Bracco, Emanuele, Porcelli, Francesco and Redoano, Michela (2013) Political competition, tax salience and accountability : theory and some evidence from Italy. Working Paper. Coventry, UK: Department of Economics, University of Warwick. CAGE Online Working Paper Series, Volume 2013 (Number 126).

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Abstract

This paper argues that high political competition does not necessarily induce
policy makers to perform better as previous research has shown. We develop a
political economy model and we show that when political competition is tight, and
elected politicians can rely on more tax instruments, they will substitute salient
taxes with less salient ones, which are not necessarily preferable. These predictions
are largely confirmed using a dataset on Italian municipal elections and taxes.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Political science -- Economic aspects, Political science -- Italy, Local elections -- Italy, Taxation -- Econometric models
Series Name:	CAGE Online Working Paper Series
Publisher:	Department of Economics, University of Warwick
Place of Publication:	Coventry, UK
Official Date:	2013
Dates:	Date Event 2013 Published
Date of first compliant deposit:	1 August 2016
Volume:	Volume 2013
Number:	Number 126
Number of Pages:	42
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	University of Warwick

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