As may be seen from the previous sections, new intermediary strata started to emerge after the 1980s and especially 1990s. As can be seen from Figure 18, the economic volume, and consequently employment in occupational categories, related to services, trades, sales and crafts started to increase since late 1980s and kept increasing in the 1990s. I denoted this occupational category as the intermediary strata in the Turkish context (Appendix Part F, Figure1). The main socio-economic change in society occurred in the increase in services and drop in the agricultural categories since the 1980s, due to the economic policies of the 1980s. However, the new socio-economic structures, i.e., the intermediary strata, which emerged on account of these policies, were also severely affected by the 2000 and 2001 economic crises.

In this context, in 2002, the AKP appeared as a source of hope for these emerging intermediary strata, by promising economic stability and growth (İnsel, 2003, p.298). In addition, the AKP received a great amount of votes from the lower strata, which, in order to achieve its aspiration of rising to the upper strata, turned to the AKP (İnsel, 2003, p.299). These arguments regarding the
socio-economic reasons behind the AKP’s emergence were also highlighted by the high-ranking official of the TESEV, Zafer who told me:

The social basis is important. Sociologically, the lower strata’s power is important. So what did people want? People in Turkey wanted more wealth, more freedom. They wanted to open up to the outside world because they wanted to sell their products to the outside world. This is important. The things in agrarian level are homogeneous. Everything is similar. Everything looks alike. But, in the middle class, everything is different. Difference brings up individualism. Individualism brings up freedom (Zafer, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

This new intermediary strata also needed a new political and economic discourse. Among the interviewees, different social actors in society (e.g. both oppositional voices, such as members of the CHP women branch and youth branch and relatively more pro-AKP actors, such as the representatives from TESEV and from the Hak-İş trade union) shared similar views about the necessity for a new political and economic opening ensuring the economic and political aspirations of society in 2002.

Moreover, they agreed that the AKP succeeded in reading the needs and aspirations of these new intermediary strata. For instance, İbrahim from the CHP youth branch highlighted that:

...AKP attempted to give this message especially to the youth. ... AKP said that AKP is the party of change. AKP is the party which has beat the status quo.... (İbrahim, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Similarly, Ayşe from the CHP women branch asserted that:

Before 2002, Turkey needed an opening. Turkey is a conservative country. It is easier to get votes from the conservative segments. That’s why someone from the conservative groups has to come up. In the meantime, the centre-right parties were not convincing anymore because of corruption and the 2001 crisis. The coalition government took important austerity measures on economic grounds. In addition, this economic programme required continuity (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1).
Moreover, my argument that is related to the changes in socio-economic structures and AKP’s perception of these social changes was supported by the representative of the TESEV, Zafer, who told me:

Here, we also have to mention Tayyip Erdogan’s strong perception... So, he perceived the change in Turkish society. According to those changes, he produced policies. Hence, Tayyip did not create the AKP. AKP’s sociological basis created the AKP. Tayyip Bey had understood the aspirations and requests of that sociological basis (Zafer, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

In a similar way, Nedim from the Hak-İş pointed out the AKP’s answers to the needs and aspirations of the intermediary strata. He emphasized that:

The AKP, compared to previous political parties, brought an important amount of projects. ... It looks simple but it does not matter if a project is simple or not. What he (referring to Tayyip Erdoğan) said: “I will bring freedoms and rights”. He named it. So he named the EU. In the economy, it was obvious that he would introduce a particular vision of the economy. Also, he mentioned that he would make roads and houses (Nedim, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Before it came to power in 2002, the AKP not only got support from the lower segments of the society that wanted to move up socially, and the intermediary strata, but it also received important support from the upper strata as well as business circles. The main reason behind the AKP’s support from various strata is based on the post-economic crisis period and also on the AKP’s non-Islamist discourse.

Similar to other social strata, the economic crisis also impacted the professionals and white collar workers who constituted the upper intermediary strata of the societal scheme. They too aspired to a new start that would bring about economic stability. In this environment, the new political party, the AKP
which was established by the reformist branch of the FP, developed a political discourse that fitted the needs of different strata: upper, intermediary and lower.

In this environment, as compared to the RP that advocated a socio-economic system based on Islamic values, the AKP carefully avoided a pro-Islamic discourse. It aimed to appeal to people by emphasizing policies based on a free-market economy and integration with the global economic system, and thereby promised to bring economic stability.

As a consequence, the AKP did not win the elections in 2002 as an Islamist party, but as a centre-right political party and its votes reached 34.26%. If the AKP had maintained a religious, pro-Islamic discourse, it would not have attained such a vote capacity (Öniş, 2010, p.266). Most likely, its votes would have been confined to 20-25% that corresponded to the RP’s vote capacity (21.38% in the legislative elections of 1995). This argument is supported by the views of an AKP member, Abdullah, who claims that:

The MSP tradition really was a conservative tradition and it was not adapting to the new system in an easy way. It was not keeping up with the change. I also think that they could not read this. Because the changes in global situations, conditions... Changes in the conditions without losing your own identities, you can make new political readings, new interpretations. However, the RP’s traditional branch could not do it. Because they could not do it, Abdullah Gül from the reformist group was defeat by Recai Kutan (the traditionalist group within the RP) during the presidential elections of the party. When Abdullah Gül was defeated, it was understood that in the same political party, they could not do things that they wanted and that’s why they established a new party [that is, the AKP]. The traditional branch of the RP could not have understood that there was no possibility to do politics without taking into account Turkish reality, global conditions and Turkey’s electorate profile. Imagine a political party in Turkey which targets only pious conservative peoples’ votes, it can not come into power. It can get only 20% of the votes... or a maximum of 30% of the votes (Abdullah, Appendix Part B, Table 1).
Similarly, Engin from the SP pointed out that:

If the AKP had imitated the RP’s road map, especially with regard to economic issues, there would have been no chance that the AKP would have come to power with such a high percentage (Engin, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Furthermore, even though the AKP came to power due to its non-Islamist discourse and its economic discourse targeting different strata, notably the AKP attracted votes from people with low income and low education levels, as well as of conservative business circles that felt aggrieved and excluded by the secular elite. On the other hand, under its new leadership, the centre-left party of 1970s, the CHP had meanwhile become the party of relatively wealthy and educated segments of the upper-middle strata (Bakırezer and Demirer, 2010, p.159).

The education levels of social bases tend to go in line with income levels. If the A & G research company’s pre-election survey of 2002 October is taken into account, it was found that the AKP; the DYP; the DEHAP;¹¹³ the SP and the DSP received the majority of their votes from voters who had low socio-economic status, as compared to the CHP, which received votes from the the upper social groups (A&G Araştırma, 2002, p.25). However, given that the majority of the social triangle is formed by the population segments with low socio-economic status, it can be concluded that the AKP receives votes from the majority and the CHP from a minority of the population.

An analysis of the voting behaviour of different strata towards the AKP reveals the predomination of economic motives in their voting. First of all, lower strata appear to act in line with the rational choice theory and vote for the AKP.

¹¹³ The DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi - Democratic People’s Party) was a Kurdish national political party, but it was closed down in March 2003 and followed up by the DTP Demokratik Toplum Partisi - Democratic Society Party.
in expection that the AKP’s policies will elevate their societal levels. Thus, the lower strata voted according to self-interest theory. The pre-election survey of the 2002 legislative elections verifies this voting behaviour, according to economic factors. According to this survey (A&G Araştırma, 2002), 50.6 % of lowest strata (D-E group)\textsuperscript{114} believed that they had not yet seen the worst of the economic crisis. In a way, they desperately looked for a way out. The survey thus put forth the fact that the economic conditions of 2002 were of primary importance for these social strata and their votes for the AKP in the legislative elections of 2002 November (A&G Araştırma, 2002).

As with lower strata, the intermediary strata and also upper intermediary strata (e.g. small and medium enterprises owners) expected the AKP to bring economic stability and growth, and also further integration with global economic order (İnsel, 2003, p.298). As a result, the intermediary strata also voted for the AKP out of economic considerations.

\textsuperscript{114} Social Status Groups in the Survey A&G Araştırma (2002), the D-E represents the lowest part of the society.
To provide a concrete example, the AKP obtained higher votes than the average (34.46%) in those provinces with mostly export-based economy. As seen in the Figure 25, export reliance in AKP strongholds was almost twice as high as that of control provinces. This demonstrates that upper strata and intermediary strata also acted according to a rational choice of theory, rather than other voting theories.

The economic factors thus worked as glue that fixed the votes of different strata to the AKP. As compared to RP, the AKP did not scare society with Islamist discourse; on the contrary, its pro-Western and pro-EU discourse

Figure 25. Export-Orientated Provinces and Support for AKP in 2002 Legislative Elections

115 (Genel Seçim, 2002)
http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=14
116 The number 1 denotes regions with higher support (more than 35% support for the AKP) (dummy=1) are Siirt, Konya, Erzurum, Kayseri, Kahramanmaraş, Düzce, Yozgat, Malatya, Çankırı, Kırıkkale, Kütahya, Çorum, Aksaray, Giresun, Karabük, Sivas, Samsun, Rize, Tokat, Trabzon, Sakarya, Nevşehir, Bolu, Kocaeli, Afyon, Gümüşhane, Niğde, Elazığ, Isparta, Ordus, Adıyaman, Bursa, Erzincan, Gaziantep, Amasya, Karaman, Ankara, İstanbul, Kilis. The number 0 (thus, dummy = 0) denotes regions with lower support (less than 35% support for the AKP) are Yalova, Balıkesir, Kırklareli, Sinop, Bingöl, Osmaniye, Kırşehir, Kastamonu, Zonguldak, Manisa, Hatay, Eskisehir, Bartın, Bayburt, Burdur and Uşak. The export volumes are calculated for each of the provinces as the percent of total exports (real prices) over regional GDP in order to identify the degree of foreign trade dependency for each of the 81 regions. Therefore the value of total exports from that region is divided over regional (real) GDP.
and its ideological stance as a conservative democracy, appealed to various strata of society in 2002. As a consequence, the main factor behind AKP’s emergence was based on its promises of economic stability and growth.

The growing capitalist class and deprived masses at the metropolitan cities under the influence of the demographic patterns, economic programmes and rapid modernization helped the AKP to emerge. As may be seen in the next chapter, the AKP addressed the needs of its target population through its social and economic policies during its tenure as the government party.

4.5.3.2 The AKP’s Feed-back into its Social Bases and the AKP’s Consolidation in 2007

The period 2002-2007 was characterized by the AKP’s first ruling tenure. As mentioned above, the AKP obtained a majority of its votes from the emerging new intermediary and lower strata of the society, but also in part from other strata. (The strong backing that came from liberal circles was, in particular, noteworthy). In the legislative elections of 2007, the AKP consolidated its electoral victory by increasing its votes to 46.6%.

At the 2007 elections, the AKP received its votes again from each stratum of society, but mostly from intermediary strata. According to a pre-election survey of the Konda research company, the AKP received most of its votes from the two lowest strata, whereas the CHP received a high percentage of its votes from the intermediary and upper intermediary income strata. (Konda Research, 2007, p.16).

Bekir Ağırdrı̇r (2007a) has made an analysis of these results on the basis of income levels and he has come to the conclusion that the AKP gets “55% of
the votes of the poorest segments, 54% of the second, lower middle income segment and 43% of the mid-level income segments, 35% of the upper-middle income level and 23% of the votes of the wealthiest segment. It is noteworthy here that besides getting the majority of its votes from the poorest segments, the AKP addresses the rich segments of the society as well (Ağırdr, 2007a, p.12).

It is also important to look, for comparison, at the voter basis of the CHP that receives only 8% of its votes from the lowest income, 33% from the upper middle income class and 50% from the highest level income (Ağırdr, 2007a, p.17).

When the analysis is done according to occupational categories (A&G Araştırma, 2007), the AKP obtains votes from the farmers (more than average) and housewives (the group which especially supports the AKP with 48.5%) and from the craftsmen, tradesmen (40.2%). The CHP, in turn, gets most of its votes from private sector employees (A&G Araştırma, 2007, p.7).

Another survey made by the Konda Research (2007) comes to similar results as the A&G Araştırma (2007). It shows that the AKP gets above average votes from lower strata (workers and people in marginal sectors, such as street sellers and house-cleaners). On the other hand, the CHP receives votes from upper intermediary strata (public servants, public servant employers, and self-employed people) (Konda Research, 2007, p.15). According to Konda’s survey, the CHP fails to attract the votes of farmers and lower strata (marginal sector workers). The MHP, which was the third party to get into parliament in the 2007 elections, mostly attracts the votes of the public servants, small scale retailers, businessmen and students (Konda Research, 2007, p.15).
It may to be of importance to clarify the reasons behind the AKP’s perception as a political party of deprived masses, in place of the CHP. A look at the past political election results from this perspective reveals that already in the 1995 legislative elections, the RP, but also MHP, received votes from deprived people. On the other hand, the CHP, even then, was the address of the votes from the educated (Akarca and Tansel, 2008, p.645). Thus, it is plausible to claim that the division of the political spectrum as an Islamist-secularist, which had already begun in the early 1990s, continued to exist in the 2000s.

Thus, it is not surprising to see such a division between the educated, wealthy voter basis of the CHP and the uneducated and deprived voter basis of the AKP. Öniş (1997) sees those people who do not have secure jobs as the losers of globalization, and claims that these unprivileged people constituted a social basis for Islamist parties in 1994. Another reason behind this divide was the fact that as mentioned before, the leftist parties could not grasp the needs of these people, as their links to them via trade unions or left-wing institutions that were broken by the 1980 coup d’état could not be restored in the following decades. Hence, they could not trace these people and address their needs (Koç, 2010).

In addition, Keyder (2005, p.128), deindustrialization has resulted in the growth of marginal jobs in the metropolitan areas. The voters of the AKP are formed mostly by this marginal sector. This is an important indicator of the link of the AKP’s basis to the migration to and deindustrialization of the metropolitan areas.
Thus, since 1980s Turkish society seems to have been in a process of evolution towards a Western type society where the parties are based with the social bases. This process was strongly affected by the socio-economic transformation of the last three decades, the military memorandum of 1997 and as well heavy economic crises of 2000 and 2001. Consequently, this transformation is reflected also in the voting behaviour of the Turkish society. In such a context, the most suitable option for the voters turned out to be the AKP that won in 2002 34.43% of the votes and then increased its share of vote in 2007 to 46.58% and in 2011 to 49.8%.

When the voting behaviour in 2007 elections is analysed according to voting behaviour theories, it is realized that economic stability throughout the period 2002-2007 helped the AKP to consolidate itself. Therefore, the AKP’s constituency which was mainly lower strata and intermediary strata were content with the AKP’s five-year performance. Başlevent and Akarca (2010) also argue that the main driving force during this period was the economy. In addition, Cem (the high-ranking member of a big holding company), Melek (the high-ranking representative of the MÜSİAD), Mehmet (the representative from the TEB), Vedat (a high-ranking official at the TOBB) as well oppositional party member Ayşe (CHP women branch), all agreed that the AKP followed a consistent economic programme during its first tenure, and appropriately addressed the needs of its social bases (Cem, Melek, Mehmet, Vedat and Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1). This in turn led to the AKP’s consolidation.

To be more specific, Melek argued that the AKP dealt with high inflation; the government also supported the banks and worked for the building-
up of the banks. She also considered privatizations, consistent price stability policies and high economic growth rates as successful developments during the AKP’s first ruling tenure (Melek, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Mehmet from the TEB pointed out that:

The AKP government behaved in a very rational way and they continued the stability programme which began during the coalition government. In 2004, they renewed the IMF stand-by agreement again. It was a surprising and unusual event in Turkey’s 80 year economic history. The fact they successfully implemented the same standby agreement for three years was a first success. Afterwards, the fact that they signed a new standby agreement with the IMF was a really unusual thing. At that time, the AKP’s economic policy brought stability and was reflected in the market and also in businesses. People began to invest again. If you look at the growth rate of Turkey, especially during 2004-2007, you will also realize that foreign investment exploded in Turkey. Hence, foreign markets started to trust in Turkey (Mehmet, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Mehmet also highlighted privatization during the AKP’s ruling tenure and asserted that:

Privatization was an important part of the economic policies. The privatization which could not happen under the previous governments occurred with success and determination during the AKP’s ruling tenure (Mehmet, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Similar to both Melek and Mehmet, Vedat from the TOBB considered that the policies until 2007 were implemented within a good macroeconomic plan and new policies were implemented for further developing private sector. After 2007, he asserted that politics outweighed economic policies (Vedat, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Moreover, regarding the economic policies during the AKP’s ruling tenure, Cem pointed out that:

It is always necessary to make a benchmarking thereby to compare the past with the present. Interest rates fell. Interest rates came down
to completely different levels from the chronic interest rates of before. Inflation fell. Even during the crisis moments, growth rates are ok. There was unemployment but there already was. There was an informal economy. But it was bigger in the past. Now, more than ever before, the government managed to place the informal economy under its control (Cem, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Among the oppositional social actors, the representative of the CHP women branch, Ayşe mentioned that in 2002, stabilization was achieved. There was a need for the continuation of stability. The AKP government prized the firms which have a high level of export potential as Özal did in the 1980s (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Similar to CHP member, the support for emerging bourgeoisie was also emphasized during the interview with the high-ranking official from the TEB; Mehmet asserted that the AKP during its ruling tenure continued similar policies as the ANAP such as subsidies to the SMEs (Mehmet, Appendix Part B, Table 1).
The centre and the periphery concepts, as described in chapter 2, have been extensively used to analyze Turkish society (Mardin, 1973; Kongar, 1985). However, a consideration of the AKP’s emergence and consolidation solely through this concept may not prove to be sufficient for an analysis of the socio-economic dynamics in the late 1990s. Expanded versions of the centre and periphery concept taking in account further fragmentations, i.e., in terms of ‘centre at the periphery’ and ‘periphery at the centre’ (Kahraman, 2008), may in turn be of better use in helping acquire insight into the outcomes of this rather complex socio-economic transformation.

In consequence, as with voting behaviour in 2002, the voting behaviour of different strata may be explained by the rational choice theory where people vote for parties that would bring them the most. As the AKP received votes from
different strata, the factor that brought them together is apparently not a specific ideology or class identification, but rather, the economy. The decrease in the AKP’s votes in the local elections of 2009 seems to confirm such an explanation. Indeed, these elections were held as the repercussions of the global economic crisis of 2008 were also felt in Turkey. As may be seen in Figure 26, the Turkish economy followed a downward trend in 2008-2009.117 Even this temporary stagnation was reflected in voting preferences, in particular in the export-oriented sectors and regions in the Western part of Turkey (Çarkoğlu, 2009, p.298).

Thus, the AKP’s magic lies in the economic programme that it has consistently followed as the government party to the advantage of its disparate constituency. During my interview with a member of the AKP youth branch, Zehra also underlined this point and added that:

The AKP gives significant importance to two segments of the society: either to wealthy ones, or to the poor ones. In our country, there are more poor people than rich. Hence, it gives houses, etc. to the poor or it provides them with a job. In the meantime, it also helps businesses (Zehra, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Indeed, the AKP met the economic needs of the lower strata by its social policies and the needs of intermediary and upper strata by keeping the economy on track. Finally, it may be important to highlight once again the difference between the AKP’s and the RP’s policies. The RP was interested in addressing the needs of its ideological constituency only, whereas the AKP, with its less radical stance and its consistent economic plans, met the needs and expectations of broad segments of the society. Therefore, the voting behaviour of the

117 The distribution of votes in the local elections of 2009: the AKP 38.8%; the CHP 23.1%; the MHP 16.1%; the DTP 5.7% and the SP 5.2%. 
electorate here was not marked by sociological or attitudinal factors, but mostly, economic factors.

4.6 Conclusion of the Chapter

Throughout this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate how changes in socio-economic structures underpinned the voting behaviour of different strata throughout time (e.g. 1923-1950; 1950-1960; 1960-1980 and 1980 to the present). The voting behaviour in Turkey, except during the years 1960-1980, has been guided more by economic factors than others (e.g. sociological, class, attitudinal).

Furthermore, a specific feature of the Turkish politics after adopting the multiparty in late 1940s has been its regular interruption nearly every ten years by military interventions: the coup d’état of 1960; the coup by referendum of 1971; the coup d’état of 1980; and the postmodern memorandum of 1997. Each time, these interventions disrupted the evolution of the political party system and the socio-economic dynamics in the country: for instance, the 1980 coup d’état abolished the left movement of the 1970s through closure of left-wing political parties and trade unions and the suppression of the working strata. Consequently, in the following decades, new workers’ strata came under the influence of the Islamic political parties, and began to translate their aspirations through the rise in political Islam.

On the other hand, the military intervention of 1980 and its neoliberal economic programme, as specified by the parliamentary resolution of 24th January 1980, impacted socio-economic structures in such a way that new intermediary strata and the so-called Anatolian (or Islamic) bourgeoisie
emerged. As explained above, these intermediary strata rigorously flourished from the early 1990s on and acquired considerable financial and political power. They played a decisive role in the emergence of the AKP in 2002 and formed an important part of the AKP’s constituency. However, the lower strata which had been negatively affected by the neoliberal policies since the 1980s, and by economic crises, also voted for the AKP, since they considered that the AKP would provide an opportunity to mitigate their problems and help them elevate their life standards and social levels. Thus, social mobility factors played an important role for the lower strata.

In its first ruling tenure, the AKP government displayed a successful economic performance, resulting in economic stability and growth. The AKP’s electoral victory of 2007 thus verified our initial hypothesis that Turkish voters’ behaviour is primarily determined by economic considerations and not ideological factors.

The analyses carried out in the framework of a line of pre- and post-electoral surveys have revealed that the social bases of the AKP correspond to a kind of cross-alliance among the different strata of society (lower-intermediary and upper strata). Thus, aggrieved people (lower strata) on the one hand and the emerging wealthy conservative class (upper strata) on the other have been found to be the main supporters of the AKP. This once again underlines the fact that the AKP has not come to power and consolidated its votes as a pro-Islamic political party, but rather with its prospects of economic stability and growth, as well as integration with the global economic order. Similarly, its consolidation is
based on the stabilization of the economy and its strong social policies in various areas.

By way of positive feedback, the AKP seems to adequately address the requisitions and anticipations of its two main supporter groups through its social and economic policies. I will explore these policies and explain how they have contributed to the consolidation of the AKP’s votes in chapter 5.
Chapter 5 Consolidation of the AKP And Significance of Its Electoral Success within Turkish Society and Political Party System

5.1 Introduction

In chapter 4, I tried to show the socio-economic dynamics which guided the emergence of the AKP and how the AKP responded to these dynamics with its economic projects. The AKP has not only claimed to answer the needs of its intermediary strata (e.g. petty bourgeoisie) by improving their standards of living through economical progress. It also used other tools such as strong social policies to address the needs of disadvantaged populations (e.g. manual workers) when the economic developments were not sufficient to cover up their needs. These policies contributed to the electoral success of the AKP in 2007, as well in 2011. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to highlight the social policies introduced by the AKP, in order to demonstrate how they contributed to party’s political consolidation and entrenchment in Turkish society.

Following the analysis of key social policies, I will move on to examine the AKP’s rights-based discourse; that is, an understanding of the initial pro-EU discourse of the AKP and of how the AKP appealed to various ideological groups in society, which in turn contributed to its electoral victory in the second legislative elections of 2007. In analysing its consolidation, I will focus specifically on changing the dynamics between the historical bloc and the AKP, in order to reveal to what extent the diminution of the historical bloc’s power has contributed to the AKP’s entrenchment in the political system (including executive; legislative).
Third, I will demonstrate how the Gülen Movement has contributed to the AKP’s success, and at the same time infiltrated the bureaucracy. This part will illustrate the grass-roots Islamist movement’s interrelation with the AKP and its contribution to the AKP’s strength, in order to assess and understand Turkish society.

Finally, I will analyse the significance of the consolidated AKP for the Turkish political party system and society - one of the key research questions of this thesis relating the AKP’s impact on Turkish society and the Turkish political party system in the long-term.

5.2 The AKP’s Social Policies and their Impact on its Consolidation

In this part of the chapter, I will first look at the AKP’s women and gender equality policies by considering policies of the AKP related to the female employment. Then, I will look at the policies related to social assistance to investigate their impact on the AKP’s consolidation. Third, I will look at the AKP’s policies on health system in order to assess whether the health policies consolidated the AKP’s ruling tenure or not.

5.2.1 The AKP’s Women and Gender Equality Policies: Female Employment on the Axis of Neo-liberalism and Social Conservatism

Women in Turkey greater enjoy freedom when compared to women in other parts of the Muslim world, due to a history of secularization and modernization. However, women’s situation in Turkey is still far from

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118 Women in Turkey are to an extent more privileged than other women, especially in the Muslim World, due to the fact that women’s rights were extended through the introduction of the Swiss Civil Code already in 1930. Thereby, women got equal rights in divorce and child custody, while polygamy was abolished. Furthermore, Islamic dress was outlawed for public employees and, in schools and universities (Keddie, 2007, pp.82-83).
attaining the level of industrialized countries. Female labour force participation is, in this respect, a good indicator of women’s status in a country.

From 1988 to 2008, female labour force participation has declined considerably in Turkey, and as of first quarter of 2012, it is the lowest among OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries with 28.2% (World Bank, 2009a, pp.x-xi; see Appendix Part F, Figure1). Demographic and socio-economic reasons\(^{119}\) certainly account for this low rate. Equally, however, it may be regarded as the outcome of the socio-economic policies of a government with a relatively long tenure period, and also its stance on the issue of women and gender equality.

Thus, in my opinion, female employment is an appropriate starting point for the analysis of policies of the AKP. Women in Turkey are in a disadvantageous situation in many areas such as education, health and work. However, female empowerment begins by female employment, which provides economic freedom; social security and confidence to women. Therefore, it is crucial to consider female employment to analyse the gender equality policies of the AKP. In addition, it may be of help to assess an important aspect of the socio-economic performance of the party; provide insight into its socio-economic philosophy and worldview; but also into the position and role it ascribes to women in the society it has in mind. While looking at those variables, it will be also possible to understand the female support for the AKP during the last decade.

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\(^{119}\) Females used to participate in labour force as unpaid agricultural workers. Due to urbanization, females’ participation in the labour market in rural environment has drastically decreased last decades. In addition, as females who used to work in agricultural labour market are poorly educated, they face constraints in entering urban labour market (World Bank, 2009a, pp.x-xi). As a result, the female labour participation rate has decreased since 1988 to 2008.
The governments make use of the available legislative and executive means in order reach their political goals. Laws, programmes and projects represent the tools they use in implementing their policies. Hence, it is important to start to the analysis by looking at the legislative changes during the AKP’s ten-year tenure, as compared to previous decades’ legislative practices (1990s and early 2000s). Some legislative advancement occurred in the 1990s for improvement of women’s rights in both economic and social areas. In 1990s, the provision in the former Civil Code which made employment subject to the permission of the husband was annulled (Article 159). By amendment of this article 159, one of the obstacles against the women’s employment was removed (Dedeoğlu, 2012, p.276; WWHR, n.d.).

Similarly, in 1998, women obtained the right to make tax statements independently of their husbands.

In terms of institutional framework, in 1990, KSMG (Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü - General Directorate for the Status and Problems of Women) was established as a national body. In 1991, the General Directorate was linked to the office of Prime Ministry and carried out its activities up to 2011 under a State Ministry in charge of Woman and Family Affairs (Şenol et al., 2005, p.37).

