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Political competition, tax salience and accountability : theory and some evidence from Italy
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Bracco, Emanuele, Porcelli, Francesco and Redoano, Michela (2013) Political competition, tax salience and accountability : theory and some evidence from Italy. Working Paper. Coventry, UK: Department of Economics, University of Warwick. CAGE Online Working Paper Series, Volume 2013 (Number 126).
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Text (Working paper)
WRAP_126.2013_redoano.pdf - Published Version Download (2105Kb) | Preview |
Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
Abstract
This paper argues that high political competition does not necessarily induce
policy makers to perform better as previous research has shown. We develop a
political economy model and we show that when political competition is tight, and
elected politicians can rely on more tax instruments, they will substitute salient
taxes with less salient ones, which are not necessarily preferable. These predictions
are largely confirmed using a dataset on Italian municipal elections and taxes.
Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance |
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Political science -- Economic aspects, Political science -- Italy, Local elections -- Italy, Taxation -- Econometric models | ||||
Series Name: | CAGE Online Working Paper Series | ||||
Publisher: | Department of Economics, University of Warwick | ||||
Place of Publication: | Coventry, UK | ||||
Official Date: | 2013 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Volume 2013 | ||||
Number: | Number 126 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 42 | ||||
Status: | Not Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) | ||||
Date of first compliant deposit: | 1 August 2016 | ||||
Date of first compliant Open Access: | 1 August 2016 | ||||
Funder: | University of Warwick |
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