The early 2000s was marked by directives of the EU for adopting the EC acquis. In 2001, with the amendment of the Civil Code, many changes regarding the women’s rights occurred. It is important to pinpoint the article 154 of the

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120 (WWHR (Women for Women’s Human Rights), n.d.) Their Campaign for Full Gender Equality in the Civil Code: http://www.wwhr.org/category/the-campaign-for-full-gender-equality-in-the-civil-code
civil code which was read as “the marriage is legally represented by the husband, assigning the man as the head of the household” was amended (Dedeoğlu, 2012, p.279). The amended law introduced equality between husband and wife in the household (TBMM, 2001).\textsuperscript{122}

After succeeding in the elections of 2002 November, the first AKP government followed the previous government’s work on EU \textit{acquis communautaire}. As a result, in 2003, the new Labour Law (No.4957)\textsuperscript{123} which included “the principle of equal pay of equal value; equal treatment as regard employment; protection of pregnant and breastfeeding women from dangerous and night work; the reversal of the burden of proof on the employer in case of sex-based discrimination in the workplace; and non-discrimination against part-time workers” was accepted by the parliament (Şenol et al., 2005, p.10; Dedeoğlu, 2012, p.280). In addition, the same law brought provisions recognizing the issue of sexual harassment within the workplace. Similarly, the new Penal Code was approved as a result of EU directives in 2005 (Şenol et al., 2005, p.10).

Furthermore, in 2009, a law (No.5840\textsuperscript{124}) was approved in order to establish a parliamentary commission on equal opportunities for men and women. In addition, the Prime Ministry issued a circular (2010/14 number\textsuperscript{125}) on ‘Female Employment’ in order to arrange provisions “ensuring gender equality, tailoring vocational training and non-formal education to the needs of women,

\textsuperscript{122} (TBMM, 2001) \textit{Türk Medeni Kanunu} (Turkish Civil Code)
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k4721.html
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{İş Kanunu} No.4957 (Labour Law No.4957) enacted on 22 May 2003
\textsuperscript{124} (TBMM, 2009)
\textsuperscript{125} (Başbakanlık, 2010) Circular of Prime Ministry (2010/14 Number)
and increasing access of working mothers to child care services” (World Bank, 2009b; Başbakanlık, 2011, p.10).

A comparison reveals that in terms of legislation, there were in both decades (1990s and especially early 2000s) attempts to enhance women’s rights and gender equality. The governments in the first decade appeared to aim at cancellation of laws which used to cause main constraints against female employment. Similarly, the AKP government laid out provisions for guaranteeing gender equality in the workplace.

However, these advances in legislation and provisions brought about by the AKP government have not resulted in any significant change regarding female employment (see Appendix Part F, Figure1). In particular, they have not prevented female employment’s further decline which has been an outcome of demographic and socio-economic transformation (World Bank, 2009b).

As may be seen from Table 1, there has been a decline in female employment rate from 30.6% in 1988 to about 25.6% in 2004, followed by a slight increase after 2006/2007. Thus, as of 2010, female employment rate is found at a level of around 25%. It remains to be seen whether this increasing trend will keep on. Moreover, it is not possible to conclude that this slight increase is due to legislative improvements. Thus, it can be argued that the ten-year tenure of the AKP has not been greatly effective in increasing female employment. This seems to be the result of some contradictions in the party’s gender equality policies. Therefore, I will first take into account these

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126 (World Bank, 2009b) http://go.worldbank.org/6RSZO7YY80
contradictions between labour market policies and women’s rights in the work place. Second, I will consider the apparent conflict between policies for promoting female employment and family and religious policies which push women into home.

When the AKP’s policies are taken into account on this specific policy area, a conflict between provisions for female employment and women’s rights at work place is observed. I now illustrate how this contradiction has been fed by the AKP’s neoliberal economic agenda. This contradiction is first seen as a tension between labour law and women’s rights in the work place with flexible labour. Secondly, the same law and other provisions on gender equality orient women towards cheap and more female-based works for the sake of female employment.

In dealing with AKP’s women agenda, it cannot be claimed that the previous governments pursued repressive policies against women’s initiatives. However, there were laws to that effect and a tendency to ignore the social security of female workers. But, the agenda of conservative society and cheap labour without social security became more significant together with the AKP’s tenure (based on the interview with the representative of Halk Evleri, Lale, Appendix Part B, Table 1) (Aydoğanoğlu, 2011).128

To better understand the AKP’s women policies, it is of importance to consider them from the perspective of the requirements of neo-liberalism. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the economic system shifted from a more

welfare-based economic system to a neoliberal economic system in 1980s. As a result, women’s working conditions and the AKP’s policies need to be understood within this new economic framework. The party has not been willing to implement policies dealing with the negative repercussions of the neoliberal economic system in the society. Rather, it has implemented policies that better fitted the cheap labour concept of the neoliberal state model.

As can be seen in the legislative changes, the AKP attempts to encourage female employment within the economic system; nevertheless, by promoting employment, it calls for a flexible and cheap female labour force. Women, therefore, find themselves in a precarious position in the labour market, in particular, when the welfare state’s safety net is reduced to female labour force lacking social security (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011, p.561 and p.567). Coşar and Yeğenoğlu argue that the new labour law (2003) replaced welfare concept by workfare and enhanced women’s submission to work under insecure conditions. Therefore, a contradictory relationship between promotion of female employment and removal of women’s social rights exists (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2009, p.2).

In line with Coşar and Yeğenoğlu (2009), the act No.6111 (known as the ‘Bag Law’ that brought new changes to the labour law 2003) appears to enhance female employment by providing flexible and unsecure jobs to women. KEİG (Kadın Emek ve İstihdam Girişimi - Women’s Labour and

129 The welfare system of Turkey was never a Keynesian welfare system, but more a welfare state existing in semi-peripheral countries.
130 The ‘Bag Law’ or ‘Bag Bill’ means amending several laws at the same time (Aslan-Akman, 2005, p.10). The amendment to previous labour code was amended under the ‘Bag Law’ in February 2011. It was published at the Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete, 2011). http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/02/20110225M1-1.htm
Employment platform and other organizations on women’s rights considered drawbacks of the act No.6111 (KEİG, 2008). In particular, it is argued that the article 14 of the labour code 4857 had already included provisions regarding flexible work opportunities. Under the light of the current amendment, these flexible work opportunities have been extended by introducing new clauses such “work by call; work at home and remote work” (Çağlayan, 2011).

Similarly, the current draft act on amendment named “Yeni Teşvik Yasası ve Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi” aims to provide flexible work opportunities for women. Under this strategy, the AKP government projects to increase female employment to 30% by 2023 (Özgentürk, 2012). Nevertheless, KEİG (2012) asserts that the new plan of the government aims to augment female employment by canalizing women to cheap, labour-intensive and female-dominated works rather than by supplying advanced and long-term solutions. KEİG (2012) illustrates their argument by taking into account the Minister of Labour and Social Security’s views on female employment: “Textile is a labour-intensive and female-dominated sector. By providing this type of female employment in the South-eastern and Eastern regions, the government aims to compete with China, Pakistan and Bangladesh and Vietnam” (KEİG, 2012).

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131 KEİG is a newly established platform of NGO academics, local authorities, labour unions and semi-public institutions to promote a gender perspective in labour and employment issues.


134 Yeni Teşvik Yasası ve Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi: New Enhancement Law and National Employment Strategy


In line with the government’s strategies for flexible and cheap female employment, the government’s promotion of female employment includes a sexist side by orienting women only towards female-dominated sectors. These policies for promoting female-dominated sectors are conflicting with women’s rights. The AKP’s adherence to this logic is observed in the Prime Ministry’s circular notice\textsuperscript{137} (Başbakanlık, 2010) which aims to concentrate on female-based sectors and canalize women towards those sectors by providing them necessary skills.

In Turkey, women are oriented towards vocational schools since there is a more chance to find jobs for graduates from vocational schools than simple high schools (Tansel, 1994, p.308). Therefore, occupational segregation is not a new concept within the Turkish labour scheme. However, policies promoting these female-based works seem to be in alliance with the current government’s policies on social conservatism which consider the main duty of women as motherhood. They implicitly orient women towards as well home-based works (Dedeoğlu, 2012, p.283; Kılıç, 2008, p.498).

As a result of home-based jobs, women are allegedly provided the opportunity to reconcile work and family, thus in long-term traditional relations are not challenged (Kılıç, 2008, pp.495-496). In addition to this reconciliation of work and family life, “women obtain more easily the work consent of their husbands or fathers. However, the jobs which are either at home or in female-dominated environments like those in the garment industry provide no social

\textsuperscript{137} (Başbakanlık, 2010) Circular of Prime Ministry (2010/14 Number)
security benefits at all’” (Dedeoğlu, 2000, p.160). With the lack of social security, as mentioned before, women’s rights in work place are neglected too.

In line with Kılıç (2008) and Dedeoğlu (2000), these traditional roles and emphasis on female-based jobs have been emphasized by the representative of Woman Branch of the AKP İstanbul who gave another perspective to these female-based jobs (Leyla, Appendix, Part 1, Table 1). She referred to the İSMEK138 (İstanbul Büyükşehir Meslek ve Eğitim Kursları - İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality Vocational Training Courses) as an example for vocational training and claims that throughout these courses, the local branches have become like a ‘Halk Üniversitesi’139.

The İSMEK comprises predominantly local and short-term projects that are restricted and do not help women to enhance their skills and/or acquire new competencies. Thus, the courses140 are limited to handicrafts, clothing and textile, marketing and retail and like. For instance, the designed professions for women are highly stereotypic and apparently determined by a conceptual framework that is biased and sexist. As a result, these courses seem to confine women to the professional roles ascribed to them within the patriarchy of neoliberal system. In short, these policies appear to lack far-sighted and comprehensive programmes with goals such as bringing about societal changes

138 İSMEK (İstanbul Büyükşehir Meslek ve Eğitim Kursları): are the vocational training courses which are provided by İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İSMEK, n.d.). http://ismek.ibb.gov.tr/ismek-el-sanatlari-kurslari/webedition/File/ekitap/ismekkatalogweb.pdf (in English) http://ismek.ibb.gov.tr/ism/kurumsal.asp (in Turkish)
139 Halk Üniversitesi: People’s University
by empowerment of women. Instead, they only aim to lead women to professions within the required cadre which can only offer cheap, limited and cumbersome employment opportunities.

In addition, by promoting this type of works for women, the patriarchal system is not challenged. As Kılıç (2008) and Dedeoğlu (2000) pointed out, these female-based jobs give opportunity to create reconciliation between homes and work, thereby without challenging women’s traditional roles. The integration of women to neoliberal system without a challenging patriarchal system was also emphasized by Lale from *Halk Evleri*[^141] who argued that women have been left out in unsecure environment by labour rights and conservative values:

> Through these tactical policies, women are pushed into economic insecurity and confined to the family, husband and/or father. Hence, women are additionally deprived of social security and enforced to ever increasing levels of dependency. The women have become unsecure within the neoliberal economic system that was strengthened by supporting policies of the AKP (Lale, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Furthermore, she supported the aforementioned idea of an alliance between neo-liberalism and promotion in female employment, stating:

> Even though women may obtain a job, the cheap labour force role that they are compelled to assume does not change their position in the society. So, they go to work in firms/workshops/or other public places ….. All the secondary roles they are imposed to play arise from this mentality and the tacit hostility against the very notion of women’s emancipation (Lale, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

[^141]: *Halk Evleri*: “People’s Houses were initially local educational establishments for disseminating Kemalist message in provincial towns” (Zürcher, 2003b, p.233). It was closed down many times in 1950, 1980. Currently, instead of a Kemalist message, the Halk Evleri has a more socialist approach advocating people’s social rights (such as rights for housing, education; health; woman; disabled; environment and labour rights) (Halk Evleri, 2011). [http://www.halkevleri.org.tr/sites/default/files/indir/20-04-2010-he-brosur.pdf](http://www.halkevleri.org.tr/sites/default/files/indir/20-04-2010-he-brosur.pdf)
In the above, I have attempted to show how the labour market policies and women’s rights in the workplace challenge each other. In addition, I have discussed how these policies for promoting female employment orient women towards specific, female-dominated jobs by keeping the patriarchal system unchallenged. I now elaborate more on the tensions between this patriarchal system’s values and policies for female employment.

As mentioned in the background chapter, the AKP has put forward conservatism together with democracy as one of its main characteristics, in order to distinguish itself from other political parties which all somewhat have a conservative vein. However, conservatism\textsuperscript{142} constitutes the main body of its politics, as well as its engine, which is itself understood as a novelty in Turkish politics (Çıtak and Tür, 2008, pp.462-463).\textsuperscript{143}

When the AKP’s social conservatism and its female employment policies are analysed, they may be seen to be in harmony with its neoliberal economic agenda. As mentioned before, within the neoliberal system, women face two options: either they have to work in unsecure jobs or to remain at home for childcare (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011, p.566). Therefore, by enhancing female employment policies, the AKP does not remove the traditional role ascribed to women (Çıtak and Tür, 2008, pp.462-463). In this context, women are allowed to work as long as they are kept attached to their homes and do not neglect their main duty: motherhood.

\textsuperscript{142} Akdoğan who is the ‘ideologue’ of conservative democracy defines conservatism as a ‘synthesis of and a fine tuning between tradition and change’ (Çıtak and Tür, 2008, pp.462-463; Akdoğan, 2004, p.45-46).

\textsuperscript{143} However, while taking into account AKP’s social policies, I will use the term social conservatism, a political ideology or moral ideology that asserts that government and/or society are responsible of “encouraging or enforcing traditional values”.

257
The AKP’s emphasis on family values and social norms is plainly seen in the views asserted by the representative of Woman Branch of the AKP, Leyla in İstanbul:

The very core of the society is the woman; the family. And that’s why; it is essential to look after woman. If you reach the woman; ultimately you reach the family. If you protect woman, eventually you protect family (Leyla, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Hence, the AKP utilizes conservative discourse thoroughly by emphasizing the conservative family ideal; the Turkish family structure; home as the primary site of women; mother’s care for children’s well-being as their primary job.

The AKP’s strong emphasis of the family and social conservatism may also be illustrated with the change of the State Ministry of Women and Family Affairs into the Ministry of Family and Social Policies following the parliamentary elections of 12th June 2011 (Arın, 2012; Sevinç, 2012; Belge, 2011). It may be argued that the AKP, after its consolidation, no longer feels the need to hide its conservative discourse and, as a sign of this change, reduces the women to a subordinate item under the issue of family and social affairs.

The elaboration of women’s issues within the family concept is not the only constraint against the AKP’s policies on female policies, there is also an important focus on religious values in dealing with problems regarding family and women issues. Arat (2010) argues that through the concerted efforts of the public bureaucracy, education system and civil society organizations, Islamist

144 (Arın, 2012)
http://www.reflectionturkey.com/?p=239
(Sevinç, 2012)
http://www.reflectionturkey.com/?p=671
(Belge, 2011)
http://bianet.org/english/women/130607-women-policies-erased-from-political-agenda
norms are being propagated in the society. Hence, under the pressure of religious values, only secondary roles are ascribed to women. Therefore, the guidance of these faith-based offices serves to propagation of Islamist norms and, consequently, submission of women to the patriarchal religious system (Arat, 2010, p.882).

The propagation of Islamist norms and emphasis on the family constitute obstacles against female empowerment by the representative of the CHP Woman Branch, Ayşe, who pinpointed that when women face problems vis-à-vis the family, the remedies that are offered to them are shaped by the religious and conservative discourse (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1). The same representative illustrated this back-up of the conservative discourse with religiosity by the orientation services given to women within a conservative and religious perspective; and in this context; she highlighted the ‘aile irşatları’\textsuperscript{145} that were established and run by Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Diyanet\textsuperscript{146}, 2010, p.24) (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1). In these orientation offices, according to the CHP Women Branch representative, the inquiries are answered with reference to the verses from the Qur’an. She asserted that the main debate focuses on the reduction of the place of woman to the family, so the women issue is discussed only within the family perspective.

Even though in the last decade, women in Turkey have been mostly limited by those two options (home as a mother versus cheap labour conditions...

\textsuperscript{145} Aile İrşat ve Rehberlik Büroları: Family and Guidance Offices
Initially, in 2003, at six pilot cities, there were these family and guidance offices. As of 2009, the number reached to 53 (Diyanet, 2010, p.24).

\textsuperscript{146} Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı: Presidency of Religious Affairs
in terms of employment opportunities), it does not mean that the AKP has been a non-friendly political party towards women. Indeed, the AKP has attracted women since 2002, according to A&G and Konda Research’s surveys; women are more likely to vote for the AKP at both 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections (Konda Research, 2007, p.15; A&G Araştırma, 2007, p.7). Why has the AKP, a socially conservative party succeeded in getting women to its own side? Women’s support for the AKP has been well illustrated by the member from the CHP’s women branch, Ayşe. She argues that:

According to the concept of secularism, being pious was not bringing any additional benefits to the CHP. There has not been a political party where headscarved ladies had the opportunity to express themselves. ... However, the AKP addressed a larger base especially for women. ... Women in the AKP did not only become members because of their husbands, but because there was not any alternative place for them to express their opinions. According to a research in 2010, women who are between 20 and 25 years old, whose monthly income is less than 500TL or 1000TL, whose education is defined by the 8-year obligatory education, who are relatively conservative, who are on the edge of urbanization and who desire modernization, they do not know which party to vote for. There is a large segment like this. They (AKP) said to these women that “modernization is your right and I am with you”. That’s why votes for the AKP increased that much. But, still this segment is still searching. There is a social climbing. They do not belong completely to the AKP. Their decisions can change; they are looking for their own benefits (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Furthermore, during its ruling tenure, the AKP has kept answering to the needs of its female constituency by providing specific social projects to them. The AKP’s brochures together with the interviews I conducted with the members from the AKP women’s branch have often highlighted social policies, specifically the ones targeting women and children (Leyla and Derya, Appendix Part B, Table 1).
To be more specific, among the interviews that I conducted among the AKP women’s branches in İstanbul and Kadıköy, they emphasized the establishment of women’s health centres, disability funds for both disabled people and their mothers and cash aids only for women for their children’s education and health expenditures (e.g. vaccinations) (Leyla and Derya, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Thus, even though the congruence between socially conservative policies and a neoliberal economic agenda look initially contradictory, indeed both of them work in harmony. Women living on the peripheries of the urban areas have been enjoying AKP’s socially conservative policies which target women’s health and their children’s health as well as their social life. In this way, since AKP’s socially conservative policies outweigh the negative repercussions of the cheap, unsafe labour conditions, since AKP’s policies bring safety to their home lives, women feel safer and they keep forming the female constituency of the AKP.

In sum, women are encouraged by the AKP to work at labour-intense and female-based occupations. The vocational training courses at local level also orient women towards these female-based occupations which can be done at home and at female-dominant sectors. This cheap, insecure female-dominated labour occupation not only fit in with the requirements of the neoliberal economic setting, but also with the traditional roles of women, to motherhood within the patriarchal system since flexible works allow women to reconcile both work and house work. The AKP within its conservative ideology often advocates the role of woman within the family and importance of motherhood.
Consequently, the AKP makes use of the alliance of neo-liberalism and social conservatism in accordance with its own worldview.

In addition, emphasis on family and religious values has become dominant in providing remedies for women’s (e.g. domestic violence) and/or family problems. Lastly, even though the AKP’s socially conservative policies and its neoliberal agenda look contradictory, they do not form a contradictory scheme for the female constituency of the AKP. Despite the cheap and unsafe labour conditions, women feel safer due to the AKP’s policies targeting the specific needs of women. Thus, women keep supporting the AKP at the ballot box.

5.2.2 The Social Assistance Policies of the AKP and their Impact on its Electoral Consolidation

In the previous section, I sought to demonstrate how the policies related to female employment have developed during the AKP’s tenure by pinpointing contradictory set of the AKP’s policy agenda. In this section, I will analyse the main developments related to the social security in Turkey. Within the social security theme, there are three main headlines (pensions, health insurance and social assistance) (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.213).

For this project, I will focus only on specific area related to the social security provisions or in other words social assistance. Through this section, I will first give the historical account of the social security system in Turkey. Then, I will document legislative changes related to the social assistance policies during the AKP’s tenure. I will then discuss how these new legislations and projects on social assistance have impacted on the society as well as on its
electoral consolidation within the party system. Finally, I will evaluate the social assistance policies of the AKP from a clientelistic perspective and continuity in a grievance in the society.

Before moving to the AKP’s social assistance policies, it is important to summarize the evolution of the welfare system in Turkey. During the single-party period, the fight against poverty was not considered to be the responsibilities of the state. Social help mostly occurred through institutions of benevolence. The origin of these (benevolent) institutions (“vakıf”) can be traced far back to the Ottoman era, but they have preserved, despite the religious values they cherish, their importance also in the Republican era. These institutions, however, were no more independent from the state; their activities took place under the state guidance (Buğra, 2008, p.98).

Thus, although statism was well one of the fundamental pillars of the state ideology, it did not comprise the poverty issue. The founders of Republic and other notables regarded the poverty as a rural problem, i.e., a problem of peasants who, though forming the majority of society, were deliberately kept by the state at their villages (Buğra, 2008, p.98). Furthermore, during the single-party period, there was no rights-based approach; poor people were considered to be responsible for their own poverty (Buğra, 2008, p.98).

On the other hand, there was already a social security system in the early Republican era, also having its roots in the Ottoman Empire (Buğra, 2008, p.100). This system mainly comprised state retirement funds for public servants, but the private sector of that time also had its funds for pension expenditures.

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147 Statism is one of the pillars of the state ideology, but it never adopted policies associated to welfare state idea.
The welfare system in the 1940s and 1950s was influenced by the ideas of solidarity which prevailed in the immediate Post-World War II period and international agreements, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and Convention No.102 on the Minimum Norms of the Social Security (1952)).

Consequently, the SSK (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu - Social Insurance Institution) for all workers and private sector employees was set up in 1946. This was followed by the establishment of a retirement/social security fund for public servants: the ES (Emekli Sandığı - Government Employees Retirement Fund) in 1952. Another noteworthy improvement was, after the adoption of the multi-party system, the establishment of the Ministry of Labour in 1945 (Buğra, 2008, p.160).

After 1960s, the debate on social security issues assumed ideological character; the discussions were accordingly made in the framework of left-right divide (Buğra, 2008, p.178). This contentious period, however, produced in 1971 another comprehensive social security institution, i.e., the Bağ-Kur (Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar ile Diğer Bağımsız Çalışanlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu - Social Security Organization of Craftsmen, Tradesmen and Self-Employed). Another important development occurred in the 1970s: introduction of the Law (No.2022) on Payment of Pension to the Elderly People in Need (65 years old and over). This law was the first regulation on social assistance which was state-based and had a distinct coverage (Metin, 2011, p.186).

In the mid-1980s, the law no: 3294 Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Teşvik Kanunu (the Encouragement of Social Assistance and Solidarity Law) was introduced in order to emphasize rights-based social provisions. The aim of this law was to
enhance a more equitable redistribution and to encourage social assistance and solidarity. Through this legislation, the government attempted to place people who were devoid of any social security in a social security programme. Moreover, based on this law, the SYDTF (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışmayı Teşvik Fonu - Social Solidarity Fund) was established and administrated by a general secretary under the Prime Ministry (Metin, 2011, p.186).

In the 1990s, an important development occurred during the coalition government of the centre-right wing party (DYP) and the centre-left party (SHP): with the introduction of the Green Card System that allowed people without access to formal means of human security system to benefit from certain services of the state health and social welfare institutions (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.213). Moreover, on an ideological basis, the projects related to social security in 1990s and in early 2000s were implemented in line with the IMF’s requirements (e.g. June 1998 Staff Monitoring Agreement148, 23rd December 1999 Standby Agreement149, 18th January 2002 Stand-by Agreement150) (Erdoğdu, 2010, p.662).

As pointed in the background chapter, the AKP government adhered firmly to the requirements of the IMF, and also made another stand-by agreement with the IMF in 2005.151 Based on this 19th Stand-by agreement with

151 (IMF, 2005)
the IMF, the AKP government started to make necessary reforms on social security. Therefore, developments during the AKP’s ten-year tenure did not come out of blue; indeed they revealed a continuity that was, in particular, observed in social aid and welfare as reflection of the international agreements requiring a minimum involvement of state in social policies (Erdoğan, 2010, p.662).

Even though the AKP period has been in continuity with this historical background; it is also characterized by some important distinctions. These distinctions were based on the increasing social provisions provided through state-operated mechanisms by prioritizing social solidarity concepts rather than citizenship rights. In addition, after its first legislative electoral victory, the AKP had to deal rigorously with poverty and deprivation which had attained a severe degree after the economic crisis of 2001 (Buğra, 2008, p.218). As mentioned before, the SYDTF used to operate under the Prime Ministry as a secretary. In 2004, it was restructured as a general directorate and it acquired a more institutionalized form as the SYGM (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Genel Müdürlüğü - General Directorate for Assistance and Solidarity) (Metin, 2011, p.188).

The AKP is distinguished from the previous centre-right parties in terms of its social solidarity concept, wrapped in Islamic colours. Furthermore, it is argued that the AKP’s market-based economic policies have not been in contradiction with the AKP’s benevolent social policies, given that the destructive and depriving market economy agenda necessitates these benevolent

social policies charity remedies (Çelik, 2010a, p.65). As a consequence, its social solidarity concept with values of social conservatism came into sight in the institutional arrangements (e.g. World Bank, IMF) which suitably fitted the neoliberal economic agenda (Erdoğdu, 2010, p.684; Köse and Bahçe, 2010, p.495).

As mentioned above, in 2004, the AKP made amendments to the existing law (no.3294) and introduced the law (no.5263) in order to link the SYDTF as a general directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity to the Prime Ministry (SYGM, 2012). Thus, it was called as the SYGM (Sosyal Yardımlar ve Dayanışma Genel Müdürlüğü - General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity). In addition, with the law number 3294, the law allowed the SYGM to establish foundations SYDV (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakıfları - Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations).

Thus, according to article 19 of the law (no.3294), the SYGM obtained the authority to establish foundations in each province and district in order to provide aid (in cash and in goods) (SYDV, 2012). In addition, the governors of the civilian administrations (müلكi idare amirleri) are presidents of these foundations.

I will now discuss the AKP’s reforms related to social assistance from a clientelistic perspective. The political clientelism, by definition, means “the distribution of selective benefits to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support” (Hopkin, 2006, p.2). In the AKP’s case, it is

152 (SYGM, 2012)
153 (SYDV, 2012)
argued that through this new social assistance scheme, the NGOs and local governments started to play a key role in social assistance services. However, the interesting part of the scheme was the act of channelling the social assistance to the NGOs and the local governments. More importantly, through this scheme, the state started to act like an NGO by establishing itself as a benevolent foundation (Metin, 2011, p.95). A representative of the AKP, Hasan, also highlighted to me the distribution of aid through these foundations:

We detect the poor people through the governorship, headmen. Then, we provide fuel aid. Through social assistance foundations, we provide various grants ... we contribute to children’s educational expenditures. In addition, we give credits through state banks. We give a lot of credits through social assistance foundations. We provide them with opportunities (Hasan, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

During the AKP’s tenure, the social assistance institutions which have increased their activities most have been those institutions which were covered under the SYDTF law. In this scheme, the state has established an organized network of foundations in order to deal with the poverty problem. Even though aid was provided from state resources, the SYDVs which behaved as benevolent NGOs appeared to act on behalf of the AKP as an extension of its political continuity (Metin, 2011, p.191).

The SYGM and its Fund Councils154 were naturally expected to operate on objective grounds; however, given the difficulty of auditing, the SYDVs’ activities were open to political influence155 (Metin, 2011, p.191).

154 The income of the SYGM’s Fund comes from: 10 % of the funds which were established or will be established according to laws and decrees; 2.8 % of the collection of income and institutional tax revenues; 50% of the traffic penalties; 15% of the RTÜK’s; other allowances; donation and aids are transferred to the SYDT Fund. The income of the fund approached 1.6 billion in TL in 2007 (Çelik, 2010, p.76).
Another problematic side of this issue is considered to be the SDYGM’s bias for canalising transfers to its foundations. It is observed that during the first ruling period of the AKP, the transfers from the SYGM to its foundations are significantly higher than the other transfers (the ones to the KYK (Kredi ve Yurtlar Kurumu - Credit and Dormitories Foundation) and to Ministry of Health) (Köse and Bahçe, 2010, p.506). The transfers from the budget to the SYGM were further highlighted by one AKP representative, Abdullah, who perceived these transfers as a result of the AKP’s good governance as compared to previous governments before the AKP. In this context, he asserted that:

Before, people who were dealing with those affairs (social), used to spend the budget for the wrong purposes. ... Now, the AKP works in a disciplined way and money allocated to this scheme becomes a larger sum and is redistributed to the nation. ... So, for instance imagine, there are large sums of money which come from the national lottery or from horse racing.... These are directly transferred... to the social assistance... In addition, all the aid is currently being organized and gathered under one roof in order to make this scheme automated (Abdullah, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

It is also argued that the SYGM has become one of the important bases for the AKP’s biased social assistance politics. The subjectivity of the policies is emphasized by the fact that the majority of foundations have a discriminatory approach in providing aid as a distinct political support (Köse and Bahçe, 2010, p.506). Indeed, the majority of these foundations display a religious and conservative stance, also raising doubt over the objectivity of the operations.

Similarly to Köse and Bahçe’s reference, Çelik also emphasizes the biased side of the distribution of fund resources in terms of social assistance

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155 Historical Account of this Fund: By the end of 1990s, the regulations within this fund were not taken very seriously. Accumulated amount under this fund was sometimes used as a fund transfer to budget in order to finance other deficits. In 1995, the accumulated money in the SYDT fund was 32.5 billion TL. Only 3.4 billion TL was used for people in need (Buğra, 2008, p.212).
through foundations (Çelik, 2010a, p.506). The distribution of aid occurred in line with the directives of the civilian authority appointed by the AKP government, i.e., the governor of the province, who as the director of the fund took decision. The detection of people in need and aid amount were thus also open to political influence (Çelik, 2010a, p.76).

The economic activities of local administrations demonstrated an important increase in the areas of social assistance. The main reason is the development of neo-liberal economic understanding. Therefore, during the AKP’s tenure, the poverty problem was assigned to the NGOs on the one hand, and on the other hand, to general benevolence (Metin, 2011, p.195). Also, in another way, the poverty problem was assigned to the local administrations. Thus, social assistance was transformed into a tool for political continuity through the mediation of local administrations and municipalities (Metin, 2010, p.196).

The importance of party’s local governments on the social assistance was also highlighted during my interviews in which emphasis was placed on the mode of the distribution policies. Selma from the NGO called Başak Sanat Vakfı emphasized that the implementation of these social policies was realized mainly through the intermediation of the organization/party organization (teşkilat/parti teşkilati) (Selma, Appendix Part B, Table 1). Indeed, this was not

156 Başak Sanat Vakfı - Başak Culture and Art Foundation: “It aims to carry out various activities to discover, support and promote artistic abilities of poor and/or low-paid young people and to eliminate difficulties they face in building their personal capacity. It is also aimed at orienting young people to be more productive in taking part in the social life as healthy individuals and engaging in scientific research in the field of culture and art” (Başak Sanat Vakfı, 2011). http://www.basaksanatvakfi.org.tr/basak/index.php/workshops-mainmenu-39/39?task=view
surprising, since the majority of local governments were being controlled by the AKP. 

In addition, the AKP’s roots in the Milli Görüş contributed to the party’s success in social policies because within this vision, the highly emphasized benevolence and charity understanding underpinned social assistance approach (Metin, 2011, p.193). Indeed, they have been particularly successful in mobilizing charitable donations and channelling them to impoverished people (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.224). 

In addition to Milli Görüş’s impact on the AKP’s social assistance scheme, the repetition of vote distribution of the AKP at both legislative and local elections is emphasized. Possession of both local and legislative administration contributed to the concentration and activation of party mentality within the whole country (Metin 2011, p.196). 

In addition to this representation of party mentality at the legislative level, it is argued that most AKP municipalities are formed by units which provide social assistance similar to the SYDTF (Metin, 2011, p.196). Through these units, social assistance (e.g. food, housing, fuel for heating) is distributed based on needs that are not well defined or not merit-based. This has made social assistance schemes undermining of other sources of authority. For example, the headman of a neighborhood told me: 

We are the headman of a region and we come from the society. We are independent people and we are not linked to any political party. In our country, muhtars can bring democracy in the most transparent way. A muhtar knows everyone in a neighborhood: the ones who go to military service, the educational levels of children and they also live in this same area. However, those ones (referring to the AKP) make agreements with their supporters, their partisan constituencies. So, if you ask me how many people get social aid in my
neighborhood, I can’t give any reliable answer because they hide this information. If you claim that you advocate a social state policy, it has to be transparent. Among the institutions, it is important to know if the families which receive social assistance, do really need this aid or not. It has to be explained, information has to be provided. This is the most important difficulty we have. They take into consideration the neighborhood leaders of parties rather than a person which is elected through democratic means. Hence, representatives from a ruling political party or local government… whoever they say, they get into a dialogue through a network and as a result of interviews that they do, they distribute aid to the persons they find suitable. The problem is not about their political ideologies. We only want a transparent service approach to the society. So, the party’s (referring to the AKP) neighborhood units evaluate and locate the places for the distributions of aid and then they chose the ones which are suitable for them. Us, muhtars, we don’t participate in this evaluation and locating process so we don’t participate in those meetings and interviews. Only these people who will take aid have to get a paper approving their poverty from us. However, there is no scheme for measuring poverty levels. We have to get access to states’ websites and we have to see, we have to be able to research their concrete and moral connections in order to realize if a citizen is poor and aggrieved. Because we don’t see how poor they are, we provide them poverty papers according to their own declarations. Then, it does not become transparent (Mustafa, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

For instance, it is argued that food aid and aid for heating fuel in Ankara reached 400,000 people. Previously, in 2001, the same aid used to reach 37,000; later in 2002; it reached 180,000 people and in 2006; it reached to 365,000 (Yıldırım, 2010, p.102). This increase in the number of people that have access to social assistance justifies the parallelism between the local government aid and the aid by the government (Metin, 2011, p.196).

The parallelism between the aid and the increase in the votes of the AKP seems to justify our argument on the clientelistic network as one of the main reasons for AKP’s consolidation. Çelik (2010a, p.69) argues that this clientelistic network has flourished because the AKP government prefers, instead of implementation of a social state, rather to adhere to a benevolent approach which
is disorganized, informal and under the influence and orientation of party mechanism. The AKP is clientelist, Çelik (2010a) asserts, because between the citizen and power-ruling power, it does not establish a connection of rights-responsibilities, instead a clientelistic. The citizen takes the aid and in return supports the party; it returns it as a vote (Çelik, 2010a, p.69). This vote buying process and widening the party’s constituency was often mentioned during the interviews that I conducted with the the AKP, the business groups and the CHP representatives.157

To be more concise, a member of the AKP main branch from İstanbul, Murat had implicitly emphasized the necessity of answering the needs of lower income segments of society and, hence, the absolute need for the development of the political mechanism when a political party wants to be a ruling government. He added that there is a desire to bring the thoughts of the society to the ruling government and thus the aim is to reach a wider social basis. For this, Murat said that the AKP promised a wealth increase to social groups who are living under the poverty line. Hence, he argued that the AKP has developed promises in order to answer to the demands of a large part of society (Murat, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Meanwhile, the representative of the TEB believed that:

… this social assistance is a strategy which is being used for its (AKP’s) own constituency because there is an assistance culture in Islam. Let’s say that they have exaggerated this existing social assistance. Besides, they have developed it as a propaganda element,

157 For instance, During my interview with Levent as a CHP Youth Branch representative in İstanbul, he had given me an apparently common example of the AKP aid; an old lady used to collect aid (food; coal for heating) from the AKP organization, in return, she used to feel felt obliged to give this aid back through voting to AKP even though she was not a particular admirer partisan of the party (Levent, Appendix Part B, Table 1).
as a strategy for their own partisan constituency (Mehmet, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Similarly, Ayşe from the CHP women branch considered this distribution of goods and services to people as a means of attracting persons to the AKP in an illegitimate way (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

In addition, Çelik (2010a) asserts that this clientelistic relationship carries paternalistic characteristics, since it limits collective rights, and it restrains organization and inculcates obedience (Çelik, 2010a, p.70). Similar to Bahçe and Köse (2010), Çelik (2010a) considers main tools of the AKP as the Green Card, municipalities, SYDTF, private sector, benevolent entities; communities; foundations. Making use of the state resources, the AKP contributes to relieve the lives of poor and lowest classes, and gets the credit as a benevolent entity (Çelik, 2010a, p.70).

Despite this clientelistic side of these policies related to the social assistance, these policies addressed the needs of the lowest strata. As pointed out in the previous chapter 4 on the social bases of the AKP, it is a cross-strata alliance party, receiving votes from both the richest and lowest social strata. Unemployed people and people who do not have regular employment contribute dramatically to the votes of the AKP and as pointed out in the chapter 4, this cross-strata coalition contributed to the emergence of the AKP in 2002.

Çelik’s statements observations on the clientelistic side seem to have been confirmed; it can also be found on Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement that expressed his disappointment over the outcome of the local elections of 2009 in Antalya. The prime minister Erdoğan’s statement after the elections of 2009 demonstrate his expectation of votes due to his support for Antalya municipality:

“I find enormously the outcome of the local elections as a very abnormal one. I went personally 28 times to Antalya for the inauguration of services. During our tenure period, Antalya has seen services that it has never seen during its history. This means that they do not acknowledge our services. I saw this. That’s why I am sad” (En son haber, 2009).

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As pointed out in the background chapter, the AKP inherited an economy that had just come out of a severe crisis and revealed socio-economic structure’s characteristics with deepened problems of poverty and unemployment. In this way, when the AKP came into power, its first responsibility was to reduce impact of the negative outcomes of the crisis at the societal level. In its struggle against socio-economic problems, such poverty and unemployment illustrates the way social policies should be taken in hand (Boratav, 2009, cited in Metin, 2011, pp.193-194).

Even though these transfers can be considered as populist, they have influenced the lives of people within the country during the first ruling period of the AKP. For instance, the cash transfers from the SYGM to the poor families occurred under the condition that poor families sent their young children to school; pass them through health control and vaccinate them (Buğra, 2008, p.234). People who benefited from this scheme during the first tenure of the AKP as a proportion to the country population was 3%, and this ratio was more than 14% in the Eastern region and South Eastern region. It can be thought of as a reason for the serious increase in the votes of the AKP in the legislative elections of 2007 (Buğra, 2008, p.234).

This positive side of social aid was highlighted in the interviews that I conducted with representatives from the AKP youth branch and the AKP İstanbul main branch headquarters. For example, an AKP representative called Zehra told me:

Society suffered a lot during those periods, so people asked for a helper, someone who saves them from this painful period. I listened to the discourse of Tayyip Erdoğan, as he was saying this... “I can’t correct everything promptly; you have to give me 2 to 3 years”. ...
They (the AKP) did most of their social policies during the second term (Zehra, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

She further added that:

If you can’t provide jobs for people, then you have to provide something else given that the country was going through a recovery process. ... I don’t know if (they were implementing this approach) for votes or something else. But, from this stance, it is good… At least, they work, at least they provide your momentary needs. For a real social state, they have to give you a job, goods, everything you need. Since they can’t give you everything you need, at least it is necessary to fulfill partially your needs. If they don’t do the real social state part, if they don’t provide aid, then there may have worse situations (Zehra, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Similar to Zehra, the representative of the AKP from the main branch İstanbul, Murat, called this type of social assistance as emergency interventions. The main remedy is to help underprivileged segments of society. He added that if a part of society is hungry, then the aim is to get food to them now as the results of investment projects will take longer. He believes that such social plans need to go through foundations and institutions which are visible on the media (Murat, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Thus, as pointed out by the representatives from the AKP (Zehra and Murat), in this post-crisis context, underprivileged people needed aid more than ever. The AKP addressed the demand of these people despite the drawbacks of the system. Thus, the AKP’s consolidation and attraction of its votes from the poor was not surprising on the basis of this type of policies.

The AKP has not managed to completely eradicate poverty from the country, given that it receives an important amount of votes from the lowest strata. In addition, when the data is analysed on the income inequality
(Aktifhaber, 2012; Turkish Weekly News, 2012)\textsuperscript{159}, it is seen that the divide between the poor and rich inequality has widened during the AKP’s period. As with this continuation of poverty, it is also argued that the AKP will not eradicate the poverty since it is getting important votes from the aggrieved segments of the society. Therefore, the AKP would prefer to keep up with a benevolent charity system through a foundation mechanism, rather than a social rights-based system (Çelik, 2010a, pp.79-80). As a result, the emphasis on the benevolent system seems to be the main reasons behind the AKP’s consolidation within the electoral system.

Furthermore, through the AKP’s social assistance scheme, the struggle against poverty can be to some extent overcome. Thus, the AKP’s tangible projects (food aid) influence the daily lives of the poor; thus, voters at the lowest strata vote for the projects which relieve them. However, this type of struggle (through poverty alleviation programmes) does not eradicate completely poverty; instead it reinstates the poverty (Metin, 2011, p.195). In this context, where poverty and inequality are so deep rooted and insecurity increased, urgent relief projects only increase the labour workers’ misery and the poor’s need and dependency (Çelik, 2010a, p.80).

Similar to Çelik (2010a), a member of the CHP Youth Branch, İbrahim argued that the AKP’s social policies were designed as a tool to make people dependent on the party:

\ldots between 2002 and 2010, the AKP exploited poor people living in shanty towns, \ldots and accommodated them to the charity culture, rather

\textsuperscript{159} (Aktifhaber, 2012)
http://www.aktifhaber.com/turkiyede-gelir-dagiliminda-ucurum-662271h.htm
(Turkish Weekly News, 2012)

277
than coming up with solutions. It took them (referring to the poor) and registered them for assistance funds and caused the bureaucracy which is formed for assistance funds to collapse. Today, as far as I know, there are 14 types of assistance funds, these are the ones that I known of. For instance, one citizen may be receiving funds from 4 different bureaucratic funds whereas another is being forgotten. But, the AKP did this for its own followers; it did it for its own political aims. So, it said that “I am not going to solve those people’s problems. I dont have such a goal. These people’s unsolved problems are important for me”. ... So, this is a complete rent-seeking account, not a social policy. Social policy is not like this. In addition, the gap between the richest and poorest layers of society has drastically increased during the AKP’s ten years in office. Thus, the AKP attempts to solve the social security problem by offering mini-solutions to those people who live in despair. It deliberately avoids challenging specific problems in apprehension of possible reactions of its constituency (İbrahim, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Similar to the perceptions of both İbrahim and Mustafa above, the representative from the TOBB asserted that this social assistance scheme has to be rights-based (Vedat, Appendix Part B, Table 1). He added that currently there are too many types of aid: there is aid from foundations, from municipalities and from state and there is no evaluation of these schemes, nor is there a possibility to measure how poor someone is (Vedat, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Moreover, a representative from the NGO Başak Sanat Vakfı indicated that poverty wages make people still more dependent on charity-based policies, and that these people bear many hardships in order to retain their wages. She added that such underprivileged people are made to believe that any aid is a favour (lütf) for them (Selma, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

The drawbacks of the system, take us back to the research question of why the votes for the AKP still remain so high; and if the income equality is still high, to the question of people still vote for the AKP at the elections of 2011.
Despite the critiques towards the AKP’s policies, Buğra (2011) emphasizes that also previously the social assistance system had not been rights-based. Therefore, she argues that the AKP’s system aimed to relieve the lives of the poor that have never benefited from the rights-based social assistance fund. In this context, they do not get liberated from the poverty through alms. Still, for people who do not know how to feed their children (given the poverty for children is really high in Turkey), they cannot say no to that aid (Buğra, 2011). This statement also is supported by results of a pre-election survey (2011) according to which 65.4% of the voters agree that social assistance bring votes to the political parties (Çevikcan, 2011).160

In addition, a more recent pre-election survey demonstrates that the third satisfactory project of the incumbent party is considered to be the accomplishments in social assistance (on a scale of 100, the satisfaction with improvements in social assistance reached to 55.9) (Genar Araştırma, 2011a, p.49).161 In another survey which was conducted in November 2011, satisfaction with improvements in social assistance reached to 66.6% on a scale of 100 (Sabah, 2011).162

In summary, the AKP government has brought about changes to social assistance which already exists as a specific fund. Due to institutional scheme of the SYGM, the auditing of the foundations and the fund is quite difficult; therefore, the system is open to political influence. The same scheme does not

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160 (Çevikcan, 2011)
161 (Genar Araştırma, 2011a, p.49)
162 (Sabah, 2011)
give assurance regarding the distribution of aid (cash or goods) according to a merit-based approach. In addition, through this scheme, the AKP government does not establish a connection of rights-responsibilities between citizens and ruling power. Instead, it asserts a clientelistic scheme through which the citizen takes aid and in return, supports the party.

Despite these drawbacks, the AKP’s social assistance keeps satisfying underprivileged groups who constitute a wide segment in society (TÜİK, 2012). As a result, despite its drawbacks, the AKP government’s social assistance projects are critical for this wide segment of society. In this context, the AKP’s consolidation of its ruling tenure through increasing social assistance does not seem to be an unreasonable claim.

5.2.3 Policies of Health Care of the AKP and their Impact on the AKP

As with the changes in the social security and social assistance, during the AKP’s tenure, the projects related to the health care system have been influenced by the neoliberal economic agenda of the AKP, as well as the international agreements with the IMF and the World Bank. For this section, I will give first changes and reforms implemented during the AKP in Health System by comparing them with the past. After the presentation of facts related to health care, I will elaborate how the health care reforms have impacted on society, and in turn on the consolidation of the AKP. While doing this analysis, I will also take into consideration the underpinning characteristics of the AKP which are neoliberal agenda, privatization and populist side of its projects.

163 Given the whole population’s 18% live under the poverty limit, the importance of social assistance is crucial (TÜİK, 2012).
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=10902
Since the beginning of the AKP’s emergence, many reforms have been implemented for the health care system. Consequently, the Turkish health care as well as welfare system have gone through a significant transformation. In this section, my primary aim is to look at the changes in health care system. However, since the health care and welfare systems are highly interrelated, I will also include the aspects of welfare system related to healthcare.

When the reforms in both health and social security areas and the factors behind them are analysed, it may be seen that they did not either come out of blue during the AKP’s tenure. Indeed, the roots of the reformist policies of the AKP go back to 1980s and 1990s and, as pointed out by scholars, this was already an ongoing process in the Turkish social security and health scheme (Hamzaoğlu and Yavuz, 2010, p.639; Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.225). The AKP’s accomplishment was the effective implementation of the social projects that had been previously prepared in line with the requirements of the World Bank, IMF and the WTO (Hamzaoğlu and Yavuz, 2010, p.652).

Health care in Turkey used to be dominated by a centralized state system run by the Ministry of Health. In 2003, the governing AKP introduced a sweeping health program aimed at increasing the ratio of private to state health care services and making health care available to a larger share of the population.

Private healthcare has blossomed in Turkey in the last decades as reaction to the long queues and lack of personal service in state-run hospitals. Private hospitals have nowadays contracts with various insurance companies that offer to the holders of private insurance better health care services. Through the
health reform, it is observed that the health care reforms have also increased the efficiency in the state-owned hospitals as compared to the private hospitals (Gök and Sezen, 2011, p.137).

Indeed, the AKP’s tenure is characterized with important legislative achievements in the area of health and social security. According to the law (No.5283), some public institutions and agencies were transferred to Ministry of Health. As a result of this unification, access to university hospitals as well as to private hospitals began to be provided to each citizen (Akdağ, 2010, p.23).

The respective legislation that has been compiled under the Social Security Reform (2008) comprises two already enacted laws and a draft law. The first of the enacted laws is the Social Security Institution Law\(^{164}\) (No.5502\(^{165}\)) that has come into effect in 2006 and resulted in the reorganization of the three previous social security institutions, i.e., the SSK, the ES and Bağ-kur, under the SGK (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu - Social Security Institution) (OECD, 2008, p.44). For a long time, the separation of health benefits according to employment status used to lead to important differences of coverage and quality among three different institutions (Aybars and Tsarouhas, 2010, p.754).

This legislative arrangement aimed to eliminate the discordance arising from the rather uncoordinated operations of three different independent governmental organisations that actually were in charge of the same mission. The aim of this health care programme was to increase the quality in health care

\(^{164}\) (Mevzuat, 2006) Law No.5502

\(^{165}\)“In 2006, Law 5502 was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. This law, which was meant to accompany Law 5510 (Law on Social Security and Universal Health Insurance), aimed at unifying the three different social security and health insurance schemes (SSK, Bağ-Kur and Emekli-Sandiği) into one unified social security institute” (OECD, 2008, p.47).
system by allowing a faster, more efficient and equitable delivery of social services (Akdağ, 2010, p.3; Deloitte166, 2010).

In addition to the Social Security Institution Law, in 2008, the Social Insurance and General Health Insurance Law (No.5510) has brought all citizens of the Republic of Turkey (plus asylum-seekers and foreigners (who stay more than one year) without an insurance in their home country) under health insurance coverage. The third supplementary legislation, i.e., the Sosyal Yardımlar ve Primsiz Ödemeler Kanunu (Social Assistance and Welfare Payment Law), once enacted, will complete the process of the Social Security Reform (İş ve Sosyal Güvenlik, 2008).167 It is envisioned to provide governmental support to elderly, disabled or lone individuals or such with a documentable income that is below one third of the minimum wage (İş ve Sosyal Güvenlik, 2008).

Within the context of the historical evolution of the Turkish health care system, it is important to recollect the introduction of the Green Card168 scheme in 1992. As aforementioned, the Green Card scheme had been introduced in order to provide health services to poor people who did not benefit from any social assistance programme “either as direct contributors or dependants” (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.223). This scheme and, in general, Turkish health care system attained completion with the adoption of the Social Insurance and General Health Insurance Law that also covers the Green Card holders

166 (Deloitte, 2010)
167 (İş ve Sosyal Güvenlik, 2008)
168 Green Cards: Health care entitlements are issued to Turkish citizens who are not unable to pay for their health services. In order to be entitled to the green card, they have to declare their revenues in a detailed way (Kısa and Younis, 2006, p.766).
As of 1st January 2012, the Green Card Programme was integrated to the General Insurance (İş ve Sosyal Güvenlik, 2012).

A further important development occurred in the health care system, affecting the health care workers more than patients: the full-time employment law (tam gün yasası). The full-time employment law (No.5947) concerns medical doctors who work both at the university or public hospitals and additionally in their private praxis or private clinics. Under the new legislation (No.5947), doctors are obliged to work full-time at the university/public hospitals, that is, to opt either for the academy/government or private sector (Akdağ, 2010, p.23). Before the AKP’s tenure, the percentage of the physicians without private affiliations was 11% in December, 2002. After the implementation of the regulation that introduced performance-based additional payment, this percentage became 89% in July, 2010. One month after the partial approval of the full-time law by the Constitutional Court, the ratio reached to 92% (Akdağ, 2010, p.124).

In addition to legislative improvements, the AKP government has introduced several tacit arrangements that facilitate life for patients. During the AKP’s tenure, considerable increases were attained in health care budget, number of hospital beds, emergency cars, and health centres (Akdağ, 2010, p.39, pp.42-43 and pp.75-76).

Health service facilities provided to the Green Card holders were also extended. Previously, the Green Card programme did not cover medicines but

(Mevzuat, 2008).\textsuperscript{169} As of 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2012, the Green Card Programme was integrated to the General Insurance (İş ve Sosyal Güvenlik, 2012).

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\textsuperscript{169} (Mevzuat, 2008)
\textsuperscript{170} In 2010, the Constitutional Court did not approve some of the articles of the full-time employment law (Akdağ, 2010, p.124).
only doctors and hospital visits (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.223). In 2005, outpatient care and pharmaceuticals were provided to Green Card holders.\footnote{171} In 2006, the pharmaceutical positive list\footnote{172} was integrated across all health insurance schemes, including that of Green Card holders (Yıldırım and Yıldırım, 2011, p.187). The SGK patients qualified for getting their medicines from the free contract pharmacies (AKP Brochure, 2007, p.14). Medicaments and/or medical material were provided to hospitalize patients directly by the hospital administration instead of by their attendants, as is the case now (AKP Brochure, 2011, p.23).

Additionally, the KDV (Katma Değer Vergisi - Value added tax) at medicament prices was reduced, and additional regulations were introduced at the pricing system. These measures resulted in an important reduction in medicament prices (Akdağ, 2010, p.22).

Among the critical views regarding the AKP’s health policies, as with poverty alleviation, it has been argued that health policies are implemented in Turkey as a requirement of the international agreement with the IMF and the World Bank and to a lesser extent, with the EU. Yet it is also argued that these international agreements which are characterized by the neoliberal economic agenda have a market-driven approach, and omit rights-based social scheme. It is further argued that for countries that follow this global order, access to and benefit from health services is no longer rights-based, since the health sector is

\footnote{171}“The coverage of the green card has been widened for low-income groups; the health services and the pharmaceutical expenses of the green card holders within the scope of “outpatient services” are also now covered by the state” (Akdağ, 2010, p.22).
\footnote{172}“Positive list defines drugs that are reimbursed by public funds (positive list)” (Nguyen-Kim et al., 2005).
http://www.irdes.fr/EspaceAnglais/Publications/IrdesPublications/QES099.pdf
turning into a new and highly profitable sector of the global capitalism. Second, it has been asserted that in those countries where these profitable models are adopted, despite payment of their allowances, citizens do not get access to a health system as should be the case. As a result, at both national and global level, health conditions of societies are deteriorating (Sütlac, 2011).  

This act of omitting a rights-based system through the neoliberal requirements was also underlined by the representative of the Halk Evleri, Lale (Lale, Appendix Part B, Table 1) who made a critique of health care and social security systems from a historical perspective. She ascribed the flaws in these systems to the establishment of the neoliberal economic system since 1980s. She stated that the neoliberal system had already begun in the 1980s. She added that:

\[ \text{...The interventions to that effect actually began in the post-1980, in the post-1995 and in 2000s and continued by picking up the pace especially on two issues: education and health. Health, during the previous periods, represented, in particular, in people's minds the basic public services area. In order to draw this area into the free market, many international agreements were signed (international trade agreements with GATT, MAI, IMF and World Bank, respectively. These agreements with supplementary amendments were readily adopted, extended and rapidly implemented by the AKP (Lale, Appendix Part B, Table 1).} \]

In addition, regarding the lack of social rights within health sector, Buğra (2011) draws attention to the Green card programme. She emphasises that a scheme according to which, depending on their income, people are entitled to obtain health benefits, cannot be considered as a social-rights scheme. The

\[ ^{173} (\text{Sütlac, 2011}) \]

http://bianet.org/bianet/dunya/133213-saglik-alani-kapitalizmin-isgali-altinda

286
negative picture drawn above is shared by the representative of the Başak Sanat Vakfı, Selma, described the AKP’s health policies such as assistance to the poor and elderly; family aid and/or health care service to the Green Card holders as sheer show (Selma, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Additionally, the performance-based health system is criticized. In particular, the law on full-time employment law naturally caused great upheaval among health workers and medical doctors since the full-time increases the burden of health sector on the practitioners, doctors and health care workers. There are two main results of this increasing burden. First, the time provided to patient decreases and quality drops (Özcan, 2009).\textsuperscript{174} Second, the health care workers work under unsecure conditions with lower payments and within this scheme, so they are deprived of their basic rights (Çakır, 2010).\textsuperscript{175}

Accordingly, the TBB (Türk Tabipler Birliği - Turkish Medical Association) as very powerful pressure group has disapproved the procedure of full-time employment with the objection that it will bring unsecure working conditions to the health workers (TTB, 2010).\textsuperscript{176} They have been trying ever since with all means and also support from different circles the annulment of this legislation. Nonetheless, it should be admitted that the full-time employment law eliminated a source of conflict of interest in the health care system.

As with the TBB’s opinion, Selma from Başak Sanat Vakfı asserted that the public services were transformed into an economic sector (Selma, Appendix

\textsuperscript{174} (Özcan, 2009)
\textsuperscript{175} (Çakır, 2010)
\textsuperscript{176} (TTB, 2010)
Thus, hospitals were conceived of as sites of business where the primary concern was about the income and expenditures, and not the health and well-being of the patient. Accordingly, the performance was assessed in terms of the numbers of patient examinations, treatments and/or medical tests and the amount of income arising from these activities. Therefore, even though the AKP was proud of its reforms, the change in the working mentality and conditions, she said, had resulted in a loss of quality in health care. She added that even though formalities were reduced, doctors simply could not solve patients’ problems by only allowing about five minutes to each patient, due to the automated system (Selma, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Above, I have attempted to provide facts related to health care system and then the critique of the NGOs of the health care reforms. My aim now is to demonstrate how the AKP’s reforms on health care sector have impacted the AKP’s consolidation despite this critical stance.

First of all, similar to poverty alleviation case, the AKP’s reforms attempted to reach a broader part of the population. As mentioned in the poverty alleviation, a minority of society were highly protected by social benefits (in terms of pensions and access to health care) whereas the majority of the society used to remain deprived of these social benefits. Buğra (2011) asserts that despite the drawbacks of the health care system and lack of a rights-based social system, as compared to the past decades, currently, the majority of people have access to the health care system. Therefore, even though health care workers suffer from this new health care scheme, the majority of the society is satisfied with the developments in health care (Buğra, 2011). Therefore, the AKP’s re-
consolidation of its votes is, in part, linked to the amelioration of health care services for the majority of the society, which is the AKP’s core constituency.

The representative of the TOBB, Vedat (Appendix Part B, Table 1) further supported the view expressed by Buğra (2011) and asserted that there used to be a big gap between the number of highly protected people and the number of people without any social security adherence. Therefore, he argued that while trying to equalize them at the mid-point, protected people who are the minority tend to protest, whereas unprotected people who make up the majority are satisfied with the improved situation. Thus, he said, that the number of people who are satisfied with the health scheme is higher now since satisfaction with healthcare reform reflected the view of the masses rather than the minority (Vedat, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

While looking at the issue from the perspective of voters’ bases, the AKP’s core constituency is formed by this majority of unprotected people. The losers of the reformed health system, in turn, are the health care workers which do not make core constituency of the AKP. Therefore, even though before the elections of 2011, the AKP’s social policies were highly criticized by the oppositional groups such as the medical associations, they did not make any challenging impact on the outcome of the elections, since the majority was satisfied with the AKP’s policies in the health sector.

The satisfaction of the majority’s with changes in health sector is also confirmed by surveys. A&G survey on the health issues demonstrates that as of 2007, 62.7% of people are satisfied with the unification of the SSK and Public Hospitals, and they agree that this unification increased the quality in services
68.3% of people find the distribution of medications by the private pharmacies rather than social security institutions’ pharmacies as appropriate (A&G Araştırma, 2007b, p.7). Regarding full-time employment for health workers, 58.7% of people do not approve of those professors of medicine work in their private practise and/or in private hospitals (A&G Araştırma, 2007b, p.4). The reform in the health sector has often been emphasized in my interviews I conducted with various representatives of the AKP, the NGOs.

For example, a representative of the AKP from Kadıköy neighbourhood youth branch asserted that:

We asked them, ‘so, in health issues, is your mother still waiting in a queue at the hospital?’ We did it like that. Look, here are opportunities; come and learn from them. Let’s use this together (Faruk, Appendix, Part B. Table 1).

Furthermore, a high-ranking representative of the AKP, Abdullah, illustrated further the changes in the health sector with regards to the comprehensiveness of health insurance and health reforms for the advantage of the society. He asserted that:

Now, there is also general health insurance in Turkey. All of the citizens in Turkey now benefit from this insurance scheme. I administered the pilot in Diyarbakir. That’s when I understood what a great and expensive project it was. I was saying that it could not be implemented in Turkey easily. But, the AKP did it. For instance, for all the people having the SGK, now it is the same… You remember, in the past, there were many bureaucratic things, there were many procedures. Now, all of them were improved. Now, you give your Turkish Identity number, then you go to the consultation room; you give your identity number, you get your medications and you go back home. As I work at the university, I have been discussing a lot with medical doctors.

Now, this full-time employment law came out. This is really for the sake of the people. ... If a doctor works at the university, he/she works at the university and he/she can’t open his/her own clinic outside. ... In the past, they used to go to their own clinics in the afternoon. ... Thus, if you wanted the doctor to deal with you, you had to go to his own clinic and pay him extra money for the consultation. As a result of the full-time employment reform, the AKP removed this scheme. It was a really important thing. ... this is something for the people’s advantages (Abdullah, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

In addition, a more recent pre-election survey demonstrates that the most satisfactory project of the incumbent party is considered as to be the improvement in health care (on a scale of 100, the satisfaction with improvements in health care reached to 65.5) (Genar Araştırma, 2011a, p.49). In another survey which was conducted in November 2011, demonstrates that the improvement in health care reached to 77.6% on a scale of 100 (Sabah, 2011).

In addition, Buğra (2011) draws attention to the other political problems existing in the first half of 2011 and argues that imprisoned journalists or increasing terror activities do not have a significant impact on the choice of parties as compared to other tangible projects. This statement is also approved by Genar’s research, which found out that majority of people vote according to party’s accomplishments (86.4% on a scale of 100) (Genar Araştırma, 2011b, p.11).

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178 (Genar Araştırma, 2011a, p.49)
179 (Sabah, 2011)
180 (Genar, 2011b, p.11)
Consequently, despite the critique of the AKP’s health care policies, the majority of people take into account tangible social policies which affect their daily lives. This also is seen when the AKP’s brochures are taken into account, and it is understood that the AKP reinforces its tangible policies while making a comparative approach between past (2002) and (2011). Since people enjoy the tangible policies such as decrease in price of medications and easy access to doctors, they do not seem to be concerned about the social rights of health care workers and lack of social-rights policies (Çalışlar, 2011; Oxford Business Group, 2008). The public response to the AKP’s performance in health care has been, as to be expected, positive and also one of the decisive factors in the consolidation of the AKP’s political power. Such arrangements serve to impress the affected individuals, especially those who come from the lowest segment of the society.

By way of illustration, we may see the views of a middle-aged and low-skilled worker, Zeki, who works in a carpet shop in İstanbul. He explained that once health cards had to be changed six months and to get that formality done was each time very cumbersome for his old mother (Zeki, Appendix Part B, Table 1). However, he commented, now health care service can be obtained by presentation of the identity card number alone, thanks to reduced bureaucracy in the health care system. He added that for people who have to live under very

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181 (Çalışlar, 2011; Oxford Business Group, 2008)
182 The novelties in the health care system on account of the following benefits: reduction of queues, bureaucracies and medicament prices; easy access to hospitals and doctors; establishment of equitable health services; provisions providing children and individuals less than 18 years free access to health care facilities and the full-time employment law.
modest conditions solely tangible projects that address their needs count. The hot political debate (e.g. constitutional change; conflicts among ruling party and opposition parties) does not interest them at all. A representative from the Hak-İş trade union also highlighted the positive side of the reforms to the health scheme:

What the AKP said before it came in power, was that I will do houses and roads first... Its second project is the reform of the health sector. It was a big thing. What I saw there, the AKP targeted a project and followed through on this project. So, it did many health reforms. ...It completely destroyed the existing scheme. For instance, in health, the AKP... shut down the SSK .... Tayyip Erdoğan walks by seeing the picture (Nedim, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

In addition, wider accessibility to health centres was mentioned by various interviewees. Muzaffer from Kadıköy main branch asserted that a narrow group (e.g. pharmacists, health care workers) constitutes the losers in these health care reforms whereas a majority wins (Muzaffer, Appendix Part B, Table 1). Besides, the AKP main branch İstanbul, Murat, and deputy from the AKP, Naci, highlighted that previously, people were not able to get access to hospitals. Murat asserted that the ones who had money used to go to private hospitals and others used to suffer from both insufficient financial sources and long queues in the corridors of the hospitals. However, now the whole hospital system was organized (Murat and Naci, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Furthermore, similar to Murat and Naci, Zehra as an AKP member, expressed that:

For instance, in the past, you were not able to go to hospital. Now you can go to hospital. Now, all the private institutions and SSK institutions were merged and we can go to any of them. Actually, some things in the health sector are not perfect.... But, since 2002,
many things have really changed. Roads, health, and education; many things have changed... (Zehra, Appendix PartB, Table 1).

As a result, as with the AKP’s social assistance system, changes in health care sector have appealed to the majority of society which has been unable to access health care services. Therefore, improvements in health care sector have satisfied more than half of society. Despite the improvements for the majority of society, health care reforms have resulted in losses for health care workers. Nevertheless, given the health care workers do not constitute the main electorate basis of the AKP; it has not influenced the AKP’s electoral consolidation. Even though the AKP receives votes from each strata of society, since its policies fulfil the needs of the majority of the population, the AKP continues to sustain its electoral success at both the 2007 and 2011 elections.

5.3 Impact of the AKP’s Rights-Discourse on its Consolidation

My aim in this section is to demonstrate the phases that the AKP’s rights-discourse has gone through in the course of its tenure. To do this, I will first document the changes in the legislations, important reform packages and constitutional amendments during the AKP’s two tenures (2002-2010). I will then investigate in section 5.3.1.1 whether the AKP’s progressive discourse and its concrete legislative reforms have contributed to the AKP’s consolidation in legislative elections of 2007 or not. After the analysis of the first tenure, I will examine how the AKP’s second tenure’s democratic initiatives (for Kurds) and constitutional amendment have affected its electoral success in legislative elections of 2011.
5.3.1 Changes in Legislations, Reform Packages and Constitutional Amendments 2002-2010

Historically, the MGK played a vital role in the relations between the civil governments and the military since its inception in 1961. It was strengthened with additional powers after the military intervention 1980\(^{183}\) (Narlı, 2009, pp.441-442). As pointed out in the chapter 1, the MGK was also responsible for the post-modern coup of 1997. Although it had a mixed composition comprising the president of the state, chief of the general staff and members from both the council of ministers and general staff, it was always dominated by the military, with a high-ranked officer assuming the task of MGK secretary.

As indicated in the chapter 1, the AKP’s pro-EU discourse did not come out of blue; indeed, the preceding changes in the pro-Islamist discourse prepared the ground for the rise and flourishing of the AKP. With this change in the discourse, party elites thought they would be able to solve their problems vis-à-vis the military (Tanyıç, 2003, p.475). Following its electoral victory in 2002, regarding civil control over military, the AKP was keen to continue to

\(^{183}\) “Established after the 1960 coup, the MGK had the right to ‘recommend to the cabinet the necessary basic guidelines regarding ... decisions related to national security’. After the 1980 coup, the 1982 Constitution expanded the powers of the MGK. Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution established the MGK as a body with 10 members, evenly divided between civilians (the president, prime minister, and ministers of defense, internal affairs and foreign affairs) and military officers (the Chief of General Staff, the commanders of the army, navy and air force, and the general commander of the gendarmerie). Under Article 118, the Council of Ministers must consider, ‘with priority, the decisions of the MGK concerning necessary measures for the protection and independence of the state, the unity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society’. The MGK’s decisions were as powerful as decrees and they were more than recommendations to civilian parliamentarians and the executive” (Narlı, 2009, p.441-442).
implement the harmonisation packages\textsuperscript{184} that aimed to integrate the Turkish legislation into the EU legislation within the frame of the EU’s ‘\textit{acquis communautaires}’ (Hale and Özbudun, 2011, p.57). The first three harmonisation packages had been already adopted and brought in force by the previous ANAP-MHP-DSP\textsuperscript{185} coalition government in 2002. The remaining six out of the nine harmonisation packages were accepted during the AKP’s first tenure. When these reforms are analysed, it may be seen that the AKP introduced reforms that dealt primarily with the structure and function of the MGK as well as other aspects of the army (Hale and Özbudun, 2011, p.61).

Under the guidance of 7\textsuperscript{th} Harmonization Package\textsuperscript{186} (No.4963), important changes occurred in the articles 4, 5, 9, 13, 15, 19\textsuperscript{187} regarding the composition of the MGK and the MGK Genel Sekreterliği (MGK Secretary

\textsuperscript{184} It should be noted that three of the EU harmonisation packages had been already accepted during the ANAP-MHP-DSP coalition government (1999-2002 November) (AB Genel Sekreterliği, 2007, p.7-9).

\textsuperscript{185} ANAP-MHP-DSP period: is the coalition government between 1999 and 2002 (28th May 1999–18th November 2002).

\textsuperscript{186} The 7\textsuperscript{th} Package of Harmonization (Law No.4963) came into effect after being published in the Official Gazette on 7th August 2003 (Resmi Gazete, 2003a).

\textsuperscript{187} “The 7th Harmonisation Package brought amendments to the Law on the MGK (Law No.2945, 1983) and brought the following changes. The package re-defined the functions of the MGK in an amendment to Article 4; and it abrogated Articles 9 and 14 of the Law on the MGK and the Secretariat General of the MGK which empowered the Secretariat General to follow up, on behalf of the President and the PM, the implementation of any recommendation made by the MGK. It amended Article 13 and limited the competencies of the Secretariat General to the functions of a secretariat of the MGK. With the amendment of Article 5, it increased the time period between regular MGK meetings from one to two months. It cancelled the prerogative of the Chief of General Staff to convene a meeting. It amended Article 15 to revise the appointment procedure of the Secretary General of the MGK; the Secretariat General is to be appointed upon the proposal of the PM and the approval of the President, allowing a civilian to serve in this office. It removed Article 19, which provided that ‘the Ministries, public institutions and organisations and private legal persons shall submit regularly, or when requested, non-classified and classified information and documents needed by the Secretariat General of the MGK’. Finally the 7th Harmonisation Package abrogated the confidentiality of the staff of the Secretariat General of the MGK. Accordingly, the scope of the MGK’s involvement in political affairs is now confined to national security issues: the MGK is to determine the national security concept, develop ideas about security in accordance with the state’s security approach and submit these views to the Council of Ministers” (Narlı, 2009, pp.443-444).
Moreover, amendment to the Sayıştay Kanunu Ek Madde 12 (Court of Auditors Supplement Article 12) was included to the 7th Harmonization Package in order to “provide the institutional and legal framework for full accountability of the military to the parliament” (Narlı, 2009, p.453). Two other amendments related to the military’s accountability were the Law on Public Financial Management and Control (Law No.5018 (10th December 2003)) and “the constitutional amendment package (passed in Parliament in May 2004). Through the latter, the Sayıştay (Court of Auditors) “has had wider mandate to inspect accounts and state property owned by the Armed Forces without any exemption and secrecy consideration” (Narlı, 2009, pp.454-455).

In addition to the changes reinforcing civil power on military, some important steps were taken also on the issue of minority rights at the turn of century. Initially, under the orientation of EU requirements, the ANAP-MHP-DSP coalition government introduced a comprehensive constitutional amendment regarding rights and freedoms. Due to EU requirements, a comprehensive amendment in the constitution which covered 34 articles was implemented in 2001 (Ergin, 2010a and 2010b). The 2001 Constitutional amendment changed the general approach to the restriction on fundamental rights and liberties (Özbudun, 2007, p.180). The 2001 Constitutional amendment occurred under the 3rd Harmonisation Package (Law No.4771).  

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188 (Ergin, 2010a and 2010b)
189 In addition, it brought important changes with respect to “personal liberty and security, privacy of individual life, inviolability of the domicile, secrecy of communications, freedom of residence and travel, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association,
Later on, in 2003, the AKP, with the introduction of the 6th harmonisation package\textsuperscript{191} (Law No.4928), rather extended the scope of these already adopted minority rights (3rd Harmonisation Package Law No.4771). It should be noted that the initiative of the coalition government itself was the primary revolutionary action regarding the minority rights. The AKP, in turn, only broadened the minority rights by “permitting relaxing restrictions on broadcasting on Kurdish language by amending the article 4 of law on the establishment and Broadcasts of Radio and Television stations, sanctioning the broadcasting (on both private and public radio and television stations), in languages and dialects used by Turkish citizens traditionally in their daily lives” (Özbudun and Hale, 2011, p.60; Hughes, 2011, p.59). “In the context of the Act on Foreign Languages and Dialects, citizens of Turkey have obtained opportunity of benefiting from existing language course facilities which are related to traditional dialects” (Salmoni, 2003; Hughes, 2011, p.59). This act was especially important for Kurdish minorities (Salmoni, 2003; Hughes, 2011, p.59). In addition, parents obtained the chance to give Kurdish names to their children.

After 2009, the AKP announced a new democratisation package. This initiative mostly aimed to solve mostly the Kurdish issue, but it also covered 

\begin{itemize}
\item freedom of assembly, the right to a fair trial, and a restriction on the death penalty to certain categories of crime” (Özbudun, 2007, p.180).
\end{itemize}
some issues regarding the **Alevis** and the **Roma** community in Turkey (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p.3). In the context of Kurdish issue, the AKP undertook initiatives for extending cultural and linguistic rights to the Kurdish minority. For instance, a full-time, state-run Kurdish-language television channel began broadcasting on 1\(^{st}\) January 2009 (Avci, 2011, pp.417-418). The Kurdish initiative was also based on some concrete measures related to Kurdish language. For instance, using original Kurdish names of places was permitted. A faculty of “Living languages” where Kurdish language and literature, (but also Persian, Arabic and Assyrian) can be taught was opened (Güzeldere, 2010, p.10).

In addition to state broadcasting, following a regulation on private broadcasting (On 13th November 2009), the restriction for broadcasting in other languages than Turkish was removed. As a result, on 23\(^{rd}\) February 2010, private TV and radio receive license for 24-hour broadcasting in Kurdish, Zazaki and Arabic (Güzeldere, 2010, p.11). On 9\(^{th}\) April 2010, the restriction to only using Turkish at political rallies was lifted, so that during election campaigns candidates could speak in other languages. This removal of restriction contributed to decrease in hundreds of court cases against Kurdish politicians (Güzeldere, 2010, pp.11-12).

During the first tenure of the AKP, the government did not reveal any attempt regarding Alevi rights. In the second tenure of the AKP, out of 341 the AKP deputies, only three were from the Alevi sect (Haber5, 2007).\(^{192}\) The AKP-Alevi relations have become more dynamic after 2007 (Köse, 2010a, p.9). At the

\(^{192}\) (Haber5, 2007)  
http://haber5.com/siyaset/akpnin-alevi-milletvekilleri-konustu
high levels, the AKP began to approach the Alevi issue through symbolic gestures (Köse, 2010a, p.9). Even though some Alevi leaders responded positively to the AKP’s initiative, a majority within the Alevi community did not consider the AKP’s approach as sincere. Later, the Alevis have raised three main identity-based claims. First, they want that the cemevis obtain legal status as worship places. Second, they demand removal of compulsory religious courses in schools. Third, they claim a restructuring in legal status and services of the Diyanet (Köse, 2010b, pp.153-154). Nevertheless, these demands have not reached a solution as of 2011.

As pointed out in the chapter 1.9, the AKP’s hegemony was counter-challenged by the army’s e-memorandum on 27th April 2007. However, the AKP overcame this issue and became successful at the elections of 22nd July 2007. In the context of civil-military relations, it is important to give information on the closure case against the AKP and the Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) cases. On 14th March 2008, the AKP faced a new and very serious crisis: the chief prosecutor of the Republic asked the Constitutional Court to open a case for the closure of the AKP. The reason for this closure case was the AKP’s anti-secular activities such as the proposal of the AKP for a constitutional change to allow lifting the headscarf ban (Aydın-Düzgit, 2008, 2).194 195 This closure case

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193 The Prime Minister calls himself a student who was mistreated by his teacher in the classroom.

194 It is also important to mention the decision of the ECHR’s decision on headscarf in 2004. Leyla Şahin in 1998 filed a lawsuit to the ECHR in which she claimed that Turkey violates freedom of religion (the ECHR’s Article 9-1 on Freedom of Religion) due to its ban on wearing headscarf at the universities (Aydın and Aydn, 2004; ECHR, 2004). http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=9958

that aimed at the AKP’s very existence, however, was rejected on July 30, 2008 by a narrow majority of votes of the court members (Hale and Özbudun, 2011, pp.74-75).

Only three months after the rejection of the closure case of the AKP came the start of the Ergenekon case that has developed in the course of time to the largest and most controversial court case in the recent history of Turkey (Heper, 2011, p.245). The Ergenekon case thus represented the first effective action against this “deep-state” organization and indirectly against the immunity of the military. Therefore, it was initially hailed as a milestone in the “demilitarization” process in Turkey.

Two years later, the Ergenekon case was followed by the Balyoz (Sledgehammer) investigation that had now the army as its direct target. On 21st February 2010, high-ranked members, nearly 200 serving and retired and mostly

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195 After its victory in 2007, the AKP started to lift the ban on headscarf (female university students who wear headscarves were not allowed to enter to the classes at the universities). The AKP tried to lift this ban by making amendment in the constitution. Attempts for removing this ban yielded to a controversial discussion in society such as Islamisation of society. In this atmosphere, the Chief Prosecutor who was filing the closure case, he took into account the headscarf debate as anti-secular activities of the AKP (Aydın-Düzgit, 2008, 2).
http://aei.pitt.edu/11590/1/1659[1].pdf

196 Ergenekon case: Allegedly, Ergenekon is the name of a criminal “deep-state” organization with connections to state security structures and the army. In the indictment drawn up by the state prosecutor, this organization was accused of being involved in political crimes, murders and conspiracies with the aim to destabilize the AKP government (Jenkins, 2009, p.10).

197 Balyoz Case: Balyoz Harekâtî (Sledgehammer coup plan) is the name of an alleged Turkish secularist military coup plan in order to overthrow the elected government of Turkey (in 2003) (Bal, 2010).
http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3321/balyoz-operation-ii-squash-blossoms.html
high-ranked members of the Turkish army were accused of having plotted in 2003 a coup against the AKP government (Ocak and Kılıç, 2010).198

Both the Ergenekon and Balyoz199 cases have been still on-going as of early 2012; however, there are already serious doubts about the fairness of the investigations associated with these cases (Avcı, 2011, p.414). The Ergenekon investigation has attained an almost unmanageable scope, on account of the length of the indictment and number of the suspects. A wide spectrum of prominent persons including high-rank army officers, politicians, university professors and columnists have been detained on accusation of being active Ergenekon members. The common denominator of these individuals that come from actually very different political groups is the fact that they have been opponents of the AKP government. Both investigations are criticized of the manner they are conducted and of the very long and unjustified pre-trial detentions (Bilancino, 2012).200 It increasingly raises the impression that they primarily aim to suppress the opponents of the AKP government.

Moreover, on political grounds, the AKP’s second tenure was marked by the AKP’s new civilian constitution initiatives. As mentioned in the background chapter, the constitution of Turkey goes back to the constitution of 1982 which was prepared and adopted during the tenure of the military government. Due to

198 (Ocak and Kılıç, 2010)
199 As of 21st September 2012, the court finalized and “the three top former commanders of the Turkish Armed Forces on were sentenced to life imprisonment due to their attempts of overthrow the elected AKP government of Turkey between 2002 and 2006 (Yetkin, 2012).
200 (Bilancino, 2012)
continuous critics of this undemocratic constitution, the AKP government attempted to make a new constitution in its second tenure period (Avcı, 2011, p.418; ICG, 2008, p.2). However, the allocation of seats in the parliament did not allow the AKP government to make much progress in this initiative (Avcı, 2011, p.418). Indeed, the AKP established an independent commission in 2007 with the mission to prepare a draft version of the constitution (Avcı, 2011, p.418). However, this attempt to prepare a new constitution was put aside due to AKP’s closure case in 2008 (on 14th March 2008).

Later on, on March 2010, the AKP submitted a partial amendment package to the TBMM (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi - Grand National Assembly of Turkey) (Gönenç, 2010). However, in the parliament, this package of 26-articles was not approved by the majority in parliament and hence the constitutional package failed to be enacted automatically (Avcı, 2011, p.418). Therefore, the articles were put to a referendum on 12th September 2010. The package had a variety of articles. The most important and

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201 (Avcı, 2011, p.418; ICG, 2008, p.2) ICG’s Critics on the Constitution
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/197_turkey_and_europe___the_decisive_year_ahead

202 Due to Turkish electoral system, even though the AKP obtained a greater vote in the elections of 2007 (46.6%) as compared to the elections of 2002 (34.6%), the AKP’s seats at the parliament dropped from 363 deputies to 341 deputies in 2007. In order to amend constitution, 2/3 of the parliament which is equivalent to 367 deputies has to be in consensus with this amendment (Duman, 2011).
http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=74894

203 (Gönenç, 2010)

204 On 13th May, the package which covered twenty-six articles was published in the Official Gazette.

Gönenç points out about the articles 24, 25 and 26 of the referendum package as following:
“The Article 26 is the commencement article. Article 25 adds two interim provisions to the Constitution, which mainly explains how the new regulations concerning the composition and competences of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Council of the Judges and Prosecutors shall be applied, in case of the amendment package enters into force after its approval in the referendum. Article 24 of the package, in turn, repeals the “Provisional Article 15” of the current constitution, which provides judicial immunity for the leaders and top officials of the 12
controversial ones were related to the judiciary, that is, the changes in the structure\(^{205}\) of the AM (Anayasa Mahkemesi - Constitutional Court) and the HSYK (Hakim ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu - High Council of Judges and Prosecutors) rendering them to the control of the AKP government (Economist, 2010a; Avcı, 2011, p.418).\(^{206}\) The articles regarding structural changes in the AM and the HSYK, as expected, caused a big disputation, and led to allegations that the AKP planned to obtain control over the judiciary. Despite the controversy, the referendum was held on 12\(^{th}\) September 2010, and the results showed a majority support of 58% in favour of the proposed changes in the referendum package (Avcı, 2011, p.418).

5.3.1.1 Impact of AKP’s Rights-Discourse during its First Tenure on its Consolidation in the Legislative Elections of 2007

Above, I have documented the changes in legislations regarding the civil-military relations; the minorities and constitutional amendments during the AKP’s first two tenures (2002-2010). In this section, I now seek to demonstrate how the AKP’s progressive discourse during its first ruling tenure appealed different ideological segments under the same umbrella. Then, I will discuss how the AKP’s position at the presidential elections of 2007 has contributed to

\(^{205}\) Structural changes regarding appointments of the judges in the AM and the HSYK.

\(^{206}\) (Economist, 2010a)

http://www.economist.com/node/16994644?story_id=16994644
its consolidation. In analysing this, I look at the dynamics between the historical bloc\textsuperscript{207} and the AKP.

An analysis of demands of the different ideological segments reveals that their common aim was to reduce the military role and expansion of fundamental rights and freedoms. As pointed out in the contextual chapter 1, the AKP’s elites had found out that they had, with the EU, a common cause in dealing with the authoritarian elements of Turkey. Therefore, they considered the EU as an appropriate ally in challenging the military and establishing democratic governance within which the Islamists would be regarded as a legitimate player (Dağı, 2005, p.32). Hence, the EU was for them the external anchor in dealing with the military’s impact in Turkey.

The internal anchor was, in turn, constituted by the liberal intellectuals of the country (Dağı, 2005, p.32). The AKP received important support from them as it was trying to reduce impact of military’s structure. Due to the military’s dominating role in the society and politics, liberals demanded demilitarization and more democracy in the country. They believed that the AKP’s pro-EU stance would bring democracy to the politics and society in Turkey.

Additionally, by emphasizing the EU criteria, the AKP did not only appeal to the Islamists’ demands, but also to the Kurds who had much suffered from the military’s interventions. The latter believed in the AKP’s progressive discourse and pro-EU stance, since they believed that they could thereby obtain

\textsuperscript{207} Historical bloc: As mentioned before in the methodology section, historical bloc is a notion developed by Gramsci (Gramsci, 1971, p.137). For Turkish context, it has been used for the bloc that is formed by the military, judiciary, bureaucracy and CHP. The historical bloc has been strong in the Turkish political party system since the establishment of the Republic. It is argued that after the AKP’s emergence in 2002, the historical bloc has tried to overcome the AKP not through legislative elections, but through allegedly organized coups and closure cases.
more rights and freedom regarding their Kurdish identity. Similar to the Islamists, their main demand was the restriction of the military’s role and to obtain more identity rights. Also, most of the Kurds believed that the EU could be a tool to achieve these goals. The AKP’s initial rights-discourse together with the EU anchor was welcomed by various interviewees. For instance, Abdullah from the AKP asserted that:

The AKP became the speaker for all of those sectors which were in a disadvantageous situation. This is like a big social opposition movement; it spoke in order to develop a counter stance against the status quo, against a political environment which is shaped by domination. Since the AKP’s political agenda came up with this rising oppositional movement, it became very successful (Abdullah, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Therefore, the AKP had developed a highly emphatic discourse that was based on the human rights and freedoms. Those slogans were also recollected in the interviews that I conducted with a representative from a prominent trade union:

There was a problem in the development of human rights and freedoms. For example, in 1996, the 28th February post-modern coup d’état happened. ... The AKP said that it would deal with the issues of rights and freedoms. ... In addition, as a direct reflection of this project, the AKP also said that it will give importance to the EU. ......So, for instance they said Cyprus...They said that “I will do things related to Cyprus (Nedim, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

The representative from the Başak Sanat Vakfı, Selma, in turn, asserted that the Kurds’ belief in the AKP’s pro-EU stance and its emphasis on the human rights was the major reason of their initial support to the AKP. She

208 On the other hand, the slogans that were brought forth by the AKP’s propaganda in 2002 stressed the fundamental rights and freedoms (hak ve özgürlükler). The billboard slogans in 2002 were formulated to that effect: “I trust: the only party which will protect rights and freedom is the AKP” and “Turn on the lights to remove the bans!” (Billboard Slogan, 2002).
further pointed out that due to the AKP’s pro-EU discourse; they were convinced that there would be an implementation of rights and freedoms to comply with the EU framework (Selma, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Accordingly, when these three main groups are taken into account in terms of cleavages (state-church and centre-periphery), the common glue which brought them together was the AKP’s promise for reduction of the centre’s power within the politics (e.g. military’s role and secularist state’s role) and diminution of secularization and homogenization attempts of the state (e.g. freedom of expression including freedom of religion and freedom of using its own language). From the cleavage structure, the AKP succeeded in appealing to the demands of these different ideological groups in the society.

During the first ruling period of the AKP (2002-2007), the AKP’s discourse was in parallel to its amendments in legislatures. In the election manifesto of 2002, the AKP claimed to make necessary changes in fundamental rights and freedoms in line with the Copenhagen Criteria (AK Parti Seçim, 2002, p.4).\(^\text{209}\) In line with this progressive declaration, as pointed out above, six harmonization packages were accepted between 2002 and 2004. This enabled the AKP to make the necessary changes in the MGK structure and to establish civilian control over the military.

Moreover, it is important to draw attention to the AKP’s practical and pragmatic approach in implementing these EU legislations in a period, as the EU enjoyed a high standing in the Turkish public opinion and people were rather enthusiastic over a prospective EU membership of Turkey. In this way, the

AKP’s democratization approach addressed a broad electoral segment constituted by various, rather disparate social bases of the society. While doing this, the AKP succeeded in promoting its pro-EU discourse.

During its first term, the AKP made use of the existing political atmosphere in order to create the impression that it was the only political party dealing with human rights and democratization in the last two decades. However, the process of democratization had already begun in the early 1990s, albeit with initially modest progress (Solo, 2010, p.77). This view is supported by a high ranking official of the TÜSİAD in who asserted that democratization did not start with the EU and, indeed, the discussion about the relationship between individuals and the state already began in 1980s with the syndicate movements, foundations and NGOs. According to him, a long period of continuous high inflation, ethnic terror and weak coalition governments prevented the achievement of noteworthy progress in democratization during the 1990s (Rıza, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Regarding the relationship between the AKP and the EU, the same member believed that the AKP used the EU as an anchor, benefitting from the previous coalition government’s concrete success at the Helsinki Summit of 1999 when Turkey was recognized as a candidate on equal levels with other

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Solo argues that the 1990s and era of globalization contributed drastically to Turkey’s democracy and civil society since liberalization and individualism developed. For instance, law banning private radio and television stations was eliminated and the subsequent growth of the media has been important in the sense that the media makes government and civil service more transparent and accountable to citizens. Also, in 1999, he pinpoints other milestone issue which is Turkey’s obtaining status for candidacy of EU membership at the Helsinki Summit. As a result of this acceptance, it is argued that this candidacy contributed to Turkey’s civil society organizations and democracy for further cooperation with the EU (Solo, 2010, p.77). Hence, the EU was already an important external anchor for the expansion of civil society in Turkey.
potential candidates (Rıza, Appendix Part B, Table 1). As previously stated, the AKP continued to implement the projects which the previous coalition government had been already initiated. Thus, one of the main reasons for the AKP’s appeal to different ideological groups was its consistency in continuing the legislative amendments that had been already initiated in the years 2001 and 2002 (Özbudun, 2007, p.180).

The continuation of the EU reforms under a party with Islamist roots attracted votes, in particular of those segments of society that demanded more democracy and fundamental rights. In contrast to the AKP’s discourse, which emphasized human rights and democracy, the stance of the main opposition party was in parallel with the military authorities’ stance. The CHP which appeared to deny its socio-democratic discourse of the 1970s failed to present a progressive image in terms of political freedom and human rights. Rather, it assumed a conservative position that was characterized with a strong anti-EU; pro-military; pro-authoritarian and inward-looking discourse (Öniş, 2006, p.131). Actually, the AKP enjoyed during its first tenure a legislative period with only a single opposition party present in parliament.

The opposition provided by this party, namely the CHP, was weak and confined to a self-appointed mission of being the safeguard of secular values, of accusing the AKP of having a hidden agenda of introducing Islamist values and an Islamist way of life into the society. The CHP pursued, in addition, close cooperation with the judiciary and military in order to block the AKP’s executive and legislative activities. The CHP failed to develop new concepts and
to come up with new progressive projects with the potential to incite excitement in society.

The CHP’s failure to adapt to the new conjuncture was also highlighted by different social actors. A representative from the CHP women branch outlined the CHP’s mistakes during the first term of the AKP. She asserted that at that time, the CHP criticized the AKP from a secularism point of view and failed to understand the bigger picture, which was not about secularism and the AKP. She further added that the CHP should have been able to see the other characteristics of the AKP, beyond religion. That is why the CHP remained weak in the 2007 legislative elections and 2010 referendum (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Similar to Ayşe, the representative of the SODEV, Soner, argued that an excessive focus by the CHP on secularism, particularly the headscarf, resulted in a reaction by the electorate, who were reminded of their Islamic identity. In addition, he pointed out that the lower income segments of society were irritated by this discussion over secularism and the headscarf. Moreover, the CHP’s secularist and nationalist approach slowly transformed itself into an anti-EU stance, which was perceived as an anti-democratic stance (Soner, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Cem, a high-ranking representative of a holding company, believes that the CHP failed to understand the overall electorate and contrasted this with the vision of the AKP. Cem argued that:

Since the 2000s, there has been a really brave government and it has been questioning all of those common taboos and it makes a mess of those taboons. ... When I say taboo, I refer to the derivatives of the concept of nationalism that date back to the 1920s. ... We were forming a buffer state for the Western countries against any communist attack from the North. Afterwards, after the end of the
Cold War, there was not a need for this. Since there was no such need, politically as a society, we began to question those taboos. The taboos which have been established up to that time became obsolete. ... the country went into an identity crisis. ... After this, in the 2000s, there came a party that established a vision, a government that knows what it is going to do and it attempts to establish a re-organization of the society (Cem, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Finally, as an AKP representative, Hasan, argued:

With the AKP, the level of democracy and of politics has increased. So, now, people’s expectations are higher. That’s why the MHP, the CHP and other political parties are behind in the political competition and unable to increase their levels. They still consider themselves as the guardians of the Republic era, and they are trying to do politics with the mentality of 1930s (Hasan, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

In addition to this weak political opposition offered by the CHP, the e-memorandum of 27th April 2007 helped the AKP to gain support from various ideological segments. With the 2007 presidential elections, the civil-military relations went into a new phase, given that the already existing tension between the military and the AKP government had turned into an open conflict. The problem between the government on one hand and the military and the judiciary on the other had existed since the emergence of the AKP in 2002. However, as aforementioned, the conflict came to open manifestation with the e-memorandum. As the previous president of Turkey’s tenure of office was close to termination in April 2007, the AKP tried to nominate one of its senior members for the presidency (Avcı, 2011, p.413). Nonetheless, such a nomination meant that the future president’s wife would wear headscarf, and this was
inacceptable for the secular front\textsuperscript{211}, since the residence of the president had always been regarded as the indication of secularism in the country.

As pointed out in the chapter 3, the Turkish state had been guided throughout its history by this historical bloc (elitist and militarist bloc). In 2007, this historical bloc vehemently tried to prevent the government from electing a president with Islamist background. Firstly, an attempt was made, through a particular interpretation of the constitution, to raise the claim that the AKP was not eligible to elect the president because of the constitutional constraints (Özbudun and Hale, 2011, pp.62-63). This constitutional crisis marked the beginning of the conflict between the AKP government and the bloc. This followed the release of the e-memorandum at the website of the General Staff of Turkey (Kahraman, 2008, p.233; Avcı, 2011, p.414).

Yet the e-memorandum helped the AKP increase its credibility and its image of strength not only within the country, but also internationally, e.g., vis-à-vis the EU and the USA. The AKP exploited the e-memorandum in a dual way. First, by not giving in and, on the contrary, standing up to this challenge, it demonstrated its political power and won a decisive victory over the military. Secondly, it cleverly played the role of the victim, presenting itself as the government party that the Jacobean state, judiciary and military together tried to deprive of its democratic right to make a nomination for the presidency (Yavuz, 2009, pp.252-253).

According to the representative of the SODEV, Soner, since the AKP could not elect the president of Turkey in April 2007, it presented itself to both

\textsuperscript{211} The secular front that comprised the CHP, the military and the judiciary, e.g., the Constitutional Court corresponded to the historical bloc of the society that had existed since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey.
domestic and international groups as a victim by claiming that they (CHP; judiciary; army) was not allowing them to democratically elect the president and they (CHP) only wanted military interventions. He further added that as a result of this unjust treatment, the AKP government presented themselves as the true democrats while accusing the main opposition party as the pro-military intervention party. As a consequence, he asserted that the AKP carefully used this unjust treatment (Soner, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

As pointed out in the chapter 1.9, this first confrontation resulted in the AKP’s decision for early parliamentary elections of 2007. The results of the elections, in turn, contributed to the consolidation of the AKP because of the increase in its votes. Thus, as mentioned above, the AKP skilfully played the victim political party within the country and abroad. The AKP was regarded a political party that only attempted to carry out the presidential election by democratic means but was blocked in its attempt by the historical bloc. The propaganda\(^{212}\) of the AKP in summer 2007 was, remarkably, based on a

\(^{212}\) For instance, one of the AKP’s slogans referred to the previous leaders who had previously also had problems with the historical blocs (first, the leader of the DP, then the leader of the ANAP and then the leader of the AKP) and denoted them as the Stars of the Democracy (Demokrasinin Yıldızları) (AKP Library, AKP General Headquarters). This slogan was characteristic of how the AKP made use of the democratic discourse to gain more votes in the elections of 2007. In the context of its conflict with the historical blocs, this slogan seemed to work very well for the AKP. In addition, the AKP attacked the secular CHP with its slogans of 2007 and accused it of making an alliance with the military against the democracy (Appendix Part F, Figures 7 and 8).

The stance of the CHP itself found support only from the secular segment of the society. Hence, a polarization arose between the Islamists and secularists (Turam, 2008, p.40). Secular segment organized rallies (Cumhuriyet Mitingleri/Rallies of the Republic) in order to advocate secularism and values of the Republic (Toktaş and Kurt, 2008, p.5). The reactions were initially directed against the Islamists’ pro-EU stance; however, the division was deepened by the controversies of the elections of 2007 (Çınar, 2006, p.486) and turned into a conflict, not only between the secularist and Islamist segments of the society, but also between the proponents of the state and those of the market (Tüğal, 2007).
discourse of democracy and democratization. As a result, the AKP harvested all protest votes (Toktaş and Kurt, 2008, p.6).

In a sense, the AKP’s electoral success was understood as an outcome of the democratic reaction of the voters to external interventions in politics. The AKP was seen in this picture as a party that tried hard to implement democracy within the political party system, but hindered in its pursuit by the historical bloc in Gramscian terms. In addition, the injustice done to the AKP attracted different ideological groups by “purging Islamically oriented deputies from the list of nominated deputies” for 2007 legislative elections (politically deprived people such as the Kurds, left-wing people and people who had suffered under the military tutelage after the military intervention of 1980; liberal intellectuals) (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, p.124 and p.131).

Even though the e-memorandum appeared to be perceived as an unjust treatment of the AKP by some authors (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007; Toktaş and Kurt 2008), pre-elections surveys demonstrate that even before the e-memorandum, the AKP was in anticipation of an increase in its votes, due to its good governance and the stable policies it had pursued in the economy (A&G Araştırma, 2007a; Ağirdır, 2007a). Therefore, AKP’s accomplishments on the economy and social policy appear to outweigh its progressive discourse.

Therefore, the primary factors which enhanced its consolidation were based on its achievements in the economy and its accomplishments in social policies. After these achievements, its completion of the pending legislations and its discourse on human rights and democracy (especially on the issue of e-memorandum) contributed to the AKP’s electoral success in 2007.
5.3.1.2 The Impact of Democratic Initiatives (for minorities) and Constitutional Amendment on the AKP’s Consolidation in Legislative Elections of 2011

Following the elections of 2007, the AKP not only consolidated its legislative majority but also managed to get the party’s nominee elected as the president of the State. This meant the conquest of the highest political position of the secular Republic by a party with Islamist roots. However, besides its symbol of secularism, as indicated in chapter 1, the president of Turkey was entitled to important legislative and executive powers. Indeed, the former president had impeded the AKP’s legislative initiatives each time he was suspicious of a hidden agenda. In addition, as pointed out in the chapter 1.9, the AKP called for a referendum for constitutional amendment regarding the direct election of the President. The amendment was accepted with 69.8% of the votes.

As a result, the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2007 elections that were held according to the rules of the democratic parliamentary regime confirmed the consolidation of the AKP. Nevertheless, the historical bloc was by no means ready to give in. As pointed out in the contextual chapter, all the parties which were considered by the military as threat to the Republic were eventually banned. The two main threats that were specified by the National Security Policy Document were ethnic separatism and Islamic fundamentalism (Pezzati, 2012).213

Consequently, as mentioned in the background section of 5.3.1, the AKP faced a closure case. This closure case that aimed at the AKP’s very existence,
however, was rejected by a narrow majority of votes. The AKP thus avoided getting banned, and the decision of the constitutional court became for the party a source of self-confidence. Moreover, the elections of 2007 and outcome of the closure case against the AKP had shown the limits of the power of the historical bloc.

As mentioned in 5.3.1 in detail, only three months after the closure case, the Ergenekon trial was revealed. Since most of arrested people were opponents of the AKP government, the trials were considered as the revengeful acts of the government. In addition, this impression gets support from the prime minister’s claims that in the course the investigations “Black and white will be detected” (Yenişafak, 2011).\textsuperscript{214} Such remarks indicate a rather revengeful positioning of the AKP. More importantly, these investigations are increasingly regarded as “a major move, not as …towards the consolidation of the pluralistic democracy in Turkey, but towards an authoritarian one party state” (Jenkins, 2009).\textsuperscript{215} The closure case against the AKP seems to have significantly contributed to the consolidation of the AKP’s regime within the political party system. In addition, the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases brought about the dismantling of the historical bloc. On the other hand, these investigations (especially the Balyoz trial) helped the AKP to deal with the military tutelage and restricting the power and respectability of the military.

\textsuperscript{214} (Yenişafak, 2011)  
http://yenisafak.com.tr/Politika/?t=17.02.2011&i=303490  
\textsuperscript{215} The changing attitude of the domestic as well as international public opinion finds its expression also in several recent reports, e.g., Turkey 2010 Progress Report of the EU (European Commission, 2010)  
In such a context, the AKP’s attempts to change the constitution became more legitimate. As mentioned above, problems such as the obstacles in electing the president and closure cases originated, in general, from the jurisdiction and, in particular, from the constitutional court. The constitutional amendment that was accepted with the referendum of 12th September 2010 served the purpose of getting this important power of the historical bloc under control. However, before moving to this important amendment, I will discuss whether the Kurdish and Alevi initiatives brought concrete returns to the AKP from these electorates.

Democratization efforts such as the Kurdish initiative or the Alevi initiative gave rise to a certain reserved rapprochement between the corresponding segments of the society and the AKP government. As pointed out in section 5.3.1, even though most of the AKP’s discourse was pragmatic, the minority groups were also pleased of being accepted by the state. The same strategy was also observed in dealing with the left and right nationalist groups and, for instance, in speeches addressed to these groups by the prime minister. This pragmatic and even opportunistic strategy was supported by the highly marketing side the AKP.

As for the rights-based discourse: the populist and pragmatic approach of the AKP only temporarily succeeded in convincing people. It turned out that the AKP was not willing and/or able to implement radical reforms on this issue of

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216 In addition, initially these positive improvements in cultural issues have received praise by 45.6 according to a survey conducted by A & G Araştırma (Research) (Tamirak, 2009a and 2009b)
a_karsiyz.html

317
fundamental rights. Thus, the improvements implemented by the AKP remained confined to the improvements mentioned in 5.3.1 (for example in broadcasting; unrestricted use of Kurdish culture and language). Similarly, the representative from the NGO Başak Sanat Vakfı, Selma, stressed how the AKP’s initial rights-discourse and Kurdish initiative turned into a partisan monotype-attitude and an Ottoman imitation. She further added that after the slowing down in EU relations, the rights-discourse became completely reversed (Selma, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

The representative of the trade union Hak-iş also shared similar ideas as Selma regarding the lack of progress by the AKP in implementing rights, arguing that:

For instance, Kurdish, Alevi initiatives were stressed but progress was not reached. It did not work. Kurdish, Alevi, Roma initiatives... for those ones, the AKP could not produce any project, it does not have any project. The AKP does not know those areas very well (Nedim, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Furthermore, the democratic initiative was overshadowed by the closure of the DTP on 11th December 2009 by the constitutional court (Önderoğlu, 2009). In addition to party closure, 37 party members (including two MPs) were banned from politics.

On the other hand, the rather solution-seeking attitude of the AKP government in the Kurdish problem was absent in the Alevi issue. Thus, the AKP government has been reluctant to exempt Alevi children from the religion course in schools in spite of the decision of the ECHR in this direction, to recognize Alevism as a distinct religious entity and Alevi places of worship

(“çemevleri”) to be distinct from mosques. It is likely that this reluctance has its roots in the Sunni Islam background of the AKP government and its concerns about possible reactions from its own political base in the case of the implementation of an Alevi reform. Thus, in the context of the Alevi issue in particular, the AKP has not been able to surpass itself and its own Sunni frame of mind in order to provide the Alevis expanded freedoms (Demir and Gamm, 2010). A representative of the EDP, Ferhat, believed that the lack of progress on Alevi issues was due to the absence of Alevis in the AKP and “if there were Alevis at the organizational framework of the AKP, this democratic initiative would have worked” (Ferhat, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Meanwhile, a representative of the BDP, Barış, said that, whilst it looks as if the Alevis’ needs are being satisfied, but the aim is to integrate the Alevis into the monotype system (Barış, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

According to Lale from Halk Evleri:

Problems related to suppressed rights is in harmony with the neoliberal regime. The neoliberal regime has a strategy to integrate suppressed groups into the system. For instance, in Turkey, by providing a democratic image for their Alevi initiative, the aim is to discipline people into believing in the Alevi belief and to integrate this disciplined Alevi community into the system. In the same way, they are trying to create benign Kurds and they believe that with this compliant Kurdish representation, they have an orientation to solve the Kurdish problem (Lale, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

In contrast to its setbacks in the Alevi and Kurdish openings, the AKP’s constitutional amendment package appealed to broad segments of the society. As pointed out above, the judiciary still had strength regarding control of

218 (Demir and Gamm, 2010)
legislatives. Therefore, the usage of referendums\(^{219}\) by going to the people was, indeed, skilfully exploited by the AKP to overcome the conflicts with its opponents. I argue that the AKP, by going to the referendum, consolidated itself and legitimized its regime whenever it encountered a challenge that it could not tackle by itself. The referendum\(^{220}\) of 12\(^{th}\) September 2010 was such a move, in order to change the constitution with the aim of removing the judiciary’s and the military’s control over the government.

During its tenure, the AKP regulated the checks and balances of Turkey that had been in power in terms of tutelage since 1980s and changed this system to its benefit. In addition, the existing problems that originated from this tutelage not only concerned the main electorate of the AKP, but also the left and right groups who had greatly suffered under military interventions. Therefore, the referendum package was supported by the MHP’s idealist base (ülküçü) (especially in Central Anatolia) and from liberal-left civil society organization (Ete et al., 2011, p.11).\(^{221}\)

With the approval of the constitutional changes presented to the referendum on 12 September 2010, the AKP not only stabilized its position, but also removed the final obstacles that came from the tutelage of the historical

\(^{219}\) In 2007, the AKP took the issue of the direct election of the president by nationwide voting (the two-round system) to referendum and presented it as part of its democratisation agenda to both the EU and liberals.

\(^{220}\) In addition, it is noteworthy that the AKP’s referendum attempts began after the consolidation of economy and continuity of its social policies. Therefore, the AKP seemed to have drawn lessons from the past. By giving priority to social policies and economy, it kept its target population on its side. Its achievements in governance, economy and social policies were the source of its political strength, and to lesser degree also its rights-discourse. They also accounted for the continuity of its electoral victories. Hence, the answer to my research question lies within the AKP’s strong governance and success in its socio-economic policies.

\(^{221}\) Detailed analysis of voter behaviour shows that the AK Party received support from non-AK Party voters, from the MHP’s idealist (ülküçü) base (especially in central Anatolia), and from liberal-left civil society organizations, which do not consider CHP as a truly “left” option (Economist, 2010b). 

bloc. In addition, the AKP used a remarkably pragmatic strategy to appeal to the those people who had been aggrieved during the military intervention of 1980. First of all, the referendum date coincided with the date of the military intervention: 12th September 1980 was the date of the intervention and 12th September 2010 was the referendum that aimed to remove the military tutelage and to amend the constitution of 1982 that the military junta had imposed.

The AKP used different types of pragmatic strategies in order to get the societal support it needed in attaining its goals. Thus, until 2006, the AKP supported the EU membership, and that helped the AKP government introduce amendments into the MGK legislation with the great support that the liberals provided. After its consolidation, however, the EU reforms became scanty and the AKP blamed the halt in the EU reforms and membership negotiations on the EU countries (Avci, 2011, p.417). This time, the AKP obtained, through the above explained strategy, the public support that was required for getting control of the judiciary.

The interviewees also referred to this strong pragmatic and marketing side of the AKP during the 2010 Referendum. Ayşe from the CHP women branch asserted that the AKP is able to read political situations very well. She added that, even though the AKP did not suffer from the 12th September 1980 military intervention, the AKP winked at both the nationalist idealists and nationalist socialists before the referendum for the constitutional amendment by exploiting Ahmet Kaya222 and people who suffered morally from the military intervention of 12th September. She also stressed that the AKP had adopted a

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222 Ahmet Kaya is a famous Kurdish singer who was accused of singing in front of a poster of the PKK and was sentenced to three years in prison.
marketing-oriented approach before the referandum. She illustrated how the AKP used a variety of social advertisements and created a diversity of posters. She also mentioned that the AKP developed different discourses for different regions. For instance, while they adopted a nationalist discourse in İstanbul, they prepared a completely different slogan for the South-Eastern region to appeal to the Kurdish population (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

This pragmatic side of the AKP during the referandum was also brought up by a representative of the youth branch of the AKP from the Kadıköy neighbourhood:

For instance, on 4th July 2010, we organized a running competition called the ‘Democracy Run’. Hundreds of people ran this race. At the beginning of the Democracy Run, we wrote the starting date as 12th September, 1980, (the date of the military intervention) and the final date as 12th September 2010 (the referandum date). At the final point, we also prepared a ballot box for the referandum and after finishing the race, each participant had to vote yes or no for the referandum. After the competition, we counted the votes in the ballot box and the number of yes votes was the majority (Faruk, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

After its consolidation, the AKP preferred to regulate the checks and balances existing in Turkish politics by means of yet another referendum, i.e., the referendum of 12 September 2010. It is, therefore, argued that the AKP made use of these steps towards democratization in order to intensify its own power and, for this reason; was keen on receiving broad public support (Uluguay, 2012, p.118). Through the use of this opportunistic strategy, the AKP first eradicated the military tutelage and then consolidated its political position (Uluguay, 2012, p.118).

The referendum package was prepared in such a way that it involved changes in the structure of the AM, the HSYK, the yargıtay (supreme court)
and the danıştay (council of the state), giving them access of the AKP government. The president Abdullah Gül, who had been one of the founders of the AKP, now had the authority to determine the compositions of these judiciary bodies to a great extent. The AKP had cleverly designed the referendum package: the clauses providing the AKP almost absolute authority over the judiciary were cleverly disguised under amendments such as the items aiming at further democratization, compliance with European legislation, and lifting the protection of the coup leaders of 1980. Given the AKP had already executive power, the judiciary elections were also linked to the president’s, hence the AKP government’s appraisal. Consequently, the AKP obtained, through the referendum, the nearly limitless authority that it had been striving for all the time. The marketing and propaganda performance during the referendum not only further consolidated the AKP’s political position, but also provided a good starting point for the next parliamentary elections held on June 12, 2011 (Avcı, 2011, p.418).

The parliamentary elections of June 12, 2011, resulted for the third time in a successive row in the victory of the AKP that additionally achieved to increase its percent of vote from 46.7% in the parliamentary elections of 2007 to 49.8%. This rather impressive achievement, however, was not sufficient to provide to the AKP the 2/3 majority\footnote{Thus, the AKP with 327 seats was slightly short of the necessary number of 330 to propose constitutional changes to a referendum alone (Duman, 2011). http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=74894} of the seats in the parliament.

The parliamentary elections of 2011 were, in a sense, the end point of the rather long and consistent course of consolidation of the AKP. It had by then gathered all three (executive, legislative and judiciary) powers under its
authority, and this fact was confirmed once again by the results of these elections. In short, the AKP cleverly exploited the issues of human rights and democratization in attaining its political aims. However, the way it acted in the course of its ruling period, and its discourse and actions that frequently changed according to the circumstantial requirements, raised doubts about its sincerity over these fundamental issues and/or its ability to make corresponding amendments.

5.4 The Role of the Global Muslim Network (Gülen Movement) on the AKP’s Political Success

The Gülen Movement is considered to be one of the global Muslim networks that is active in an area extending from Kenya to Kazakhstan and beyond with emphasis on “the service to the common good” (Stourton, 2011). It is also argued that the Gülen Movement and the AKP (both possessing socially conservative values based on Sunni Islam) have been in an alliance of “convenience or symbiotic coexistence during the AKP’s term in power (Armstrong, 2012).225

224 (Stourton, 2011)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13503361
Gülen Movement is also considered as a Hizmet (services) movement (Kurucan, 2010).
http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/18724/12/
The movement is also distinctive, with its emphasis on education and interfaith dialogue. Around the globe, many schools were established. The movement is considered as the Gülen Movement since the service movement is initiated by Turkish intellectual and preacher Fethullah Gülen (Vural, 2008).
In addition to Gülen schools around the global, the Gülen movement is active in interfaith dialogue.
The Gülen Movement has also activities in other areas such as media, finance and health (Zalewski, 2012).
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2115391,00.html
225 (Armstrong, 2012)
http://www.opendemocracy.net/william-armstrong/temporary-alliance-akp-fethullah-g%C3%BClen-and-religion-in-turkish-politics
In such a context, it is important to take into consideration the role of the Gülen Movement in the AKP’s emergence, successful ruling period and finally in its consolidation. To do this, I first plan to look at the Gülen Movement and its relationship with political parties before the AKP in section 5.4.1. Second, I demonstrate the Gülen Movement’s role in the AKP’s political success by analyzing their common economic and political interests.

5.4.1 The Gülen Movement: Moderate Islamism

The Gülen movement claims to be a moderate Islamist network and strictly opposes to radical tendencies. Moreover, it aims to keep good relations with the state. Historically, the Gülen Movement became stronger and more noticeable after the military intervention of 1980, as the junta adopted the Turkish-Islamic synthesis that describes the Turkish identity in connection with the Sunni Islam as state ideology (Toprak, 2005, p.179). The Gülen Movement thereby emerged as the Islamic movement against religious fundamentalism (Gözaydın, 2009, p.1218).

In addition, the Gülen Movement, as compared with radical Islamic networks, kept a distance from Islamic parties and instead, where political advocacy was concerned, preferred to support the centre-right political parties such as the ANAP in the 1980s and 1990s (Gözaydın, 2009, p.1218). The Movement’s projects were implicitly supported by the Prime Minister Özal who was considered to be its sympathizer. Due to its state-backed projects, the movement increased its power significantly since 1982: for example, two hundred Gülen schools have been opened since 1982 and in addition, university of Fatih, hospitals, charities and a television channel (Samanyolu TV) (Park,
The rather impressive expansion of the movement abroad is also being followed with awe, admiration or scepticism in Turkey (Zalewski, 2012).

5.4.2 The Relationship between the AKP and the Gülen Movement

As pointed out previously, the RP that advocated the Milli Görüş ideology of the 1980s and 1990s and also political Islam did not appeal to the Gülen Movement because of its radicalism. In addition, in contrast to the Gülen Movement, the RP did not accept global free-market economy as an economic and political reality of our time. Hence, the Gülen Movement was not willing to support the RP. Indeed, in the 1990s, it was only the Gülen Movement that advocated the pro-globalization and moderate Islam (Kuru, 2005, p.265). Later, when the AKP was established according to the principles of globalization and moderate Islam, the Gülen Movement became its natural supporter.

The troika of Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç was considered as the reformist branch of the FP or in Kuru terms, it symbolized the group of late Milli Görüş members (the reformist group which came close to the Gülen Movement) (Kuru 2005: 272). This relationship became more obvious when this troika began to participate in the Abant Workshops that

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226 Kuru considers that the Islamic movements had different tendencies. The RP initially had close ties with another Islamic movement called the Nakşibendi Order and later developed the Milli Görüş Movement. The Milli Görüş Movement itself went through an evolutionary phase in the late 1990s. The troika is considered to belong to the late Milli Görüş Movement, according to Kuru. They do not advocate radical views as the Milli Görüş Movement. In a sense, this reformist group has adopted the pragmatic side of the Gülen Movement (Kuru, 2005, p.272).

227 There is a foundation called the GYV (Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Derneği - Journalists and Writers’s Foundation). Since 1994, the GYV organizes events promoting love, tolerance and dialogue. Under the GYV, there are six platforms which are Abant Platform, Intercultural Dialogue Platform; Dialogue Eurasia Platform, Medialog Platform and Women’s Platform (GYV, 2011). [http://www.gyv.org.tr/Hakkimizda/Detay/19/About%20the%20Foundation#Abant%20Platform] The Abant Platform was established in order to discuss dogmatic issues which have not been discussed in Turkish political life. Throughout this platform, the main principle is
were organized by the Gülen Movement (Kuru, 2005, p.272). In addition to them, another platform of interactive dialogues was the Zaman Gazetesi, the newspaper of the Movement (Kuru, 2007, p.145).

The shift from the Milli Görüş to the Nur Movement mostly occurred after the post-modern coup d’état of 28th February 1997. The military intervention thus caused a transformation within the Milli Görüş Movement. The emerging movement moved away from the anti-globalization and strict Islamist stance and assumed a more pragmatic and “mild Islamist” approaches that also approved market economy. In a sense, the 28th February intervention gave way to a significant change in the mindset of the Islamic movement in Turkey by leading it towards a milder stance that became open to contemporary economic concepts, such as globalization and market economy (Kuru, 2005, p.273).

Although the Gülen Movement itself was negatively affected by the military’s post-modern coup d’état, it remained at the side of the state, hence the military. Therefore, it was greatly distanced from the Islamist party. In addition, the Gülen Movement always advocated interfaith dialogue and had close ties with the EU and the USA. It is likely that the Movement’s good international connections contributed to the favourable reception of the AKP abroad. The Gülen Movement’s support gained further importance after the AKP’s electoral victory in 2002. If one wonders how the AKP initiated close ties with the EU and the USA, the answer may lie in the Gülen Movement with its pragmatic and

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based on the democracy’s strengthening throughout “differences being in dialogue”. Throughout this Abant platform, various workshops are being organized in order to discuss various topics such as the Kurdish problem, Islam and Secularism, military coups (Gulen movement, 2009). http://www.fethullahgulenmovement.org/press-room/169-news/3407-abant-platform-coups-are-greatest-obstacle-to-democratization.html

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moderate stance and its dialog with the Western world. Thus, an alliance was formed between the AKP and the Gülen Movement during the first years of the 2000’s (Kuru, 2005, p.272).

The alliance between the AKP and the Gülen Movement revealed itself in many areas: economy, politics and social issues. I look at first their alliance in economic issues and then I investigate political ones.

First, the Gülen Movement participants have established many international business links such as “the TUSKON (Türkiye İş Adamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu - Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists); the İŞHAD (İş Hayatı ve Dayanışma Derneği - Association for Solidarity in Business Life) and the AGİAD (Anadolu Genç İş Adamları Derneği - Anatolian Young Businessmen Association)” (Çelik, 2010b, p.56). “Regarding business interests, many commentators suspect a patronage link between the AKP government and quite a number of business groups which are possessed by the Gülen Movement participants” (Gözaydın, 2009, p.1219). For instance, it is claimed that some business groups owned by the movement followers have increased their power through the state tenders and privatization of state enterprises. The distribution of tenders to the party adherents and/or followers of the Gülen Movement are another way of power shift (Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2010).228

Later, in the period preceding the elections of 2007, the Gülen Movement’s media outlets (daily Zaman, Bugün and TV stations) (all put out) were found of making propaganda in favour of the AKP government and at the

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228 The close relationship between the Gülen Movement and AKP has served to the vantage of the businesses owned by the Gülen followers in state tenders (Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2010).
same time of displaying a hostile attitude towards the opposition parties and the military (Gunter and Hakan, 2007, p.293). Hence, the connection between the AKP and the Gülen Movement seems to have operated smoothly, as long as it addressed the anticipations and interests of both sides.

Another type of crony capitalism may be seen in the media sector. The AKP also consolidated itself in terms of media power. As of 2012, the oppositional voices in Turkey were greatly reduced. Media power Doğan Holding was accused of having failed to pay appropriately the taxes associated with the transactions that took place in 2005 and 2006. Hence, it was urged to pay a bulk sum of 4.8 billion TL (3.2 Million$) comprising the unpaid tax, the fine and default interest in 2009 (Altaylı, 2009).229 In this regard, the high-ranking official of a holding company, Cem, said that:

Imagine that the previous president of the TÜSİAD was Arzuhan Doğan, who was also a member and a partner of Doğan Holding. How can she highlight things she does not approve of while the Doğan group is under blockade by the government? (Cem, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

From this time on, the secular media seems to have become more silent due to financial intimidation. Zaman and other media organs belonging to the Movement or other Islamic organizations are, in turn, prospering. The state media organizations, such as TRT (Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu - Turkish Radio and Television Corporation), themselves are under the control of the AKP government and broadcast, in general, programmes that have a more conservative and religious focus.

229 (Altaylı, 2009)
http://fr.reuters.com/article/idUKGEE5AO0AS20091125
Second, their symbiotic alliance revealed itself in various political issues. In May 2006, the AKP administration (in response to the EU pressure for Turkey to democratize its legal system) amended the criminal code provisions regarding views expressed in public speech. With this amendment, Fethullah Gülen was exempted from the charges raised against him in 2000.230

Moreover, an important output of the alliance between the AKP and the Movement was the infiltration of ministries and important institutions with people who belonged to the Gülen Movement and its social network. The most important institutions staffed by people of the Gülen Movement are claimed to be the Ministry of Education and the Police (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007, p.129). The military’s reaction to the AKP was, in part, due to this infiltration and systematic replacement of the secular cadres with the nationalist and Islamist groups. Ayşe, the representative of the CHP women branch, also stressed that the Gülen Movement has been infiltrating state institutions, at all levels, over the past 8 years. (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Cronyism based on association to the Gülen Movement or other Islamic circles became increasingly prevalent in the highest ranks of the state bureaucracy after the election of Abdullah Gül the presidential office. As pointed out in section 1.9, the constitution of 1982 vests the president with extraordinary power such as appointing the members of the Constitutional Court, University rectors, Chief Justice, President of Higher Education Council (Criss, 2011, p.47).

230 The Supreme Court ratified Fethullah Gülen’s acquittal from the charges raised in the framework of the anti-terrorism law No.3713 called the TMK (Terörle Mücadele Kanunu – Anti Terror Law) (Todays Zaman, 2008).
Thus, in the period following the elections of 2007, nearly all appointments to these supreme ranks of bureaucracy occurred in line with the criterion of being a member of an influential Islamic network. This kind of appointment procedure that ignored the criterion of merit thus justified the concerns originally expressed by the military.

In addition, the representative of the Halk Evleri, Lale, argued that, through these appointments, the AKP is reshaping state institutions:

It is the network of cemaat organizations, especially the Fethullah Gülen, which has been accomplishing operational roles while implementing a transformation in those institutions. Being dependent on the AKP and being supported by the AKP, they fulfill their operational roles in the media, in the military and, especially, the police. So, for instance, in opposition to the military, they have constituted an expanded police organization, which is still flourishing. In these transformed institutions, security doctrine has a primary role. The media belongs to this structure, the judiciary, and the YÖK are in their hands. As a consequence of this new structure, the AKP, which used to play the victim and opposition to the status quo, now has obtained complete power (Lale, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

The symbiotic relationship between the AKP and the Gülen Movement is still on-going, as of beginning of 2012. However, the interests of the two seem to diverge occasionally and cause in-house confrontations. Such a conflict has come to manifestation in the context of the Ergenekon case. The large number of the detainees and unusually long pre-trial detention times are attributed to the actions of the prosecutors allegedly from the Gülen Movement who aims to intimidate secular individuals and to discourage the secular groups and organizations in their activities (İnsel, 2009).231 There are, however, also

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231 (İnsel, 2009)
counter-arguments claiming that such accusations of “the Gülen Movement are raised in order to undermine the Ergenekon case” (Doğan, 2012).  

Another recent confrontation between the AKP government and the Movement broke out, as the state prosecutors who were again allegedly members of the Movement called the undersecretary of the MİT (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilati - National Intelligence Unity) to testify over the MİT-PKK negotiations. Since the undersecretary was a close associate of the prime minister, this call was understood in public opinion as a move directed at the prime minister himself (Karaveli, 2012; Arsu, 2012). The AKP that finally got rid of the secular judiciary seems to have to deal now with the judiciary that is under the control of the Movement.

The question arises as to how the political staffing that took place during the AKP’s ten year tenure will be reflected in society in the long-term. Given the above mentioned incidents encountered in the course of the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, the Movement is implicated in striving for its own consolidation, aside from that of the AKP. In the light of the confrontations that broke out between these forces in 2012, it is questionable whether their coalition may last long. Of the three forces in Turkey, i.e., the AKP, the Gülen Movement and the military (Hürriyet, 2009) the military power seems to have been eliminated as of 2011. Hence, in the near future, the share of political power in Turkey will

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232 (Doğan, 2012)
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=044727DCB2D425AC34975E53055B5510?newsId=270535
233 (Karaveli, 2012)
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/120220A.html
(Arsu, 2012)
234 (Hürriyet, 2009)
most likely be settled on the basis of the relationship and/or confrontation between the Gülen Movement and the AKP.

In summary, the AKP and the Gülen Movement have been in co-existence since the reformist branch of the FP went over to set up the AKP after the FP’s closure. Throughout the AKP’s term in power, the AKP and the Movement have reciprocally supported each other in both political and economic terms. However, as pointed out in previous section 5.3.1.2, the military’s power has been in decline since the early 2009 due to Balyoz trials. In addition, as a result of referendum of 2010, the AKP has eradicated secular judiciary from the state cadres. Currently, the AKP and the Gülen Movement have remained as the two main powers. However, their discord on the above mentioned issues raises doubts about their long-term co-existence and cooperation.

5.5 Feedback Effect of the AKP’s Ten-Year Tenure into Turkish Society and the AKP’s Impact on the Long-term Restructuring of Turkish Party System

In this section, my aim is to discuss the significance of ten-year tenure of the AKP in Turkish society and political party system. In order to engage in such a discussion, first there is a need to look at the AKP’s significance at the societal level. As pointed out in the contextual chapter, the Turkish political party system has evolved in terms of the existing and emerging cleavages since the beginning of multi-party system. Therefore, it is important to look at the AKP’s entrenchment into the society from the perspective of cleavage structure.
In using this approach, I also demonstrate how the AKP’s policies have influenced the existing cleavages in society (e.g. centre-periphery; secular-Islamist; Kurdish-Turkish; left-right). After looking at changes at societal level, I move on to the AKP’s significance at the political party system. My main aim is to answer the question of how the AKP may impact on the long-term restructuring of Turkish political party system. As mentioned above in chapter 1, the party system in Turkey revealed a high level of fragmentation, especially in the 1970s and in the 1990s. Given this historical background, my main aim is to evaluate whether the AKP is a mould breaker in the Turkish political system and whether and how it may impact on the long-term restructuring of the Turkish party system.

5.5.1 The AKP’s Entrenchment into the Society and its Influence on the Existing Societal Cleavage Structures

In looking at the AKP’s impact on the societal cleavages, I take into account the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage structure that was explained in the theoretical framework of the chapter 3. Therefore, I will look at the societal changes from four different cleavages structures: state-church; centre-periphery; land-industry and owner-worker.

5.5.1.1 State-Church

As mentioned in the theoretical framework, I incorporate state-church cleavage into the Turkish context in order to illustrate the division between secularists and Islamists/conservatives (or simply anti-secularists). As pointed out in the contextual chapter, this division evolved throughout the Turkish party history; initially it was based on a division between the ruling elites and the
masses. Later on in 1960s and 1970s, the division became distinct as a left-wing and right-wing cleavage. After 1990s, the division has emerged in form of a cleavage between the secularist and Islamist groups (anti-secularists). The AKP’s tenure brought a new dimension to the secularist-Islamist cleavage.

Initially, the AKP’s ideological stance has been more moderate than the previous Islamists parties such as the RP and the FP. Therefore, as pointed out in the contextual chapter 1, the AKP did not get votes as an Islamist political party, but more as a centre-right political party. Thus, it did not come out as a product of a secular-anti-secular cleavage. On the other hand, the Islamists who used to be considered on the excluded or the peripheral side of the society were brought by the AKP’s tenure closer to the centre; thus, they obtained access to power in almost all levels of the society.

The Islamists’ movement to the centre and their progressive discourse were perceived by the secularist groups as a threat to their own and the state’s existence. Indeed, the secularists assumed an opposing stance towards the Islamists, and instead of adopting a more progressive discourse, they adopted a more “protectionist, security-based language and more inward-looking” (Keyman, 2010, p.325).

At the societal level, the Islamists’ integration with the centre and their political and social claims began to cause reactions of secularist circles. This occurred especially during the presidential elections of 2007. As mentioned in 5.3, the secularists did not want a president with Islamist background. Consequently, in 2007 spring, secular middle classes organized big rallies (Cumhuriyet Mitingleri - Republican Rallies) in order to demonstrate their
discontent with the AKP’s candidate for presidency. During the demonstrations, the main emphasis was on the threat from the side of the AKP for secular lifestyles and the secularity principle of the state. In chapter 4, I explained the social bases of the AKP and the CHP. It was seen that most of those who voted for the CHP were well-educated individuals. On an occupational basis, they worked in specialized sectors such as banking; insurance; law, and/or as medical doctors, teachers or university staff. They participated in the Republican Rallies and considered themselves as the middle class who defended their worldview (Yavuz, 2009, p.244).

The concerns of the secularist circles over the threat towards their lifestyle were later to be confirmed on different occasions. I will here mention some typical incidents that disclosed the AKP’s normative stance in this issue and in particular point to the alcohol issue, because it symbolizes the dispute between the secularists and Islamists the positions of both sides.

Most AKP’s members apparently do not drink alcohol; they fulfil their religious obligations. Concerning the lifestyle aspects, they have more in common with the members of the previous Islamist political parties of 1990s, such as the RP and the FP.

In course of its tenure, the AKP’s own understanding of everyday life came to manifestation on several occasions. Thus, after its consolidation in 2007, the party was more self-confident and expressed freely its opinion on different issues of lifestyle and made persistently attempts of intervention, e.g., on alcohol consumption. While the AKP administration initially expressed its

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235 They fast during the Ramadan; they pray regularly each day. Compared with the members of the previous centre-right governments, they use this Muslim discourse with more emphasis
opinion on this issue carefully and, in general, in pretext of its concerns on the public health, the AKP members were more direct. But in the course of time, the party leadership also assumed a normative attitude.236

After the AKP’s consolidation in 2007, attacks towards secular lifestyle (e.g., alcohol issue) started first through increases in taxation on alcoholic beverages and bureaucratic difficulties raised in issuing alcohol (purchasing) licence or permission for recreational places that serve alcohol. These problems emerged especially after the AKP-enacted changes in the local government legislation in 2008 (Tait, 2008).237 Thus, the AKP’s worldview came to expression in other areas of life as well. Even though representatives from all levels of the AKP asserted that the AKP does not attack anyone’s freedoms and worldviews, the interviews I conducted with the representatives of NGOs and business people put forward opposite arguments. For instance, the representative of the TÜSİAD, Rıza, mentioned that:

The conservative stance has to be better understood. They (the AKP) make implicit comments about individual rights and freedoms. The legislation regarding alcohol is worrying. There is no ban. It is said that they tolerate people who drink. If you tolerate the other one, this

236 For illustration, in 2010, the Prime Minister started to make prescriptive suggestions to people who drink alcohol (“Instead of drinking wine, they should better eat grapes”) and later on, even pejorative remarks about them (based on interview conducted with the representative of SODEV (Soner, Appendix Part B, Table 1).
237 (Tait, 2008)
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/16/turkey.islam
The RTÜK (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu - Radio Television Supreme Council) began to control the programmes according to this conservative worldview. For instance, they penalized the programmes that emphasized sexuality. Similarly, they censored scenes of old movies that involved sexuality. They blurred the images of smoking from the scenes or they put a bib voice for the swear words. To justify these actions, they made use of the usual argument of the conservative political parties: the well-being of children and family structure. Another important issue was the regulation of internet usage in 2011 according to which access to web sites were restricted based on user types (Vatan, 2008; RTÜK, 2010).
http://haber.gazetevatan.com/RTUKten_dizi_ve_filmlere_alkol_yasagi__158220_11/158220/11/Haber#.UIld2G_A9IE
means that “you are an infidel; I am not committing a sin”. However, this statement related to tolerance means that “I am tolerating for the time being and this can change over time”. Respect is one thing, tolerance is another” (Rıza, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

In addition to the division between secularist and conservative circles, the division also reveals in terms of sectarian division as Alevi-Sunni. As pointed out in section 5.3, the AKP has not shown that much of effort’s discourse when it comes to the rights for the Alevis. In this case of Alevis, the AKP’s vein on Sunni-Islam becomes more prevalent. As explained in the section 5.3, the AKP government is not willing to recognize Alevis’ denominational identity rights and to turn its positive discourse over Alevis into actions. Hence, its discourse is reciprocated by the Alevi community with distrust and accusations of insincerity. A representative of the CHP, referring to the AKP’s stance towards the Alevis, argued that the AKP’s dominant view of Islam is the Sunni interpretation. Thus, she added that with regards to the Alevi issue, the AKP had a standpoint which claims “Of course, we will teach Islam (referring to Sunni interpretation of Islam and not Alevi belief) too” (Ayşe, Appendix Part B, Table 1). A representative from the NGO Halk Evleri, Lale, and a member of the EDP, Ferhat, argued that the AKP has not put into practice any of the Alevi demands Alevi and not a single result was obtained from the workshop on Alevis” (Lale and Ferhat, Appendix Part B, Table 1). Therefore, the alienation of the Alevis seems to give rise to a deepening Alevi-Sunni cleavage as well.

Thus, during the AKP’s tenure, the division between secularist and conservatives circles resulted in polarization among them and deepened the existing division.
5.5.1.2 Centre-Periphery

As mentioned before in the contextual chapter and the theoretical framework of chapter 3, the cleavage of Lipset-Rokkan on centre-periphery is incorporated into thesis as a Kurdish-Turkish cleavage. Similar to the state-church, it has changed significantly throughout the Turkish party system. For instance, up until 1990s, Kurdish citizens did not develop an identity-based discourse and they highlighted left values more than their identity claims. Since 2000s the Kurds have emphasized more their Kurdish identity rather than left values or freedom claims (Keyman, 2010, p.319).

During the AKP’s tenure, Kurds and their identity claims have found more reception than ever before. Nevertheless, the fact that Kurdish problem has not been solved yet and terror acts of the separatist organization PKK have steadily increased in intensity and violence have given rise to the emergence of a new division in terms of centre-periphery or more specifically in terms of Kurdish-Turkish division. Therefore, as pointed out by Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu (2009), the conservatism does not only exist in terms of anti-secular-secular divide but aside from the secular-anti-secular cleavage due to rising tide of conservatism, a new cleavage appears to emerge on the basis of identity claims (Keyman, 2010, pp.324-325).

As a result of this increasingly conservative discourse, at the societal level, Kurdish and Turkish identities have become more predominant. Therefore, it is more common that families in the West do not prefer to have neighbours coming come from the Eastern Anatolian (Keyman, 2010, pp.324-325). Similarly, after the death of soldiers because of increasing terrorist attacks of the PKK, lynching towards the Kurdish people and demonstrations against Kurdish people have become more distinct during the AKP’s tenure. As a result, the conservatism has started to reveal itself not only in terms of secularists and Islamist, but also in terms of Kurdish and Turkish identities.
5.5.1.3 Land-Industry

Another cleavage in terms of Lipset-Rokkan is the land-industry.\textsuperscript{239} As pointed out in the methodology, I looked at this cleavage from Gallagher et al.’s point of view (2005). When the AKP’s ten-year tenure is analysed from the land-industry cleavage, the AKP has expanded its own capitalists not only the Anatolian capitalists but also generally the petty bourgeoisie. As a result, previous small tradesmen and merchants (such as Kiler group\textsuperscript{240}) have become owners of big holdings or corporations. One of my interviewees, Veli, gave the example of the Kiler group, which was initially a small retail group and now takes part in big tenders, having significantly expanded during the AKP’s ruling tenure (Veli, Appendix Part B, Table 1). As a result, the AKP’s tenure has resulted in an expansion in new business and capitalist groups. On the other hand, the AKP’s tenure has also satisfied the big capital’s needs due to economic stability and growth over the last decade.

5.5.1.4 Employer-Worker

The fourth employer-worker cleavage is taken into account as the AKP government’s impact on underprivileged social groups in the metropolitan cities. As pointed out in 5.2, underprivileged people have benefited significantly from the policies in health care system and social assistance. The AKP government

\textsuperscript{239} Initially, when I take into land-industry cleavage, I did not take into consideration the land side of the cleavage and I focus mostly the industrial and business pressure groups’ impact on the AKP. However, it is important to pinpoint the AKP government’s policies on agricultural policies. The AKP government does not seem to have addressed the anticipations of the agricultural sector. The farmers complain of high production costs, insufficiency of subsidies and exploitation by middlemen. Thus, a land-industry cleavage does exist and lead to diminution of the agricultural since this sector does not dispose over sufficiently powerful pressure groups to affect the public opinion and to impose its demands (Aysu, 2012). http://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/130329-tarimda-akp-gercekleri-ve-ciftci-gercekleri

has cleverly concealed through these policies the effects of its neoliberal economic agenda that has in general resulted in deterioration of workers’ rights. What has been said above in 5.2.1 in the context of female employment holds also for male labour force which is often compelled to work in temporary jobs under unsecure conditions and without social security. The workers seem to be helpless against this neoliberal regime, due to the inability of the trade unions that have been systematically intimidated and attenuated over the last three decades. Since this issue does not lie within the scope of my research I do not go further in detail. Here, I want to confine myself to a very recent analysis of how Islamist and neoliberal worldviews appear to be reconciled by the Anatolian capital (Boratav, 2012). Thus, devout, hard-working and parsimonious employers have become role models for their workers inculcating them to devotion, loyalty and resignation (to God) (tevekkül). Nevertheless, this relation seems to be increasingly constrained due to opposition of these devout workers against being exploited by their employers.

In summary, in terms of state-church cleavage, the AKP’s ten-year tenure has brought Islamists/conservatists to the centre and marginalized secularist circles. Due to the AKP’s intervention into secularists’ lifestyles, the existing polarization between secularists and Islamists has intensified. This polarization in turn has resulted in the segregation of people, according to their life styles in their own communities. Hence, as Ağırdr (2010) stated each person has started to live in its own aquarium without interacting with others.

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241 (Boratav, 2012)
242 (Ağırdr, 2010)
Similarly, the division between Kurds and Turks has also become stronger and led to a similar kind of segregation. This preference according to worldview and/or ethnicity reduces the chance of multiculturalism and pluralism in the society. In terms of land-industry, it is clear that AKP has preferred to prioritize the latter. As a natural consequence of its neoliberal policies, the AKP has assumed a similar attitude also in employer-worker divide. The last two cleavages presently remain latent, but may intensify and become sources of new conflicts in case of a future setback in the pursued neoliberal economic policies.

5.5.2 AKP’s Impact on the Long-term Restructuring of Turkish Party System

In the above, I have tried to show the AKP’s main feedback effect in four main cleavages of Turkish society. In this section, I discuss how strong the AKP’s impact on the long-term restructuring of the party system may be. To undertake such an analysis, first I discuss the current party system in Turkey, given that it displayed a high level of fragmentation in the past decades (Özbudun, 2000, p.77). Then, I draw attention to continuity that I consider as the main requirement for a long-term path to a competitive party system. Provided that this condition is fulfilled, I discuss potential dynamics (e.g. the changes in the main opposition party CHP) in order to make hypotheses for the long-term structure of the party system.

First, as pointed out in chapter 1, the AKP has consolidated itself in legislations of 2007 and 2011. As a consequence, its electoral success in 2011 has led to a two-bloc system, with the AKP garnering 49.5% of the votes on one side and the remaining three parties on the opposing side, namely the secular
CHP (25.9% of the votes); the right-nationalist MHP (12.9% of the votes) and the Independent deputys as representatives of the Kurdish Movement (account for 6.58% of vote). Thus, the fragmented parliamentary system of 1990s that could only function by formation of coalition governments, has transformed into a single-dominant party system (Sayarı, 2007; Çarkoğlu, 2011). In addition, there has been a marked shift in ideology towards the right of the spectrum (Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu, 2009, pp.91-92).

This two-fold party system has started initially in 2007, and seems to be stabilised with the legislative elections of 2011. Regarding long-term restructuring of the party system, the interventions into political relations have to be taken into account. As previously pointed out, the Turkish party system has witnessed three military interventions, one post-modern memorandum and an e-memorandum. These interventions have disrupted the evolution of Turkish political party system. For instance, the emergence of the ANAP in 1983 was linked to banned parties of 1970s, and it was an intermediary solution in the transition to democratic system. Indeed, it did not manage to survive long after the establishment of the parliamentary regime.

The AKP’s emergence in turn was the outcome of the transition period following the post-modern coup d’état of 1997. In addition to this background, given Lipset-Rokkan’s emphasis (1967, p.2) on continuity of parties, parties obtained the opportunity to compete freely at the parliamentary level only if

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243 It is important to mention that the independent deputies as representatives of the Kurdish movement are elected as independent deputies in order to bypass the 10% electoral barrier (Cagaptay et al., 2011, p.6). After they are elected as independent deputies, they take their political party positions. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote15.pdf

244 “Parties do not simply present themselves de novo to the citizen at each election; they each have a history and so have the constellations of alternatives they present to the electorate” (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p.2).
there was no external intervention into politics. In this competitive system, then, the party which best achieves the needs of the society becomes the main party. The AKP itself has become a mould breaker within the Turkish party system because it managed to terminate the period of coalition governments with its electoral victory in 2002. Secondly, having made the best out of the chance provided by this electoral victory, the AKP consolidated its position in the subsequent legislative elections, thanks to its accomplishments during its tenure. However, its impact on long-term restructuring will depend on the continuity of party system. Therefore, given that this condition of continuity is fulfilled, I draw attention to dynamics on the main oppositional party.

Even though the AKP has consolidated its electoral power in legislative elections of 2011, some dynamics have also occurred on the opposition side, especially on the CHP (Economist, 2011). Since 2009/2010, there have been changes in the CHP in terms of its institutional framework (e.g. the party leader has changed; the party code was amended in order to enhance intra-party democracy on 4th April 2012) (Ulugay, 2012; Celep, 2010; Radikal, 2012).

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245 (Economist, 2011)
http://www.economist.com/node/18774786
246 Under the leadership of previous leader Deniz Baykal (who was the president of the party from 2000 up to 2010 May), the CHP could not develop a convincing discourse for the AKP’s target electorate (Ulugay, 2012, pp.93-94). The CHP took a position close to the military, the constitutional Court or the judiciary that are opting to protect the secularism and their lifestyles. In addition, in the previous CHP, the CHP defended its own view with an archaic ideology; kemalism which was used for the modernization of the Turkey in the 1920s. They considered that they needed another Atatürk to save the secularists from these problems or they need another war of independence (which was done against the Imperialist powers) (Ulaga, 2012, pp.94-95). This explains why the CHP failed to win the hearts and minds of the people that asked mainly for solutions to poverty and unemployment. Therefore, the CHP failed to expand its electorate more than its own social basis (educated; intermediary strata formed mostly by white collars). (Celep, 2010)
In addition to an institutional opposition, there is a need for a grass-roots opposition. As of 2012\textsuperscript{247}, such an opposition does not exist, but some protests in the society give these oppositional signals. In this context, a representative of the Halk Evleri, Lale, points out that:

All the groups that are in opposition, such as the working class, labour, poor and unprivileged social segments, democrats, communists and so on... Throughout this period, these people have grown in number and gained ability to act in an effective way in order to oppose what is happening. At the moment, this opposition is very fragmented and weak. However, Turkey’s social opposition has been slowly flourishing. Hence, the AKP, which represents a coalition between the market-based economy and reactionary politics, is facing a serious public opposition. Even though it is invisible, ... the AKP... has now seriously authoritarian tendencies. It does not hesitate to use fascist practices. Moreover, measures that the AKP has used so far to direct the society have also begun to weaken. ... Another example; when they go to demolish the house of a person who voted for the AKP, who is pious and conservative... As a consequence, he can come against his political party which he used to vote for, against Tayyip Erdogan who he used to admire. These transitions can be incredibly fast (Lale, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

Since 2010, the AKP has adopted a more authoritarian approach; as compared to 2002, it has lost to a great extent the support of liberal intellectual (Birch, 2012).\textsuperscript{248} The trials of Ergenekon, Balyoz, KCK (Kürdistan Topluluklar

\textsuperscript{247} Protests started on 28th May 2013 in order to demonstrate opposition against the urban development plan for Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park. However, the peaceful protesters who were occupying the park, were attacked by the police on 31st May in the early morning. Subsequently, police’s outrageous attacks on the peaceful protesters sparked the Taksim Gezi Park protest. Thus, supporting protests and strikes took place accross Turkey by protesting a wide range of concerns which were mostly freedom of press, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and the government’s instrusion in every aspect of life, especially on the secular life styles. Police’s use of excessive force through tear gas and water cannon continued till 11th June. As a result, 4 people were killed, many of them injured. Over three thousand were arrested and many were kept in custody.

\textsuperscript{248} (Birch, 2011)
Bir观点 - Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan) and the imprisonment of journalists and academics raises critique in both national and international media because the AKP is suspected of being involved in these trials. Hence, the AKP is held responsible for the problems, e.g., long and apparently unjustified detentions, disorders in trial proceedings, associated with these trials (Tisdall, 2012).

In this context, thus far, as a highly empowered government party, the AKP has not shown much willingness to get in a cooperative dialogue with the opposition groups including the civil society organizations. Rather, it is being criticized for ignoring and looking down on them, and, moreover, of assuming an increasingly authoritarian attitude (Koplow and Cook, 2012).

In this context, it appears rather difficult for the opposition parties to compete presently with the AKP. Nevertheless, in a democratic and competitive political party system, an opposition party (e.g., the main opposition party, the CHP or any party in the long-term) that inspires with its projects, policies and actions confidence in the electorate may offer a serious challenge even to a powerful party such as the AKP.

Regarding the establishment of an oppositional group in Turkey, Zafer considers the issue from a demand and supply mechanism and argues that:

250 (Tisdall, 2012) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/25/turkey-sledgehammer-coup-trial-verdict
251 (Koplow and Cook, 2012) On the contrary to its initial discourse, it has started using a similar discourse as its Kemalist opponents, since it consolidated its institutional structure. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137754/michael-j-koplow-and-steven-a-cook/the-turkish-paradox
When will the AKP lose its power? ... When the AKP fails in fulfilling the ideological needs of its main constituency, it will lose its ruling tenure. It will happen. Let me tell you this. I don’t know at which election but this will happen. Then, the real opposition will emerge at that time because it will begin to criticize the things that the AKP did; it will... ask them “why did you do less? why don’t you expand freedom? Why don’t you further negotiations with the EU?” When a political party starts to criticize the AKP’s policies because of the insufficiency of the AKP’s policies, then a real oppositional party will emerge. So, there is no need to look at the political parties but, there is a need to look at the aspirations of the society (Zafer, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

The AKP is still being guided and dominated by its party leader Tayyip Erdoğan. Even though the AKP’s organizational structure is strong, the absence of such an almighty leader will be likely to create a vacuum that will not be so easily filled. The authoritarian structure and lack of pluralism have so far hindered the emergence of new leadership candidates in the AKP (Yavuz, 2009, pp.102-103). The interviews with representatives from different ranks of the AKP stressed specifically Tayyip Erdoğan’s charisma. Among them, it is important to look at the statement of a member of the AKP from the youth branch in order to realize the importance of the leader factor:

I don’t think that the AKP will continue after the prime minister. As a matter of fact, all levels of the party, such as the main branch, district, provinces, everything happens with the statements of the prime minister. As soon as the prime minister says something, things begin to work. In fact, everything depends on him. He directs everything in a greatly planned way. He guides things in districts and provinces. His strong eloquent skills also help him to guide people. In addition, he can mobilize young people with even one statement. For instance, 1 minute after the event, young people became agitated and went to the airport to welcome him after the meeting in Davos\(^\text{252}\) (Zehra, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

\(^{252}\) Davos incident: In 2009, at the World Economic Forum, in Davos, Prime Minister Erdogan had an angry exchange over the Gaza War with Israeli President Shimon Peres. During the panel discussion, the moderator favoured Mr. Peres’ remarks about the Israeli military campaign in Gaza. Thus, Erdogan said “When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill” to Peres and afterwards, he walked out in anger.
Similarly, Veli argues that the prime minister has all the power. For instance, if a minister is not successful, then he does not add him to the candidacy list. Veli says that there is an immense pressure on AKP members from the Prime Minister (Veli, Appendix Part B, Table 1).

In summary, given that there is no more intervention, the long-term restructuring of party system may not be based solely on the AKP but also on the performance of the rest of parties. In a competitive environment ensured by the continuity of the parliamentary system, any party that comes up with some projects offering better solutions to the needs of the society has the chance of challenging the government party, in our case the AKP. Aside from a small segment that votes out of ideological considerations, the majority of the Turkish electorate seems to have the ability to identify the appropriate party addressing its anticipations and needs and mostly addressing their economic expectations (Başlevent and Akarca, 2010). In a competitive party system, external shocks like economic crises, increasing terror acts or social dynamics originating from the existing cleavages may any time strain even a dominant party and let the electorate look for other alternatives. The continuity of the political party system is here the prerequisite for finding proper solutions to problems.

5.6 Conclusion of the Chapter

In chapter 5, I have tried to answer my research question related to the AKP’s consolidation in both the legislative elections of 2007 and 2011. In order to answer this question, I have first taken into account the social policies of the AKP in three main areas: woman and gender policies; social assistance and health care policies. The woman and gender policies appeared to be of
importance in order to examine whether and how the AKP reconciled the policies for increasing female employment with its neoliberal agenda and social conservatism. In this approach, I did not want to demonstrate the women’s contribution to the AKP’s consolidation, but to provide the main characteristics which have underpinned the AKP’s projects and legislative regulations regarding female employment. Nevertheless, I have come to the conclusion that these policies have so far encouraged employment in flexible, unsecure and female-dominated job occupations. This seems to be in line with the AKP’s worldview that the primary site of the woman is her family and the primary task that of motherhood.

Then, I chose two important policy areas: social assistance and health care services. In social assistance, important legislatives were accepted such as the SYGM’s new institutional framework. I first explained these legislatives related to social assistance, but then I provided a critical appraisal of the clientelistic side of the activities of the foundations established under the general directorate. The activities of the SYGM have reached. In this scheme, as I found out, the AKP’s projects on social assistance find a broad appreciation of the electorate. The drawbacks of their clientelistic side do not mean much for the voters, since what counts for them is the fulfilment of their needs.

As with social assistance, the AKP has implemented important improvements in health care by unifying, standardizing and extending the health care services. These regulations have satisfied the majority of society, since they attained for the first time access to efficiently provided health care services. The achievements in both social assistance as well as health care directly addressed
the needs of broad segments of society, and thus contributed to the AKP’s electoral victories in 2007 and 2011.

In addition to the projects above, the AKP’s pro-EU stance and its emphasis on fundamental rights and freedom also appealed to different segments in society, in particular in its first tenure period. As a result, the AKP received the support of both liberal circles and deprived groups such as Kurds, Christian minorities and conservative people that felt discriminated by the state. The AKP’s stance before the military on the occasion of the e-memorandum was also greatly appreciated by the majority of society. However, the AKP’s efforts towards democratization and improvements in human rights and freedom did not produce a great breakthrough. In terms of its impact on the AKP’s consolidation in 2007, the party’s commitment in these issues was still minor, as compared to the impact of its economic performance and its concrete social projects.

On the other hand, the AKP’s call for the referendum for constitutional amendments received the support of again various ideological groups (e.g. religious; nationalist and left). As a result, the constitutional package was accepted in September 2010 by the majority of society. In addition, this success in referendum resulted in a positive feedback for the legislative elections of 2011. However, as with the legislative elections of 2007, the decisive factors of the electoral victory were again economic economy, health care reform and social assistance projects. Thus, it can be asserted that without the socio-economic achievements, the AKP would have not consolidated its tenure during the last decade.
From the very beginning on, the AKP had two powerful supporters with which it was in a close relationship of mutual benefit. The first of these was the Anatolian capital that prospered further with the help of the pursued neoliberal economic policies and powerful economic growth of the country. It remained the AKP’s closest and most faithful ally throughout its tenure. The other supporter was the Gülen Movement, and I now analyse the role of the Gülen Movement on the AKP’s consolidation. Since the AKP’s emergence, the Gülen Movement has become an increasingly important force within Turkish politics. The Gülen Movement seems to have initially helped the AKP in setting up its relations with the Western world: the EU and the USA. Subsequently, a close symbiotic relationship developed between the AKP and the Gülen Movement, both of which shared similar views in terms of neoliberal free-market economy and globalization and advocated a moderate version of Islam. Moreover, although never openly declared, many influential AKP members were at the same time members of the Gülen Movement. This tight interrelationship allowed the companies from the Gülen Movement to have an ever greater share of state tenders and the Movement, to systematically infiltrate into the bureaucracy, police and judiciary. However, this relationship has recently shown serious ups and downs. Thus, the question arises as to what may come out of this co-existence, of the common interests of the two no longer match.

After discussing the consolidation of the AKP in both 2007 and 2011 legislative elections, I attempted to answer another research question related to the AKP’s feedback effect into the society. From the perspective of cleavage structures, the AKP has influenced Turkish society in many aspects. First of all,
the AKP has steadily prioritized conservative circles, displaced the secular elements out of the bureaucracy and thus marginalized the secularist segments of the society. This process has become distinct, especially since its second tenure (2007-2011). In addition, the AKP which used to conceal its conservative worldview has started to intervene in a secularist life style. These interventions have deepened polarization within society, and considerably hardened the (secular-Islamist) cleavage fronts. A similar cleavage exists as the Alevi-Sunni cleavage because of the AKP’s persistence in denial of the Alevi demands for recognising and granting their confessional rights. Aside from this division between secularists and anti-secularists, the Kurdish identity claims have become louder, not least due to a failed Kurdish initiative of the AKP government. The secessionist terror activities that have gained in intensity have caused, if not a polarization, at least alienation between Kurds and Turks. In economic terms, as aforementioned, the AKP has developed its own capitalist class and economic pressure group keeps supporting it. On the other hand, the AKP and the big secular metropolitan capital seem to tolerate each other, despite their distance, simply because of their mutual dependence. Lastly, regarding employer and worker relationship from the perspective of Lipset’s deprivation hypothesis, the AKP’s projects have satisfied the needs of underprivileged people. As a result, the AKP has satisfied majority’s needs and thus of its target electorate thereby ensuring its electoral victories of 2007 and 2011.

As for the AKP’s impact on the long-term restructuring of party system, I argue that the AKP presently brought the dominant party system in Turkey. The long-term restructuring of the party system requires the continuity of the
presence of competing parties. However, due to the Turkish party system’s experience with military interventions; a competitive party system has not yet evolved properly in Turkey. Therefore, if the present party system is given this chance, it will very likely come to a state to appropriately translate the needs, anticipations and demands of the different fractions of society.
Conclusion

This research has set out to investigate the emergence and consolidation of the AKP and its significance in the Turkish political party system and society, and has aimed to answer the five core research questions. Among them, first, this research attempted to answer the question related to what changes in structures of Turkish society elucidate the emergence and electoral success of the AKP in 2002. Second, it aimed to answer the question related to the contribution of long, medium and short-term economic factors on the rise of the AKP. Third, the thesis attempted to answer the question on how political conjuncture of the early 2000s helps the AKP to succeed electorally in 2002. Fourth, the aimed to answer the question regarding the impact of the establishment of the AKP in Turkish politics as an indicator long-term restructuring of the Turkish party system. Fifth, I attempted to find answers the research question on whether the entrenchment of the AKP in Turkish politics since 2002 represented a shift from secularism towards conservatism and religion in Turkey.

These research questions have been answered in chapters 1, 4 and 5 in order to examine the reasons behind the AKP’s emergence in 2002 and the consolidation of its regime in 2007. I have also analysed the significance of these developments for Turkish society and the party system.
What changes in the structures of Turkish society explain the emergence and electoral success of the AKP?

This question is dealt with in Chapter 4. I investigate how the changes in the country’s social structure have occurred as a consequence of the economic restructuring and developments and in turn have affected politics; more specifically voting patterns.

My investigation found that the main changes in Turkish society occurred after the 1990s due to the sharp decline in occupations related to agriculture (the rural exodus towards towns and cities) and due to the significant increase in the services sector, mostly in categories related to crafts, trades and sales. Those who entered these specific categories became part of what may be termed as intermediary social strata. Thus, the main evolution in social structure before the AKP period occurred in relation to these intermediary strata.

Furthermore, the economic circumstances of early 2001 (e.g. severe economic crises of 2000 and 2001) impacted adversely on the living standards of these intermediary strata. Therefore, the AKP’s promises on economic stability; growth and integration into the global economic order (mostly the European one) attracted these strata in particular.

From my findings I would conclude that the AKP did not come to power due to its Islamic roots but because of its promises of economic stability.
To what extent did long, medium and short-term economic factors contribute to the rise of the AKP?

This question was dealt in chapters 1 and 4. In examining the evolution of Turkish economy over time, I found that medium-term economic factors (between 1980 and 2002), aided the rise of the AKP significantly. During this period, economic reforms were aimed at liberalization of the country’s economy through adoption of free-market and export-driven policies that were. These policies served the burgeoning Anatolian capitalists who constituted a powerful group and became an important source of financial support for political Islam. Thus, economic reforms in the medium term contributed to the rise of the AKP.

Furthermore, the economic conjuncture of the early 2000s may be regarded as crucial when one analyses the impact of short-term economic factors on the AKP’s electoral success in 2002. The findings of this study reveal that the severe economic crises of 2000 and 2001 were main trigger factors leading to the electoral victory of the AKP. Moreover, the economic improvements which have taken place during the AKP’s tenure (2002-2011) have been analysed in order to explain the consolidation of the AKP in 2007 and in 2011.

As for its consolidation, the AKP made the best out of its first electoral victory in 2002. It implemented the economic programme that the previous government had launched and thereby displayed fiscal discipline and efficient governance. This policy resulted in the decline of chronic inflation and also in significant economic growth and stability that proved to be sustainable over the next few years and, moreover, resistant to global economic crises.
To what extent did the political conjuncture of the early 2000s help the AKP to succeed electorally in 2002?

This question was dealt with in Chapter 1. In order to answer it, it was necessary to explore the roots of the AKP within Turkish society and the party system. Thus, the period from 1923 to the emergence of the AKP in 2002 was analysed in order to explain how the development of Islamist movements and parties in Turkey resulted in the emergence of the AKP.

A vital incident during the development of Islamist parties and the Turkish party system in general is the military intervention of the 1980s and the neo-liberal economic policies which had at that time been deliberately advised by Turkey’s western allies as measures against the advance of the Communist Block. Hence the military intervention suppressed left-wing and labour movements, imposed an anti-democratic constitution and promoted political Islam as a remedy against the apparent communist threat in the country.

The rise of political Islam was represented by the RP, which steadily increased its electorate, not the least by getting access to lower, once left-orientated, strata of society which by then comprised mainly disadvantaged people who had migrated from rural areas to metropolitan cities and who lived in squatter areas without fixed employment and social security. In this situation, the role and function of the left and the trade union movement, which had not recovered from the devastating sequels of the military intervention of 1980, were assumed by the RP. Following the RP’s electoral successes, first in the municipal elections of 1994 and then in the legislative elections of 1995, the RP
came to power, albeit in a coalition government with the centre-right party (the DYP), in 1996.

However, the post-modern coup of 1997 brought about the end of this government and subsequently led to the RP’s closure. As a consequence of post-modern coup, the Islamist political party was doomed to transform within Turkish political arena. Therefore, the post-modern coup and its reflections into Turkish politics should be considered as unique case within the Middle Eastern region. Therefore, the emergence of the AKP has to be considered within this unique case of Turkey with its post-modern coup and its outcomes.

The post-modern coup produced moderation in the discourse of the Islamist parties that emerged in succession to the RP. Moreover, it caused the emergence of a still more moderate, reformist group with a pro-western (pro-EU) stance, discourse of democracy and human rights that also laid emphasis on neo-liberal, free market-economics and globalization. This group was strongly encouraged by the Anatolian capitalist and Gülen Movement both of which advocated the economic policies that the AKP espoused in 2001.

Once founded, the AKP received not only the support of the Anatolian capitalists and the Gülen Movement, but it also inherited to a great extent the RP’s electorate and organizational networks. Strong support was also provided by opposing groups, i.e. the centre-right electorate on one hand and liberal intellectuals on the other hand who hailed the party’s democratic discourse and pro-EU stance.

Thus, a relatively broad segment of the Turkish electorate accepted the AKP, despite its Islamist origins, as an actor in the political party system and
even brought it to power. The fact that political Islam in Turkey followed the rules of democratic competition and never gave in to violent action explains the AKP’s acceptance by the Turkish electorate and the latter’s willingness to give a chance to the party. The willingness to allow an Islamic party into the institutions of a secular state was also helped by the endurance of a multi-party system over a period of nearly 60 years, barring temporary military interventions and rule. Besides, this multi-party system expressed cleavage-based political alternatives through various parties including the AKP. This most likely accounted for moderation and the narrowing of cleavages.

Finally, the political conjuncture of early 2000s also helped the AKP to succeed electorally. After a decade of coalition governments, economic stagnation and the severe crises of 2000 and 2001, people were looking for an alternative and a new start, and this was presented by the AKP. The deprivation factor (Lipset, 1960, pp.63-64) undoubtedly also played a role in the AKP’s emergence. The electorate punished the parties that constituted the coalition government prior to the 2002 elections. Thus, the Turkish electorate and political system, by allowing the AKP’s emergence, contributed to an event that at that time was without precedence in the Islamic world. Moreover, contrary to expectations, political dynamics in Turkey were influenced by economic factors, rather than by political Islam and its discourse.
Is the establishment of the AKP in Turkish politics an indicator of the long-term restructuring of the Turkish party system?

This question was dealt with in Chapter 5. Before demonstrating whether the AKP’s establishment indicated the long-term restructuring of Turkish party system, its consolidation within Turkish society and the party system was explored. The AKP’s implementation of successful reforms became the main source of its political strength in both the legislative elections of 2007 and 2011.

Therefore, in order to demonstrate its ability to consolidate its political position, I examined health reforms and policies related to social assistance that were successfully implemented by the AKP government. On the other hand, the AKP’s performance on gender and equality issues, specifically female employment, was found to be inadequate, since women were offered the alternatives of either working as part of a cheap and temporary labour force without social security or that of remaining at home. As a conservative party with a neo-liberal agenda, the AKP followed a policy which had the effect of undermining women’s position in the labour market.

The party’s positive performance in terms of human rights and continuation of the reform packages initiated by the previous government with the aim of conforming to EU legislation were also investigated. Minorities and citizens of Kurdish origin who began to benefit from these changes joined the mass of the AKP supporters. The official negotiations relating to Turkey’s EU membership constituted another achievement attributable to the AKP. Put together, all these factors ensured the AKP’s electoral victory of 2007.
The AKP’s consolidation required, beyond electoral victories, mastery in challenging the historical block (composed of military, judiciary (e.g. constitutional court) and main oppositional party CHP). As revealed later on by the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, there were inconclusive initiatives to destabilize and overthrow the AKP government during its first tenure. These initiatives, allegedly planned under the guidance of some high-ranking officials, were not implemented since they were not approved by the general staff. Thus, there was either a mindset of change within the military and/or the AKP’s performance and popularity did not allow the military to take the conclusive steps of undermining the government, as it had done in previous decades. More importantly, society no longer tolerated the idea of military interventions in the political system and this most likely played a decisive role. Consequently, the last military intervention was confined to a delicate e-memorandum posted on the general staff web site in April 2007.

This so-called e-memorandum marked the tacit conflict that had been going on between the AKP and the military during the party’s first tenure. The AKP’s second tenure thus bore witness to an open conflict with the historical block which ended in the party’s victory. The reform packages that had been implemented by the AKP in order to harmonize Turkish legislation with the EU “acquis communautaire” proved to be of great help in this process which restricted the power of the military, i.e. its position in the MGK. Thus, the AKP gradually gained control of the military and the judiciary towards the end of this second period of government. The third electoral victory in 2011 made the AKP the dominant party. The party attained not only legislative but also executive
consolidation; that is, it acquired control of the bureaucracy, the majority of municipalities and also control of the judiciary (namely the higher courts).

The present situation in the political party landscape corresponds to the dominant party system with the AKP having won three successive legislative elections, each time increasing its share of the votes and without there being a credible challenge in the near future. Whether the political party system will retain this dominant position in long-term is difficult to predict.

Unlike other regions of the world where the dominant party system has proved to be sustainable over extended periods of time (e.g., Japan\textsuperscript{253}, South Africa\textsuperscript{254}), in the case of the AKP there are quite a few uncertainties.

To begin with, the continuity of this system requires the presence of a series of conditions in Turkey: internal stability of the dominant party, absence of anti-democratic interventions, absence of external alternatives (continuing weakness of the opposition parties) and stability in economy as well as domestic and international politics. Not least, electoral laws (in the sense of Duverger’s hypotheses on proportional representation) also have some bearing over the sustainability of such a dominant party system (Clark and Golder, 2006, pp. 681-682).

In this context, proportional representation (including the 10% electoral barrier) has allowed the AKP, despite its impressive electoral victory, to increase its votes to a respectable 49%, and gain a parliamentary presence that is far greater than the number of seats required to propose direct constitutional changes. Nevertheless, the AKP also is short of the number required to change

\textsuperscript{253} LDP (Liberal Democrat Party) in Japan: 1955-1993; 1994-2009
\textsuperscript{254} NP (National Party) in South Africa: 1948-1994
the constitutional change alone due to electoral laws (AKP is short of 2/3 to make necessary constitutional changes).

The AKP presently appears to be a well-governed party under a strong, efficient and charismatic leadership. However, this apparent strength conceals features that may turn out to be weaknesses in the near feature. This is associated with the strong leadership structure of the party. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as the founder and president of the party and as the prime minister has until now dominated the AKP and has been decisive in maintaining good governance and high performance. However, the authoritarian structure and lack of pluralism within the party have held back the development of young politicians with prospects of leading the party with a similar authority and efficiency after him.

A clause in the AKP’s charter stipulates the restriction of the parliamentary tenure of each AKP MP to a maximum of three successive terms. This clause will likely raise such a problem since none of the senior members may stand for the legislative elections of 2015. Prime Minister, Erdoğan will very likely stand down before in 2014 for the presidency. Thus, the question arises of how the leadership vacuum will be filled and whether the AKP will face a similar fate (decline) as the ANAP, in 1991, after Özal left his party to become the president of the Republic.

Accordingly, the AKP’s pragmatic and opportunistic side which helped the different groups to come together under the same umbrella, with clientelistic and nepotistic networks, is the main cohesive factor that keeps the party together. In the AKP’s case, pragmatism and opportunistic features replaced a party ideology that should normally be the glue that keeps any party together.
Thus, as mentioned before, the AKP’s main glue has been its economic performance. Its dependence on economic stability is another risk factor which may challenge the prospect of continuing dominance. However, the economy is an area where many factors are at play. The economic policies of the AKP, such as tight fiscal control and good governance have proved to be highly successful so far.

External threats such as the effects of a global economic or ongoing EU debt crisis are certainly more difficult to manage. Armed conflicts in neighborhood regions also present a still greater challenge to the economic growth and stability, even without Turkey’s direct involvement. If a deterioration of the economy sets in, it is likely that the glue kept intact many different groups of interest under the AKP will melt. As pointed out before while answering the first research question, Turkish voters consider their pockets and the income entering into their household. As a consequence, this attitude requires the sustainability of economic performance for the long-term electoral success of the AKP.

As main key findings, AKP obtained a great amount of votes at the last elections. Thus, the AKP’s consolidation resulted in the emergence of the dominant party system in Turkey. As mentioned above, the AKP increased its votes, and now, it has both legislative, executive power and judiciary. Thus, the AKP can make amendments easily. Despite its significant power, the AKP fails in changing constitution on its own and it needs to collaborate with other political parties in order to change constitutional amendments. Therefore, despite
its successes in consecutive elections, the AKP did not succeeding in reaching absolute majority in parliamentary due electoral system.

Furthermore, due to the dynamics in Turkish society and the society’s self-interested voting behavior, internal dynamics in society may lead to a change in the party preferences of society. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter 5, the AKP’s policies have resulted in the deepening of polarization among different cleavages within Turkish society.

In addition to domestic dynamics, the international conjuncture (e.g. relations with Syria, EU) may vacuum the AKP’s leadership. Together with electoral law, the domestic and international dynamics can always jeopardize the AKP’s long-term restructuring of Turkish party system. In this context, it is unlikely that this dominant party system will continue in the long term.

**Does the entrenchment of the AKP in Turkish politics since 2002 represent a shift from secularism towards conservatism and religion in Turkey?**

The final research question was dealt in Chapter 5. This final question of whether the AKP’s entrenchment in Turkish politics represents a shift from secularism towards conservatism and religion in Turkey needs consideration in the broader framework of stability in domestic politics. The establishment and maintenance of an environment of peace and reconciliation in a country is vital for the continuation of public support for a government party.

In answering the first research question related to the impact of changes in socio-economic structures on the AKP’s emergence, my findings demonstrate that the AKP did not gain power or consolidate itself, owing to Islamist
discourse. Nonetheless, the feedback effect on the society of the consolidated AKP since 2007 reveals its conservative world view.

During its third tenure, the AKP seems to have finally expressed an Islamist agenda. Full of self-confidence due to its defeat of the historical block, the AKP government has made some interventions into the secular way of life, and has attempted to impose its (Sunni-inspired) values, principles and worldview. This has become evident in its discourse, and legislative actions, especially in the area of education.

The disclosure of its Islamist agenda has already given rise to an increased polarization between the AKP government and the secular and Alevi segments of society. Moreover, the increasingly nationalistic and Sunni-Islamist discourse and rather combative style of the AKP in dealing with its political opponents has led to the emergence of equally confrontational opposition. Thus, as of 2011, the secular-anti-secular cleavage in Turkey has tended to become a central problem, due to the change in the AKP’s stance and policies. This cleavage is also reflected in the parliament.

On the other hand, the separatist terror which has escalated during the AKP’s third tenure has (once again) aggravated the centre-periphery cleavage in the form of a Turkish-Kurdish sub-cleavage.

It remains to be seen whether the AKP, after having attained a peak of consolidation with the elections of 2011, will manage to stay there and successfully deal with the emerging problems or whether it will follow a course of decline. The factors discussed above will determine which option the Turkish
electorate will vote for in the few next years (2013 and 2014) when a series of critical elections and perhaps also referendum(s) take place.

**Methodological and Research Challenges**

One methodological challenge that I faced was in the selection of interviewees. For example, it would be useful to have been able to interview members of the Gülen Movement or ask questions to other relevant informants about the impact of the Gülen Movement on the AKP. Additional information related to the Gülen Movement’s role within the AKP, would have contributed more originality to the thesis.

Furthermore, another difficulty of working on the AKP is that its political project is on-going. Therefore, it was difficult to analyse the projects, policies and discourse of the AKP without being influenced by daily news items related to the AKP in the different media organs which often ran contradictory or unsubstantiated stories depending on their respective political positions. It was also problematic to limit the time frame for the analysis of the AKP’s consolidation and its significance in society and party system. This cannot be analysed with certainty while the party is still in power.

**Final Remarks**

My research has revealed the difficulty of analyzing the development of the Turkish political system in terms of criteria that are specific to western (European) democracies. In my research, I adopted a purely Western theoretical model, the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage structure, and I applied it to the Turkish context by incorporating recent Turkish dynamics. The cleavages (state-church; centre-periphery; land-industry and employer-worker) have been shaped by the
evolution of institutions in Western European countries. Thus, it is necessary to recognize difficulties and mismatches between Turkish society dynamics and Western dynamics. Despite these existing drawbacks, the analytical framework which underpins my thesis has helped me to build a new taxonomy related to cleavages within Turkish party system. Now, I will discuss how I incorporated each cleavage into the Turkish context by noting the changes and adjustments that I have made.

First, I have incorporated the state-church cleavage into the Turkish context as two different cleavages: Secularist-Islamist and Sunni-Alevi. The division between the church and the state is a concept which was born as a result of 1789 French Revolution. These two concepts in the French context indicate a strict division between the church (religious affairs) and the state (anything profane).

Since the beginning of the Republic of Turkey, Turkey has been officially a secular country. However, when the distinction between the French case and Turkish case is made, it is observed that the government in 1937 did not separate completely state and any profane affairs. Instead, the government established the directorate of Religious Affairs through which it aimed to control religion (Islam) (Berkeş, 1998, p.19).

Meanwhile, the Turkish state imposed a secular education system through which the aim was to control the relationship between the nation-state and the individual citizen (Ware, 1996, p.187; Burdy and Marcou, 1995, p.13). Despite this crucial difference between the French and Turkish case, there is a possibility to incorporate this divide into Turkish context under the guidance of
Durkheim who considers that according to the secularism norm, anything profane has to be strictly separated from any consecrated norm (including non Christian religions) (Giddens, 1971, p.107).

In accordance with Durkheim’s theory, the state-church cleavage structures political developments in Turkey related to the tension between the secularists and Islamists. Throughout the thesis, I refer to different cleavages in order to stress between the secularists and Islamists. For instance, during the period of the 1970s, the left-right cleavage was more important than the secularist-Islamist cleavage. However, since the end of the Cold War, the left-right cleavage became obsolete and it was replaced by tensions between secularists and Islamists. The main reasons behind this division are as following: first, due to conjunctural reasons (e.g. the end of the Cold War); second, the electoral success of the RP in the local elections of 1994 and, third, the consolidation of the AKP in 2007 and the gradual drift in Turkish society towards moderate Islamic and traditional values. Thus, I argue that this cleavage of state-church has to be recognized as a secularist-Islamist cleavage.

Moreover, since the establishment of the Republic, Alevi s have been excluded by the state, which advocates Sunni Islam. As mentioned in 5.3.2, the AKP started a democratic initiative for the Alevi s. Even though the democratic initiative did not yield any concrete results, in society, Alevi s have started to express themselves in a relatively more vocal way and they reveal more often their discontent with Sunni Islam. Hence, even though in previous decades (e.g. the 1970s), Alevi used to be adherents of left ideologies, currently, the Alevi do not express their discontent through a left ideology, instead, they criticize
directly the Directorate of Religious Affairs and its Sunni Islam discourse and they request the recognition of their own Alevi belief. Thus, AKP’s strong adherence to Sunni-Islam (especially after its consolidation) has made the Alevi-Sunni cleavage more distinct. In this context, I have classified a new cleavage called Alevi-Sunni Muslims.

As a last remark for the “Secularist-Islamist” and “Alevi-Sunni” cleavages, an overarching cleavage would not be possible because it is not possible to declare that all secularists are Alevis or all the Sunnis are Islamists. As a consequence, instead of state-church cleavage, I have introduced “secularist-Islamist” and “Alevi-Sunni” cleavages into the Turkish cleavage structure.

Second, while incorporating the centre-periphery into the Turkish political context, it is important to explain that Lipset and Rokkan developed the centre-periphery cleavage in order to demonstrate the conflict between homogenenous nation-state (centre) and ethnically, linguistically or religiously distinct groups (peripheral segments) which resist the homogenization efforts from the centre (Ware, 1996, p.186).

Regarding the incorporation of this cleavage into the Turkish context, instead of centre-periphery, I have suggested the “Turkish-Kurdish” cleavage. First of all, following the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Turkey’s political system implemented numerous reforms aiming to standardize language,

255 Regarding the Alevi-Sunni cleavage, it can be considered as a response to the Islamization of the AKP. But, it happened more implicitly. More than a response, the Alevis’ claims for their own belief has become more distinct. But, this cleavage always existed in society; it just came to the surface.
religion and education in order to control sub-national or peripheral units. The Kurds, since the beginning of the Republic, have felt alienated by the homogenization attempts of the Turkish nation-state. However, Kurds did not explicitily express their identity requests until the 1990s.

Similar to the “Alevi-Sunni” cleavage and “Secularist-Islamist” cleavage, the Turkish-Kurdish cleavage used to exist under other cleavages, such as the left-right cleavage in the 1970s. As demonstrated in chapter 1, Kurds used to choose left-wing ideologies in the 1970s. Nevertheless, since the beginning of the civil conflict in the South-Eastern region between Kurds and the Turkish authorities, this cleavage has transformed into a Turkish-Kurdish cleavage. Especially since the 1990s, Kurds have developed further their ethnic and political identities and they have kept away from the mainstream political parties, including the centre-left political parties.

As a result, I have classified the centre-periphery cleavage as the “Turkish-Kurdish” cleavage. It is also important to add that the previous cleavages and “Turkish-Kurdish” cleavage overlap to a large degree. For instance, it is possible to identify further cleavages, such as “Alevi-Kurdish vs. Sunni-Turkish”; Alevi-Kurdish vs. Sunni-Kurdish”; “Sunni-Kurdish; Sunni-Turkish” and “Alevi-Turkish vs. Alevi-Kurdish”. Even though those dynamics were beyond my research, the classification of cleavages can be further developed for further research.

Third, the land-industry cleavage emerged in England as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution. Since Turkey did not have an industrial revolution like in Western societies, it was difficult to incorporate this cleavage into the
Turkish context. Nonetheless, I incorporated this cleavage by taking into account Gallagher et al’s point of view (2005) and the cleavage was used in order to highlight the emerging Anatolian business circles and their institutional existence through the MÜSİAD and the AKP. Opposed to this emerging Anatolian business circles, I consider the business circles of the big metropolitan regions. In this way, the cleavage provides three meanings: geographical division (Metropolitan cities vs. Inner Anatolia); ideological positioning (secularist vs. pious) and their initial economic emergence (through state aid vs. free market economy). Therefore, I have introduced this cleavage as “Secular Metropolitan Big Industrialists vs. Conservative Provincial Medium-sized Industrialists” into the new Turkish cleavage-structure.

Fourth, the employer-worker cleavage was developed in the Western context as a result of worker movements. In my thesis, I adopted this framework by taking into account Lipset’s relative deprivation theory and I considered the employer-worker cleavage as a division between the wealthier segments of urban centres versus the peripheral segments of urban areas that are looking for economic development and social mobility. Thus, I adapted the employer-worker cleavage to the Turkish context considering geographical and socio-economic factors. I used Kahraman’s (2007) recent work on centre-periphery cleavage and named this cleavage as the “centre vs. periphery-at-the-centre”. The centre reflects the old elites of the society whereas the periphery-at-the-centre means the underprivileged masses living on the periphery of urban areas. Therefore, I have the “Centre-Periphery-at-the-Centre” as the Turkish version of the “employer-worker” cleavage.
As a consequence, I have adopted a new cleavage structure related to the Turkish party system, which is formed by the “Alevi-Sunni”; “Secularist-Islamist”; “Turkish-Kurdish”; “Secular Metropolitan Big Industrialists-Conservative Provincial Medium-sized Industrialists” and “Centre-Periphery at the Centre” as the new taxonomy.

Now, I will use this new taxonomy in order to predict future developments regarding Turkish politics. While using this new taxonomy as a tool to predict future developments in Turkish politics, as of 2013, it is observed that the cleavages between secularist and Islamist will remain. However, due to recent changes in the educational system and due to the increasing religious motives in the educational system (e.g. the prime minister’s aims to create a pious generation); Sunni Islam will remain predominant in the Turkish context over the next 10 years. Regarding the Kurdish-Turkish cleavage, as of 2013, peace attempts between Turks and Kurds are going well as compared to previous occasions. However, Turkey is situated in a risky geographical arena and there are other international factors which may distort these negotiations between Turks and Kurds. Even if Turks and Kurds succeed in the current peace agreements, this does not mean that peace will be achieved in the long term.

Supposing peace is achieved, the Kurdish problem has existed since the early 1980s and a whole generation has witnessed those difficult and traumatic years. Therefore, even though in institutional terms, a peaceful solution is obtained, it seems to be difficult to recover from the traumatic repercussions of the 30-year-civil war in Turkey on the society level.
The “Secular Metropolitan Big Industrialists-Conservative Provincial Medium-sized Industrialists” cleavage will continue in the long-term. Regarding the impact on the economy, the industrialists of metropolitan cities are still very strong. However, as mentioned before in 5.4, in 2010, one of the biggest media powers, Doğan Holding, was accused of having failed to pay sufficient taxes associated with the transactions that took place in 2005 and 2006. Hence, it was asked to pay a bulk sum of 4.8 billion TL (3.2 Million$).

If there are more attacks against large holding companies with regards to paying tax penalties, it might reduce their financial strength. However, in the long term, I argue that big industrialists will be the predominant economic group in Turkey. Provincial Medium Industrialists will flourish in the long term; however, I do not believe that they will challenge the big industrialists.

Regarding the “Centre-Periphery at the Centre” cleavage, the peripheral sections of society have become integrated into the centre through new urban gentrification projects and new contructions. The main question is how the educational level of those on the periphery will be in the long term. Currently, the masses in the periphery are in abundance in terms of number as compared to the centre; however in terms of skills, educational level, urbanization, they are still behind those of the metropolitan centre. Thus, if future generations living in these peripheral areas acquire more skills, then they would constitute a challenge to the centre not only in number but also in skills.

Consequently, this taxonomy can also highlight future developments in Turkish politics. Throughout the thesis, I have attempted to demonstrate how the AKP emerged as a result of changes in socio-economic structures since the
1980s, which led to the emergence of new intermediary strata. Similarly, I believe that future developments in Turkish politics will be based on changes in socio-economic structures and demographic factors in the long term. Therefore, it is crucial to look at the dynamics regarding the cleavage “Centre-Periphery at the Centre”, especially dynamics within the “periphery at the centre” in order to make future predictions related to Turkish politics.

**Further Research on the Overarching Cleavage**

Accordingly, an explanation of its evolution within the narrow analytical framework of class in terms of a left-right cleavage has proved to be insufficient. The diversity of existing (emerging and declining cleavages (e.g. left-right division can be considered as a declining cleavage), due to historical, socio-economic developments, ethnicity and religion, has accounted for the very dynamism and heterogeneity of the Turkish political party system since the beginning of the multi-party era. Thus, a multi-dimensional approach (using the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage structures (1967) inspired by Talcott-Parsonian theory) proved to be more suitable and more relevant in analyzing the institutions of a society that has developed from a collapsed Ottoman empire in search of a national identity, and which did not bear witness to critical socio-economic and political ruptures such as the industrial revolution in Britain and the Revolution of 1789 in France.

Consequently, the AKP’s emergence needs to be seen not so much from the perspective of the last two decades, but from that of a much longer process which began with the establishment of the Republic in 1923 and which was built upon Ottoman heritage. As I have shown, this historical event (i.e. the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire and emergence of the Republic in 1923) caused deep divides in Turkish society in the sense of cleavages (e.g. between (urban) centre and (rural) periphery, state and church or secularists and Islamists).

Thus, since its establishment almost 90 years ago, the Republic of Turkey has had to deal with the negative features (conflicts arising from the various cleavages) of the Ottoman Empire. The continuity between Empire and Republic has been expressed in the divisions between cleavages of (republican) centre and periphery (imperial heritage including); (secularist Republic) state and church (suppressed Ottoman religious institutions e.g. abolition of the system of Caliphate in Islam); land-industry cleavage (loss of bourgeoisie after the establishment of Republic and after the exchange of population in 1924). As a result, the collapse of Ottoman Empire and the establishing of the Republic as historical events impacted the evolution of cleavages during the republican era.

Thus, given the shift between the Ottoman and Republican periods, it may be more appropriate to use an over-arching cleavage which comprises those mentioned above, even though the Republican period attempted to suppress Ottoman heritage in different areas of society by imposing requirements during the single-period regime (1923-1946). Following the beginning of the multi-party era, the cleavages which were suppressed during the single-party regime became visible again. Thus, the right-wing (DP, ANAP), nationalist (e.g. MHP) and Islamist parties (MNP, MSP, RP, and FP) have expressed their respect for the Ottoman tradition. This respect for the Ottoman tradition has continued under the AKP. Thus, for example, the AKP takes particular pride in cherishing Ottoman traditions of social assistance.
In the light of this Ottoman-Republican continuity, there are opportunities for further research into the AKP’s foreign policy regarding the EU or the Middle East. In addition, there is also space for further research in specific policy areas such as education, pensions system, and housing and youth issues.
## Appendices

### Appendix Part A - Tables for Literature Review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsiveness of parties and party systems to changes in factors that created them</th>
<th>Sociological</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Competition</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Largely unresponsive</td>
<td>Lipset and Rokkan</td>
<td>Panebianco</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Michels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Von Beyme</td>
<td>Sartori</td>
<td>Duverger (parties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mair</td>
<td>Epstein</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Budge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Duverger (party systems)</td>
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</table>

**Table 1.** Ware's Classification of Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Systems  
*Source: Ware, 1996, p.8*
Table 2. Sartori’s Simplified Model
*Source: Ware, 1996, pp.168-170*
Appendix Part B - Table regarding Key Informants Interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names[^56]</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Organisation Represented</th>
<th>Position held in Organisation</th>
<th>Location of Organisation</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1 Leyla</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26-40</td>
<td>AKP Provincial Presidency</td>
<td>High-ranking Representative (Women Branch)</td>
<td>Sütlüce İstanbul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Ali</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>26-40</td>
<td>AKP Provincial Presidency</td>
<td>High-ranking Representative (Youth branch)</td>
<td>Sütlüce İstanbul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Faruk</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>26-40</td>
<td>AKP District Presidency</td>
<td>Representative (Youth Branch)</td>
<td>Kadıköy İstanbul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Derya</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>41-60</td>
<td>AKP District Presidency</td>
<td>Representative (Women branch)</td>
<td>Kadıköy İstanbul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Abdullah</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>41-60</td>
<td>AKP Headquarters</td>
<td>High-ranking Representative (Main Branch)</td>
<td>Söğütözü Ankara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Murat</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>26-40</td>
<td>AKP Provincial Presidency</td>
<td>High-ranking Representative (Main Organization/Ana Kademe)</td>
<td>Sütlüce İstanbul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Cem</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>41-60</td>
<td>Big İstanbul based Holding</td>
<td>High-ranking Official</td>
<td>Levent İstanbul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Mehmet</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>60+</td>
<td>TEB</td>
<td>High-ranking Official</td>
<td>Kabataş İstanbul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Ayşe</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>60+</td>
<td>CHP Headquarters</td>
<td>High-ranking Official (Women Branch)</td>
<td>Söğütözü Ankara</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Hasan</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 İbrahim</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>CHP Headquarters</td>
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<td>12 Rıza</td>
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<td>High-ranking Official</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Ahmet</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>41-60</td>
<td>Alevi Belief</td>
<td>Grassroot</td>
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[^56] All of the names are pseudonyms.
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<th>Age</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<td>Ziya</td>
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<td>41-60</td>
<td>Deputy</td>
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<td>Veli</td>
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<td>Coventry UK</td>
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<td>Haldun</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Muzaffer</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>26-40</td>
<td>AKP District Presidency Member of the AKP (Main Branch)</td>
<td>Kadıköy İstanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Çelik</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>41-60</td>
<td>AKP District Presidency Neighborhood Leader</td>
<td>Kadıköy İstanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Zeki</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>26-40</td>
<td>Person from lower strata Assistant at a Carpet Shop</td>
<td>Eminönü İstanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Vedat</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>26-40</td>
<td>TOBB Official from the TOBB</td>
<td>Söğütözü Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Naci</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>61+</td>
<td>AKP Parliamentary Deputy</td>
<td>Söğütözü Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Soner</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>61+</td>
<td>SODEV High-ranking Official</td>
<td>Erenköy İstanbul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1.** Profile of Key Informants Interviewed (36)
Appendix Part C - Consent Form

CONSENT FORM

Project Title: The Emergence, Consolidation and Significance of the AKP in Turkey

Name of Researcher: Miss Sevinç Bermek

I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated ………………. for the above project. I may keep this information for my records and have had the opportunity to ask any questions I may have wished to ask at this stage of my participation in the project.

I agree to take part in the above study and am willing to:

[ ] Be interviewed
[ ] Voice recorded

I understand that my information will be held and processed for the following purposes:

[ ] Completion of a PhD thesis in Centre of Ethnic Relations at the School of Health and Social Studies
[ ] Presented in anonymised form in future seminars and conferences

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time (up to three months after the interview/ focus group meeting date) without giving any reason and without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way.

_________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________
Name of Participant Date Signature

_________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________
Name of person taking consent if different from Researcher

_________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________
Researcher Date Signature

257 Form was translated mot-a-mot to Turkish.
Appendix Part D - Available Data on Elections, Surveys, Archival Sources

1. Available Data on Elections, Surveys

1.1 Data on the Results of the Election

1.1.1 Parliamentary election data


1.1.2 Local elections data

1.2 Data on Pre-election Surveys


Sonar had been preparing surveys not just one month before the elections but in May 2006; November 2006.

Metro Poll Research Company had an interesting pattern towards the surveys; it had started to analyse the political state of Turkey since 2007 January till 2007 September. In addition, it also chose specific region of the metropolitan cities İstanbul and Ankara for the surveys.

Estima made a survey on the tendencies of the voters in 2007 March.

There are other research companies such as Başkent Research Company; Odak Research Company and Anar Research Company; nevertheless, I have not found their data on collaboration (“7 Şirketin Seçim Anketi Sonuçları”, 2007). According to Haber 7, among all these research companies, only Anar and Odak have predicted the increase of the AKP’s votes and its victory with high percentage (around 40%).

Furthermore, Konda Research Company made a pre-election survey and it expected a victory of the AKP with 44% (“Konda’nın Anketine göre Yüzde 44 Güçlü İktidar”, 2007).

1.3 Post-election Survey Data

The post-election survey data which is prepared by Sonar Research Company is as following:

- Survey on the AKP’s 6\textsuperscript{th} year at the office (2008);
- Survey on the political tendencies in Turkey (2009 June);
- Survey on the political tendencies in Turkey (2009 September) and
- Survey on the political tendencies in Turkey (2009 October).

The post-election survey prepared by the Konda research company is called New Period in politics. This survey can be considered more as an analysis of the parliamentary elections of 2007 rather than a post-election survey.

2.1 Available Sources for Archival Research

2.1.1 Minutes of the Parliamentary Debates

An example of minutes for a parliamentary debate is available on the website: \url{http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem21/yil2/bas/b099m.htm}. The debate occurred on 25\textsuperscript{th} Mai, 2000 and the debate includes both the discussions for the legislation and the general discussion (e.g. suggestions of some deputies).

2.1.2 Party Programmes

- The AKP

  - Availability of the party’s regulation; programme; party’s declarations and party campaigns
  - At the web page of the AKP, the party regulation is available.\footnote{http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu [Accessed on 20th October 2012]}
  - The party programme is accessible from the website.\footnote{http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-programi [Accessed on 20th October 2012]}
  - The party declarations and the party’s activities are available from the archive of news from 2003 to the present.\footnote{http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/kategori/basin-odasi/158 [Accessed on 20th October 2012]}

\url{http://www.sonararastirma.com/secim-sonuclari.html} [Accessed on 20th October 2012]
\url{http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu} [Accessed on 20th October 2012]
\url{http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-programi} [Accessed on 20th October 2012]
• **The party’s press releases** have not been published at the website of the AKP. However, they can be reached from the archives of the newspapers.

  ✓ The SP

  • The analysis of the SP is important since when the predecessor of the AKP (the FP) was split into two parties in 2001; one group called reformers established the AKP whereas the core group of the FP established the SP. Therefore, the logic used for the in-depth interviews is valid for the archival research method. It is important to look at the discourse of the SP and its critique towards the AKP.

  Furthermore, the SP’ increasing ‘success’ at the local elections of 2009 was considered as a potential threat to the AKP at the long-term.

  • **The party’s press releases; brochures and posters** for the elections of 2002 and 2007 are available from the website of the SP.

  • There is also a section on the press meetings.

  • **The party programme** is mentioned clearly from the website of the party.

  ✓ The CHP

  • **The party programme** for 2008 is available from the website of the RPP.

  ✓ The MHP

  • **The speeches of the general president of the CHP (at the parliament; at the party meetings; at the election campaigns; on the TV; at the press releases)** are accessible from the website.

  • **Some of the CHP brochures** are accessible from the website.

  ✓ The MHP

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• The MHP’s party programme; regulations and various publications on its vision are available at the MHP’s website.\textsuperscript{276}

• The MHP’s reports on the economy; agriculture; justice; privatization; corruption; poverty issue; unemployment and employment; the foreign policies; Cyprus and the EU are published at its website.\textsuperscript{277}

2.1.3 Archives of Main Newspapers

✓ Radikal

• The archive of the Radikal newspaper is available from 1998 Mai to the present.\textsuperscript{278}

✓ Milliyet

• The archive of Milliyet is accessible online from 3\textsuperscript{rd} Mai 1950 to the 30\textsuperscript{th} April 2004.\textsuperscript{279}

✓ Hürriyet

• The archive of Hürriyet is available from 1997 7\textsuperscript{th} July to the present.\textsuperscript{280}

✓ Vatan

• The archive of Vatan newspaper is available from 2003 1\textsuperscript{st} January to the present.\textsuperscript{281}

✓ Zaman

• The archive of Zaman newspaper is available from 1994 (but at the early years, there are some days when the newspaper is not available online) to the present.\textsuperscript{282}

✓ Cumhuriyet

\textsuperscript{276} http://www.mhp.org.tr/mhp_index.php [Accessed on 20th October 2012]


\textsuperscript{279} http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr [Accessed on 20th October 2012]


\textsuperscript{281} http://www.gazetevatan.com/root.asp [Accessed on 20th October 2012]

• The archive of the newspaper Cumhuriyet is available from 7th Mai, 1998 to the present but, in order to reach this source, there is a need of subscription (with a fee) otherwise the source is not accessible online.
  ✓ Today’s Zaman
• The archive of the newspaper Today’s Zaman is available from March, 2004 to the present.  

2.1.4 Archives of the European Court of Human Rights [ECHR]

They do exist also from the website of ECHR.  

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285 http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/How+the+Court+works/Archives/ [Accessed on 20th October 2012]
Appendix Part E - Figure regarding Turkish Social Structure

**Figure 1.** Illustration for Turkish Social Structure  
*Source: This figure was produced according to the ILO statistics on occupational categories related to Turkey*
Appendix Part F - Figures, Maps and Pictures

**Figure 1.** 1988-2011 Female Employment Rate %
*Source: Statistics Institute of Turkey (TÜİK) from section on Employment, Unemployment and Wages*

**Figure 2.** Geographical Distribution of the Votes at the Legislative Elections of 2002
Dark Brown: DEHAP (Kurdish votes)
Grey: Independent votes
*Source: http://www.genelsecim.org/GenelSecimSonuclari.asp?SY=2002*
Figure 3. Geographical Distribution of the Votes at the Legislative Elections of 2007
Yellow Colour means independent votes (mostly for independent Kurdish deputies)

Figure 4. Geographical Distribution of the Votes at the Legislative Elections of 2011
Figure 5. Geographical Distribution of the Votes at the Local Elections of 2004

Figure 6. Geographical Distribution of the Votes at the Local Elections of 2009
Figure 7. Demokrasinin Yıldızları/Stars of the Democracy
The slogan of the AKP for the national elections of 2007
Source: Billboard Photo taken from AKP library, AKP Headquarters in Ankara

Figure 8. AK Parti Oradaydı! Muhalefet Neredeydi? 27 Nisan 2007-Cuma
AKP was there! Where was the Opposition? 27th April 2007-Friday
Source: Billboard Photo taken from AKP library, AKP Headquarters in Ankara
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